Immigration Habeas Tracker: Government Obstruction, Judicial Trust, and Accountability

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to Judge Humetewa’s show-cause order, after which the court held that they had “failed to justify Petitioner’s detention” and ordered immediate release.

Petitioner Jose C.-R. filed his habeas petition on Mar. 20, 2026. On Mar. 24, Judge Humetewa ordered Respondents to show cause by Mar. 26 why the petition should not be granted and why the court should not order release or a bond hearing under § 1226(a). The order required any response to be supported by documentary evidence, including affidavits by individuals with personal knowledge where applicable.

Respondents did not respond to the petition. On Apr. 17, Judge Humetewa wrote: “Respondents’ deadline was March 26, 2026, but that deadline has now expired, and Respondents did not file a response.” The court stated: “Respondents therefore failed to justify Petitioner’s detention.” Because Petitioner was not “seeking admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A), and because Respondents failed to provide any other justification for detention, the court treated any other argument as waived and granted the petition. Judge Humetewa ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately under the same conditions that existed before detention and to file a notice of compliance within two business days of release. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond by the court-set deadline after Judge Liburdi ordered them to show cause why habeas relief should not issue in a Bautista-related detention challenge, noting that courts had rejected ICE’s § 1225(b)(2) mandatory-detention position “with near unanimity.” After “No response to the Order to Show Cause” was filed, the court gave Respondents a second deadline and warned that failure to respond could lead to summary grant of the petition and sanctions. Judge Liburdi then granted habeas relief under the Bautista class judgment and ordered a bond redetermination hearing or release; later enforcement motions were denied because Petitioner had received the ordered bond hearing and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s discretionary bond denial.

Petitioner Mario Suarez-Maya had lived in the United States for about 24 years after entering without inspection. ICE detained him around Sept. 22, 2025 and classified him as an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner filed his habeas petition and TRO/preliminary-injunction motion on Dec. 17, 2025, challenging his immigration detention.

On Dec. 18, Judge Liburdi ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted. The court summarized Petitioner’s claim that ICE had classified him as an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), even though he had lived in the United States for roughly 24 years, and that he was instead entitled to § 1226(a) bond process. Judge Liburdi emphasized: “This issue has been presented in voluminous cases in this Court and others around the country, and, with near unanimity, courts—including this Court—have rejected ICE’s position.” The court ordered Respondents to respond by Dec. 30 and directed the Clerk to transmit the petition, TRO motion, and order to specified representatives of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona.

Respondents did not respond by the Dec. 30 deadline. On Jan. 2, Judge Liburdi wrote that “No response to the Order to Show Cause has been filed.” The court ordered Respondents to respond by Jan. 6 and warned: “If Respondents do not respond by that date, the Court may issue an order to show cause why the Petition should not be summarily granted and sanctions may be imposed for failure to respond to the December 18, 2025 Order.” Respondents filed a response on Jan. 6.

On Jan. 8, Judge Liburdi granted the petition. The court noted that the Central District of California had certified a Bautista bond-eligible class and entered Rule 54(b) judgment declaring that class members were detained under § 1226(a), not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), and vacating DHS’s July 8, 2025 interim detention-authority guidance. Respondents acknowledged that “Petitioner appears to be a member of the Bond Eligible Class.” Judge Liburdi held that, under the Bautista judgment, Petitioner was entitled to release or a bond redetermination hearing within seven days. The court ordered Respondents to provide a bond redetermination hearing within seven days or release Petitioner under the same conditions that existed before detention, and to file a notice of compliance within three days after release or the hearing. The Clerk entered judgment the same day. Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Jan. 9.

Petitioner later moved twice to enforce the judgment. In those motions, he acknowledged that Respondents held a bond hearing on Jan. 15, 2026, but challenged the immigration judge’s denial of bond after finding him a danger to the community. On Mar. 19, Judge Liburdi denied both enforcement motions. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s discretionary bond determination merely because Petitioner disagreed with the outcome. Judge Liburdi wrote that “[t]his Court is not a council of revision for every discretionary decision made by immigration judges,” and that the proper remedy was an administrative appeal to the BIA. Because Petitioner had received the bond hearing the court ordered and sought review of the IJ’s discretionary determination, the court denied both motions and left the case closed.

This habeas case involved an unsupported government answer and a later release-compliance dispute after Judge Desai granted habeas relief. Although the court had ordered Respondents to support their answer with documentary evidence and, where applicable, personal-knowledge affidavits, Judge Desai later noted that “Respondents submitted no documentary evidence with their response.” The court ordered immediate release on procedural-due-process grounds; after Petitioner moved to enforce and sought contempt and coercive sanctions over “any delay in Petitioner’s release,”Judge Desai ordered an expedited response, then denied contempt and sanctions after finding Respondents had shown “good cause” for the delay.

Petitioner Sardarbek Dzhuraev, a native and citizen of Russia, arrived at a Texas port of entry on June 19, 2023 to seek asylum. Respondents paroled him into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), released him from custody, and initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for asylum before the Chicago Immigration Court. On Oct. 29, 2025, immigration officials detained him and transported him to Eloy, Arizona, where he remained detained.

On Jan. 26, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. Later that day, Judge Desai ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 30 “why the Petition should not be granted”and why the court should not order Petitioner released or provided a § 1226 bond hearing. The order further required that “[a]ny response must be supported by documentary evidence,” including, where applicable, “affidavits by individuals with personal knowledge of the factual statements made therein and signed under penalty of perjury.” On Jan. 28, Petitioner amended his petition, and on Jan. 30, Respondents filed their answer.

On Mar. 17, Judge Desai granted the amended petition as to the due-process claim. The court first emphasized that, although Respondents had been instructed to support their answer with that evidence, “Respondents submitted no documentary evidence with their response.” Respondents argued that Petitioner was subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he had presented at a port of entry and, under the “entry fiction” doctrine, should be treated as if he had not entered the United States for due-process purposes. The court rejected that argument as applied to Petitioner’s present detention. Relying on D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Judge Desai explained that the entry-fiction doctrine preserves the government’s authority over admissibility determinations, but loses its justification when the challenged action does not implicate admission. Because Petitioner challenged detention rather than removal, admissibility, or the processes producing those determinations, he was a “person[]” within the United States and the Fifth Amendment imposed constraints on the deprivation of his liberty.

Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, Judge Desai held that the factors favored Petitioner. The court emphasized that freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty interests,” that the risk of erroneous deprivation was high because Petitioner had received no bond or custody-redetermination hearing, and that Respondents’ interest in re-detaining him without a hearing was low because he had previously been released on parole after immigration officials necessarily determined he was not a flight risk or danger, and there was no indication he violated any parole condition. Judge Desai therefore found that Petitioner was entitled to a hearing before re-detention and that immediate release, rather than another bond hearing, was the appropriate remedy.

The court ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions that existed before his re-detention” and to provide a notice of compliance within two business days of release. The court granted the petition as to Count One, denied the remainder of the petition as moot, directed judgment in Petitioner’s favor, and closed the case. Judgment was then entered.

Petitioner then moved to enforce the order, seeking immediate release, a civil-contempt finding, and coercive sanctions. Judge Desai ordered Respondents to respond by noon the next day. Respondents filed a Mar. 20 response advising that Petitioner had been released that day and explaining the timing of the release. On May 26, Judge Desai deemed the motion to enforce moot to the extent it sought release, and denied the motion to the extent it sought civil contempt and sanctions. The court explained:

“Respondents filed a response to Petitioner's Motion advising that Petitioner had been released on that date and explaining the circumstances of the timing of the release. ... Respondents have shown good cause as to any delay in Petitioner's release.”

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to provide the bond redetermination hearing or release Judge Desai ordered within seven days of granting habeas relief, followed by their failure to file the required notice of compliance. After Petitioner moved for contempt asserting that she had not received a bond hearing and remained in custody “in violation of the Court’s April 29, 2026 Order,” Judge Desai noted that “Respondents have not filed a notice of compliance” and ordered them to address “whether or when Petitioner had a bond redetermination hearing, and if not, why Respondents failed to comply with the Court’s April 29, 2026 Order.” Respondents then filed a notice stating that Petitioner had been released on May 15, after the court’s bond-hearing-or-release deadline, and Judge Desai deemed the contempt motion moot.

Petitioner Arlin Monrroy-Salazar entered the United States without inspection in 2007. Immigration authorities arrested her in May 2025, and she remained detained at Eloy Detention Center without having received a bond hearing. She filed her § 2241 petition on Apr. 10, 2026, challenging her present immigration detention.

On Apr. 13, Judge Desai ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondents maintained that, despite Petitioner’s nearly two decades in the United States, she was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing. Judge Desai later wrote that Respondents “do not otherwise attempt to justify Petitioner’s detention or explain how she is justifiably detained without bond in these circumstances.”

On Apr. 29, Judge Desai granted habeas relief. The court held that Petitioner was not “seeking admission” within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A), relied on related authority rejecting the same mandatory-detention theory, and independently concluded that Petitioner’s detention was governed by § 1226 rather than § 1225. The court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond redetermination hearing within seven days or release her from custody under the same conditions that existed before detention. Judge Desai also ordered Respondents to file a notice of compliance within three days of releasing Petitioner or providing the bond hearing. Judgment was entered the same day.

Respondents did not file the ordered notice. On May 19, after Petitioner filed a motion for contempt, Judge Desai first entered a text order noting that the Apr. 29 habeas order required Respondents to provide a bond hearing within seven days or release Petitioner, and further required a notice of compliance within three days of release or hearing. The court wrote: “To date, no Notice has been filed.” Judge Desai ordered Respondents to file the notice of compliance by May 22.

Later that day, Judge Desai vacated that notice-of-compliance order and addressed the contempt motion directly. The court stated that Petitioner appeared to assert that “she has not received a bond hearing, and she remains in custody, in violation of the Court’s April 29, 2026 Order,” and again noted that “Respondents have not filed a notice of compliance.” Judge Desai ordered Respondents, within one day, to respond to the contempt motion and address “whether or when Petitioner had a bond redetermination hearing, and if not, why Respondents failed to comply with the Court’s April 29, 2026 Order.”

Respondents then filed a notice of compliance stating that Petitioner had been released on May 15. Judge Desai accordingly deemed the motion for contempt moot.

This habeas case involved the redetention of a Russian asylum seeker after prior release and Respondents’ failure to answer the court-ordered due-process issue. Judge Lanham granted habeas relief after finding that Respondents “failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause” and made “no effort to explain the reason for Petitioner’s redetention or the process for revoking her prior release.”

Petitioner Ekaterina Lukina, a native and citizen of Russia, entered the United States in January 2023 seeking asylum. She was released while her claims were considered, remained on ISAP after an IJ denial, and was redetained on or about Apr. 28, 2025 despite allegedly not violating supervision conditions and “without any individualized explanation, justification, or identified triggering event.” She filed her habeas petition on Mar. 22, 2026.

On Apr. 21, after having ordered Respondents to show cause on the pre-deprivation-hearing issue, the court granted habeas relief, writing:

“But Respondents failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or Petitioner’s argument that she was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being redetained following her release. Respondents make no effort to explain the reason for Petitioner’s redetention or the process for revoking her prior release. In so doing, Respondents have waived any challenge to Petitioner’s due process claim that she was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being redetained.”

The court ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions that existed before her redetention,” and required a notice of compliance within two business days. Judgment entered the same day.

This habeas case involved the redetention of a petitioner who had been released on his own recognizance and Respondents’ failure to address the court-ordered pre-deprivation-hearing issue. Judge Humetewa granted habeas relief after finding that Respondents “submitted their standard argument” about mandatory detention but “failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or explain the basis for Petitioner’s redetention.”

Petitioner Francisco Jose Cruz Calvachi entered the United States in 2023 and, after a short period of detention, was released on his own recognizance pending immigration proceedings. On Dec. 30, 2025, immigration officials re-detained him without a pre-deprivation hearing. He filed his habeas petition on Apr. 21, 2026.

On Apr. 22, Judge Humetewa issued an order to show cause in a habeas challenge by a petitioner who had been released on his own recognizance and later re-detained without a pre-deprivation hearing. The court noted that “[n]umerous courts” had recognized a due process right to such a hearing, and ordered Respondents to show cause by Apr. 28, supported by documentary evidence and any affidavits from individuals with personal knowledge.

On Jun. 3, Judge Humetewa granted the petition, ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions that existed before his redetention,” and required a notice of compliance within two business days. In granting relief, the court wrote:

“Respondents responded to the OSC but did not respond to Petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing following his release from immigration detention in 2023. Rather, Respondents submitted their standard argument regarding applicants for admission being subject to mandatory detention no matter how long they have lived in the United States.”

The court then added:

“In submitting their response, Respondents failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or explain the basis for Petitioner’s redetention following his release on his own recognizance. In so doing, Respondents have waived any challenge to Petitioner’s due process claim that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being redetained.”

Judgment entered the same day.

This habeas case involved Petitioner’s redetention after prior release on his own recognizance and Respondents’ inadequate response to an order to show cause addressing whether due process required a pre-deprivation hearing before redetention. Judge Desai granted habeas relief after finding that Respondents “failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or explain the basis for Petitioner’s redetention,” and had instead relied on their “standard argument” that applicants for admission were subject to mandatory detention.

Petitioner Buloki Matumona-Bienvenue entered the United States in April 2024 and was released on his own recognizance pending immigration proceedings. On Jan. 20, 2026, immigration officials re-detained him without a pre-deprivation hearing. He filed his habeas petition and a motion for temporary injunctive relief on Feb. 11.

On Feb. 12, the court denied the TRO motion without prejudice, ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted, and identified a line of cases holding that similarly situated noncitizens are entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before redetention. Respondents filed a response on Feb. 19, but the court found that it did not address the issue the court had identified and granted the petition on Apr. 2, writing:

“Respondents responded to the OSC but did not respond to Petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing following his release on his own recognizance. Rather, Respondents submitted their standard argument regarding applicants for admission being subject to mandatory detention despite their presence in the United States.”

Judge Desai added wrote:

“In submitting their response, Respondents failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or explain the basis for Petitioner’s redetention following release on his own recognizance. In so doing, Respondents have waived any challenge to Petitioner’s due process claim that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being redetained.”

The court ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions that existed before his redetention,” and required a notice of compliance within two business days. Judgment entered the same day.

This habeas case involved the redetention of a Venezuelan transgender woman after prior release and Respondents’ inadequate OSC response. Judge Lanham granted habeas relief after finding that Respondents “failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause” or Petitioner’s pre-deprivation-hearing argument.

Petitioner Carlos Jesus Saenz-Perez, also known as Karla Saenz-Perez, a transgender woman and citizen of Venezuela, applied for admission at a port of entry on Mar. 3, 2024, was released on her own recognizance the next day, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture on Feb. 25, 2025. She filed her habeas petition on Apr. 8, alleging that her re-detention resulted from arbitrary and capricious agency action and an abuse of discretion, in violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. She sought release from detention.

On Apr. 10, Judge Lanham ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted, noting that “[n]umerous courts” had concluded similarly situated noncitizens were entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before redetention. The court required any response to be supported by documentary evidence, including affidavits from individuals with personal knowledge where applicable, and granted limited discovery requiring Respondents, subject to objections, to produce responsive documents by Apr. 17, including Petitioner’s A-file, release-on-recognizance records, check-in records, and required custody-review documents.

On Apr. 21, Judge Lanham granted the petition, ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions that existed before her redetention,” and required a notice of compliance within two business days.

The court noted that Respondents’ Apr. 17 response acknowledged a “discrepancy” in Petitioner’s custody paperwork: although they asserted she was an arriving alien subject to § 1225, they admitted she had received a custody redetermination document indicating release under § 1226 and apparent eligibility for an immigration-judge bond hearing. But Judge Lanham found that Respondents had not answered the operative due-process issue:

“But Respondents failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or Petitioner’s argument that she was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being redetained following her release on her own recognizance. In so doing, Respondents have waived any challenge to Petitioner’s due process claim that she was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being redetained.”

Judgment entered the same day.

This habeas case involved Petitioner’s redetention after prior release on his own recognizance, Respondents’ inadequate response to a show-cause order addressing whether due process required a pre-deprivation hearing before redetention, and Respondents’ later failure to file the court-ordered notice of compliance by the deadline. Judge Desai granted habeas relief after finding that Respondents “failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or explain the basis for Petitioner’s redetention,” and later entered a text order noting that, “[t]o date, no Notice has been filed.”

Petitioner Sergio Mendez Betanco entered the United States without inspection in November 2021 and, after brief detention, was released on his own recognizance. In December 2025, he was served with a Notice to Appear for a Jan. 16, 2026 hearing. After attending that hearing and asking for time to retain counsel, he was approached near the elevators by two plain-clothed ICE officers, one masked, who took him into custody “without clearly identifying who they were and why he was being arrested.” Petitioner sought a bond redetermination hearing, but the immigration judge ruled on Mar. 9 that she lacked jurisdiction. He filed his habeas petition on Mar. 19.

On Mar. 19, Judge Desai ordered Respondents to show cause by Mar. 24 why the petition should not be granted, after identifying cases holding that previously released noncitizens are entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before redetention. On Mar. 24, Respondents answered that they did not oppose a § 1226(a) bond hearing, but when granting the petition on Mar. 25, Judge Desai found the response inadequate because Respondents “failed to respond” to the show-cause order. The court wrote:

“Respondents responded to the OSC indicating ‘[u]nder the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly given that Petitioner was previously released under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Respondent’s [sic] do not oppose Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).’ But Respondents ignore that a bond hearing was not the extent of Petitioner’s request for relief. Rather, Petitioner’s prayer for relief included requesting that the Court: ‘Grant a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to immediately and unconditionally release Petitioner from custody, or at minimum, order a bond hearing with adequate procedural protections[.]’”

Judge Desai therefore found:

“Respondents failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or explain the basis for Petitioner’s redetention. In so doing, Respondents have waived any challenge to Petitioner’s due process claim that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being redetained.”

The court also noted in a footnote: “Respondents also did not address the three-pronged test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.” The court ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner under the same conditions that existed before redetention, and required a notice of compliance within two business days. Respondents did not file that notice by the deadline. On Apr. 7, Judge Desai entered a text order stating: “To date, no Notice has been filed.” The court ordered Respondents to file the required notice of compliance by Apr. 9. Respondents filed the notice later that day.

This habeas case involved Petitioner’s redetention after release on bond and administrative closure of his removal proceedings. Judge Lanham granted habeas relief after finding that Respondents filed their standard § 1225 mandatory-detention argument but “failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or explain the basis for Petitioner’s redetention.”

Petitioner Javier Molina-Perez entered the United States without inspection in approximately 1991. In approximately 2013, he was placed in removal proceedings. In August 2015, he was released on bond, and his removal proceedings were administratively closed. On Dec. 15, 2025, ICE officials apprehended and re-detained him without a pre-deprivation hearing. Petitioner filed his habeas petition and a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on Mar. 23, 2026.

On Mar. 24, Judge Lanham denied preliminary relief without prejudice but ordered Respondents to show cause by Mar. 31 why the petition should not be granted. The court wrote that “[n]umerous courts” had concluded that similarly situated noncitizens were entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before redetention “as a matter of due process,” and required any response to be supported by documentary evidence, including affidavits from personal-knowledge declarants where applicable.

Respondents filed a response on Mar. 31, but when granting the petition on Apr. 1, Judge Lanham found that they had not answered the due process issue identified in the show-cause order. The court wrote:

“Respondents responded to the OSC but did not respond to Petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing following his release on bond and the termination of removal proceedings. Rather, Respondents submitted their standard argument regarding applicants for admission being subject to mandatory detention no matter how long they have lived in the United States.”

Judge Lanham therefore found:

“In submitting their response, Respondents failed to respond to the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause or explain the basis for Petitioner’s redetention following release on bond and termination of his removal proceedings. In so doing, Respondents have waived any challenge to Petitioner’s due process claim that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing before being redetained.”

Judge Lanham ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner under the same conditions that existed before redetention, required a notice of compliance within two business days, and directed the clerk to enter judgment. Judgment entered on Apr. 1.

This immigration habeas class action involved the government’s continued detention of Bond Eligible Class members under a mandatory-detention theory Judge Sykes had already rejected, immigration judges’ continued reliance on Matter of Yajure Hurtado after the court’s final judgment, and Respondents’ broader noncompliance with classwide declaratory and APA-vacatur relief requiring access to individualized bond hearings. After finding that immigration judges continued to deny bond hearings “despite the Court’s determination that the DHS Policy is unlawful,” and that Respondents had directed immigration judges to disregard the court’s orders by maintaining that Yajure Hurtado remained good law, Judge Sykes entered final judgment and later granted Petitioners’ motion to enforce. Opening the enforcement order with James Madison’s warning that the accumulation of legislative, executive, and judicial power “may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny,” the court held that Respondents had “far crossed the boundaries of constitutional conduct,” that their opposition “deliberately seeks to erode any semblance of separation of powers,” and that they continued to “violate the law” by detaining class members in contravention of the final judgment. The court described the noncompliance as too broad and voluminous to recount exhaustively, found that Respondents advanced “frivolous arguments that aim to insulate unlawful policies from judicial review,” and wrote that Bond Eligible Class members had been forced to “affirmatively seek habeas relief” because Respondents denied them the individualized bond hearings to which they were entitled. Judge Sykes wrote that Respondents could not “relitigate the validity of the Court’s final judgment” or “continue to endorse an executive interpretation of law” contrary to it, observed that “Respondents appear to have little regard for such fundamental tenets,” and stated that “Respondents engage in unlawful practices under the guise of ‘immigration enforcement’ and fidelity to agency regulations.” She also wrote that the court had, “possibly out of naivete,” trusted Respondents to follow the law as declared in the final judgment, but that Respondents instead chose to “privilege an executive interpretation of law over the judiciary’s.” The court further rejected DHS’s public “worst of the worst” framing as “an inaccurate description of most of those affected,” adding that, if the phrase had any “inkling of truth,” it “merely mirrors the severity and ill-natured conduct by the Government” while ignoring “a greater, more dire reality:” that noncriminal noncitizens were being swept into “nationwide and reckless violations of the law by the executive branch.” In the same discussion, the court stated that, “[b]eyond its terror against noncitizens, the executive branch has extended its violence on its own citizens, killing two American citizens— Renée Good and Alex Pretti—in Minnesota.” The court vacated Yajure Hurtado as “functionally equivalent” to the vacated DHS policy, found that Respondents sought to “obfuscate the identity of these executive actions” by selectively invoking agency regulations, ordered classwide notice through ICE, DHS, EOIR, detention-facility, immigration-court, and charging-document channels, and imposed coordinated reporting requirements to enforce compliance. The government appealed, and the Ninth Circuit later stayed the Feb. 18 enforcement order and stayed the Dec. 18 judgment insofar as it extended beyond the Central District of California, while leaving the judgment in place within that district and expressly not addressing the merits of the government’s § 1225(b)(2)(A) detention theory.

The named petitioners were four noncitizens and longtime U.S. residents detained during immigration raids and enforcement actions in Los Angeles and held at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center. Lazaro Maldonado Bautista had lived in Los Angeles since 2021, had no criminal history, and was arrested on Jun. 6, 2025, during an ICE operation in Los Angeles. Ananias Pascual had lived in the United States for more than twenty years and was arrested the same day at the Ambiance Apparel clothing manufacturer in the Fashion District of downtown Los Angeles. Ana Franco Galdamez had lived in the United States for more than twenty years and was arrested in Los Angeles on Jun. 19. Luiz Alberto De Aquino De Aquino had lived in the United States since 2022 and was arrested on Jun. 6 at Ambiance Apparel. ICE charged each petitioner as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), did not set bond, and immigration judges at the Adelanto Immigration Court denied their bond requests between Jul. 15 and Jul. 22 after treating them as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Bautista and the three other petitioners filed a habeas petition and ex parte TRO application on Jul. 23, 2025, fifteen days after DHS issued its Jul. 8 Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission. The Interim Guidance stated that DHS, “in coordination with” DOJ, had revisited its legal position on detention and release authorities. Under that policy, ICE employees were instructed to treat anyone arrested within the United States and charged as inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore subject to mandatory detention rather than the bond-hearing framework available under § 1226(a).

The TRO application sought emergency relief requiring Respondents to release Petitioners or provide individualized bond hearings before an immigration judge under § 1226(a) within seven days. Petitioners also sought an order prohibiting Respondents from relocating them outside the Central District of California while the case proceeded, and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. On Jul. 28, after Judge Sykes granted the TRO, Petitioners filed a class action complaint and amended habeas petition. The amended pleading added class allegations and sought declaratory relief establishing that class members were subject to detention under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, and were therefore entitled to individualized custody determinations and, if not released, bond determinations by the Immigration Court. It also sought APA relief vacating and setting aside DHS’s detention policy for the proposed Bond Eligible Class and the Adelanto Immigration Court’s bond-denial policy for the proposed Adelanto Class.

On Nov. 20, 2025, the court granted partial summary judgment but declined to enter final judgment because class certification remained pending. On Nov. 25, the court certified a Rule 23(b)(2) Bond Eligible Class. Then, on Dec. 18, Judge Sykes issued two related orders and entered final judgment. In the reconsideration and clarification order, the court held that the procedural posture had materially changed and that newly emerged facts warranted reconsideration. Judge Sykes clarified that the earlier merits order had encompassed Count III and granted classwide vacatur of the unlawful DHS Policy, while declining at that stage to include vacatur of Matter of Yajure Hurtado because that relief had not been pleaded. The same day, in an amended consolidated order, the court restated the partial-summary-judgment, class-certification, and reconsideration rulings, certified the Bond Eligible Class, appointed Bautista as class representative, clarified the available declaratory and APA-vacatur relief, and stated that final judgment would issue separately. At the same time, Judge Sykes stated that “the core holding of Yajure Hurtado cannot be squared with the MSJ Order,” that the court had already determined that Petitioners and similarly situated class members were not “applicants for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, and that, even though the merits order did not vacate Yajure Hurtado, “Yajure Hurtado is no longer controlling; the legal conclusion underlying the decision is no longer tenable.”

The Dec. 18 reconsideration order treated subsequent noncompliance as the critical changed circumstance. Petitioners sought clarification, the court explained, to “eliminate any doubt regarding [Respondents’] legal obligations and ensure [their] compliance.” Judge Sykes first found “new facts pertaining to IJ’s lack of compliance:” “The various supporting exhibits attached to the Application confirm that immigration judges (‘IJs’) continue to deny bond hearings for members of the Bond Eligible Class despite the Court’s determination that the DHS Policy is unlawful.” The court emphasized the breadth of the problem: “This is the case in at least ten other states.” Judge Sykes further found that several immigration judges had cited the absence of final judgment or otherwise misunderstood the effect of the court’s prior orders: “In these determinations, IJs have cited to this Court’s order, choosing to disregard the declaratory relief granted because it did not enter final judgment or due to some misunderstanding on part of the IJs as to the effect or nature of the Court’s orders.”

The court then identified what it described as a more serious development: evidence that Respondents had affirmatively directed immigration judges not to follow the court’s rulings. “Similarly, and perhaps more troubling, is the emergence of the Respondents’ direction to IJs that they should disregard this Court’s orders,” the court wrote. Specifically, Judge Sykes noted evidence that the Office of Immigration Litigation had issued a memorandum instructing immigration judges to “hold the position that Yajure Hurtado remains good law.” Because of those developments, Judge Sykes found reconsideration warranted. The court stated that “[b]ecause the Court has now decided both the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Class Certification Motion, and considering the newly emerged facts as to noncompliance, the posture of this case presents materially different circumstances that would compel reconsideration.” The same noncompliance finding supported entry of final judgment:

“Furthermore, because new facts indicate Respondents have counseled the noncompliance with the Court’s orders as discussed in Part III.B.1. Evidence of these circumstances present exigent circumstances that may cause irreparable harm to those detained without a bond hearing, where they are otherwise entitled to one.”

Judge Sykes found “no just reason for delay,” explained that final judgment would likely aid the “expeditious decision of the case,” and entered final judgment as to Counts I, II, and III. Respondents immediately appealed the Dec. 18 final judgment to the Ninth Circuit. See Bautista v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 25-7958 (9th Cir.).

On Dec. 31, the district court stayed Respondents’ answer deadline pending that appeal, but the final judgment itself remained operative. The Dec. 18 consolidated order had also set a Jan. 16, 2026, status conference and required a Jan. 9 joint status report addressing how the parties intended to proceed. In that report, Petitioners raised concerns that Respondents had not implemented the final judgment because immigration judges continued to follow Yajure Hurtado, which adopted the same legal interpretation as the vacated DHS Policy. Respondents maintained that no further relief was required and that Yajure Hurtado remained the correct interpretation.

Shortly before the Jan. 16 status conference, the court learned of what it later described as “a material development:” an article containing nationwide guidance from Chief Immigration Judge Teresa L. Riley that “questioned this Court’s final judgment.” Judge Sykes continued the status conference to Jan. 22, ordered written responses by Jan. 20, and identified compliance issues for the parties to address. At the Jan. 22 conference, Respondents did not give definitive answers on EOIR’s compliance with the final judgment, the judgment’s effect within the Central District of California, or whether their position privileged an executive agency’s legal interpretation over the court’s. The court then set expedited briefing on Petitioners’ motion to enforce judgment, which Petitioners filed on Jan. 28. Respondents opposed on Feb. 2, Petitioners replied on Feb. 5, Respondents filed supplemental authority on Feb. 11, and the court held a motion hearing on Feb. 13.

On Feb. 18, Judge Sykes granted Petitioners’ motion to enforce the Dec. 18 final judgment. The court opened with James Madison’s warning in The Federalist No. 47:

“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”

The enforcement order did not merely clarify the prior ruling. It vacated Matter of Yajure Hurtado as contrary to law under the APA; ordered classwide notice of the final judgment through the ICE Online Detainee Locator System, the DHS website, the EOIR case-information site, Adelanto detention and immigration-court facilities, Forms I-862 and I-213, service on detained and newly arrested potential class members, attorney-call access within one hour of receiving notice, and immigration-judge confirmation at the first master-calendar hearing; and, after a 14-day stay of that portion of the order, required coordinated weekly and biweekly reporting by ICE, DHS, EOIR, and Adelanto concerning detained and released Bond Eligible Class members, custody determinations, and requested bond hearings. The order rested on Judge Sykes’s finding that Respondents were continuing to detain Bond Eligible Class members in contravention of the final judgment by relying on Yajure Hurtado, which the court found was “functionally equivalent” to the vacated DHS Interim Policy and “parrot[ed]” the same unlawful legal interpretation.

The order substantially escalated the case from clarification and final judgment into direct enforcement. It addressed Respondents’ continued detention of Bond Eligible Class members, their continued reliance on Yajure Hurtado, the burden their noncompliance had imposed on courts and counsel nationwide, and what Judge Sykes described as a broader separation-of-powers threat. After framing the enforcement dispute in those terms, the court turned to DHS’s public rhetoric. DHS press releases had repeatedly described ICE’s Los Angeles operations as targeting the “worst of the worst,” but the court found that phrase inaccurate as applied to many people swept into DHS and ICE’s operations:

“‘Worst of the worst’ is an inaccurate description of most of those affected by DHS and ICE’s operations. Perhaps in utilizing this extreme language DHS seeks to justify the magnitude and scope of its operations against non-criminal noncitizens. Maybe that phrase merely mirrors the severity and ill-natured conduct by the Government. Even though these press releases might contain an inkling of truth, they ignore a greater, more dire reality.”

The court placed the case within what it described as wider executive-branch conduct, stating that Americans had expressed “deep concerns over unlawful, wanton acts by the executive branch,” citing the detention of Adrian Conejo Arias and his five-year-old son “without a valid warrant,” see Conejo Arias v. Noem, 5:26-cv-00415 (W.D. Tex.), and writing: “It is not the ‘worst of the worst’ that are swept into the nationwide and reckless violations of the law by the executive branch.” The court also stated that, “[b]eyond its terror against noncitizens, the executive branch has extended its violence on its own citizens, killing two American citizens— Renée Good and Alex Pretti—in Minnesota.”

Judge Sykes then tied that broader framing back to Bautista. Bautista had no criminal record, had lived in Los Angeles for approximately four years, worked at the same company since 2021, and had several U.S.-citizen family members in Southern California. DHS and ICE arrested him on Jun. 6, 2025, during a concerted immigration operation in Los Angeles, denied him release on bond, detained him at Adelanto, and then refused to provide a bond redetermination hearing after an immigration judge concluded that he lacked jurisdiction. The court emphasized that Bautista was not an outlier: “Bautista is but one of hundreds, if not thousands, of noncitizens with no criminal background that have been arrested and detained by the Government for being in the country without admission.” After recounting the Supreme Court’s explanation in Arizona v. United States that “it is not a crime for a removable [noncitizen] to remain present in the United States,” the court stated: “This is not what happened to Bautista or many others like him.”

Judge Sykes then summarized the case’s procedural arc. Bautista and other petitioners filed the habeas petition on Jul. 23, 2025, fifteen days after DHS circulated its July 8 Interim Guidance announcing, in coordination with DOJ, that the agencies had “revisited” their legal position on detention and release authorities. Respondents detained Bautista and refused to release him or provide a bond hearing until the court ordered relief. Since then, Judge Sykes explained, the court had declared indefinite detention unlawful for Bautista and similarly situated people, certified a nationwide class, and vacated the DHS Policy on which the government had relied. The court stressed that it had repeatedly rejected the government’s interpretation, and on increasingly developed records: “On each occasion, and with each ruling being based on a more developed factual record than before, the Court determined the DHS Policy improperly interpreted the INA and that continued detention of Plaintiff Petitioners and those similarly situated was unlawful.”

The enforcement order then turned directly to noncompliance. Judge Sykes wrote that ordinary respect for a federal court’s statutory interpretation should have resolved the issue:

“One might assume that four separate orders issued by a federal district court interpreting a federal statute would make clear that enforcing executive policies premised on a contrary legal interpretation is improper. Remarkably, that has not been the case.”

The court stated that it would provide only a non-exhaustive account because of the volume and breadth of violations: “Each of the events below reflects Respondents’ failure to comply with the Final Judgment; however, given the breadth and volume of events, the Court cannot provide an exhaustive account.” Judge Sykes found that Respondents’ noncompliance had transformed habeas adjudication in the Central District of California. Between Dec. 19, 2025 and Jan. 30, 2026, 551 habeas petitions were filed in that district, compared with 165 habeas petitions between Jan. 1 and Jul. 8, 2025. Although not all 551 petitions were filed by Bond Eligible Class members, the court confirmed that “a considerable portion” were, including more than 70 expressly designated as related to Bautista. The court made clear that, “[a]n increase in habeas filings alone may not strike the Court’s attention. However, ample evidence demonstrates Respondents’ noncompliance with the Final Judgment.”

The court also described nationwide effects. It identified more than 400 post-final-judgment cases in which district courts had granted habeas petitions filed by Bond Eligible Class members, and it noted that government attorneys in related cases had reported EOIR backlogs and difficulty scheduling bond hearings. Judge Sykes also referenced a District of Minnesota hearing in which counsel representing some of the same Respondents asked to be held in contempt “so that [counsel] can have a full 24 hours of sleep.” The court wrote: “Respondents’ noncompliance with the Final Judgment has taken a toll on wrongfully detained noncitizens, courts, and government and Petitioners’ attorneys.” And: “Respondents are under extraordinary strain. No irony is lost on the Court. Respondents have chosen to avail themselves of these exact circumstances of which they now complain.”

Judge Sykes then addressed the January 2026 status process. In the Jan. 9 joint status report, Petitioners expressed concern that Respondents had not provided relief consistent with the final judgment and that immigration judges continued to follow Yajure Hurtado, which adopted the same legal position as the vacated DHS Policy. Respondents disagreed that further relief was warranted, argued DHS was no longer relying on the DHS Policy, and maintained that Yajure Hurtado remained the correct interpretation. At the Jan. 22 status conference, Judge Sykes found that Respondents could not give substantive answers about compliance. When asked about EOIR compliance, Respondents said EOIR “was not coerced to do anything” and suggested other forums could determine the judgment’s preclusive effect. When the court asked about the final judgment’s preclusive effect in the Central District of California, Respondents said they “would have to brief that specifically.”

The court further noted that Respondents confirmed the essence of their position: Yajure Hurtado remained a “valid legal interpretation” binding immigration judges because of the BIA’s precedential authority. Respondents also agreed that, beyond “the interpretation and the binding controlling authority of Yajure Hurtado,” they were not identifying another basis for “the continued detention of and denial of bond hearings for [Bond Eligible Class members].” Judge Sykes then asked whether Respondents’ position “privilege[ed] an executive agency’s legal interpretation over a federal district court’s legal interpretation.” The court wrote that it received no definitive response; Respondents again said they were willing “to address [that issue] in briefing” and were “not in a position to answer.” The enforcement order treated the motion as necessary to execute the final judgment:

“Ordinarily, a final decision ‘generally . . . ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ … As detailed above, this Motion has become necessary to do exactly that: execute the judgment.”

Judge Sykes then went on to emphasize, in some of the order’s strongest institutional language, that Respondents’ position had exceeded ordinary litigation disagreement. The court wrote:

“Respondents have far crossed the boundaries of constitutional conduct. Somehow, even after the judicial declaration of law that the DHS was misguided in its act of legal interpretation that nullified portions of a congressionally enacted statute, Respondents still insist they can continue their campaign of illegal action. The shameless submission that is Respondents’ Opposition deliberately seeks to erode any semblance of separation of powers.”

The court continued:

“Respondents can only do so in a world where the Constitution does not exist. The Constitution makes no apology in condemning Respondents. With no other option but to uphold its constitutional duty, the Court grants Petitioners’ Motion.”

Judge Sykes next explained that separation of powers was central to the enforcement dispute. Respondents and immigration judges had described the situation as “awkward” or “confusing,” but the court rejected that framing. It explained that tension between branches was not an anomaly but part of the constitutional design, invoking The Federalist No. 51, Marbury, Loper Bright, and United Mine Workers. The court wrote:

“Ordinarily, the Court would not state basic principles of law to avoid pontification. Yet separation of powers concerns is at the heart of this case, this Court’s exercise of authority, and this country’s foundational principles imbued in the Constitution. Respondents appear to have little regard for such fundamental tenets; thus, a brief lesson in legal history is apt.”

Judge Sykes then framed Respondents’ conduct as unlawful executive action masked as immigration administration, writing that “Respondents engage in unlawful practices under the guise of ‘immigration enforcement’ and fidelity to agency regulations,” and adding, “Those practices were found unlawful by way of statutory interpretation by this Court.” The court emphasized that federal court orders must be obeyed unless and until reversed: “Respondents cannot relitigate the validity of the Court’s final judgment here nor continue to endorse an executive interpretation of law that is contrary to the final judgment’s declaration of law.”

Given the volume of filings and Respondents’ continued treatment of Bond Eligible Class members, the court found further relief necessary. “As evidenced by the volume of habeas petitions filed by Bond Eligible Class members and the conduct of Respondents in continuing to violate the rights of those class members, further is relief necessary to effectuate the Final Judgment,” the court wrote, continuing: “Given the circumstances surrounding Respondents’ noncompliance and its threat to separation of powers, the Court finds further relief is proper to fulfill this Court’s constitutional duties.”

The court then moved to the form of relief. It found that Respondents were still violating the law by detaining class members contrary to the final judgment and by advancing arguments designed to shield unlawful policies from review:

“Respondents have violated and continue to violate the law by detaining Bond Eligible Class members in contravention of the Final Judgment. Worse, Respondents proffer frivolous arguments that aim to insulate unlawful policies from judicial review while taking positions that seek to bludgeon separation of powers into oblivion.”

Judge Sykes rejected Respondents’ argument that Yajure Hurtado remained different from the vacated DHS Policy because it was issued by the BIA. The court characterized Respondents’ position as a “deliberately dense three-step maneuver” leading to an “absurd conclusion

This habeas case involved eight Adelanto ICE detainees who challenged continued detention under § 1225(b)(2) and sought release or individualized bond hearings under § 1226(a). Judge Holcomb granted a TRO temporarily enjoining Respondents from continuing to detain Petitioners unless each received an individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing by Dec. 8, 2025. Respondents provided six Petitioners timely bond hearings, but later admitted that, as to Petitioners Martinez and Pena, they failed by the deadline either to provide individualized bond hearings or release them. After Respondents’ counsel represented that Martinez and Pena received bond hearings on Dec. 12—“four days late”—and “offered no satisfactory explanation why Respondents failed to comply with the TRO in the first instance,” Judge Holcomb ordered Respondents to show cause why sanctions should not issue for “their failure to comply with this Court’s TRO.” The court later accepted Respondents’ explanation, discharged the show-cause order as to Respondents, and vacated the sanctions hearing.

Petitioners Florin Tanasache, Inocencio Castro Martinez, Russell Gomez Dzul, Jesus Rene Carranza Gutierrez, Robert Cruz Hernandez, Oscar Efren Cadena Alonso, Demetrio Acosta Pena, and Javier Perez filed their habeas petition on Nov. 24, 2025. The petition sought release or bond hearings under § 1226(a), a declaration that Petitioners’ detention under § 1225(b)(2) was unlawful, and an order preventing transfer outside the Central District of California while the case remained pending. That same day, Petitioners filed an ex parte TRO application seeking release or individualized bond hearings within seven days, a declaration that § 1226(a) governed their detention, and an order barring transfer outside the district.

On Dec. 1, after a hearing, Judge Holcomb granted Petitioners’ TRO application. The court temporarily enjoined Respondents “from continuing to detain Petitioners unless Petitioners, and each of them, are provided with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) no later than December 8.” The court also ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue and set a preliminary-injunction hearing for Dec. 15.

At the Dec. 15 hearing, the court denied the preliminary-injunction application as moot because all Petitioners had by then received individualized bond hearings. But the court expressly noted that Respondents had not met the TRO timeline for two Petitioners: “Although Respondents failed to provide bond hearings for Petitioners Martinez and Pena by the seven-day timeline specified in the Court’s Order re Petitioners’ Ex Parte Application for a TRO, the Court concludes that because all Petitioners have now received the requested bond hearings, a preliminary injunction granting the same relief is moot.” The court further stated that it would issue “a separate Order to Show Cause regarding the dismissal of the underlying petition and an Order to Show Cause regarding sanctions for Respondents’ failure to comply with the Court’s TRO.”

The next day, Judge Holcomb issued written orders to show cause. The court recounted that “Respondents represented that they complied with the TRO with respect to six of the eight Petitioners by offering those six Petitioners individualized bond hearings by December 8.” As to the remaining two Petitioners, the court wrote: “With respect to the remaining two Petitioners—Martinez and Pena—Respondents admitted that they failed to comply with the TRO either to provide an individualized bond hearing or to release those two Petitioners by December 8, 2025.” The court further stated: “During the December 15, 2025, hearing regarding the preliminary injunction, Respondents’ counsel represented that the remaining two Petitioners received bond hearings on December 12, 2025—i.e., four days late—but Respondents’ counsel offered no satisfactory explanation why Respondents failed to comply with the TRO in the first instance.” Judge Holcomb therefore ordered Respondents to show cause why sanctions should not issue for “their failure to comply with this Court’s TRO.”

The court also ordered Petitioners to show cause why the case should not be dismissed as moot. Judge Holcomb noted that all Petitioners had received the requested bond hearings and that, as members of the recently certified class in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, Petitioners may already have received the declaratory relief they sought regarding whether § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governed their detention.

Respondents filed their response to the sanctions order to show cause on Jan. 9, 2026. On Jan. 12, Judge Holcomb discharged the show-cause order as to Respondents only, stating in a text order that the court “appreciates and accepts Respondents’ explanation.” The court vacated the Feb. 6 OSC hearing as to Respondents. Petitioners filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice on Jan. 16.

This habeas case involved a Bautista bond-eligible class member in circumstances Judge Sykes described as “all too familiar with this Court:” Respondents acknowledged Petitioner appeared covered by the Bautista judgment and were ordered to provide a § 1226(a) bond hearing or release. The later noncompliance arose after the immigration judge set a $25,000 bond and Petitioner’s family paid it, but Petitioner remained detained with “no release date.” Judge Sykes held that “There is no basis for Respondents to continue detaining Petitioner” and that “continued detention of Petitioner is unlawful,” ordered release “forthwith,” and required Respondents to show cause why he had not been released upon payment of bond, warning that failure to comply would result in sanctions. The court discharged the OSC after Petitioner was released and denied contempt as moot.

Petitioner Roberto Carlos Rivas Martinez, a Salvadoran national, had been in immigration detention since Sept. 12, 2025 and was detained at the Adelanto Detention Facility. He alleged that he was a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista and sought release or a § 1226(a) bond hearing. He filed his habeas petition on Dec. 30, 2025 and moved for a TRO on Dec. 31. Judge Christina A. Snyder initially barred his removal from the Central District of California, and the case was later transferred to Judge Sykes as related to Bautista.

On Jan. 7, Judge Sykes granted the TRO, writing: “The troubling circumstances surrounding the refusal by executive agencies to provide Petitioner as well as those in the Bond Eligible Class with bond hearings are all too familiar with this Court.” Respondents did “not expressly oppose the TRO” and acknowledged that Petitioner appeared subject to the Bautista judgment. Judge Sykes ordered Respondents not to continue detaining Petitioner unless he received an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge under § 1226(a) within seven days. The court also barred Respondents from transferring, relocating, or removing him from the Central District of California without further order pending final resolution.

At the Jan. 30 OSC hearing, Judge Sykes ordered a subsequent bond hearing under the Bautista order no later than Feb. 2. The court stated that if Petitioner was not provided that hearing by the deadline, he “shall be released forthwith.” The immigration judge later set bond at $25,000, and Petitioner’s family paid the full amount.

Petitioner remained detained after bond was paid. On Feb. 9, Petitioner moved to enforce the court’s prior order and for contempt. On Feb. 10, Judge Sykes ordered immediate release and issued an OSC as to sanctions. The court wrote that, despite payment of the $25,000 bond, “Petitioner remains in immigration detention with no release date.” Judge Sykes held: “There is no basis for Respondents to continue detaining Petitioner. In other words, continued detention of Petitioner is unlawful.” The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner “forthwith,” to show cause by 5:00 p.m. that day whether he had been released, and to show cause why he had not been released upon payment of bond. The court warned that failure to comply would result in sanctions.

Respondents responded to the OSC, and Petitioner also filed a response. On Feb. 11, Judge Sykes found that Petitioner had been released from immigration detention and sought no further relief. The court discharged the OSC, denied the contempt motion as moot, and directed the Clerk to close the case.

This habeas case involved a detained Indian national whom Judge Sykes treated as a member of the Bautista Bond Eligible Class, but who remained detained while Respondents continued to dispute or delay the bond-hearing relief required by the classwide judgment. In granting a TRO, Judge Sykes ordered Respondents to provide an individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing by Jan. 22, 2026, and to explain “why they did not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in the first instance given membership in the Bond Eligible Class.” The court framed the case as part of a broader pattern, writing that Respondents had “continued their course of action in detaining those in the Bond Eligible Class” and warning that “Respondents’ continued defiance of valid court orders and its final judgment” had produced “unnecessary, voluminous filings” and could lead the court to “set hearings for contempt.” After later ordering a “subsequent bond hearing” under the court’s Bautista order and warning that Petitioner would be released if no hearing occurred, Judge Sykes ultimately ordered that Petitioner “be released forthwith.”

Petitioner Gurjinder Singh, an Indian national, entered the United States on Apr. 27, 2023, and alleged a credible fear of return to India. Judge Sykes recounted that, despite having “no criminal history, history of violence, or factors indicating danger or flight risk,” ICE detained him on Aug. 9, 2025, when he attended a regularly scheduled appointment. At the time of the TRO order, Petitioner remained detained at Adelanto Detention Facility in pending removal proceedings and had been denied the opportunity for release on bond by EOIR. The court also noted that “there was no arrest warrant issued against Petitioner to support his detention that would compel his re-detention,” and that re-detention under § 1226(b) was not permitted “absent a change of circumstance.”

Petitioner filed his habeas petition and ex parte TRO application on Jan. 5, 2026. That same day, Judge Christina A. Snyder barred his removal and enjoined Respondents from relocating him outside the Central District of California pending further order.

After the case was transferred to Judge Sykes on Jan. 14, she granted the TRO on Jan. 15, ordered that Petitioner receive an individualized bond hearing by Jan. 22, barred transfer or removal without further order, and ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, including “why they did not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in the first instance given membership in the Bond Eligible Class.”

Judge Sykes framed the case as part of a broader compliance problem, not a one-off dispute. She wrote that, “[i]n spite of these conclusions following Bautista, Respondents have continued their course of action in detaining those in the Bond Eligible Class and persist in challenging the class members’ right to a bond hearing,”making it “necessary to briefly catalogue the litany of excuses raised by Respondents to evade compliance with the Court’s orders and relevant judicial doctrines.” She further warned that “Respondents’ continued defiance of valid court orders and its final judgment has resulted in unnecessary, voluminous filings of ex parte temporary restraining orders,” and that, “[s]hould Respondents continue to detain members of the Bond Eligible Class and deny them bond hearings, the Court will set hearings for contempt.”

Judge Sykes also expressed skepticism toward Respondents’ claim that Petitioner had violated the local rules by submitting “no declaration or evidence” with his TRO application. The court rejected that argument on the merits, noted that Petitioner had submitted his Notice to Appear, found any possible scrivener’s errors immaterial, and observed that the volume of similar TROs “reinforce Respondents’ familiarity with the issues presented.” She then went further: “The Court is skeptical as to Respondents’ intentions in raising compliance with the Local Rules given Respondents’ lack of compliance with the Court’s orders in all the subsequent habeas actions filed by Bond Eligible Members.” Finding that Respondents faced neither “undue surprise nor prejudice,” the court said it was “perplexed” by the insistence that relief be denied “for that threshold reason alone.”

The subsequent docket suggests that the ordered Jan. 22 bond-hearing deadline was not met. At the Jan. 30 show-cause hearing, Judge Sykes again ordered that a Bautista bond hearing be held, this time by Feb. 6, and continued the show-cause hearing. When the matter returned on Feb. 13, the court instead ordered that Petitioner “be released forthwith,” no later than that day. On Mar. 6, the case was closed as moot.

This habeas case involved the re-detention of a Vietnamese refugee and longtime lawful permanent resident after more than two decades on supervised release, followed by both TRO-stage attorney-compliance proceedings and the later grant of habeas relief. During the TRO phase, Karen E. Smith noticed an appearance as Special Assistant U.S. Attorney and counsel of record for Respondents, opposed the TRO motion, and was counsel of record when the government filed an “untimely” opposition, then failed to appear at the TRO hearing, failed to file court-ordered dismissal briefing, and failed to appear at the status conference. Judge Blumenfeld first ordered the government to show cause why sanctions, “including finding the government in default,” should not be imposed, citing “serious concerns about the government’s repeated failures to abide by Court orders in this case.” After Chief Daniel A. Beck appeared and responded to the OSC, Smith withdrew, and Chief Beck and Civil Division Chief David M. Harris appeared at the show-cause hearing, the court issued a further OSC directed to Smith, whom the court then described as “the former Special Assistant United States Attorney assigned to this case.” Judge Blumenfeld ordered Smith to address her “failures to appear and otherwise comply with court orders,” later discharged the OSC, declined sanctions, and issued a “formal admonition.” Magistrate Judge Sagar then granted the petition, ordered Respondents to “immediately release” Petitioner, and held that Respondents “failed to provide adequate notice,” had not identified any specific “changed circumstances,” and had not shown that removal to Vietnam was reasonably foreseeable.

Petitioner Thai Quoc Truong, a native of Vietnam who was married to a U.S. citizen and had three U.S.-citizen children, entered the United States as a refugee in 1975 at the age of two and became a lawful permanent resident the following year. After 1994 and 1996 convictions, Petitioner was ordered removed in 2001, detained for several months, and then released in September 2001 because removal did not appear “reasonably foreseeable at this time.” More than twenty-four years later, on Dec. 16, 2025, ICE re-detained him at a routine check-in, served him with a warrant of removal and a notice revoking release, and asserted that “changed circumstances” made removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings on Dec. 23, filed his habeas petition and an initial TRO motion on Jan. 5, 2026, and renewed his TRO application on Jan. 22 after the first motion was denied without prejudice on procedural grounds.

The court set a hearing on the TRO application for Jan. 30. Karen E. Smith, a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (SAUSA) at the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO), noticed an appearance for the government on Jan. 27 and opposed the TRO motion. On Jan. 29, the court issued an order stating: “The Court has posted a tentative ruling on its webpage. The parties are ordered to review the tentative ruling and be prepared to address it at the hearing.” Respondents did not appear at the Jan. 30 hearing. The hearing minutes stated: “The government failed to appear. The government is ordered to file a declaration by 2/13/2026, addressing why an order to show cause should not be issued for the failure to appear.” The court also ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding whether the petition should be dismissed in light of the TRO ruling. Petitioner was ordered to file his position on dismissal by Feb. 6, Respondents were ordered to respond by Feb. 9, and the court set a status conference for Feb. 13.

On Feb. 2, Judge Blumenfeld denied the TRO application, but expressly noted Respondents’ first missed deadline. The court wrote that “[t]he government’s opposition was untimely, as it was filed beyond the 48-hour period prescribed by the Court’s standing order.” Although the court exercised its discretion to accept the filing, it warned that “failure to timely respond in the future may be construed as consent to the relief requested.” On the merits, the court concluded that Petitioner had not shown entitlement to immediate release at the TRO stage because the government had presented unrebutted evidence that Vietnam’s prior policy barring removal of pre-1995 immigrants had changed and that ICE had requested a travel document. The court also found that Petitioner had not shown he was denied constitutionally or statutorily required process, while noting the government’s evidence that he had been served with a warrant of removal and notice of revocation and had received an informal interview under the regulations governing revocation of release.

On Feb. 5, Magistrate Judge Sagar ordered Respondents to respond to the habeas petition after Judge Blumenfeld denied TRO relief. The court required Respondents to file a notice of appearance within seven days and a response to the petition within thirty days. If Respondents sought dismissal without reaching the merits, Petitioner was required to oppose or file a notice of non-opposition within twenty-one days of service, and Respondents could reply within seven days. If Respondents instead answered on the merits, Petitioner could file a reply within seven days, limited to ten pages absent leave of court. On Feb. 12, Petitioner filed an ex parte application for reconsideration of the order denying TRO relief. The application was set for hearing before Judge Blumenfeld on Feb. 20 at 8:30 a.m.

Respondents failed to file a dismissal brief and failed to appear at the status conference. On Feb. 13, in addition to admonishing Petitioner’s counsel “to appear on time for Court proceedings,” Judge Blumenfeld ordered the government to show cause, writing:

“The government failed to file a brief, as ordered, addressing whether this habeas petition should be dismissed in light of the Court denying Petitioner’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO). The government also failed to appear at the status conference, after previously failing to appear at the TRO hearing. The Court ordered the government to file a declaration by today, February 13, addressing its prior failure to appear. Although that declaration is not yet overdue, the Court has serious concerns about the government’s repeated failures to abide by Court orders in this case.”

Judge Blumenfeld added:

“Accordingly, the government is ordered to show cause (OSC), at a hearing on February 20, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 6C, why sanctions—including finding the government in default—should not be imposed. The government is ordered to file a response to the OSC by 5:00 p.m. on February 17; its failure to timely file a written response will result in the government being found in default and will be construed as consent to granting Petitioner’s immediate release, as requested in his habeas petition. Both parties shall appear on February 20.”

Respondents filed a notice acknowledging receipt of the court’s order later that day. On Feb. 17, Daniel A. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of the Complex and Defensive Litigation Section of the USAO (Chief Beck), filed a notice of appearance and notice to the court’s order. SAUSA Smith withdrew as counsel on Feb. 19. At the Feb. 20 show-cause hearing, Chief Beck and David M. Harris, Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of the Civil Division, appeared for Respondents. The court later issued an order to show cause directed at SAUSA Smith, who appears to have no longer held that role at the time. The court wrote:

“Karen Smith, the former Special Assistant United States Attorney assigned to this case, is ordered to appear on February 27, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 6C to address her failures to appear and otherwise comply with court orders. She shall file a declaration by February 25, 2026, addressing the OSC. Failure to timely file a declaration will result in the Court issuing sanctions. The government is ordered to notify Ms. Smith of this order immediately.

The court also denied without prejudice Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and ordered that further proceedings in the case proceed before Magistrate Judge Sagar for all purposes. On Feb. 25, former SAUSA Smith filed a declaration. On Feb. 27, she appeared at the show-cause hearing, after which the court discharged the order and formally admonished her. Court minutes stated:

“The Court heard from Karen Smith regarding the Court's order to show cause (OSC) re her failures to appear and failure to comply with court orders. The Court issued an order to show cause directing counsel to explain her failure to appear at scheduled hearings and to comply with applicable deadlines. Having reviewed the declaration of former Special Assistant United States Attorney Karen E. Smith and the record in this matter, the Court discharges the order to show cause, declines to impose sanctions, and issues a formal admonition.”

On Mar. 20, Magistrate Judge Sagar granted the petition and ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner under the same conditions that governed his release before re-detention. The court also enjoined Respondents from re-detaining him without complying with 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1) and 241.13(i). In recounting the procedural history, the court noted the earlier proceedings before Judge Blumenfeld: at the Jan. 30 TRO hearing, “the government failed to appear,” and on Feb. 13 the court noted that the government had again “failed to appear” and “also had failed to file its response regarding dismissal.” The court further noted that the government was ordered to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, that the government later responded, and that Judge Blumenfeld discharged the OSC.

On the merits, Judge Sagar held that Petitioner was entitled to release because Respondents “failed to provide adequate notice” and had not identified any specific “changed circumstances” supporting re-detention. The notice of revocation, the court found, did not specify the facts on which ICE relied, and Respondents still had not identified any changed circumstances regarding Petitioner’s removability. The court also held that Respondents had failed to show that removal to Vietnam was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, explaining that evidence of a travel-document request and a few anecdotal removals of other Vietnamese nationals did not satisfy the government’s burden. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved the re-detention of a Cambodian refugee who had long lived in the United States under an order of supervision, and the government’s failure to meet the court-ordered deadline to respond to the order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

On Jan. 14, 2026, Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition challenging ICE’s re-detention and seeking immediate release. On Feb. 27, Judge Valenzuela granted a TRO, ordered Respondents to “immediately release” Petitioner, barred re-detention absent compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 241.4(l) and § 241.13(i), enjoined third-country removal, and prohibited transfer outside the Central District of California pending final resolution or further order. The TRO further ordered Respondents to “show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue” and required that “[r]espondents must file any written response to the Order to Show Cause no later than 3/6/2026,” warning that “[f]ailure to file a response by this deadline shall be deemed as consent to the granting of a Preliminary Injunction.”

On Mar. 10, the court entered the preliminary injunction after finding that “Respondents did not file a response to the order to show cause by the March 6 deadline.” The court therefore issued a PI continuing the same protections: for the pendency of the lawsuit, Respondents were enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner without compliance with § 241.4(l) and § 241.13(i), from removing him to a third country absent notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral arbiter, and from transferring, relocating, or removing him outside the Central District of California absent a final order of removal.

On May 8, Magistrate Judge Christensen directed the parties to file, by May 18, a stipulated order and proposed judgment granting the § 2241 petition “on the same grounds and under the same terms” as the TRO, with appellate rights reserved, or else file a joint status report explaining why they could not do so. The parties then jointly requested entry of judgment on those terms. On May 29, Judge Valenzuela granted the petition as stipulated, with appellate rights reserved, and ordered judgment entered accordingly.

This habeas case involved the government’s failure to oppose Petitioner’s emergency TRO application despite notice, a standing-order deadline, and Judge Blumenfeld’s same-day warning that the application would be granted unopposed if no response was filed by 5:00 p.m. The court noted that “the government received notice” on Jan. 30 and, “[d]espite indicating that it would oppose the application,” had “failed to file an opposition” by the required deadline. The next day, Judge Blumenfeld found that the government “failed to file an opposition despite being warned that failure to do so would result in the TRO being granted,” granted the unopposed application, ordered immediate release, and enjoined re-detention pending preliminary-injunction proceedings. After Petitioner’s release, Judge Blumenfeld later entered a permanent injunction, final judgment, and an unopposed EAJA fee award for Petitioner’s successful habeas litigation.

Petitioner Vagan Aykaserovich Klyan, a citizen of the former Soviet Union, was detained by ICE at the Adelanto Detention Facility on Jan. 8, 2026. On Jan. 30, he filed a habeas petition and an emergency ex parte TRO application seeking immediate release from custody and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

On Feb. 3, Judge Blumenfeld entered a text order noting that “the government received notice of Petitioner’s application for a temporary restraining order on January 30,” but, “[d]espite indicating that it would oppose the application,” had “failed to file an opposition” within the deadline required by the court’s standing order. The court warned that, if the government did not file an opposition by 5:00 p.m. that day, “the TRO application will be granted as unopposed.”

On Feb. 4, Judge Blumenfeld granted the unopposed TRO application. The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately, enjoined Respondents from detaining him until the court adjudicated the preliminary-injunction motion, ordered Respondents to appear on Mar. 6 to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, and set briefing deadlines for Respondents’ OSC response and Petitioner’s reply.

On Feb. 18, Magistrate Judge Kim entered a multi-case status-conference order covering Klyan and seven other immigration habeas cases. The order required lead counsel to appear on Mar. 11 for purposes including “expediting disposition of this action,” “establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of management,” and “discouraging wasteful pretrial activities.” The court reminded counsel of Rule 11(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and counsel’s responsibility not to “over-use, misuse, and abuse” procedural tools in ways that increase cost and delay. The order warned that “[f]ailure to appear at the status conference or to be prepared to participate in good faith at the conference may lead to sanctions or contempt proceedings,” including monetary sanctions or involuntary dismissal.

On Feb. 27, after Petitioner had been released, Judge Blumenfeld noted that the parties disputed whether the petition was moot and ordered them to meet and confer on expedited consideration of the petition and entry of a permanent injunction. The parties later agreed to expedited consideration of the underlying habeas petition and proposed permanent-injunction language.

On Mar. 5, Judge Blumenfeld granted a permanent injunction. The court held that “the grant of preliminary relief does not render the petition moot because Petitioner seeks broader, permanent relief,” vacated the preliminary-injunction hearing, and enjoined Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent specified regulatory predicates, including violation of release conditions, changed circumstances supporting a significant likelihood of reasonably foreseeable removal, or an authorized determination under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2). The court further required that, upon any re-detention, Petitioner receive notice of the reasons for revocation of release and an informal interview within seven days, giving him an opportunity to respond. The court denied Petitioner’s request for a pre-detention hearing, but stated that, if Petitioner believed the government violated the permanent injunction, he could “move to enforce the injunction as appropriate.” Final judgment entered the same day.

On Apr. 30, Judge Blumenfeld granted Petitioner’s unopposed EAJA fee application. The court noted that judgment had entered after it granted the habeas petition, that the parties had agreed on the amount of fees and costs, and that Petitioner’s unopposed application was granted. Judge Blumenfeld awarded Petitioner “$2,026.67 for fees and costs incurred in the successful litigation of this matter.”

This habeas case involved ICE’s re-detention of a previously paroled asylum applicant during a routine check-in without a pre-detention hearing, a procedurally deficient post-detention bond hearing, and Respondents’ later failure to respond by a court-ordered deadline after Petitioner’s release made the case potentially moot. Judge Scarsi granted preliminary relief after finding that “Petitioner should have been afforded a pre-detention hearing” and that “the parties agree that the process Petitioner received at her January 2026 bond hearing before the immigration judge was deficient.”After Petitioner was released, Magistrate Judge Spaeth ordered briefing on mootness, but Respondents missed the deadline; the court then issued an OSC noting that “Respondents have not filed a response” and ordering them to show cause why they had failed to do so. Judge Scarsi later granted the petition and entered final judgment on the same grounds and terms as the preliminary-relief order. The court subsequently denied Petitioner’s EAJA fee application without prejudice for procedural and substantive deficiencies, while allowing an amended application or stipulated fee award.

Petitioner Nona Hasratyan was paroled into the United States in November 2024, released under orders to report periodically to DHS, applied for asylum in April 2025, and reported periodically to ICE. In July 2025, ICE detained her at a regularly scheduled check-in and held her at the Adelanto detention facility. In January 2026, an immigration judge denied bond after relying on evidence from the removal proceedings to find her a flight risk.

On Jan. 17, Petitioner filed her habeas petition and ex parte TRO motion. Judge Mark C. Scarsi temporarily barred Respondents from removing or transporting her outside the Central District of California while the motion was pending, then orally granted relief on Jan. 28 and issued a written preliminary-injunction order on Feb. 2. The court held that Petitioner was likely to succeed on her procedural due process claim because “Petitioner should have been afforded a pre-detention hearing.” Judge Scarsi also found the later bond process inadequate: the immigration judge relied on merits-case material that had not been made part of the bond record, issued only four words of reasoning—“Risk of Flight. Credibility.”—and Respondents’ counsel conceded the immigration judge should have incorporated the merits briefing into the record. The court summarized the point directly: “the parties agree that the process Petitioner received at her January 2026 bond hearing before the immigration judge was deficient,” and BIA review “is doubtlessly months away.” Judge Scarsi ordered Respondents to release Petitioner “forthwith” and enjoined re-detention absent a pre-detention hearing before a neutral adjudicator.

On Feb. 3, Magistrate Judge Spaeth ordered Petitioner to show cause why the case should not be dismissed as moot, required Petitioner to identify any remaining claims by Mar. 5, and ordered Respondents to respond by Mar. 19. Petitioner responded, but Respondents did not meet their deadline. On Mar. 24, Judge Spaeth issued an order to show cause stating that “[a]s of the date of this Order, Respondents have not filed a response,” and ordered Respondents “to show cause why they have failed to file a response by no later than April 7.” Respondents later responded and the OSC was discharged. On Apr. 23, the court ordered the parties to show cause why preliminary relief should not be converted to final judgment “for the same reasons and on the same terms provided in the order granting preliminary relief.” After the parties filed a stipulated proposed order and judgment, Judge Scarsi granted the petition on May 1, entered judgment under § 2241, and closed the case.

On May 27, Judge Scarsi denied Petitioner’s EAJA fee application without prejudice. Although the court had entered judgment in Petitioner’s favor and Petitioner represented that the fee application was unopposed, the court noted that Respondents had not stipulated to the proposed relief. The court denied the application for two independent reasons: it did not comply with the local rules governing motion practice, including hearing, memorandum, and prefiling-conference requirements, and it did not establish the required EAJA elements. Judge Scarsi explained that the application did not show Petitioner’s eligibility for an EAJA award, did not affirmatively allege that the government’s position was not substantially justified, and did not include an itemized fee statement. The court allowed Petitioner to file an amended application within 14 days or, alternatively, for the parties to stipulate to an EAJA fee award.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ TRO response that purported to respond to “the Court’s February 26, 2026, order” even though Petitioner did not commence the action until Mar. 19 and no such order existed, followed by Respondents’ later failure to file the court-ordered response to the habeas petition. Judge Garnett struck the TRO response because “[t]he Court did not order Respondents to file this response” and “necessarily could not issue an order before Petitioner commenced the action,” cautioning that “future misrepresentations before the Court may be deemed sanctionable conduct.” The court also warned that, if Petitioner was a Maldonado Bautista class member, Respondents were required to comply with that final judgment, citing Rios Vega and cases describing Respondents’ “continued defiance of valid court orders and its final judgment” and repeated denial of bond hearings to class members “on numerous occasions.” Magistrate Judge Spaeth later ordered Respondents to “show cause” by May 8 “why they have failed to file a response to the Petition.”

Petitioner Saajan Dhiman filed his habeas petition pro se, an ex parte TRO application, and a motion for appointment of counsel on Mar. 19, 2026. He was detained by ICE at Adelanto ICE Processing Center and sought immediate release, return to “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy,” prospective protection against re-detention absent governing immigration and due-process protections, and an order preventing transfer out of the Central District of California while the petition remained pending.

On Mar. 25, Respondents filed a response to the TRO application stating that they “submit this response to the Court’s February 26, 2026, order requiring a response to Petitioner’s ex parte application for temporary restraining order.” Judge Garnett struck the response on Mar. 27. The court explained that it had not ordered Respondents to file the response, that Petitioner had filed the petition and TRO application on Mar. 19, and that “[t]he Court necessarily could not issue an order before Petitioner commenced the action.” The court therefore struck the response and “cautioned that future misrepresentations before the Court may be deemed sanctionable conduct.” Judge Garnett also noted Respondents’ statement that Petitioner “appears to be a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz.” The court emphasized that, if Petitioner was a class member, Respondents were “mandated to act in accordance with the court’s final judgment” in Maldonado Bautista. Respondents’ were warned “failure to do so” could result in sanctions, with the court flagging previous C.D. Cal. decisions that raised concern regarding government compliance class relief:

“Respondents’ failure to do so will undoubtedly result in an unnecessary emergency petition and, if granted, possible sanctions. See, e.g., Rios Vega v. Noem, No. 5:26-CV-00058-SSS-BFM, 2026 WL 136227, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026) (citing cases where ‘Respondents’ continued defiance of valid court orders and its final judgment has resulted in unnecessary, voluminous filings of ex parte temporary restraining orders,’ such that members of the Bond Eligible Class were detained and denied bond hearings on numerous occasions).”

Respondents later filed a response on Apr. 6 representing that Petitioner had received an Apr. 3 bond hearing and that the immigration judge denied release on bond after finding that Petitioner had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not a flight risk. Petitioner replied that he was entitled to the TRO relief because Respondents had not responded to the merits of his application. On Apr. 21, Judge Garnett denied the TRO application under General Order 26-05, finding that Petitioner had not shown “imminent, irreparable harm” justifying ex parte emergency relief rather than the standard or expedited habeas briefing schedule. The court referred the habeas petition and pending counsel motion to Magistrate Judge Spaeth.

On Apr. 22, Magistrate Judge Spaeth ordered the parties to comply with General Order 26-05’s briefing schedule and to file all documents necessary to resolve the petition, including records concerning Petitioner’s charging document, prior release, notice given before or at detention, custody-redetermination order, and criminal history, if any. The court required records to be authenticated by a competent declaration and stated that extension requests would be granted only on good cause and should be made before the deadline. The same day, Magistrate Judge Spaeth referred the case to the Federal Public Defender for consideration of appointment of counsel. The Federal Public Defender appeared for Petitioner on May 1.

Also on May 1, Magistrate Judge Spaeth entered an order to show cause for failure to file the petition response. The court noted that it had issued an order requiring a response to the petition, had ordered the parties to comply with General Order 26-05, and that, “[a]s of the date of this Order, Respondents have not filed a response to the Petition.” The court ordered Respondents to “show cause” by May 8 “why they have failed to file a response to the Petition.” Respondents filed their answer on May 7, and Petitioner filed a reply on May 14.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a notice of compliance after Judge Fitzgerald ordered Petitioner returned to the Central District of California, released from custody, and protected from re-detention absent compliance with Order of Supervision (OSUP) revocation regulations. The court set a compliance hearing, later vacated it after Respondents filed the required notice, and Magistrate Judge Viramontes subsequently warned that failure to appear or participate in good faith at a status conference could result in “sanctions or contempt proceedings.”

Petitioner Osmar S.C., a native and citizen of Cuba, had lived in the United States since August 1993. After a 1999 drug-related charge, he was ordered removed and held in immigration detention, but was released on an OSUP in August 2000 because Cuba refused to accept him. For more than 25 years, he remained on supervised release and attended regular ICE check-ins. At his Feb. 25, 2026 check-in, Respondents revoked his OSUP and arrested him. Petitioner stated that ICE gave him no documentation or notice and that an ICE agent told him only that “Petitioner’s life was not in danger anymore in Cuba.” He filed his habeas petition and ex parte TRO application on Mar. 20, and Respondents transferred him from Adelanto, California, to El Paso, Texas, on Mar. 23.

On Apr. 7, Judge Fitzgerald granted TRO relief. The court found that Respondents had failed to “meaningfully oppose” the TRO application and that Petitioner had shown a likelihood of success because ICE had not complied with the mandatory OSUP-revocation procedures in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). The court accepted Petitioner’s uncontested filings as showing that Respondents failed to provide “any documentation or any notice” and did not provide “an informal interview” or meaningful opportunity to be heard. Judge Fitzgerald also ordered Petitioner’s return to the district under the All Writs Act and the court’s inherent authority, because Respondents had relocated him to Texas during the case.

The TRO required Respondents to return Petitioner to Adelanto within two days if he was not already there, immediately release him under the same supervision terms that applied before re-detention, file a notice of compliance by Apr. 10, and refrain from re-detaining him unless they complied with 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i). Respondents did not file the notice by Apr. 10.

On Apr. 13, Judge Fitzgerald entered a scheduling notice stating that, “[a]s of April 13, 2026, Respondents have failed to file a notice of compliance,” and set an Apr. 15 hearing “to discuss Respondents’ efforts to comply with the TRO.” The court gave Respondents an “alternative:” if they filed notice by Apr. 14 at 3:00 p.m. indicating that Petitioner had been returned and released, the hearing would be taken off calendar. Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Apr. 14, and the court vacated the Apr. 15 hearing.

On Apr. 20, Magistrate Judge Viramontes ordered the parties to show cause at a May 6 status conference why the preliminary relief should not be converted immediately to final judgment on the merits. The order permitted the parties to discharge the show-cause order by filing a stipulation and proposed judgment by May 4, and warned that “failure to appear at the status conference as ordered or to be prepared to participate in good faith at the conference may lead to sanctions or contempt proceedings.” The parties later stipulated to judgment, and on May 6 Judge Fitzgerald entered judgment granting the petition and enjoining Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner unless they complied with 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i).

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a court-ordered certificate of compliance after Judge Kronstadt held that the TRO had taken effect and ordered Petitioner released “forthwith.” After Respondents did not submit supplemental evidence by the Apr. 10 deadline, the court held that, “under its terms, the TRO is in effect,” ordered release, and required Respondents to certify compliance by Apr. 17. When Respondents “failed to do so,” Judge Kronstadt set a new deadline and warned that further noncompliance could result in an OSC “as to why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to comply with Court orders.” Respondents then filed a notice stating that Petitioner had been released, and the court later granted preliminary relief in part, rejecting mootness because Petitioner still faced a material risk of unlawful re-detention and ordering that Respondents “shall not re-detain Petitioner for the purpose of effecting his removal unless and until” they satisfied Zadvydas and the OSUP regulations in §§ 241.4 and 241.13.

Petitioner George Zammar Yakoub, a citizen and national of Syria, first entered the United States in 2002 on a B-2 tourist visa and alleged that he had lived in the United States since then. He also alleged that his wife and daughter are U.S. citizens. ICE charged him as removable in 2011, but an immigration judge granted him asylum. After later state criminal convictions, his immigration proceedings were reopened; in 2015, an immigration judge ordered him removed while granting deferral of removal to Syria under the Convention Against Torture. After approximately five months in post-order detention, ICE released him on an order of supervision because the government could not obtain travel documents for his removal to Syria. Petitioner contended that the United States and Syria lack diplomatic relations or repatriation agreements. On Mar. 10, 2026, San Bernardino County authorities arrested him on vehicle-related charges. The next day, ICE conducted what Respondents described as a “targeted enforcement operation” at the jail, saw someone matching Petitioner’s description leaving the facility, arrested him, revoked his OSUP, and detained him at Adelanto ICE Processing Center. Petitioner alleged that an ICE agent told him the agent “believed,” but was “not sure,” whether a travel document could be obtained.

Petitioner filed his pro se habeas petition and TRO motion on Mar. 23. On Mar. 24, Judge Kronstadt set a TRO briefing schedule and entered a no-transfer order. The court stated that, “in light of Petitioner’s interest in participating in further proceedings before this Court and in maintaining adequate access to legal counsel through these proceedings,” Petitioner could not be transferred except to a facility within the Central District of California while preliminary-relief proceedings remained pending.

After the magistrate judge referred the matter to the Federal Public Defender, the FPD appeared for Petitioner on Mar. 31. Respondents initially filed a notice of non-opposition to the TRO motion, then withdrew it and filed an opposition the same day.

On Mar. 31, Judge Kronstadt granted the TRO in part. The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner from custody within 14 days, subject to the prior terms and conditions of his OSUP, and enjoined Respondents from re-detaining him without complying with the regulations governing revocation of an OSUP based on changed circumstances. The court stayed the injunctive relief for 14 days to permit Respondents to submit supplemental evidence by Apr. 10 showing that Petitioner’s removal was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court also denied without prejudice Petitioner’s request for an injunction barring removal to a third country. The Mar. 24 no-transfer order remained in place until the court made a final determination on whether to extend the stay or modify the TRO.

Respondents did not submit supplemental evidence by the Apr. 10 deadline. On Apr. 15, Judge Kronstadt entered a text order noting that the TRO provided that, absent supplemental evidence, the stay would end 14 days after issuance and the injunctive relief would take immediate effect “without further order of the Court.” “Respondents did not submit any supplemental evidence by the April 10, 2026 deadline, and have made no other submissions in response to the TRO,” the court wrote, holding that “under its terms, the TRO is in effect” and ordered Respondents to release Petitioner “forthwith.” The court also ordered Respondents to file a certificate of compliance by Apr. 17.

Respondents did not file the certificate by Apr. 17. On Apr. 20, Judge Kronstadt entered an order stating that Respondents had been ordered to file a certificate of compliance by Apr. 17 and “failed to do so.” The court ordered Respondents to file the certificate by Apr. 21 and warned: “If Respondents do not comply with this Order, an Order to Show Cause may issue as to why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to comply with Court orders.” Respondents filed a notice of compliance later on Apr. 20, stating that Petitioner had been released from custody on Apr. 2.

That same day, Judge Kronstadt ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, including whether the TRO had made the preliminary injunction request and the habeas petition moot. On Apr. 24, Respondents argued that the case was moot because Petitioner had been released under the TRO. Petitioner replied that preliminary relief remained necessary to prevent re-detention without the required process.

On May 6, Judge Kronstadt granted preliminary relief in part, explaining that the petition challenged Respondents’ failure to comply with the OSUP-revocation procedures in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13 and incorporating the TRO analysis, which had found that Respondents violated Petitioner’s substantive due-process rights by detaining him for removal despite no “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” The court rejected Respondents’ mootness argument because the TRO had expired and Petitioner still faced a material risk of unlawful re-detention, particularly given the OSUP requirement that he attend in-person ICE check-ins and the fact that similarly situated petitioners had been re-detained after release under TROs. Finding the Winter factors satisfied, but declining to enter a broad “obey the law” injunction, the court ordered that Respondents and those acting with them “shall not re-detain Petitioner for the purpose of effecting his removal unless and until there is a ‘significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’” and the government has complied with §§ 241.4 and 241.13. The court discharged the preliminary-injunction OSC and required no bond.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to comply with the General Order 26-05 appearance and briefing schedule, followed by an in-person hearing and grant of habeas relief after “no opposition was filed by Respondents.”After Respondents did not timely appear, Magistrate Judge Spaeth stated that “Respondents have not filed a notice of appearance” and ordered them “to show cause why they have failed to file a notice of appearance.” The court later found that Respondents had “failed to timely appear, respond to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, and timely file an answer to the Petition,” set an in-person hearing requiring “[a]ll counsel” to appear, and then granted the petition. The next day, pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation, the court ordered DHS to release Petitioner from ICE custody “immediately under appropriate conditions of supervision” and within 24 hours absent extraordinary circumstances.

Petitioner Ani Akcheirlian filed his habeas petition and an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order on Apr. 1, 2026, while in ICE custody. On Apr. 2, Magistrate Judge Spaeth denied Petitioner’s TRO application for failure to comply with Rule 65, but stated that, if Petitioner sought to accelerate the General Order 26-05 briefing schedule, the parties should meet and confer and file a stipulation or joint statement.

On Apr. 8, after Respondents did not file a notice of appearance within the three-day General Order 26-05 deadline, Magistrate Judge Spaeth wrote, “As of the date of this Order, Respondents have not filed a notice of appearance,” and ordered Respondents “to show cause why they have failed to file a notice of appearance.” The court emphasized that the OSC did “not alter or suspend the parties’ obligations under the expedited briefing schedule.”

On Apr. 13, the court escalated. Magistrate Judge Spaeth wrote that “Respondents have failed to timely appear, respond to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, and timely file an answer to the Petition,” and set a hearing on both the show-cause order and the petition for Apr. 15, requiring “[a]ll counsel” to appear in person. Respondents filed a notice of appearance and answer on Apr. 14. At the Apr. 15 hearing, however, the minute entry stated that “no opposition was filed by Respondents,” and the court granted the petition. On Apr. 16, pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation, the court ordered DHS to release Petitioner from ICE custody “immediately under appropriate conditions of supervision” and within 24 hours absent extraordinary circumstances, entered judgment, and closed the case.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to Petitioner’s TRO motion within the time the court allotted, after which Magistrate Judge Eick granted partial TRO relief requiring a prompt immigration-court bond hearing and barring transfer outside the district. The court wrote that “Respondents failed to file any response to the Motion within the allotted time” and ordered Respondents to provide a bond hearing before an immigration judge within seven days. After Petitioner later moved for further relief, apparently challenging the adequacy of the Apr. 22 bond hearing, Magistrate Judge Eick denied the motion, holding that the court had ordered “a bond hearing, not a factual exploration of the March 25, 2026 revocation of supervision,” that “[t]he immigration judge held a bond hearing,” and that Petitioner had received “a meaningful opportunity to contest his current detention.”

Petitioner Dok Zainutdinov, a Russian national of Chechen ethnicity, entered the United States in 2021 and was released by immigration authorities on supervision. He substantially complied with supervision until Feb. 12, 2026, when he failed to arrive on time for an immigration hearing because of a reported medical emergency. The immigration judge denied counsel’s request to delay the hearing and entered an in absentia removal order. Petitioner filed a motion to rescind and reopen, which remained pending when ICE re-detained him on Mar. 25. He filed his habeas petition and TRO motion on Apr. 13.

On Apr. 13, Magistrate Judge Eick ordered Respondents to respond to the TRO motion by 9:00 a.m. on Apr. 15. Respondents did not respond. On Apr. 15, the court wrote: “Respondents failed to file any response to the Motion within the allotted time.” The court found that Petitioner had shown the required elements for a TRO “mandating a prompt bond hearing,” concluded that Petitioner had shown a likelihood of success on his claim that re-detention without a prompt bond hearing violated due process, and ordered Respondents to provide a bond hearing before an immigration judge within seven days. The court also enjoined Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside the district during the case and ordered the parties to file a compliance report by Apr. 24. Except for that relief, the court denied the TRO motion, holding that Petitioner had not shown that immediate release or an injunction against removal was appropriate at that time.

On Apr. 23, Respondents filed a notice of compliance, with an attached exhibit. On May 14, Petitioner filed motions for relief and to enforce the court’s order, apparently challenging the adequacy of the Apr. 22 immigration-court bond hearing. On May 18, Magistrate Judge Eick ordered Respondents, within 14 days, to file both a response to Petitioner’s motion for further relief and “a transcript of the April 22, 2026 hearing before the Immigration Judge.” The court stated that it would then take the motion under submission without oral argument.

On Jun. 4, Magistrate Judge Eick denied Petitioner’s motions for further relief. After reading the parties’ filings and listening to an audio recording of the Apr. 22 immigration-court hearing, the court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the immigration judge had violated the Apr. 15 order by failing to identify the specific reasons for the revocation of supervision. The court explained that it had ordered “a bond hearing, not a factual exploration of the March 25, 2026 revocation of supervision,” and that Petitioner had received “a meaningful opportunity to contest his current detention.” The court also held that any alleged burden-of-proof error was immaterial because the immigration judge found that the result would be the same under Petitioner’s proposed burden, and that Petitioner’s disagreement with the merits of the bond decision did not show a failure to follow the court’s order or provide a basis for habeas relief. The court denied the motion and allowed the parties to file additional papers in support of or opposition to the petition by June 17.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ repeated failure to file the notice of appearance required by the court’s General Order 26-05 schedule, with both Magistrate Judge Early and Judge Wilson identifying the failure before Respondents appeared. Magistrate Judge Early first stated that “Respondents did not file a timely NOA” and ordered them to file the notice “forthwith.” After Respondents still had not appeared, Judge Wilson stated that Respondents “have still failed to do so” and ordered them “for a third time” to file the notice of appearance “forthwith.” Respondents appeared later that day. Judge Wilson then granted TRO relief after the government agreed that Petitioner fell within the Maldonado Bautistaclass, ordering Respondents to provide an individualized bond redetermination hearing within seven days or release him under his prior conditions.

Petitioner Silverio Gonzalez Mendiola filed his § 2241 habeas petition on Apr. 23, 2026, while detained at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center. The same day, he moved for certification as a class member under Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz.

On Apr. 24, Judge Wilson issued a General Order 26-05 briefing notice. On Apr. 29, Magistrate Judge Early noted that Respondents had been ordered to file a notice of appearance within three calendar days but had not done so: “Respondents did not file a timely NOA.” The court ordered Respondents to file the notice “forthwith,” and reminded them that their answer and response to Petitioner’s class-member motion were due May 1. On May 1, after Respondents failed to file, Judge Wilson stated that “Respondents … have still failed to do so,” and ordered them “for a third time” to file the notice of appearance “forthwith.” Respondents filed their notice of appearance and return later that day.

On May 5, Judge Wilson granted Petitioner’s TRO request. Because “the Government agrees that this Petitioner falls within the class as described in Maldonado Bautista,” the court concluded that Petitioner was entitled to that judgment’s relief and ordered Respondents to provide an individualized bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge within seven days or release him under the same conditions that existed before detention. The court also ordered Respondents to file a notice of compliance within seven days of the bond hearing.

On May 18, Respondents filed a notice of compliance, attaching the immigration judge’s bond order. On May 21, Magistrate Judge Early issued a report and recommendation (R&R), recommending that the district judge accept the recommendation, deny Petitioner’s class-member motion as moot, and dismiss the habeas petition without prejudice. Objections were due May 28.

This habeas case involved ICE’s re-detention of Petitioner at a routine check-in after revoking his Order of Supervision, Respondents’ failure to file a substantive response to Petitioner’s discovery motion by the court-ordered deadline, and the parties’ later failure to file the joint status report required after Magistrate Judge Scott ordered Petitioner’s release. After Respondents filed only a notice that the parties were attempting to meet and confer, the court granted discovery, explaining that informal resolution efforts were “not a valid reason to ignore a Court-ordered deadline to respond to a motion.” After the parties then failed to file the required post-release status report, Magistrate Judge Scott issued an “order to show cause why the parties should not be held in contempt for failure to file a joint status report,” stating that “no status report has been filed” and ordering them to “show cause” why they should not be held in contempt “for failure to obey a court order.” The court later granted habeas relief after finding that ICE violated due process and its own regulations when it revoked Petitioner’s OSUP, and that “Respondents’ Answer presents no new argument or evidence.”

Petitioner Tigran Bedrosian, an ethnic Armenian born in Azerbaijan in 1984, came to the United States around age 11 because of the war in Azerbaijan and had lived in the Los Angeles area for decades. After a 2012 removal order, ICE released him on an order of supervision because it could not obtain travel documents for Azerbaijan. On Oct. 3, 2025, ICE detained him at a routine check-in and revoked his OSUP. He filed his habeas petition on Oct. 23, asserting due process and APA claims based on the OSUP revocation, as well as a separate claim that he feared removal to a third country without notice or an opportunity to challenge that removal.

On Nov. 4, Petitioner filed an ex parte TRO application. Judge Hwang ordered Respondents to respond by Nov. 6; Respondents timely opposed, and the TRO was denied without prejudice on Nov. 12. On Dec. 8, Petitioner moved for discovery, attaching 18 proposed requests for production. At a Dec. 11 telephonic status conference, Magistrate Judge Scott ordered Respondents to respond to the discovery motion by Dec. 16. Respondents instead filed a notice of meet and confer, stating that the parties were “attempting to resolve the issues.” On Dec. 19, after Respondents failed to file a substantive opposition, Magistrate Judge Scott granted the motion and ordered Respondents to respond to the document requests within 30 days. The court wrote: “While the Court commends the parties for attempting to resolve their disputes informally, this is not a valid reason to ignore a Court-ordered deadline to respond to a motion, particularly since Respondents’ notice does not indicate that the parties have reached a resolution.”

On Jan. 15, Magistrate Judge Scott granted Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that immigration officials violated due process and their own regulations by giving Petitioner insufficient notice and an insufficient opportunity to be heard before revoking his OSUP and detaining him. The court ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner subject to his prior OSUP, enjoined re-detention unless and until Respondents complied with 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13, barred transfer out of the district if he was later re-detained, required service of relevant documents on counsel, and ordered a joint status report within seven days addressing release, possible re-detention, travel-document efforts, possible third-country removal, and mootness.

Respondents and Petitioner did not file the required joint report. On Jan. 26, Magistrate Judge Scott entered an “order to show cause why the parties should not be held in contempt for failure to file a joint status report.” The court wrote: “Because the preliminary injunction order was issued on January 15, 2026, the status report was due by January 22, 2026. As of the date of this order, no status report has been filed.” The parties were ordered to “show cause” by Jan. 30 “why they should not be held in contempt for failure to obey a court order,” but could “discharge this order to show cause by filing the joint status report described above.”

The parties filed status reports on Jan. 30 confirming release. Respondents argued the petition should be dismissed as moot, but Petitioner disagreed. On Feb. 2, Magistrate Judge Scott ordered Respondents to answer the petition within 14 days and directed that if Respondents argued any claim was moot or unripe, the answer “must also address the merits of the claims in the alternative.” Respondents filed their answer on Feb. 18, argued mootness, and attached earlier declarations, but did not present any merits argument.

On May 20, Magistrate Judge Scott granted the petition. The court held that preliminary release had not mooted the habeas case because the preliminary injunction had not been made permanent and Petitioner still faced re-detention risk. As to Grounds One and Two, the court held that ICE violated due process and its own regulations when it revoked Petitioner’s OSUP without sufficient notice or an interview, and that “Respondents’ Answer presents no new argument or evidence.” As to Ground Three, the court found Petitioner’s fear of third-country removal ripe because Officer Langill’s declaration showed ICE was exploring whether Petitioner had documents or status in other countries, including Russia. The court then held that removal to a third country without meaningful notice and an opportunity to challenge removal would violate due process, § 1231, and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(b)(2).

This habeas case involved Respondents’ repeated failure to participate in the litigation: they missed Magistrate Judge Scott’s response deadline, failed to respond to a follow-up order, failed to appear at a status conference, and later failed to file the custody-status report required after Judge Holcomb ordered Petitioner released forthwith. Magistrate Judge Scott recommended release in part because Respondents had not met their burden under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), then issued an order to show cause why she should not certify facts for civil contempt proceedings before later discharging that order.

Petitioner Marlon Castillo Espada, a Bolivian national and lawful permanent resident since 1989, was ordered removed to Bolivia in 2013 but was granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture and released on an OSUP when the government could not remove him. He has four U.S.-citizen children and was convicted of DUI in May 2014 and October 2022, receiving jail sentences of 60 and 45 days, respectively. ICE re-detained him on Oct. 23, 2025, and he filed his habeas petition on Nov. 6, arguing that removal was not reasonably foreseeable and that his detention violated due process under Zadvydas and § 1231(a).

On Nov. 10, Magistrate Judge Scott issued an order requiring a response to the habeas petition and enjoined Respondents from transferring, relocating, or removing Petitioner outside the Central District of California pending final resolution or further order. Petitioner then filed a TRO application. Judge Holcomb ordered Respondents to respond to the TRO application by Nov. 17 at noon; Respondents did so. After a Nov. 19 hearing, Judge Holcomb continued the TRO hearing to Dec. 19 and directed Respondents to file a status report by Dec. 12 advising the court of their efforts to obtain travel documents and effectuate removal. Respondents filed a Dec. 12 status report saying they had “no updates or additional information to report,” and Judge Holcomb denied TRO relief without prejudice on Dec. 19.

On Dec. 23, Magistrate Judge Scott ordered further briefing on the habeas petition and required Respondents to respond within 14 days weeks, by Jan. 6, 2026. Respondents did not do so. On Jan. 7, Magistrate Judge Scott entered a text order stating that “Respondents have failed to” “respond to the Petition within 2 weeks.” The court set a telephonic status conference for Jan. 9, but noted that it might cancel the conference if Respondents filed a response to the petition beforehand. Respondents did not file anything before the status conference and did not appear. The Jan. 9 minute entry records that the status conference was held, Petitioner’s counsel appeared, “Counsel for Respondent: No appearance,” and the court took the matter under submission.

On Jan. 9, Magistrate Judge Scott issued a report and recommendation (R&R) recommending that the petition be granted. On Jan. 16, Respondents filed objections, and on Jan. 20, Magistrate Judge Scott issued a final R&R explaining why those objections did not change the recommendation. In the final R&R, the court stated that the record had materially changed since the TRO denial because “Respondents failed to file any response to the underlying Petition after being ordered to do so, and they failed to appear at a hearing before the Magistrate Judge on January 9, 2026.” The court explained:

“On December 23, 2025, the Court issued a scheduling order requiring Respondents to respond to the Petition within 14 days, i.e., by January 6, 2026. Respondents failed to timely respond. On January 7, 2026, the Court issued an order noting Respondents’ failure to respond to the Petition and setting a telephonic status conference for January 9, 2026. The Court noted that if Respondents filed a response to the Petition prior to the status conference, it might take the status conference off calendar. Respondents did not file anything in response to this order. The Court held the status conference on January 9, 2026, and Respondents failed to appear.”

On the merits, Magistrate Judge Scott held that Petitioner’s re-detention after prior OSUP release was governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), and that Respondents bore the burden to show changed circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondents had not produced the OSUP revocation notice, identified any third country willing to accept Petitioner, or shown any changed circumstances making removal more likely than it had been in 2013. The court also found Respondents’ travel-document assertions too vague, noting that ICE had only “initiated the process of requesting travel documents from third countries” and did “not anticipate any obstacles to removal once travel documents are issued.” By the time of the initial R&R, Respondents had provided no further travel-document update, no petition response, and no appearance at the Jan. 9 conference; the court also noted that the conviction underlying Petitioner’s removal order had been vacated and that Petitioner had moved the BIA to reopen his case.

On Jan. 23, Judge Holcomb accepted and adopted the final R&R’s findings and recommendations, granted the petition, ordered Respondents to release Petitioner “forthwith” subject to the prior OSUP, enjoined re-detention unless Respondents followed 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l) and 241.13(i), and directed Respondents to file a status report by Jan. 30 advising the court of Petitioner’s custody status.

Respondents did not file the required status report. On Feb. 3, Magistrate Judge Scott ordered “Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating court orders.” The court recounted the earlier missed response deadline, nonresponse to the Jan. 7 order, failure to appear at the Jan. 9 conference, as well as the missed Jan. 30 custody-status-report deadline. It wrote: “As of the date of this order, no Status Report has been received by the Court.” Magistrate Judge Scott ordered Respondents, within seven days, to file a status report advising the court of Petitioner’s custody status and A-number, and to “[s]how cause in writing, if any they have, why the Magistrate Judge should not certify the facts set forth in this Order and initiate civil contempt proceedings before the District Judge.”

Respondents filed a response to the show-cause order on Feb. 10, attaching the OSUP release exhibit. On Feb. 12, after reviewing that filing, Magistrate Judge Scott discharged the Feb. 3 OSC. On Feb. 27, Judge Holcomb entered judgment, ordering, adjudging, and decreeing that “the Petition is granted,” and the case was terminated.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to meet two court-ordered deadlines in emergency habeas proceedings: first, their failure to respond to Petitioner’s TRO / preliminary-injunction motion, and then their failure to file the compliance statement required after release relief was granted. Judge Aenlle-Rocha first preserved jurisdiction by ordering that Petitioner “shall not be removed from the United States unless and until this court orders otherwise” and, “given Petitioner’s interest in participating in further proceedings before this court and maintaining adequate access to legal counsel,” that he “shall not be transferred outside this District absent further order from this court.” After Respondents appeared but filed no response and sought no extension, the court deemed “Respondents’ failure to file a timely Response as consent to the granting of the Motion,” ordered Respondents to “release Petitioner from custody immediately,” return his property, and file a statement “attesting to Respondents’ compliance.” When Respondents did not timely file that statement, the court stated that “Respondents have not filed a statement timely,” ordered a status report “regarding their compliance,” and warned that further failure could result in sanctions against Respondents and counsel, “including monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000.”

Petitioner Rakesh Rakesh filed his § 2241 petition on Jan. 30, 2026, challenging his immigration detention under the Due Process Clause, the INA, the APA, and federal regulations. The same day, he moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking immediate release during the habeas proceedings “without requiring bond or electronic monitoring,” and an order enjoining Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining him absent compliance with constitutional protections and government policies.

On Feb. 3, Judge Aenlle-Rocha set a briefing schedule on the motion, despite noting that Petitioner had not noticed a hearing or complied with the local rules governing ex parte applications. The court warned that it expected “the parties to comply fully with all statutory requirements, court rules, and court orders,” and that failure to comply could result in “the striking or denial of motions and other filings.” The court ordered Respondents to respond to the motion by Feb. 11 at 11:59 p.m., set Petitioner’s reply deadline for Feb. 18, and set a Feb. 27 hearing. To preserve jurisdiction, the court ordered that Petitioner “shall not be removed from the United States unless and until this court orders otherwise.” It also ordered, “given Petitioner’s interest in participating in further proceedings before this court and maintaining adequate access to legal counsel,” that Petitioner “shall not be transferred outside this District absent further order from this court.”

On Feb. 23, the court granted Petitioner’s motion as unopposed. Judge Aenlle-Rocha wrote that, although Respondents had appeared through counsel on Feb. 11, “[t]o date, Respondents have not filed a Response to the Motion or requested additional time to respond.” Citing Local Rule 7-12, the court explained that “[t]he failure to file any required document, or the failure to file it within the deadline, may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion ….” The court therefore deemed “ Respondents’ failure to file a timely Response as consent to the granting of the Motion” and ordered Respondents to “release Petitioner from custody immediately,” “return all property to Petitioner that was confiscated from him when he was arrested and processed into detention,” and “file a statement with the court within one business day of Petitioner’s release, attesting to Respondents’ compliance with this Order.” The court also preliminarily enjoined Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner during the habeas action absent express authorization from the court.

Respondents then missed the court’s one-business-day compliance-reporting requirement. On Mar. 2, Judge Aenlle-Rocha entered a text order noting that the Feb. 23 order had required Respondents to release Petitioner, return his property, and “file a statement with the court by February 24, 2026, attesting to Respondents’ compliance with the court’s Order.” The court stated that “Respondents have not filed a statement timely.” The court therefore ordered Respondents to file a status report by Mar. 4 “regarding their compliance” with the Feb. 23 order and warned: “Failure to file a status report timely may result in the imposition of sanctions against Respondents and their counsel, which may include monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000.”

On Mar. 4, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (SAUSA) Patrick J. Kearney appeared as new counsel for Respondents and filed the court-ordered status report with an exhibit concerning Petitioner’s release. Kearney also filed a notice that SAUSA Karen E. Smith was no longer counsel of record.

This habeas case involved ICE’s re-detention of a long-supervised Armenian/Soviet-born petitioner at a routine check-in, Respondents’ failure to respond to his TRO application, and a later sanctions OSC after Respondents also failed to respond to the court’s preliminary-injunction show-cause order. Judge Slaughter granted TRO relief after noting that Respondents “failed to file any response at all,” ordered release, and then ordered Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Karen E. Smith personally to show cause why sanctions should not issue and to appear in person. Before the OSC response was filed, new government counsel appeared, Smith withdrew, and new counsel filed the response with evidence of release. Judge Slaughter later discharged the sanctions OSC but stated that it remained “concerned about the government’s repeated failure to respond to filings in this case.”

Petitioner Akop Dzhulakyan is a native and citizen of the former Soviet Union, born in what is now Armenia. He had previously been a lawful permanent resident, but was ordered removed in 2004 after a conviction. Because ICE did not remove him during the removal period, ICE released him under an Order of Supervision on May 29, 2012. In 2014, at Respondents’ request, Petitioner applied for an Armenian passport, but the Armenian consulate refused to issue a passport or travel document, and Respondents recognized that Armenia was unlikely ever to issue one. Petitioner reported under his OSUP from 2012 through 2025. On Jan. 16, 2026, during a scheduled routine check-in, ICE detained him, citing “changed circumstances,” but allegedly did not provide written notice identifying the specific changed circumstances, any available travel document, or any removal timeframe.

On Jan. 29, Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition. On Feb. 2, Magistrate Judge Alicia G. Rosenberg ordered Respondents to file a notice of appearance within 14 days, a motion to dismiss within 60 days, or an answer within 75 days. On Feb. 6, Petitioner filed an ex parte TRO application. On Feb. 9, Judge Slaughter ordered the government to respond to the TRO application by 5:00 p.m. that day and ordered that Petitioner not be removed or relocated from the Central District of California pending further order. Respondents filed nothing.

On Feb. 10, Judge Slaughter granted the TRO. The court wrote that “Respondents did not file any response to the Application, and the deadline to do so has passed.” It added that, under Local Rule 7-12, failure to file a required document on time may be deemed consent to granting the motion, and that the court “could grant the Application on this basis alone.” Reaching the merits, the court found that Petitioner had adequately shown that the government likely failed to comply with § 241.13(i)(3) and § 241.4(l), because ICE relied on “changed circumstances,” which Petitioner’s evidence described as standardized revocation language, and courts regularly found similar language insufficient under the regulatory notice requirement. The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner by Feb. 13 at 1:00 p.m., under his original OSUP conditions, and ordered Respondents to show cause by Feb. 18 why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

On Feb. 20, Karen E. Smith, a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (SAUSA) at the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s Office, appeared as counsel for Respondents Todd Lyons, Kristi Noem, and Fereti Semaia. On Feb. 27, after Respondents had not responded to the Feb. 18 preliminary-injunction show-cause order, Judge Slaughter entered an order to show cause directed to SAUSA Smith. The court wrote that, “[a]s of the present date—9 days after Respondents’ deadline to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue—Respondents have filed nothing.” The court also noted that “Respondents filed nothing” to Petitioner’s TRO motion and “failed to comply with the court’s February 18, 2026 deadline (after also failing to comply with the court’s deadline to respond to the TRO Application).” Judge Slaughter ordered SAUSA Smith to show cause in writing by Mar. 3

“why she should not be sanctioned for failing to comply with the court’s February 10, 2026 order to show cause by February 18, 2026 why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Ms. Smith is further ordered to appear in person at the March 5, 2026 hearing at 10:00 a.m. … Failure to comply with the court’s order to show cause in writing or to appear at the hearing may result in the court issuing appropriate sanctions.

Separately, Ms. Smith’s failure to appear at the March 5, 2026 hearing will result in the court issuing a preliminary injunction.”

On Mar. 3, before SAUSA Smith responded to the show-cause order, Assistant U.S. Attorney Paul Bartholomew Green (AUSA Green) appeared as new counsel for Respondents. SAUSA Smith withdrew as counsel the same day. That same day, AUSA Green, on behalf of Respondents, then filed a response to the show-cause order with evidence of release and a written statement.

On Mar. 4, Judge Slaughter denied preliminary-injunction relief, discharged the sanctions OSC, vacated the Mar. 5 hearing, and referred further proceedings to the magistrate judge. The court noted that its Feb. 10 TRO had “order[ed] Respondents to release Petitioner from custody on or before February 13, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time,” and that “Respondents did so.” Judge Slaughter found that the TRO relief had been provided and that Petitioner had not made an adequate showing that further preliminary-injunction relief was warranted at that time. But the court also stated that, “[a]lthough the court is concerned about the government’s repeated failure to respond to filings in this case,” it would discharge the sanctions OSC. The prior order barring Petitioner’s removal or relocation from the Central District of California remained “in full effect.”

On Apr. 17, Respondents filed an answer to the habeas petition. On May 20, after the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Pedro V. Castillo following Magistrate Judge Rosenberg’s retirement, the court ordered the parties to file a joint status report by May 27 addressing Petitioner’s current custody status, what issues remained for decision, whether the parties intended to stand on existing briefing, whether further briefing was necessary, and whether the parties would consent to magistrate-judge jurisdiction.

This habeas case involved a Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class member whom Judge Sykes found had been denied the bond-hearing relief required by the final judgment, Respondents’ continued effort to oppose class-member relief despite collateral estoppel, and a later court-ordered bond hearing that failed to reflect the correct burden of proof. Judge Vera first barred Petitioner’s transfer or removal after finding that he had shown “both a probability of success on the merits and numerous forms of irreparable harm,” then transferred the case to Judge Sykes. Judge Sykes described the case as “yet another in a slew of habeas petitions” caused by “Respondents’ deliberate choice to continue defying the final judgment entered in Bautista,” held Respondents collaterally estopped from relitigating Bond Eligible Class members’ entitlement to bond hearings, and stated that she could “no longer confer Respondents with the benefit of the doubt as to the intent of their filings.” When Respondents later opposed preliminary relief without disclosing material intervening facts, Judge Sykes found that “[t]hese facts were never disclosed by Respondents” and that Respondents had not “accurately presented the facts of Petitioner’s circumstances.” The court ordered immediate release after the resulting bond order gave only “flight risk” as its explanation and the record “support[ed] the conclusion that the burden of proof was misplaced.”

Petitioner Denil Josue Hernandez-Bueso, a Honduran national, entered the United States with his father in January 2019, when he was 14 years old. DHS charged him with presence without admission and released him the next day on an order of recognizance. Months later, the Los Angeles Immigration Court ordered him removed in absentia, but Petitioner alleged that he did not know about the order and continued living openly in the United States, graduating from high school and completing his first year of college in 2024. On Oct. 23, 2025, nearly six years after DHS released him, ICE arrested him while he was boarding a flight to North Carolina to visit his fiancée. On Nov. 14, an immigration judge reopened proceedings and vacated the in absentia removal order. Petitioner then sought custody redetermination, but on Jan. 13, 2026, the immigration judge denied release on bond.

On Jan. 15, Petitioner filed his habeas petition and TRO application. On Jan. 16, Judge Hernán D. Vera granted emergency relief in part, finding that Petitioner had shown “both a probability of success on the merits and numerous forms of irreparable harm,” and enjoined Respondents from “transferring, relocating, or removing Petitioner outside of the Central District of California,” including transfer to an ICE facility outside the district or removal from the United States, while the application remained pending. Judge Vera also found that Petitioner appeared to be a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista and transferred the case to Judge Sykes for further proceedings.

On Jan. 23, Judge Sykes ordered Respondents to respond to the TRO application by Jan. 27. The court wrote that, “[u]pon reviewing the Application and Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” Petitioner was “a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista,” and that, “[a]s such, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing consistent with the Court’s final judgment in Bautista.” The court required Respondents to detail whether they objected to Petitioner’s membership in the class and stated that, if class membership was not contested, it would issue an order granting class-member relief consistent with Bautista. To preserve jurisdiction, the court also ordered that Petitioner not be removed from the United States or transferred except to a facility within the Central District absent further order.

Respondents filed their response on Jan. 27. That same day, Judge Sykes granted the TRO in an order that situated the case within a broader post-Bautista pattern. The court wrote:

“This matter is yet another in a slew of habeas petitions following the Court’s ruling in Bautista v. Santacruz that has unfortunately become routine in this Court. But individuals filing these habeas petitions are not to blame; rather, the current volume of habeas petitions and temporary restraining orders being filed can be attributed to Respondents’ deliberate choice to continue defying the final judgment entered in Bautista.”

Judge Sykes described a recurring sequence in which Bond Eligible Class members sought habeas relief consistent with Bautista, Respondents opposed despite being “well-aware of the directives in Bautista’s final judgment,” and the court then ordered bond hearings because the issues were “identical.” The court that, at first, it had assumed good faith and considered each merits argument, but those arguments had been found precluded or meritless. Judge Sykes wrote:

“When this pattern of filings began, Respondents’ arguments were initially merits-based. This Court, assuming good faith on behalf of Respondents, initially considered each argument raised in opposition. However, each argument was found to be precluded by the law of the case doctrine, or determined meritless.”

Judge Sykes continued:

“Respondents then changed course. As of late, Respondents seek to identify procedural technicalities and deficiencies to oppose the relief sought. Despite the clarity of the Court’s previous orders and legal doctrines that preclude Respondents from relitigating issues at the heart of these requests, Respondents continue to manufacture arguments for sake of opposition.”

Respondents’ pattern had exhausted the court’s willingness to assume good faith, Judge Sykes emphasized:

“At this point in time, the Court can no longer confer Respondents with the benefit of the doubt as to the intent of their filings. Despite the final judgment in Bautista, it appears that immigration judges continue to rely on legal interpretations that were expressly found unlawful.”

Judge Sykes then invoked collateral estoppel sua sponte, writing:

“The volume of filings has caused the Court to expend a considerable level of resources to ensure the just determination of each action and proceeding. To prevent further perpetuation of this pattern, the Court articulates below how and why Respondents are collaterally estopped from opposing the merits of the Bond Eligible Class members’ habeas petitions.”

The court found that each Respondent in Hernandez-Bueso had been a party to Bautista; that the issues were identical—“whether a member, or members, of the Bond Eligible Class were entitled to a bond hearing under the INA;” that “Respondents had a full and fair opportunity to litigate” those issues; and that Bautista’s final judgment satisfied the requirements for issue preclusion. Because Respondents did “not dispute” that Petitioner was a member of the Bond Eligible Class, the court held that Respondents were “collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue as to whether Bond Eligible Class members are entitled to the exact relief as provided in the Bautista final judgment,” and “collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue against all members of the Bond Eligible Class.” Judge Sykes ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days, enjoined transfer or removal from the Central District pending final resolution, and ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. The court specifically directed Respondents to explain “why Petitioner did not receive a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge in the first instance given his membership in the Bond Eligible Class.”

On Feb. 6, Respondents opposed preliminary-injunction relief and sought dismissal for mootness, stating that Petitioner had been scheduled to receive a bond hearing but that the request had been withdrawn. Petitioner’s reply disclosed intervening facts that Respondents had not included: he had sought a § 1226(a) bond hearing on Jan. 13; IJ Ravit Halperin denied the request for lack of jurisdiction under Yajure Hurtado; and, on Jan. 20, after the habeas petition was filed, IJ Halperin pretermitted Petitioner’s asylum application and ordered him removed to Honduras.

On Jan. 28, Respondents requested bond redetermination before IJ Halperin, consistent with the TRO. But because IJ Halperin had already issued a removal order, Petitioner indicated that he intended to refile for a bond hearing, and no bond hearing occurred after the TRO. On Feb. 13, after the show-cause hearing, Judge Sykes ordered that “[a] bond hearing pursuant to 1226(a) shall be held within 7 days from the date of this Order.” The court also ordered Respondents to respond to Petitioner’s reply by Feb. 20, set any further reply deadline for Feb. 24, and continued the show-cause hearing to Feb. 27 by Zoom. A bond hearing was

On Feb. 26, Judge Sykes granted a preliminary injunction and ordered Petitioner’s immediate release. The court wrote that Respondents’ Feb. 6 response “did not provide further context as to the specifics of this matter,” and that only Petitioner’s Feb. 10 reply alerted the court to material “intervening events” that had occurred before the TRO was granted. Judge Sykes emphasized that “[t]hese facts were never disclosed by Respondents, even though these events occurred prior to Respondents’ filing the Response to the TRO,” and later stated that “Respondents had not accurately presented the facts of Petitioner’s circumstances in its Response to the TRO.” After the Feb. 13 show-cause hearing, the court had ordered that “[a] bond hearing pursuant to 1226(a) shall be held within 7 days from the date of this Order.”

The court noted that Petitioner had challenged the adequacy of the resulting bond hearing and sought release. Respondents argued that no preliminary injunction was necessary because a bond hearing had been held on Feb. 19 pursuant to the court’s order and contended there was no legal error. Judge Sykes noted that Respondents appeared to concede that “the proper burden is that the government, not a detainee, needs to bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence at a bond hearing,” but found that the bond order did not confirm that the burden had been correctly placed. Instead, “the Bond Order contains only two words to justify denial of Petitioner’s release on bond: ‘flight risk.’” The court reviewed Petitioner’s transcribed excerpts from the bond hearing and the evidence submitted to the immigration judge and found that they “support[ed] the conclusion that the burden of proof was misplaced.” Judge Sykes ordered Respondents to release Petitioner from immigration detention “forthwith,” and no later than Feb. 27, and to file a status report certifying compliance within 24 hours.

On Feb. 27, Respondents filed a status update regarding release. On Mar. 4, Judge Sykes discharged the OSC as moot “in light of the Court’s Order Granting Preliminary Injunction and Respondents’ Status Update, wherein Respondents confirm Petitioner was released from ICE custody.” Magistrate Judge Brianna F. Mircheff then ordered the parties to meet and confer about what remained for decision, and later set merits briefing.

On May 15, Judge Sykes accepted Magistrate Judge Mircheff’s report and recommendation. The court granted the petition as to Claim One “on the ground that Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing was unlawful,” and otherwise denied the petition. The court noted that Petitioner had sought unconditional release and had already been released on Feb. 26, but found the report and recommendation appropriate because the record was unclear whether Petitioner’s 2019 order of release on recognizance imposed release conditions and because Petitioner had not objected to the report and recommendation as to conditions of release. Judgment was entered the same day. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved a Chinese national detained under § 1231(a) for more than 10 months after his final removal order, Respondents’ failure to respond by the deadline to Magistrate Judge Kim’s Zadvydas show-cause order, and Respondents’ later failure to provide the specific rebuttal evidence the court had identified as necessary to justify continued detention. Judge Kim first found that “Respondents’ showing thus far has been factually vague and legally inadequate,” then appointed counsel, set expedited briefing, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing after Respondents provided “no response” by the show-cause deadline. When Respondents later filed an untimely response, the court found that they had offered only “another vague and conclusory declaration,” did not produce the declarant for examination, submitted “no further evidence,” and confirmed they had “no evidence” of whether or when travel documents would issue or a removal flight would be scheduled. Judge Kim held that all that remained was an “unsubstantiated possibility” of eventual removal to China, ordered Petitioner’s immediate release under an order of supervision, and warned that failure to comply could lead to contempt proceedings.

Petitioner Feng Chen, also known as Jason Chan, is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China who entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1982. Between 1996 and 1998, he sustained multiple state felony convictions and served a lengthy prison sentence. ICE detained him in February 2025, shortly after his release on parole, and an immigration judge ordered him removed to China in March 2025. Petitioner did not appeal the final removal order, but he remained in ICE custody for months after the removal order issued.

On Dec. 3, 2025, while detained at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition and a motion for appointment of counsel, arguing that there was no significant likelihood of his removal to China in the reasonably foreseeable future. Shortly after filing, Deportation Officer Lourdes Palacios (DO Palacios) informed him that he would soon be placed on a flight to China. Petitioner expected to board a Dec. 15 flight, but the flight was canceled without explanation or he was prevented from boarding. Over the next month, ICE moved Petitioner between detention facilities without removing him to China, before returning him to Adelanto in January 2026. On Dec. 19, Magistrate Judge Kim ordered Respondents to answer the petition within 30 days and required the United States Attorney to lodge all pertinent documents with the answer. Respondents later filed an amended return with an attached declaration from Deportation Officer Jorge Suarez addressing Petitioner’s immigration history, custody, and removal status. On Jan. 22, Petitioner filed an ex parte application for a TRO.

On Feb. 4, Judge Kim conditionally granted Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel, denied without prejudice Petitioner’s filing styled as an ex parte TRO application, and ordered Respondents to show cause why the habeas petition should not be granted. Judge Kim wrote that Petitioner had been detained “[m]ore than 10 months” under § 1231(a), and that Respondents had only “vaguely claim[ed]” that “‘the government is in the process of obtaining a travel document from China’” and “‘believe[d] one will be issued in the reasonably foreseeable future.’” Petitioner, by contrast, had explained that the Dec. 15 flight to China he expected to board had been canceled without explanation and that he had received no information about whether he was “‘awaiting another flight or if he is just being detained indefinitely once again.’”

Judge Kim held that Petitioner had provided prima facie reason to believe there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and that Respondents had to rebut that showing. The court then stated: “Respondents’ showing thus far has been factually vague and legally inadequate.” Judge Kim specified exactly what Respondents had to provide:

“Respondents may discharge this order with an official declaration from an ICE official including authenticated evidence of either a date certain by which petitioner will receive his travel papers and board a scheduled flight to China or a confirmed date of petitioner’s removal to China. Upon satisfactory response, the court may vacate its conditional order appointing counsel for petitioner and close this action as moot. Otherwise, if the response is unsatisfactory, the court will issue an order appointing counsel, requiring expedited briefing, and setting an evidentiary hearing. Respondents’ written response to the show-cause order is due within 14 days of this order.”

Respondents did not respond by the Feb. 18 show-cause deadline. On Feb. 24, Judge Kim granted Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel, appointed the Federal Public Defender, set expedited briefing, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing, emphasizing: “More than 10 months later, Petitioner remains detained.” The court underscored both the clarity of its Feb. 4 order and Respondents’ non-response:

“Respondents were informed that their current evidence rebutting Petitioner’s prima facie showing was ‘factually vague and legally inadequate.’ The Court went so far as to identify for Respondents the precise rebuttal evidence required: ‘Respondents may discharge this order with an official declaration from an ICE official including authenticated evidence of either a date certain by which petitioner will receive his travel papers and board a scheduled flight to China or a confirmed date of petitioner’s removal to China.’”

Judge Kim then wrote: “The Court gave Respondents a two-week window to show cause,but Respondents provided no response to the court by the February 18, 2026 show-cause deadline.” “Given Respondents’ complete lack of response,” the court appointed counsel, ordered expedited briefing, set a Mar. 11 evidentiary hearing, and required Respondents to “produce all evidence it intends to present at that hearing by no later than March 2, 2026, and identify for Petitioner’s counsel which witnesses they intend to produce at the hearing for live testimony.” The court also allowed the parties, in lieu of briefing and a hearing, to lodge a stipulation and proposed judgment granting the petition as unopposed.

On Mar. 2, Respondents filed a response with a declaration from DO Palacios and conviction record. On Mar. 11, Judge Kim held the evidentiary hearing. The parties consented to proceed before Judge Kim, and the matter was submitted for decision. On Mar. 12, Judge Kim granted the petition and ordered immediate release. The court recounted that Respondents had filed “not only an untimely response but also another vague and conclusory declaration by DO Palacios indicating only that travel documents have again been requested.” At the evidentiary hearing, “[R]espondents did not produce DO Palacios for witness examination and submitted no further evidence,” the court wrote, adding,“Respondents confirmed that they have no evidence of whether or when valid travel documents will be obtained or a removal flight scheduled. Nor did respondents have any evidence confirming whether or to what extent China is accepting detainees for repatriation, especially those with criminal backgrounds like petitioner’s.”

Applying Zadvydas, the court found that Petitioner’s post-removal detention had exceeded the six-month presumptively reasonable period, that Petitioner had provided good reason to believe there was no significant likelihood of removal to China in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that Respondents had not carried their burden to rebut that showing. The court stressed that Respondents had repeatedly failed to secure travel documents despite requests in August 2025, November 2025, and March 2026; that even during the failed December 2025 removal attempt, Respondents apparently did not have appropriate travel documents; and that Petitioner had cooperated in efforts to secure his own travel documents.

Judge Kim then rejected Respondents’ evidentiary showing:

“At most, they have just repeated a vague and conclusory assertion that travel documents have been requested (again) and that they expect petitioner can be removed sometime in the future. They concede they have no other evidence, including of whether the Chinese government has ever responded to (or even acknowledged) the request for travel documents. All that remains is an ‘unsubstantiated possibility’ that the Chinese government may, at some point, eventually provide travel documents for petitioner.”

The court concluded that, on that record, Respondents could not continue to detain Petitioner consistent with due process. The court granted the petition, ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately from ICE custody under an appropriate order of supervision, and required Respondents to file a notice of compliance within 48 hours of release. Judge Kim warned: “Failure to comply with this order may lead to contempt proceedings.” Judgment was entered the same day, and Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Mar. 14 stating Petitioner had been released.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to oppose Petitioner’s renewed TRO application after the court set a response deadline, leaving unrebutted Petitioner’s new declaration that he had not received notice or an informal interview before re-detention.

Petitioner Armen Grigorye Sinanyan was born in Armenia in 1982, when Armenia was part of the former USSR. He lawfully entered the United States in 1991, at age eight, with his parents; held a passport issued by the former USSR; became a lawful permanent resident in 1991; and had lived in the United States for approximately 35 years. DHS issued an NTA in 2012 charging him as removable based on criminal history, and a removal order issued in 2013. After a custody review in May 2013, Petitioner was released under an order of supervision. He attempted to comply with removal by applying for a passport at the Armenian Embassy, but the Embassy refused to issue travel documents. ICE re-detained him during an ICE check-in on Dec. 9, 2025, and he remained detained at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center.

On Jan. 29, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition and TRO application. Judge Valenzuela denied the original TRO on Feb. 10, finding that Petitioner had not shown likelihood of success because he submitted no evidence rebutting Respondents’ evidence that he had received notice and an interview, and because he had not yet been detained for six months. Petitioner filed a first amended petition and renewed TRO application on Feb. 18.

On Feb. 19, the court ordered Respondents to oppose the renewed application by Feb. 23 and allowed Petitioner to reply by Feb. 25. Respondents missed the opposition deadline, and Petitioner filed a reply confirming that no opposition had been filed. On Mar. 2, granting the TRO application, Judge Valenzuela wrote: “Respondents failed to file their opposition by the February 23, 2026 deadline, and on February 25, 2025, Petitioner filed a Reply, confirming that no opposition was filed.” The renewed application included Petitioner’s declaration that he had not received notice or an informal or formal interview, and Respondents filed no opposition to rebut it. “Given Petitioner’s declaration, and in light of Respondents’ decision not to oppose the requested relief,” Judge Valenzuela concluded that TRO relief was warranted.

The court enjoined Respondents from continuing to detain Petitioner unless he received notice and an informal interview under § 241.13(i)(3) within seven calendar days, barred transfer, relocation, or removal outside the Central District of California pending final resolution or further order unless executing a final removal order, and ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. The court warned that failure to respond to the OSC by Mar. 10 would be deemed consent to a preliminary injunction.

After Judge Valenzuela issued the preliminary injunction, Magistrate Judge Karen E. Scott set a merits briefing schedule. The order directed Petitioner to file a notice of dismissal by Mar. 30 if he believed the district judge’s TRO and preliminary-injunction rulings had mooted the petition; otherwise, Respondents were required to answer and lodge all relevant documents by Apr. 13. Respondents filed an answer and suggestion of mootness on Apr. 10, and Petitioner replied on Apr. 27. On Apr. 28, Magistrate Judge Scott issued a report and recommendation (R&R), recommending that the district court enter the TRO and preliminary-injunction rulings as final judgment and otherwise dismiss the first amended petition without prejudice as moot.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ “fail[ure] to file a TRO response brief by the deadline ordered,” after which Judge Fairbank granted Petitioner’s TRO application as unopposed and ordered immediate release, return of confiscated property, and limits on re-detention. The court later rejected Respondents’ “specious” mootness argument and converted the core protections into a preliminary injunction.

Petitioner Julio Cesar Delgado Rivera—docketed as Julio Cesar Salgado Rivera—was in ICE detention when he filed his habeas petition and application for injunctive relief on Mar. 12, 2026. His nationality, date and manner of entry, broader immigration history, criminal history, and precise detention theory are not clear from the public materials reviewed. The available record shows only that he had previously been released from ICE custody.

On Mar. 13, Judge Fairbank ordered Respondents to file a brief responding to the application for a temporary restraining order by 11:59 p.m. on Mar. 15, and permitted Petitioner to reply by 11:59 p.m. on Mar. 16. Respondents failed to respond to the TRO application by the deadline. On Mar. 17, granting the application as unopposed, the court wrote::

“It appears that the respondents failed to file a TRO response brief by the deadline ordered, which was 11:59 p.m. last night, Monday, March 16, 2026. A new attorney, Elaine Goss, filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the respondents this morning, Tuesday, March 17, 2026, and petitioner roughly simultaneously filed a request for a ruling on his TRO application.”

The court ordered Respondents to “immediately release” Petitioner under the same terms as his previous release from ICE custody, prohibited additional monitoring restrictions, including a GPS ankle bracelet, restrained Respondents from re-detaining him absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing where the government proved by clear and convincing evidence that physical custody was required, and ordered Respondents to return confiscated property, including identification and employment-authorization documents. The court also allowed Respondents to show cause in writing by Mar. 20 why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

On Mar. 22, Judge Fairbank granted the preliminary-injunction application. The court rejected Respondents’ mootness argument in sharp terms:

“The Court rejects the respondents’ specious argument that the TRO’s release of petitioner from ICE detention somehow mooted the entire habeas corpus petition and PI application. It is obvious that the habeas corpus petition sought and seeks far more relief than merely release from ICE detention, and that this Court’s recent TRO awarded more relief than merely release from ICE detention.”

The preliminary injunction continued to bar additional monitoring restrictions and re-detention absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing with a clear-and-convincing burden on flight risk or danger. Judge Fairbank also ordered Respondents, by Mar. 27, to file a notice of compliance confirming that they had returned any confiscated property, including identification and employment-authorization documents.

Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Mar. 27. On Apr. 16, Magistrate Judge Viramontes set a video status conference, which was held on Apr. 22. At that conference, AUSA Elaine Goss appeared for Respondents, and the court ordered the parties to meet and confer about possible resolution and file any stipulation by Apr. 29; if they could not agree, the parties were to contact the court with the remaining issues and a proposed briefing schedule.

On Apr. 30, the court noted receipt of the parties’ joint email and stated that the parties did not stipulate to entry of judgment. The court adopted the parties’ stipulated merits schedule, ordering Respondents to file an answer by May 7 and allowing Petitioner to file an optional reply by May 11. Respondents filed their answer on May 7, and Petitioner replied on May 8. On May 26, Magistrate Judge Viramontes issued a report and recommendation (R&R) on the habeas petition, and separately lodged a proposed judgment and order; objections were due Jun. 9. The R&R is not publicly accessible.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to comply with Judge Valenzuela’s TRO order requiring Petitioner’s release within 24 hours, followed by the court’s decision to preserve re-detention and transfer protections because of Respondents’ delayed compliance. In ruling on preliminary relief, Judge Valenzuela noted that “neither party has complied with the terms of the TRO Order—Respondents failed to release Petitioner within 24 hours and Petitioner failed to file a Reply.” The court “admonishe[d] counsel for both parties” and stated that it expected “strict compliance with its orders in the future.” Although the court found the release and notice-of-compliance portions of the TRO moot, it refused to dissolve the protections against re-detention, transfer, relocation, or removal from the Central District of California, holding that, “[g]iven Respondents’ cavalier attitude toward timely compliance with the Court’s order to release Petitioner immediately and to provide a notice of compliance within 24 hours, these protections for Petitioner are essential.”

Petitioner Behzad Bolourchi, a native of Iran, had lived in the United States since the 1990s, when he entered on a valid nonimmigrant visa. In 2001, an immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia to Iran. On Dec. 22, 2003, immigration authorities issued an Order of Supervision governing his release from detention. For over 22 years, he remained at liberty under supervision, attended all scheduled ICE check-ins, complied with reporting requirements, and neither resisted supervision nor attempted to abscond. He married a U.S. citizen in 2007, and USCIS approved his spouse’s I-130 petition in 2019. On June 26, 2025, ICE officers stopped Petitioner and his wife while they were driving, removed him from the vehicle, handcuffed him, and detained him at ICE’s processing center in Adelanto, California. The government did not provide a written explanation identifying changed circumstances, Iranian travel documents, a scheduled removal date, or a timeline for removal, and did not give him an opportunity to respond before taking him into custody.

On Feb. 18, 2026, Petitioner filed a § 2241 petition. On Feb. 20, he filed an emergency ex parte application for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction seeking immediate release, protection from removal, and limits on re-detention. On Feb. 26, Judge Valenzuela granted the application in part. The court ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner under his prior order of supervision, barred re-detention without compliance with applicable INA regulations, required a notice of compliance within 24 hours of release, and enjoined Respondents from transferring, relocating, or removing him outside the Central District of California pending final resolution or further order, unless executing a final removal order. The court also ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, warning that failure to respond by Mar. 6 would be deemed consent to a preliminary injunction.

On Mar. 17, ruling on the order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, Judge Valenzuela noted that neither side had complied with the TRO order:

“As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that neither party has complied with the terms of the TRO Order—Respondents failed to release Petitioner within 24 hours and Petitioner failed to file a Reply. The Court admonishes counsel for both parties and expects strict compliance with its orders in the future.”

Respondents argued that they had complied with the TRO by releasing Petitioner and not re-detaining him, and that release mooted both the preliminary-injunction request and the habeas petition. Judge Valenzuela agreed only in part, finding moot the portions of the TRO requiring release and notice of compliance, but not the protections against re-detention or transfer. The court wrote that, “[g]iven Respondents’ cavalier attitude toward timely compliance with the Court’s order to release Petitioner immediately and to provide a notice of compliance within 24 hours, these protections for Petitioner are essential.” Judge Valenzuela issued a preliminary injunction barring Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without compliance with applicable INA regulations and barring transfer, relocation, or removal outside the Central District of California pending final resolution or further order, unless executing a final removal order.

Magistrate Judge Michael B. Kaufman then ordered Respondents to answer the habeas petition by Apr. 1. Respondents filed their answer that day. On Apr. 17, Magistrate Judge Kaufman ordered Petitioner to file a reply by Apr. 24 or, if he agreed with Respondents’ position, to file a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a). On Apr. 28, Magistrate Judge Kaufman issued a report and recommendation on the habeas petition. The R&R is not publicly accessible. No party objected. On May 14, Judge Valenzuela accepted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation, denied the habeas petition, and dismissed the case without prejudice. Judgment was entered on May 15.

This habeas case involved repeated government failures to file court-ordered responses, including a missed preliminary-injunction response deadline and three failures to respond to the operative habeas pleadings. After Respondents failed twice to answer the original petition and then failed to answer the First Amended Petition, Magistrate Judge Early ordered Respondents’ counsel to appear and show cause why “Respondents’ three failures to comply with Court Orders” should not be deemed consent to immediate relief; Respondents then stated they did not oppose Petitioner’s immediate release without conditions.

Petitioner Cuong Tu Hong was born in Vietnam in 1970 and came to the United States in 1984 as a refugee after his mother sponsored him; he later became a lawful permanent resident. In 1989 and 1994, he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of two California felonies. After his release from prison around 2000, ICE took him into custody, and on Jan. 31, 2001, he was ordered removed. Because Vietnam was not accepting deportees, Petitioner was released on an order of supervision after at least 90 days in detention. For roughly 24 years, he lived in the United States under supervised release and “has not missed a required check-in.” In 2025, ICE added further supervision conditions, including an ankle monitor on Aug. 12, and then detained him on Sept. 11 without providing notice revoking his order of supervised release or an interview to address the reasons for detention. On Sept. 23, an immigration judge granted Petitioner’s motion to reopen and terminate removal proceedings, finding that the sole basis for removability was void; on Sept. 30, the removal order was terminated; and on Oct. 23, the government appealed. Petitioner remained in ICE custody when he filed his habeas petition and TRO application on Dec. 12.

On Dec. 12, 2025, Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition and an ex parte TRO application seeking immediate release and reinstatement of his prior order of supervision. Later that day, Magistrate Judge Early appointed the Federal Public Defender and ordered Respondents to answer the petition by Jan. 9. Judge Klausner denied the first TRO application that same day, and later denied a renewed TRO application on Dec. 17, noting that Respondents had not opposed it but that Petitioner still had not justified ex parte relief. After Petitioner requested preliminary-injunction proceedings, Judge Klausner ordered the government to respond by Dec. 22 at 3:00 p.m. Judge Klausner later denied preliminary relief on Dec. 29, noting that Respondents had “filed no opposition or other response.”

Respondents also failed to answer the petition by the Jan. 9 deadline. On Jan. 20, Magistrate Judge Early directed counsel to confer and file a joint status report “[i]n light of the Order, Respondents failure to timely respond to the Petition, and Respondents stated view the release of Petitioner has rendered the Petition moot.” On Jan. 30, the court again ordered Respondents to answer by Feb. 6. Respondents did not do so. Petitioner replied on Feb. 9, arguing that relief should be granted because Respondents had twice failed to answer.

After Petitioner filed a first amended petition on Feb. 17, Magistrate Judge Early ordered Respondents to answer the amended petition within three court days, raising all defenses and lodging all records bearing on their arguments. Magistrate Judge Early expressly noted that Respondents were “familiar with the case,” had raised the procedural-status issue that led to the amended petition,” and emphasized that Respondents had “twice failed to file an Answer to the original Petition despite orders to do so,” explaining:

“[A]lthough ordered to file an answer to the Petition, Respondents did not timely file an answer or seek additional time in which to do so. On January 30, 2026, the Court again ordered Respondents to file an answer to the Petition. Respondents did not file an answer or seek additional time in which to do so. On February 9, 2026, Petitioner filed a Reply, arguing that the Court should grant relief because Respondents have now twice failed to answer the Petition.”

Respondents did not file a response or request more time. On Feb. 24, Magistrate Judge Early entered a text order stating that, because “Respondents have failed to provide a substantive response to either the original Petition or the First Amended Petition…, despite three (3) orders requiring such a response,” Respondents’ counsel were ordered to appear by telephone to “show cause why Petitioner's Request that Respondents' three failures to comply with Court Orders to respond to the operative petitions should not be deemed consent to the immediate.”

At the Feb. 25 show-cause hearing, “Counsel for Respondents state[d] that[,] on the current record, Respondents do not oppose the primary relief requested in the” amended petition: “immediate release from immigration custody without conditions.” Judge Klausner then terminated the magistrate referral, ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately “without conditions,” and required a status report by 4:00 p.m. on Feb. 26 confirming release, after which judgment would be entered dismissing the case as moot.

On Mar. 2, Magistrate Judge Early noted that Respondents had represented on Feb. 26 that Petitioner was “on the final stage of release from custody and is confirmed to be released” that day and that they “will file the release paperwork with the court” that day, but that no confirmation had been filed as of 4:00 p.m. on Mar. 2. The court ordered release confirmation by noon on Mar. 3. Respondents filed a status report with a release form on Mar. 3, and Judge Klausner entered judgment dismissing the case as moot on Mar. 4.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond by Judge Kato’s expedited TRO deadline. The court granted the TRO, ordered immediate release, required a compliance status report, ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, and warned that “[f]ailure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions.”

Petitioner Vishal None, a native of India, entered the United States on May 9, 2024. DHS briefly detained him on arrival, served him with a Notice to Appear, and later released him on an order of release on recognizance subject to ATD monitoring. Petitioner complied with all release and supervision conditions, had never been found to be a flight risk or danger, “lived openly and lawfully under DHS supervision for more than a year,” maintained employment, and integrated into the community. ICE re-detained him on Nov. 10, 2025, in the parking lot of his apartment building as he left for work. Petitioner had no warrant or or criminal history. He remained detained at Desert View Facility in Adelanto, California.

On Feb. 12, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition and TRO motion. That same day, Judge Kato ordered Respondents to respond to the TRO motion by noon on Feb. 13. Respondents did not file a response. Granting a TRO on Feb. 13 TRO, Judge Kato wrote, “As of the date of this Order, Respondents have not filed a response,” and later repeated that “Respondents failed to file a response.” Because Respondents did not oppose the motion, they did not dispute Petitioner’s contentions that he was not a flight risk, had no criminal history, and was arrested without explanation while leaving for work.

The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately, barred re-detention absent a pre-detention hearing with a clear-and-convincing burden on flight risk or danger, and required a compliance status report by Feb. 16. The court also ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue and warned that “[f]ailure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions.” Respondents filed a status report on Feb. 16 confirming release and requested dismissal. After Petitioner did not oppose dismissal, the court dismissed the petition on Feb. 27.

This habeas case involved ICE’s redetention of a legally blind Syrian national who had lived in the United States since childhood and had spent almost 14 years on an order of supervision, followed by Respondents’ failure to file an answer to the petition and failure to respond to a later show-cause order about final judgment. Judge Hsu found multiple defects in the government’s revocation process: the notice gave only a generic reference to “changed circumstances,” Respondents’ declaration was silent on whether the required informal interview occurred, a form alone was “insufficient,” and the record did not establish that the revocation was made by an authorized official.

Petitioner Shant Ovikian, a native and citizen of Syria, entered the United States in 1987 as a young child. He was ordered removed to Syria in 2011, released on an order of supervision in March 2012 because DHS could not effectuate removal, and later received deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture in 2015. The court noted that he complied with reporting requirements, lived with his wife, children, and six U.S.-citizen grandchildren, was legally blind due to Stargardt disease, had worked at the same company for nearly 12 years, and had no additional criminal convictions since 2011. ICE detained him at his twentieth ICE check-in on Jan. 2, 2026, gave him revocation paperwork he could not read because of his vision loss, and transferred him to Adelanto.

On Jan. 14, Petitioner filed his habeas petition, and Magistrate Judge Eick ordered Respondents to answer within 23 days. On Jan. 15, Petitioner moved ex parte for a TRO. On Jan. 16, Judge Hsu ordered Respondents to oppose the TRO by Jan. 21 and to keep Petitioner within the Central District of California while the application remained pending. Respondents opposed on Jan. 21. On Jan. 23, Judge Hsu granted the TRO in part, ordered Respondents to release Petitioner “forthwith,” and enjoined further detention—including “significant restriction on his liberty such as electronic monitoring”—unless and until Petitioner received proper due process for revocation of the order of supervision.

On the merits of the detention claim, Judge Hsu held that the notice failed to provide the “reasons for revocation” required by regulation. The court found the notice “plainly insufficient” because it merely stated that detention was based on review of Petitioner’s file and “changed circumstances,” without factual allegations. The court also found that Respondents’ declaration—the “actual evidence”—was silent on whether an informal interview occurred, what happened during any interview, or whether Petitioner was told the interview was his opportunity to respond. Because the notice was facially deficient, the court held that “no interview conducted at the time of the Petitioner’s re-detention could satisfy this requirement,” and found that an informal interview under § 241.13(i)(3) “was not conducted.”

Judge Hsu also rejected Respondents’ remedial position. The court wrote that providing an interview ex post facto while keeping Petitioner detained would not remedy the constitutional violation, because the absence of an interview rendered the detention unlawful “in the first place.” It held that the only appropriate remedy was release and an injunction against re-detention unless and until Petitioner received due process for OSUP revocation. The court denied the third-country-removal claim, however, because the alleged injury was “potential,” speculative, and not “actual or imminent.”

On Feb. 6, after a hearing, Judge Hsu entered a preliminary injunction on the same detention theory, stating that the Winter factors continued to weigh substantially in Petitioner’s favor. Respondents suggested mootness because Petitioner had been released, but the court found at the hearing that the preliminary injunction was not moot.

On Feb. 11, after Respondents failed to file an answer by the Feb. 6 deadline, Magistrate Judge Eick noted that “the deadline for Respondents to file an Answer to the Petition expired without any Answer having been filed.” He ordered the parties to show cause within seven days why the court should not enter final judgment granting, on a final basis, the same relief previously granted in the Jan. 23 TRO and Feb. 6 preliminary injunction, while otherwise dismissing the petition without prejudice. The order warned that failure to respond “may be deemed consent” to entry of that final judgment. Respondents again failed to respond.

On Feb. 11, after Respondents failed to file an answer by the Feb. 6 deadline, Magistrate Judge Eick ordered the parties to show cause by Feb. 18 why final judgment should not enter granting the same relief on a final basis and otherwise dismissing the petition without prejudice. The order warned that failure to respond “may be deemed consent” to final judgment. Respondents again failed to respond.

On Feb. 20, Judge Hsu entered final judgment after Respondents failed to respond to both the answer deadline and the Feb. 11 show-cause order. The court noted that, “[a]fter the February 6, 2026 deadline for Respondents to file an Answer to the Petition expired without any Answer having been filed,” Magistrate Judge Eick ordered the parties to show cause why final judgment should not enter, and warned that failure to respond “may be deemed consent to the entry of such a final judgment.” “Nevertheless,” the court wrote, “Respondents failed timely to file any response to the February 11, 2026 Order.” For the reasons stated in the Jan. 23 TRO and Feb. 6 preliminary injunction, the court entered judgment enjoining Petitioner’s further detention, including significant liberty restrictions such as electronic monitoring, unless and until he received proper due process for revocation of his Order of Supervision, and otherwise dismissed the petition without prejudice.

This habeas case involved repeated missed or nonconforming government filings, a sanctions show-cause order tied to Respondents’ failure to file a release declaration, and a later in-person hearing concerning possible sanctions against Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Patrick J. Kearney for “breach of the duty of candor to the Court.” Respondents first failed to answer the petition by the court-ordered deadline, then filed their TRO response late and styled it as an answer. Judge Court considered the late filing because it preferred to decide the application on the merits, but admonished Respondents that “goodwill has its limits, especially when Respondents offer no explanation for their lack of compliance.” After ordering immediate release, transfer protections, and a declaration “attesting to Petitioner’s release,” the court warned that sanctions could issue if Respondents took action “impairing Petitioner’s ability to obtain complete relief,” and later ordered Respondents to show cause why sanctions should not issue for “lack of compliance with the Court’s order.” After SAUSA Kearney responded, the court ordered him to appear in person; the hearing minutes described the issue as why sanctions should not be imposed on counsel for “breach of the duty of candor to the Court.” Judge Court discharged the show-cause order after hearing Kearney’s explanation, but later rejected Respondents’ mootness argument because they offered “no assurance that their previous wrongs would not recur,” and entered a preliminary injunction preserving re-detention and transfer protections.

Petitioner Serhat Baran, a native of Turkey, entered the United States on Nov. 21, 2022, and was inspected by CBP. After his release around that date, he was placed under ISAP supervision. He initially complied with the conditions of parole and supervised release, but was later arrested and convicted of assault in Colorado. On July 18, 2025, Petitioner reported to a mandatory ICE check-in, where Respondents detained him without a warrant, notice, or interview, thereby revoking his release; he remained detained at Adelanto. He later received two bond hearings: at the first, the immigration judge concluded he lacked jurisdiction; at the second, on Jan. 28, 2026, the immigration judge denied bond after finding Petitioner posed a flight risk and danger to the community.

On Jan. 2, 2026, Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition pro se. On Jan. 20, Magistrate Judge Spaeth ordered Respondents to respond to the petition by Feb. 19 and to lodge all records bearing on their contentions. Respondents did not do so. On Feb. 23, Magistrate Judge Spaeth issued an order to show cause, writing, “As of the date of this Order, Respondents have not filed a response to the Petition,” and ordering Respondents “to show cause why they have failed to file a response to the Petition by no later than March 2.”

On Feb. 26, after Petitioner filed an amended emergency application seeking immediate release, Judge Court barred Petitioner’s removal from the Central District of California pending further order and required Respondents to oppose the application by the end of Mar. 2. Respondents did not file by that deadline. The court further warned: “Respondents are cautioned that sanctions may be imposed if Respondents take any action impairing Petitioner’s ability to obtain complete relief.” Respondents did not file their answer until Mar. 3, a day after the deadline.

On Mar. 3, in an order granting a TRO, Judge Court wrote that Respondents “did not file anything until March 3,” when they filed what they “styled” as an “answer” to the habeas petition. The court considered the filing because it preferred to decide issues on the merits, but warned: “the Court admonishes Respondents that goodwill has its limits, especially when Respondents offer no explanation for their lack of compliance.” On the merits, the court held that Petitioner was likely to succeed on his procedural due process claim because Respondents had provided no pre-deprivation process before re-detaining him. It rejected Respondents’ reliance on a later bond hearing, explaining that “a bond hearing constitutes post-deprivation relief” and had “no bearing on whether Respondents provided the requisite pre-deprivation relief.”

Judge Court ordered immediate release under the conditions that applied before the July 18 detention, barred re-detention without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, barred transfer outside the Central District pending final resolution, required Respondents to serve the order on Petitioner, and ordered a release declaration by the end of Mar. 4. The court also ordered Respondents to show cause within seven days why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

Respondents then missed the Mar. 4 release-declaration deadline. On Mar. 6, Judge Court issued an order to show cause, writing that Respondents had “failed” to file the required declaration “attesting to Petitioner’s release,” and ordering “Respondents to show cause in writing no later than end of day on March 9, 2026, as to why the Court should not issue sanctions for Respondents’ lack of compliance with the Court’s order.”

Respondents filed a response on Mar. 9. On Mar. 10, the court ordered Respondents’ counsel, Patrick J. Kearney, a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (SAUSA) at the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s Office, to appear in person on Mar. 13. After the Mar. 13 show-cause hearing—which court minutes described as addressing “why sanctions should not be imposed on counsel for breach of the duty of candor to the Court”—the court discharged the OSC, stating that it had heard SAUSA Kearney’s explanation.

On Mar. 26, Judge Court rejected Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s release mooted the case and granted a preliminary injunction. The court held that Respondents had not met their “heavy burden” to show mootness because they offered “no assurance that their previous wrongs would not recur,” and that Petitioner continued to face the threat of re-arrest and detention. The court granted preliminary relief for the duration of the action, enjoining Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, requiring Respondents to apply the conditions that existed before the July 18 detention, enjoining transfer outside the Central District of California, and ordering immediate return of any property confiscated during Petitioner’s arrest and processing into detention.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to oppose Petitioner’s emergency application by the court-ordered deadline, which Judge Walter treated under Local Rule 7-12 as “consent to the granting of Petitioner’s Application,” followed by a second missed briefing deadline after Respondents failed to answer the habeas petition. Magistrate Judge Mircheff then wrote that “Respondents’ answer is overdue” and warned that, because this was “the second time Respondent’s counsel has simply failed to respond to a court order setting a date for briefing in this case,” any further failure to respond or address mootness by Jan. 14 “may result in an order to show cause regarding sanctions.”

Petitioner Garo Vartanyan filed his § 2241 habeas petition on Nov. 26, 2025. On Dec. 2, Magistrate Judge Mircheff ordered Respondents to answer the petition by Dec. 31 and to lodge all records bearing on Petitioner’s claims. On Dec. 14, Petitioner filed an ex parte application seeking a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. On Dec. 16, Judge Walter ordered Respondents to oppose the application by Dec. 18 at 4:00 p.m. and, in the meantime, enjoined Respondents from removing or deporting Petitioner to Azerbaijan or any third country until the court ruled. The same day, the court required Petitioner to refile the TRO materials because the original filing violated Local Rule 5-4.3.1.

Respondents did not file an opposition. On Dec. 19, Judge Walter granted the application. The court wrote that Respondents had been ordered to oppose by Dec. 18 and that “Respondents have failed to file a timely Opposition to Petitioner’s Application.” Applying Local Rule 7-12, Judge Walter deemed Respondents’ failure to oppose or otherwise comply with the order as “consent to the granting of Petitioner’s Application.” The court also reviewed the application on the merits and concluded that Petitioner was entitled to injunctive relief. Because Respondents had notice and an opportunity to respond, Petitioner had extensively briefed the issues, and the TRO and preliminary-injunction standards were the same, the court treated the application as a preliminary-injunction motion.

Judge Walter ordered Petitioner released immediately and barred re-detention unless and until Petitioner received adequate notice and a hearing to determine the legality of re-detention. The court also ordered that, if Petitioner were to be removed to a third country, he must be informed of ICE’s intention to do so and receive an individualized opportunity to challenge removal through a reasonable-fear interview.

Respondents then missed the answer deadline. On Jan. 8, Magistrate Judge Mircheff wrote that, “[b]ased on the Court’s review, Respondents’ answer is overdue,” and ordered Respondents to answer by Jan. 14 or, if the parties agreed the preliminary relief had mooted the case, to file a notice or stipulation of voluntary dismissal. Judge Mircheff added: “As this is the second time Respondent’s counsel has simply failed to respond to a court order setting a date for briefing in this case, failure to do one of the two things by January 14, 2026, may result in an order to show cause regarding sanctions.” Respondents filed an answer on Jan. 14.

On Feb. 13, Judge Mircheff issued a report and recommendation (R&R). On Mar. 31, Judge Walter accepted the R&R, granted Claim Two in the petition, and entered judgment. The judgment granted the petition as to Claim Two and entered a permanent injunction precluding Respondents from arresting or detaining Petitioner without compliance with the procedures set out in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to Petitioner’s TRO application by the court-ordered deadline, prompting Judge Wilson to order Respondents to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, before Respondents later filed a notice of non-opposition, released Petitioner, and the case was dismissed as moot.

Petitioner Zhosef Ovsepyan filed his habeas petition and ex parte TRO application on Feb. 12, 2026, seeking release from ICE custody at Adelanto. The petition materials described him as a lawful permanent resident with a decades-old removal order, prior release and supervision history, mental-health and medical conditions, employment history, and family/community ties.

On Feb. 13, Judge Wilson ordered the government to respond to the TRO application by noon on Feb. 20. Respondents did not do so. On Feb. 23, Judge Wilson ordered “Respondents to show cause” by Feb. 27 “why sanctions should not be imposed against Respondents for failing to respond to Petitioner’s TRO as ordered by the Court.”

Respondents filed a notice of non-opposition on Feb. 26. On Feb. 27, “[i]n light of Respondents’ non-opposition,” Judge Wilson ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner an individualized bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge within seven days or release him from custody under the same conditions that existed before detention. The court also ordered a notice of compliance within seven days.

On Mar. 5, Respondents informed the court that Petitioner had been released from immigration detention on Mar. 4. On Mar. 13, Magistrate Judge Patricia Donahue ordered the parties to confer on mootness, noting that the district judge had ordered a bond hearing or release and that Respondents reported release. The court directed Petitioner to file a proposed mootness dismissal order by Mar. 19 if the parties agreed the petition was moot, or otherwise directed any party disputing mootness to identify the remaining factual and legal basis for relief.

On Apr. 10, Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Donahue issued a report and recommendation (R&R) concluding that the petition should be dismissed as moot after Petitioner’s release. No objections were filed. On Apr. 23, Judge Wilson accepted the R&R and expressly “adopt[ed] it as [the court’s] own findings and conclusions.” The court ordered judgment dismissing the action without prejudice as moot, and judgment was entered the same day.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ missed deadline to oppose Petitioner’s TRO application, followed by an order to show cause as to why Respondents should not be sanctioned. Judge Wilson ultimately denied the TRO and then denied the habeas petition on the merits.

Petitioner Henrikh Vardanyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, applied for admission at the San Ysidro Port of Entry on Dec. 11, 2024 and was later released on parole. ICE detained him on June 4, 2025 during a check-in. In December 2025, Petitioner received a Rodriguez bond hearing at which the government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention was warranted; the immigration judge denied bond on flight-risk and danger grounds. Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition on Dec. 4, 2025, arguing that his detention violated due process, that ICE’s denial of parole violated the APA, and that humanitarian and medical grounds supported release.

On Dec. 8, Magistrate Judge Steve Kim ordered the United States Attorney to answer the petition within 14 days. Respondents filed an opposition on Dec. 22, and Petitioner replied on Dec. 26. On Jan. 6, 2026, Judge Kim ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted to the extent it sought an immediate individualized bond hearing under expedited decisions in the district. After Respondents filed materials concerning Petitioner’s Rodriguez bond hearing and bond denial, Judge Kim ordered Petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as moot. Petitioner opposed.

On Feb. 10, Petitioner filed an ex parte TRO application seeking immediate release. On Feb. 11, Judge Wilson ordered the government to respond by Feb. 18. Respondents did not file by that deadline. On Feb. 23, Judge Wilson ordered “Respondents to show cause” by Feb. 27 “why sanctions should not be imposed against Respondents for failing to respond to Petitioner’s TRO as ordered by the Court.” Respondents filed their TRO opposition on Feb. 24 and responded to the sanctions OSC on Feb. 27.

On Mar. 25, Judge Wilson denied the TRO. The court held that Petitioner was “in the position of an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225” despite his parole into the United States, because parole did not constitute “entry” or “admission.” The court also reasoned that § 1226 applied only to aliens detained pursuant to a warrant and that nothing in the record indicated Petitioner had been arrested and detained under a warrant. Judge Wilson concluded that Petitioner was therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), that due process required nothing more, and that any argument that the Rodriguez hearing was constitutionally defective was foreclosed because Petitioner was not entitled to a bond hearing at all. The court also rejected Petitioner’s Zadvydas and medical-condition arguments and held that ICE’s denial of humanitarian parole was a discretionary decision outside the court’s review.

On Apr. 14, Judge Wilson denied the habeas petition for the same reasons. The court summarized its prior conclusions: despite being paroled into the country, Petitioner remained an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), was subject to mandatory detention, was not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing, and had no release claim under the INA or Due Process Clause. The court also rejected the APA parole theory because the denial of parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) was discretionary and outside judicial review. Applying law-of-the-case principles to the pure legal conclusions reached at the TRO stage, Judge Wilson held that “nothing in the INA, the Fifth Amendment, or the APA provides petitioner a legal avenue for release under § 2241 based on his June 2025 detention by ICE.” The court denied the petition, and judgment dismissing the habeas action followed.

This habeas case involved repeated noncompliance by Respondent and Respondent’s counsel, Patrick J. Kearney, a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (SAUSA Kearney), during emergency litigation over ICE’s re-detention of an Egyptian lawful permanent resident who had been living under an order of supervision. Judge Slaughter first granted a TRO after Respondent “failed to file any response” to the application; then entered a compliance order after Respondent failed to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and then ordered SAUSA Kearney to show cause why sanctions should not issue after counsel “did not comply with the TRO or Compliance Order.” The sanctions OSC was discharged after Respondent stated that Petitioner had been timely released and that the partial TRO noncompliance resulted from an “inadvertent calendaring error.” Magistrate Judge Eick later recommended a merits declaration and re-detention injunction, but Judge Slaughter rejected the R&R and dismissed the petition as moot because the TRO had restored Petitioner to his prior supervision status.

Petitioner Hani Labib Karas entered the United States from Egypt as a lawful permanent resident on Dec. 18, 1972, at age eleven, with his parents and siblings. He was convicted of second-degree robbery without a firearm in the 1980s and later sustained several drug-use-related convictions. In 1997, an immigration judge ordered him removed to Egypt, but he was later released under an order of supervision. In 2017, he married a U.S. citizen. In 2018, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute; after serving his sentence, he was again released on an order of supervision. ICE arrested and detained him on Jan. 27, 2026. He alleged that, during the arrest, he was not served with a notice of revocation or similar document explaining why his supervision was being revoked, and that although ICE interviewed him about travel documents, it did not give him an opportunity to address the reasons for detention.

Petitioner filed his habeas petition and application for a TRO and preliminary injunction on Feb. 19, 2026. On Feb. 23, Judge Slaughter ordered the government to respond to the TRO application by 9:00 a.m. the next day and ordered that Petitioner not be removed or relocated from the Central District of California pending further order.

Respondent did not respond by the deadline. On Feb. 24, Judge Slaughter granted the TRO, noting that Respondent “did not file any response to the Application, and the deadline to do so ha[d] passed.” The court further noted that Local Rule 7-12 allowed failure to file a required document by deadline to be deemed consent to granting or denying a motion, and stated that the court “could grant the Application on this basis alone.” The court nevertheless addressed the merits and found that Petitioner had shown likely success on his claims that ICE failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i)(3) and 241.4(l), which govern revocation of release for noncitizens with final removal orders. The court emphasized that “government agencies are required to follow their own regulations” and that courts have ordered release where ICE fails to follow those regulations.

Judge Slaughter ordered Respondent to release Petitioner by Feb. 26 at 1:00 p.m. PST, under the original order of supervision and the terms and conditions that would have existed had he not been detained. The court also ordered Respondent to provide Petitioner with a copy of the TRO by the same deadline, continued its prior no-removal/no-relocation order, and stated that any future enforcement action after release “must comply with the required procedures.” Finally, the court ordered Respondent to show cause in writing by Mar. 2 why a preliminary injunction should not issue, set Petitioner’s response deadline for Mar. 6, and scheduled a Mar. 12 preliminary-injunction hearing. The same day, Feb. 24, SAUSA Kearney of the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s Office filed a notice of appearance as counsel for Respondent.

Respondent again did not meet the court’s deadline. On Mar. 4, Judge Slaughter entered a compliance order, noting that writing: “At the time of this Order, Respondent has not shown cause in writing as to why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction in this case despite being ordered to do so.” The court ordered SAUSA Kearney to file, by Mar. 5, a response explaining why a preliminary injunction should not issue and to “address whether Respondent complied with” the TRO’s release and service requirements. The court also set a hearing on whether a PI should issue for Mar. 12. Judge Slaughter warned SAUSA Kearney:

“The court warns Counsel that the next failure to comply with the court’s orders will result in the court ordering Counsel to show cause why Counsel should not be sanctioned for subsequent failures to comply with the court’s orders.”

Counsel did not comply with that compliance order either. On Mar. 6, Judge Slaughter issued an order to show cause, writing that “[t]he court warned Mr. Kearney that the next failure to comply with the court’s orders will result in the court ordering Mr. Kearney to show cause why Mr. Kearney should not be sanctioned for subsequent failures to comply with the court’s orders.” Nonetheless, “[a]t the time of this Order, Mr. Kearney has not complied with the TRO or Compliance Order,” Judge Slaughter emphasized. The court ordered SAUSA Kearney to show cause by Mar. 9:

“Respondent’s counsel is ordered to show cause in writing on or before March 9, 2026, at 2:00 p.m., why Respondent’s counsel should not be sanctioned for failing to comply with the TRO and Compliance Order. Failure to comply with the court’s order to show cause in writing may result in the court issuing appropriate sanctions.”

Later on Mar. 6, Respondent filed a response to the court’s TRO order, and SAUSA Kearney separately responded to the OSC. On Mar. 9, Judge Slaughter discharged the OSC, recounting: “Respondent states that Respondent partially failed to comply with the court’s TRO due to an inadvertent calendaring error. Respondent further states that Respondent timely complied with order to release Petitioner on February 25.” Respondent also stated that, upon receiving the OSC, counsel immediately served the TRO on Petitioner and Petitioner’s immigration-court counsel. Based on the record, including Respondent’s response, the court discharged the OSC, extended Petitioner’s preliminary-injunction reply deadline to Mar. 19, and continued the preliminary-injunction hearing to Mar. 26.

On Mar. 23, Judge Slaughter denied the preliminary-injunction request as moot. The court summarized the earlier noncompliance sequence: Respondent had not responded to the TRO application as ordered; Respondent had not shown cause by Mar. 2; the court entered a compliance order; Respondent failed to comply; and counsel was ordered to show cause why sanctions should not issue. The court noted that Respondent had explained the partial TRO failure as an inadvertent calendaring error and stated that Petitioner was timely released on Feb. 25. Turning to preliminary relief, the court found that Petitioner had “mostly obtained” the relief sought in the TRO application and had not made an adequate showing that a preliminary injunction was warranted. The court denied the preliminary-injunction request as moot, vacated the Mar. 26 hearing, ordered Petitioner to show cause why the entire case should not be dismissed as moot, and referred further merits proceedings, including mootness, to Magistrate Judge Eick.

The same day, Magistrate Judge Eick ordered Respondent to answer the habeas petition by Apr. 17. Respondent filed a return to the petition and a response to Petitioner’s mootness briefing on Apr. 17, and filed a certificate of service on Apr. 20. On Apr. 24, Magistrate Judge Eick issued a report and recommendation (R&R). The R&R recommended granting the petition and entering judgment “declaring that ICE’s previous detention of Petitioner violated applicable regulations and Petitioner’s due process rights,” and “enjoining Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without complying with applicable regulations.”

On May 26, Judge Slaughter rejected the R&R and dismissed the petition as moot. The court acknowledged the R&R’s recommended merits declaration and injunction, but held that Petitioner had already received the effective relief available through the TRO: release under the prior order-of-supervision terms. Judge Slaughter reasoned that Petitioner’s continued supervision conditions did not create redressable collateral consequences because he had been subject to similar supervision before the challenged detention; the TRO had put him “in the position he would have been were he never unlawfully detained.” The court also rejected Petitioner’s “capable of repetition yet evading review” argument as “speculative and hypothetical” as applied to him, noting that any risk of future re-detention did not save the petition from mootness after release by court order and that Petitioner acknowledged re-detention could be justified if materially new circumstances arose. Judge Slaughter therefore rejected the R&R, denied the petition as moot, and dismissed the case without prejudice.

This habeas case involved a Christian refugee from Syria with TPS and work authorization who had been released under an order of supervision because ICE could not effectuate his removal to Syria, but whom ICE later re-detained to execute the same removal order. The case’s tracked issue is Respondents’ TRO opposition: after Judge Wilson ordered the government to respond to Petitioner’s emergency release request, Respondents filed a response concerning “an entirely different case” and an apparently unrelated detainee, prompting the court to order the government to show cause “why sanctions should not issue for substantively failing to respond to the Court’s order to oppose Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief.”

Petitioner Suliman Alhayek, a Christian refugee from Syria, fled to the United States on May 20, 2023. ICE detained him on arrival, charged him as inadmissible, and placed him in expedited removal proceedings. After a negative credible-fear finding was affirmed by an immigration judge, Petitioner was ordered removed to Syria on June 24, 2023. ICE was unable to effectuate removal and released him under an order of supervision on July 22, 2023. He then remained in the United States with Temporary Protected Status and work authorization and, according to Judge Wilson’s background summary, complied with the supervision requirements of his release.

On Nov. 11, 2025, ICE re-detained Petitioner without notice for the purpose of executing the 2023 removal order. Judge Wilson’s later TRO order noted that, after 100 days of detention, Petitioner requested a custody review, but the government failed to respond. Petitioner filed his § 2241 habeas petition and TRO motion on Feb. 27, 2026, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the INA, and the APA, and seeking immediate release.

On Mar. 2, Judge Wilson ordered the government to respond to Petitioner’s TRO motion by noon on Mar. 9. Respondents filed an opposition on Mar. 9, but Judge Wilson later wrote that the “response related to an entirely different case,” “an apparently unrelated detainee, Gurpreet Singh,” who “had been released from ICE detention. The response made no reference to Petitioner and offered no argument to justify his continued detention.”

On Mar. 27, Judge Wilson entered a text order, on the court’s own motion, directing the government to show cause in writing by Apr. 1 “why sanctions should not issue for substantively failing to respond to the Court’s order to oppose Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief.” Respondents withdrew their earlier response on Mar. 28 and filed a corrected response to the sanctions OSC on Mar. 29.

On Apr. 17, Judge Wilson denied the TRO motion without prejudice. The court found that, because Petitioner had been detained since Nov. 11, 2025, his detention had lasted a little over five months and remained presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas. The court held that Petitioner had not shown removal to Syria was not reasonably foreseeable because he had not provided evidence that Syria had denied acceptance or that U.S. immigration laws or procedures precluded removal there. The court added that, if detention continued beyond the presumptively reasonable six-month period, “the burden will shift” and Petitioner’s likelihood of success would improve, so denial was without prejudice to renewal in 25 days.

On Apr. 20, Magistrate Judge Viramontes ordered Respondents to answer the habeas petition by Apr. 27, and Respondents filed their answer that day. Petitioner replied on Apr. 29. Magistrate Judge Viramontes issued a report and recommendation on May 6.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond by the court-ordered deadline to Judge Slaughter’s preliminary-injunction show-cause order, after the court had granted TRO relief requiring a § 1226(a) bond hearing or release. A week after the deadline, Judge Slaughter wrote that “Respondents did not comply” and had “filed nothing,” ordered the government to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and directed Respondents to file the overdue response because it was already “so late.” The court later described the government’s preliminary-injunction response as “extremely late” and its sanctions explanation as “disappointingly weak,” but discharged the sanctions show-cause order in its discretion. Because Petitioner had received the bond hearing required by the TRO, and because his challenge to the adequacy of the immigration judge’s bond decision belonged first before the BIA, the court denied preliminary-injunction relief as moot and referred further proceedings to the magistrate judge.

Petitioner Francisco Eduardo Ixtos Ajqui filed his habeas petition and TRO application on Nov. 6, 2025, while detained at Adelanto. He challenged his detention without a bond hearing after ICE arrested him in Los Angeles on Aug. 21, 2025 during “Operation At Large,” served him with an NTA charging inadmissibility as a noncitizen present without admission or parole, and treated him as mandatorily detained under § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner argued that, as a person residing in the interior of the United States, he was detained under § 1226(a) and entitled to bond process.

On Nov. 10, Judge Slaughter granted the TRO. The court rejected Respondents’ jurisdictional objections under § 1252(b)(9) and § 1252(g), found Petitioner likely to succeed because § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), likely governed his detention, and noted that the government had not applied the law to case-specific facts but instead repeated the legal position it had taken in similar cases where TROs had been granted. Judge Slaughter enjoined Respondents from continuing to detain Petitioner unless he received an individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing before an immigration judge by Nov. 17. If no hearing occurred, Respondents were ordered to release him by Nov. 18 at 1:00 p.m. The court also barred transfer, relocation, or removal from the Central District of California pending final resolution absent further order, and ordered Respondents to show cause by Nov. 19 why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

Petitioner later reported that an immigration judge held a bond hearing on Nov. 14 and denied bond. He argued, however, that the hearing did not comply with § 1226(a) or due process because, among other things, the immigration judge’s remarks showed irritation or hostility toward the court’s order, the immigration judge failed to consider probative evidence on flight risk, and the bond denial lacked a reasoned explanation.

Respondents did not file their preliminary-injunction OSC response by Nov. 19. On Nov. 26, Judge Slaughter wrote: “Respondents did not comply with this Order; a week after the deadline, Respondents have filed nothing.” The court ordered “[t]he government … to show cause” by Dec. 1 “why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to comply with the OSC.” Because the government’s response “was due a week ago,” “so late,” the court also ordered the government to file the overdue preliminary-injunction response by Dec. 2 and to address both Petitioner’s compliance arguments and the court’s mootness inquiry.

On Dec. 3, Judge Slaughter denied preliminary-injunction relief as moot and discharged the sanctions OSC. The court noted the government’s “extremely late response” to the preliminary-injunction OSC and described the government’s sanctions response as “disappointingly weak.” The court summarized the explanation as counsel’s “fail[ure] to calendar the deadline,” an eight-day trip out of the country “without reviewing emails,” and the government’s workload from an “‘unprecedented number of TRO applications’” during “‘staffing shortages.’” Nonetheless, in its discretion, the court discharged the sanctions OSC.

On mootness, Judge Slaughter held that Petitioner had received the bond hearing he sought through the TRO and that his challenge to the sufficiency of the immigration judge’s bond decision was more appropriately addressed to the BIA, not the district court in the first instance. The court therefore denied the preliminary-injunction request as moot, vacated the Dec. 4 hearing, and referred further merits proceedings, including whether the case should be dismissed as moot, to Magistrate Judge Patricia Donahue. Respondents later moved to dismiss, Petitioner opposed, and Petitioner filed a voluntary dismissal on Apr. 1.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ transfer of Petitioner to Texas after Judge Fairbank entered a TRO barring removal or transfer outside the Central District of California. The court stated it was “inclined to agree” that, if Respondents transferred Petitioner outside the district, “that would be a violation of the TRO,” ordered Respondents “[t]o comply with this Court’s TRO” to “immediately bring petitioner back,” and required them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for “failing or refusing to comply with the TRO.” Judge Fairbank later declined contempt after finding that Respondents’ counsel “was still not aware of the content of the Court’s TRO when the transfer occurred,” that counsel acted with “reasonable[] promptness under the circumstances,” and that Respondents “did not willfully or recklessly violate this Court’s TRO.” The court nevertheless continued the no-transfer protection and ordered release or an individualized detention hearing.

Petitioner Yeny Carolina Iraheta Lopez filed her habeas petition and emergency TRO application on Mar. 18, 2026. The petition sought emergency relief to prevent removal, challenge the legal authority for detention, and secure release or a bond hearing. After the Clerk issued a notice of deficiency because the TRO application had been filed as an attachment rather than as a separate event, Petitioner refiled corrected and amended TRO applications the same day.

On Mar. 20, Judge Fairbank granted the TRO. The court ordered that, “[p]ending further order of this Court, the respondents are temporarily restrained from removing petitioner from the United States of America or otherwise moving petitioner outside this federal judicial district, the Central District of California.” The TRO also required Respondents by Mar. 25 to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue extending that relief and requiring either release from detention or “a prompt individualized bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which the government shall bear the burden of establishing a lawful basis for detention.” Although signed on Mar. 20, the TRO was not entered until 9:26 a.m. on Mar. 23.

Later on Mar. 23, approximately thirteen hours after the TRO was docketed, Petitioner filed an emergency enforcement request and notice of violation, alleging that Respondents had transferred her to Texas earlier that day. On Mar. 24, Judge Fairbank stated that the court was “inclined to agree,” writing:

“The Court is inclined to agree that if the respondents transferred petitioner outside this federal judicial district, the Central District of California, that would be a violation of the TRO. However, the record does not supply the facts needed to form a reasoned opinion as to whether the respondents were aware of the content of the Court’s TRO when they allegedly transferred petitioner to another ICE facility in Texas, outside our federal judicial district. Inter alia, the Court does not know the exact time at which a Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or other executive branch order to transfer petitioner to Texas was issued or conveyed to the ICE correctional personnel and/or warden at the Adelanto, California ICEfacility where petitioner was detained when she filed this action six days ago.”

Judge Fairbank therefore entered an enforcement order and contempt show-cause order. The court ordered that, “[t]o comply with this Court’s TRO,” Respondents “shall immediately bring petitioner back into this federal judicial district.” The court also required Respondents to file a compliance notice with documentation by Mar. 27 and to file a response by Mar. 26 “showing cause why they should not be held in contempt for failing or refusing to comply with the TRO filed 9:26 a.m. on Monday, March 23, 2026.” Respondents were required to attach documentation establishing the exact times at which Petitioner was ordered removed from the district, physically removed from the district, and arrived at the new facility in Texas.

Respondents filed their preliminary-injunction response on Mar. 25 and their contempt response and supporting declaration on Mar. 26. On Mar. 30, Judge Fairbank declined to hold Respondents or their counsel in contempt, explaining:

“The Court agrees with petitioner that if the respondents had read the TRO and then still arranged or allowed the transfer of petitioner outside this federal judicial district, the Central District of California, that would have been a willful violation of the TRO.

Having read the respondents’ response to the enforcement/contempt motion, however, the Court finds that the respondents’ counsel was still not aware of the content of the Court’s TRO when the transfer occurred. It is not always reasonable to expect counsel to check for new filings, then immediately read those filings, even court orders, as soon as the order is docketed, depending on a variety of factors including inter alia when the item was filed, where counsel was and what he or she was doing at the time with regard to other cases and matters, how quickly counsel could realistically reach people in other agencies or entities to convey a court order and ask that it be followed, etc.”

Further, the court found that Respondents had “complied” with the Mar. 24 return order because they “brought [P]etitioner back to the Adelanto, California ICE facility by the afternoon of March 26.”

Judge Fairbank also credited Respondents’ timing explanation, stating that Respondents’ counsel had acted with “reasonable[] promptness under the circumstances,” especially given the “unusual volume of non-citizen habeas corpus cases pending and being filed in federal courts in recent months.” The court quoted Respondents’ explanation that the TRO was docketed at 9:26 a.m., forwarded from the USAO civil email box at 11:07 a.m., reviewed by an AUSA, and sent to ICE at 5:59 p.m. identifying the order as containing a removal and transfer bar. Judge Fairbank therefore held that Respondents “did not willfully or recklessly violate this Court’s TRO,” and declined to hold Respondents or counsel in contempt.

At the same time, Judge Fairbank issued a preliminary injunction. Pending final judgment and any appeals, Respondents remained enjoined from transferring Petitioner out of the Central District of California. The court ordered Respondents, by Apr. 7, either to release Petitioner from ICE detention on appropriate supervision conditions or to hold “an individualized detention hearing before an impartial judge at which the government bears the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, a lawful justification for continuing to detain petitioner pending attempts to remove her from this country.” The court found in Respondents’ favor, however, that Petitioner had not yet shown serious questions going to the merits of the argument that removal would be substantively unlawful even after all constitutionally or statutorily required process.

Judge Fairbank also denied Petitioner’s second motion, filed Mar. 27, to enforce the TRO, explaining that Petitioner had “misunderstood” the TRO’s “clear language:” the TRO “did not require” a hearing by Mar. 27 or require release if a hearing had not occurred by that date. The court “admonished” Petitioner’s counsel to follow the Central District’s local civil rules and not continue filing motions without first consulting Respondents’ counsel to the extent practicable and providing proof of consultation or consultation efforts.

On Apr. 27, Petitioner filed an amended petition. The government answered on May 4. On May 11, Magistrate Judge Eick issued a report and recommendation.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ transfer of Petitioner from Adelanto to Texas on the day she filed her habeas petition, followed by an attempted or intended removal after Judge Kim had enjoined removal and transfer while the habeas proceedings remained pending. After Respondents represented that Petitioner would be returned to Adelanto, the court ordered that, once she returned, Respondents were “enjoined from removing her from the United States or transferring her outside this district pending further order of this Court.” Petitioner later filed a second emergency motion to enforce, and Judge Kim found that, “[d]espite that order,” Respondents had “attempted to remove or, at the very least, intended to remove Petitioner from the country,” and now said they “intend[ed] to remove Petitioner on April 27, 2026, or shortly thereafter” to an unidentified country “in violation of the Court’s April 10 order.” Given “Respondents’ disregard for the Court’s order enjoining removal,” Judge Kim granted enforcement and ordered Respondents’ counsel to appear in person to “show cause why the Government should not be held in contempt.” The court discharged the contempt OSC after the hearing and set the amended petition for expedited briefing.

Petitioner Magdalena Zepeda Gomez filed a counseled § 2241 habeas petition on Apr. 6, 2026, alleging that her immigration detention was unlawful and seeking release or, alternatively, a bond hearing. She also filed an ex parte TRO application seeking immediate release. On the day she filed the petition, Respondents transferred her from Adelanto Detention Facility, within the Central District of California, to El Paso Camp East Montana Detention Facility in El Paso, Texas. Petitioner moved to enforce General Order 26-05’s notice provisions and to require her return to Adelanto. Respondents then informed the court that she would be returned to Adelanto on Apr. 13.

On Apr. 10, Judge Kim denied the first motion to enforce as moot, without prejudice if Petitioner was not returned as scheduled. The court ordered the parties to file a joint status report within 48 hours of her return or by Apr. 17, whichever came first. Judge Kim also ordered that, once Petitioner returned to the district, Respondents were “enjoined from removing her from the United States or transferring her outside this district pending further order of this Court.”

On Apr. 13, Judge Kim denied Petitioner’s TRO application without prejudice, explaining that immediate release was the core merits relief sought in the habeas petition and was best resolved through the expedited merits review established by General Order 26-05. The court emphasized that it was not “foreshadow[ing]” its view on whether the proper habeas remedy, if relief were granted, should be a custody hearing, unconditional release, or a conditional writ.

Respondents filed a joint status report on Apr. 15 regarding Petitioner’s return to Adelanto. Petitioner filed a second emergency motion to enforce on Apr. 17. On Apr. 21, Judge Kim granted that motion. The court recounted that, after Respondents attempted to remove Petitioner from the country during her habeas proceedings, it had enjoined them from removal or transfer:

“Despite that order, Respondents attempted to remove or, at the very least, intended to remove Petitioner from the country on or about April 20, 2026. Worse, Respondents now say they ‘intend to remove Petitioner on April 27, 2026, or shortly thereafter’ to an unidentified country in violation of the Court’s April 10 order.”

“Given Respondents’ disregard for the Court’s order enjoining removal,” the court granted Petitioner’s second motion to enforce and ordered “counsel for Respondents ... to appear in person on April 22, 2026 at 1:30 P.M. ... to show cause why the Government should not be held in contempt for violating the Court’s April 10 order enjoining removal pending habeas proceedings here.”

At the Apr. 22 hearing, counsel appeared, the court conferred with the parties, and the order to show cause was discharged. The court deemed the amended petition filed as of Apr. 22, set the government’s answer deadline, and allowed Petitioner to reply. Respondents later answered, Petitioner replied, and Petitioner filed a third motion to enforce on May 29.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file the court-ordered Notice of Compliance after Judge Hsu adopted the R&R, granted habeas relief, and ordered Petitioner released within 24 hours. Judge Hsu directed Respondents to release Petitioner “under the same conditions that were in place prior to her re-detention,” return her personal belongings, and file a Notice of Compliance within three calendar days confirming release. After that deadline passed, Magistrate Judge Audero entered a sanctions OSC, stating that the court had ordered release and a compliance notice but “no Notice of Compliance has been filed.” The court ordered Respondents to “show cause within 24 hours why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to comply with a court order,” while providing that the OSC would discharge automatically if Respondents filed the required notice within 24 hours. Respondents filed the Notice of Compliance later that day, and Judge Hsu later entered judgment granting the petition.

Petitioner Haiyan Liu filed her habeas petition and an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order on Mar. 23, 2026. On Mar. 24, Judge Hsu entered a limited stay after a preliminary review of the petition. The court ordered Respondents to ensure that Petitioner remained within the Central District of California while the TRO application was pending and required Respondents to state whether they contested Petitioner’s membership in the Bond Eligible Class. The court indicated that, if membership was not contested, it would issue relief consistent with Bautista.

On Mar. 26, after Respondents filed a notice of non-opposition, Judge Hsu granted the TRO. The court held that Respondents were precluded from relitigating whether Petitioner, as a Bautista Bond Eligible Class member, was entitled to the requested TRO relief. Judge Hsu enjoined Respondents from continuing to detain Petitioner, or placing any new restriction on her liberty such as electronic monitoring, unless she received an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge under § 1226(a) within seven days. The court also barred Respondents from transferring, relocating, or removing Petitioner from the Central District of California without further order and pending final resolution, required Respondents to provide the immigration judge with a copy of the order, and ordered a joint status report by Apr. 3 addressing the hearing, outcome, and compliance.

On Apr. 3, after the parties filed status reports, Judge Hsu found that the TRO had been satisfied and vacated it. The court stated that, “[w]ithout additional evidence,” it could not evaluate “the sufficiency of the process afforded to Petitioner” or the merits of, or jurisdiction to entertain, additional injunctive relief. Further proceedings were referred to Magistrate Judge Audero. On Apr. 21, Magistrate Judge Audero set a merits briefing schedule, noting that the underlying request for habeas relief remained pending.

On May 11, Magistrate Judge Audero issued a report and recommendation (R&R). Respondents objected on May 12. Judge Hsu adopted the R&R, granted the petition, and ordered Respondents to release Petitioner from custody within 24 hours of entry of the order “under the same conditions that were in place prior to her re-detention.” The court also ordered Respondents to return all of Petitioner’s personal belongings and file a Notice of Compliance within three calendar days confirming release. Judge Hsu further enjoined Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner, or placing any new restriction on her liberty such as electronic monitoring, without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which the government bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that detention was appropriate to prevent flight or protect the public.

Respondents did not file the required Notice of Compliance within the time ordered. On May 22, Magistrate Judge Audero entered a text-only order stating that, on May 13 at 11:20 a.m., the court had directed Respondents to release Petitioner within 24 hours and file a Notice of Compliance within three calendar days, but that “no Notice of Compliance has been filed.” The court therefore ordered Respondents to “show cause within 24 hours why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to comply with a court order.” The order stated that, if Respondents filed the Notice of Compliance within 24 hours of the OSC, the OSC would be discharged automatically.

Respondents filed a notice of compliance later on May 22. On May 28, Judge Hsu entered judgment granting the petition, citing the May 12 order accepting the report and recommendation and Respondents’ May 22 Notice of Compliance.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a timely answer after Magistrate Judge Early ordered them to respond by Apr. 15, followed by a show-cause order warning that default could be entered unless Respondents filed by noon the next day. Respondents then filed an opposition, stated they were “not presenting an opposition argument at this time,” and the court ordered a new individualized bond hearing within seven days.

Petitioner Christian Adolfo Perez Aragon filed his habeas petition on Apr. 1, 2026, challenging ongoing immigration detention. He had previously received a bond hearing but alleged that the denial was “constitutionally deficient” and “rest[ed] entirely on a facially unreliable rap sheet entry.” He sought immediate release on reasonable supervision conditions, or alternatively a new bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the government bore the burden and the decisionmaker had authority to order release on bond or conditions.

On Apr. 9, Magistrate Judge Early noted that Respondents had not filed a notice of appearance within the time required by General Order 26-05 and ordered them to file one by Apr. 10. The court also ordered Respondents to file their answer to the petition by Apr. 15. Respondents filed their notice of appearance on Apr. 10.

Respondents did not file an answer by Apr. 15. On Apr. 16, Magistrate Judge Early entered a text-only order stating: “Respondents were ordered to file an Answer by 4/15/26. No Answer has been filed.” The court ordered Respondents to “show” cause in writing by noon on Apr. 17 “why a default should not be entered,” and stated that Respondents could “comply” by filing an answer by that same deadline.

Respondents filed an opposition on Apr. 17. In the Apr. 21 order resolving the petition, Magistrate Judge Early noted that Respondents had informed the court that they “are not presenting an opposition argument at this time,” and that if the court entered relief, judgment could be entered without further filings or proceedings. The court interpreted Respondents’ lack of opposition as an agreement to reopen the prior bond denial in the ongoing removal proceedings.

Magistrate Judge Early ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner a new individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge, compliant with governing law and due process, within seven days. If Petitioner was not timely provided that hearing, Respondents had to release him from custody. The court denied the other relief sought and dismissed the petition without prejudice. Judgment was entered Apr. 21.

Coming soon.

This habeas case involved a Bond Eligible Class member who sought relief after being denied a bond hearing, and a court order cataloguing what Judge Sykes described as Respondents’ broader pattern of “continued defiance of valid court orders and its final judgment.” The court granted a TRO requiring a § 1226(a) bond hearing within seven days and warned that, if Respondents continued detaining Bond Eligible Class members and denying them bond hearings, “the Court will set hearings for contempt.” Judge Sykes also described a “litany of excuses raised by Respondents to evade compliance” with prior orders and stated that she was “skeptical as to Respondents’ intentions” in raising local-rule objections given Respondents’ “lack of compliance with the Court’s orders in all the subsequent habeas actions filed by Bond Eligible Members.”

Petitioner Juan Rios Vega, a Mexican national, filed his habeas petition and ex parte TRO application on Jan. 7, 2026. He had been detained since Dec. 5, 2025, at Adelanto Detention Facility, was in pending removal proceedings, and had been denied the opportunity for release on bond by EOIR. He alleged membership in the nationwide Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista and sought relief consistent with that case: release or a § 1226(a) bond hearing.

On Jan. 8, the case was transferred to Judge Sykes as related to Maldonado Bautista. On Jan. 9, Judge Sykes ordered Respondents to oppose the TRO by Jan. 12. The court also entered preservation relief. To preserve jurisdiction, Judge Sykes ordered that Petitioner not be removed from the United States unless and until the court ordered otherwise. The court also ordered that, in light of Petitioner’s interests in participating in further proceedings and maintaining adequate access to counsel, he could not be transferred except to a facility within the Central District of California absent further order.

On Jan. 14, Judge Sykes granted the TRO. The court first described the “troubling circumstances surrounding the refusal by executive agencies to provide Petitioner as well as those in the Bond Eligible Class with bond hearings” as “all too familiar with this Court.” Judge Sykes explained that, after final judgment in Maldonado Bautista, the court had declared that § 1226(a) governed detention of Bond Eligible Class members, that class members were not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that DHS’s July 2025 interim detention-authority guidance was unlawful under the APA.

Judge Sykes then addressed Respondents’ course of conduct after Maldonado Bautista, emphasizing was “necessary to briefly catalogue the litany of excuses by Respondents to evade compliance:”

“In spite of these conclusions following Bautista, Respondents have continued their course of action in detaining those in the Bond Eligible Class and persist in challenging the class members’ right to a bond hearing. The Court finds necessary to briefly catalogue the litany of excuses raised by Respondents to evade compliance with the Court’s orders and relevant judicial doctrines.”

Judge Sykes noted that Respondents had renewed arguments that had already been rejected “numerous times,” and held that, because Petitioner was a Bond Eligible Class member, he was entitled to TRO relief:

“Yet, Respondents now renew the same arguments that have been rejected numerous times. Because Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Bautista, he is entitled to the relief sought in the TRO. The Court expects Respondents to act in accordance with the Court’s final judgment in Bautista. Respondents’ continued defiance of valid court orders and its final judgment has resulted in unnecessary, voluminous filings of ex parte temporary restraining orders. Should Respondents continue to detain members of the Bond Eligible Class and deny them bond hearings, the Court will set hearings for contempt.”

Judge Sykes also rejected Respondents’ procedural objections. Respondents argued that Petitioner had failed to comply with local rules requiring declarations and evidence, but the court found those concerns immaterial. Judge Sykes stated that Petitioner’s notice to appear gave Respondents enough information to identify and verify the facts alleged, and that the volume of similar habeas petitions and TROs on the same issue reinforced Respondents’ familiarity with the issues. The court added that it was “skeptical as to Respondents’ intentions in raising compliance with the Local Rules given Respondents’ lack of compliance with the Court’s orders in all the subsequent habeas actions filed by Bond Eligible Members.”

Judge Sykes held that the TRO raised serious questions on the merits, that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in Petitioner’s favor, that continued detention without an initial bond hearing was likely irreparable harm, and that relief served the public interest. The court enjoined Respondents from continuing to detain Petitioner unless he received an individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing before an immigration judge within seven days. The court also enjoined Respondents from transferring, relocating, or removing Petitioner from the Central District of California without further order pending final resolution.

The TRO remained in effect until Jan. 30. Judge Sykes ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue and directed them to explain why they had not provided Petitioner a bond hearing in the first instance given his Bond Eligible Class membership. Respondents filed a response on Jan. 22. Petitioner voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice the same day, and Judge Sykes discharged the OSC and vacated the Jan. 30 hearing as moot.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a court-ordered answer to the petition after Magistrate Judge Kaufman warned that failure to answer by the deadline, or to respond to any claim, “may be deemed as consent to the granting of the Petition.” After Respondents’ counsel appeared but did not answer, Magistrate Judge Kaufman ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted as unopposed and for failure to comply with court orders. Respondents then stated that they had “no opposition argument to present,” and Judge John W. Holcomb adopted the report and recommendation, granted habeas relief, issued a writ requiring immediate release, and barred re-detention without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Petitioner Ping Zhong filed her habeas petition on Feb. 20. On Feb. 23, Magistrate Judge Kaufman ordered Respondents to answer by Mar. 2 and to address the merits of all grounds for relief. The court stated that habeas petitioners are entitled to a prompt ruling and quoted authority explaining that habeas is meant to provide a “swift and imperative remedy.” The order required Respondents to address all grounds for relief in the answer, lodge all pertinent documents, and warned that “[f]ailure to file an answer by the deadline, or to respond to any Petitioner’s claims for relief, may be deemed as consent to the granting of the Petition.”

Respondents’ counsel, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Patrick J. Kearney (SAUSA Kearney), filed a notice of appearance on Mar. 2 but did not file a response. On Mar. 3, Magistrate Judge Kaufman issued an order to show cause. The court wrote that, “[a]s of the date of this Order, Respondents’ counsel have” appeared “but have not filed a response to the Petition.” The court ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted as unopposed and permitted Respondents either to state that they did not oppose the petition or to file a response in accordance with the earlier order. The court continued the hearing to Mar. 6 and left all other requirements of the prior order in effect.

On Mar. 5, Magistrate Judge Kaufman issued a report and recommendation (R&R). The docket reflects that Respondents had made clear that they had “no opposition argument to present,” which the magistrate judge construed as a waiver of their right to object. Judge Holcomb accepted and adopted the R&R the same day. The court entered judgment granting the petition, issued a writ requiring Zhong’s immediate release, prevented Respondents from re-detaining Zhong “without notice and an opportunity to be heard,” and dismissed the case with prejudice. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Petitioner’s re-detention after prior release under § 1226(a), immediate release under a TRO, and Respondents’ failure to answer the court’s order to show cause why the TRO should not be converted into a preliminary injunction. Judge Almadani converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction after finding that Respondents “did not file any response to the Court’s order to show cause,” and that their “wholesale failure to respond” left them unable to show there was no reasonable expectation that Petitioner’s unlawful re-detention without due process would recur.

Petitioner Binod BK, a citizen of Nepal, arrived in the United States in the fall of 2024. CBP apprehended him, detained him, and then released him under § 1226(a). While detained, he received a credible-fear interview and was found to have a credible fear of return to Nepal. He filed for asylum, complied with asylum-application and immigration-appearance requirements, and was re-detained on or about Feb. 6, 2026 without prior notice. He remained detained at Adelanto Detention Facility when he filed his habeas petition and TRO application on Feb. 19.

On Feb. 27, Judge Almadani granted the TRO. Respondents argued that Petitioner was a member of the Maldonado Bautista bond-eligible class and that the only appropriate remedy was a bond hearing within seven days. Judge Almadani rejected that limit, finding that Petitioner was not a member of the bond-eligible class because he had been apprehended, detained, released, and later re-arrested. The court found Petitioner likely to succeed on his procedural due-process claim, stating that “Respondents make no argument that Petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant or provided written notice of the termination of his supervised release and an opportunity to be heard before he was re-detained.” The court further found:

“Respondents do not assert any purported governmental interest in Petitioner’s continued detention or offer any argument or explanation for why Petitioner could not have been provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard before his release was revoked and he was re-detained, as is generally required under Zinermon. … Respondents thus fail to establish the government has significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention.”

Judge Almadani ordered Respondents to release Petitioner forthwith, not impose additional release restrictions unless deemed necessary at a future pre-deprivation bond hearing, and show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue by Mar. 6.

Respondents did not respond. On Mar. 11, Judge Almadani converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction, writing that “Respondents did not file any response to the Court’s order to show cause. Petitioner did not file a reply.” The court explained:

“Respondents had an opportunity to explain why a preliminary injunction should not be issued and failed to file a response. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-12, the Court may treat Respondents’ failure to file the Court-ordered response as consent to the granting of the preliminary injunction.”

The court also rejected any mootness theory based on release after the TRO:

“Here, given Respondents’ wholesale failure to respond to the Court’s order to show cause, there can be no doubt that they have failed to carry the heavy burden of demonstrating that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong—i.e., the unlawful re-detention of Petitioner without due process—will be repeated.”

Judge Almadani granted preliminary injunctive relief for the duration of the action, enjoining Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent pre-deprivation notice describing the changed circumstances requiring re-detention and a timely hearing at which Respondents would bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence.

This habeas case involved Petitioner’s re-detention after six years on an Order of Supervision, Respondents’ non-opposition to emergency release despite taking no steps to release him absent court order, and their later failure to respond to the court’s order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Judge Almadani ordered immediate release after finding that the government had detained Petitioner “without due process of law” and “present[ed] no defense or explanation for its actions,” warning that failure to file reliable proof of release could result in sanctions. The court later converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction after Respondents “never filed a separate response to the Court’s order to show cause” and had shown a “wholesale failure to respond.”

Petitioner Zhang Dong, a citizen of China, first entered the United States in 2010 on a student visa and had lived in the United States for more than 15 years. An immigration judge ordered him removed in 2018 and designated China as the country of removal. ICE was unable to effectuate removal, and Petitioner was released on Mar. 22, 2019, on an Order of Supervision. In the six years that followed, ICE could not obtain travel documents from China. On Aug. 14, 2025, Petitioner arrived for a routine ICE check-in and was detained. Petitioner was not given notice why his Order of Supervision was revoked or an opportunity to respond. He was initially held in a federal-building holding tank for six days without a proper place to sleep, change of clothes, shower, or regular meal before transfer to Adelanto. He filed his habeas petition and TRO application on Feb. 20, 2026.

On Feb. 25, Judge Almadani ordered Respondents to respond to Petitioner’s TRO motion by Feb. 26 at 5:00 p.m., barred Respondents from transferring or removing Petitioner pending the TRO decision, and required Respondents to personally serve Petitioner with their opposition and all court orders in the case. Respondents filed a notice of non-opposition stating only that they had no opposition argument. On Feb. 27, Judge Almadani granted the TRO, writing:

“Given the government’s non-opposition to the TRO Application, the Court finds that Petitioner is clearly entitled to immediate release from custody. The government has detained Petitioner without due process of law, without demonstrating that there is any significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and without demonstrating that Petitioner violated any term of his supervision.”

Judge Almadani further held that Petitioner had been detained without notice and an opportunity to be heard on revocation of supervision, in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), and emphasized that “[i]t is black letter law that government agencies are required to follow their own regulations.” The court also criticized the government for “present[ing] no defense or explanation for its actions despite freedom from detention being ‘the most elemental of liberty interests.’” Judge Almadani emphasized:

“Despite effectively conceding that Petitioner has been unlawfully detained, Respondents make no effort to release him. Given its prerogative, the government would continue to deprive Petitioner of his most fundamental liberty interest, keeping him unlawfully detained until this Court orders his release. This approach not only squanders finite judicial resources, but more importantly, it offends the Constitution.”

The court ordered immediate release, reinstatement of Petitioner’s prior Order of Supervision without additional restrictions, and a notice-and-hearing injunction against re-detention. It also ordered Respondents to file reliable proof of release by Mar. 2 and warned: “failure to do so may result in sanctions.”

Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Mar. 2. But they did not answer the PI OSC. On Mar. 11, Judge Almadani converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction. Noting Respondents’ notice of compliance, the court wrote that “Respondents notably did not reference the preliminary injunction in the notice and never filed a separate response to the Court’s order to show cause,” adding,“Petitioner did not file a reply.” The court treated Respondents’ failure to respond as materially significant, stating, “Respondents had further opportunity to explain why a preliminary injunction should not be issued and failed to file a response,” and further cautioned: Pursuant to Local Rule 7-12, the Court may treat Respondents’ failure to file the Court-ordered response as consent to the granting of the preliminary injunction.” The court stressed:

“Here, given Respondents’ wholesale failure to respond to the Court’s order to show cause, there can be no doubt that they have failed to carry the heavy burden of demonstrating that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong—i.e., the unlawful re-detention of Petitioner without due process—will be repeated.”

Judge Almadani granted a preliminary injunction for the duration of the action, barring re-detention without notice and an opportunity to be heard consistent with due process and immigration law and regulations.

This habeas case involved Petitioner’s re-detention after release on supervision, a temporary restraining order requiring immediate release, Respondents’ failure to timely file proof of release, and Respondents’ later failure to respond to the court’s preliminary-injunction show-cause order. Judge Almadani granted TRO relief after finding that Respondents “do not meaningfully respond” to Petitioner’s due-process claim, made “no effort to show that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community,” and “does not address these arguments at all.” The court ordered immediate release and warned that failure to file reliable proof of release “may result in sanctions.” When “no such proof” was filed by the deadline, Judge Almadani ordered Respondents to cure the failure and show cause why they had failed to timely file proof of release. The court later converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction after Respondents filed no response to the preliminary-injunction OSC, finding that their “wholesale failure to respond” meant they had not carried the “heavy burden” required to show that Petitioner’s unlawful re-detention without due process would not recur.

Petitioner Ali Vatadi entered the United States in May 2023 and was released on supervision subject to reporting and compliance requirements. He complied with those conditions and had no criminal offense or other violation. On Sept. 25, 2025, ICE arrested him at a scheduled check-in and detained him at Adelanto Processing Center. He had an active asylum case, no final removal order, and requested a bond hearing, but was “compelled to withdraw” that request based on the immigration judge’s statement. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Jan. 2, 2026, in Vatadi v. Bowen, 5:26-cv-00082 (C.D. Cal.), and filed an emergency TRO motion on Jan. 9. Because of a clerical error, the TRO motion opened a second case, the instant case, Vatadi v. Bowen, 5:26-cv-00098 (C.D. Cal.), which was later consolidated with the original habeas action.

On Feb. 12, Judge Almadani granted the TRO after finding that Respondents did not meaningfully answer Petitioner’s due-process challenge to prolonged detention. The court noted that Respondents “do not meaningfully respond” to Petitioner’s primary claim, did not address the Mathews test, and made “no effort to show that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community.” It found the risk of erroneous deprivation high because Petitioner had been re-detained without an opportunity to contest the basis for detention and the government “does not address these arguments at all”or identify any countervailing interest in re-detention without a pre-deprivation bond hearing. Judge Almadani ordered immediate release, required Respondents to file reliable proof of release by Feb. 13, warned that “[f]ailure to do so may result in sanctions,” and ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, warning that “[f]ailure to file a response will be deemed consent to the issuance of the preliminary injunction.”

Respondents did not timely file proof of release. On Feb. 17, Judge Almadani entered an order requiring proof of release and ordering Respondents to show cause:

“On February 12, 2026, the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. … The Court ordered Respondents to file proof that it had complied with the Court’s order and released Petitioner by no later than February 13, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. As of the date of this order, no such proof has been filed.”

The court ordered Respondents to cure that failure by filing proof of Petitioner’s release “immediately and no later than February 18, 2026, at 5:00 p.m.” The court also ordered Respondents to “show cause” by Feb. 18 “why the government failed to timely file proof of release as ordered by the Court.”

Respondents filed proof of service and a response with proof of release on Feb. 18. They did not, however, file any response to the preliminary-injunction show-cause order. On Feb. 20, Judge Almadani converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction:

“The Court further ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. … Respondents did not file any response to the Court’s order to show cause.”

The court explained that Respondents had another opportunity to explain why a PI should not issue:

“Respondents had notice and an opportunity to respond in opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for a TRO. … Respondents had further opportunity to explain why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-12, the Court may treat Respondents’ failure to file the Court-ordered response as consent to the granting of the preliminary injunction.”

The court went on to Respondents’ mootness based on voluntary cessation argument:

“Here, given Respondents’ wholesale failure to respond to Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, there can be no doubt that they have failed to carry the heavy burden of demonstrating that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong—i.e., the unlawful re-detention of Petitioner without due process—will be repeated.”

Judge Almadani granted preliminary injunctive relief for the duration of the action, enjoining Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent pre-deprivation notice describing changed circumstances requiring re-detention and a timely hearing where Respondents bear the clear-and-convincing burden.

This habeas case involved a warrantless arrest at a USCIS biometrics appointment, an identity-error record in which ICE’s own I-213 stated that Petitioner was “not the same subject as our target,” and Respondents’ failure to provide the individualized bond hearing required after ICE served Petitioner with a Maldonado Bautista class notice. Magistrate Judge Bristow found that Respondents’ brief answer did “not address the substantive issues or claims raised in the Petition,” did not “even mention” that ICE had notified Petitioner he was a Bautista class member, and left the petition’s factual allegations undisputed. The court held that, despite “Respondents’ admission that Petitioner is a member of the Maldonado Bautista class,” Respondents “failed to comply with the final judgment in Maldonado Bautista” because they did not provide him an individualized bond hearing “during the entirety of his detention,” and ordered immediate release, return of confiscated property, and notice-and-hearing protections before any re-detention.

Petitioner Alejandro Ramirez-Serna, a 53-year-old citizen and national of Mexico, first entered the United States around 1992, when he was 19. He had lived in Bell Gardens for more than three decades, supported himself through work, paid taxes, participated in his Catholic parish, sent financial support to elderly parents in Mexico, and was the principal beneficiary of a U-visa petition based on a serious assault in which he intervened to help another person and suffered a brain hemorrhage.

The case also involved what the court described as a long-running identity error. An unknown person had used Petitioner’s identifying information and caused a fatal DUI collision in 200. After Petitioner disputed the record, the California DMV corrected it following individualized review. ICE later attached a criminal-history record for that third party to Petitioner’s I-213, but ICE’s own narrative stated:

“Based on the new information gathered, I Officer Avina, determined that RAMIREZ was not the same subject as our target, and even though they shared the same name, date of birth and country of citizenship as RAMIREZ, RAMIREZ is amenable to removal pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA.”

On Apr. 1, Petitioner appeared at the USCIS Application Support Center for scheduled biometrics in connection with his U-visa petition. The court stated that “[t]he arrest occurred without any warrant, administrative or judicial,” that “ICE has never claimed that any warrant existed at the time of the arrest,” and that there was no “‘likely to escape’ circumstance” because Petitioner had “walked voluntarily into a federal building to provide biometrics for an immigration application he had himself filed.” Later that day, ICE served him with a Bautista Class Notice in Spanish, which the court described as “ICE’s own contemporaneous acknowledgment that Petitioner is a member of the Bautista class entitled to specific procedural protections regarding U-visa eligibility.” On May 5, Petitioner filed his habeas petition and emergency TRO motion.

On May 7, the court denied temporary-restraining-order relief under General Order 26-05 but, to preserve jurisdiction, ordered that Petitioner “shall not be removed from the Central District of California pending resolution of this case, or unless otherwise ordered by the Court.” Respondents filed a brief answer on May 13.

On May 28, the court granted habeas relief, finding that Respondents “failed to comply with the final judgment in Maldonado Bautista” because they had not provided Petitioner, an admitted class member, with “an individualized bond hearing during the entirety of his detention.” The court first noted that Respondents’ answer did not address the petition’s substantive claims or the Bautista class notice:

“In their Answer, which is brief, Respondents do not address the substantive issues or claims raised in the Petition, nor do they even mention that they have previously notified Petitioner that he is a member of the certified class in Bautista.”

The court then treated the petition’s factual allegations as undisputed:

“In their Answer, Respondents do not challenge or otherwise dispute these facts, or substantively dispute any of Petitioner’s claims. In light of Respondents’ Answer, the Court finds that the facts alleged in the Petition are undisputed.”

After explaining that the Maldonado Bautista final judgment remained effective within the Central District of California, the court held:

“Notwithstanding this fact, and also notwithstanding Respondents’ admission that Petitioner is a member of the Maldonado Bautista class, Respondents failed to comply with the final judgment in Maldonado Bautista with respect to Petitioner, as they did not provide him with an individualized bond hearing during the entirety of his detention.”

The court ordered immediate release, ordered Respondents to return all property confiscated during arrest and processing, enjoined re-detention without notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral arbiter where the government bears the burden of proving flight risk or danger, and required a status report within two business days confirming release.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ “non-compliance with the Court’s order” to provide a declaration from the ICE officer who interviewed Petitioner, court-facing reliability concerns where ICE’s submitted interview materials “suggested to the Court that ICE’s internal records were either mistaken or otherwise lacked integrity,” and escalation warnings that failure to comply “may result in monetary sanctions” and that future untimely filings would be stricken. Judge Murillo initially found a fair chance that Respondents had failed to provide the informal interview required by § 241.13(i)(3), ordered Respondents to provide that interview, and required “a declaration from the ICE official who conducted the interview.” Respondents instead filed a declaration from an officer who “does not claim she conducted the interview,” while the attached form identified another officer as the interviewer. After Respondents missed the Dec. 29 supplemental-declaration deadline and later attached the declaration to an opposition filed “three days after the deadline,” the court described the late declaration as “Respondents’ belated submission” and held that it was “a violation of the court’s order,” while concluding that the late filing did not undermine the evidence that Petitioner ultimately received an informal interview.

Petitioner Narine Pogosyan, a citizen of the former Soviet Union, was admitted into the United States as a parolee in 1992 and became a lawful permanent resident two years later. An immigration judge ordered her removed to Armenia in 2008. ICE released her from custody and placed her on supervision later that year. In October 2025, ICE revoked her release under § 241.13 and re-detained her. She filed her habeas petition and first TRO application on Nov. 19, 2025.

On Nov. 25, after Petitioner reported that she had been moved from Adelanto to a Bakersfield field office for an unknown reason, Judge Murillo found it necessary to preserve “the status quo and this Court’s jurisdiction over this habeas proceeding” under the All Writs Act. The court barred Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States until the petition was resolved and required a personal-knowledge declaration confirming that Petitioner was, and would remain, in the United States.

On Dec. 3, Judge Murillo granted the TRO in part. The court found that Petitioner had not made the required showing on her reasonable-foreseeability and individualized-determination claims, but found that she had shown a fair chance of success on her claim that Respondents failed to provide the informal interview required by § 241.13(i)(3). The court explained that “the evidence shows that Respondents have not complied with the Section 241.13(i)(3)’s revocation procedures by failing to provide Petitioner with an informal interview,” and ordered:

“Respondents, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and other persons who are in active concert or participation with Respondents are ordered to provide Petitioner with an informal interview by December 10, 2025, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Respondents are further ordered to submit a declaration from the ICE official who conducted the interview by December 12, 2025.”

Respondents filed a declaration from Deportation Officer Ana Juarez. But on Dec. 18, Judge Murillo found that the record suggested Officer Juarez was not the officer who conducted the interview. The court wrote:

“Officer Juarez does not claim she conducted the interview. … According to that form, Deportation Officer Noah Kiohak conducted the interview, not Officer Juarez. … Respondents have not provided a declaration from Officer Kiohak.”

The court ordered a supplemental declaration and warned of sanctions:

“Based on the Court’s review of the record, it appears that Officer Juarez was not the officer who conducted the interview on December 9, 2025. Accordingly, Respondents are ordered to file a supplemental declaration from the officer or officers who conducted the informal interview with Pogosyan on December 9, 2025. The supplemental declaration or declarations are due December 29, 2025. The Court cautions Respondents and their attorneys that failure to comply with this order may result in monetary sanctions.”

Respondents did not file the supplemental declaration by Dec. 29. On Jan. 12, 2026, while filing an opposition to Petitioner’s second TRO application three days after the court’s deadline, Respondents attached a declaration from Deportation Officer Noah Kichak stating that he and Officer Rigoberto Gilbert were present during Petitioner’s Dec. 9 informal interview.

On Feb. 23, Judge Murillo denied the preliminary injunction as moot. In doing so, the court explained why it had required a supplemental declaration in the first place: the prior materials had raised questions about the reliability of ICE’s internal records. The court wrote:

“The evidence provided by Respondents—namely, Deportation Officer Jorge A. Suarez’s declaration … and the Alien Informal Interview … suggested to the Court that ICE’s internal records were either mistaken or otherwise lacked integrity.”

The court then addressed Respondents’ failure to comply with the declaration order:

“While Respondents’ non-compliance with the Court’s order to provide a declaration from the officer who interviewed Petitioner, and their belated submission of Officer Kichak’s declaration is an issue, it is not one that undermines the truth of whether Petitioner was provided an informal interview.”

In a separate order the same day, Judge Murillo denied Petitioner’s second TRO application. The court first addressed Respondents’ late opposition:

“Respondents’ opposition was due January 9, 2026, Dkt. 19, but they did not file it until January 12, 2026—three days after the deadline.”

Judge Murillo declined to strike the opposition in that instance because of the complicated procedural posture, but warned that “Respondent should be aware that any untimely filings in the future will be stricken.” The court then again addressed the belated declaration:

“Ultimately, on January 12, 2026, in filing an untimely opposition to the instant Second Application for TRO, Respondent attached a declaration signed under penalty of perjury by deportation officer Noah Kichak stating that he and officer Rigoberto Gilbert were present during the informal hearing of Petitioner held on December 9, 2025.”

Judge Murillo concluded:

“While Respondents’ belated submission of the declaration is a violation of the court’s order, it is not one that undermines the truth of whether Petitioner was provided an informal interview as required by the Code of Federal Regulations.”

The court denied the second TRO and ordered Petitioner to show cause why the habeas petition should not be dismissed as moot. The court also left in place its Dec. 31 order barring Petitioner from being moved outside the Central District of California during the case absent further order. Petitioner later filed a voluntary dismissal on Mar. 20.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ untimely response to an expedited preliminary-injunction schedule in a habeas challenge to ICE’s re-detention of Petitioner without notice or a pre-deprivation hearing. After Judge Kato converted the TRO motion into a preliminary-injunction motion, ordered Respondents to oppose by Mar. 27 at noon, barred removal from the Central District of California to preserve jurisdiction and counsel access, and warned that “[f]ailure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions,” Respondents filed what the court described as “an untimely Response to Petitioner’s Motion.” Judge Kato granted immediate release after finding that Respondents “offer no evidence showing any material changes” since DHS had released Petitioner on recognizance, “identify no countervailing interest in re-detaining Petitioner,” and “provide no reason for re-detaining Petitioner.” The court rejected Respondents’ position that Petitioner was entitled “at most” to a post-detention bond hearing, ordered release and return of belongings, enjoined re-detention absent a pre-detention hearing with the government bearing the clear-and-convincing burden, and later entered judgment consistent with that preliminary-injunction order.

Petitioner Cong Yin, a citizen of China, entered the United States without inspection on Jul. 23, 2023. That same day, DHS released him on an Order of Release on Recognizance under § 1226(a), after determining that he posed no danger and no flight risk. Petitioner later lived in Los Angeles, complied with immigration requirements, filed an asylum application based on fear of political persecution in China, and had no criminal history. On Jan. 23, 2026, ICE apprehended him when he appeared for a routine check-in.

On Mar. 24, Petitioner filed a habeas petition and emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking immediate release from immigration custody based on his procedural due-process claim. He alleged that ICE “provided no explanation” or “allegation of noncompliance” justifying the re-detention. The next day, Judge Kato converted the TRO motion into a preliminary-injunction motion and ordered Respondents to file their opposition by Mar. 27 at noon. The court also ordered that, “to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction” and protect Petitioner’s interest in participating in proceedings and “maintaining adequate access to legal counsel,” Petitioner “shall not be removed from the Central District of California pending resolution of this litigation.” Judge Kato warned: “Failure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions.”

On Mar. 27, Respondents filed an untimely response. On Mar. 30, Judge Kato granted the preliminary injunction after Respondents filed what the court described as “an untimely Response to Petitioner’s Motion.” The court noted that the response had been due at noon on Mar. 27. In that response, Respondents stated that Petitioner “appears to be a member of the Bond Eligible Class” certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz and was therefore entitled, “at most,” to a § 1226(a) bond hearing.

Applying Mathews, the court found that Petitioner was likely to succeed on his procedural due-process claim because Respondents re-detained him without notice or a pre-detention hearing. The court emphasized that ICE had previously released Petitioner after determining he was not a flight risk or danger, and that “Respondents offer no evidence showing any material changes in Petitioner’s circumstances since then.” The court further wrote that “Respondents identify no countervailing interest in re-detaining Petitioner,”that “Respondents have not shown Petitioner poses a flight risk or danger to the community,” and that “Respondents provide no reason for re-detaining Petitioner.”

Judge Kato rejected Respondents’ position that Petitioner was entitled “at most” to a post-detention bond hearing. The court found that Petitioner continued to suffer irreparable harm while unlawfully re-detained in violation of due process and that immediate release, not a later bond hearing, was necessary to restore the status quo ante. Judge Kato ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner subject to the same conditions as his prior Order of Release on Recognizance, return his belongings, refrain from re-detaining him without a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which Respondents would bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence, and file a compliance status report by Mar. 31. The court again warned: “Failure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions.”

On Mar. 31, Respondents filed a status report stating that Petitioner had been released from detention subject to the same conditions as his prior Order of Release on Recognizance. Magistrate Judge Spaeth then ordered Petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as moot. On Apr. 29, the parties jointly proposed that the petition be granted and judgment entered consistent with Judge Kato’s preliminary-injunction order. On Apr. 30, Judge Kato granted the petition and entered judgment, enjoining Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without first providing a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which Respondents bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that physical custody is required because Petitioner is a flight risk or danger. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to timely oppose an emergency TRO application challenging Petitioner’s mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), after which Judge Wright granted temporary relief and ordered either release or a § 1226(a) bond hearing within seven days. Judge Wright wrote that “Respondents failed to timely oppose the TRO,” then incorporated his prior analyses rejecting the same detention theory after having “considered this identical issue in nearly identical factual circumstances.” The court found Petitioner likely to succeed in showing that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), governed her detention, held that detention without a bond hearing constituted irreparable due-process harm, enjoined relocation outside the Central District of California, and ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

Petitioner Sandra De Leon Perez, a citizen of Guatemala, had lived in the United States since 2019. ICE detained her on Mar. 26, 2026 during a scheduled check-in and held her at Adelanto Detention Facility. The petition alleged that she had no criminal record, was not a flight risk, had strong community ties, and had a U.S.-citizen son. Following her arrest and transfer to Adelanto, Respondents detained her without an opportunity to post bond or seek release on other conditions, applying Matter of Yajure Hurtado to treat her as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

Petitioner filed her habeas petition and ex parte TRO application on Mar. 27. That same day, after preliminary review, the court ordered Respondents to respond to the TRO application by Mar. 29 at 5:00 p.m. Judge Wright later granted the TRO on Mar. 30, writing that “Respondents failed to timely oppose the TRO.”

On the merits, Judge Wright found that Petitioner was likely to succeed in arguing that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), governed her detention. The court noted that it had “considered this identical issue in nearly identical factual circumstances” and incorporated its prior analyses in Garcia v. Noem and Kumar v. Santacruz. Judge Wright also found irreparable harm because detention without a bond hearing constituted a due-process deprivation, and held that equity and the public interest supported relief because “neither equity nor the public’s interest are furthered by allowing violations of federal law to continue.”

Judge Wright granted the TRO and ordered Respondents either to release Petitioner or provide her with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge under § 1226(a) within seven days. The court also enjoined Respondents from relocating Petitioner outside the Central District of California pending final resolution of the case, and ordered Respondents to show cause by Apr. 6 why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction. The court set a preliminary-injunction hearing for Apr. 13.

On Apr. 1, Respondents filed a response to the OSC. On Apr. 8, Respondents filed a supplement, and Petitioner requested voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Magistrate Judge Early dismissed the action without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) and administratively closed the case.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to answer J.D.U.W.’s habeas petition after Magistrate Judge Kaufman ordered a response by Dec. 22, followed by an order to show cause why the petition should not be granted “as unopposed.” After Petitioner filed her habeas petition and emergency application, Judge Fairbank granted preliminary injunctive relief, barred Respondents from relocating, transferring, or removing her from the Central District of California or the United States, ordered preservation of the status quo ante regarding release conditions, required return of all documents in Respondents’ possession upon release, and prohibited re-arrest or re-detention absent a pre-arrest hearing before a neutral arbiter applying a clear-and-convincing standard. Separately, Magistrate Judge Kaufman ordered Respondents to answer, dismiss, or transfer the habeas petition by Dec. 22, directed that any answer address all grounds for relief and any procedural defenses, and required any extension request to be made before the deadline with a declaration showing good cause. Respondents did not respond by the deadline. On Jan. 6, Magistrate Judge Kaufman issued an “order to show cause why the petition should not be granted for failure to comply with court orders,”stating that, “[a]s of the date of this Order, Respondents have not filed a response to the petition,” and ordering Respondents to show cause why the action should not be granted “as unopposed.” Respondents later filed a response, but Judge Fairbank ultimately adopted Magistrate Judge Kaufman’s findings and recommendation, granted the petition, dismissed the case with prejudice, and issued a writ prohibiting re-detention unless Respondents first provided a hearing at which a neutral arbiter found by clear and convincing evidence, considering alternatives to detention and ability to pay bond, that Petitioner was a danger to the community or a flight risk warranting detention.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ repeated failure to file court-ordered responses in a case brought by two Indian asylum applicants arrested at a scheduled asylum interview. After A.K. and G.S. filed their habeas petition, Judge Scarsi enjoined Respondents from transporting, removing, or deporting them out of the Central District of California while the court resolved their emergency application. Respondents filed an opposition to the TRO application, which Judge Scarsi later noted was untimely but considered, and at the Dec. 10 hearing the court ordered supplemental briefing by Dec. 15 on three questions central to the legality of Petitioners’ detention: whether A.K. had been arrested in 2019, Petitioners’ current immigration status, and whether G.S. had a valid claim for relief. Respondents filed nothing. On Dec. 16, Judge Scarsi granted preliminary release relief, writing that “Respondents did not file anything by the deadline,” deeming Petitioners’ procedural-due-process argument conceded based on Respondents’ “failure to file any response addressing the Court’s questions,” and finding likely success on the merits based on Petitioners’ showing and Respondents’ “failure to offer a cogent response.” Magistrate Judge Kaufman separately ordered Respondents to answer, dismiss, or transfer the habeas petition and respond to the pseudonym motion by Jan. 12; Respondents again did not meet the deadline. On Jan. 13, Magistrate Judge Kaufman issued an “order to show cause why the petition should not be granted as unopposed and for failure to comply with court orders,” stating that “Respondents have not filed a response to the Petition or the Motion,” and ordering Respondents to show cause why the petition and motion should not be granted “as unopposed.” Judge Scarsi later granted the habeas petition, while declining to impose permanent restrictions on future re-detention or supervision conditions as beyond the scope of the habeas relief warranted on the petition.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ re-detention of Asghar Payman Farsi, an Iranian refugee and longtime lawful permanent resident who had been living under an order of supervision for years, without the notice and opportunity to be heard required before revoking that release, followed by Respondents’ failure to answer the petition by Magistrate Judge Kaufman’s deadline. After Farsi filed his habeas petition and TRO application, Judge Hsu ordered that he remain in the Central District of California and later granted TRO relief in part, finding that Respondents had “failed to provide the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard” regarding revocation of his order of supervision. The court noted that Respondents’ own declaration referred to a 90-day POCR Notice and FOD CD, but “a copy of the POCR Notice and FOD CD were not included” despite the declaration’s statement that they would be filed concurrently; without those documents or specific testimony, the court could not determine whether Respondents had identified any specific changed circumstances justifying detention. Judge Hsu further found that the declaration “only cursorily attests” to notice and did “not convince the Court” that Respondents had identified the changed circumstances or the authorized official responsible for the decision, and concluded that no compliant informal interview had occurred because Farsi had not been apprised of the grounds underlying it. The court ordered release forthwith and barred further detention unless and until Respondents provided the due process necessary to revoke an order of supervision. Separately, Magistrate Judge Kaufman ordered Respondents to answer, dismiss, or transfer the petition by Jan. 12, but Respondents did not do so; on Jan. 14, he issued an “order to show cause why the petition should not be granted as unopposed and for failure to comply with court orders,” stating that “Respondents have not filed a response to the Petition” and ordering them to show cause why the action should not be granted “as unopposed.” Judge Hsu later adopted the findings and recommendation, rejected Respondents’ objections as “unpersuasive and unresponsive to the due process framework that forms the backdrop of this Petition,” held that “Respondents’ conduct must comport with basic due process principles,”rejected mootness because it was not “absolutely” clear that Respondents would not repeat the wrongful conduct, and issued a writ prohibiting re-detention unless and until Farsi received the process required for revocation of an order of supervision.

This habeas case involved a Peruvian noncitizen who had been released on her own recognizance in 2022, re-detained at an ICE check-in in San Francisco in October 2025, and ordered released after Magistrate Judge Oberto held that she could not be re-detained absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing. The case also involved Respondents’ failure to produce court-ordered A-File and detention records, despite two production orders, prompting an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Although the court ultimately discharged the sanctions order, it found that Respondents “did not comply” with its orders and clarified that an order “to produce” documents under Habeas Rule 5 requires production to both the court and petitioner.

Petitioner Rosa Maria Aguilera Barrientos, a citizen and national of Peru, entered the United States in November 2022, was encountered and detained near El Paso, Texas, and was released on her own recognizance on Nov. 13, 2022. She later filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, with a merits hearing set for Aug. 12, 2026. On Oct. 30, 2025, she was re-arrested and detained in San Francisco while reporting to an ICE check-in appointment. On Nov. 4, Petitioner filed a habeas petition challenging her re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing. At the time, she was detained at the California City Detention Center. On Nov. 17, Magistrate Judge Oberto ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted and directed Respondent to include “a copy of Petitioner’s Alien File and any and all other documentation relevant to the determination of the issues raised in the petition.”

Respondents filed their answer on Dec. 8 but did not produce Petitioner’s A-File or other relevant documents. Although they “acknowledge[d]” the court’s order, they sought reconsideration of the requirement to provide the entire file. On Dec. 12, the court granted reconsideration in part, but still ordered Respondents to produce documents in Petitioner’s A-file relating to her original detention in 2022, release in 2022, and re-detention on Oct. 30, 2025, including release and re-detention records, by no later than 5:00 p.m. on Dec. 15. Respondents still did not comply. On Dec. 18, Magistrate Judge Oberto therefore issued an order directing Respondents to “show cause why sanctions should not be imposed,” explaining that Respondents had “failed to provide Petitioner’s A-File or any relevant documents in conjunction with the answer, as ordered,” had “failed to produce said documents, or respond to the Court’s order in any way,” and that the court would decide the petition “notwithstanding Respondents’ failure.”

That same day, the court granted the habeas petition, ordered Respondents to “release Petitioner immediately,” enjoined re-detention absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing at which Respondents would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was a flight risk or danger, and required a status report confirming release by 5:00 p.m. on Dec. 18. Respondents then responded to the sanctions order, arguing they had understood the court’s direction “to produce” documents to mean production “only” to Petitioner’s counsel. In its Dec. 22 order, the court said that contention was “difficult to fathom,” though Respondents “appear to be sincere in their interpretation.” While noting that Respondents “did not comply” with its orders, the court discharged the sanctions show cause order after Respondents provided an email showing the documents had been sent to Petitioner’s counsel. Magistrate Judge Oberto nonetheless clarified that when the court directs Respondents “to produce” relevant documents under Habeas Rule 5, it means production “on the Court as well as Petitioner.” The court also noted that, according to Respondents’ amended status report, Petitioner was released from ICE custody on Dec. 18, 2025, at 4:52 p.m., and closed the case.

This habeas case involved a detained noncitizen seeking emergency relief after being re-detained, in which Respondents failed to timely file a court-ordered opposition to Petitioner’s temporary restraining order motion, prompting Judge Drozd to note that Respondents had “failed to file their opposition within the allotted time” and warn that any further failure would be construed as no opposition to the requested relief.

Petitioner Navdeep Singh filed his habeas petition and motion for temporary restraining order on Dec. 22, 2025. That same day, Judge Drozd entered a status quo order barring Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States or moving him out of the Eastern District of California pending resolution of the TRO motion. The court directed Petitioner’s counsel to serve the petition, motion, and order on the U.S. Attorney’s Office by Dec. 23 at 5:00 p.m., required Respondents’ counsel to promptly enter appearances, and ordered Respondents to file a written opposition to the pending TRO motion by 5:00 p.m. on Dec. 26. The court further directed Respondents to address whether any law or fact distinguished the case from Judge Drozd’s prior similar decisions.

When no opposition was filed by that deadline, the court entered a Dec. 27 minute order stating that Respondents had “failed to file their opposition within the allotted time.” Judge Drozd ordered Respondents to file their opposition by 4:00 p.m. on Dec. 29 and expressly warned that any further failure “will be construed as indicating that respondents have no opposition to the granting of the requested relief.” Respondents designated counsel and filed their response on Dec. 29.

On Dec. 30, Judge Drozd granted relief in part. Noting Respondents’ concession that Petitioner’s re-detention without an adequate showing of changed circumstances was not meaningfully distinguishable from the court’s prior decisions, the court ordered Petitioner’s immediate release on the same pre-Dec. 8, 2025 conditions, barred re-detention absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral adjudicator, and barred use of the adjustment-of-status process to re-detain him, including at or near any future interview. The court denied Petitioner’s separate request to compel reopening and adjudication of his adjustment application.

This habeas case involved a detained noncitizen whose request for emergency release relief proceeded after Respondents failed to timely file a court-ordered opposition, prompting Judge Calabretta to state that Respondents had “failed to file an Opposition,” order them to show cause, and warn that any further failure to respond would be treated as non-opposition.

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Jan. 12, 2026. In a Jan. 14 order, Judge Calabretta construed the petition as also a motion for temporary restraining order because Petitioner alleged unlawful detention and sought release, and ordered Respondents to file any opposition on or before Jan. 19. The Clerk served the petition and order on the United States Attorney that same day.

On Jan. 20, when no response had been filed by the deadline, Judge Calabretta entered an order to show cause stating that “Respondents failed to file an Opposition.” He therefore ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 21 why Petitioner’s motion should not be granted and expressly warned: “Failure to file a response will be construed as non-opposition to the Court granting Petitioner’s Motion.” Respondents filed an opposition on Jan. 21.

On Jan. 22, Judge Calabretta denied preliminary injunctive relief, finding Petitioner had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and referred the case to the magistrate judge. Magistrate Judge Delaney then granted in forma pauperis status and appointment of counsel, appointed counsel, and gave Petitioner 14 days to file a preliminary-injunction motion and/or amended habeas petition. On Feb. 20, Judge Delaney noted that, as the district judge had already indicated, the petition did not provide a basis for habeas relief, denied discovery, and gave Petitioner 30 days to amend. But by Mar. 13, counsel reported that Petitioner was no longer in ICE custody because he had left for Nicaragua, and on Mar. 15 Judge Delaney recommended dismissal as moot. On Apr. 27, Judge Calabretta adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in full and dismissed the habeas petition. The court noted that neither party had filed objections and found the recommendations supported by the record and the magistrate judge’s analysis. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved a Cuban noncitizen who had been subject to a final order of removal since 2005 but whom the government had been unable to remove to Cuba for over twenty years, and whose request for release proceeded after Respondents failed to timely file a court-ordered opposition, prompting Judge Calabretta to state that Respondents had “failed to file an Opposition,” order them to show cause, and warn that any further failure to respond would be treated as non-opposition.

Petitioner Roberto Perez Castano filed his habeas petition on Jan. 12, 2026. In a Jan. 14 order, Judge Calabretta construed the petition as also a motion for temporary restraining order because Petitioner sought immediate release, and ordered Respondents to file any opposition on or before Jan. 21. The Clerk served the petition and order on the United States Attorney that same day.

On Jan. 22, when no response had been filed by the deadline, the court entered an order to show cause stating that “Respondents failed to file an Opposition.” Judge Calabretta therefore ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 23 why Petitioner’s motion should not be granted and expressly warned: “Failure to file a response will be construed as non-opposition to the Court granting Petitioner’s Motion.” Respondents did not file their opposition until Jan. 26.

On Jan. 28, the court granted relief, holding that Petitioner’s re-detention violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 because Respondents showed no change in circumstances justifying re-detention. After noting that the government had been unable to remove Petitioner to Cuba for over twenty years and had offered only a bare assertion of likely removal, the court ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, barred additional restrictions absent a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing, and enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent a change in circumstances. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved a detained noncitizen whose request for emergency release relief proceeded after Respondents failed to timely file a court-ordered opposition, prompting Judge Calabretta to state that Respondents had “failed to file an Opposition,” order them to show cause, and warn that any further failure to respond would be treated as non-opposition.

Petitioner Manjeet Singh filed his habeas petition on Jan. 19, 2026 and a motion for preliminary injunctive relief on Jan. 20. In an order the same day, Judge Calabretta stated that the issues appeared to mirror those raised in prior similar cases and ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 22 whether any factual or legal issues rendered the case distinct and would justify denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Petitioner’s counsel was also directed to send the petition, motion, and Petitioner’s identifying information to the U.S. Attorney’s Office by Jan. 20 at 6:00 p.m.

On Jan. 23, when no response had been filed by the deadline, the court entered an order to show cause stating that “Respondents failed to file an Opposition.” Judge Calabretta therefore ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 25 why Petitioner’s motion should not be granted and expressly warned: “Failure to file a response will be construed as non-opposition to the Court granting Petitioner’s Motion.” Respondents then filed a response to the order to show cause, an opposition, and a motion to dismiss on Jan. 25. On Jan. 25, the court granted preliminary injunctive relief, ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, barred additional restrictions absent a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing, and enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent compliance with constitutional protections. Respondents later filed a response to the show-cause order on Feb. 6.

This habeas case involved a noncitizen whose August 2025 re-detention was imposed without notice or an opportunity to be heard, and whose request for emergency release relief proceeded after Respondents failed to timely file a court-ordered opposition, prompting Judge Calabretta to issue an order to show cause and warn that any further failure to respond would be treated as non-opposition.

Petitioner Anqiao Wei entered the country in early 2024 and was detained shortly after entry, but was released the next day on her own recognizance. On Aug. 25, 2025, she appeared for an appointment with ICE and was detained. Judge Calabretta later noted that her re-detention “was enacted without notice or an opportunity to be heard” and “was not predicated on any changed circumstances since Petitioner’s release.” Petitioner filed her habeas petition and motion for temporary restraining order on Jan. 21, 2026.

On Jan. 21, Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to file any opposition to the temporary restraining order motion on or before Jan. 27, 2026, and directed Petitioner’s counsel to send the petition and motion, along with Petitioner’s full name and A-number, to the U.S. Attorney’s Office that same day. When no opposition was filed by the deadline, the court entered a Jan. 28 show cause order stating that “Respondents failed to file an Opposition.” Judge Calabretta therefore ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 29 why Petitioner’s motion should not be granted and warned: “Failure to file a response will be construed as non-opposition to the Court granting Petitioner’s Motion.” Respondents designated counsel and filed a response to the order to show cause later that same day.

Granting relief on Jan. 30, the court converted the TRO motion to a motion for preliminary injunction and granted relief. Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner, directed that no additional restrictions be imposed absent a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing, and enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent compliance with constitutional protections.

This habeas case involved a detained noncitizen whose request for emergency release relief proceeded after Respondents failed to timely file a court-ordered opposition, prompting Judge Calabretta to state that Respondents had “failed to file an Opposition,” order them to show cause, and warn that any further failure to respond would be treated as non-opposition.

Petitioner Sangiovanni Reynoso Nunez filed his habeas petition and motion for temporary restraining order on Jan. 24, 2026. In an order on Jan. 26, Judge Calabretta stated that Count 2 of the petition appeared to mirror issues the court had already addressed in prior similar cases, explained that it intended to rule directly on the petition while also considering the TRO materials, and ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 28 “as to whether there are any factual or legal issues in this case that render it distinguishable from the Court’s prior orders.” Petitioner’s counsel was directed to serve the petition, motion, and order on the U.S. Attorney’s Office that same day, and counsel for Respondents promptly entered appearances.

On Jan. 29, when no response was filed by the deadline, the court entered an order to show cause, stating “Respondents failed to file an Opposition” by Jan. 28. Judge Calabretta therefore ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 29 why Petitioner’s motion “should not be granted,” allowed Petitioner to file a reply by Feb. 2, and expressly warned: “Failure to file a response will be construed as non-opposition to the Court granting Petitioner’s Motion.” Respondents then filed an opposition later that same day.

On Feb. 3, the court granted relief, ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner, directed that no additional restrictions be imposed absent a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing, and permanently enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent compliance with constitutional protections, including pre-deprivation notice and a timely hearing at which the government would bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved a pro se noncitizen re-detained after years on release without a pre-deprivation hearing, Respondents’ failure to file the opposition Judge Calabretta ordered on the emergency TRO request, and final habeas relief after the court concluded that re-detention without pre-deprivation process violated due process. Judge Calabretta first found that Respondents “failed to file an Opposition,” ordered them to show cause why temporary relief should not be granted, warned that failure to respond would be construed as non-opposition, and later reiterated that Respondents “failed to comply” with the court’s opposition deadline. Judge Calabretta ordered Petitioner’s immediate release and barred re-arrest or re-detention absent constitutional protections; after Magistrate Judge Peterson recommended granting the underlying petition, Judge Calabretta adopted the findings and recommendations in full, made the preliminary injunction permanent, and entered judgment for Petitioner.

Petitioner O.M.G. alleged that he had lived in the United States for 31 years, was married to a U.S. citizen, had four U.S.-citizen children, had a pending I-130 petition, and had requested asylum. He also alleged that he had previously been released on bond from Adelanto Detention Center in 2018 after nine months in custody, had no “new charges o[r] convictions,” and was the economic support for a family that depended on him. ICE re-detained him on Sept. 26, 2025, and he remained in custody at Golden State Annex in McFarland, California when he filed his habeas petition on Jan. 26, 2026.

On Jan. 27, Judge Calabretta reviewed the petition, construed it as also seeking temporary restraining order relief, and ordered Respondents to file any opposition “on or before January 30, 2026.” The court also directed Respondents to address whether they opposed converting the TRO request into a motion for preliminary injunction, and the Clerk served both the petition and the court’s order on the United States Attorney.

When no opposition was filed by the Jan. 30 deadline, Judge Calabretta entered a Feb. 1 order stating that Respondents “failed to file an Opposition.” The court ordered Respondents to show cause by Feb. 2 why Petitioner’s motion should not be granted and warned: “Failure to file a response will be construed as non-opposition to the Court granting Petitioner’s Motion.” Respondents filed both a response to the show-cause order and their opposition on Feb. 2. In the Feb. 5 preliminary-injunction order, Judge Calabretta reiterated that the court had directed Respondents to file an opposition, “Respondents failed to comply,” the court issued an order to show cause, and Respondents then filed both their show-cause response and opposition.

On the merits, Judge Calabretta found that Petitioner had “a clear liberty interest in his continued release,” that Respondents had “not identified any material concerns to warrant re-detention,” and that Petitioner “was owed some process before his re-detention.” The court ordered Respondents to “immediately release” Petitioner and “not impose any additional restrictions on him,” unless later found necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing. Judge Calabretta also enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent constitutional protections, including pre-deprivation notice, a timely hearing, the government’s clear-and-convincing burden on danger or flight risk, and Petitioner’s right to counsel.

The case then continued on the underlying § 2241 petition. On Apr. 7, Magistrate Judge Jeremy D. Peterson ordered Respondent to file a response to the petition and any documents necessary to resolve the petition within seven days; Respondent filed a response on Apr. 14. On Apr. 27, Magistrate Judge Peterson issued findings and recommendations (F&Rs). He noted that the court had already granted injunctive relief by ordering Petitioner’s release, but that the habeas petition remained pending. He identified the “primary dispute” as “whether re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights,” stated that he had “consistently found that re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violates a noncitizen’s due process rights,” and found, after considering the parties’ filings and similar cases, that “petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated.” Magistrate Judge Peterson recommended that the petition be granted, that the preliminary injunctive relief previously granted be made permanent, and that judgment be entered.

No party objected. On May 21, in an order entered May 22, Judge Calabretta adopted the F&Rs in full after reviewing the file and finding them “supported by the record and by the Magistrate Judge’s analysis.” Judge Calabretta granted the habeas petition, made the Feb. 5 preliminary injunctive relief permanent, ordered the Clerk to enter judgment and close the case, and judgment was entered for Petitioner the same day.

This habeas case involved a 69-year-old man whom immigration authorities detained after he missed an immigration court hearing due to a medical emergency, and in which Judge Drozd granted temporary restraining order relief after Respondents, despite notice of the case, “failed to file an opposition as directed,” and failed to provide any lawful detention authority for his continued detention.

Petitioner Zambrano Rodriguez filed his habeas petition and TRO motion on Mar. 16, 2026. That same day, Judge Drozd ordered that respondents “shall not take any action to remove petitioner from the United States or to move petitioner out of the Eastern District of California” pending further order, directed service by email on the U.S. Attorney’s Office, required Respondents’ counsel to “promptly enter Notices of Appearance,” and ordered Respondents to file a written opposition to the TRO motion by 5:00 p.m. on Mar. 18. The court specifically directed Respondents to address whether any law or facts distinguished the case from JUDGE Drozd’s prior similar decisions and to state whether they opposed immediate release, a bond hearing, conversion of the TRO motion into a preliminary-injunction motion, or resolution of the underlying habeas petition on the merits.

On Mar. 23, granting the TRO, Judge Drozd noted that “[R]espondents’ counsel [had] filed an unrelated form on the docket indicating that counsel was aware of the pendency of this case,” but that “[n]onetheless, to date, [R]espondents have failed to file an opposition as directed.” The court then reviewed petitioner’s evidence, noting that he had entered the United States on Dec. 10, 2023; had been detained on Jan. 16, 2026 after missing an immigration court hearing the previous day “due to a medical emergency;” and had “not received a bond hearing since his detention.” “In light of the lack of an opposition and due to [R]espondents’ failure to provide petitioner with a statutorily mandated bond hearing,” the court inferred that Respondents had purportedly detained him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), concluded that he could be detained only under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and further found that “the appropriate remedy is immediate release where respondents have failed to provide a lawful detention authority for petitioner’s detention.”

The court therefore ordered Respondents to “immediately release petitioner,” enjoined them from re-detaining him absent exigent circumstances without notice and a pre-detention hearing under § 1226(a), and required a status report confirming release by Mar. 26 at 5:00 p.m. Respondents later filed a status report on Mar. 26 and a supplemental status report on Mar. 27.

This habeas case involved repeated missed court-ordered deadlines after Chief Judge Nunley granted habeas relief and ordered Petitioner’s immediate release: Respondents’ counsel, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Yu, failed to file a release-compliance notice and then failed to file a timely status update concerning Petitioner’s passport, driver’s license, and other possessions. After Yu described his handling of hundreds of habeas cases as a form of “triage,” Judge Nunley imposed a $250 sanction, finding that Yu’s noncompliance in this case “and in others” demonstrated “an unwillingness — not an inability — to adhere to basic procedural requirements,” and noting that counsel had “failed to timely file notices of compliance in numerous cases before this Court.” On reconsideration, Judge Nunley shifted the sanction from Yu personally to the U.S. Attorney’s Office after U.S. Attorney Eric Grant attributed the failures to systemic workload constraints, but the court stressed that Yu had “violated multiple court orders, including more than one in this matter,” that “Compliance with court orders is not optional,” and that future “unchecked and unaddressed mistakes” may be treated as “a deliberate and strategic choice.”

Petitioner Eblis Alexander Y.T. entered the United States on Mar. 5, 2023. He owned a drywall company that “generate[d] employment for other workers” and was the sole provider for his wife and four children. On Feb. 26, 2026, local police stopped him because his vehicle plates were flagged for a warrant related to a failure to appear in court for a traffic ticket. He was handcuffed, taken into local custody, and then transferred to ICE. He filed this habeas petition pro se on Mar. 16, challenging the lawfulness of his civil immigration detention. The next day, Judge Nunley ordered Respondents to respond within three court days, required production of relevant records, and barred any transfer outside the district pending further order.

On Apr. 3, Judge Nunley granted the petition, found that Respondents had violated Petitioner’s due process rights, ordered his immediate release, and directed Respondent to file a notice certifying compliance by Apr. 6. When no notice was filed and no extension sought, the court on Apr. 7 ordered Respondents’ counsel, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (SAUSA) Jonathan Yu, to “file a status report and to show, in writing,” by Apr. 8 “as to why counsel should not be sanctioned in the amount of $250 for failure to follow this Court's order and timely file notice,” expressly noting that this was “not the first time Respondents’ counsel has failed to follow Court order[s].” That same day, after Petitioner moved for return of his identification documents, the court ordered Respondents to return his passport, driver’s license, and other possessions by Apr. 10 and to file a status update by the end of that day. Respondents again missed the deadline and did not seek an extension, eventually filing their status report on Apr. 13.

In the meantime, on Apr. 7, SAUSA Yu responded to the show-cause order and urged the court to find good cause to discharge it. In its Apr. 14 sanctions order, entered Apr. 15, the court rejected Yu’s asserted justification that he had been “juggling” hundreds of immigration habeas cases and, through his own “triage” system, prioritizing actual release of detainees over “collateral responses” to orders. The court wrote:

“Respondents’ counsel describes that he has been assigned over three hundred immigration habeas cases in the last three months and as a result, dozens of responses and ‘collateral responses’ are due daily. … Respondents’ counsel contends juggling the tasks and deadlines can best be described as triage, wherein getting Petitioners released from custody is the absolute priority, ensuring a response to maintain the government’s position in each case is the next priority, and ‘court orders are also a high priority.’ … Respondents’ counsel concedes he has certainly missed a few deadlines but argues each time was inadvertent.”

Judge Nunley said he was “not persuaded sanctions should not be issued,” emphasizing that SAUSA Yu had twice missed court-ordered deadlines, the second time while the sanctions issue was already pending. Judge Nunley warned that he did “not take such failures lightly,” stressing, “Compliance with court orders is not optional; it is a fundamental obligation of any attorney appearing before this Court.” The court concluded that “Respondents’ counsel’s conduct reflect[ed] a pattern of disregard for that obligation,” given “this [wa]s not an isolated incident” and counsel “ha[d] failed to timely file notices of compliance in numerous cases before this Court.” The court went on to underscore:

“Respondents’ counsel does not contend he could not comply with the Court’s order but rather, that he had higher priorities. Thus, Respondents’ counsel’s noncompliance in this matter, and in others, demonstrates an unwillingness — not an inability — to adhere to basic procedural requirements.”

Concluding that sanctions were “warranted,” Judge Nunley imposed $250 in sanctions against SAUSA Yu:

“While the Court recognizes that mistakes can occur, repeated violations of court orders cannot be excused as mere oversight. Such conduct wastes judicial resources, delays proceedings, and undermines the orderly administration of justice. An attorney’s duty to the Court includes diligence, responsiveness, and strict adherence to court directives. Respondents’ counsel has fallen short of these standards.”

Respondents moved the same day for partial reconsideration of the sanctions order. In that filing, U.S. Attorney Eric Grant asked Judge Nunley to reconsider imposing the $250 sanction personally on Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Yu and instead impose it on Grant himself or the United States Attorney’s Office generally. The Sacramento Bee, which described and quoted from the filing as a “highly unusual pleading,” reported that Grant argued Yu’s missed deadlines were not a matter of personal willfulness but of systemic overload: “His failure to comply with the court’s orders was not willful, but the result of a mistake.” Judge Nunley’s later order recounted the same core argument, quoting the United States Attorney’s position that the failure to comply was caused by “the strain of the system that is not keeping up with the overwhelming burden,” and that, “if fault is to be assigned, it is with the [United States Attorney’s Office] for having placed that [individual attorney] in a position in which he could not keep up with the volume of work that fell to him.”

The Bee further reported that Grant said he had brought in four new attorneys, added legal assistants, reassigned staff, created a new immigration unit, borrowed four DHS lawyers, brought in two ICE officers to help locate documents and verify releases, implemented daily communication with detention facilities, automated new-case opening, and circulated a daily district-wide detainee list. Grant wrote that those measures had been “reasonably effective in helping to maintain the standard rightly expected of this office among a surge of more than 3,000 cases that operate on very tight timelines,” but acknowledged that, “as the present case demonstrates, the measures have not achieved perfection.”

On Apr. 30, Judge Nunley granted reconsideration only as to whom the sanction would run against. The court acknowledged the United States Attorney’s request to shift the sanction from SAUSA Yu to the USAO, “based on the United States Attorney’s representations that the failures at issue were the product of systemic workload constraints rather than intentional disregard of court orders.” Judge Nunley accepted that allocation point “in the interest of addressing the root cause of the deficiencies,” and directed that the $250 sanction be imposed on the USAO rather than Yu personally.

But the court did not retreat from its finding that the orders had been violated, including by Yu, or from its warning that workload triage could not subordinate court compliance. Judge Nunley wrote:

“That said, the record reflects that the individual attorney violated multiple court orders, including more than one in this matter. Compliance with court orders is not optional and must be prioritized above competing demands and resources. Even in the face of significant workload pressures, counsel has an obligation to ensure that court directives are timely and fully observed.

To the extent counsel must ‘triage’ competing obligations, adherence to court orders is a non-delegable duty, and must be treated as the highest priority. A pattern of unchecked and unaddressed mistakes in complying with court orders will be viewed as a deliberate and strategic choice. Future failures of this nature — whether attributed to the individual or to systemic conditions — may result in sanctions directed at both the individual attorney and United States Attorney’s Office generally.”

The court therefore discharged the $250 sanction against Yu, imposed the same $250 sanction on the United States Attorney’s Office, and ordered the office to remit payment to the Clerk of Court within 30 days.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ repeated failure to respond to the petition on the court’s schedule: after missing the original response deadline, they missed a same-day extension deadline despite a non-opposition warning, and moved for an extension only after Petitioner requested entry of default.

Petitioner Miguel C.C., a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection in March 2014. He was apprehended inside the United States, released on his own recognizance, and later re-apprehended while complying with mandatory inspection appointments. The record contained discrepancies over whether ICE re-detained him in September or October 2025, but it showed that immigration judges denied bond on Oct. 7, 2025 and Jan. 9, 2026 for lack of jurisdiction under Matter of Yajure Hurtado. On Mar. 6, Petitioner filed his habeas petition.

On Mar. 10, Magistrate Judge Kim ordered Respondents to answer or move to dismiss within seven days. Respondents did not file by the Mar. 17 deadline. On Mar. 18, the court wrote, “No response was filed,” and gave Respondents until 5:00 p.m. that same day to respond and warned that “Respondents’ failure to file a response to the petition will be interpreted as a non-opposition to granting the petition.” Respondents again did not respond.

On Mar. 25, after Petitioner requested entry of default, Respondents moved for a two-day extension. Magistrate Judge Kim wrote that Respondents’ response had been due Mar. 17, that the court had then “notifying Respondents of their failure,” and that “Respondents again failed to file any response despite being provided a second opportunity.” The court granted the extension only in part, noting that it was sought “over a week after Respondents' response was due,” and ordered Respondents to answer by Mar. 27 and include any release orders or supervision orders with their answer.

On Apr. 3, in her findings and recommendations, Magistrate Judge Kim recommended granting habeas relief. The findings and recommendations expressly recounted that Respondents had moved for an extension “after realizing they had failed to respond to the petition and failed to comply with the Court’s orders.” On the merits, Magistrate Judge Kim found that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), governed; that Petitioner should have received a § 1226(a) bond hearing; and that his detention violated due process. The recommended remedy included immediate release, return of any documents in Respondents’ custody, and a bar on re-detention absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing at which the government proved flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence.

On Apr. 13, Judge Drozd adopted the findings and recommendations in full. He rejected Respondents’ objections, denied their motion to dismiss, ordered Petitioner released under the same conditions that existed before re-detention, and enjoined Respondents from re-detaining him absent exigent circumstances unless they provided written notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing at which Respondents bore the burden by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond by the deadline Judge Calabretta set in his order to show cause. After Respondents missed the Mar. 24 response deadline, the court stated that “Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order,” ordered the required response by Mar. 26, and warned that it “may construe Respondents’ failure to file a timely response as a non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion.”

Petitioner Jersson Sneider Sanchez Pedraza filed his habeas petition on Mar. 16, 2026, while detained at the Golden State Annex. On Mar. 18, Judge Calabretta observed that the petition appeared to mirror legal issues the court had addressed in earlier Eastern District of California cases. The court ordered Respondents to show cause by Mar. 24 why the court should not grant a writ of habeas corpus, and to identify any factual or legal issues that distinguished the case from the court’s prior orders.

Respondents did not file by Mar. 24. On Mar. 25, Judge Calabretta stated that the court had ordered Respondents to respond by Mar. 24, but that “Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order.” The court ordered Respondents to file the required response by Mar. 26 and warned that failure to file a timely response could be construed as non-opposition. Respondents filed their response on Mar. 26.

On Mar. 29, Judge Calabretta granted habeas relief. The court stated that Respondents did not identify any factual or legal issues materially distinguishing the case from the court’s prior orders, made no new legal arguments, and had not justified denying the petition. The court granted the writ for the reasons stated in its prior orders.

Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody and not impose any additional restrictions unless later determined necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing. The court permanently enjoined Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent constitutional protections, including pre-deprivation notice describing changed circumstances, a timely hearing, the government’s burden to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, and counsel’s presence at the hearing. Respondents were ordered to file a status update by 5:00 p.m. on Mar. 30 confirming compliance. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ missed deadline to answer Judge Thurston’s expedited show-cause order in a mandatory-detention habeas challenge.

Petitioner Antonio Castillo-Castillo, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States in or about May 2021 through humanitarian parole. ICE arrested him on Feb. 5, 2026, and held him at the California City Detention Facility in California City, California.

On Mar. 12, Petitioner filed his habeas petition and a request for a temporary restraining order challenging his ongoing detention. Later that day, the court ordered Respondents to show cause in writing by Mar. 20 why Petitioner’s TRO motion should not be granted. The court required any response to include relevant A-File materials and supporting documents.

On Mar. 23, after Respondents failed to show cause, the court wrote: “Respondents have failed to timely file a response to the Court's order to show cause regarding the pending TRO,” adding, “If no response is filed by 2pm pacific time tomorrow, … the Court will assume Respondents have no objection to the requested relief.”

On Mar. 24, the government opposed the petition and TRO, arguing that Petitioner’s detention was mandatory under § 1225(b)(2). Granting habeas relief on Mar. 26, Judge Thurston wrote: “The government filed a response to the TRO and the underlying petition asserting only that the petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, a legal position that this Court has rejected repeatedly.” Respondents cited “two non-binding opinions” and made “no effort to distinguish this current case from the numerous cases issued by the undersigned, Judge Thurston stated, finding this legal position to be incorrect and the detention unlawful.” The court ordered Petitioner released “immediately” and enjoined Respondents from re-detaining him absent at least seven days’ advance notice and a § 1226(a) bond hearing before a neutral arbiter, with the government bearing the burden to justify physical custody by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ missed deadline to answer Judge Thurston’s expedited show-cause order in a mandatory-detention habeas challenge.

Petitioner Jean Carlos Romero Romero, a citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States seeking asylum. ICE arrested him on Feb. 9, 2026, and held him at the California City Detention Facility in California City, California.

On Mar. 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a habeas petition and request for a temporary restraining order challenging his ongoing detention.

On Mar. 13, the court ordered Respondents to show cause in writing by Mar. 20, 2026, why Petitioner’s TRO motion should not be granted. The court also required any response to include relevant A-File materials and supporting documents. On Mar. 23 court wrote, “Respondents have failed to timely file a response to the Court's order to show cause,” adding, “If no response is filed by 2pm pacific time tomorrow, March 24, 2026, the Court will assume Respondents have no objection to the requested relief

Respondents then opposed the petition and TRO by arguing that Petitioner’s detention was mandatory under § 1225(b)(2). On Mar. 26, Judge Thurston granted the petition that Respondents cited two nonbinding opinions and made “no effort to distinguish this current case from the numerous cases issued by the undersigned, finding this legal position to be incorrect and the detention unlawful.” The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately and barred re-detention absent seven days’ advance notice and a § 1226(a) bond hearing before a neutral arbiter, where the government would bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ missed court-ordered response deadline in a re-detention habeas case, followed by Magistrate Judge Baker’s finding that Respondents had “failed to comply with the Court’s order to timely file a response” and warning that any further failure to comply would trigger an OSC as to sanctions. Judge Thurston had ordered Respondents to respond within 21 days after denying emergency TRO relief but preserving the status quo through a no-removal/no-transfer order. When that deadline passed, Judge Baker ordered Respondents to file the overdue response by the next day and warned that “[a]ny failure by Respondents to timely comply with this order will result in issuance of an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.” Respondents then filed their answer, and Judge Baker later recommended habeas relief on procedural-due-process grounds, rejecting Respondents’ § 1225(b)(2) mandatory-detention theory and recommending a § 1226(a) bond hearing within 14 days, with the government bearing the clear-and-convincing burden, or immediate release.

Petitioner Yhoan Alexander Melendez-Bello, a native and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States in December 2023, was apprehended by Border Patrol, served with a notice to appear, and released on recognizance on Dec. 15, 2023. He later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. During approximately two years of release from immigration custody, he was never charged with a crime, established community ties, and maintained lawful employment. On Dec. 13, 2025, his vehicle was stopped by police in Salt Lake City, Utah, and he was charged with an open-container offense that remained pending. ICE encountered him at the Salt Lake City Metro Jail on Dec. 15 and returned him to immigration detention.

On Mar. 16, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. On Mar. 17, Magistrate Judge Baker ordered Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted and to identify any factual or legal issues distinguishing the case from prior Eastern District decisions treating § 1226(a) as the proper detention framework for noncitizens who had previously been encountered, released, and later re-detained. The court required Respondents to provide relevant A-file materials and supporting documents, including notices to appear, release orders, and records related to any asserted release-condition violation or changed circumstance warranting re-detention.

On Mar. 20, Judge Thurston denied Petitioner’s Mar. 19 TRO motion as untimely because he had been detained since December and had not adequately explained the delay in seeking emergency relief. At the same time, she preserved the status quo, ordering that Respondents could not remove Petitioner from the United States or transfer him out of the Eastern District of California unless and until the court ordered otherwise. Judge Thurston set a 21-day response deadline.

Respondents missed that deadline. On Apr. 13, Magistrate Judge Baker wrote that the Mar. 20 order required Respondents to respond by Apr. 10, that “[t]he filing deadline has passed and Respondents have failed to comply with the Court's order to timely file a response.” The court ordered Respondents to file their responsive pleading by Apr. 14 and warned that “[a]ny failure by Respondents to timely comply with this order will result in issuance of an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.” Respondents filed their answer on Apr. 14, and Petitioner replied on Apr. 16.

On May 29, in his findings and recommendations (F&Rs), Magistrate Judge Baker recommended granting the petition. He found that Petitioner had a continuing liberty interest in remaining free from re-detention after ICE had released him on recognizance for about two years, during which he maintained employment, community ties, and no criminal history. The F&R rejected Respondents’ § 1225(b)(2) mandatory-detention theory, explaining that other judges had held § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), governs noncitizens who were released after an initial immigration encounter and then resided in the United States for a significant period. The court quoted Valencia Zapata for the point that the government “cannot switch tracks” and subject Petitioner to mandatory detention after previously releasing him under § 1226(a).

Applying Mathews, Judge Baker found that Petitioner’s private liberty interest was significant, the risk of erroneous deprivation was considerable because he had received no bond or custody-redetermination hearing, and the government’s interest in detention without a hearing was low. The court did not treat Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner’s arrest violated release conditions as relevant to whether he was entitled to custody redetermination, but found ICE’s reliance on the arrest “not obviously pretex[t]ual,” making a post-deprivation bond hearing sufficient. The F&R recommended a § 1226(a) bond hearing within 14 days, with the government required to prove flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence; if no hearing occurred, it recommended immediate release and no re-detention absent seven days’ notice and a hearing consistent with the order. The F&R shortened the objection period to seven days given Petitioner’s harm, the recommended finding that Respondents violated the Constitution, and the parties’ extensive briefing.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file the ordered show-cause response by the court’s deadline, after which Judge Calabretta wrote that they had “failed to comply with this Court’s Order” and warned that continued nonresponse could be treated as non-opposition.

Petitioner Carlos Ernesto De Jesus Sanchez filed a § 2241 habeas petition and TRO motion on Mar. 24, 2026. That same day, Judge Calabretta stated that Count 1 appeared to mirror issues the court had addressed in prior cases and ordered Respondents to show cause by Mar. 30 whether factual or legal differences justified denying the petition or whether the matter was not substantively distinguishable.

Respondents missed the Mar. 30 deadline. On Mar. 31, Judge Calabretta wrote: “To date, Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order.” The court ordered Respondents to file the required response by Apr. 1 and warned that it “may construe Respondents’ failure to file a timely response as a non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion.” Respondents filed a response on Apr. 1, agreeing that “the factual and legal issues present here are not substantively distinguishable” from the court’s prior cases. On Apr. 3, Judge Calabretta granted habeas relief as to Count 1, ordered immediate release without additional restrictions, and permanently enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent constitutional protections, including pre-deprivation notice, a timely hearing, counsel access, and a government burden of clear and convincing evidence.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ missed compliance-notice deadline after Chief Judge Nunley granted habeas relief, ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, and required a notice certifying compliance. The underlying habeas order also highlighted Petitioner’s multiple interstate transfers and “hidden detainee” status: the court stated that, “[a]s a result of the frequent transfers and his ‘hidden detainee’ status,” Petitioner’s family had “significant difficulty locating him to coordinate assistance,” and noted that although Respondents said his ICE Detainee Locator information had been updated, “this Court still cannot locate Petitioner” in EOIR’s automated case system. After Respondents missed the release-compliance notice deadline, the court stated that “Respondents have not filed notice, nor sought an extension of time,” noted that “this is not the first time Respondents’ counsel has failed to timely comply with an order of this Court,” and ordered “Respondents’ counsel” to file a status report “immediately” and “show cause, in writing,” why counsel should not be sanctioned $250. Lauren Black was government counsel of record at the time and filed the Apr. 9 status report; U.S. Attorney Eric Grant appeared the next day and later filed the OSC response. Chief Judge Nunley discharged the OSC after accepting counsel’s error as “an inadvertent mistake,” but warned that “a pattern of unchecked and unaddressed mistakes in complying with court orders will be viewed as a deliberate and strategic choice.”

Petitioner Mynor E.L.H. first entered the United States around Mar. 9, 2021, and had lived and worked in the United States for five years with no criminal history. Immigration authorities arrested him in Florida around Mar. 1, 2026, then transferred him from Florida to Texas, Arizona, and California. When he filed his habeas petition on Mar. 26, he was detained at the California City Detention Facility and alleged that he was a “hidden detainee” because his detention and removal-proceedings information did not appear in public ICE or immigration-court locator systems, making it difficult for his family to locate him and coordinate assistance.

On Mar. 27, Chief Judge Nunley granted Petitioner’s request to prevent transfer and ordered Respondents not to transfer him out of the Eastern District of California while the court resolved the habeas petition. The court also ordered Respondents to respond within three court days, produce Petitioner’s full Form I-213, any release or detention orders, custody warrants or notices, and relevant A-file materials, and address Petitioner’s alleged “hidden detainee” status. The court warned that failure to respond timely would be treated as non-opposition and appointed counsel for Petitioner. Respondents’ counsel, Lauren Black, answered the petition on Mar. 30.

On Apr. 7, granting habeas relief, Chief Judge Nunley wrote that, “[a]s a result of the frequent transfers and his ‘hidden detainee’ status,” Petitioner’s “family has faced significant difficulty locating him to coordinate assistance.” The court noted that Respondents conceded they had no legal arguments or facts distinguishing the case from prior orders granting similar habeas petitions. Chief Judge Nunley held that Petitioner was not an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), that his detention was governed by § 1226(a), and that, because Respondents had not provided any bond or custody-redetermination hearing during more than a month of detention, “Respondents violated § 1226(a) of the INA.” The court also held that Petitioner’s detention violated the Fifth Amendment, finding that he had been detained for over a month, transferred across multiple states, and isolated from his family “without any opportunity to be heard as to the justification of his detention.”

Chief Judge Nunley ordered Respondents to “immediately release” Petitioner under the same conditions that existed before his detention, prohibited additional restrictions absent a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing, required return of all documents and possessions at the time of release, and ordered Respondents to file a notice of compliance by Apr. 8. The court also enjoined re-detention absent constitutional protections, including seven days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral factfinder. Judgment was entered the same day.

Respondents missed the compliance-notice deadline. On Apr. 9, the court stated: “Respondents have not filed notice, nor sought an extension of time.” The court then raised concern that the lapse fit a broader pattern of failures to comply, writing: “The Court notes this is not the first time Respondents’ counsel has failed to timely comply with an order of this Court.” Chief Judge Nunley ordered “Respondents’ counsel” to file a status report on Petitioner’s detention “immediately” and to “show cause, in writing, no later than April 13, 2026 as to why counsel should not be sanctioned in the amount of $250 for failure to follow this Court’s Order.”

The docket reflects that government counsel of record Lauren Black filed the Apr. 9 status report. The next day, U.S. Attorney Eric Grant appeared for Respondent, and Grant filed the Apr. 13 response to the show-cause order. On Apr. 15, Chief Judge Nunley discharged the OSC after reviewing Respondents’ status report and “Counsel’s Response to the Order to Show Cause.” The court accepted inadvertence but warned of a pattern:

“The Court accepts counsel's error in failing to timely comply with this Court's Order as an inadvertent mistake. In the future, a pattern of unchecked and unaddressed mistakes in complying with court orders will be viewed as a deliberate and strategic choice. However, the Court trusts that counsel will take sufficient remedial action to ensure future compliance.”

On May 6, after government counsel Lauren Black was appointed as an immigration judge, Shelley D. Weger was designated as government counsel for Respondents, and Black was withdrawn from the docket.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to oppose Petitioner’s TRO motion by the court’s deadline despite entering an appearance and filing other documents, after which Judge Drozd granted release and directed a compliance notice.

Petitioner Edwin Sneyder Aguilera Nino, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States on or about Jan. 1, 2024, presented himself to immigration authorities, and was released on his own recognizance. Petitioner was re-detained on Mar. 16, 2026, after a minor traffic stop, when local authorities told him that ICE had requested his detention. He had no prior criminal history. He filed his habeas petition and ex parte TRO application on Mar. 31.

On Mar. 31, Judge Drozd ordered Respondents not to remove Petitioner from the United States or move him out of the Eastern District of California while the court resolved the TRO motion. The court ordered Respondents to file a written opposition by 5:00 p.m. on Apr. 2, to address whether any law or fact distinguished the case from Ayala Cajina and related cases, and to state whether they opposed converting the TRO motion into a preliminary-injunction motion or resolving the habeas merits.

Respondents did not file the ordered opposition. On Apr. 3, Judge Drozd wrote: “To date, respondents have failed to file an opposition to the pending motion despite entering an appearance and filing unrelated documents in this action.” The court found Ayala Cajina instructive, incorporated that reasoning, concluded that Petitioner’s detention violated due process, and granted TRO relief. Respondents were ordered to release Petitioner immediately under the same conditions that applied before his re-detention and were enjoined from re-detaining him absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a hearing at which Respondents would bear the burden of proving danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. “In light of their failure to respond to the court’s prior order,” Judge Drozd also directed Respondents to file a “notice of compliance” within three days of release. Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Apr. 6.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond by the deadline Judge Calabretta set in his order to show cause. After Respondents missed the Apr. 15 deadline, the court stated that “Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order,” ordered the required response by Apr. 17, and warned that it “may construe Respondents’ failure to file a timely response as a non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion.”

Petitioner Zavala Cantillano Rafael filed his § 2241 habeas petition and motion for a temporary restraining order on Apr. 10, 2026. The petition raised issues that Judge Calabretta described as appearing to mirror issues already addressed in several prior Eastern District of California cases. The court stated that it intended to rule directly on the habeas petition while considering the TRO materials.

On Apr. 10, Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to show cause by Apr. 15 whether any factual or legal issues made the case distinguishable from the court’s prior orders, or to indicate that the matter was not substantively distinguishable. The court did not set the matter for hearing, but reserved the possibility of doing so if necessary.

Respondents missed that deadline. On Apr. 16, Judge Calabretta entered a minute order stating that, on Apr. 10, Respondents had been ordered to respond by Apr. 15, but that “Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order.” The court ordered Respondents to file the required response no later than Apr. 17 and warned that it “may construe Respondents’ failure to file a timely response as a non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion.” Respondents filed a response later on Apr. 16.

On Apr. 17, Judge Calabretta granted habeas relief as to Count 2. The court quoted Respondents’ response that “Respondent does not identify any factual or legal issues that render this case distinguishable from the cases identified in the Court’s order.” Because Respondents made no new legal arguments and identified no factual or legal issues distinguishing the case from prior decisions, the court granted the petition for the reasons stated in those earlier orders.

Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody and not impose additional restrictions unless later determined necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing. The court permanently enjoined Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent constitutional protections, including pre-deprivation notice describing changed circumstances, a timely hearing, the government’s burden to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, and counsel’s presence at the hearing. The court entered judgment and closed the case on Apr. 17. A later docket entry confirmed Petitioner’s release on Apr. 18.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond by the deadline Judge Calabretta set in an order to show cause, prompting the court to warn that it could treat any further failure as non-opposition to the petition.

Petitioner Maria Elena Uribe Vargas filed a § 2241 habeas petition and motion for a temporary restraining order on Apr. 30, 2026. On Apr. 30, Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to show cause by May 5 why the court should not grant habeas relief as to Count 2, which appeared to mirror issues the court had addressed in prior cases. Respondents were required to file a return under § 2243 identifying any factual or legal issues that made the case distinguishable from those prior orders or to state that the matter was not substantively distinguishable.

Respondents missed the May 5 deadline. On May 7, Judge Calabretta wrote: “To date, Respondents have failed to respond to the Court’s Order.” The court ordered Respondents to respond by May 8 and warned that it “may construe Respondents’ failure to file a timely response as a non-opposition to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on May 7, and Petitioner replied on May 8.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to oppose Petitioner’s TRO by Judge Calabretta’s deadline and Petitioner’s re-detention after prior release on recognizance. Judge Calabretta wrote that “Respondents failed to file an Opposition,” ordered Respondents to show cause why the TRO should not be granted, and later found serious due process questions because Petitioner had been re-detained “without notice or an opportunity to be heard” after the criminal charges underlying the asserted Laken Riley Act detention theory were not filed.

Petitioner Parminder Singh entered the United States in April 2023, was detained by immigration officials, and was released a few days after on his own recognizance under § 1226. On Dec. 29, 2025, ICE took him back into custody after his release from the Kern County Sheriff’s Office in Kern County, California. Petitioner’s re-detention occurred “without notice or an opportunity to be heard.”

On Jan. 22, 2025, Petitioner filed his habeas petition and TRO motion. On Jan. 23, Judge Calabretta reviewed the habeas petition and TRO motion, noted that the issues appeared to mirror those previously addressed in Singh v. Andrews, Mariagua v. Chestnut, and Ortega v. Noem, and ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 26 whether any factual or legal issues distinguished the case from those prior orders and would justify denial of preliminary relief. The court also directed Respondents to state whether they opposed conversion of the TRO motion into a preliminary-injunction motion, and directed Petitioner’s counsel to send the petition and Petitioner’s identifying information to the U.S. Attorney’s Office by Jan. 23 at 6:00 p.m.

Respondents did not file to the TRO by the Jan. 26 deadline. On Jan. 27, Judge Calabretta entered a text order stating: “Respondents failed to file an Opposition.” The court ordered Respondents to explain by Jan. 28 why the motion should not be granted, warning that no response would be treated as non-opposition. Respondents filed a response, opposition, and return to the petition on Jan. 28. On Jan. 29, Judge Calabretta ordered Petitioner to file a reply by Feb. 2. Petitioner filed his reply the same day.

On Feb. 2, Judge Calabretta granted the TRO, finding serious due process questions because Petitioner had previously been released from ICE custody and was later re-detained without notice or a hearing. Although Respondents invoked the Laken Riley Act based on Petitioner’s arrest for battery with serious bodily injury, the court noted that prosecutors had declined to file charges and closed the case, and that mandatory detention based on “a mere arrest for which prosecutors concluded they did not have sufficient evidence to charge Petitioner with a crime” raised serious due process concerns.

Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to provide a constitutionally adequate bond hearing within five days, with the government bearing the burden to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence and with counsel permitted to be present. After Respondents filed their Feb. 9 response, Judge Calabretta denied the preliminary-injunction motion as moot on Feb. 18 because Petitioner had received the court-ordered bond hearing, and referred the remaining habeas proceedings to Magistrate Judge Claire. Magistrate Judge Claire later ordered the parties to address whether further briefing was needed and whether the petition was moot in light of the bond hearing; Respondents filed their response on Mar. 2, and Petitioner filed on Mar. 3.

This habeas case involved a pro se immigration detainee’s challenge to prolonged final-order detention, Respondents’ failure to respond to Judge Calabretta’s initial show-cause order by the deadline, and a later grant of habeas relief after Respondents’ travel-document representations weakened rather than strengthened over time. Judge Calabretta first denied TRO relief based on Respondents’ late-filed representations that removal to China was reasonably foreseeable, but Magistrate Judge Cota later found that Petitioner’s detention had reached nearly ten months and that Respondents failed to rebut his showing under Zadvydas.

Petitioner Ouyang Zhong, a Chinese national, alleged that he had been subject to a final removal order since 1995, that ICE had previously been unable to remove him to China, that he had been released on an order of supervision in 2006 after earlier habeas relief, and that he was re-detained on June 9, 2025 despite no change in his removal status. He filed a pro se habeas petition on Jan. 8, 2026, seeking release from immigration detention.

On Jan. 9, Judge Calabretta construed the petition as a TRO motion and ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 15 whether there was a significant likelihood that Petitioner could be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future and why the court should not grant relief. Respondents did not respond by that deadline. On Jan. 16, Judge Calabretta entered a second show-cause order:

“On January 9, 2026, the Court issued an Order directing Respondents to show cause, on or before January 15, 2026, as to whether there is a significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future and why the Court should not grant Petitioners Motion. … Respondents failed to file a response to that Order. Accordingly, Respondents are ordered to show cause, by January 19, 2026 at 11:59 A.M., as to whether there is a significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future and why the Court should not grant Petitioners Motion. Failure to file a response will be construed as non-opposition to the Court granting Petitioner’s Motion.”

Respondents filed a response on Jan. 19. On Jan. 22, Judge Calabretta denied TRO relief, noting Respondents’ initial failure but relying on their later representations. Respondents asserted through a DHS deportation officer declaration that travel documents had been requested from the Chinese consulate on Oct. 2, 2025; that China was awaiting verification of Petitioner’s identity; that the officer was informed and believed China would issue travel documents within three months; and that the Bakersfield ERO office had received approximately ten China-issued travel documents for similarly situated detained individuals in the preceding six months. Based on those representations, Judge Calabretta found Petitioner had not yet shown likely success because Respondents had made “clear representations” that removal was likely in the foreseeable future.

The matter then proceeded before Magistrate Judge Dennis Cota on the merits. On Apr. 8, Judge Cota recommended granting the petition, finding that Petitioner had been detained for almost ten months, had shown good reason to believe there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that Respondents failed to rebut that showing. Respondents’ answer relied on the same information they had provided in January and stated that they “believe that they will receive Petitioner’s travel documents in the next three months.” Judge Cota found the government’s position had worsened over time. In January, Respondents represented that Petitioner’s removal was likely within three months; nearly a month later, they claimed only that travel documents might be ready within three months. The court wrote:

“More important, though almost a month had passed, Petitioner’s removal appears further away because Respondents shifted from stating Petitioner may be removed in three months to merely stating his travel documents may be ready in three months. Respondents do not claim that they are in the position to remove Petitioner once his travel documents are ready – it instead appears they are less prepared to effectuate Petitioner’s removal.”

Magistrate Judge Cota emphasized that Respondents did not explain why China previously refused to issue travel documents, why China would now issue them, or whether they were ready to remove Petitioner if documents issued. Because Petitioner’s detention had grown longer while removal had become less foreseeable, the court recommended Zadvydas relief. On Apr. 16, Judge Calabretta adopted the findings and recommendations in full, granted the petition, ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner with his belongings on the same terms as his prior release, barred additional restrictions such as electronic monitoring absent a later pre-deprivation or custody hearing, and enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent seven days’ notice and a neutral hearing. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to comply with Magistrate Judge Baker’s order to file a notice of appearance, followed by a sanctions warning, in a challenge brought by a Brazilian asylum seeker whom ICE re-detained more than 16 months after releasing him on recognizance. After Respondents missed the appearance deadline, the court stated that Respondents had “failed to comply with the Court’s order to file a notice of attorney appearance,” ordered them to file the notice by Jan. 14, and warned that “[a]ny failure by Respondents to timely comply” would result in an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Magistrate Judge Baker later granted habeas relief after rejecting Respondents’ attempt to treat Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), finding that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest from his release on recognizance “for well over a year without incident,” and ordering immediate release absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing with clear-and-convincing proof before a neutral decisionmaker.

Petitioner Marcos Dos Santos, a citizen of Brazil, entered the United States from Mexico in March 2024 seeking asylum after receiving death threats in Brazil. Border Patrol arrested him near San Diego, found him inadmissible, and ICE released him on recognizance in April 2024. His immigration proceedings remained pending when ICE detained him in Buffalo, New York, in August 2025, purportedly as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). He had no U.S. criminal history or warrants.

On Dec. 29, Petitioner filed his habeas petition, motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and motion to appoint counsel. On Dec. 31, Judge Baker ordered Respondents to file a merits response or motion to dismiss within 30 days and to file a notice of appearance within seven days. The order also required Respondents to include “any and all transcripts or other documents relevant to the resolution of the issues presented in the petition.” Judge Baker also denied Petitioner's motion to appoint counsel.

Respondents did not file a notice of appearance by Jan. 7. On Jan. 12, Judge Baker entered a minute order stating that Respondents had “failed to comply with the Court’s order to file a notice of attorney appearance.” The court ordered Respondents to file the notice by Jan. 14 and warned: “Any failure by Respondents to timely comply with this order will result in the issuance of an order directing Respondents to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.” Respondents filed a notice of appearance later on Jan. 12.

On Jan. 21, after all parties consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction, the case was reassigned to the magistrate judge. On Jan. 29, Respondents filed their petition response. That same day, Magistrate Judge Baker ordered supplemental documentation because Respondents represented that Petitioner had previously been released on his own recognizance, but the cited exhibit did not establish that fact. The court ordered Respondents to file documents sufficient to establish Petitioner’s release on recognizance and his compliance or non-compliance with release terms.

On Jan. 30, Magistrate Judge Baker granted the petition. The court held that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest because he had been released on recognizance for well over a year without incident, and Respondents did not assert that he had violated release conditions or proffer facts showing he was dangerous or a flight risk. The court rejected Respondents’ reliance on § 1225(b)(2), explaining that many courts had rejected the government’s attempt to “switch tracks” after earlier release under § 1226(a). Applying Mathews, the court found that Petitioner’s re-detention without a bond hearing violated procedural due process, ordered his immediate release, enjoined re-detention absent clear-and-convincing proof at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, denied the motion to appoint counsel as moot, and closed the case. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to timely oppose or file a statement of non-opposition to Petitioner’s preliminary-injunction motion, after Judge Thurston had barred Petitioner’s removal or transfer out of the district to preserve jurisdiction. Magistrate Judge Grosjean ordered a response after finding that “more than fourteen days have passed, and Respondents have failed to file an opposition or statement of nonopposition,” and warned that absent a response the court would presume there was no opposition.

Petitioner Martin Paul Prior, a 56-year-old citizen of the United Kingdom and lawful permanent U.S. resident since 1993, had a U.S.-citizen spouse, two U.S.-citizen children, and a U.S.-citizen grandchild at the time of the habeas proceedings. DHS charged him as removable in 2020 based on prior controlled-substance and stalking convictions, but did not detain him then. Between 2020 and 2025, he traveled abroad and returned to the United States several times without being taken into immigration custody, continued working as an electrician, and pursued rehabilitation and treatment. CBP detained Prior on Feb. 22, 2025, when he returned through San Francisco from visiting his mother abroad. In April 2025, an immigration judge granted his cancellation-of-removal application, but DHS appealed to the BIA. In July 2025, California courts vacated the convictions underlying the inadmissibility charges; Prior then sought release from ICE and moved to terminate removal proceedings, but ICE did not respond to his release requests and DHS opposed termination.

Petitioner filed his habeas petition and TRO motion on Sept. 5, 2025. On Sept. 8, Judge Thurston reviewed the filings and identified several developments that made immediate relief potentially appropriate: an immigration judge had determined Petitioner was entitled to cancellation of removal, Respondents appeared to have missed the deadline to file a brief related to the appeal of that IJ determination, and Petitioner’s state convictions had been vacated. The court wrote that it preliminarily believed Petitioner might be entitled to an immediate Joseph hearing and ordered Respondents to show cause by Sept. 10 why the court should not grant TRO relief by ordering such a hearing. The court also ordered that Respondents not remove Petitioner from the United States or transfer him out of the district absent further order.

Respondents opposed the TRO on Sept. 10. On Sept. 18, Judge Thurston denied TRO relief without prejudice to renewal as a preliminary-injunction motion, but kept the no-removal/no-transfer protection in place to preserve jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a first amended petition on Dec. 16. In an order dated Dec. 16 and filed Dec. 17, Magistrate Judge Grosjean vacated the Oct. 21 scheduling order and directed Respondents, within 30 days of service, to file a response to the amended petition and “any and all transcripts or other documents necessary for the resolution of the issues presented;” if Respondents answered, Petitioner could file a traverse within 30 days, and if Respondents moved to dismiss, Petitioner had 14 days to oppose, with any reply due seven days later.

On Dec. 24, Petitioner moved for a preliminary injunction. More than 14 days passed without any opposition or statement of non-opposition. After the preliminary-injunction motion was assigned to Magistrate Judge Grosjean, she issued a Jan. 12, 2026 order citing Local Rule 230(c), including its warning that failure to file a timely opposition may be construed as non-opposition. The court wrote: “To date, more than fourteen days have passed, and Respondents have failed to file an opposition or statement of nonopposition.” The court ordered Respondents to file a response by Jan. 16, “or the Court will presume there is no opposition to the motion.” Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on Jan. 16. On Feb. 5, in her findings and recommendations (F&Rs), Magistrate Judge Grosjean recommended granting the first amended petition, denying the preliminary-injunction motion as moot, denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss, and ordering immediate release. The court noted: “To date, no reply in support of the motion to dismiss has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed.”

Respondents objected that same day; Petitioner filed a statement of non-opposition to the F&Rs the next day. On Mar. 12, Judge Thurston adopted the F&Rs in part, granting the first amended petition on Petitioner’s second claim for relief, denying the preliminary-injunction motion as moot, denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss, and closing the case. The court departed from the magistrate judge’s recommended immediate-release remedy, finding instead that Petitioner was entitled to a substantive parole-revocation hearing by Mar. 25, at which the government would bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was a flight risk or danger to the community. The court also permanently enjoined Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent constitutionally adequate pre-deprivation notice and hearing protections. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved the re-detention of a Colombian asylum seeker who had previously been released on parole and complied with reporting requirements, Respondents’ failure to respond to the court’s OSC why a preliminary injunction should not issue, and Respondents’ failure to file the release-confirmation status report required by the TRO. Magistrate Judge Claire granted the TRO, then issued a preliminary injunction after writing that Respondents “have not filed any response to the order to show cause and their time to do so has passed.”

Petitioner Esteban Quiroga-Chaparro, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in April 2023 seeking asylum. After a positive credible-fear determination, he was released on parole with reporting requirements under the Alternatives to Detention program. The court noted that he had not missed in-person check-ins, had responded to SMARTLink requests, had complied with parole conditions, had no criminal history, had lived in the United States for more than two and a half years, and had married a U.S. citizen. ICE re-detained him at a routine check-in on Oct. 22, 2025, without notice, cause, or explanation.

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Dec. 4. On Dec. 8, Magistrate Judge Claire ordered Respondent to file an answer or return within 14 days, with any reply or traverse due seven days after service. To preserve jurisdiction over the pending § 2241 petition, the court also ordered that Respondent not transfer Petitioner outside the district pending further order. Respondent answered the petition on Dec. 22. Petitioner moved for a temporary restraining order on Dec. 24 and filed a reply brief in support of the petition on Dec. 26.

On Dec. 29, after reviewing the habeas petition and TRO motion, Magistrate Judge Claire ordered Respondents to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the TRO by Dec. 30 and to address whether the case was distinguishable from the court’s prior similar decisions. Respondents opposed. On Dec. 31, the court granted the TRO, ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately on the same release conditions that applied before his Oct. 22 detention, barred additional restrictions absent a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing, and enjoined re-detention unless Respondents first proved by clear and convincing evidence before a neutral decisionmaker that Petitioner was a flight risk or danger. The court also required a release-confirmation status report within three days and ordered Respondents to show cause by Jan. 5 why a preliminary injunction should not issue on the same terms.

Respondents did not show cause and did not file the release-confirmation status report. On Jan. 8, Magistrate Judge Claire issued the preliminary injunction, writing: “Respondents have not filed any response to the order to show cause and their time to do so has passed,” and adding, “Respondents were also ordered to file a status report confirming petitioner’s release but have failed to do so. However, petitioner has filed a response confirming he has been released from custody.” The court issued a preliminary injunction on the same terms as the TRO, prohibited additional restrictions absent a future hearing, and directed Petitioner to notify the court whether he intended to amend the petition.

This habeas case involved the re-detention of a Venezuelan asylum seeker whom immigration authorities had released on his own recognizance under § 1226, Respondents’ failure to oppose or file a statement of non-opposition to Petitioner’s pseudonym motion, and Judge Sherriff’s later rejection of Respondents’ attempt to treat Petitioner as subject to the entry-fiction doctrine and mandatory detention under § 1225. After Respondents failed to comply with Local Rule 230(c), Magistrate Judge Baker ordered them to “show cause” why sanctions should not be imposed and warned that “[a]ny failure by Respondents to timely comply with this order will result in the imposition of sanctions,” before discharging the OSC the same day after Respondents filed a statement of non-opposition. Judge Sherriff later granted habeas relief, holding that Respondents “incorrectly characterize[d]” Petitioner’s 2023 release, that the record showed he had been released under § 1226 rather than treated as an arriving applicant subject to § 1225, and that the government’s prior conduct “undermines respondents’ attempt to apply the entry fiction doctrine.”

Petitioner N.A.L.C., an asylum seeker from Venezuela, entered the United States in September 2023 and turned himself in to immigration officials. About a month later, officials provided him with a notice to appear for § 1229a removal proceedings and released him on his own recognizance under a Form I-220A stating that he was released “in accordance with” § 1226. He later moved to Buffalo, New York, worked in construction and cleaning jobs, supported family overseas, applied for asylum, complied with release conditions, and maintained a clean criminal record. Immigration authorities re-detained him in August 2025 after a traffic stop of a company vehicle in which he was a passenger.At the time he filed his petition, Petitioner had been transferred through several detention facilities and was detained at Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center in Bakersfield, California.

On Dec. 18, Petitioner filed his habeas petition, motion for a temporary restraining order, and motion to proceed pseudonymously. On Dec. 19, Judge Sherriff indicated that the court intended to rule directly on the habeas petition, ordered Respondents to show cause by Dec. 23 whether the case was factually or legally distinguishable from the court’s prior orders, and directed Petitioner’s counsel to serve the petition and TRO motion. Respondents filed their show-cause response on Dec. 23, and Petitioner replied on Jan. 4.

On Jan. 7, before ruling on the merits, Magistrate Judge Baker addressed Petitioner’s pending motion to proceed under pseudonym. Because Respondents had “failed to timely file an opposition or statement of non-opposition as required under Local Rule 230(c),” the court ordered Respondents to “show cause” in writing by Jan. 12 “why sanctions should not be imposed for their failure to comply with this Court’s Local Rules.” Judge Baker added: “Respondents may comply with this order in the alternative by filing an opposition or statement of non-opposition to Petitioners motion by that same deadline. Any failure by Respondents to timely comply with this order will result in the imposition of sanctions.” Respondents filed a statement of non-opposition to the pseudonym motion later that day, and Magistrate Judge Baker discharged the show-cause order.

On Jan. 18, Judge Sherriff granted the petition. The court held that Respondents’ opposition “incorrectly characterize[d]” Petitioner’s 2023 release as parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A), when the record showed that he had been released on conditional parole under § 1226. Judge Sherriff found that the government had not treated Petitioner as if he had been stopped at the border or subject to § 1225; instead, it released him under § 1226 and placed him in full removal proceedings under § 1229a. That prior conduct, the court wrote, “undermines respondents’ attempt to apply the entry fiction doctrine.”

Judge Sherriff also held that Petitioner’s prior release created a protected liberty interest. Even assuming § 1225(b)(2) could apply, the government had previously represented to Petitioner that he had been released under § 1226(a), creating a reasonable expectation that he could retain liberty so long as he was not a flight risk or danger. The court held that due process required a pre-deprivation hearing, ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately, and enjoined re-detention absent clear-and-convincing proof before a neutral decisionmaker that Petitioner was a flight risk or danger. Judgment was entered on Jan. 30.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a response to Petitioner’s TRO motion by the court-ordered deadline. Judge Calabretta stated that “Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order,” gave Respondents a second deadline, and warned that continued failure could be construed as non-opposition.

Petitioner A.I.J.P. entered the United States in 2018 and was detained shortly after entry. He was released from custody on bond on Feb. 12, 2019, then re-detained by ICE in February 2026 when he was transferred from local custody to ICE custody. That re-detention occurred without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

On Feb. 25, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. On Feb. 26, he filed a TRO motion and a motion to proceed under a pseudonym. That same day, Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to file any opposition by Mar. 3. The court also granted Petitioner’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym, finding that he had “adequately alleged the sensitive and highly personal nature of the facts” at issue, minimal prejudice to Respondents, and no “meaningful impair[ment]” of the public’s interest in open proceedings.

Petitioner filed a statement of non-opposition on Mar. 4, and the court then entered a second order, stating: “To date, Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order,” adding, “The Court may construe Respondents’ failure to file a timely response as a non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion.” The court ordered Respondents to file the required response by Mar. 5 and allowed Petitioner to reply by Mar. 6.

Respondents filed their opposition and a motion to dismiss on Mar. 5. In a Mar. 9 order entered Mar. 10, the court converted the TRO application into a preliminary-injunction motion and granted it. The court held that Petitioner had shown a likelihood of success because he had a clear liberty interest in continued release, the risk of erroneous deprivation was considerable, and Respondents’ interest in detention was low given the minimal burden of procedural safeguards. Because Petitioner had been re-detained after a criminal custodial sentence, the court concluded that a post-deprivation hearing was proper and ordered Respondents to afford Petitioner a constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an immigration judge within five days, with the government bearing the clear-and-convincing burden on danger or flight risk and Petitioner permitted to have counsel present.

This habeas case involved ICE’s re-detention of a Chinese national previously released on recognizance, Respondents’ failure to oppose his TRO motion by Judge Drozd’s court-ordered deadline, and the government’s later attempt to modify the TRO based on a claimed ability to remove him to China. Judge Drozd granted interim relief after noting that Respondents had “failed to file an opposition as directed,” then granted habeas relief after finding Respondents were “simply incorrect” that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2), that they did “not explain why petitioner’s detention would be necessary” to execute removal, and that they “provided no evidence” to support their assertion that the government had a travel document allowing immediate removal. The case later generated a related follow-on habeas petition, Li v. Mullin, after Petitioner alleged he had been re-detained in violation of the Apr. 10 habeas order; Judge Drozd did not find a violation at that stage, but wrote that, “[i]f petitioner’s allegations … are accurate,” the court had “significant concerns that respondents have failed to comply with this court’s previous order.”

Petitioner Lian Fang Li, also listed as Lianfang Li, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States on Apr. 22, 2023. On Apr. 23, he received a Notice to Appear and Petitioner refused to sign it. That same day, Petitioner received a custody determination stating that he would be released on his own recognizance, and on May 3, 2023, he signed an order of release on recognizance. ICE re-detained him on Nov. 13, 2025, allegedly without notice of the reason for re-detention or a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

On Feb. 4, 2026, Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition and TRO motion. On Feb. 5, Judge Drozd ordered Respondents not to remove Petitioner from the United States or move him out of the Eastern District of California while the TRO motion remained pending, and directed Respondents to file an opposition by Feb. 6 at 5:00 p.m. The order specifically required Respondents to address whether anything distinguished the case from Perez, O.A.C.S., and similar decisions previously issued by the court. Respondents did not file an opposition.

On Feb. 11, Judge Drozd granted the TRO in part. The court wrote that, although Petitioner’s counsel had served the TRO motion on Respondents the same day it was filed and the court had ordered a response by Feb. 6, “respondents have failed to file an opposition as directed.” Adopting the reasoning of Ayala Cajina and Perez, the court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately under the same conditions that applied before his Nov. 13 re-detention, and enjoined re-detention absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge, where Respondents would bear the burden to show danger or flight risk.

On Feb. 13, Respondents moved to modify the TRO to allow them to execute a purported final order of removal. They argued that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2), and that they did not know whether they would violate the TRO if they took him into custody “for the sole purpose of swiftly executing his final order of removal to China, without a pre-deprivation hearing.”

On Apr. 9, in an order entered Apr. 10, Judge Drozd granted the petition and denied Respondents’ motion to modify the TRO as moot. The court first noted that Petitioner’s Apr. 23, 2023 Notice to Appear identified him as a native and citizen of China, but stated that it had been “provided orally to [P]etitioner in the Spanish language, despite his being a citizen of China,” and that “[P]etitioner refused to sign” it. Turning to Respondents’ motion to modify the TRO, Judge Drozd noted that Respondents sought permission to take Petitioner into custody to execute a purported final removal order to China, but “do not explain why petitioner’s detention would be necessary in order for them to execute a removal order.” Respondents also stated that “the government has a travel document that will allow it to execute the final order of removal immediately[],” but “provided no evidence to the court in support of this statement.”

Judge Drozd then rejected Respondents’ mootness argument, writing that the court was “unpersuaded” that the petition had become moot merely because Petitioner had been released under the TRO. The court also concluded that Respondents were “simply incorrect” that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2). Because Petitioner’s appeal from the denial of reopening of his in absentia removal order remained pending before the BIA, and the BIA’s interim denial of a stay did not itself make the removal order final, Judge Drozd held that Petitioner remained subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2). Incorporating his prior reasoning in O.A.C.S. and Perez, Judge Drozd found that, absent changed circumstances, Petitioner’s re-detention without notice and an opportunity to be heard was unlawful. The court granted habeas relief, enjoined Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner for any purpose—absent exigent circumstances or detention required by § 1231(a)(2)—without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, and entered judgment in Petitioner’s favor.

On May 15, Petitioner filed a new habeas petition in Li v. Mullin, 1:26-cv-03749, alleging that Respondents had re-detained him on May 5 in violation of Judge Drozd’s Apr. 10 order. In a May 22 order, Judge Drozd related and reassigned the new case to himself and Magistrate Judge Brennan, noting that the new petition directly implicated the prior habeas judgment in Li v. Albarran. The court recounted the operative terms of the Apr. 10 order:

“On April 10, 2026, this court granted petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and enjoined his re-detention, absent exigent circumstances or as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge where respondents will have the burden of establishing that petitioner is either a flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence.”

Judge Drozd then described the new allegation: “On May 15, 2026, petitioner filed a new petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he states he was re-detained on May 5, 2026 in violation of this court’s previous order.” The court did not find a violation at that stage, but it treated the allegations as serious enough to require expedited briefing. Judge Drozd wrote that Petitioner alleged he had not been properly notified of the court-ordered pre-deprivation hearing because of “multiple failures by respondents:”

“Petitioner alleges that he was not properly notified of the court-ordered pre-deprivation hearing due to what appears to be multiple failures by respondents to properly serve petitioner and his attorney, including scheduling the pre-deprivation hearing the same day as that hearing was conducted without confirming that petitioner or counsel received notice of the hearing.”

Judge Drozd then stated:

“If petitioner’s allegations in this regard are accurate, then the court has significant concerns that respondents have failed to comply with this court’s previous order. Given the nature of the allegations in the petition and good cause appearing, the court will require expedited briefing.”

Judge Drozd directed Respondents to file a return to the new petition by May 27, with any traverse due three court days after service. Respondents filed a return on May 27.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to meet the court’s response deadline, prompting Judge Calabretta to write that “Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order” and warn that continued nonresponse could be treated as non-opposition.

Petitioner Jairo Mauricio Chimbo Chimbo entered the United States in 2023. After being placed in immigration proceedings, he was released from custody and continued reporting for ICE check-ins. On Jan. 20, 2026, ICE re-detained him when he attended a check-in appointment. The court later described the re-detention as having occurred “without notice or an opportunity to be heard” and without any “changed circumstances” since his release.

On Mar. 11, 2026, Petitioner filed a habeas petition and TRO motion seeking release from ICE custody. That same day, Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to file any opposition by Mar. 17, directed Petitioner’s counsel to serve the petition, motion, full name, and A-number on the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and directed Respondents’ counsel promptly to appear. On Mar. 19, after Respondents missed the deadline, the court entered a text order stating: “To date, Respondents have failed to comply with this Court’s Order. Accordingly, Respondents shall file the required response no later than March 20.” The court added that it “may construe Respondents’ failure to file a timely response as a non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion,” and directed Petitioner to file any reply by Mar. 23.

Respondents filed their opposition on Mar. 20, and Petitioner replied on Mar. 21. On Mar. 23, Judge Calabretta granted the petition as to Count 1, finding that Petitioner had established that “his present detention violates his due process rights.” The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately, prohibited them from imposing additional restrictions unless later found necessary at a pre-deprivation or custody hearing, and enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent constitutional protections, including at minimum pre-deprivation notice, a timely hearing, and a clear-and-convincing burden on danger or flight risk. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to oppose a TRO motion after Judge Drozd ordered them to respond by Mar. 10 and restrained removal or transfer outside the district while the motion was pending. Judge Drozd granted the TRO after finding that “respondents have failed to file an opposition despite having appearing in this action.”

Petitioner Niangong Zou entered the United States in 2023, where he was initially encountered by immigration officials, briefly detained, and released on his own recognizance on July 5, 2023. He alleged that immigration officials re-detained him at a regularly scheduled check-in on Jan. 14, 2026 without prior notice or a hearing, and that he had no prior criminal history.

On Mar. 5, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. On Mar. 7, he filed a TRO motion. On Mar. 9, Judge Drozd barred Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States or moving him out of the Eastern District of California pending resolution of the TRO motion, and ordered Respondents to file a written opposition by Mar. 10 addressing whether the case was distinguishable from Ayala Cajina and similar decisions. Respondents did not file an opposition. Petitioner requested entry of default on Mar. 12. That same day, Judge Drozd granted the TRO, writing: “To date, respondents have failed to file an opposition despite having appear[ed] in this action.”

Judge Drozd found Ayala Cajina analogous because Respondents had previously released Petitioner into the country on recognizance and then allegedly re-detained him without notice or a hearing. The court ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner under the same conditions that applied before his Jan. 14 re-detention and enjoined re-detention absent exigent circumstances without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, where Respondents would bear the burden to establish flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner filed a voluntary dismissal on Mar. 26, and the court dismissed the action without prejudice on Mar. 27.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to oppose Petitioner’s TRO and pseudonym motions after Judge Drozd ordered a response by Mar. 10, despite proof of service and Respondents’ own intervening docket filing. The court granted both motions, ordered immediate release, and barred re-detention absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a pre-detention hearing.

Petitioner Y.A.C.F. entered the United States on Jan. 21, 2024 through humanitarian parole and was detained by immigration officials on June 1, 2025. On Mar. 6, 2026, Petitioner filed a habeas petition and TRO motion. Petitioner also moved to proceed under a pseudonym, alleging that disclosure of identity could lead to retaliatory harm.

That that day on Mar. 6, Judge Drozd barred Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States or moving Petitioner out of the Eastern District of California pending resolution of the TRO, directed Petitioner’s counsel to serve the papers by Mar. 9, and ordered Respondents to file an opposition to both pending motions by Mar. 10. Petitioner filed proof of service on Mar. 6, and Respondents submitted an unrelated consent/decline filing on Mar. 7.

On Mar. 11, Judge Drozd granted the TRO, noting that, “to date, respondents have failed to file an opposition to the pending motion as directed.” The court adopted the reasoning of Rocha Chavarria, where due process required a pre-detention hearing to protect a petitioner’s liberty interest in continued release. The court ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner under the same conditions that applied before detention on June 1, 2025, and enjoined re-detention absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral adjudicator, where Respondents would bear the burden to show flight risk or danger. The court also granted the pseudonym motion because Petitioner alleged disclosure “could lead to him suffering retaliatory harm.”

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a TRO opposition after Judge Drozd ordered them to respond, even though Respondents’ counsel had previously entered a designation of counsel for service. The court granted TRO relief, ordered immediate release, and barred re-detention absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a pre-detention hearing.

Petitioner Ismael Cruz Suastegui had been deported to Mexico in 2003 following a criminal conviction, returned to the United States later that year, was detained by ICE in 2014 and released with check-in requirements, and was re-detained on June 1, 2025. On Jan. 8, 2026, Sandra Abriz, acting as next friend for Petitioner, filed the habeas petition and emergency motion for release. The court later appointed counsel.

After counsel was appointed, Petitioner filed an amended TRO motion on Mar. 3. On Mar. 4, Judge Drozd barred Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States or moving him out of the Eastern District of California pending resolution of the TRO motion and ordered Respondents to file a written opposition by 5:00 p.m. on Mar. 5. Respondents did not do so. On Mar. 9, granting a TRO, Judge Drozd wrote that, “to date, [R]espondents have failed to file an opposition to the pending motion as directed.”

The court found Yang analogous because ICE allegedly failed to comply with its own regulations governing re-detention under § 1231(a)(6), and, to the extent Petitioner was not subject to a final removal order, found Ayala Cajina analogous because a petitioner retained a liberty interest in continued release regardless of whether detention was under § 1225 or § 1226. The court ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner under the same conditions that applied before his June 1, 2025 re-detention and enjoined re-detention absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge, where Respondents would bear the burden to show danger or flight risk.

This habeas case involved ICE’s re-detention of a Peruvian asylum seeker at a routine check-in after more than three years on release, Respondents’ failure to oppose her TRO motion by Judge Calabretta’s deadline, and later post-injunction briefing failures before Magistrate Judge Claire. Judge Calabretta granted immediate-release TRO relief after noting that Respondents had “not appeared nor filed any opposition,” and Magistrate Judge Claire later entered a preliminary injunction on the same terms, rejecting Respondents’ § 1225 theory and holding that Petitioner, who had been released under § 1226(a), could not properly be treated as a noncitizen “seeking admission.” After the preliminary injunction, the parties failed to submit the joint proposed briefing schedule Judge Claire had ordered, and Respondents then filed a document that did “not address the substance of the petition” but instead sought “indefinite suspension of briefing,”which the court denied as “non-cognizable.”

Petitioner Michelle Montero-Alvarez, a native and citizen of Peru, entered the United States in July 2022 seeking asylum. Federal agents detained her on arrival and released her on her own recognizance with an I-220B order of supervision and a notice to appear. She later filed for asylum, received work authorization, complied with ICE and USCIS appointments, and had no criminal history. On Nov. 21, 2025, she appeared for a rescheduled ICE appointment and was detained.

On Dec. 1, Petitioner filed her habeas petition and TRO motion. Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to oppose the TRO motion by Dec. 3. Respondents did not do so. On Dec. 5, Judge Calabretta granted the TRO in part, writing that “Respondents have not appeared nor filed any opposition to Petitioner’s Motion.” The court ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, barred additional restrictions absent a later pre-deprivation or custody hearing, required a status report confirming release, and enjoined re-arrest or re-detention absent constitutional protections, including pre-deprivation notice and a timely hearing at which the government would bear the burden to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. The court also ordered Respondents to show cause by Dec. 12 why a preliminary injunction should not issue on the same terms.

After reassignment by consent, Magistrate Judge Claire reinstated the show-cause deadlines. On Dec. 12, Respondents filed an opposition to the TRO rather than a response styled to the show-cause order. On Dec. 29, Judge Claire issued a preliminary injunction on the same terms as the TRO, construing Respondents’ TRO filing as their show-cause response. The court noted that Respondents’ opposition addressed only likelihood of success and did not address the other three Winter factors; the court rejected Respondents’ § 1225 theory, held that Petitioner was released under § 1226(a), and found that she could not properly be categorized as a noncitizen “seeking admission.” The preliminary-injunction order directed the parties to meet and confer within seven days and submit a joint proposed briefing schedule within ten days. They did not do so. On Jan. 13, Judge Claire wrote that “[t]he parties have not submitted a joint proposed briefing schedule as previously directed,” and therefore set the briefing schedule herself, directing Respondents to file an answer or return within 14 days and include any relevant transcripts or documents.

Respondents filed an answer and request to suspend briefing on Jan. 27. On Jan. 29, the court found that Respondents’ filings did “not address the substance of the petition but requests indefinite suspension of briefing,” and denied the request as “non-cognizable.” Further, the court ordered: “Within seven days from the date of this order, respondents are ordered to file a response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus that complies with the applicable rules of procedure.” Respondents filed a response and notice of intent to rely on prior filings on Jan. 30, and Petitioner filed a notice of submission on Feb. 2.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to oppose Petitioner’s TRO motion by the deadline Judge Drozd set, after the court specifically directed them to address whether the case was distinguishable from prior parole-redetention decisions. Judge Drozd noted that “to date, respondents have failed to file an opposition to the pending motion as directed,” granted interim relief, and later adopted Magistrate Judge Riordan’s recommendation that Petitioner had “acquired a liberty interest in his continued release” and that the Mathews factors required release.

Petitioner Carlos Rea Bustamante entered the United States on or about Sept. 4, 2022, when immigration officials contacted him, served him with a notice to appear, and paroled him into the United States. On Oct. 23, 2025, he appeared at a scheduled ICE check-in and was re-detained “without notice of the reason for his re-detention or an opportunity to be heard.”

On Jan. 27, Petitioner filed his habeas petition, and Respondents, through government counsel Jonathan Yu, appeared the same day. On Jan. 29, in a minute order issued by the Courtroom Deputy for Magistrate Sean C. Riordan, Respondents were ordered to file an answer/return within seven days, directed that Petitioner could file a reply/traverse within three days of service, and stated that the petition would then be taken under submission absent further order. On Feb. 5, Respondents filed a response to the order to show cause and answer to the petition.

On Feb. 13, Magistrate Judge Riordan recommended granting the petition. He declined to decide whether DHS had originally paroled Petitioner under § 1226(a) or § 1182(d)(5)(A), because “given his prior release, the procedural due process analysis would be the same even if he is subject to a mandatory detention statute.” He found Respondents’ argument that Petitioner had not acquired a liberty interest from his 2022 parole “unconvincing,” explaining that government release creates “an implicit promise” that liberty will be revoked only for violation of release conditions, and held that Petitioner “acquired a liberty interest in his continued freedom when DHS elected to release him.” Applying Mathews, he found Petitioner’s private interest strong, the risk of erroneous deprivation “particularly high” because Respondents did not dispute parole compliance and relied instead on § 1225 mandatory detention “as a matter of law,” and the government’s interest “low.” He recommended immediate release under the prior supervision conditions, an injunction barring re-detention absent written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, return of Petitioner’s documents and possessions, and a compliance notice within two days of adoption.

Also on Feb. 13, Judge Drozd entered an All Writs Act order barring Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States or moving him out of the Eastern District of California while the TRO motion remained pending. The court ordered Respondents to oppose the TRO by Feb. 17 and specifically directed them to address whether any law or fact distinguished the case from Rocha Chavarria, Singh v. Albarran, and similar decisions by the court. Respondents did not file the required opposition. On Feb. 19, Judge Drozd granted the TRO, writing, “Respondents had previously filed their designation of counsel for service on 1/27/2026. Nonetheless, to date, respondents have failed to file an opposition to the pending motion as directed.” The court ordered immediate release under the same conditions Petitioner had before his Oct. 23 redetention, and enjoined Respondents from re-detaining him absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge.

Respondents objected to the findings and recommendations, arguing that Petitioner’s detention was lawful under Barrera-Echavarria. On Mar. 16, Judge Drozd rejected that objection, incorporating his reasoning in Valencia v. Noem and concluding that Respondents’ objection provided “no basis” to decline adoption. After de novo review, the court held that the findings and recommendations were “supported by the record and by proper analysis,” adopted them in full, granted the petition, ordered Petitioner’s immediate release if he had not already been released, and enjoined re-detention unless Respondents first provided written notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing at which they would bear the burden to show danger or flight risk. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to oppose a TRO by the court-ordered deadline after ICE re-detained Petitioner without prior notice or a hearing based on misdemeanor charges that were later dismissed. Judge Drozd noted that Respondents had been ordered to respond by Feb. 12 but, “[t]o date, respondents have failed to file any opposition,” then granted interim relief requiring a bond hearing and later granted habeas relief, holding that Petitioner’s redetention without a hearing violated due process.

Petitioner Manveer Singh entered the United States on or about June 20, 2024. Immigration authorities later released him and placed him in an intensive supervision program requiring weekly SmartLINK photo uploads, monthly in-person office visits, and monthly video check-ins. He was arrested on or about Sept. 28, 2025, for theft and other misdemeanor offenses, but all criminal charges were dismissed on Dec. 1, 2025. On Nov. 25, 2025, before the charges were dismissed, he appeared at the San Jose ICE office at ICE’s direction and was re-detained due to the arrest, without prior notice or a hearing.

On Feb. 10, Petitioner filed his habeas petition and moved for a TRO. That same day, Judge Drozd entered a no-removal and no-transfer order under the All Writs Act, directing Respondents not to remove Petitioner from the United States or move him out of the Eastern District of California while the TRO motion was pending, and ordering Respondents to file an opposition by 5:00 p.m. on Feb. 12. The order also specifically directed Respondents to address whether anything distinguished the case from Cajina v. Wofford and similar cases.

Respondents did not file any opposition by the deadline. On Feb. 17, Judge Drozd granted the TRO in part, noting, “To date, respondents have failed to file any opposition to the pending motion.” The court ordered Respondents to provide a bond hearing within ten days, and required a status report within three days of the hearing confirming that it had occurred. Respondents filed status reports on Feb. 27 and Mar. 3, stating that Petitioner had received a bond hearing, had been released, and that the parties submitted on prior briefing for a ruling on the petition.

On Mar. 18, Judge Drozd granted the petition. The court incorporated its TRO reasoning, concluded that Petitioner was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) because the charges had been dismissed, and held that Petitioner had gained a liberty interest in continued release after Respondents had previously released him from custody. The court ordered enjoined Respondents from re-detaining him, absent exigent circumstances, without written notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, at which Respondents must prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment was then entered. On May 18, Respondents filed a notice of appeal.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ late response to a pro se immigration detainee’s prolonged-detention habeas petition. Magistrate Judge Boone first granted habeas relief after writing that “no response has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed,” then clarified the next day that Respondents had filed a response one week late, but that the late response did “not change the analysis.” A post-judgment motion to enforce the habeas order remains pending.

Petitioner Juan Luis Martinez Hernandez was detained in DHS custody beginning Mar. 11, 2025. Proceeding pro se, he filed a § 2241 petition on Dec. 8, 2025, following continued detention for approximately eleven months without any bond hearing. On Dec. 12, Magistrate Judge Boone ordered Respondents to respond to the petition within 60 days, making the response due Feb. 10, 2026. Judge Boone also denied Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice.

On Dec. 22, Judge Jennifer L. Thurston reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Boone. Respondents filed a response on Feb. 17, one week late. On Feb. 18, 2026, Magistrate Judge Boone granted the petition, noting, “To date, no response has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed.” The court ordered Respondents to provide an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge within 30 days, with the government bearing the burden under Singh v. Holder to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was a flight risk or danger.

On Feb. 19, Judge Boone issued a separate order addressing Respondents’ late response. The court noted that the deadline to respond was Feb. 10, but that “Respondents filed a late response one week later on February 17.” The late response indicated that Petitioner was being subjected to Respondents’ policy of treating anyone arrested in the United States and charged as inadmissible as an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore “subject to mandatory detention.” But the court emphasized that the petition challenged prolonged detention without a bond hearing, not the statutory detention authority, and held that “the arguments raised in Respondents’ late response do not change the analysis” of the habeas order.

After judgment, Petitioner filed an Apr. 6 motion to enforce the habeas order, and Respondents later obtained a five-day extension to respond, though Judge Boone noted that deadline-day extension requests are “looked upon with disfavor.” On May 14, after the Federal Defender filed an amicus motion to reconsider appointment of counsel, Judge Boone granted the motion, found that “the interests of justice require the appointment of counsel,” and set deadlines for counsel to be identified and to appear, and for Petitioner to file either an amended motion to enforce judgment or a reply to Respondents’ response.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ missed deadline to answer or move to dismiss in a pro se habeas challenge to ICE’s re-detention of a parolee, prompting Judge Baker to issue a sanctions OSC and warn that further noncompliance would result in sanctions. After Respondents filed by the OSC deadline, the court discharged the OSC for good cause; later, Judge Baker recommended, and Judge Thurston adopted, habeas relief on procedural-due-process grounds, ordering immediate release because Respondents relied only on § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention and did not assert any release-condition violation, flight risk, danger, or individualized parole-revocation determination.

Petitioner Ilias Dzhatdoev, a citizen of Russia, unlawfully entered the United States at San Ysidro on Oct. 27, 2023. DHS detained him on arrival, charged him as inadmissible, served him with an NTA, and released him on parole the same day under INA § 212(d)(5)(A). After more than 17 months living in the United States while immigration proceedings remained pending, ICE re-detained him on Apr. 4, 2025 during a routine check-in. He filed his habeas petition on Oct. 31, 2025 while detained at Golden State Annex in McFarland, California.

On Nov. 5, Magistrate Judge Baker preliminarily concluded that the petition might be cognizable under § 2241 and ordered Respondents to respond within 60 days, making the response due Jan. 5, 2026. Respondents did not meet that deadline. On Jan. 9, Judge Baker wrote that “[t]hat deadline has passed and Respondents have not filed any response or motion to dismiss the petition.” He ordered “Respondents … to show cause” by Jan. 12 “why sanctions should not be imposed for their failure to timely file their response or motion to dismiss,” but allowed Respondents to comply in the alternative by filing their response or motion to dismiss by the same deadline. He warned: “Failure to timely comply with this order will result in the imposition of sanctions.” Respondents filed a response on Jan. 12, and on Jan. 13 Judge Baker discharged the OSC for “good cause.”

Petitioner moved for a TRO on Jan. 8. On Jan. 13, Judge Baker recommended denial, not on the merits, but because Petitioner had waited about nine months after re-detention and more than two months after filing the petition before seeking emergency relief, without an explanation warranting TRO treatment. On Jan. 29, Judge Thurston adopted the recommendation and denied the TRO, treating the ruling as a refusal to grant last-minute emergency relief on shortened time.

On Feb. 5, in his findings and recommendations (F&Rs), Judge Baker recommended granting habeas relief, finding that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest after release on parole, that Respondents had not claimed any release-condition violation or identified facts showing danger, flight risk, or an individualized parole-revocation determination, and that comparable courts had rejected the government’s § 1225(b)(2) mandatory-detention theory. Applying Mathews, Judge Baker found a due-process violation in Petitioner’s April 2025 arrest and continuing detention. On Feb. 12, Judge Thurston adopted the F&Rs after de novo review, rejected Respondents’ reliance on nonbinding Fifth Circuit authority, and ordered immediate release because Respondents offered no detention basis other than § 1225 and did not assert flight risk or danger. The court also barred re-detention absent advance notice and a § 1226(a) bond hearing, or a prompt post-deprivation hearing if legally sufficient circumstances justified arrest without notice, and entered judgment for Petitioner.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file the court-ordered habeas response within 30 days and failure to provide the ordered A-file materials in a pro se prolonged-detention case, prompting Judge Oberto to issue a sanctions OSC for “failure to comply with a court order.” When Respondents later responded, the court found the filing still did not address Petitioner’s central Fifth Amendment due-process claim and omitted the relevant A-file materials; Judge Oberto proceeded on the premise that the due-process claim was uncontested, granted habeas relief, and ordered a bond hearing within 30 days with the government bearing the clear-and-convincing burden, or release on appropriate supervision conditions.

Petitioner Inderjeet Singh, a national and citizen of India, had been detained since Mar. 12, 2025. He was in removal proceedings, had filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, and was detained at Golden State Annex in McFarland, California. He filed his habeas petition on Nov. 24, 2025, arguing that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violated procedural due process and seeking release or a bond hearing at which the government would justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.

On Dec. 1, Judge Oberto ordered the government to show cause within 30 days why the petition should not be granted. The order directed the response to include “a copy of Petitioner’s Alien File and any and all other documentation relevant to the determination of the issues raised in the petition.” Respondents did not file a response within the 30-day period. On Jan. 13, Judge Oberto issued a sanctions OSC, writing that the Dec. 1 order had directed “Respondents to show cause within thirty (30) days why the petition should not be granted,” but that “[o]ver thirty (30) days have passed, and Respondent has not filed a response or otherwise responded to the Court’s order.” The court explained: “Local Rule 11-110 provides: ‘Failure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent power of the Court.’” The court ordered the government to “show cause” within ten days “why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to comply with a court order.” Respondents later filed a habeas response and a response to the sanctions OSC.

On Jan. 23, Judge Oberto granted the petition. The court noted that the government’s response did not address Petitioner’s due-process claim and that Respondents had not provided relevant A-file materials as ordered. Judge Oberto declined Respondents’ stay request because Rodriguez v. Bostock concerned the statutory basis for detention, not Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment prolonged-detention claim, and proceeded on the premise that the government did not contest that claim.

Judge Oberto found that Petitioner’s 10-month detention was prolonged, that there was “no evidence that Petitioner has acted to prolong detention,” and that the record did not show the government had assessed flight risk, danger, or alternatives to detention. The court held that “Petitioner’s prolonged detention without a bond hearing before an IJ violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights;” ordered a bond hearing within 30 days at which the government must justify detention by clear and convincing evidence, or release on appropriate supervision conditions; and directed entry of judgment. Judgment was later entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ repeated failure to file the court-ordered response to the petition, an order to “show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to follow” the Dec. 23 and Jan. 30 response orders, and a removal-record discrepancy in which Respondents’ narrative said Petitioner was removed on Dec. 19 to Vietnam while their attached evidence “indicates that Petitioner was removed to Laos on December 16, 2025.” After the original response deadline passed, Magistrate Judge Grosjean gave Respondents a single sua sponte extension, writing that “[t]o date, no response has been filed.” When Respondents again failed to respond by the extended deadline, the court issued the sanctions OSC and directed Respondents to state whether they had “complied” with the Dec. 23 no-removal/no-transfer order. Respondents attributed the missed deadline to an office record-keeping “oversight” and stated that Petitioner had already been removed before the no-transfer order. Relying on Respondents’ attached removal records rather than their narrative description, Magistrate Judge Grosjean read the evidence as showing removal to Laos on Dec. 16—after the habeas petition was filed but before the no-transfer order—then discharged the OSC, declined sanctions, and recommended dismissal as moot. Judge Sherriff later adopted the recommendation and entered judgment.

Petitioner Bounmy Kae Mangmoradeth, born in and ordered removed to Laos, filed a pro se habeas petition on Dec. 15, 2025. He challenged his continued immigration detention on the ground that there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and also challenged Respondents’ third-country removal policy.

On Dec. 23, Magistrate Judge Grosjean ordered that “Respondents shall not remove Petitioner from the United States nor transfer Petitioner out of this District” while the court reviewed the petition. That same day, the court separately ordered Respondents to file a response to the petition within 30 days and to file any transcripts or other documents necessary to resolve the issues presented. After no response was filed more than a week after the original deadline, Judge Grosjean granted Respondents a single sua sponte extension on Jan. 30 and directed them to respond by Feb. 9, writing, “To date, no response has been filed.”

Respondents again did not respond by the deadline. On Feb. 10, Judge Grosjean ordered Respondents to file a response and to “show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to follow the Court’s December 23, 2025 and January 30, 2026 orders to respond.” The court explained:

“As no response had been filed more than a week after the original deadline, on January 30, 2026, the Court granted a single sua sponte extension and ordered Respondents to file a response to the petition on or before February 9, 2026. To date, no response has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed.”

The court also directed Respondents to provide Petitioner’s current address and to indicate whether they had “complied” with the Dec. 23 order barring removal from the United States or transfer out of the district. The order directed the Clerk to serve the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Assistant U.S. Attorney Kimberly A. Sanchez by email.

Respondents filed their show-cause response the same day, attributing the missed deadline to “an oversight in the office’s record-keeping concerning cases that did not have a TRO or preliminary injunction deadline,” stated that the office had taken remedial steps, including adding new personnel to address the high volume of immigration-detention cases in the district, and apologized through undersigned counsel on behalf of the office. Respondents also stated in the response that Petitioner had been removed from the United States on Dec. 19, 2025, on a charter flight to Vietnam, before the court entered its Dec. 23 no-transfer order.

On Feb. 12, Judge Grosjean recommended dismissal as moot because Petitioner was no longer in federal immigration custody and had not been subjected to the challenged third-country removal policy. In doing so, the court relied on the removal records Respondents had attached to their OSC response, reading those records differently from Respondents’ narrative description. The court wrote that Respondents’ evidence “indicates that Petitioner was removed to Laos on December 16, 2025,” citing entries showing that Petitioner was “Removed to LAOS” and that the final destination was “VLVT,” which the court identified as Wattay International Airport in Laos. On the court’s reading of Respondents’ own evidence, Petitioner had been removed to his country of removal on Dec. 16—after the habeas petition was filed, but before the Dec. 23 no-transfer order. The court discharged the show-cause order and declined sanctions.

On Mar. 19, Judge Sherriff conducted de novo review, adopted the findings and recommendations in full, dismissed the petition as moot, and directed the Clerk to close the case. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to comply with a court order requiring a response to Petitioner’s amended habeas petition, which raised new re-detention and third-country removal claims after the court found he had “presented serious questions concerning the legality of his re-detention.” After more than 30 days passed without a response, Judge Oberto ordered Respondents to show cause why sanctions should not issue for “failure to comply with a court order” and required a status report on whether Petitioner had been removed or remained in custody. Respondents later reported that Petitioner had been removed to Laos on Jan. 12, 2026, and the case was ultimately dismissed as moot after Judge Thurston adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations.

Petitioner Eng Leukhumphan, an immigration detainee proceeding pro se, filed a habeas petition on Dec. 5, 2025, challenging his immigration detention without a bond hearing. On Dec. 9, Magistrate Judge Oberto initially recommended summary dismissal without prejudice, finding that Petitioner’s approximately one-month detention did not yet qualify as unreasonably prolonged. The court also denied appointment of counsel.

On Dec. 22, Petitioner filed a first amended petition and renewed counsel motion. The amended petition added claims that potential removal to a third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to contest removal violated the Fifth Amendment, the INA, the Convention Against Torture, and implementing regulations; that third-country removal would constitute banishment; and that re-detention without changed circumstances, proof of significant likelihood of removal, notice of revocation reasons, or an informal interview violated statutory and constitutional protections.

On Jan. 9, Judge Oberto vacated the earlier summary-dismissal recommendation. The court found that Petitioner had “presented serious questions concerning the legality of his re-detention,” denied appointment of counsel without prejudice, and ordered Respondents to show cause within 30 days why the petition should not be granted. The court directed Respondents to include Petitioner’s A-file or relevant portions and all other documentation relevant to the issues raised. The court also ordered the parties to notify the court if Petitioner was released from ICE custody while the petition was pending.

Respondents did not comply within the 30-day period. On Feb. 11, Judge Oberto ordered Respondents “to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to comply with a court order,” writing that “Respondents were granted thirty (30) days to respond. Over thirty (30) days have passed, and Respondents have not complied.” The order required Respondents, within ten days, to explain why sanctions should not issue and to notify the court whether Petitioner had been removed or remained in custody. Judge Oberto also noted that the Jan. 9 order served on Petitioner had been returned as “Undeliverable-Not in Custody” and that, if Petitioner had been removed, the case “would appear to be moot.”

On Feb. 20, Respondents filed a status report indicating that Petitioner had been removed to Laos and was no longer in custody. On Mar. 9, Judge Oberto recommended dismissal as moot. The court stated that Petitioner had requested immediate release from indefinite detention, but Respondents submitted that he had been removed to Laos on Jan. 12, 2026 by chartered flight. Because Petitioner was no longer in custody and the court could provide no further relief on the petition, Judge Oberto recommended dismissal as moot.

On Apr. 5, Judge Thurston conducted de novo review, adopted the findings and recommendations in full, dismissed the petition as moot, and directed entry of judgment and closure of the case. The final order described Petitioner as a former immigration detainee and held that, because he had been removed from the United States and was no longer in Respondents’ custody, the petition was moot. Judgment was later entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ repeated failure to comply with court-ordered response deadlines in a pro se immigration habeas case: after Respondents failed to answer or move to dismiss by the Jan. 27 order’s deadline, Judge Kim gave them a second deadline and warned that failure to respond could be treated as non-opposition to habeas relief; when Respondents again failed to respond, she ordered them to show cause why sanctions should not issue. Judge Kim later vacated the OSC for good cause after Respondents filed a response and motion to dismiss, but also found that Respondents had failed to serve those filings on Petitioner, ordered proof of service, and later required additional records after finding the record insufficient. Judge Calabretta ultimately adopted Judge Kim’s findings and recommendations in full, granted the petition, ordered immediate release, required return of any documents in Respondents’ custody, and barred re-detention absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing with the government bearing the clear-and-convincing burden.

Petitioner Romilio Ramirez Rodriguez, a native of Cuba proceeding pro se, entered the United States without inspection in July 2022. He was detained by CBP inside the United States and released on his own recognizance on July 4, 2022 under § 1226. He was placed in standard § 240 removal proceedings and later applied for asylum. In November 2025, after a local arrest on cocaine-possession and resisting-arrest charges that the prosecution later dismissed, ICE re-detained him. He filed his habeas petition on Jan. 20, 2026 while detained at Golden State Annex in McFarland, California.

On Jan. 27, Magistrate Judge Kim ordered Respondents to file an answer or motion to dismiss within seven days. Respondents did not do so. On Feb. 11, Judge Kim ordered Respondents to file an answer or motion to dismiss by 5:00 p.m. on Feb. 12, writing, “As of the filing of this order on February 11, 2026, respondents have not filed an answer or motion to dismiss.” The courtwarned that if no filing was made by that deadline, the failure would be construed as non-opposition to the requested habeas relief. Respondents again did not respond. On Feb. 13, Judge Kim ordered Respondents to “show cause why sanctions should not issue for respondents’ failure to respond to the Court’s orders filed 1/27/2026 and 2/11/2026 directing respondents to respond to the petition.” The docket reflected that AUSA Edward Olsen was copied on the OSC.

Respondents filed an OSC response and motion to dismiss on Feb. 15. On Feb. 17, Judge Kim vacated the OSC for good cause, but noted that “respondents failed to serve a copy of their response and motion to dismiss on petitioner, who is proceeding pro se.” The court ordered Respondents to file a certificate of service confirming that they had served Petitioner with the OSC response, motion to dismiss, and exhibits, and reminded Petitioner that his opposition was due ten days after service. Respondents filed the certificate of service the same day.

On Mar. 5, Judge Kim found the record insufficient to determine the issues presented and ordered Respondents to submit “any and all Notices to Appear, release orders, and supervision orders” by 5:00 p.m. on Mar. 6. Respondents filed the supplemental materials and a supplemental brief on Mar. 6.

On Mar. 10, Judge Kim recommended granting habeas relief. She rejected Respondents’ § 1225(b) theory, finding that Petitioner was detained under § 1226(a) because he had been expressly released on his own recognizance under that provision, had lived in the United States for more than three years after release, and was not arrested upon arrival. The court also noted that Respondents identified § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), an expedited-removal provision, as the statutory detention basis, but that the reference “appears to be in error” because Respondents’ argument was actually based on § 1225(b)(2)(A), and because Petitioner’s NTA placed him in standard, not expedited, removal proceedings.

Judge Kim held that Petitioner’s prior release created a protected liberty interest and that due process required a pre-deprivation hearing before re-detention. The court found that Petitioner had lived out of custody for more than three years and had a strong liberty interest in continued release, that the risk of erroneous deprivation was high because no neutral arbiter had determined whether he was a flight risk or danger, and that the government’s interest in detaining him without a hearing was low because detention hearings are routine and impose minimal cost. The court recommended immediate release, return of any documents in Respondents’ custody, and an injunction barring re-detention unless the government first proved by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker that Petitioner was a flight risk or danger.

On Mar. 11, Judge Calabretta conducted de novo review, adopted the findings and recommendations in full, granted the petition, denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss and request for a stay, and ordered Respondents to immediately release Petitioner. The district court also ordered Respondents to return Petitioner’s documents at the time of release if they had custody of them and enjoined Respondents from re-detaining him unless the government made the required clear-and-convincing showing at a pre-deprivation bond hearing. Judge Calabretta did not require a separate status report. Judgment entered the same day.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ missed initial response deadline after Magistrate Judge Grosjean ordered them to respond to the petition within thirty days. After the deadline passed, the court wrote that “to date, no response has been filed” and granted Respondents “a single sua sponte extension.” Judge Thurston later granted habeas relief and ordered a constitutionally compliant bond hearing or release. Although the case later produced a sanctions show-cause order over alleged bond-hearing noncompliance, Judge Thurston ultimately discharged that OSC and denied enforcement after finding that Respondents had provided “a constitutionally adequate bond hearing in compliance with this Court’s prior habeas order,” and that Petitioner’s counsel’s contrary allegations were “at best deeply uninformed, and at worst, purposefully misleading.”

Petitioner Sehajveer Singh, an Indian national, alleged that he fled India after being threatened by the Bharatiya Janata Party because of his political beliefs and sought humanitarian protection in the United States. On Apr. 8, 2023, he entered the United States without inspection near San Ysidro, California, where Customs and Border Protection encountered him. He was served with a notice to appear charging him as a noncitizen present without admission or parole, and later released on his own recognizance subject to Alternatives to Detention reporting requirements. On Mar. 26, 2025, Fresno County sheriff’s deputies arrested him for reckless driving, but he was not convicted of that offense. On Nov. 22, 2025, ICE arrested and detained him for multiple alleged ATD violations, including a failed virtual home visit and multiple missed biometric check-ins.

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Jan. 10, 2026, challenging his re-detention on due process grounds. On Jan. 13, Magistrate Judge Grosjean ordered Respondents to respond within thirty days. On Feb. 13, after the Feb. 12 response deadline had passed, the court wrote that “to date, no response has been filed” and granted Respondents “a single sua sponte extension.” The court ordered Respondents to file a response within seven days and directed the clerk to serve the order by email on the U.S. Attorney’s Office and an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Respondents filed their response later that same day.

On Mar. 20, Judge Thurston granted habeas relief, writing that courts had “overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ new legal position” that Petitioner was mandatorily detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that Respondents “offer little to rebut Petitioner’s due process claim and do not provide any justification for detaining Petitioner.” The court ordered Respondents within 14 days either to provide a substantive bond hearing at which “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence” that Petitioner was a flight risk or danger, or release him. EOIR held the hearing on Mar. 26 and denied bond. After Petitioner moved to enforce, alleging lack of notice and exclusion from the hearing, Judge Thurston entered an Apr. 14 show-cause order as to why sanctions should not issue “for failing to comply with this Court’s prior order.” But on May 13, the court discharged the OSC and denied enforcement, finding that Respondents had “demonstrate[d] to the Court that Petitioner received a constitutionally adequate bond hearing in compliance with this Court’s prior habeas order,” and that Petitioner's counsel’s contrary allegations were “at best deeply uninformed, and at worst, purposefully misleading.”

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to comply with Magistrate Judge Baker’s order requiring an opposition or statement of non-opposition to Petitioner’s pseudonym motion, followed by an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. After Respondents missed the Dec. 8 deadline, Judge Baker wrote that “Respondents have failed to timely comply with the Court’s order” and ordered them “to show cause” why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to comply with the court’s order and the Local Rules, warning that “[f]ailure to timely comply with this Order will result in the imposition of sanctions.” Respondents responded the same day, and Judge Baker discharged the OSC after finding good cause and concluding that counsel’s conduct was “the result of excusable neglect.” Separately, Judge Thurston granted preliminary relief in part, later adopted Judge Baker’s findings and recommendations, and granted the habeas petition in part on procedural-due-process grounds.

Petitioner E.A.P.C., a citizen and national of Venezuela who alleged that he fled political persecution after refusing military orders to fire on civilians, entered the United States near Yuma, Arizona in November 2021, was apprehended by DHS, and was released on an order of recognizance around Dec. 1, 2021. His release included ATD/ISAP supervision. He later lived in California, had work authorization, worked as a mechanic and delivery driver, and had a pending asylum application. ICE arrested him on Oct. 23, 2025 when he reported to the ICE office in Stockton for a scheduled visit, and later transferred him to Mesa Verde.

On Nov. 12, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. On Nov. 13, Judge Thurston reviewed the habeas petition and emergency motion, found that Petitioner might be able to show success on his due-process claim, and ordered Respondents to show cause why the TRO should not be granted. The court also ordered that, pending further order, Respondents “shall not remove Petitioner from the United States nor transfer Petitioner out of this District,” citing the All Writs Act and the need to preserve jurisdiction. Respondents filed an opposition on Nov. 18, and Petitioner replied on Nov. 20.

On Nov. 25, Judge Thurston converted the TRO motion into a preliminary-injunction motion by agreement of the parties and granted preliminary relief in part. The court found that Respondents relied on an incorrect interpretation of § 1225, and rejected the government’s position that Petitioner’s detention was mandatory under § 1225(b)(2). The court distinguished cases involving noncitizens who had never been processed by immigration officials, emphasizing that Petitioner had been processed, released on recognizance, and placed into § 240 removal proceedings before the government adopted its new detention theory. Even assuming Respondents’ new § 1225 interpretation were correct going forward, the court concluded it did not apply retroactively to Petitioner such that his detention was “mandatory.”

Judge Thurston also found that Petitioner had shown a likely procedural-due-process violation. She reasoned that Respondents “fail[ed] to contend with the liberty interest created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance in November 2021, prior to the manifestation of this interpretation.” Applying Mathews, the court found that Petitioner had a substantial private liberty interest after roughly four years out of custody, that there was at least some risk of erroneous deprivation because the record raised questions about whether detention was justified, and that the government’s interest in detaining him without proper process was slight. The court ordered a substantive parole-revocation hearing by Dec. 9, at which an immigration judge would determine whether Petitioner posed a flight risk or danger if released, with the government required to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence.

On Dec. 2, Judge Baker ordered Respondents to file, by Dec. 8, either an opposition or statement of non-opposition to Petitioner’s motion to proceed by pseudonym.

Respondents did not do so. On Dec. 10, Magistrate Judge Baker wrote that “Respondents have failed to timely comply with the Court’s order” and ordered them “to show cause” within two days “why sanctions should not be imposed for their failure to comply with the Court's order and the Local Rules.” The court made clear that “[t]he filing by that same deadline of an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the pending motion to proceed via pseudonym will not relieve Respondents of showing cause in writing why sanctions should not be imposed,” adding, “Failure to timely comply with this Order will result in the imposition of sanctions.” Respondents filed an OSC response the same day. On Dec. 11, Judge Baker discharged the OSC for good cause and imposed no sanctions, concluding “that [Respondent’s] counsel’s conduct … is the result of excusable neglect.” The court separately granted Petitioner’s unopposed request to proceed by pseudonym.

On Jan. 6, in his findings and recommendations (F&Rs), Magistrate Judge Baker recommended granting the petition in part. Because the government filed a notice stating that it did not intend to submit further merits briefing, Judge Baker treated the government’s preliminary-injunction opposition as its merits argument. The F&R recommended granting relief only on Petitioner’s procedural-due-process claim. It reasoned that the government stood on arguments already rejected in the preliminary-injunction order, that Petitioner was not subject to mandatory detention under Respondents’ § 1225 theory, and that the government had not rebutted the procedural-due-process claim.

Judge Baker recommended denying the substantive-due-process claim. Although Petitioner argued that immigration detention without danger or flight-risk justification had become punitive, the F&R found that the record included evidence of ISAP reporting violations and Petitioner’s acknowledgment that noncompliance could result in arrest or detention. On that record, Judge Baker concluded that Petitioner had not shown that detention served no regulatory purpose or was excessive in relation to that purpose.

Respondents objected but incorporated their prior mandatory-detention position and raised no new argument. On Jan. 29, Judge Thurston conducted de novo review, found the F&R “supported by the record and by proper analysis,” adopted it in full, granted the petition in part only as to the procedural-due-process claim, and directed the Clerk to close the case. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved multiple court-identified compliance failures: Respondent missed the answer/return deadline; Respondents transferred Petitioner to El Paso, Texas, “despite Court order not to transfer Petitioner;" and, after habeas relief issued, Respondents’ status reports did not “certify compliance” with the order requiring a due-process-compliant opportunity to be heard on fear-based claims before an immigration judge. The court first gave Respondent “another opportunity to respond,” while warning that further failure would cause Petitioner’s request for relief to be treated as unopposed. After the transfer, Judge Nunley ordered Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt, ordered them to immediately return Petitioner to a detention facility in the Eastern District of California, and later noted that the court still had not received a notice of compliance with that return order. Judge Nunley ultimately granted habeas relief, barred removal to Laos unless Petitioner first received “a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his fear-based claims before an immigration judge in compliance with due process,” and later found that Respondents had continued detaining Petitioner for nearly a month and a half without providing that process before imposing a seven-day hearing-or-release deadline.

Petitioner Saysouk Maharaj, a 46-year-old man born in Nongkhai Refugee Camp in Thailand, first arrived in the United States in 1982 with his parents as refugees. His parents, who are of Laotian descent, and his siblings are now U.S. citizens, but Petitioner has no claim to citizenship in any country. In 2014, he was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia in Hawaii and imprisoned until 2019. While serving that sentence, he was placed in removal proceedings, applied pro se for asylum, and was ordered removed to Thailand; Thailand later refused to accept him because there was no evidence of citizenship. After later periods of criminal custody in Arizona and elsewhere, ICE took him into immigration detention immediately upon his release from incarceration in October 2025 and detained him at California City Detention Center. On Jan. 24, 2026, ICE notified him of its intent to remove him to Laos.

Petitioner filed this habeas petition on Jan. 26, and filed a first amended petition on Mar. 3 challenging the lawfulness of his civil detention and seeking immediate release or, in the alternative, a bond hearing. On Jan. 29, the court ordered Respondent to show cause within seven days why the writ should not be granted, directed the response to address Nguyen v. Charles, and barred transfer outside the district pending further order to preserve jurisdiction. On Feb. 11, after Respondents failed to file a response, the court wrote: “Respondent has not filed an answer/return and the time to do so has expired.” However, “[i]n order to ensure a full record,” the court allowed Respondents “another opportunity to respond and is directed to file an answer/return by February 18,” but stressed: “If Respondent fails to file a timely answer/return, the undersigned will construe petitioner's request for relief as unopposed.”

Respondent answered the amended petition on Mar. 10. On Mar. 16, Petitioner filed an emergency enforcement request alleging that Respondents had transferred him to El Paso, Texas, despite the court’s order not to transfer him. On Mar. 17, Judge Nunley ordered:

“(1) by noon on March 18, 2026, Respondents must show cause why Respondents should not be held in contempt for violating the Court's January 26, 2026 Order; (2) Respondents shall immediately, but no later than March 19, 2026, return Petitioner to a detention facility within the Eastern District of California; and (3) by March 20, 2026, Respondents shall file a notice of compliance with the Court's order to return Petitioner.”

The court further ordered Respondents not to remove Petitioner from the United States pending further order. Judge Nunley later required verification of Respondents’ removal assertions. In their answer, Respondents contended that “ICE received approval to deport [P]etitioner to Laos.” But, as the court noted on Mar. 19, Petitioner argued in reply that Respondents had not produced a travel document, a repatriation agreement, or confirmation from the Lao government. Judge Nunley ordered Respondents to provide same-day supplemental briefing on the status of any travel documents and the identities of any entities that had approved travel documents for Petitioner. The court required that any supplemental filing include a copy of the travel document and evidence that a travel document had been approved. Respondents then filed a supplemental brief with a deportation officer declaration and a Lao laissez-passer.

On Mar. 25, Judge Nunley granted the amended habeas petition. On Petitioner’s transfer to Texas, the court wrote:

“Despite Court order not to transfer Petitioner, Respondents transferred Petitioner to El Paso, TX. After the Court issues an order to show cause, Respondents contend Petitioner is being returned to a detention facility in California. The Court has yet to receive a notice of compliance with the Court’s order to return Petitioner to a detention facility within the Eastern District of California.”

The court noted that Respondents had provided notice of intent to remove Petitioner to Laos and had produced a travel document from the Laotian government. Petitioner’s original Zadvydas claim had rested on Respondents’ failure to produce travel documents; after Respondents produced a travel document, Petitioner appeared to concede that removal was reasonably foreseeable and narrowed his requested relief to a fear interview before any removal to Laos.

Judge Nunley held that Respondents’ third-country removal procedures, as applied to Petitioner, violated due process. The court explained that noncitizens may not be removed to countries where their life or freedom would be threatened on protected grounds or where it is more likely than not that they would be tortured if removed. Although Respondents had notified Petitioner of their intent to remove him to Laos, the court found “nothing in the record indicating Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to assert fear-based protections claims with respect to Laos.” Judge Nunley therefore held that, without that opportunity, Respondents’ third-country removal procedures violated Petitioner’s due-process rights.

As relief, Judge Nunley again ordered Respondents to immediately return Petitioner to a detention facility within the Eastern District of California. The court granted the first amended habeas petition and temporarily enjoined and restrained Respondents and those acting with them from removing Petitioner to Laos until they first allowed him “a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his fear-based claims before an immigration judge in compliance with due process.” The court directed the clerk to enter judgment for Petitioner and close the case.

On Mar. 26 and Mar. 27, Respondents filed status reports, but the court later found that none certified compliance with the Mar. 25 order. On Apr. 24, the court ordered Respondents to file a notice of compliance by May 1, explaining that they had not certified that Petitioner had received “a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his fear-based claims before an immigration judge in compliance with due process.” “The Court is in receipt in Respondents’ status reports, none of which certify compliance with the Court's March 24, 2026 Order,” the court emphasized.

Respondents’ May 1 status report stated that Petitioner had not received an opportunity to assert his fear-based claims before an IJ because of “the lack of an existing procedure for presenting” such claims. On May 6, noting that “Respondents have continued to detain Petitioner for nearly a month and a half after the Court's March 25, 2026 without providing him a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his fear based claims as directed,” the court enjoined Respondents from continuing detention for more than seven days unless Petitioner received a due-process-compliant hearing before an immigration judge, required a post-hearing status report, and barred re-arrest or re-detention after release absent constitutional protections, including seven days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. On May 13, Respondents filed a notice of compliance.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to provide the court-ordered A-file materials and records supporting alleged supervised-release violations, followed by a sanctions show-cause order after Judge Thurston found they had “not complied” with her production order and noted that “these same Respondents and the US Attorneys Office representing them, have failed repeatedly to comply with similar orders of this Court.” Respondents opposed TRO relief using an I-213 and declaration but did not produce the relevant A-file materials the court had ordered, then sought reconsideration on the ground that full A-file production was burdensome. Judge Thurston denied reconsideration, clarified that she had ordered production only of relevant documents, and directed Respondents either to produce “every document or screen shot, as necessary,” or show cause why sanctions should not be imposed on them and their attorneys. In granting preliminary-injunction relief, the court again identified the noncompliance, noting that Respondents had provided only the I-213, reported that the physical A-file was inaccessible, and “offer[ed] no explanation” for how they had produced the I-213 if that was so. The court granted a seven-day extension to produce the records and separately ordered a substantive parole-revocation hearing, with the government bearing the clear-and-convincing burden to justify detention.

Petitioner J.E.H.G., a citizen and national of Peru, entered the United States near Eagle Pass, Texas, in November 2022 and was placed in removal proceedings in December 2022. Immigration officials released her on recognizance and parole, enrolled her in ISAP, and placed her in standard removal proceedings. Petitioner alleged she diligently complied with ICE office check-ins and mobile-app reporting, while Respondents alleged a series of missed self-report check-ins and outside-zone check-ins. Petitioner lived in Turlock, California with her parents and brother, had employment authorization, a driver’s license, a Social Security card, no criminal record, and a pending asylum application with a final hearing date in 2028. ICE arrested her during a scheduled Stockton field-office visit on or about Oct. 25, 2025 for alleged ISAP noncompliance.

Petitioner filed her habeas petition, TRO application, and motion to proceed under pseudonym on Nov. 30. On Dec. 1, Judge Thurston ordered Respondents to show cause by Dec. 4 why TRO relief should not issue and required any response to provide “all referenced/relevant portions of Petitioner’s A-File and other supporting documents,” including available records documenting the alleged supervised-release violations. The court also barred Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States or transferring her out of the district pending further order, citing the All Writs Act and the need to protect the court’s jurisdiction.

Respondents opposed the TRO on Dec. 4, relying on a declaration and an I-213, but did not provide the A-file materials the court had ordered. On Dec. 7, Judge Thurston denied Respondents’ request for reconsideration, explaining that the court had ordered production “only [of] relevant” A-file documents, “not the litany of records they discuss in their current motion.” Judge Thurston further underscored “that these same Respondents and the US Attorneys Office representing them, have failed repeatedly to comply with similar orders of this Court.” The court ordered Respondents, by 5:00 p.m. on Dec. 8, to “comply with the Court's order and produce every document or screen shot, as necessary, or show cause in writing why sanctions should not be imposed on each of them and their attorneys for their failure to comply with the Court's order.”

Respondents filed a response on Dec. 8. In the Dec. 9 preliminary-injunction order, Judge Thurston noted Respondent's noncompliance, writing:

“The Court ordered Respondents to provide copies of all portions of the A-file relied upon in their opposition. Rather than do so, Respondents provide only a copy of the I-213 and, upon further order of the Court, report that the physical A-file in [sic] inaccessible at this time, and they request seven days to comply (Doc. 14). They offer no explanation for why, if this is the case, how they were able to provide a copy of the I-213.”

The court further granted the “request for a seven-day extension of time to comply with the Court orders” by producing the records, directing Respondents to also “detail how A-files are maintained and attesting, in particular, to the fact that the A-file is not kept electronically.”

On the merits, Judge Thurston converted the TRO request into a preliminary-injunction motion by agreement of the parties and granted it in part. The court rejected Respondents’ reliance on § 1225(b) mandatory detention as applied to Petitioner, reasoning that she had been present in the United States for about three years, had been released before Respondents adopted their new interpretation, and had been placed in § 240 proceedings. Even if Respondents’ new § 1225 reading were correct going forward, the court concluded, it did not make detention mandatory here. Judge Thurston also found that due process required a hearing before parole revocation. Applying Mathews, the court emphasized Petitioner’s liberty interest in remaining out of custody, the prior release determination that she was not a flight risk or danger, and the need for a neutral factfinder to decide whether the alleged ISAP violations justified detention. The court ordered a substantive parole-revocation hearing by Dec. 22, 2025, at which the government would bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence to show flight risk or danger, and referred the petition for prompt further consideration.

On Dec. 16, the parties stipulated to dismissal without prejudice. On Jan. 5, Judge Thurston dismissed the case as moot under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and directed the Clerk to close the case.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to comply with court orders protecting Petitioner’s identifying information, followed by a sanctions OSC after Respondents failed to timely refile corrected exhibits with the required redactions. Magistrate Judge Boone first struck Respondents’ exhibits after finding they contained “numerous instances of unredacted material that violate the Court’s July 2, 2025 order,” then later ordered Respondents to “show cause why sanctions should not be imposed” because “[m]ore than two weeks” had passed and they still had not submitted Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 6 with appropriate redactions. Judge Thurston later adopted Judge Boone’s merits findings and granted habeas relief, requiring an individualized bond hearing at which “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond.” After the immigration judge denied bond, however, Judge Thurston denied Petitioner’s motion to enforce and TRO request, concluding that Petitioner had not shown Respondents or the immigration judge failed to comply with the habeas order.

Petitioner Loba L.M., a transgender woman and longtime lawful permanent resident, came to the United States from El Salvador in 2008 at age twelve. In 2020, she was convicted of lewd act on a child under fourteen and possession of child pornography and received concurrent prison terms of six years and one year. The California Board of Parole Hearings found her suitable for early release, and she was released from state custody one year early in November 2023. DHS initiated removal proceedings on Jan. 17, 2024, charging her as removable based on an aggravated felony conviction, and ICE detained her the same day. Petitioner later sought CAT protection; after the immigration judge denied relief and found her removable, she appealed to the BIA. She filed this § 2241 habeas petition on May 22, 2025, challenging prolonged mandatory detention under § 1226(c) without an individualized bond hearing.

Early in the case, Judge Boone granted Petitioner’s motion to proceed under initials and chosen name. The Jul. 2, 2025, order permitted Petitioner to proceed as Loba L.M. and ordered Respondents to use “Loba L.M.,” “Loba,” or “Mx. L.M.” in place of Petitioner’s legal name, and to redact from exhibits her full legal name, most digits of identifying numbers, street addresses, last names of family members, and case numbers linked to her full legal name. On Aug. 1, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss with exhibits. Petitioner moved to strike or seal, arguing that the exhibits contained unredacted material that violated the Jul. 2 order.

On Aug. 12, Judge Boone granted Petitioner’s motion to strike. The court found good cause to strike Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 6 from Respondents’ motion to dismiss, directed the clerk to remove them from the docket, and ordered Respondents, within seven days, to refile the evidence with appropriate redactions in compliance with Rule 5.2(a) and the Jul. 2 pseudonym/redaction order.

Respondents did not refile the corrected exhibits within that deadline. On Aug. 29, Judge Boone ordered Respondents to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. The court recounted the July 2 redaction order, the Aug. 12 strike order, and the seven-day refiling deadline, then wrote that “[m]ore than two weeks have passed since the August 12, 2025 order, and Respondents still have not submitted Exhibits 1, 3, 4, and 6 with the appropriate redactions.” Citing Local Rule 110, the court ordered Respondents, within seven days, to “show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failure to comply with this Court’s August 12, 2025 order,” and to refile the exhibits with appropriate redactions.

Respondents filed a response to the sanctions OSC and refiled exhibits on Sept. 5. Petitioner again moved to strike the refiled exhibits, and Respondents also moved to strike. On Sept. 15, Judge Boone granted Petitioner’s motion in part, granted Respondents’ motion, struck Exhibits 1, 3, and 4 from the record without prejudice, and directed the clerk to remove those exhibits from the docket.

On Oct. 16, in his findings and recommendations (F&Rs) Judge Boone recommended granting habeas relief. He concluded that prolonged mandatory detention under § 1226(c) without an individualized bond hearing can violate due process and applied the three-factor test from Lopez v. Garland: total detention length, likely future duration, and delays caused by the petitioner or the government. Judge Boone found that Petitioner had been detained for approximately twenty-one months, a period beyond what courts have generally tolerated without a bond hearing. He also found future detention likely to remain lengthy because the BIA appeal was pending and further proceedings or Ninth Circuit review could add months or years.

On delay, Judge Boone rejected Respondents’ broader attempt to attribute the immigration-case timeline to Petitioner. He noted that Petitioner requested only two continuances: one to seek counsel and one for counsel to obtain information necessary to enter pleadings. Other continuances were attributable to the immigration judge’s scheduling or the evidentiary structure of the CAT proceedings. Judge Boone also noted Petitioner’s counsel’s declaration that the immigration judge took hours questioning witnesses, that hearings were often set nearly two months apart, and that the number of merits hearings and delay was “nearly unprecedented” in counsel’s experience representing detained clients. Judge Boone therefore found the delay factor also weighed in Petitioner’s favor and recommended that Respondent provide an initial bond hearing.

On Nov. 14, Judge Thurston adopted the F&Rs in full after de novo review. She noted that Petitioner had been in immigration custody under § 1226(c) for approximately twenty-two months without an individualized bond hearing and that no party objected to the F&R. Judge Thurston granted the petition, denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition, dismissed all respondents other than facility administrator Tonya Andrews, and ordered Respondent to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing within thirty days before an immigration judge. The court required that the hearing comply with Singh v. Holder and that “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond.” The order further directed the immigration judge, if Petitioner was found not dangerous and not so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond, to consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances and alternatives to detention.

The immigration court first scheduled a custody redetermination hearing for Nov. 24. According to the later district-court order, Petitioner’s counsel asserted that her EOIR appearance remained in “submitted” status but was not accepted for several days, that no hearing notice was attached in ECAS, and that neither Petitioner nor counsel received proper notice of the Nov. 24 hearing. Petitioner appeared pro se at that hearing and told the immigration judge that neither she nor her attorney had proper notice. The immigration judge continued the hearing to Dec. 1. Petitioner’s counsel then appeared and moved for another one-week continuance, which the immigration judge denied.

At the Dec. 1 custody hearing, Petitioner’s counsel argued that the lack of notice and denial of a further continuance violated due process because counsel had only one business day before the Thanksgiving holiday to notify experts and prepare witness testimony. Petitioner submitted more than 400 pages of evidence addressing dangerousness and flight risk, including declarations from supporters, a psychological evaluation, rehabilitation and education records, recidivism materials, and release-plan evidence. DHS submitted removal records, conviction records, an FBI RAP sheet, Megan’s Law website materials, and authorities on prosecutorial discretion and competency.

On Dec. 15, the immigration judge denied bond. The IJ acknowledged that the district court had required an individualized hearing at which DHS “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or danger to the community to justify the denial of bond.” The IJ also stated that DHS bore the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s release would pose a present danger or that her flight risk was too high to mitigate through bond or other conditions. The IJ nevertheless denied bond, finding that DHS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that release would pose a danger to the community and separately that Petitioner was such a significant flight risk that no bond or non-monetary conditions would sufficiently mitigate the risk.

Petitioner appealed to the BIA and, on Jan. 21, moved in district court to enforce the habeas order and for a TRO seeking immediate release. She argued that the bond hearing did not comply with the court’s order because the IJ failed to demonstrate impartiality, misapplied the legal standard, violated due process through notice and continuance defects, and did not hold the government to its burden.

On Mar. 13, Judge Thurston denied the motion to enforce and the request for a TRO, while noting that “Respondents did not file a timely opposition.” The court began by recognizing its authority to review compliance with a prior habeas order and excused exhaustion because Petitioner alleged ongoing irreparable harm from continued detention. But Judge Thurston held that the asserted procedural defects did not warrant enforcement relief. The court emphasized that its earlier order required a hearing within thirty days and the clear-and-convincing standard, but did not specify when or how notice had to be provided or require the Assistant U.S. Attorney in the habeas case to notify Petitioner of a hearing in immigration court. The court further found that Petitioner had not shown prejudice because she did not identify the specific expert testimony or evidence that additional time would have produced, and counsel had filed more than 400 pages of supporting evidence and demonstrated familiarity with the record. The court concluded that Petitioner had not shown Respondents or the IJ failed to comply with the habeas order on this ground.

Judge Thurston also rejected Petitioner’s argument that the IJ’s use of generic bond-hearing language showed failure to apply the clear-and-convincing standard. The court acknowledged that the same immigration judge had inserted similar boilerplate about “extremely broad discretion” in another matter, but held that boilerplate alone was not determinative absent additional indications of abuse of discretion. Judge Thurston wrote that the court “declines to infer noncompliance on the part of an IJ where there appears to be a good faith effort to comply with this Court’s mandate.” The court added important limiting language: “this does not relieve the government of its obligation to meet the clear and convincing burden, nor does it permit IJs to rely on talismanic language in lieu of proper analysis.” Still, Judge Thurston concluded that Petitioner had not demonstrated that Respondents or the immigration judge failed to comply with the court’s order.

Finally, Judge Thurston rejected the argument that the IJ failed to consider probative evidence. The court noted that an IJ need not cite every piece of evidence and that the bond memorandum stated the IJ had carefully considered all evidence. Judge Thurston held that Petitioner’s arguments largely challenged the IJ’s weighing of evidence, which the habeas court could not second-guess on enforcement review. Because the court found no clear legal error or unsupported decision sufficient to show noncompliance with the habeas order, it denied enforcement and denied the TRO request for immediate release.

This habeas case involved Respondent’s failure to comply with two court orders requiring a consent-or-decline form, prompting Magistrate Judge Oberto to issue an OSC as to sanctions before granting habeas relief in part. The court later discharged the OSC after Respondent filed the form and counsel explained that the orders had been overlooked, but Judge Oberto “strongly emphasize[d] the need to stay apprised of court orders” and noted that “[f]our court orders, along with the time and work expended, could have been avoided had the first order been properly handled.” On the merits, Judge Oberto held that Petitioner’s more than five years of mandatory immigration detention without a bond hearing violated procedural due process and ordered a bond hearing within 30 days or release on appropriate supervision conditions.

Petitioner Prince Joseph Peters, a native and citizen of Liberia, entered the United States as a refugee. He had several criminal convictions, including assault, forgery, larceny, and assault/making terroristic threats, and received early release on parole. DHS issued a warrant for his arrest and an NTA on Feb. 19, 2020, charged him as removable based on his criminal history, and detained him under the mandatory-detention provision of INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). He remained continuously detained from Feb. 19, 2020 onward. After an immigration judge ordered him removed to Liberia and the BIA affirmed, Petitioner later moved to reopen. The BIA stayed removal and, in September 2024, reopened and remanded the case. In June 2025, the immigration judge again ordered him removed.

Petitioner filed his § 2241 habeas petition on Apr. 29, 2025, arguing that his prolonged mandatory detention without a bond hearing violated procedural due process and seeking a bond hearing at which the government would justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. He also filed an application for an order to show cause within 14 days under § 2243. On May 6, Judge Oberto denied that request, explaining that Habeas Rule 4 permits the court to set a response deadline beyond the strict § 2243 timeline and that, in this district, 60 days is generally used in habeas cases, with 45 days set here because the case involved immigration detention.

On Apr. 29, the court ordered the parties to file either a consent or decline to magistrate jurisdiction by Jun. 2. Petitioner complied. On Jun. 20, after noting that the earlier response order had not directed Respondent to complete the form, Judge Oberto ordered the Clerk to mail Respondent a consent/decline form and directed Respondent to complete and return it within 14 days. Respondent still did not comply. On Aug. 7, Judge Oberto issued an order to show cause, writing that Respondent had failed to comply with both the Apr. 29 order and the renewed June 20 order, and directed Respondent to show cause within 10 days “why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to comply with court orders.”

On Aug. 8, Judge Oberto issued findings and recommendations (F&Rs), noting the same noncompliance at the outset. She wrote that Respondent “failed to comply with both the April 29, 2025, order, as well as the renewed order of June 20, 2025,” and that she would address sanctions by separate order but, because “time is of the essence,” would proceed with assignment and merits recommendations. Judge Oberto recommended denying Respondent’s motion to dismiss, granting the petition in part, and directing Respondent to provide a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

On the merits, Judge Oberto found that Petitioner had been detained for approximately five years and five months under § 1226(c). Applying Mathews, the court found Petitioner’s private interest in freedom from prolonged detention substantial and distinguished cases where a petitioner had already received a bond hearing. Judge Oberto also found that Petitioner’s private interest was not diminished by his own litigation conduct. Although some early removal-proceeding delay was tied to Petitioner’s continuances or pleading issues, the court found that most of the period after Dec. 2020 was attributable to government inaction or agency delay: nothing apparent in the record prevented removal between the BIA’s Dec. 2020 affirmance and the Nov. 2021 stay, and after the stay issued, the case “languished before the BIA for almost 3 years” until the BIA acted in September 2024.

Judge Oberto further found that the risk of erroneous deprivation weighed in Petitioner’s favor because he had received no bond or custody redetermination hearing despite more than five years in detention, and the value of a bond hearing was high. The court found the government’s relevant interest was not simply detention but detention without a bond hearing, and that providing a bond hearing would not undermine the government’s interest in effectuating removal because the hearing would address flight risk and danger. Judge Oberto concluded that “Petitioner’s prolonged detention without a bond hearing before an IJ violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights.”

After Respondent belatedly filed the consent/decline form on Aug. 9, the case was reassigned to Judge Oberto for all purposes on Aug. 12. On Aug. 14, Judge Oberto entered the final habeas order, adopting the analysis from the F&Rs, denying Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and granting the petition in part. The court ordered Respondent, within 30 days, to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration judge under a clear-and-convincing-evidence framework or, in the alternative, release him on appropriate supervision conditions. The court directed the Clerk to enter judgment and close the case.

That same day, Judge Oberto discharged the sanctions show-cause order. Respondent had filed the consent/decline form on Aug. 9 and counsel filed an OSC response on Aug. 13. Counsel explained that the orders were overlooked because of attention to other tasks and obligations and because the regularly assigned paralegal for the U.S. Attorney’s Office Habeas Unit was on scheduled leave. Counsel also stated that she had spoken with office management to ensure backup personnel were properly trained. Judge Oberto accepted the explanation and declined sanctions “at this time,” but emphasized that the court was also “very busy” and that the extra court orders, time, and work could have been avoided if the first order had been handled properly. Judge Oberto concluded:

“The Court accepts the reasons stated and will not impose sanctions at this time. Nevertheless, the Court strongly emphasizes the need to stay apprised of court orders as the Court is also very busy. Four court orders, along with the time and work expended, could have been avoided had the first order been properly handled.”

Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondent’s missed 30-day deadline to answer a prolonged-detention habeas petition. After “[o]ver thirty (30) days” had passed and Respondent had “failed to file a responsive pleading,” Magistrate Judge Singer ordered Respondent to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for “failing to comply with a court order.” Respondents later filed the overdue response and attributed the missed deadline to counsel’s “oversight.” Judge Singer discharged the sanctions OSC, finding sanctions unwarranted because the oversight was not intentional, while noting that “the failure is significant due to a person’s potential liberty is at stake.”

Petitioner Daniel Martinez-Hernandez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, filed this pro se immigration habeas petition on Feb. 17, 2026. He alleged that he had been continuously detained by ICE since Aug. 29, 2023, that his detention had become unreasonably prolonged in violation of due process, and that he was entitled to a bond hearing.

On Feb. 20, Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted. The court directed Respondent to include “a copy of all relevant portions of Petitioner’s Alien File and any and all other documentation relevant to the determination of the issues raised in the petition,” and set a thirty-day deadline for the response. The order also required the parties to notify the court by motion to dismiss or other proper pleading if Petitioner was released from ICE custody while the petition remained pending.

The deadline passed without a response. After the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Singer, the court issued a Mar. 30 order to show cause regarding sanctions. The court recounted that Petitioner had filed a habeas petition challenging detention since Aug. 29, 2023, that the Feb. 20 order had given Respondent thirty days to respond, and that “[o]ver thirty (30) days have passed, and Respondent has failed to file a responsive pleading.” Citing Local Rule 11-110, the court noted that failure to comply with court rules or any court order may support sanctions authorized by statute, rule, or the court’s inherent authority. Magistrate Judge Singer therefore ordered Respondent “to show cause” within ten days “why appropriate sanctions should not be imposed for failing to comply with a court order.”

Respondents filed a response to both the habeas petition and the sanctions order on Apr. 9, with exhibits. On Apr. 21, Magistrate Judge Singer discharged the sanctions order to show cause, writing:

“Counsel for Respondent submits that the failure to respond was due to oversight. Counsel states she requested information from her contacts in … ICE … necessary to prepare the response on March 4, 2025. Counsel states that for a substantial portion of the response period, she was out of the country without access to a work computer or a secure phone necessary for access to case files and electronic notifications. Upon her return, she realized the order had been overlooked, and further, that the requested information from ICE had not been received until after the deadline had passed. Counsel acknowledges the failure and requests sanctions not be imposed.”

The court found sanctions were not “warranted in this instance” as “[c]ounsel provides a valid reason for the oversight,” adding, “[w]hile the failure is significant due to a person’s potential liberty is at stake, it is apparent the oversight was not intentional.”

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to promptly comply with Judge Calabretta’s order that Petitioner be “immediately release[d]” from ICE custody. When the court learned nearly two weeks later that Petitioner said he had not been released and ICE’s locator still showed him in custody, Judge Calabretta ordered Respondent to show cause “why the Court should not find Respondent in contempt for failure to comply” with the release order. The court later discharged the OSC and declined contempt “at this time,” but only after Respondent “confirmed that Petitioner was not released until the evening of March 17, 2026, following the Court’s order to show cause;” Judge Calabretta called the “substantial delay” “a source of serious concern,” emphasized that release should be “measured in hours, not days,” and warned that repeated noncompliance could require status reports in future cases.

Petitioner Daniel Alberto Blas Sandoval filed this habeas petition on Mar. 2, 2026. On Mar. 3, Judge Calabretta issued a text order stating that the issues appeared to mirror issues the court had already addressed in prior immigration habeas cases, including Garcia Mariagua v. Chestnut, Ortega v. Noem, and Lopez v. Lyons. The court ordered Respondent to show cause by Mar. 6 why the writ should not be granted and directed Respondent either to identify any factual or legal issues distinguishing the case from the court’s prior orders or to indicate that the matter was not substantively distinguishable.

Respondent filed a return on Mar. 4. On Mar. 5, Judge Calabretta granted the petition. The court wrote that Respondent “agrees that the factual and legal issues present here are not substantively distinguishable” from the cited cases. Because Respondent had not made any new legal arguments or identified any factual or legal issues distinguishing the case from the court’s prior decisions, Judge Calabretta granted habeas relief “for the reasons stated in those prior orders.”

As relief, Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to “immediately release” Petitioner from custody. The court also ordered that Respondents “shall not impose any additional restrictions on Petitioner,” unless those restrictions were determined necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing. The court permanently enjoined and restrained Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner unless they complied with constitutional protections, including at minimum pre-deprivation notice describing the changed circumstances requiring arrest and detention, and a timely hearing. At any such hearing, the government would bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner posed a danger to the community or flight risk, and Petitioner would be allowed counsel. Judgment was then entered.

The release did not occur promptly. On Mar. 17, in a minute order, the court wrote that, earlier that day, “the Court Clerk’s Office received a phone call from an individual purporting to be Petitioner. That individual stated that he had not been released from custody despite the Court's order.” The court added that “[a] review of ICE's Online Detainee Locator System shows Petitioner is still currently in ICE custody at California City Corrections Center.” Judge Calabretta therefore ordered Respondent “to show cause” by 4:00 p.m. that day “why the Court should not find Respondent in contempt for failure to comply with the Courts order that Petitioner be immediately released from Respondent's custody.”

Respondent filed a response and status report. On Mar. 18, discharging the show-cause order, Judge Calabretta wrote that Respondent had “confirmed that Petitioner was not released until the evening of March 17, 2026, following the Court’s order to show cause.” Based on Respondent’s representations, the court discharged the show-cause order and declined to make a contempt finding “at this time.” But Judge Calabretta made clear that the release delay remained serious. The court wrote that “the substantial delay in releasing Petitioner is a source of serious concern,” and that although the court appreciated that release orders trigger administrative processes, “the Court expects that process to be measured in hours, not days.” The court further noted that Respondent’s counsel appeared to have made “reasonable and appropriate efforts” to transmit the order, but that “this step was not effective in ensuring Petitioner’s release.” Judge Calabretta warned that, while he had not required status reports in similar cases to confirm compliance, “should the Court see issues of repeated noncompliance, it may be forced to require status reports in all future cases.”

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to promptly comply with Judge Calabretta’s order requiring Petitioner’s immediate release, instead transferring him from Adelanto to a detention facility in Tucson, Arizona, before releasing him two days later. After Petitioner moved for contempt, Respondents attributed the transfer to an “administrative error”and reported that Petitioner had been released on Mar. 7. Judge Calabretta denied contempt, finding that Respondents had sought to correct the error quickly, but stated that “[t]he failure to promptly comply with the Court’s order and release Petitioner is of serious concern to the Court” and emphasized that “[t]he Court expects the Government to ensure compliance with all Court orders.”

Petitioner Manuel Jesus Flores Aguaiza filed a habeas petition and TRO motion on Mar. 2, 2026. Judge Calabretta advised the parties that Count 2 appeared to mirror issues previously addressed in the court’s prior immigration-detention decisions and ordered Respondents to show cause whether any factual or legal issues made this case distinguishable. Respondents agreed that the case was not substantively distinguishable.

On Mar. 5, Judge Calabretta granted habeas relief as to Count 2 after noting that Respondents “agree[d] that the factual and legal issues present here are not substantively distinguishable” from the court’s prior decisions and had “not made any new legal arguments” or identified any factual or legal distinction warranting a different result. For the reasons stated in those prior orders, the court ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner Manuel Jesus Flores Aguaiza from their custody.” Judge Calabretta further ordered that Respondents “shall not impose any additional restrictions” unless necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing, and “permanently enjoined and restrained” Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent constitutional protections. Those protections included pre-deprivation notice identifying changed circumstances requiring arrest and detention, a timely hearing, government proof by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner posed a danger or flight risk, and Petitioner’s ability to have counsel present. Judgment was then entered.

Petitioner later moved for contempt on Mar. 11. He asserted that, “[i]nstead of releasing Petitioner,” Respondents transferred him from Adelanto Detention Facility in California to a detention facility in Tucson, Arizona, where he remained in custody “in direct violation of this Court’s Order.” Judge Calabretta ordered Respondents to respond by Mar. 13.

Respondents advised the court that, because of an error, Petitioner had been transferred rather than released, but that he was ultimately released from custody on Mar. 7. On Mar. 19, Judge Calabretta denied the contempt motion. The court wrote:

“Respondents thereafter advised that due to an error Petitioner was transferred and not release[d] but was ultimately released from custody on March 7, 2026. The failure to promptly comply with the Court's order and release Petitioner is of serious concern to the Court. The Court expects the Government to ensure compliance with all Court orders. Nevertheless, it appears that the failure to release Petitioner was the result of an administrative error that Respondents sought to quickly correct and Petitioner has now been released.”

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to answer after Chief Judge Nunley granted temporary relief, ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, and ordered Respondents to show cause why habeas should not be granted. In granting habeas relief, Chief Judge Nunley wrote that “Respondents have not filed an answer,” and held that Petitioner was entitled to notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker before re-detention.

Petitioner Harpreet S. entered the United States on or about Sept. 5, 2023, near Lukeville, Arizona, without inspection. Respondents initiated removal proceedings under § 1229a and issued a notice to appear. Before the detention challenged in the petition, Petitioner lived in Fresno, California, applied for asylum, and allegedly timely and consistently appeared for all immigration-court hearings. He alleged that he had no criminal history, no current charges or custodial sentence, did not pose a danger to the community, and was not a flight risk. Petitioner filed his habeas petition and TRO motion on Feb. 2, 2026, while detained at the Golden State Annex detention facility.

On Feb. 3, Chief Judge Nunley granted the TRO. The court ordered Respondents to "immediately release” Petitioner from detention under the same conditions that existed before his current detention, return all documents and possessions at release, and refrain from re-arresting or re-detaining him absent constitutional protections, including seven days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. The court also ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted, with responsive papers due Feb. 10.

Respondents did not file a response. On May 15, Chief Judge Nunley granted habeas relief. The court found that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his continued freedom, explaining that the government’s prior release decision was an “implicit promise” that he would not be re-detained while proceedings remained pending if he complied with release terms. “Respondents did not even file a response to the Court’s order to show cause and therefore do not contend that Petitioner failed to comply with the conditions of his release,” the court emphasized.

Applying Mathews, the court held that Petitioner had a substantial private interest in liberty, that the risk of erroneous deprivation was considerable because he had received “virtually no procedural safeguards,” and that the government’s interest in detention without notice and a hearing was negligible. Chief Judge Nunley held that Petitioner was entitled to notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker before detention, that he received neither, and that Respondents violated his due process rights. The court enjoined Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent constitutional protections, including seven days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing at which Respondents would have to show material changed circumstances or prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, with counsel permitted to attend. Judgment was then entered.

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This habeas case involved a final-order ICE detainee whom Kazakhstan refused to admit after Respondents placed him on a removal flight, Respondents’ failure to answer his actual Zadvydas claim, and Respondents’ failure to provide court-ordered alien-file documentation bearing on whether removal was reasonably foreseeable. Magistrate Judge Oberto vacated an initial release recommendation after Respondents belatedly supplied additional information, but wrote that “Respondent’s failure to respond and failure to provide any reason for the failure to respond, is disturbing to say the least.” Even after considering the new information, Judge Oberto again recommended relief because Respondents had not rebutted Petitioner’s showing that removal was not reasonably foreseeable. Judge Thurston then required a supplemental declaration on removal efforts, and later adopted the recommendation in full after Respondents reported that Kazakhstan still had not responded to a renewed travel-document request and that a third-country-removal request remained pending.

Petitioner Leonid Kovalchuk, a native and citizen of Kazakhstan, entered the United States as a refugee in May 1996. He had a final order of removal, a “lengthy and serious criminal history,” and had previously been released on an order of supervision after efforts to remove him to Kazakhstan failed. ICE detained him again on May 20, 2025. On Nov. 10, 2025, Respondents placed him on a flight to Kazakhstan, but Kazakhstan refused him entry and he was returned to the United States, where he remained in ICE custody.

On Jan. 8, 2026, Petitioner’s pro se § 2241 petition was opened in the District of Arizona, challenging his continued immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and Zadvydas. After Respondents moved to transfer, the Arizona court granted transfer to the Eastern District of California because Petitioner had already been transferred to a detention facility there on Jan. 2, before the petition was mailed and opened, meaning jurisdiction lay in the district of confinement.

Respondents sought new travel documents from Kazakhstan on Jan. 19, but had heard no response by Apr. 30. On Jan. 20, they also began pursuing third-country removal through the State Department, and later conducted a travel interview with Petitioner on Feb. 5.

On Feb. 9, Magistrate Judge Oberto ordered Respondent to file a response to the habeas petition within 30 days of service. The order required Respondent to include relevant portions of Petitioner’s Alien File or other documentation bearing on the petition’s issues, allowed Petitioner 30 days to file a traverse after the response, and required the parties to notify the court if Petitioner was released while the petition remained pending. Respondents filed a response on Mar. 6. On Mar. 11, Judge Oberto issued findings and recommendations stating:

“The response does not respond to Petitioner’s claims. Respondents contend that Petitioner’s detention is mandatory pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), but fail to address Petitioner’s claim that his prolonged detention is unreasonable as there is not significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondents also fail to provide any relevant documentation from Petitioner’s alien file despite the Court’s order to do so. Accordingly, the Court will operate on the assumption that Respondent concedes Petitioner’s contention.”

On the merits, the court treated Petitioner’s detention as governed by § 1231(a)(6) and Zadvydas, found that he had been detained well beyond the presumptively reasonable removal period, and credited his showing that Kazakhstan had refused to accept him after an attempted removal. Because Respondents did not rebut that showing, the court found his continued detention unlawful and recommended granting the petition and ordering release on conditions of supervision.

On Mar. 17, Respondents objected to the first findings and recommendation and supplied new information, including Petitioner’s criminal history, Kazakhstan citizenship, prior order of supervision, and the failed November 2025 removal attempt to Kazakhstan. Consequently, on Mar. 19, Judge Oberto vacated the prior recommendation but emphasized that Respondents acknowledged their earlier failure and offered no reason for it. The court wrote:

“On March 6, 2026, Respondent filed a response to the petition. The response did not respond to Petitioner’s claims. … Respondents also failed to provide any relevant documentation from Petitioner’s alien file despite the Court’s order to do so. … Respondents acknowledge that they failed to provide any additional information despite the Court’s order. Respondent offers no reason for the failure but states, ‘Now Respondents submit this filing with additional information.’”

Vacating her earlier earlier recommendation, Judge Oberto stated:

“Respondent’s failure to respond and failure to provide any reason for the failure to respond, is disturbing to say the least. The Court also now has information from which it can make a more complete finding and recommendation.”

Even with the new information, Judge Oberto concluded that Respondents had not rebutted Petitioner’s showing that removal was not reasonably foreseeable. The court stressed that the government “provide[d] no evidence” to rebut Petitioner’s showing, offered only that ERO was working to obtain Kazakhstan travel documents or third-country approval, and gave “no reason” why removal to Kazakhstan was now significantly likely or any meaningful details about third-country-removal efforts. The court also rejected Respondents’ reliance on Petitioner’s criminal history, explaining that under Zadvydas and Tuan Thai, dangerousness did not authorize continued detention where removal was not reasonably foreseeable.

On Apr. 9, Judge Thurston ordered Respondents to provide a supplemental declaration regarding removal prospects. The court noted that more than ten days had passed since service of the Mar. 19 findings and recommendations and that no party had objected. Given Petitioner’s “serious criminal history” and the passage of almost a month since Respondents’ last substantive filing, the court found it “prudent” to require an update on Respondents’ efforts to obtain travel documents or otherwise plan for removal. Respondents were ordered to file, within 21 days, a supplemental declaration detailing any additional information bearing on the likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future.

On Apr. 30, Judge Thurston adopted the findings and recommendations in full and granted the petition. Respondents’ supplemental declaration showed that, although they had reapplied for Kazakhstan travel documents on Jan. 19, Kazakhstan had not responded; that Respondents began seeking third-country removal through the State Department on Jan. 20; that they conducted a travel interview with Petitioner on Feb. 5; and that the third-country request remained pending with no further updates. Judge Thurston emphasized that, absent evidence that removal was reasonably foreseeable, controlling Ninth Circuit authority, including Tuan Thai, “appears to require Petitioner’s release,” and that Respondents had not filed formal objections or argued that Tuan Thai did not control. The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner within 30 days, subject to an order of supervision under § 1231(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.5, allowing that period so Respondents could determine appropriate release conditions or hold a bond hearing if needed. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to the petition after Magistrate Judge Cota ordered a response within 60 days. Magistrate Judge Cota wrote that “Respondents have not complied,” and ordered Respondents to show cause why he should not recommend granting the petition for “Respondents’ failure to comply with court orders.” The OSC was later discharged after Respondents responded, with the court treating any future failure to file a response as a decision to stand on their prior filing and not argue mootness.

Petitioner Sukhchain S., a citizen and national of India, was apprehended entering the United States on June 5, 2023. Removal proceedings were initiated, and he was placed in the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program and released with conditions. On Sept. 9, 2025, Petitioner went to an ISAP office to obtain permission to travel out of state and was detained upon exiting the office.

Petitioner filed his habeas petition, motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and motion to appoint counsel on Dec. 15, 2025. On Dec. 16, Chief Judge Nunley granted IFP status and appointed counsel. He also directed Respondents to oppose Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief by Dec. 19.

On Dec. 22, Chief Judge Nunley granted temporary relief. The court ordered Petitioner released immediately from Respondents’ custody and required Respondents to file a notice certifying compliance by 5:00 p.m. on Dec. 23. The court enjoined Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent constitutional protections, including seven days’ notice and a hearing before a neutral factfinder at which Respondents would have to show materially changed circumstances or prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Dec. 23.

On Jan. 6, Chief Judge Nunley granted a preliminary injunction for the reasons stated in the TRO order. The court again enjoined Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent seven days’ notice and a hearing with the same protections, and referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Cota for further proceedings.

On Jan. 26, Magistrate Judge Cota directed Respondents to file a response within 60 days and to include any transcripts or other documents relevant to the issues raised in the habeas application. Petitioner’s reply was due within 30 days after Respondents’ response.

Respondents did not file within 60 days. On Apr. 15, Magistrate Judge Cota entered an order to show cause. He wrote that “[m]more than 60 days have passed, and Respondents have not complied.” He ordered Respondents to “show cause” within three days why he should not recommend granting the petition for “Respondents’ failure to comply with court orders.”

Respondents responded on Apr. 16. On Apr. 20, Magistrate Judge Cota discharged the OSC. The court ordered Respondents to inform the court within 30 days whether they would “stand on their prior filing” or file a new response. It stated that Respondents’ failure to timely file a response would be accepted as a decision to stand on the prior filing and not argue mootness. Petitioner was given 60 days to reply.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a court-ordered compliance notice and failure to respond to Chief Judge Nunley’s preliminary-injunction order to show cause after the court had granted emergency relief to Abdullah M., an Afghan refugee who had lived in the United States since childhood and had been released under an order of supervision for nearly fifteen years after Afghanistan twice denied travel documents. After Abdullah filed a pro se habeas petition and TRO request, Chief Judge Nunley ordered Respondents to respond and to include “copies of all referenced/relevant portions of Petitioner’s A-File and any and all available records related to Petitioner’s allegations,” barred transfer out of the district to preserve jurisdiction, appointed counsel, and later granted TRO relief. The court found that Respondents had “lost the benefit of the Zadvydas presumption,” that there was “good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and that, once the burden shifted, “Respondents offer no such evidence.” The court ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner under the same conditions he was released previously,” required a compliance notice by Jan. 8, barred re-arrest or re-detention absent notice, counsel access, and a pre-deprivation hearing, and also ordered protections before any third-country removal because, under ICE’s challenged policy, Petitioner would have “no meaningful opportunity to seek relief in any court” before removal. Respondents then failed to comply with the court’s filing requirements. On Jan. 20, Chief Judge Nunley wrote that “Respondents have not filed a notice of compliance or a response to the order to show cause, nor requested an extension of time, and the deadline to do so has passed,” again ordered a notice of compliance, and directed Respondents to “show cause” why they should not be sanctioned for “failure to comply with the Court’s previous order.” The court construed Respondents’ failure to respond to the preliminary-injunction OSC as waiver of opposition and entered a preliminary injunction on the TRO’s terms; after Respondents filed a notice and response the next day, the court discharged the sanctions OSC for good cause. Magistrate Judge Peterson later found that Respondents did “not present any new argument or evidence,” recommended granting the petition and making the preliminary injunction permanent, and Chief Judge Nunley adopted that recommendation, granted habeas relief, made the preliminary injunctive relief permanent, and entered judgment.

This habeas case involved the warrantless arrest and detention of a 57-year-old Salvadoran man who had lived in the United States for more than 20 years, had no criminal history, owned a business, paid taxes, and cared for his wife during her cancer recovery. Judge Wise granted emergency relief after finding it “again inexplicable” that a person like Petitioner had been “arrested and detained without a warrant and without a hearing,” later rejected the government’s detention theory, and granted a preliminary injunction barring re-detention without notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an individualized custody determination before a neutral immigration judge. In doing so, the court found that one government argument “strains credulity,” that the government had “provided no assurances” against immediate re-detention, and that it had offered “no evidence” and “no legitimate interest” supporting detention without those protections.

Petitioner Fulvio Castillo Gomez, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2006. After he was apprehended near the border, the government processed him for removal proceedings but released him on his own recognizance even though he did not have a U.S. address. The government issued a Notice to Appear, but Petitioner, a monolingual Spanish speaker who had never attended school and could read and write only his own name, did not appear and was ordered removed in absentia in May 2006. The parties later agreed that the removal order was never served on him.

In 2024, Petitioner hired counsel to learn more about his immigration status. His lawyer submitted multiple FOIA requests to the Department of Justice seeking all records in Petitioner’s name. Judge Wise later noted that those requests yielded nothing from the government: “no records, no Alien Number (‘A-number’), no order of removal.” On May 7, 2024, DOJ responded that, “[a]fter conducting a name search in our database, we could not locate the record with the information provided.”

On Mar. 2, 2026, nearly 20 years after his arrival, masked ICE agents arrested Petitioner outside a Wells Fargo branch in Napa, California. That evening, Petitioner filed his habeas petition and TRO motion. Judge Chhabria ordered the government to respond the next day and barred the government from deporting Petitioner or removing him from the district while the TRO application was pending.

On Mar. 3, Judge Wise granted TRO relief. The court stated that it had “no information that officers had a warrant to arrest Mr. Gomez,” and was not aware of “any exigent basis” for the arrest. In granting immediate release, Judge Wise wrote:

“To the Court, it is again inexplicable that a person such as Mr. Gomez has been detained by ICE in this manner. Mr. Gomez is a 57-year-old man who has been here since 2005 and has no criminal history has been arrested and detained without a warrant and without a hearing.”

The court ordered Petitioner’s release from custody by 2:00 p.m. that day, enjoined them from re-detaining him without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and barred deportation, removal, or transfer outside the United States or the district pending further order. The court also directed Respondents to address why their conduct was not “enjoined and in direct violation of this Court’s and other recent decisions by courts around the nation,” including the preliminary injunction in Garro Pinchi. Judge Wise further noted that Petitioner had “presumably been held at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco for more than 12 hours,” which was “independently concerning,” and required Respondents to say whether, if he had been held there more than 12 hours, they complied with “every requirement” of Judge Pitts’s Pablo Sequen order governing extended detention conditions at 630 Sansome.

On Mar. 4, before hearing Respondents’ motion to dissolve the TRO, Judge Wise issued written questions for the parties. The court asked, among other things, whether ICE had a warrant to arrest Petitioner and, if not, what legal authority Respondents relied on for a warrantless arrest. The court also asked: “Is it the Government’s position that Petitioner, who has resided in the United States for more than 20 years, can be arrested and detained without any further legal process?” And, after quoting Petitioner’s declaration that an immigration-record search had revealed no records, the court asked: “Why would a search reveal no records?”

On Mar. 5, Judge Wise denied Respondents’ motion to dissolve the TRO, extended the TRO, and ordered the parties to meet and confer about how to proceed. The parties later stipulated to a preliminary-injunction briefing schedule, with the TRO remaining in effect pending the court’s ruling.

On May 5, after briefing and an Apr. 29 hearing, Judge Wise granted a preliminary injunction. The court rejected Respondents’ jurisdictional argument under § 1252(g), explaining that Petitioner challenged only detention, not the removal order itself. The court also rejected Respondents’ argument that preliminary relief was improper because it overlapped with the ultimate habeas remedy, quoting another Northern District judge’s response to the government’s “identical argument” that the government had “backwards.”

Judge Wise then found that the government lacked statutory authority to detain Petitioner. The court held that the 90-day removal period began in 2006, not when ICE arrested Petitioner in 2026. Respondents argued that Petitioner’s failure to provide an updated address extended the removal period, but Judge Wise wrote:

“On its face, this strains credulity, particularly when the United States chose to release Mr. Gomez at the border when he had no address. If it was imperative that the United States always knew Mr. Gomez’s whereabouts, they could have elected not to release him.”

The court found that Petitioner’s initial lack of an address, and later lack of meaningful notice of the removal order, was not a “bad faith failure to cooperate” or an “act to prevent” removal. The court therefore held that his detention could not be governed by § 1231(a)(1) or (a)(2). Judge Wise also held that, after the removal period expired, the government still had not shown detention authority under § 1231(a)(6), because it failed to present evidence that it had given Petitioner notice and an opportunity to submit information before detaining him beyond the removal period.

Judge Wise further held that, even if the government had statutory authority to detain Petitioner, due process required notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an individualized custody determination before re-detention. Applying Mathews, the court emphasized Petitioner’s strong liberty interest after two decades out of custody, his reliance on the government’s prior release decision, and the high risk of erroneous deprivation absent pre-deprivation process. The court noted that the government “provided no assurances during oral argument that ICE does not plan to immediately re-detain Mr. Gomez.” It also found that the government “articulated no legitimate interest during oral arguments,” “expressed no concern that Mr. Gomez is a flight risk,” “poses a threat to the community,” or that detention would serve either permissible civil-immigration purpose. The court added that the government had “offered no evidence” that detention would serve the purposes of preventing flight or protecting the community.

Judge Wise granted the preliminary injunction and “enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner unless and until” it complied with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and due process, including notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an individualized custody determination before a neutral and independent immigration judge. The court also ordered the government to show cause by May 12 why final judgment should not enter on the merits of the habeas petition, permitted Petitioner to reply by May 19, and required the parties to inform the court within three days of any change in Petitioner’s immigration status or upcoming immigration proceedings. Respondents filed objections to immediate final judgment, then filed a response to the show-cause order; Petitioner filed a reply. No final judgment appears on the docket as of the latest docket materials reviewed.

This habeas case involved DHS’s detention of an Afghan asylum seeker based on, among other things, an arbitrary and capricious parole revocation, his arrest as he left immigration court after Respondents orally moved to dismiss his pending § 240 proceedings, and his placement in expedited removal before those proceedings had been dismissed. Judge Curiel granted habeas relief, ordered immediate release, held that Respondents violated due process and the APA by revoking parole without notice, reasoning, individualized determination, or an opportunity to be heard.

Petitioner Sayed Naser Noori, a native and citizen of Afghanistan, fled after the Taliban took control of Kabul in August 2021. The court described Petitioner as “one of the thousands of United States government allies left behind” after the Taliban takeover; because of his support for the United States, he was forced into hiding and threatened with death. After presenting at the San Ysidro port of entry on Jul. 5, 2024, CBP paroled him into the United States the next day, after noting his lack of criminal history, checking government records, and reviewing his documents from Afghanistan. Respondents served him with a Notice to Appear and placed him in § 240 proceedings. He received work authorization, regularly complied with ICE check-ins, and applied for asylum before the San Diego Immigration Court.

Around Apr. 11, 2025, Petitioner received a “mass, generic notification … indicating Respondents were revoking his parole.” On Jun. 12, Petitioner appeared for his immigration-court hearing. Respondents orally moved to dismiss the § 240 case, asserting that the NTA had been improvidently issued. When the immigration judge (IJ) asked why the NTA was supposedly improvidently issued, government counsel did not explain the basis for that position. Instead, counsel stated that Petitioner would be detained and placed in expedited removal. The IJ did not grant the motion that day and instead set a new hearing for Sept. 15. As Petitioner left the courtroom, ICE agents detained him and placed him in expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). Respondents did not provide individualized notice or reasoning for its actions. The IJ did not grant the motion to dismiss the original § 240 proceedings until Jun. 26. After a positive asylum-officer determination, Respondents issued a new NTA on Jul. 12.

On Jul. 17, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. On Sept. 4, Respondents opposed relief by arguing, among other things, that the petition was moot, that Petitioner was not bringing a proper habeas challenge, and that the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions barred review. On Sept. 26, Judge Curiel granted the petition in part in a short order, declared that Petitioner’s detention violated due process, ordered Respondents to immediately release him and return him to his original parole conditions, and barred Respondents from re-detaining him during removal proceedings without prior leave of court. The court summarized four findings: Petitioner could not legally be subjected to and detained under expedited removal on Jun. 12 because his original § 240 proceedings were still pending; Respondents revoked parole without notifying him, giving reasons, or allowing an opportunity to be heard; parole was revoked without an individualized determination or reasoning, violating the APA; and because Petitioner’s parole was “DT” humanitarian parole, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) required written notice of termination, which he had not received.

In the full Oct. 1 order, Judge Curiel first rejected Respondents’ jurisdictional objections. The court held that the petition was not moot because Petitioner remained detained and challenged “the lawfulness of the expedited removal proceedings that led to his detainment.” It also rejected Respondents’ attempt to characterize the petition as an improper APA action, holding that Petitioner was challenging the lawfulness of his detention and seeking release under § 2241. Judge Curiel further held that § 1252(g), § 1252(b)(9), § 1252(a)(2)(A), and § 1252(e) did not strip jurisdiction. The court explained that the “crux” of Petitioner’s argument was that the government “did not have lawful authority” to revoke his parole, dismiss his removal proceedings, initiate expedited removal, and detain him as he left the courtroom. The court also noted that § 1252’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions generally apply to final orders of removal, while Petitioner challenged his detention before any final order had issued. Even if those provisions otherwise barred review, Judge Curiel held that the Suspension Clause would provide jurisdiction.

On due process, Judge Curiel rejected Respondents’ reliance on Thuraissigiam, explaining that Petitioner was not an arriving noncitizen at the threshold of entry, but someone who had been present in the United States for more than a year. The court found that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest in remaining free, that detention and parole revocation had to be guided by the core goals of ensuring appearance and preventing danger, and that he was “entitled to both notification of revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an opportunity to be heard and contest the determination.” Respondents, however, “did not provide Petitioner individualized notice and reasoning prior to his arrest and detention” and “presented no legitimate reason for why those decisions were made.” The court added that Petitioner had no criminal record, had complied with ICE check-ins and court hearings, and that Respondents supplied no information indicating that he was a flight risk or danger. “Denying Petitioner notice and reasoning on the termination of his 240 removal proceedings, his placement into expedited removal proceedings, and revocation of his parole,”Judge Curiel held, “took away a meaningful opportunity to contest and violated due process.” The court also held that applying the 2025 expedited-removal designation to Petitioner, who entered before its effective date, violated due process because the designation’s language did not clearly require retroactive application.

Judge Curiel separately held that Respondents’ parole revocation was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Humanitarian parole, the court explained, may be terminated only when the parole purpose has been accomplished, or when humanitarian reasons or public benefit no longer warrant the person’s continued presence, with written notice. Neither condition was met. Petitioner was paroled so he could seek asylum, and he was still pursuing asylum when Respondents revoked parole; therefore, “the purpose of Petitioner’s parole had not been served,” and “Respondents do not argue otherwise.” The court further held that “humanitarian reasons still warrant[ed] the Petitioner’s presence in the country,” because he had aided U.S. forces against the Taliban, had gone into hiding, and had been threatened with death, while “Respondents offered no evidence to the contrary.” Judge Curiel concluded that Respondents had not complied with the Parole Statute or § 212.5(e). Even if Petitioner had not received humanitarian parole, the court held that revocation still required an individualized determination and that “Respondents must provide at minimum some reasoning explaining why the Petitioner would now be considered a flight risk or danger to the community.” “Given Respondents have not attempted to justify the revocation for Petitioner,” the court held, “Respondent has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA.”

Judge Curiel also held that Petitioner could not lawfully be placed in expedited removal. Because Petitioner was no longer an arriving noncitizen and had been paroled into the United States, the court found that he could not be subject to § 1225. In any event, he could not be subjected to expedited removal on Jun. 12 because his original § 240 proceedings were not dismissed until Jun. 26. “Thus,” Judge Curiel wrote, “detaining him under § 1225(b) on June 12 had no legal basis.” The court concluded: “Respondents’ actions are arbitrary, fail to adhere to the law, and therefore, violate the APA.”

The court granted the petition, retained jurisdiction, and ordered under the All Writs Act that Respondents “shall not cause Petitioner to be re-detained during the pendency of his removal proceedings without prior leave of this Court.” The court also directed Petitioner’s counsel to submit a fee application and billing records by Oct. 14, with any opposition due Oct. 28. Judgment entered the same day.

This habeas case involved the warrantless courthouse detention of a 19-year-old Nicaraguan parolee after DHS moved to dismiss her pending removal proceedings, and Judge Simmons’s conclusion that the revocation of her parole and resulting detention violated due process and were arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court granted habeas relief and ordered Petitioner immediately released, subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole and Form I-95.

Petitioner Melany Navarro Sanchez was a 19-year-old citizen of Nicaragua who fled the country with her parents because of political persecution. She alleged that her family faced persecution for their political opinions and activism against the Ortega government, including helping others flee Nicaragua, and that she had resisted efforts by the Sandinistas to recruit her into the Sandinista youth and narrowly escaped being kidnapped. On Dec. 12, 2024, Petitioner arrived in the United States through a CBPOne appointment, was inspected, and was paroled into the country. CBP issued her a Form I-94 valid for two years, until Dec. 12, 2026. She attended three immigration court hearings after being paroled into the United States.

On Apr. 11, 2025, DHS emailed Petitioner “without explanation” that her parole would terminate within seven days and told her to depart the United States immediately. On Jul. 30, ICE officials detained her at her third immigration court hearing after DHS moved to dismiss her removal proceedings in order to place her into expedited removal proceedings. Although the immigration judge gave Petitioner’s counsel time to brief the issue, ICE took Petitioner into custody “without a warrant, notice, or opportunity to be heard.” Petitioner had no criminal history and had attended all hearings in her immigration case, including those after DHS’s parole-termination email. She filed her habeas petition on Sept. 15.

On Sept. 26, Judge Simmons granted the petition. The court first held that §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9) did not bar jurisdiction because Petitioner sought review only of the legality of her detention, not review of the Attorney General’s decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. On due process, the court held that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest in her parole status and that Respondents denied her due process by revoking parole and detaining her without notice, evidentiary findings, or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The court emphasized that DHS may revoke parole, but only within constitutional limits and with individualized legal justification for detention. Respondents did not identify a sufficient change in circumstances related to Petitioner’s case, and Petitioner’s asylum-based parole, valid Form I-94, and repeated attendance at immigration hearings undermined any claim that her conduct justified detention.

The court also held that the APA provided separate and independent grounds for habeas relief. Because Respondents asserted that Petitioner was inadmissible and in removal proceedings, the court found that termination of her parole was reviewable as final agency action with “lasting incurable consequences.” Judge Simmons held that DHS “did not articulate a satisfactory explanation including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’ for the change to Petitioner’s status.” Respondents “do not state any reasons for the revocation of Petitioner’s parole based on any individualized facts about her asylum case or her actions on parole at all,” and they likewise did “not show any consideration of the ‘serious reliance interests’ that they have engendered in Petitioner by granting her parole prior to their change in policy.” Because Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole and detained her “without any rational individualized fact-finding or consideration of the effects of altering their prior decisions,” the court held that they had “acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA.” Judge Simmons added that Respondents’ APA violation constituted “adequate and independent grounds” on which Petitioner’s confinement was unlawful.

The court ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner from custody,” subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole and Form I-95, and directed the parties to file a joint status report confirming her release. The docket reflects that the parties filed a joint status report on Sept. 30 confirming that Petitioner had been released from ICE custody, and the clerk entered judgment that same day.

This habeas case challenged ICE’s termination of Petitioner’s parole without notice, her placement in expedited removal after more than three years in the United States following parole, and her resulting detention at Otay Mesa without a bond hearing. Judge Curiel granted the petition, held that Respondent’s actions violated due process and the APA, and ordered that Respondent “shall not cause Petitioner to be re-detained during the pendency of her removal proceedings without prior leave of this Court.”

Petitioner Dariya Karmamoldoyeva entered the United States on July 9, 2022 with her mother and two siblings and was granted parole. She later applied for asylum and withholding as part of her mother’s application, and after the immigration judge dismissed that case based on prosecutorial discretion, she joined her father’s pending USCIS asylum claim as a derivative applicant. Petitioner had complied with all parole conditions, appeared for ICE check-ins, received work authorization, obtained a California driver’s license and Social Security card, and applied for asylum. On Nov. 24, 2025, while working as an Uber driver, she inadvertently crossed onto a military base and was detained; ICE terminated her parole that same day without notice. On Jan. 14, 2026, an immigration judge denied custody redetermination after concluding that Petitioner was detained under § 1225(b) and therefore ineligible for bond under § 1226(a).

On Jan. 23, Petitioner filed her § 2241 petition, challenging her continued detention and seeking release or, in the alternative, an immediate bond hearing. Judge Curiel ordered Respondent to respond by Jan. 28, set a traverse deadline of Jan. 30, and scheduled a Feb. 6 order-to-show-cause hearing. Respondent filed a return on Jan. 28, and Petitioner filed her traverse on Jan. 30.

On Feb. 2, Judge Curiel granted the petition and vacated the Feb. 6 hearing. Respondent conceded that “Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled to an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),” but reserved the right to supplement if there were a stay of the Bautista final judgment, appellate relief, or a change in DHS policy. Judge Curiel nevertheless conducted a full analysis because of that reservation.

The court first held that Petitioner had due-process rights because she was not an “arriving” noncitizen, had been physically present in the United States for more than three years, and had developed an interest in remaining during that time. Applying the Mathews framework, the court held that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest in remaining free, including while on parole, and that she was entitled to notice and reasons before parole revocation. Judge Curiel wrote that Petitioner had been allowed into the country after a CBP officer determined she was not a flight risk or danger, had timely applied for asylum, and had complied with ICE check-ins. The court held that these proceedings “created a protectable expectation of her due process rights in her removal proceedings and the fair procedures this country guarantees.”

Judge Curiel found that the government had not justified the revocation or detention. ICE had provided no individualized notice or reasoning before arresting and detaining Petitioner on Nov. 24; Petitioner had no criminal record and had complied with reporting requirements; and there was “no indication that she is a flight risk or presents a danger to the community.” Respondent had “not supplied any additional information to the contrary.” The court concluded that “[d]enying Petitioner notice and reasoning on revocation of her parole took away a meaningful opportunity to contest and violated due process.”

Judge Curiel then held that the parole revocation violated the APA. The court explained that, “to meet statutory and regulatory requirements, revocation should only occur when the parole’s purpose is served, and the noncitizen is provided written notice,” but that “neither of the other two conditions were met here.” First, “Petitioner was not provided any notice as to the termination of her parole.” Second, “Respondent must provide at minimum some reasoning explaining why the Petitioner would now be considered a flight risk or danger to the community.” Because “Respondent has not attempted to justify the revocation for Petitioner,” the court held that “Respondent has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA.”

Judge Curiel also rejected the use of expedited removal. The court held that Petitioner was no longer an “arriving” noncitizen after residing in the United States for more than three years and, separately, had been paroled into the United States. The court therefore found that “Petitioner could not be subject to § 1225.” Judge Curiel summed up Respondent’s conduct as follows: “In sum, Respondent’s actions are arbitrary, fail to adhere to the law, and therefore, violate the APA.”

Judge Curiel granted habeas relief and ordered the parties to file a joint status report within 72 hours confirming Petitioner’s release. The court retained jurisdiction and ordered under the All Writs Act that Respondent not cause Petitioner to be re-detained during her removal proceedings without prior leave of court. Judgment entered the same day. On Feb. 4, Respondent filed a joint notice of compliance and status report confirming release.

This habeas case involved a Cuban asylum seeker detained under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) and Respondents’ repeated failure to meet court-ordered response deadlines in a habeas case the court ultimately denied on the merits. After Respondents failed to file their return by the Feb. 17 deadline, Judge Schopler stated that “[t]o date, they have filed nothing” and ordered them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. When Respondents also failed to respond to that contempt OSC, the court wrote that “[R]espondents once again disregarded the Court’s order,” directed counsel to be prepared to address “the proper remedy for the repeated failure to respond to court orders,” and ordered service on “the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California himself and the head of the Civil Division.”Although Judge Schopler later denied habeas relief after holding that Petitioner remained subject to mandatory detention while his asylum application was still under consideration, the court “admonished [R]espondents to strictly comply with future court deadlines.”

Petitioner Rodney Valido Mesa was a Cuban asylum seeker who arrived in the United States on Jan. 15, 2025 and remained in immigration detention. His habeas petition alleged that his prolonged detention violated due process, notwithstanding what the court described at the screening stage as his having “winning protection against removal to Cuba based on persecution he suffered for his political opinion.” Petitioner filed his habeas petition and a separate application for an order to show cause on Jan. 26, 2026, seeking release from immigration custody.

On Jan. 28, Judge Schopler concluded that the petition was not frivolous. The court noted that some courts had held that unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing can violate due process, and therefore ordered the government to respond. Judge Schopler required Respondents to file their return by Feb. 17, set a Feb. 24 traverse deadline, and scheduled oral argument for Mar. 4. In light of that briefing schedule, the court denied Petitioner’s separate show-cause motion as moot.

Respondents did not file their return by the Feb. 17 deadline. On Feb. 23, Judge Schopler issued an order to show cause, stating that Respondents “were ordered to file their return by February 17” and that, “[t]o date, they have filed nothing.” The court ordered Respondents to show cause by Feb. 24 “why they should not be held in contempt of the Court’s [Jan. 28] order.”

Respondents then did not respond to the Feb. 23 show-cause order. On Feb. 25, after resetting the habeas hearing to Mar. 3, Judge Schopler issued a second order stating that, despite the court’s Feb. 23 show-cause order, “[R]espondents once again disregarded the Court’s [Jan. 28] order.” The court directed that, at the Mar. 3 hearing, “[R]espondents’ counsel should be prepared to discuss the proper remedy for the repeated failure to respond to court orders.” The court also ordered service not only on counsel of record, but also on “the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California himself and the head of the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s office.” Respondents filed their return and a declaration later that day.

At the Mar. 3 hearing, the court denied the petition. Judge Schopler also “admonished [R]espondents to strictly comply with future court deadlines.” In a written order entered Mar. 4, Judge Schopler clarified the statutory basis for detention and held that Petitioner remained detained under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which mandates detention during “consideration of the application for asylum.” Although the immigration judge had denied asylum and the BIA had affirmed, the BIA’s order had been stayed by the Ninth Circuit. The court therefore held that “consideration of the application for asylum” remained ongoing and that detention was statutorily mandated. Judgment was entered the same day.

Petitioner noticed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit on Mar. 10. The Ninth Circuit granted in forma pauperis status on Apr. 6, but Petitioner later moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. On May 6, the Ninth Circuit granted voluntary dismissal and issued its order as the mandate.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file the notice required after Judge Simmons granted habeas relief and ordered a § 1226(a) bond hearing. Judge Simmons ordered Respondents to provide a bond hearing within ten days and file a Notice of Compliance within five days afterward, but later found that “Respondents have not filed no such Notice,”ordered them to show cause why they had failed to comply, and required a brief providing “the justification for such noncompliance.” Respondents later filed an untimely Notice of Compliance, and Petitioner moved to enforce the judgment, arguing that the bond hearing itself did not comply with the court’s prior order or due process.

Petitioner Xiang Li filed his habeas petition on Jan. 29, 2026. On Jan. 30, Judge Simmons stayed Petitioner’s removal to preserve jurisdiction, ordered Respondents to respond to the petition by Feb. 4, and set a Feb. 6 traverse deadline.

On Feb. 5, Judge Simmons granted in part the petition. The court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond determination hearing under § 1226(a) within ten days and to file a Notice of Compliance within five days after the hearing confirming that the hearing occurred and stating its result. Respondents did not timely file the required notice. On Feb. 23, Judge Simmons entered an order, writing:

“To date, Respondents have not filed no such Notice. Respondents are ordered to show cause as to why they have failed to comply with the Court’s February 5, 2026, Order. Respondents are required to file a brief containing the justification for such noncompliance, no later than 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 25, 2026. This brief shall also apprise the Court of: (1) when Petitioner was provided with a bond hearing; and (2) the results of that hearing.”

Judgment was entered Feb. 23. Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Feb. 24. Judge Simmons stated that Respondents’ notice was “untimely” and reported that the immigration judge had denied bond after finding that Petitioner did not establish that he was not a danger to the community and was not a flight risk.

On May 2, Petitioner moved to enforce the judgment, arguing that the bond hearing provided did not comply with the court’s prior order or the constitutional requirements of due process. On May 12, Judge Simmons ordered Respondents to show cause why the motion should not be granted by filing a response by May 19, with any reply due May 22. Parties timely filed.

This habeas case involved a later fee-stage noncompliance issue after Judge Robinson granted habeas relief in part and ordered an individualized bond hearing: Respondents failed to oppose Petitioner’s EAJA fee application despite a briefing order stating that it was “the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially justified.”

Petitioner Gevork Guyumdzhyan filed his habeas petition on Jan. 16, 2026. Judge Robinson ordered a response and set a Jan. 22 show-cause hearing. Respondents filed a return on Jan. 21. At the Jan. 22 hearing, Respondents argued that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and had no due-process right to release or a bond hearing for prolonged detention. The court disagreed, granted the petition in part, and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing within 14 days.

Petitioner later moved for $8,036.75 in fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. On Mar. 3, the court set a briefing schedule, stating that because “it is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially justified,” Respondents “shall file an opposition on or before March 16.” The court also warned that an opposing party’s failure to timely oppose a motion “may be construed as consent to the granting of the motion.”

Respondents did not oppose. On Mar. 25, Judge Robinson wrote that, “[a]lthough the Court explicitly warned Respondents” that failure to oppose could be treated as consent, “Respondents have failed to file an opposition.” The court did not immediately award fees because Petitioner still bore the burden of establishing EAJA eligibility, and the court could not determine on the existing record whether Petitioner qualified as a “party” under the statute. Judge Robinson permitted a supplemental declaration on eligibility by Mar. 31. Petitioner withdrew his application the same day.

This habeas case involved an Iranian CAT-protection grantee detained at Otay Mesa for more than 14 months under § 1225(b)(1), followed by a court-ordered bond hearing that Judge Lopez later found was not constitutionally adequate because the immigration judge did not apply the clear-and-convincing burden to the government. After initially ordering Respondents to provide an individualized bond hearing at which “the government bears the burden,” Judge Lopez granted Petitioner’s motion to enforce, held that alleged “failure to comply with the terms of that Order” was “appropriately addressed by a motion to enforce,” found that the IJ had construed “evidence (or the lack of evidence)” against Petitioner despite DHS presenting no supporting evidence, and ordered immediate release.

Petitioner Mohammad Rash, a citizen of Iran born to “ethnic minority Kurdish” parents, alleged that Iranian authorities detained and tortured him twice for his political views. He fled Iran and entered the United States on Nov. 18, 2024. DHS immediately took him into custody, and he remained detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center. On Apr. 16, 2025, Petitioner submitted an asylum application. On Sept. 22, an immigration judge granted him deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, but DHS appealed to the BIA on Oct. 21. Because the appeal remained pending, there was no final order of removal when Judge Lopez ruled on the habeas petition.

On Jan. 2, Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition, arguing that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and seeking immediate release or, alternatively, a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. That same day, Judge Lopez screened the petition, ordered Respondents to respond by Jan. 13, allowed a reply by Jan. 20, and preliminarily enjoined Respondents from removing Petitioner from the district “to maintain the status quo and allow the Court to provide a reasoned decision.” Respondents filed their return on Jan. 13, and Petitioner filed his traverse on Jan. 20.

On Jan. 30, Judge Lopez granted the petition. The court rejected Respondents’ argument that § 1252(g) barred jurisdiction, finding that Petitioner was not challenging the commencement of removal proceedings but rather the government’s authority to detain him for a prolonged period without a bond hearing. On the merits, Judge Lopez held that a noncitizen detained under § 1225(b) for a prolonged period without an individualized bond hearing may assert a due process challenge. Applying the Banda factors, the court found that Petitioner’s 14-month detention, the likely duration of future detention, and the penal nature of confinement at Otay Mesa weighed in his favor. Judge Lopez ordered Respondents, within seven days, to arrange an individualized bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge “in which the government bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk if released.” Judgment was then entered.

A bond hearing was held on Feb. 2. Petitioner later moved to enforce the court’s order, arguing that Respondents had failed to provide a “constitutionally compliant hearing as ordered by this Court.” He asserted that the immigration judge stopped DHS counsel while he was presenting his case and instead listed concerns the immigration judge believed weighed against release; that DHS provided no evidence of flight risk; and that DHS submitted articles and reports about the Iranian military’s designation as a terrorist group without showing that Petitioner himself was dangerous. Respondents opposed enforcement, argued that Petitioner had failed to exhaust by appealing to the BIA, and maintained that the hearing complied with the court’s order.

On May 19, Judge Lopez granted Petitioner’s motion to enforce. The court first held that it had jurisdiction because Petitioner challenged the bond process as constitutionally flawed and because district courts retain authority to enforce their habeas orders. Respondents argued that Petitioner had failed to exhaust by appealing the bond denial to the BIA, but Judge Lopez emphasized that the bond hearing had been conducted pursuant to the court’s Jan. 30 order, which required the government to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner argued that Respondents had not met that “heavy burden,” and Judge Lopez held that “Respondents’ failure to comply with the terms of that Order is an issue appropriately addressed by a motion to enforce the Court’s order.” The court distinguished Leonardo v. Crawford, where the government had “complied exactly” with the district court’s order, writing: “That is not the case here.” Judge Lopez waived exhaustion “for the limited scope of determining whether the bond hearing was constitutionally adequate as required by this Court’s prior order.”

On the merits, Judge Lopez found that the bond hearing was neither legally nor constitutionally adequate. The court wrote that “a ‘mere recitation’ of the legal standard is insufficient to show that the IJ actually applied the burden.”Although the immigration judge acknowledged the burden on DHS at the start of the hearing, she “never stated in her oral decision that DHS had met their burden of clear and convincing evidence,” and Respondents did not directly dispute that point. Petitioner also asserted, and Respondents did not dispute, that the immigration judge stopped DHS counsel from presenting his case and “listed out six points of [Petitioner’s] preexisting docket that she believed argued against release.” Judge Lopez wrote that “it was DHS’ burden, not the IJ’s to argue against Petitioner’s release,” and emphasized that an immigration judge “has a responsibility to function as a neutral, impartial arbiter and must be careful to refrain from assuming the role of advocate for either party.”

The court then found that the record did not support the immigration judge’s danger or flight-risk findings under the clear-and-convincing standard. DHS submitted “a series of articles and reports about the designation of the Iranian Military as a terrorist group,” but “did not submit any evidence that Petitioner himself was a terrorist or a danger.” On flight risk, Judge Lopez found that DHS had offered no evidence; its only argument was that Petitioner lacked a sponsor or residence address, which Petitioner’s counsel corrected, and Respondents’ argument that Petitioner could still be removed to Turkey or another third country was “not a ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Judge Lopez concluded: “Therefore, the Court finds that the IJ construed evidence (or the lack of evidence) against Petitioner even though DHS had presented no evidence to support the IJ’s decision.”

Judge Lopez ordered immediate release rather than another bond hearing. Citing habeas courts’ remedial flexibility, the court found that, “[b]ased on the facts of this case, ‘another bond hearing would serve little purpose and would only prolong a detention that has already become constitutionally problematic.’” The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner within 24 hours under appropriate supervision conditions, barred re-detention absent compliance with 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i), and 8 U.S.C. § 1231, entered judgment in Petitioner’s favor, and closed the case.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file the initial show-cause response by the court-ordered deadline, followed by a later dispute over whether the bond hearing provided after habeas relief complied with the court’s order. Judge Simmons granted habeas relief, ordered a constitutionally adequate individualized bond hearing, later declined to treat Petitioner’s notice of noncompliance as a motion, and then ordered briefing once Petitioner filed a motion to enforce.

Petitioner Pun Magar Sandesh is a native of Nepal who entered the United States on Dec. 2, 2024, fleeing political persecution. He was detained at entry and remained detained. He passed an initial credible-fear interview, applied for asylum, had a final merits hearing scheduled for Apr. 9, 2026, and planned to appeal to the BIA if asylum was denied.

On Feb. 9, 2026, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition. After the court appointed counsel, Petitioner filed an amended petition on Feb. 18 raising prolonged-detention issues and challenging whether an ordinary immigration-judge bond hearing would provide adequate relief. The court ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted and to file a response by 5:00 p.m. on Feb. 23, while also staying Petitioner’s removal “to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction pending a ruling in this matter.”

Respondents did not respond, and Petitioner filed a traverse on Feb. 24. On Mar. 5, Judge Simmons granted the petition, writing, “The Court ordered Respondents to show cause why the Petition should not be granted no later than February 23, 2026, and Respondents failed to file a response.” The court held that Petitioner’s detention for over a year under § 1225(b) had become unreasonable and that due process required an individualized bond hearing. The court ordered Respondents to provide a bond hearing within ten days, required the government to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, required the IJ to consider alternative conditions of release and ability to pay if bond were appropriate, required a complete bond-hearing record, and ordered Respondents to file a notice of compliance within five days of the hearing.

On Mar. 12, Respondent filed a notice of compliance certifying that Petitioner had received a bond hearing that complied with the Mar. 5 order. On Mar. 19, Petitioner filed a notice of noncompliance alleging the bond hearing did not comply. On Mar. 23, Judge Simmons declined to construe the notice as a motion because Petitioner was represented by counsel, writing that any party seeking relief must do so by “properly noticed motion.” After Petitioner filed a motion to enforce judgment on Mar. 23, arguing that the hearing did not comply with the prior order, the court ordered Respondents to respond by Mar. 30 and Petitioner to reply by Apr. 8. Parties timely filed their briefs.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a return by the court-ordered deadline, followed by a late return in which Respondents acknowledged that Petitioner was a member of the Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class and was entitled to a § 1226(a) bond hearing. Judge Lopez granted the petition in part and ordered an individualized bond hearing within seven days.

Petitioner Juan Carlos Reyes Guerrero filed his habeas petition on Feb. 19, 2026. Judge Lopez ordered Respondents to file a return by Feb. 25 at 4:30 p.m. Respondents missed that deadline. On Feb. 27, Petitioner filed a traverse and requested that the court rule on the petition and grant appropriate relief based on Respondents’ nonresponse.

On Mar. 2, granting in part the petition, Judge Lopez wrote: “Respondents failed to file a Return by the Court-issued deadline of February 25, 2026 at 4:30 p.m.” The court noted that, on Mar. 1, “Respondents filed a late-filed Return” acknowledging that Petitioner was a Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class member, that final judgment had been entered for the class, and that Petitioner was detained under § 1226(a) and entitled to an order directing a bond hearing. Judge Lopez granted the petition in part, ordered Respondents to provide an individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing within seven days, and stated that Matter of Yajure Hurtado had been vacated as contrary to law and could not be invoked by the immigration judge to decline jurisdiction. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a return by the court-ordered deadline. Judge Lopez addressed the merits in light of that failure, found Petitioner was a member of the Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class, and ordered a § 1226(a) bond hearing within seven days.

Petitioner Erick Ariel Marcos Lorenzo, a citizen of Guatemala, was detained by ICE agents on Jan. 13, 2026, and held at Otay Mesa Detention Center. On Feb. 18, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. On Feb. 19, Judge Lopez ordered Respondents to file a return by Feb. 25 at 4:30 p.m. Respondents missed that deadline.

On Mar. 2, Judge Lopez granted the petition in part. She wrote: “Respondents failed to file a Return by the Court-issued deadline of February 25, 2026 at 4:30 p.m.” After noting further noting “Respondents’ failure to file a Return,” he court found that Petitioner was a member of the Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class, was detained under § 1226(a), and was entitled to an order directing a § 1226(a) bond hearing. The court ordered Respondents to provide an individualized bond hearing within seven days and directed that Petitioner’s bond could not be denied on the basis that § 1225(b)(2) required mandatory detention. The court also stated that Matter of Yajure Hurtado had been vacated as contrary to law under the APA and could not be invoked by the immigration judge to decline jurisdiction. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to file a return by the court-ordered deadline after Judge Lopez ordered briefing and restrained Petitioner’s removal from the United States or the district.

Petitioner Henry Yonel Yanez Ochoa, a citizen of Honduras, was detained by immigration agents on Jan. 29, 2026, and held at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in Diego County, California. On Feb. 18, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. That day, Judge Lopez ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted by filing a written return by Feb. 24 at 4:30 p.m. and ordered that Respondents, their agents, employees, successors, attorneys, and those acting with them not remove Petitioner from the United States or the district pending further order. The court explained that the limited All Writs Act stay was necessary to preserve the status quo and avoid jurisdictional problems if Petitioner were removed from the district before the court could issue a reasoned decision.

Respondents did not file a return by the Feb. 24 deadline. On Mar. 2, Petitioner filed a request for clerk’s entry of default and a motion for default. That same day, Judge Lopez granted the petition in part, noting that “Respondents failed to file a Return by the Court-issued deadline of February 24, 2026 at 4:30 p.m.”

“In light of Respondents’ failure to file a Return,” Judge Lopes then addressed the merits of the petition. The court found Petitioner to be a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista, concluded he was detained under § 1226(a), and ordered Respondents to provide an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days. The court directed that Respondents could not deny bond on the ground that § 1225(b)(2) required mandatory detention and stated that Matter of Yajure Hurtado had been vacated as contrary to law and could not be invoked by the immigration judge to decline jurisdiction. The court denied Petitioner’s request for release and denied his default motion as moot. Judgment was later entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ late return to a § 2241 petition challenging ICE’s redetention of a Venezuelan asylum seeker without notice or a hearing. After Judge Lopez ordered Respondents to show cause by filing a written return by Feb. 17, Respondents missed the deadline, filed four days late, and “failed to address why their Return was late;” Judge Lopez nevertheless reached the merits, but warned that future failure to meet court-ordered deadlines “may result in a waiver of their arguments.”

Petitioner Juan Manuel Camacho Cabrera, a Venezuelan citizen, entered the United States in September 2023 to seek asylum, surrendered to border officials, and was released on his own recognizance after DHS determined he posed little, if any, flight risk or danger. After nearly two years of compliance, work authorization, employment, no criminal history, and about “one dozen court appearances,” ICE arrested him at his Aug. 18, 2025 immigration-court hearing in San Diego and detained him at Otay Mesa.

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Feb. 11, 2026. On Feb. 12, Judge Lopez ordered Respondents to file a return by Feb. 17 and, under the All Writs Act, enjoined Respondents from removing Petitioner from the United States or the district “to maintain the status quo to allow the Court to provide a reasoned decision.” Respondents did not meet that deadline. Petitioner filed a traverse on Feb. 19 based on Respondents’ failure to file. Respondents filed their late return on Feb. 21.

On Feb 23, granting the petition in part, Judge Lopez wrote that “Respondents filed a late Return on February 21, 2026, that failed to address why their Return was late (four days beyond the Court-ordered deadline of February 17, 2026),” adding:

“Respondents failed to abide by the Court-ordered deadline of February 17, 2026 to file their Return. Notwithstanding this failure, the Court will still rule on the Petition on its merits, but reminds Respondents that failure to do so in the future may result in a waiver of their arguments.”

On the merits, Judge Lopez rejected Respondents’ jurisdiction-stripping argument under § 1252(g), holding that Petitioner challenged “his re-detention without notice or justification,” not the commencement, adjudication, or execution of removal proceedings. On due process, the court held that Petitioner was not merely an “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal rights, but had a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody after release. Applying Mathews, the court found that Respondents re-detained him “without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard,” had not pointed to any material changed circumstances, and had violated the Due Process Clause. Judge Lopez ordered immediate release under his prior recognizance conditions and required, before any re-detention, notice of the reasons and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, with the government bearing the burden to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to timely file the court-ordered return to the petition, followed by Judge Schopler’s order directing Respondents to “show cause in writing why they should not be held in contempt for failing to timely file a return as ordered by the Court.” After Petitioner “acknowledge[d]” that the petition duplicated an earlier, fully adjudicated habeas action, and Respondents’ counsel “apologize[d] to the Court for missing the Court’s deadline,” Judge Schopler discharged the OSC, dismissed the case as duplicative, and admonished Respondents’ counsel “to scrupulously follow Court orders and deadlines going forward.”

Petitioner Jamshid Moradi filed this habeas petition on Feb. 19, 2026 while detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San Diego County, California. The case was initially assigned to Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz, who entered a scheduling order requiring Respondents to file a return by Mar. 10. On Mar. 19, after Petitioner filed a traverse and because he had filed a prior petition raising apparently similar claims, the case was reassigned to Judge Andrew G. Schopler.

On Mar. 23, Judge Schopler ordered Petitioner to show cause by Apr. 3 why the case should not be dismissed as duplicative of his earlier petition in Moradi v. LaRose, 3:26-cv-00968, which the court described as “seemingly raising the same claims” and already “fully adjudicated.” Separately, Judge Schopler ordered Respondents by the same date to “show cause in writing why they should not be held in contempt for failing to timely file a return as ordered by the Court,” noting that the scheduling order had required that “Respondents must file a return no later than March 10, 2026.”

The parties responded the same day. Petitioner “acknowledge[d]” that the pending case was “duplicative.” Respondents’ counsel “apologize[d]” for missing the court’s return deadline. On Apr. 1, Judge Schopler wrote that Petitioner “acknowledge[d] that this pending case is duplicative” and that “Respondents’ counsel apologize[d] to the Court for missing the Court’s deadline.” Further, the court further wrote that “Respondents’ counsel is admonished to scrupulously follow Court orders and deadlines going forward,” discharged the order to show cause, and dismissed the case. The clerk entered judgment on Apr. 10, stating that the order to show cause was discharged, the case was dismissed, and the case was closed.

This habeas enforcement case involved Judge Ohta’s enforcement of a prior order requiring Respondents either to provide a constitutionally adequate bond hearing within seven days or release Petitioner, who remained detained while his removal appeal was pending. The Mar. 13 order required the government to justify detention by clear and convincing evidence and barred denial of bond based on § 1225(b) mandatory detention or BIA precedent depriving the immigration judge of bond jurisdiction. After Petitioner moved to enforce compliance, Judge Ohta granted the motion “for the reasons stated on the record at oral argument,” ordered Respondents to release Petitioner by 5:00 p.m. on May 29, and required an affidavit attesting to release. The court also renewed re-detention protections, enjoining Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner during removal proceedings unless they first provided a constitutionally adequate bond hearing with the same burden, financial-circumstances, and alternatives-to-detention safeguards, and filed a declaration attesting full compliance at least 48 hours before any re-detention.

Petitioner Attaullah Khan, a citizen of Pakistan, entered the United States in December 2024 and was immediately detained by immigration officials. Officials determined that he had a credible fear of persecution if returned to Pakistan, and DHS placed him into standard removal proceedings. On Nov. 17, 2025, an immigration judge denied asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection and ordered him removed to Pakistan. Petitioner appealed to the BIA, leaving his removal proceedings pending.

On Feb. 27, 2026, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. That same day, Judge Ohta ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted, required Respondents to file the complete immigration record necessary to adjudicate the petition unless they conceded complete relief, and set oral argument. The court also ordered that Petitioner could not be transferred out of the Southern District of California without 48 hours’ advance docketed notice explaining why the movement was necessary and should not be stayed pending further proceedings.

On Mar. 13, Judge Ohta granted habeas relief. The court held that the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not bar Petitioner’s collateral challenge to his current detention. It then found that Petitioner’s prolonged detention without a bond hearing violated due process. Petitioner had already been detained for more than 14 months, his BIA appeal remained pending, and his detention could approach or exceed two years. The court found no evidence that he had engaged in bad-faith delay, posed a danger, presented a flight risk, or that the government had another legitimate interest in continued detention.

Judge Ohta ordered Respondents to provide an individualized bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge within seven days. At that hearing, the government had to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was a danger or flight risk that could not reasonably be addressed by bond or conditional release. The court further ordered that Respondents could not deny bond on the ground that § 1225(b) required or authorized mandatory detention, or that BIA precedent deprived the immigration judge of jurisdiction to decide bond. If no hearing occurred by Mar. 20, Respondents had to release Petitioner by 5:00 p.m. on Mar. 21. Respondents also had to file a declaration by Mar. 23 stating the hearing outcome or confirming release.

The Mar. 13 order also protected against redetention. Because the court had found that detention without a bond hearing had surpassed constitutional limits, it enjoined Respondents from redetaining Petitioner during his removal proceedings without first providing a constitutionally adequate bond hearing. Respondents also had to file a declaration attesting to full compliance at least 48 hours before any redetention.

On Apr. 23, Petitioner later moved to enforce compliance with the Mar. 13 order. On May 28, after oral argument, Judge Ohta granted the motion to enforce. The court wrote:

“On April 23, 2026, Petitioner Attaullah Khan filed a motion to enforce compliance [with] the Court’s March 13, 2026 order. On May 28, 2026, the Court held oral argument on the motion. For the reasons stated on the record at oral argument, the Court grants Petitioner’s motion to enforce compliance.”

The court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner by 5:00 p.m. on May 29 and to file an affidavit attesting to release by 5:00 p.m. the following business day. Judge Ohta again barred redetention absent constitutionally adequate process. The court enjoined Respondents from redetaining Petitioner during his removal proceedings without first providing a bond hearing before an immigration judge to justify the deprivation of his liberty interest. At any such hearing, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the public or a flight risk that cannot reasonably be addressed by bond or conditional release. Respondents may not deny bond based on § 1225(b) mandatory detention or BIA precedent depriving the immigration judge of bond jurisdiction, and the immigration judge must consider financial circumstances and alternatives to bond. The court also ordered that any such hearing be transcribed, required Respondents to file a declaration attesting full compliance, and enjoined Respondents from redetaining Petitioner until 48 hours after that declaration was filed. Respondent failed a status report on Jun. 1.

This habeas case involved the prolonged detention of Mohammad Bayani, an Iranian asylum seeker held at Otay Mesa for more than a year under § 1225(b), and a later enforcement ruling after the immigration judge denied bond at the court-ordered hearing. Judge Simmons first granted habeas relief, finding that due process required “individual findings regarding his detention” because Bayani had been detained for over a year, his proceedings faced further delay, and Otay Mesa was “not meaningfully distinguishable from penal confinement.” The court ordered a bond hearing at which the IJ could not deny bond based on § 1225(b) and instead had to require the government to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that Bayani was a flight risk or danger.

After the IJ denied bond, Judge Simmons granted Bayani’s motion to enforce. The court found that the IJ had relied on evidence with “minimal probative or specific value” to find flight risk, including Bayani’s upcoming merits hearing and his manner of entry, and had improperly speculated that if Bayani “really wants his claims to be heard,” he would want the hearing to occur while detained. The court said an IJ’s role is to determine whether the government met its burden, “not to concoct theories regarding Petitioner’s motivations,” and found that the IJ ignored mitigating evidence and alternatives to detention. Considering the errors together, the court held that the IJ “abused her discretion by failing to place the burden on the government” to prove flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence, and that the deficient bond hearing was a “deprivation of Petitioner’s right to due process.” The court ordered Respondents to provide a second bond hearing within 10 days and to file a notice of compliance within five days of that hearing.

This habeas case involved Respondent’s failure to meet Judge Ohta’s expedited response deadline, followed by habeas relief after the government conceded there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. After Respondent failed to file by the court’s May 15 noon deadline, Judge Ohta ordered Respondent to “show cause why they failed to comply with the Court’s May 12, 2026 order” and to file the required response by May 19.

Petitioner Johanna Montserrat Mero Sambrano filed her habeas petition on May 11, 2026, challenging detention following a final removal order. ICE had taken her into custody on Feb. 18, 2026, when she appeared for a scheduled ICE appointment. The court took judicial notice that an immigration judge ordered her removed on Feb. 20, 2026; the record indicated that she did not appeal, so the removal order became final on that date. She remained detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center.

On May 12, Judge Ohta adopted the standard immigration habeas procedures with an accelerated response schedule: the government’s response was due by May 15 at 12:00 p.m., and a hearing was set for May 21. Respondent did not file the response by the deadline. On May 15, Judge Ohta wrote: “To date, Respondents have not filed a response. Respondents are ordered to (1) show cause why they failed to comply with the Court's May 12, 2026 order and (2) file the required response no later than Tuesday, May 19, 2026, at 5:00 p.m.” Respondent filed a response on May 18.

On May 22, Judge Ohta granted habeas relief. The court held that § 1252(g) did not bar Petitioner’s collateral challenge to the constitutionality of her detention, because a challenge to continued detention pending removal does not intrude on the government’s discretion over when or whether to execute a removal order. The court then held that continued detention violated Zadvydas. Although detention during the initial removal period is generally mandatory and presumptively reasonable for up to six months, Judge Ohta held that the presumption had been rebutted because the government conceded there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and the record showed no meaningful steps toward removal.

Judge Ohta ordered Respondent to release Petitioner by 5:00 p.m. on May 23 and file a declaration confirming release by 5:00 p.m. the following business day. The court also enjoined Respondent from removing Petitioner from the United States or from the District, and from re-detaining her, unless the government had obtained travel documents and made concrete flight arrangements for removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondent had to file a written declaration at least 48 hours before any re-detention confirming compliance with those requirements. Judgment was then entered. Respondent filed a notice confirming release on May 26.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to the court’s initial show-cause order, a second show-cause order noting that “Respondents have not filed a response,” and Respondents’ later notice of non-opposition before the court granted habeas relief in part. Judge Montenegro later summarized that Respondents had been ordered to show cause why the petition should not be granted and “failed to do so.”

Petitioner Enes Kurtulu, a national and citizen of Türkiye, entered the United States on or around May 23, 2024, without having been admitted or paroled after inspection. He remained in the United States for approximately 21 months. ICE arrested him at his place of employment while he was making a routine work-related delivery, issued an NTA charging him as removable as a noncitizen present without admission or parole, and detained him at Otay Mesa Detention Center while his asylum application was pending. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Feb. 26, 2026.

On Feb. 27, Judge Montenegro ordered Respondents to show cause by Mar. 10 why the petition should not be granted. The court required a written response, relevant documents and evidence, and a recommendation about whether an evidentiary hearing was needed. The court also barred Petitioner’s transfer outside the Southern District of California while the matter remained pending.

On Mar. 23, Judge Montenegro noted that Respondents had been ordered to respond to the court’s initial show-cause order by Mar. 10, but that, “[a]s of the date of this Order, Respondents have not filed a response.” The court ordered Respondents to respond by Mar. 25 and warned that failure to do so would be treated as consent to granting the petition. Respondents then filed a notice of non-opposition on Apr. 1. On Apr. 6, Judge Montenegro granted the petition in part and summarized the sequence:

“On February 26, 2026, Petitioner commenced this action by filing the Petition. The Court ordered Respondents to show cause why the Petition should not be granted on or before February 27, 2026. Respondents failed to do so. Petitioner timely filed a Reply on March 11, 2026. The Court then issued a second Order to Show Cause. On April 1, 2026, Respondents submitted a Return to Habeas Petition and Notice of Non-Opposition.”

On the merits, the court held that Petitioner was detained under § 1226(a) and that “his arrest and detention without a meaningful bond hearing [therefore violated] the Due Process Clause.” The court ordered Respondents to provide an individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing within ten days, with Respondents bearing the burden by clear and convincing evidence, barred denial of bond on the basis that § 1225(b)(2) required mandatory detention, and ordered release if the hearing was not conducted within ten days. Judgment entered the same day.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to answer an order to show cause concerning DHS’s alleged failure to provide sufficient notice or an opportunity to be heard before re-detaining Petitioner. Judge Robinson granted the petition after finding that Respondents’ failure to respond left a record establishing that they “failed to comply with their regulations in re-detaining Petitioner.”

Petitioner Heydi Francela Vargas Montiel filed her habeas petition on Mar. 3, 2026. She alleged that she was not provided sufficient notice or an opportunity to be heard before her Feb. 14, 2026 re-detention, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(1).

On Mar. 4, Judge Robinson ordered Respondents to show cause by Mar. 10 why Petitioner should not be released on that basis. Respondents did not timely respond. On Mar. 15, Petitioner filed a notice of failure to comply and request for release.

On Mar. 18, Judge Robinson granted the petition, writing:

“On March 4, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why Petitioner should not be released because DHS had failed to provide sufficient notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to re-detaining Petitioner, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(1). … As Petitioner notes, … because Respondents have failed timely to respond, the record before the Court establishes that Respondents failed to comply with their regulations in re-detaining Petitioner.”

The court granted the petition and ordered Respondents to release Petitioner from detention subject to her preexisting conditions of release.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to a show-cause order requiring them to justify Petitioner’s detention by the court-ordered deadline. Judge Simmons granted habeas relief after finding that Respondents “failed to do so” and had “still not made any appearance.”

Petitioner Arnoldo Jeronimo Perez, a 19-year-old Guatemalan national, had lived in the United States since 2022. Upon arrival, he was designated an unaccompanied minor, transferred to the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and then released to his aunt in Georgia, where he lived thereafter. He had no criminal history and significant community ties in the Atlanta area. Immigration authorities arrested him on Nov. 21, 2025, while he was driving to pick up his minor sister from an ORR shelter so she could be reunited with family in Georgia. He was placed in removal proceedings and denied bond by an immigration judge on jurisdictional grounds. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Feb. 3, 2026.

That same day, Judge Simmons ordered Respondents to show cause by Feb. 6 why the petition should not be granted and directed that their response “include any documents relevant to the determination of the issues raised in the Petition” and address whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary. The court also stayed Petitioner’s removal from the district to preserve jurisdiction, ordering that “Petitioner shall not be removed from this District unless and until the Court orders otherwise.”

Respondents did not respond. On Feb. 10, Judge Simmons granted the petition, noting that, despite being ordered to show cause why the Petition should not be granted, “Respondents failed to do so, and have still not made any appearance in this matter to date.”

Petitioner declined to file an optional traverse, and Judge Simmons therefore evaluated the petition on its face and granted relief. On the merits, the court found that Petitioner’s release under the TVPRA created a protected liberty interest and that he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before that release was revoked. The court stated that “[n]o documentation before this Court indicates that Petitioner was informed of any individualized changed circumstances justifying revocation of his release, or that he was given meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding that revocation.”

The court also noted that the petition alleged, and Respondents did not contest, that “there are no changed circumstances or other factor in this case justifying re-detention,” meaning that any notice and opportunity to be heard “could not have been meaningful.” Judge Simmons concluded that “Respondents violated the TVPRA, and the due process rights due to Petitioner under his TVPRA release, when they re-detained him on November 21, 2025.” The court ordered Petitioner’s immediate release subject to any preexisting conditions of release, required a joint status report confirming release by Feb. 11, denied the remaining claims as moot, and closed the case.

This habeas case did not involve an asserted violation of a court order in the instant matter. It involved Judge Briones’s use of prophylactic no-removal/no-transfer relief and expedited compliance deadlines based on prior order violations in related habeas cases. On the day the petition was filed, the court barred removal and transfer because of “prior incidences” in which Respondents or their assigns had removed petitioners from the United States or the Western District of Texas “even after the Court orders them not to do so,” and found that a temporary restraining order was necessary to preserve the status quo and the court’s ability to assess the habeas petition. The court later granted habeas relief in part, found § 1225(b)(2) unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner, ordered a burden-shifted bond hearing or release, and imposed an expedited compliance schedule after citing “multiple instances where alleged inadvertent mistakes have caused this Court’s orders to be violated.” After Respondents later reported technical and communication errors affecting Petitioner’s ability to post bond, the court noted that it “received no further updates,” contacted Petitioner’s attorney, and learned from counsel that Petitioner had successfully posted bond and been released.

Petitioner Candelario Rincon Chavero, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 1991 and had been domiciled in the country for almost 35 years. He was the father of four U.S.-citizen children, grandfather of six U.S.-citizen grandchildren, married to a lawful permanent resident, worked as a carpenter in Las Cruces, New Mexico, and had no criminal history in the United States. ICE arrested him at his home in Las Cruces on Sept. 10, 2025, allegedly declining to produce a warrant. He was detained at the El Paso Processing Center when he filed his habeas petition on Dec. 10, 2025.

That day, Judge Briones issued an order to show cause and barred removal or transfer. Citing his concerns in Blandon Raudez, Judge Briones wrote:

“Further, this case is filed by an alien detainee seeking relief under habeas corpus. Due to prior incidences in this Court of Respondents or their assigns removing petitioners from the United States and/or jurisdiction of the Western District of Texas – El Paso Division even after the Court orders them not to do so, this Court, in its discretion, finds good cause to issue a temporary restraining order restraining Respondents from removing Petitioner from its jurisdiction or the United States until further order of the Court. In the interest of preserving the status quo and the Court’s ability to fully assess this case on the merits, the Court orders that Petitioner not be removed from the United States or to a facility outside the jurisdiction of the Western District of Texas – El Paso Division.”

The court ordered:

“Respondents shall not (1) remove or deport Petitioner from the United States, or (2) transfer Petitioner from any facility outside the boundaries of the El Paso Division of the Western District of Texas, until the Court orders otherwise or this case is closed.”

On Dec. 18, Judge Briones granted the petition in part. The court rejected Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments, found that Petitioner was entitled to Fifth Amendment due-process protection, and held that § 1225(b)(2), as applied, violated due process. In setting the remedy, the court again pointed to prior violations of court orders and set an accelerated compliance schedule. It cited Blandon Raudez, where Respondents removed “Petitioner to Mexico nearly 14 hours after this Court issued an order not to remove him from the United States,” and Pacay Garcia, where Respondents removed “Petitioner from United States after an order not to remove was issued because, among other things, Respondents’ counsel ‘inadvertently failed to forward the Order to Show Cause to ICE agency Counsel.’” The court wrote:

“Further, considering multiple instances where alleged inadvertent mistakes have caused this Court’s orders to be violated, the Court issues an expedited timeline for compliance with the instant Order.”

Judge Briones ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing by Dec. 22, at which the government would “bear the burden of justifying, by clear and convincing evidence,” his dangerousness or flight risk, or release him under reasonable conditions of supervision. The court also ordered Respondents to file an advisory by Dec. 19 stating when the hearing would occur and a further advisory by Dec. 23 explaining “in detail” the reasons for the IJ’s bond decision.

On Dec. 19, Respondents advised that Petitioner was “set for a bond hearing on December 22, 2025, at 11:00 a.m.,” and later reported that “the Immigration Judge granted Petitioner release upon the posting of a bond of $2,500.00” and that “ICE was in the process of processing the bond.” Later that day, however, Respondents advised that Petitioner was unable to post bond because of “various technical and communication errors.” On Jan. 7, 2026, however, the court wrote that it had “received no further updates,” contacted Petitioner’s attorney on Jan. 5, and learned from counsel that Petitioner “had successfully posted bond and had been released.” On Jan. 14, after Respondents filed a joint status report advising that “there are no more issues before the Court,” Judge Briones entered final judgment because “no live issues remain.”

This habeas case involved Respondents’ improper revocation of Petitioner’s humanitarian parole through a mass-form termination process, without individualized reasoning or the reasoned decisionmaking required by the APA. Judge Moskowitz granted habeas relief after finding that the purposes of Petitioner’s parole had not been served, that humanitarian reasons still justified parole, and that Respondents “provided no reasoning that was particular to Arias.” The court held that Respondents “failed to demonstrate that their revocation of Arias’s parole was the product of reasoned decisionmaking,” and that, by denying Petitioner “the required procedure before purporting to terminate [her] parole,” Respondents “acted arbitrarily and capriciously and violated the APA.” Because the improper revocation caused Petitioner to be detained, the court ordered her immediate release on her preexisting conditions and retained jurisdiction to enforce the writ.

Petitioner Luz Loaiza Arias arrived in the United States on Oct. 19, 2023 to seek asylum after fleeing Colombia. At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, she applied for admission, was found inadmissible for lack of valid entry documents, and was given written notice to appear in § 1229a removal proceedings. That same day, Respondents granted her humanitarian parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A), and she received an I-94 listing a departure date two years later.

In April 2025, DHS sent Petitioner and other noncitizen parolees a “mass form email” stating that their parole would be terminated within seven days. Removal proceedings began the next month. On July 28, Respondents moved to dismiss those proceedings. After the immigration court granted the motion, Respondents issued a warrant and arrested Petitioner. She remained detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center when she filed her habeas petition on Oct. 1.

On Oct. 6, Judge Moskowitz set an expedited briefing schedule, concluding that summary dismissal was unwarranted. Respondents were ordered to file a response by Oct. 20, Petitioner was ordered to file a traverse by Oct. 31, and the hearing was set for Nov. 7, with no oral argument unless requested by the court.

On Nov. 25, Judge Moskowitz granted the petition. The court first rejected Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments under § 1252(b)(9) and § 1252(g), adopting other decisions in the district and holding that Petitioner was not asking the court to review removal proceedings or only conditions of confinement, but was instead challenging the legality of her detention.

The court then held that Respondents improperly revoked Petitioner’s humanitarian parole. The court explained that, under § 1182(d)(5)(A) and the governing regulation, humanitarian parole may be terminated only if the purpose of parole has been accomplished or if humanitarian reasons and the public benefit no longer warrant parole. The court found Respondents had failed to follow those statutory and regulatory requirements in three respects.

First, the court found that “the purpose of Arias’s parole has not been served.” Petitioner had fled to the United States to seek asylum, and she was still seeking asylum when she was arrested and detained. Second, the court found that “humanitarian reasons still justify Arias’s parole instead of detention and removal,” citing the continuing threat from the organization she fled. Third, the court found that parole revocation required an individualized determination, but Respondents had not provided one:

“Although Arias received written notice that her parole was revoked, Respondents provided no reasoning that was particular to Arias. No evidence suggests that the Respondents explained their reasons for revocation to Arias aside from the mass form email they sent to parolees.”

Judge Moskowitz also rejected Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s parole had been terminated or expired. Assuming that the expedited-removal notice counted as written notice, the court found that Respondents still had not shown that the purpose of parole had been served or that humanitarian reasons and public benefit no longer warranted parole. The court also rejected the argument that the I-94 departure date itself ended the parole, explaining that an ex ante date on the I-94 could not substitute for the Attorney General’s real-time opinion that the purpose of parole had been served. The court concluded that “Arias’s parole remains active despite the expiration of her I-94.”

The court held that Respondents had failed to provide reasoned decisionmaking:

“The Respondents failed to demonstrate that their revocation of Arias’s parole was the product of reasoned decisionmaking. By denying Arias ‘the required procedure before purporting to terminate [her] parole, Respondents acted arbitrarily and capriciously and violated the APA.’”

Because the parole revocation was improper, the court found that Petitioner was not eligible for detention under either § 1225 or § 1226, and that the issue of which statute governed her detention was no longer before the court. The court nevertheless noted that § 1225(b)(1) facially could not apply to Petitioner because she had been in the United States for more than two years on humanitarian parole, and that § 1225(b)(2) appeared to apply to arriving noncitizens rather than those already present.

Judge Moskowitz concluded: “That revocation action caused Arias to be improperly detained. The writ must issue to release her from custody.” The court granted the petition on the APA claim, issued the writ, and ordered Respondents to “immediately release Arias from custody on her preexisting conditions.” The court dismissed the first claim without prejudice as moot, required the parties to file a statement as to satisfaction of the writ by Nov. 26 at 5:00 p.m., and retained jurisdiction to enforce the writ. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Judge Simmons granting Petitioner’s motion to enforce after a court-ordered § 1226(a) bond hearing failed to provide the “constitutionally adequate and individualized bond hearing” required by the court’s prior order. The hearing lasted only “about 3:16 minutes,” and the immigration judge denied bond based “alone” on Petitioner’s attempted entry into Camp Pendleton, even though the Form I-213 recorded Petitioner’s explanation that he had made “the wrong turn as he was heading home” and the immigration judge acknowledged that the incident “could be simply a missed turn” or “something more nefarious.” Judge Simmons held that the evidence on which the immigration judge relied fell short of the “probative and specific standard,” and that the immigration judge “abused his discretion” by finding danger based on evidence that was not probative or specific. Because that abuse of discretion constituted “a deprivation of Petitioner’s right to due process at the bond hearing,” the court granted enforcement relief and ordered a new bond hearing.

Petitioner Zhenwei Lu, a native of China, had been detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since Feb. 4, 2025. He filed his habeas petition on Feb. 9, 2026, arguing that he should not be considered mandatorily detained under § 1225(b), and that his detention was instead governed by § 1226. Respondents acknowledged that Petitioner had to be considered detained under § 1226(a), citing the final judgment in Maldonado Bautista. Judge Simmons noted that at least one court had disagreed that a similar petitioner fell within the Maldonado Bautista class, but held independently that a petitioner apprehended at the border, paroled into the country, and then re-detained after residing in the country is governed by § 1226 rather than § 1225.

On Feb. 13, Judge Simmons granted the petition and ordered Respondents to provide a bond determination hearing under § 1226(a) within ten days. The court required a “constitutionally adequate and individualized bond hearing” and directed Respondents to file a notice of compliance within five days of the hearing, including the result and a copy of the bond order.

Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Feb. 24 stating that a timely bond hearing had been held and that bond was denied. The filing attached a one-page immigration-judge order denying bond based on “danger.” Petitioner moved to enforce on Mar. 5, arguing that the hearing did not comply with the court’s order or due process. Judge Simmons set a briefing schedule, ordered the parties to provide a transcript or audio recording of the bond hearing, and later ordered supplemental documentation, including the Form I-213.

On Jun. 2, Judge Simmons granted the motion to enforce. The court found that the hearing lasted “about 3:16 minutes.” Petitioner appeared by video with counsel. The immigration judge stated that the burden was on Petitioner to show he was not a danger or flight risk, and noted that he had the motion for bond and 23 pages of submitted evidence. Petitioner’s counsel argued that the burden should be on the government, and then argued for a $1,500 bond because Petitioner had no criminal record, was not a flight risk, had always checked in with ICE as required, had a fixed address if released, and had a credible sponsor. The immigration judge denied bond based only on the Camp Pendleton incident, the court emphasized, writing:

“I have the government’s form I-213. It establishes that the Respondent attempted to enter a U.S. military base. Based on that alone, I find that he is a danger to the community. When a foreign national tries to enter a military base, we don’t know his true reasons. It could be simply a missed turn, or it could be for something more nefarious. So bond is denied. Respondent is a danger to the community.”

Judge Simmons noted that, after making that statement, the immigration judge gave the parties no further opportunity to respond or argue, and only asked whether they reserved rights before ending the hearing.

The supplemental record showed the thinness of the evidence. The Form I-213 stated that ICE officers assigned to Camp Pendleton were contacted by a military police officer who had a foreign-born individual in custody at the main gate. It identified Petitioner as a citizen of China without documents permitting him to be in the United States, and stated that he made no claim to military service. But it also recorded Petitioner’s explanation: he “stated he attempted to enter Camp Pendleton by making the wrong turn as he was heading home.”

Judge Simmons first rejected Petitioner’s argument that the immigration judge applied the wrong burden. The court held that, under Rodriguez Diaz and related Southern District authority, a § 1226(a) detainee bears the burden of showing by a preponderance that he is not a danger or flight risk.

But the court then held that the hearing was constitutionally inadequate because the single item of evidence on which the immigration judge relied was not “probative and specific.” Judge Simmons compared the case to precedent allowing immigration judges to consider non-conviction evidence where the evidence is reliable and detailed, but found the record here lacking. The court wrote:

“Here, the IJ relied upon Petitioner’s entry into the Camp Pendleton base without authorization. Petitioner does not appear to have been charged with a crime related to this conduct. The only evidence in front of the IJ at the bond hearing was the Form I-213, which stated that Petitioner was being held at the Main Gate to Camp Pendleton and was a foreign-born individual.”

The report gave no further details about how Petitioner entered Camp Pendleton, except for Petitioner’s wrong-turn explanation. Judge Simmons emphasized the immigration judge’s own uncertainty:

“At the hearing itself, the IJ acknowledged that he did not know the true reason that Petitioner entered the base: ‘It could be simply a missed turn, or it could be for something more nefarious.’ The IJ did not take further evidence or testimony on this issue.”

The court then held:

“Evaluating this evidence in light of the cases as summarized above, the Court finds that the evidence relied upon here falls short of the ‘probative and specific standard.’”

Judge Simmons explained that conduct need not be criminally charged before an immigration judge may rely on it, but the evidence still must contain enough detail and specificity to support danger or flight-risk findings. Here, the immigration judge acknowledged the benign explanation but treated the incident as danger anyway, the court noted: “Here, even the IJ acknowledged that Petitioner’s entry into the base may have been an honest mistake, which would not support a finding of danger to the community.” The court concluded:

“Accordingly, the Court finds that the IJ abused his discretion by relying upon evidence to find danger where such evidence was not probative or specific. Because this abuse of discretion constitutes a deprivation of Petitioner’s right to due process at the bond hearing, the Court grants the motion to enforce judgment.”

Judge Simmons ordered the government to provide a second bond determination hearing within 14 days, “adhering to all Constitutional requirements as interpreted by this Circuit and this Court,” unless Petitioner requested a continuance. The government was ordered to file a notice of compliance within five days of the new hearing, including the result. Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Jun. 8.

This habeas case involved a Mexican national and longtime Colorado resident whom Judge Jackson ordered to receive a § 1226(a) bond hearing with DHS bearing the burden of proof, then later granted a motion to enforce after concluding he was “not confident that this modified procedure was followed,” that the burden-shifting risk “appears to have been realized here,” and that there were “substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information in the Form I-213.”

Mr. Cervantes Arredondo had lived in the United States for 28 years, including the last 13 in Colorado. He lived with his partner and her elderly father, both U.S. citizens with significant health issues, worked as an independent carpenter, and helped support the household. ICE arrested him on June 26, 2025 and detained him at Aurora under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). He filed this habeas petition on Sept. 26, 2025. On Oct. 31, Judge Jackson granted habeas relief in part, held that his detention was governed by § 1226(a), not § 1225, denied immediate release, and ordered Respondents to provide a bond hearing within seven days. The court further ordered that, at that hearing, DHS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he posed “a danger to the community or a flight risk such that he should remain in detention,” and required a post-hearing status report.

After the Nov. 4, 2025 bond hearing, the IJ denied bond on flight-risk grounds, and Petitioner moved to enforce, alleging that Respondents “failed to comply with the Court’s order” because the hearing and decision effectively shifted the burden back to him. On Dec. 18, Judge Jackson granted the motion to the extent of ordering a new bond hearing. The court explained that if the IJ considered “‘any evidence in the record’” without regard to the sequence required by the court’s earlier order, that approach “collapses this sequence and risks impermissibly shifting the burden back to the noncitizen,” and found: “This risk appears to have been realized here.” Because the IJ’s decision “discusses the evidence submitted by both parties interchangeably,” Judge Jackson wrote, “it is impossible to discern whether the government’s evidence, standing alone, satisfied its clear-and-convincing burden,” and therefore “the IJ did not adhere to the burden allocation and analytical sequence required by this Court’s Order.”

The court was also “troubled that some of the information the IJ relied upon … appears to be inaccurate,” observing that the Form I-213 was the only source for the assertion that Mr. Cervantes Arredondo had twice been charged with “Flight to Avoid (prosecution, confinement, etc.),” even though “there does not appear to be a Colorado state crime” by that name and the criminal case printouts “contain no reference to charges involving flight from prosecution or attempting to evade arrest.” Because “[a]part from the I-213, the record contains no evidence that [Petitioner] attempted to evade apprehension at any point,” the court concluded that “there are substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information in the Form I-213.” Judge Jackson ordered a new bond hearing within ten days and required another status report. Respondents later reported that a second bond hearing had taken place, and final judgment was entered in mid-February 2026.

This habeas case involved a Guinean national whom DHS had previously released on his own recognizance under § 1226(a), then re-detained at a Newark check-in under § 1225(b)(2)(A), after which Respondents missed the deadline to answer the magistrate judge’s show-cause order and the district judge ultimately granted habeas relief, ordered his immediate release, and required his return to New Jersey.

Petitioner Youssouf Diallo entered the United States without inspection in January 2024, was initially detained near the Arizona border, and passed a credible-fear interview. DHS then placed him in removal proceedings, later issued a superseding Notice to Appear charging him under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and released him on his own recognizance under § 1226(a). He later applied for asylum, received work authorization and a Social Security number, and, according to his DHS file, had no prior criminal history and did not appear to pose a threat to national security, border security, or public safety. By the time of the petition, he had secured employment, become engaged, and recently purchased property with his fiancée. He was re-detained at a Sept. 27, 2025 ERO Newark check-in, transferred to Colorado the following month, and filed this habeas petition on Nov. 6 while detained at the Aurora Contract Detention Facility.

On Nov. 6, Judge Starnella ordered Respondents to show cause within 60 days why the petition should not be granted, with any reply due 21 days after Respondents’ answer. On Jan. 19, Judge Starnella wrote that despite the Jan. 16 deadline, “To date, no Response has been filed,” “strongly admonished” Respondents “to follow court-imposed deadlines in the future,” and again ordered them to show cause by Jan. 23; Respondents filed their response on Jan. 20. On Jan. 29, 2026, Judge Crews granted habeas relief, held that Respondents were unlawfully detaining Diallo under § 1225 rather than § 1226, and ordered his immediate release, his return to Newark within 36 hours at Respondents’ expense, and written confirmation of his release and return by Feb. 2. In a joint status report filed Feb. 1, the parties advised that Respondents had purchased Diallo a commercial flight to Newark on Jan. 30, taken him to the airport, ensured that he boarded, and that he landed in Newark that evening. Final judgment entered on Feb. 2.

This habeas case involved a gay Moroccan man whom ICE transferred from Colorado to Texas after he filed his petition and, after the court ordered his return, did not bring back by the initial deadline—prompting Judge Sweeney to state that Respondents “have failed to return Petitioner to Colorado” and to warn that further noncompliance “may result in Respondents being held in contempt of Court” before later granting habeas relief and ordering his immediate release.

Petitioner Karim Chennah is a gay man from Morocco who entered the United States in October 2024, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, and in June 2025 received an immigration ruling ordering removal to Morocco while granting withholding of removal to Morocco. He had remained detained since June 2025. On or about Jan. 8, 2026, he was given notice of proposed removal to Cameroon, and he filed this habeas petition on Jan. 10, 2026.

On Jan. 11, Judge Sweeney ordered Respondents to respond within seven days and, under the All Writs Act, barred Petitioner’s removal from the District of Colorado or the United States absent further order. Two days later, Respondents reported that Petitioner had been transferred out of Colorado to Port Isabel Service Processing Center near Harlingen in Texas on Jan. 11—after the petition was filed but before the court entered its transfer prohibition—and that ICE was arranging his return. On Jan. 14, the court ordered Respondents to confirm his arrival back in Colorado by Jan. 16. When Respondents reported on Jan. 16 that he had still not been returned, Judge Sweeney wrote on Jan. 20 that “as of Jan[.] 16, … Respondents have failed to return Petitioner to Colorado,” ordered a further status report by 5:00 p.m. that day, and warned that “[f]ailure to comply with this Order may result in Respondents being held in contempt of Court.” The next day, following further updates by Respondents, the court ordered another status report by Jan. 22, adding, “[f]or avoidance of doubt,” the court ordered Respondents to transfer Petitioner back to Colorado no later than Jan. 22.

Granting habeas relief on Jan. 23, Judge Sweeney noted that Respondents had returned Petitioner to Colorado on Jan. 22, rejected their argument that removal was reasonably foreseeable, and granted the habeas petition under Zadvydas. She ordered Respondents to “immediately release Petitioner from custody,” to notify counsel of the exact time and location of release at least three hours in advance, and to file a status update within twenty-four hours confirming release. The case later closed on final judgment.

This habeas case involved a longtime U.S. resident whom Judge Sweeney ordered to receive a bond hearing within five days and then sharply rebuked Respondents for failing to file the required post-hearing status report, writing that they had “failed to comply” with a “clear, unequivocal, and explicit directive” and warning that future failures could result in sanctions or civil contempt.

Petitioner Leonel Servin Estevez had continuously resided in the United States since February 2006 and, as Judge Sweeney noted, “was not seeking lawful entry into the United States at the time he was detained” because “he was already here.” Respondents acknowledged that the case was not materially distinguishable from Judge Sweeney’s prior rulings holding that detention in such circumstances is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2). On Feb. 3, 2026, Judge Sweeney granted the petition and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within five days, with the government bearing the burden of justifying continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. She also ordered Respondents to file a status report within two days after the bond hearing stating whether and when it occurred, whether bond was granted or denied, and whether any supervised-release conditions had been imposed.

Respondents did not file that required status report. Instead, Petitioner was “forced to file” his own update, which informed the court that he had received a bond hearing on Feb. 6, 2026, had been granted bond, and that the immigration judge “did not impose any conditions” on release. In a Feb. 10 order, Judge Sweeney wrote that Respondents had “failed to comply” with the reporting requirement and “have not even attempted to explain their lack of compliance with this clear, unequivocal, and explicit directive.” The court emphasized that “C ourt orders are neither suggestions nor guidelines” and “‘must be followed,’” highlighting that Respondents had “not even attempted to explain their lack of compliance with this clear, unequivocal, and explicit directive,” and that Petitioner’s own filing “demonstrates the minimal effort necessary to satisfy the Court’s [Feb. 3] Order.” “Still, Respondents failed to do so,” the court wrote,ordering Respondents to file another status report by Feb. 17 confirming that Petitioner had appeared at his Feb. 16 meeting with immigration authorities and that no additional supervision conditions, including electronic monitoring, had been imposed without authorization. Judge Sweeney further warned that “any future failure to adhere to such mandatory orders may result in Respondents, or Respondents’ counsel, incurring such consequences, including being subjected to sanctions or being held in civil contempt.”

Respondents filed status reports on Feb. 10, 11, and 17. On Feb. 18, after reviewing Respondents’ Feb. 17 filing regarding Petitioner’s Feb. 16 meeting with immigration authorities, the court noted that although Petitioner appeared, “the ICE office was closed,” and ordered the parties to file a joint status report by Feb. 27 confirming whether the meeting had been rescheduled and, if so, for when. The parties filed that joint status report on Feb. 23. A later Mar. 23 minute order by the newly assigned magistrate judge noted Respondents’ representation in the joint status report that Petitioner’s Feb. 16 meeting with immigration officials “has not been rescheduled” and directed them to file another status report once it was. No further status report appeared on the public docket as of Apr. 17.

This habeas case involved a noncitizen whom ICE re-arrested after imposing GPS monitoring and check-ins that the immigration judge had not ordered when releasing him on bond, prompting Judge Sweeney to grant habeas relief, bar any release conditions inconsistent with the IJ’s order, and then later grant enforcement when Respondents failed to return his driver’s license, employment authorization document, and passport—conduct the court said was “obviously wrong” and “certainly … a violation of an order from this Court.”

Petitioner Javier Andres Garcia Cortes had already secured relief once before this petition, in a habeas case brought in August 2025.: after Judge Sweeney ordered a bond hearing on Sept. 16, 2025, an immigration judge released him on a $15,000 bond, finding that he was not a danger and did “not pose a flight risk.” ICE nonetheless “enrolled” him the next day in its Alternatives to Detention program, requiring GPS monitoring and periodic check-ins, and then re-arrested him on Jan. 21, 2026 for alleged noncompliance with those added conditions. He filed this habeas petition on Jan. 24.

On Feb. 2, Judge Sweeney granted the petition and ordered Petitioner released from custody. She held that “Respondents may not impose additional conditions after an IJ has ordered release on a bond and set conditions of release,” ordered that Respondents “shall not subject Petitioner to conditions of release that are inconsistent with the exact terms as set by the Immigration Judge,” including “any and all GPS monitoring technology or devices,” and required a status update within twenty-four hours certifying compliance. The court noted that Respondents "acknowledge" that the IJ "imposed no additional conditions on Petitioner’s release", adding that "absent any intervening change in law or material—and the Court means material—change in fact, the Court will require no argument in the future as to whether the after-the-fact imposition of conditions that exceed or contradict an immigration judge’s bond order amount to a petitioner’s due process violations."

Respondents filed a status report the next day representing that Petitioner had been released. But on Feb. 6, Petitioner moved to enforce, stating that Respondents had not returned all of his property, including his driver’s license, employment authorization document, and passport. Granting the motion that same day, Judge Sweeney wrote that Respondents “were and are obviously wrong” not to return such items upon release, items that were “of paramount importance to him.” “and that retaining them was “certainly … a violation of an order from this Court.” The court added:

“At its most benign, this failure is an unforced error of preventable dimension. At its worst, this is unjustifiable intransigence, where retention of Petitioner’s belongings is tantamount to imposition of an additional and illegal condition the immigration judge didn’t and hasn’t imposed. ... And certainly it’s a violation of an order from this Court.”

The court ordered Respondents to “immediately return to Petitioner all of his belongings,” required a status report within three hours, and, if the items had still not been returned, another status report by 5:00 p.m. that same day certifying that the possessions were in Petitioner’s or counsel’s possession. The court later entered final judgment on Mar. 2 and closed the case.

This habeas case involved an unlawful automatic stay of an immigration judge’s bond order, a finding that Respondents’ detention of Petitioner without an initial custody determination was “arbitrary and capricious,” and Respondents’ later imposition of additional release conditions after Judge Sweeney ordered release subject to the immigration judge’s bond conditions. After Petitioner moved to enforce, Judge Sweeney ordered Respondents to show cause why they should not be required to remove “all conditions other than monetary bond, including the ankle monitor.” Respondents later represented that they had removed the GPS monitor and all check-in requirements, and the court denied the enforcement motion as moot.

Petitioner Ivan Arana-Hernandez filed his habeas petition on Feb. 21, 2026, and an amended petition on Feb. 27, challenging his detention under § 1226. An immigration judge granted bond on Feb. 22, but Respondents appealed to the BIA, triggering an automatic stay of the bond order and prolonging Petitioner’s detention. On Feb. 23, Judge Sweeney ordered Respondents not to remove Petitioner from the District of Colorado or the United States while the petition remained pending.

On Mar. 12, Judge Sweeney granted habeas relief. The court agreed with Petitioner that Respondents’ “invocation of the automatic stay” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 was unlawful, explaining that other courts had reached the same conclusion and that “Respondents fail to persuade otherwise.” The court also rejected Respondents’ ripeness argument, reasoning that, notwithstanding the BIA appeal, Petitioner’s claims “relate to the lack of an initial custody determination,” and the “pending appeal has no effect on those legal and constitutional claims.”

Judge Sweeney then made the case’s core APA finding. The court explained that § 1226 requires an initial custody determination before detention; the record showed, and Respondents acknowledged, that Petitioner was detained under § 1226; and the record also showed that Petitioner was detained without an initial custody determination. “Respondents do not contest this, nor could they,” the court wrote. The court held that the immigration judge’s amended Feb. 22 order “didn’t change this” because it gave an earlier alternate bond finding “full effect” but did not, and could not, revise the prior conclusion that Respondents had failed to make an initial custody determination.

For those reasons, Judge Sweeney held that Respondents “did not comply with their own regulations.” The court concluded that Petitioner’s detention was therefore “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA and had to be set aside. The court ordered Petitioner released from custody subject to the terms and conditions, including bond conditions, imposed by the immigration judge’s Feb. 22 order. Judge Sweeney further ordered that Respondents “shall not impose any conditions beyond those imposed by the immigration judge,” and required a status report within five days stating whether Petitioner had been released on bond.

On Mar. 31, Petitioner moved to enforce, representing that Respondents had violated the prior order by imposing the additional condition of wearing an ankle monitor. Judge Sweeney ordered Respondents to show cause why the court should not grant the enforcement motion and order Respondents to remove “all conditions other than monetary bond, including the ankle monitor.”

“Before the Court is Petitioner's Motion to Enforce, in which Petitioner represents that Respondents have violated the Court's prior order by imposing upon Petitioner the ‘additional condition’ of ‘wear[ing] an ankle monitor.’ Respondents are ordered to show cause on or before Friday, April 3, 2026, why the Court should not grant Petitioner's enforcement motion, ordering Respondents to comply with the Court's prior order and remove ‘all conditions other than monetary bond, including the ankle monitor.’”

On Apr. 6, after Respondents responded, Judge Sweeney denied the enforcement motion as moot, writing:

“In the response, Respondents represent that they have removed the GPS monitor, as well as removed all check-in requirements, including the March 24, 2027 check-in at the ICE ERO Florence Office. Thus, based on Respondents' representations, they have removed all ‘additional conditions, including an ankle monitor and check-in requirements.’”

Final judgment was entered May 4.

This habeas case involved ICE’s removal of a Nigerian citizen to Nigeria despite Judge Wang’s April 14 order barring Respondents from removing him from the District of Colorado or the United States unless the district court or Tenth Circuit vacated the order. Judge Wang had entered that order “to preserve its jurisdiction to consider the Petition,” and Respondents themselves later represented that removal “cannot be effectuated unless and until this Court’s do-not-remove order is vacated.” After Petitioner filed an emergency motion to enforce, Respondents admitted that he had been removed, said they “greatly regret this error,” and attributed the removal to an “oversight” in ICE’s EARM system. Judge Wang found that “there is no dispute—nor could there be” that Respondents “unequivocally violated” the April 14 order, that “there can also be no doubt” Respondents had notice and understood the order, and that the violation—“inadvertent or otherwise”—was not justified by the “unprecedented onslaught of immigration detention-related habeas petitions.” Although the court denied the habeas petition, granted Respondents’ motion to vacate the no-removal order, and declined to order Petitioner returned, it ordered Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt and required to pay Petitioner’s reasonable attorneys’ fees for the emergency enforcement motion as a sanction.

Petitioner Stanley Chigozie Nwabuwa filed his habeas petition on Apr. 10, 2026, while detained in Colorado. On Apr. 14, Judge Wang ordered Petitioner to serve Respondents, directed Respondents within seven days of service to “show cause why the Petition should not be granted,” and ordered that Respondents “shall not remove Petitioner from the District of Colorado or the United States unless or until this Court or the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacates this Order.”

Respondents appeared and filed an answer and a motion to vacate the no-removal order on May 1. On May 4, Judge Wang ordered Petitioner to respond to the motion to vacate by May 8, and Petitioner filed his response on May 6.

On May 20, Petitioner filed an emergency motion to enforce the court order, for an order to show cause, sanctions, and an order requiring Respondents to facilitate his return to the United States. Judge Wang ordered Respondents to respond by noon the next day and set a telephonic status conference for May 21. The court also ordered Respondents to have a representative present at the conference “to answer the Court’s questions regarding the removal.”

At the May 21 status conference, Respondents’ representative Sean Christner appeared with counsel. The courtroom minutes state: “The Court was alerted that Petitioner was removed from the United States of America to Nigeria despite the Court Order that he remain in the District of Colorado until and unless this Court or the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the Order.” The minutes further state that Respondents’ counsel and representative answered the court’s questions about Petitioner’s removal “based on an administrative error,” and that counsel answered questions about conferral to rectify the situation. Judge Wang took under advisement both Petitioner’s enforcement / sanctions / return motion and Respondents’ motion to vacate the no-removal order, stating that the court would issue a written order.

Petitioner filed a separate motion for temporary restraining order on May 27. In the Jun. 1 order, Judge Wang denied the emergency enforcement motion in part and reserved it in part, denied the habeas petition, granted Respondents’ motion to vacate the no-removal order, and vacated the Apr. 14 order. The court declined to order Petitioner’s return or release because his removal order had become final, he was then subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a), and the court concluded that he had not shown entitlement to a renewed custody determination or release on the record before it. But the court separately found that Respondents’ removal of Petitioner while the Apr. 14 order remained “in full force and effect” had “unequivocally violated” an unambiguous order of which Respondents had knowledge. Although Respondents had responded to the emergency enforcement motion, Judge Wang ordered them, “out of an abundance of caution,” to “show cause as to why they should not be held in civil contempt and ordered to compensate Petitioner for reasonable attorney’s fees associated with the filing of the Emergency Motion to Enforce as a sanction for their violation of this Court’s April 14 Order while it was in full force and effect.” The court’s decretal paragraph likewise ordered Respondents to “show cause no later than June 8, 2026 why they should not be held in civil contempt for violating the Court’s April 14 Order and why Petitioner should not be awarded attorney’s fees associated with the filing of the Emergency Motion to Enforce.”

This habeas case involved enforcement of Magistrate Judge Chung’s habeas order requiring a § 1226(a) bond hearing after the court found that Petitioner’s “continued detention without a bond hearing was a violation of his due process rights.” After the immigration judge placed the burden of proof on Petitioner, Magistrate Judge Chung granted the motion to enforce in part, holding that the hearing “did not provide him the required due process” and, “[i]n short,” “did not comport with the minimal requirements of due process because the immigration judge placed the burden of proof on the petitioner”; the court ordered a second bond hearing at which “the government bearing the burden” must prove flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence or danger by clear and convincing evidence.

Petitioner Josue Isai Perez Ruiz, a citizen of El Salvador, had lived in the United States since 2017. DHS officers took him into custody on Jan. 14, 2026, and transported him to the Aurora Contract Detention Facility in Colorado. Immigration authorities treated him as ineligible for a bond hearing because they asserted that § 1225(b), rather than § 1226(a), required his detention pending removal proceedings.

On Apr. 14, Magistrate Judge Chung granted habeas relief in part. The court held that Petitioner was detained under § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that his continued detention without a bond hearing violated due process. Respondents relied on contrary authority from outside the Tenth Circuit, but the court noted that they presented no reason to reverse its prior analysis and conceded that, if the court adhered to its prior ruling, the facts were not materially distinguishable. The court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days, enjoined them from denying bond on the ground that he was detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and required a status report within seven days of the hearing stating whether bond was granted and, if denied, the reasons.

An immigration judge held the bond hearing on Apr. 21. On Apr. 30, Petitioner moved to enforce, arguing that the hearing did not satisfy due process because the immigration judge placed the burden of proof on him. Respondents did not dispute Petitioner’s account of the hearing’s outcome, but argued that they had complied with the court’s order, that the court lacked jurisdiction, and that Petitioner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

On May 29, Magistrate Judge Chung granted the motion in part. The court held that it retained jurisdiction because Petitioner was not asking the court to “conduct a bond hearing, weigh the evidence, or step into the shoes of the immigration judge,” but instead asked whether “the bond hearing complied with due process.” The court emphasized that it had granted habeas relief because Petitioner’s “continued detention without a bond hearing was a violation of his due process rights,” and that it therefore “continues to have jurisdiction to consider whether the bond hearing he was afforded complied with due process.”

The court then rejected Respondents’ argument that the bond hearing provided the required due process. The Apr. 14 habeas order had not specified which party bore the burden of proof, but Magistrate Judge Chung wrote that “[t]he Court’s clear intent was to provide the petitioner with the due process he had been denied.” Incorporating its later analysis in Kuzmic, the court held that “to comply with due process, at a § 1226(a) bond hearing the government must bear the burden” of proving flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence or danger by clear and convincing evidence. Because the burden was placed on Petitioner, the court held that the bond hearing “did not provide him the required due process.” It stated the defect most directly: “In short, the bond hearing before the immigration judge did not comport with the minimal requirements of due process because the immigration judge placed the burden of proof on the petitioner.”

Magistrate Judge Chung declined to order immediate release and instead found that “a second bond hearing is the just and proper outcome.” The court ordered Respondents to provide a second § 1226(a) bond hearing within seven days, with “the government bearing the burden” of proving flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence or danger by clear and convincing evidence, and required a status report within seven days of the hearing stating whether bond was granted and, if denied, the reasons.

This habeas case involved a court-ordered § 1226 bond hearing that Judge Sweeney later found was constitutionally defective because the immigration judge’s flight-risk analysis ignored nearly all of Petitioner’s evidence, relied on speculation about future immigration relief and future behavior, and failed to provide the individualized assessment required by due process. After construing Petitioner’s post-hearing status report as a motion to enforce, Judge Sweeney found that the hearing was “faulty—and to such a degree that warrants Petitioner’s immediate release,” held that “Respondents and the IJ failed to comply with the Court’s prior order,” and ordered Petitioner released within 24 hours without additional conditions.

Petitioner Luis Enrique Perez Serrano filed his habeas petition on Apr. 16, 2026. On Apr. 17, Judge Sweeney ordered Respondents to respond and barred Petitioner’s removal from the District of Colorado or the United States while the case remained pending. On Apr. 30, after Respondents acknowledged that the central legal issue was materially indistinguishable from a prior ruling by the same court, Judge Sweeney granted the petition and ordered Respondents to provide a § 1226 bond hearing within five days. The order required the government to “bear the burden of demonstrating to an immigration judge (IJ) by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally justified.” bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was a flight risk or danger such that physical custody was legally justified. The court also barred undue delay in bond payment or processing if bond were granted, required a status report within two days of the hearing, and barred later re-detention absent a new pre-deprivation bond hearing at which the government again bore the burden.

After an extension, the immigration judge held the bond hearing on May 8 and denied bond. Petitioner filed a status report on May 13 arguing that, although Respondents had provided a hearing “by action alone,” the “underlying compliance” with the court’s order was “questionable.” Judge Sweeney ordered Respondents to respond and to provide the immigration judge’s bond memorandum, which Petitioner represented had not been provided to him or his immigration counsel.

On May 19, Judge Sweeney construed Petitioner’s status report as a motion to enforce and granted immediate release. The court first confirmed that it had authority to ensure its earlier bond-hearing order had been “carried out,” and then found that the bond hearing did not comply with the court’s order or due process, stating:

“The parties dispute the constitutional sufficiency of Petitioner’s bond hearing. The Court agrees this hearing was faulty—and to such a degree that warrants Petitioner’s immediate release.”

Judge Sweeney emphasized that Petitioner had submitted a “robust record offered in support of release,” including mortgage information, his wife’s death certificate, his daughter’s birth certificate, utility bills, pay stubs, and twenty letters of support from community members, family, and friends. Yet the immigration judge’s memorandum referred only to the daughter’s birth certificate before relying on speculation about Petitioner’s possible immigration relief:

“However, a reader of the IJ’s bond decision and supporting memorandum would lack awareness of it, given that the IJ’s bond memorandum discussed only the daughter’s birth certificate. This is error on a constitutional scale.”

The court then identified the second problem: the immigration judge’s speculation that Petitioner’s “limited options” and “speculative likelihood” of future relief increased flight risk because he supposedly had “little incentive” to appear. Judge Sweeney wrote:

“Simply stated, this is not the ‘individualized assessment’ that the IJ was required to provide Petitioner, nor does such speculative assessment engage the relevant statutory factors—which the IJ recited, but obviously failed to discuss in her analysis or meaningfully apply.”

The court summarized the defects in direct terms:

“In sum: the IJ speculated as to future events. Based on these speculations, the IJ further speculated as to Petitioner’s future behavior. Virtually all of the record went unacknowledged in the IJ’s bond memorandum and finding that bond denial was warranted. … Each of these errors, standing alone, presents a constitutional infirmity. The same is true when considering them together.”

Judge Sweeney rejected Respondents’ argument that the bond memorandum complied with the court’s order or due process. The court explained that it was not substituting its own discretionary bond decision for the immigration judge’s, but determining whether Petitioner received the required procedural protections. “Explained above, he wasn’t,” the court wrote, concluding: “Having concluded Respondents and the IJ failed to comply with the Court’s prior order, it must now determine the proper remedy.”

Judge Sweeney ordered immediate release, no later than within 24 hours, and barred Respondents from imposing additional release or supervision conditions beyond those in place immediately before Petitioner’s recent detention. The court also required a compliance status report within three days and enjoined Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner unless they first proved, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing, that he was a flight risk or danger such that physical custody was legally justified. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved Judge Martínez first granting habeas relief and ordering a § 1226(a) bond hearing with the Government bearing the burden by clear and convincing evidence, then later granting amended habeas relief after finding that the hearing did not comply with the court’s order or due process. After the court’s Mar. 13 order required a bond hearing within seven days, the immigration judge denied bond in a conclusory order that purported to find against Petitioner whether the burden rested on DHS or on Petitioner, and Judge Martínez later wrote that the order “supplies nothing further” and offered “no analysis whatsoever.” When Petitioner challenged the hearing, the court held that it was not reviewing the immigration judge’s discretionary bond decision but “assessing whether the IJ applied the legal standard prescribed by this Court and otherwise followed the Court’s directives,” and stated that it had retained authority “to address noncompliance with its mandate.” Judge Martínez found the bond order “plainly deficient on its face,” “wholly bereft of any analysis whatsoever,” and insufficient to show that the immigration judge had applied the court-ordered burden framework. The court rejected the Government’s later supplemental filing attaching an after-the-fact immigration-judge order, holding that the “post-hoc explanation” did not cure the problem, that “[n]othing in the IJ’s order backs up” the Government’s assertion that actual findings were made in accordance with the court’s order, and that the later order was “not at all credible.” Judge Martínez concluded that the immigration judge had “failed to adhere to the burden allocation and analytical evidentiary sequence required by this Court’s Order” and thereby deprived Petitioner of due process. Relying on the “mounting evidence” that § 1226(a) bond hearings in immigration court had “preordained outcomes” that had become “impossible to ignore,” the court described the case as “yet another example of that unfortunate reality,” refused to require Petitioner “to undergo yet another sham bond hearing,” and ordered immediate release.

This habeas case involved Judge Martínez ordering immediate release rather than even an initial immigration-court bond hearing after finding that the Government’s § 1225 mandatory-detention position was already foreclosed by prior District of Colorado decisions and that ordinary bond-hearing relief could not be relied on to cure the unlawful detention. The court wrote that, “[b]ased on the observations of fellow judges across the country,” it was “far from convinced” that deficient § 1226(a) bond hearings were “an isolated incident”; to the contrary, the “mounting evidence” that immigration-court bond hearings under § 1226(a) have “preordained outcomes” had become “impossible to ignore.”Judge Martínez pointed to cases in which immigration judges had acted by all appearances as “mere rubber-stamp[s]”for predetermined detention decisions, relied on materially false criminal-record information, failed to explain bond denials, or issued decisions with “zero reference” to the record or arguments. The court then adopted the rationale that “[R]espondents’ conduct can no longer be attributed to mere negligence or ineptitude,” and that ordering another immigration-court process would “effectively allow the Government to transform an unlawful detention into a lawful one through post-hoc justifications.” Judge Martínez concluded that, “[g]iven this reality,” immediate release was required. The court ordered Petitioner released on recognizance with all personal belongings, subject only to his pre-existing parole conditions, barred additional release conditions, and enjoined re-arrest, re-detention, removal, or transfer absent further court action or a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which Respondents would bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence.

Petitioner Amrit Pal, an asylum seeker from India, arrived in the United States around May 26, 2022. ICE apprehended him in June 2022 and released him after he posted an immigration bond. In August 2025, after a social gathering where he consumed alcohol, Petitioner became seriously ill, developed a high fever, and was taken to a hospital by friends. He later received minor alcohol-related citations. ICE arrested him on or about Aug. 29, 2025, pursuant to an administrative warrant connected to immigration proceedings, and detained him under § 1225 at the Denver Contract Detention Facility.

Petitioner filed his emergency habeas petition on Mar. 18, 2026, challenging the legality of his detention. On Mar. 25, Judge Martínez ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted and enjoined Respondents, under the All Writs Act and to preserve the court’s jurisdiction, from removing, transferring, or causing Pal’s removal or transfer from the District of Colorado unless the district court or the Tenth Circuit vacated the order.

Respondents argued that the central legal issue was whether a noncitizen present in the United States and not admitted or paroled was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), or instead entitled under § 1226(a) to seek a bond hearing. But Respondents acknowledged the issue was “not materially different” from one Judge Martínez had already resolved in another case.

On Apr. 7, Judge Martínez granted the petition. The court relied on its prior decisions holding that noncitizens already present in the United States for years are not “seeking admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that detention in that posture is governed by § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225. The court rejected the Government’s effort to treat Petitioner’s case differently from those earlier cases. It relied on prior District of Colorado reasoning:

“Noncitizens who are just ‘present’ in the country . . ., who have been here for years upon years and never proceeded to obtain any form of citizenship[,] . . . are not ‘seeking’ admission.”

The remedy was the central tracked feature. Ordinarily, after finding § 1226(a) governs detention, a court might order a bond hearing. Judge Martínez instead relied on a recent line of cases finding bond-hearing relief inadequate because of recurring defects in immigration-court bond proceedings. The court identified a March 2026 bond order in Quiroz Zacarias, where an immigration judge issued an alternative ruling that found for DHS whether the burden rested on DHS or on the detainee:

“If DHS bears the burden, the Court finds that DHS has met its burden to establish that the respondent is both a danger and a flight risk.

If the respondent bears the burden, the Court finds that the respondent has not met his burden to establish that he is neither a danger to the community nor a significant flight risk such that release from custody is warranted.”

Judge Martínez then concluded:

“Based on the observations of fellow judges across the country, the Court is far from convinced this was an isolated incident. To the contrary, the mounting evidence that bond determination hearings conducted in Immigration Court under § 1226(a) have preordained outcomes has become impossible to ignore.”

The court cited cases in which district courts had ordered immediate release after constitutionally deficient immigration-court bond hearings. The cited examples included a New Jersey case in which an immigration judge acted by all appearances as a “mere rubber-stamp” for Respondents’ predetermined decision to deny bond (Zheng v. Rokosky); a Nevada case involving bond revocation based on materially false criminal-record information (Montero-Martinez v. Chief Council for the District of Nevada); a Central District of California case where the immigration judge did not explain the basis for denying bond (Miri v. Bondi); and a Northern District of Ohio case where an immigration judge’s decision contained “zero reference” to the record or arguments and supplied no reasoning for danger or flight-risk conclusions (Rodriguez v. Greene). The court then quoted the rationale for not ordering even an initial bond hearing in cases like Petitioner’s:

“[R]espondents’ conduct can no longer be attributed to mere negligence or ineptitude, . . . and doing so would effectively allow the Government to transform an unlawful detention into a lawful one through post-hoc justifications.”

Judge Martínez concluded that, “[g]iven this reality, the Court will order Pal’s immediate release.” The court made the order to show cause absolute, granted the petition on Claims 1 and 2, and did not reach the remaining claims. It ordered Respondents to release Petitioner on his own recognizance by Apr. 9, with all personal belongings, subject only to the conditions of his pre-existing parole. Respondents were barred from imposing additional release conditions.

The court also enjoined Respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner unless they first demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that he was a flight risk or danger to the community. Any such hearing had to place the burden on Respondents and allow Petitioner to have counsel present. The court also continued the no-removal/no-transfer injunction barring Respondents from removing or transferring Petitioner from the District of Colorado unless the district court or Tenth Circuit vacated the order.

This habeas and civil-rights case involved President Donald J. Trump’s (President Trump’s) secret invocation of the Alien Enemies Act, rapid removals to El Salvador’s CECOT prison while emergency judicial proceedings were underway, Chief Judge James E. Boasberg’s (Judge Boasberg’s) finding of probable cause for criminal contempt, and later rulings on constructive custody, judicial-review evasion, and return-facilitation. On Mar. 15, while the signed proclamation remained undisclosed, the government loaded Venezuelan detainees onto buses and planes. After Judge Boasberg entered an ex parte temporary restraining order for the named Plaintiffs and convened an emergency hearing on classwide relief, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Drew C. Ensign (DAAG Ensign) could not provide flight details even as Plaintiffs reported that “planes are going right now taking Venezuelans to El Salvador.” Judge Boasberg orally directed DAAG Ensign that any plane carrying class members that was “going to take off or is in the air needs to be returned to the United States,” or at minimum that no one be disembarked, and later entered a written classwide TRO. The planes continued to El Salvador, where passengers were transferred into CECOT. In the ensuing compliance and contempt proceedings, Judge Boasberg wrote that the government’s “decision to hastily dispatch flights as legal proceedings were ongoing” implied “a desire to circumvent judicial review,” that later flight movements “were obscured from the Court” because the government represented that it still had no flight details, and that the court faced the “growing realization” that the government “might be rapidly dispatching removal flights in an apparent effort to evade judicial review while also refusing to provide any helpful information.” When the government resisted providing flight details, Judge Boasberg wrote that it had “again evaded its obligations” and called a declaration from Acting Field Office Director Robert L. Cerna (Acting FOD Cerna) “woefully insufficient.” At the Apr. 3 show-cause hearing, Judge Boasberg stated that there was “a fair likelihood” that the government had “acted in bad faith throughout that day,” and DAAG Ensign agreed that public statements suggesting the TRO required release, barred ordinary removals, or prevented ordinary enforcement would be “false.”

On Apr. 16, Judge Boasberg found probable cause for criminal contempt. He wrote that the government had “continued the hurried removal operation” and, hours after the order issued, transferred “two planeloads of passengers protected by the TRO into a Salvadoran mega-prison.” The court found that Defendants’ actions demonstrated “willful disregard” for the order, that “none of their responses” had been satisfactory, and that the Constitution “does not tolerate willful disobedience of judicial orders — especially by officials of a coordinate branch who have sworn an oath to uphold it.” Judge Boasberg described the day as moving at “breakneck speed” because of the government’s “apparent effort to remove individuals more quickly than the judicial proceedings in which it was actively participating could keep pace,” and wrote that government officials’ later boasts “intimated that they had defied the Court’s Order deliberately and gleefully.” The court also described the government’s post-order conduct as “increasing obstructionism,” including “hyper-technical legal arguments,” refusal to provide relevant facts even privately to the court, and “various imaginative arguments” for why it had technically complied. Judge Boasberg found “no convincing reason to avoid the conclusion that appears obvious”: Defendants had “deliberately flouted this Court’s written Order and, separately, its oral command,” and their conduct “betrayed a desire to outrun the equitable reach of the Judiciary.” The court gave the government a choice: purge contempt by facilitating habeas review for the removed class members or identify the officials who, with knowledge of the TRO, decided not to halt transfer of class members out of U.S. custody.

The later merits track centered on whether the government’s removals had defeated effective habeas review. In the Jun. 4 preliminary-injunction opinion, Judge Boasberg wrote that the Supreme Court had “effectively said that the Constitution flatly prohibits the Government from doing exactly what it did that Saturday,” when it “secretly loaded people onto planes, kept many of them in the dark about their destination, and raced to spirit them away before they could invoke their due-process rights.” The court stated that its Mar. 15 mandate not to relinquish custody “was ignored,” and held that due process mattered because “the Government’s mere promise that there has been no mistake does not suffice.” Judge Boasberg wrote that there was “simply no way to know for sure” whether the CECOT Plaintiffs were properly subject to the Act because they “never had any opportunity to challenge the Government’s say-so”; instead, Defendants “spirited away planeloads of people before any such challenge could be made,” and “significant evidence” later suggested that many people “currently entombed in CECOT” had no gang connection and were being held on “flimsy, even frivolous, accusations.” Although the court initially accepted the government’s constructive-custody position “at this point,” it flagged the “incongruity” between the government’s account and public statements by Salvadoran and U.S. officials, warned that courts must not allow the Executive “to switch the Constitution on or off at will” by moving detainees beyond habeas reach, and described Plaintiffs’ theory of the arrangement with El Salvador as a possible “ruse — and a fraud on the court — designed to maintain control over the detainees beyond the reach of the writ.” Judge Boasberg also reminded the government that “knowingly false statements in a sworn declaration” could expose an official to perjury prosecution.

On Dec. 22, Judge Boasberg granted summary judgment and class certification, finding that the United States had maintained constructive custody over the CECOT detainees, that the court had habeas jurisdiction, that the class had been denied due process, and that the government had to facilitate Plaintiffs’ ability to obtain hearings. The opinion opened by stating that Venezuelan men had been “hustled out of a detention center in Texas, loaded onto planes, and shipped to an infamous mega-prison in El Salvador with no explanation and no opportunity to challenge the reason for their hasty removal.” Judge Boasberg found that El Salvador held Plaintiffs “not because of any independent interest in their detention, but purely because it would receive a financial benefit via its arrangement with the United States,”and that the government “retained, and exercised, the power to control the return of CECOT detainees.” He rejected the government’s effort to minimize U.S. control over the later prisoner exchange as “at odds with the undisputed record,” writing that the government’s account “belies reality.” The court then made an express review-evasion finding: Plaintiffs’ “hasty and secretive removal from the United States was certainly intended to deprive them of an opportunity to secure prior judicial review.” DOJ Office of Immigration Litigation attorney Erez Reuveni’s (Reuveni’s) whistleblower statements “corroborate[d]” that conclusion, including the disclosure that Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove (Bove) said that if courts tried to stop the removals, DOJ would need to consider telling courts, “Fuck you,” and ignoring any court order. After summary judgment, Judge Boasberg ordered return-facilitation relief, writing that the government had denied due process to a class of Venezuelans deported to El Salvador “in defiance of this Court’s Order,” that the government’s responses “essentially told the Court to pound sand,” and that “it is up to the Government to remedy the wrong that it perpetrated here.” The D.C. Circuit ultimately intervened twice through mandamus, first vacating the probable-cause contempt order and later directing termination of the renewed criminal-contempt proceedings, but the district-court record remained centered on Judge Boasberg’s findings of willful disregard, bad-faith and deliberate defiance concerns, judicial-review evasion, constructive custody, and failure to provide an adequate remedy for the due-process violations.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to meet Judge Dudek’s § 2243 show-cause response deadline. After ordering Respondents to show cause why the petition should not be granted, the court later noted that “[n]o response has been filed” and directed Respondents to “show cause why they have not complied with this Court’s Order,” while allowing them to discharge the order by answering the petition. Respondents then filed their response, and the court discharged the compliance show-cause order. On the merits, Judge Dudek denied habeas relief without prejudice, applied a “presumption of regularity” to ICE’s operational judgment, found that Petitioner offered “nothing more than his own skepticism to rebut it,” and rejected any bad-faith or review-evasion theory because the record was “devoid of evidence” that officials manipulated release and re-detention to reset the Zadvydas clock or avoid judicial oversight.

Petitioner Luc Quy Tran, a Vietnamese national, arrived in the United States as a child. After a murder conviction, an immigration judge ordered him removed, but because the government could not effectuate his return to Vietnam because of repatriation issues, ICE released him on an order of supervision in 2003. For more than twenty years, Petitioner lived in the community and apparently complied with his release conditions. On Dec. 9, 2025, ICE revoked his supervision and detained him, citing changed circumstances and a significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future based on a new plan to remove him to Mexico. He filed this habeas petition on Dec. 30, 2025, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment, the INA, the APA, and the Accardi doctrine. He also filed a motion for injunctive relief.

On Dec. 31, Judge Dudek ordered Respondents under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 to show cause by Jan. 15, 2026 why the petition should not be granted. When no response was filed by that deadline, the court entered a Jan. 16 order stating that “[n]o response has been filed” and directing Respondents by Jan. 23 to “show cause why they have not complied with this Court’s Order,” while allowing them to “alternatively discharge these orders by responding to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Respondents filed their response on Jan. 23.

The case then proceeded on both emergency relief and the merits. On Jan. 20, Judge Dudek denied Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order, writing that although the court took his “underlying liberty claims seriously,” the stopgap measures he sought were “either beyond our reach or beside the point.” The court held that § 1252(g) barred it from staying execution of a removal order, that an order preventing transfer out of the district was unnecessary because jurisdiction would not be destroyed by a later government-effectuated transfer, and that Petitioner’s proposed third-country-removal notice injunction was an improper request for a general “obey the law” order.

On Mar. 10, Judge Dudek denied the habeas petition without prejudice. The court first rejected the government’s jurisdictional arguments, holding that Petitioner was not asking the court to vacate or stop a removal order but was instead challenging “the procedural mechanics of his current detention.” On the merits, however, the court held that Petitioner had “not been detained long enough” to transform his custody into a Zadvydas violation. The court also rejected Petitioner’s attempt to aggregate his prior 2003 detention with his current detention, declining “to endorse a blanket rule that all prior periods of confinement automatically aggregate to satisfy the Zadvydas six-month clock.” Instead, Judge Dudek adopted a flexible approach under which the government receives a new presumptively reasonable six-month period for each discrete detention “unless there are facts suggesting the government is acting with an improper motive.” The court added that aggregation may be appropriate if the record showed “a calculated pattern of catch-and-release designed merely to reset the Zadvydas clock or evade judicial review,” but found that “the record is devoid of evidence that immigration officials manipulated his release and rearrest to bypass the six-month presumption or avoid judicial oversight.”

Judge Dudek also rejected Petitioner’s procedural due-process and Accardi claims. The court found that ICE gave Petitioner written notice and an informal interview on Dec. 9, the same day he was detained, and that this process “clears the bar” for Fifth Amendment purposes. On the Accardi claim, the court held that Petitioner relied on the wrong regulation in challenging the signature on the revocation notice, that § 241.13 governed his revocation, and that ICE’s plan to remove him to Mexico qualified as a changed circumstance. The court wrote that ICE’s operational judgment came with “a presumption of regularity,” and that Petitioner offered “nothing more than his own skepticism to rebut it.” The court also held that the notice “did not hide the ball,” that Petitioner failed to rebut the government’s interview notes, and that the notice’s citation to § 241.4 rather than § 241.13 was not a substantive failure because “the agency’s core rationale has not changed.” Finally, the court rejected Petitioner’s APA claim as conclusory and duplicative of habeas, and rejected his third-country-removal claim as premature and jurisdictionally barred to the extent he sought an injunction restraining removal. Judgment was entered on Mar. 11.

This habeas enforcement case involved Respondent’s failure to comply with a habeas judgment requiring a § 1226(a) bond hearing or release within ten days. After Judge Steele held that Petitioner was entitled to statutory process under § 1226(a), not continued detention under § 1225(b)(2), the court ordered Respondent to provide “statutory process, including a bond hearing, or release him.” When Petitioner moved to enforce, the court found that “the time to comply has passed, but [Petitioner] remains detained, and no bond hearing has been scheduled,” and ordered Respondent to appear in person “to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the Court’s earlier order.” After Respondent notified the court that Petitioner had been released, Judge Steele denied the enforcement motion as moot, discharged the show-cause order, and cancelled the hearing.

Petitioner Lopez Martinez, a citizen of Cuba, entered the United States without inspection in November 2022. He was initially detained at the border and released on an order of recognizance. He had no reported criminal history. On Oct. 25, 2025, he was detained when he reported to a regularly scheduled ICE check-in, and he was thereafter held at the Glades County Detention Center under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

On Dec. 31, Petitioner filed his petition. On Jan. 30, 2026, Judge Steele granted habeas relief, holding that Petitioner was entitled to the statutory process associated with § 1226(a), including a bond hearing, rather than continued detention under § 1225(b)(2). The court ordered that, within ten days, Respondent “shall provide [Petitioner] with statutory process, including a bond hearing, or release him.”

When that deadline passed without compliance, Petitioner moved to enforce the judgment on Feb. 20. On Mar. 1, Judge Steele issued an order to show cause stating that “the time to comply has passed, but [Petitioner] remains detained, and no bond hearing has been scheduled,” and ordered Respondent to appear in person on Mar. 5 “to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the Court’s earlier order.” But in a Mar. 5 order, the court said Respondent had notified it on Mar. 2 that Petitioner had been released, so therefore denied the enforcement motion as moot, discharged the show-cause order, and cancelled the hearing.

This habeas case involved ICE’s transfer of a Venezuelan asylum applicant out of Orange County Jail less than a day after Judge Byron barred any transfer, prompting the court to order her “immediately return[ed]” to the Middle District of Florida and to require officials to show cause “why they should not be held in civil contempt.” The court emphasized that its order was “not a mere suggestion,” and later explained that the transfer restriction was designed “to prevent” Respondents from moving Petitioner to an ICE facility or elsewhere, “thus depriving the Petitioner of access to counsel,” and from doing so “in an attempt to circumvent the bond hearing requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” Granting habeas relief and ordering immediate release, Judge Byron described the case as part of the “disturbing practice” of ICE moving detainees out of Orange County Jail to “circumvent” limits on detention under ICE detainers, permanently enjoined detention under § 1225, and barred § 1226 detention absent a timely bond hearing or release.

Petitioner Viayrubis Elius Chavez Mora, a Venezuelan national lawfully present in the United States, paroled after entry, with a pending asylum application, a valid Florida driver’s license, and an approved employment authorization application. She was arrested on Jan. 20, 2026, based on an allegation that she was “undocumented.” No criminal charges were filed, and no judicial warrant was issued. She was then held at the Orange County Jail based solely on an ICE detainer. On Jan. 31, Petitioner filed her emergency habeas petition and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief.

On Feb. 2, Judge Byron granted a TRO barring Respondents from transferring Petitioner from Orange County Jail and ordered them to respond by Feb. 7, warning that failure to do so would result in the petition being granted “without further notice.” The endorsed order was served on the government. The court’s Feb. 3 written order also made clear that the TRO prohibited Respondents from temporarily transferring Petitioner to an ICE facility or any other facility and then returning her to the Orange County Correctional Facility, “thus depriving the Petitioner of access to counsel,” and stated that if the result of the TRO was that the jail could not hold her for more than 72 hours, “the Petitioner shall be released from custody.”

Despite that order, ICE transferred Petitioner on Feb. 3 first to an ICE office in Orlando and then to the Broward Transitional Center, Pompano Beach, Florida. Judge Byron responded on Feb. 4 by granting Petitioner’s Feb. 3 emergency motion to order return. Writing that “[t]he Court’s Order is not a mere suggestion,” he ordered Respondents to “immediately return the Petitioner to the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division” and ordered the Orange County Jail warden and the ICE Miami Field Office Director to “show cause” “why they should not be held in civil contempt” “for disobeying the Court’s Order,” adding, “Failure to timely respond shall result in the imposition of sanctions without further notice.”

On Feb. 5, Respondents moved to clarify the terms of the TRO and asked whether their intended release of Petitioner would comply with the court’s order.On Feb. 6, the court granted Respondents’ motion for clarification, granted the habeas petition, and ordered Petitioner’s immediate release. Responding to the motion to clarify, the court wrote, “Release of Petitioner is undoubtedly acceptable under the Court’s Written Order,” adding, “[i]ndeed,” the TRO’s “sole purpose” was “to prevent Respondents from transferring Petitioner from Orange County Jail to an ICE Facility or any other facility in an attempt to circumvent the bond hearing requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” The court further stated that the case represented a growing trend in Miami whereby Respondents sought to “circumvent” DHS regulatory prohibitions on maximum stays in criminal-justice facilities. As the court wrote:

“This case, like others before and since, involves the disturbing practice of ICE removing the detainee from the Orange County Jail to circumvent the prohibition against holding ‘alien[s] not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency’ for more than 48 hours. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).”

Judge Byron permanently enjoined Respondents from detaining Petitioner under § 1225, and also from detaining her under § 1226 until at least Feb. 16. He further directed that if Respondents later chose to redetain her under § 1226, they must release her within 72 hours unless she was provided a bond hearing in that period, must facilitate her transportation if released, and warned that if she was later detained and “deprived of a timely hearing but not released as ordered herein,” she could reopen the case without filing a new action. Judgment was entered in Petitioner’s favor on Feb. 10.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to provide the § 1226(a) bond hearing Judge Chappell had ordered as the only alternative to release. The court had directed that, if Respondents were “unable to ensure [Petitioner] receives the bond hearing he is entitled to under § 1226(a) within ten days, they must release him.” When the immigration judge instead concluded that Petitioner was detained under § 1225(b)(2) and lacked bond jurisdiction, Judge Chappell held that Petitioner “did not get the bond hearing he is entitled to under § 1226(a)” and ordered his release within 12 hours.

Petitioner Yor Lazaro Fernandez Alvarez, a native and citizen of Cuba entered the United States on July 14, 2024. DHS paroled him into the country under the Cuban parole program, later terminated that parole, and he then applied for adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act, which remained pending. On Dec. 25, 2025, local law enforcement arrested him during a traffic stop and turned him over to ICE. He was then detained at Glades County Detention Center without an opportunity to seek release on bond. He filed his petition on Feb. 11, 2026.

On Feb. 20, Judge Chappell granted habeas relief. Rejecting the government’s jurisdiction, exhaustion, and detention arguments, the court held that Petitioner’s detention was governed by § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), and ordered Respondents within ten days either to bring him before an immigration judge for an individualized bond hearing or release him under reasonable conditions of supervision. The court was explicit that “[i]f the respondents are unable to ensure [Petitioner] receives the bond hearing he is entitled to under § 1226(a) within ten days, they must release him.”

But when an immigration court convened on Feb. 27, the immigration judge found he lacked jurisdiction to release Petitioner on bond because Petitioner was detained under § 1225(b)(2). In a Mar. 4 enforcement order, Judge Chappell held that Petitioner therefore “did not get the bond hearing he is entitled to under § 1226(a)” and that the court’s prior order “thus requires the respondents to release him from custody.” The court granted the post-judgment motion and ordered Respondents to release him within 12 hours and facilitate his transportation from the detention facility by notifying counsel when and where he could be collected.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ representation that Petitioner had been deported, which Judge Dudek relied on to dismiss the petition as moot before vacating that ruling because “[t]hat fact turned out to be untrue.” After reinstating the case, the court granted partial habeas relief, finding that “the Government’s response is telling in its silence,” that ICE “skipped” the required post-revocation interview “entirely,” and that “the government cut corners and denied him the process he was due.” Judge Dudek ordered Respondents to provide the required § 241.13 process by Apr. 3, 2026, or release Petitioner, retained jurisdiction to enforce the order, and later received a disputed compliance notice followed by a fully briefed enforcement motion.

Petitioner Roberto Francisco Franco Rodriguez, a Cuban national, arrived in the United States in 1980 as part of the Mariel boatlift and later became a lawful permanent resident. After he was convicted of selling methamphetamine, an immigration judge ordered him removed, but the government could not effectuate his return to Cuba because of diplomatic barriers. ICE therefore released him on an order of supervision. For more than twenty years, Rodriguez lived in the community and apparently complied with his release conditions. On Nov. 2, 2025, ICE revoked his supervision and detained him, citing a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. He filed this habeas petition on Jan. 2, 2026 while detained at Alligator Alcatraz, challenging the legality of his detention.

On Jan. 5, Judge Dudek ordered Respondents under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 to show cause why the petition should not be granted, setting a Jan. 26 response deadline. On Jan. 12, the court denied Petitioner’s emergency motion to stay removal, holding that § 1252(g) deprived the district court of jurisdiction to stop execution of a removal order, even where Petitioner sought a stay to “preserve” the habeas proceedings.

On Jan. 27, relying on Respondents’ Jan. 26 response, Judge Dudek denied the petition as moot because Respondents represented that they had “removed Rodriguez from this country” and that he was therefore “no longer in the custody of immigration officials.” The court wrote that “[t]here is no live controversy left to adjudicate, and the Court is powerless to grant relief for a detention that has already ended.” On Jan. 31, Petitioner moved under Rule 60(b) to set aside judgment, stating that he had not in fact been removed. On Feb. 1, Judge Dudek wrote:

“The Court dismissed this case on the Government’s representation that Petitioner had been removed from the country, leaving his habeas petition moot. Petitioner's counsel now claims, through a Rule 60 motion, that Petitioner has not been removed. The Government is directed to respond to the Rule 60 motion on or before February 4, 2026. By that same date, Petitioner's counsel is directed to supplement the motion with any additional evidence supporting the contention that Petitioner remains in the country. The Court is concerned that counsel is relying entirely on the inmate locator, which could be lagging or not reflective of the actual facts.”

After further filings, the court vacated the dismissal on Feb. 5, explaining: “The Court dismissed this habeas action as moot on the representation that Petitioner was deported. That fact turned out to be untrue.” The court reinstated the case and stated that it would address the habeas petition on the merits.

On Mar. 17, Judge Dudek granted the petition in part and denied it in part. He rejected Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments under §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9), holding that Rodriguez was not asking the court to vacate his removal order or stop removal, but was instead challenging “the procedural mechanics of his current detention.” On the merits, the court held that Respondents violated procedural due process by revoking Rodriguez’s supervised release without giving him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Judge Dudek wrote that “[t]he Government’s response is telling in its silence,” because it pointed to “no hearing, no informal interview, and no immediate forum where Rodriguez could contest his sudden re-detention.” The court added: “That is not how due process works. A belated review months after the jail cell door slams shut is cold comfort.” Judge Dudek concluded that “Rodriguez has proven a constitutional violation—the government cut corners and denied him the process he was due.”

The court separately held that Respondents violated the Accardi doctrine by failing to follow ICE’s own regulations. Judge Dudek concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, not § 212.12, governed Rodriguez’s re-detention because he had become a lawful permanent resident after arriving during the Mariel boatlift and was later released on an order of supervision. Under § 241.13(i)(3), ICE was required to provide an informal interview after returning him to custody, but the court found that “the Government skipped that step entirely—a clear regulatory violation.” The court declined to order immediate release as the first remedy, explaining that “a procedural foul typically calls for a procedural fix.” It ordered Respondents to provide Rodriguez with the informal interview required by § 241.13(i)(3) by Apr. 3, 2026, and directed that, “[i]f that procedure is not provided by the Court’s deadline, Respondents are directed to release Rodriguez.” The court entered judgment, closed the case, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the order.

Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Mar. 26. Petitioner then moved to enforce the judgment on Apr. 16. Judge Dudek ordered a response the next day; Respondents opposed the motion on May 1; Petitioner sought leave to reply on May 8; and, after the court granted leave, Petitioner filed a reply on May 13.

This habeas case involved Judge Dalton’s finding that the government’s habeas briefing was “less than candid,” reflected a “woeful, wholesale failure to point to scores of contrary persuasive cases,” and included an argument that “beggars belief and appears to deliberately mislead the Court about the law and the record.” The court granted habeas relief and ordered immediate release after concluding that Petitioner, a Venezuelan high-school student held under an ICE detainer after local officers arrested him even though he “had not committed any crime,” was governed by § 1226 rather than § 1225. At the emergency hearing, Judge Dalton reminded government counsel that, as an officer of the court, counsel could take a contrary legal position but could not “misrepresent the state of affairs.” The court then ordered two DOJ attorneys to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for failing to meet their duty of candor, warning counsel: “Don’t hide the ball,” don’t ignore contrary authority, and don’t “send a sacrificial lamb to stand before this Court with a fistful of cases that don’t apply.” Although the court later discharged the OSC without sanctions, it issued formal admonitions, stated that the U.S. Attorney’s reliance on “unprecedented” times to explain “recent subpar practice rings hollow,” cited other cases in observing that “[t]hese violations are widespread,” and said it was “troubled” by the suggestion that counsel need not cite contrary law because the court was already familiar with the jurisprudence.

Petitioner Javier Gimenez Rivero, a Venezuelan high-school student who had lived in Central Florida with his family for more than four years, had entered the United States as a minor with his parents, had been paroled when he entered, had no criminal record, and had been issued a Florida driver’s license, a Social Security card for work purposes, and an employment authorization document valid through 2030. He continued to live, work, and attend school in Central Florida until Jan. 7, 2026, when Orange County sheriff’s officers arrested him even though, as the court emphasized, he “had not committed any crime.” For days he was held at Orange County Jail under an ICE detainer “without criminal charges, a notice to appear, a warrant, a hearing, or any written notice of the basis of his detention.”

On Jan. 12, after ICE told him it was moving him to an immigration detention facility in Miami, his attorneys filed the habeas petition. On Jan. 14, Judge Dalton entered a temporary restraining order preserving the status quo and barring his transfer from Orange County Jail. On Jan. 16, after the petition had already been filed and after the court had entered its TRO, ICE served him with a Notice to Appear. On Jan. 20, the government filed its response.

On Jan. 21, at an emergency hearing,Judge Dalton stressed that this was “a simple case,” because Petitioner was “not an applicant seeking admission,” the government had made the same arguments “in hundreds of cases” and “lost in almost every one,” and § 1226—not § 1225—plainly governed. The court orally granted the petition and ordered his immediate release that same day. The court further admonished government counsel for the Jan. 20 response to petition:

“You’re an officer of the court. … You have every right to take a contrary position …, not to misrepresent the state of affairs. … I found your briefing … to be less than candid.”

On Jan. 26, granting habeas relief, issuing a TRO, and ordering two Justice Department to “show cause why they should not be sanctioned, … including by being required to pay Petitioner’s attorney’s fees and costs,” for failing to “meet th[e] standard” placed upon all “Members of this Bar [to] have a duty of candor to the Court.” The court sharply criticized DOJ attorneys’ “woeful, wholesale failure to point to scores of contrary persuasive cases,” warning it would not decide the matter “totally devoid of context, as if we live in a fantasy world where hundreds of other judicial orders do not exist.” The court said attorneys’ lack of candor forced it to look “outside the record for context,” including the “highly unusual step” of citing news articles. Judge Dalton stressed that “no matter what is happening outside this Court, the rules inside it remain the same,” and that every filing represents that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support and the legal contentions are warranted.” While Respondents may press “a widely rejected position,” the court underscored that the government's “lawyers must make those arguments in a way that comports with their professional obligations, as lawyers have done since time immemorial.” However, Judge Dalton warned:

“Don’t hide the ball. Don’t ignore the overwhelming weight of persuasive authority as if it won’t be found. And don’t send a sacrificial lamb to stand before this Court with a fistful of cases that don’t apply and no cogent argument for why they should.”

The court also rejected Respondents’ argument that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1252(g) because “[s]ecuring an alien while awaiting a removal determination constitutes an action taken to commence proceedings,” writing: “This argument beggars belief and appears to deliberately mislead the Court about the law and the record.” On Feb. 9, responding to the court’s show-cause order, DOJ attorneys urged that they be discharged “with no sanctions imposed,” explaining that the failure to cite contrary district-court decisions was an “unintentional” “oversight,” “was not from a lack of candor,” and “will not re-occur.” Counsel attributed the lapse “in part” to the “extremely high volume and expedited timelines in the current Orlando habeas corpus docket,” while acknowledging the filing’s “shortcomings” and apologizing for the omission. DOJ also moved for a hearing and oral argument on the order to show cause.

On Mar. 19, in an order discharging the show-cause order without sanctions, the court nonetheless delivered formal admonitions. “First,” the court wrote, “the U.S. Attorney blaming ‘unprecedented’ times for the recent subpar practice rings hollow,” adding, “[t]he Government cannot use exigency as an excuse when it caused the exigency,” and emphasizing that “[u]nfortunately, its line attorneys are the ones suffering the consequences,” while citing Chief Judge Schiltz’s Feb. 26 appendices documenting noncompliance in the district. The court went on to admonish DOJ lawyers for blindly following “imperious client” instructions, emphasizing that “[i]n this District alone, ICE has falsified warrants” (Silva Parucho); “deported American citizens,” including two 12-year-old twin girls the government conceded were unlawfully detained (A.E.T.M.); as well as “defied no-transfer orders” (Mora Duran). Underscoring that “[t]hese violations are widespread”—citing Kumar in New Jersey, where the government submitted a declaration listing over 50 instances of noncompliance in the district and the court considered criminal contempt—the court went on to write of government counsel’s professional duty:

“[T]he Government's attorneys have a duty of candor to the Court independent of their duties to their client. See Fla. Bar R. 4-3.3. … The Government's attorneys cannot allow an imperious client to separate them from their professional obligations. The Court expects them to practice ethically even in unprecedented times. Crucially, this ethical obligation of candor includes fully briefing contrary authority. The notion that an attorney need not cite contrary law when the Court is ‘well versed’ on the applicable jurisprudence improperly shifts counsel's responsibility to the Court. … The Court is troubled that attorneys would offer that as an excuse in a show-cause response. The Government's lawyers know better.

With those “admonitions,” the show-cause order was discharged without sanctions, and the motion for a hearing on the show-cause order was denied as moot.

This habeas case involved a Nicaraguan parolee whom Judge Steele ordered to receive a § 1226(a) bond hearing or be released, then later enforced that order after the first hearing was conducted without notice to counsel or counsel’s participation, while declining further enforcement after a second hearing because the IJ’s alternative merits-based denial was not reviewable in district court.

Petitioner Bello Morales, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, was paroled into the United States in September 2023 under the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Parole Program. His parole expired in September 2025, and ICE detained him on Oct. 22. He was held at Glades County Detention Center, and his attorney’s request for a bond hearing was denied on the ground that he had been “designated as an arriving alien.”

Petitioner filed his petition on Feb. 4, 2026, which Judge Steele granted on Feb. 26, ordering Respondents, within ten days, either to provide Bello Morales “with the statutory process required under § 1226, which includes a bond hearing,” or to release him under reasonable conditions of supervision. On Mar. 12, Petitioner moved to enforce, stating that the Mar. 5 bond hearing had been conducted without notice to counsel and without counsel’s participation. On Mar. 16 Judge Steele granted the enforcement motion in part and ordered that “[a] new bond hearing shall be conducted with counsel present” by Mar. 26. In so doing, the court highlighted that “the federal respondents state that they cannot oppose a new bond hearing as counsel has no information as to why a notice of the bond hearing did not issue,” adding, “[t]he motion will be granted to the extent that respondents do not oppose a new bond hearing.”

After the second hearing on Mar. 26, the IJ again denied bond, stating both that the court lacked jurisdiction because Petitioner had been charged as an arriving alien and that he was not a suitable bail risk because he was under an order of removal, had no property in the United States, and no close immediate family with lawful status. In denying Petitioner’s second motion to enforce on Apr. 2, Judge Steele held that while jurisdictional ground was “insufficient to comply with the Court’s Opinion and Order,” the IJ’s “alternative reasons for denial are arguably in compliance” and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of that alternative denial under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). The court directed Petitioner to pursue any further challenge through the ordinary immigration appeal process.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to meet a court-ordered response deadline after the petition was transferred from the Southern District of Florida to the Middle District of Florida. After transfer, Judge Dudek ordered Respondents under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 to show cause why the petition should not be granted and directed prior government counsel, if no longer handling the case, to “ensure that the appropriate office has notice and responds.” When no response was filed by the Mar. 5 deadline, the court ordered Respondents to “show cause” why they had “failed to respond” to the petition. Respondents answered by the new deadline, and Judge Dudek later discharged the response-failure show-cause order and denied habeas relief on the merits, holding that Petitioner was detained under § 1225 and that his approximately month-and-a-half detention without a bond hearing was not yet unconstitutional prolonged detention.

Petitioner Arlei Ferreira De Jesus illegally entered the United States on May 2, 2022, was apprehended at the border, and was “paroled due to detention capacity at the Central Processing Center in El Paso, TX.” ICE later re-detained him, and after processing he was sent to Alligator Alcatraz in the Middle District of Florida. He claimed that the government was holding him without a bond hearing in violation of the INA, the Fifth Amendment, and the APA.

The case was first filed in the Southern District of Florida. There, Judge Dimitrouleas ordered an expedited response by Feb. 25, 2026, but after Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to transfer venue, he sent the case to the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division. On Feb. 26, after transfer, Judge Dudek directed Respondents under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 to show cause by Mar. 5 why the petition should not be granted, and expressly instructed that if AUSA Carlos Javier Raurell was no longer handling the matter after transfer, he “must ensure that the appropriate office has notice and responds.” When no response was filed by that deadline, the court on Mar. 6 ordered Respondents to “show cause” by Mar. 11 “as to why they failed to respond to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Respondents filed their answer on Mar. 11.

In a Mar. 13 order, Judge Dudek “discharge[d]” the Mar. 6 show-cause order “[b]ased on the Government’s [Mar. 11] Response” and denied the petition on the merits. He held that Petitioner’s detention did not violate the INA because, having been apprehended at the border and paroled, he fell under § 1225 rather than § 1226, and further held that his roughly month-and-a-half detention without a bond hearing did not yet amount to unconstitutional prolonged detention.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to a court order in a duplicate pro se habeas case, even though government counsel knew Petitioner had filed an identical counseled petition in another case. After “no response has been entered by the government,” Judge Steele ordered Respondents to respond or show cause “why they should not be subject to sanctions for failure to comply with a Court order.” The court later dismissed the petition as moot because the first-filed case had granted relief, but emphasized that “Petitioner’s duplicate filing did not excuse Counsel from complying with the Court’s order to respond by alerting this Court to the mistake.”

Petitioner Jose Luis Suarez Rodriguez initiated this pro se habeas petition on Apr. 6, 2026, by filing a § 2241 petition and paying the filing fee. The case was first filed in the Southern District of Florida and transferred to the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, shortly after, as Petitioner was detained at Glades County Detention Center .

On Apr. 9, Judge Steele ordered Respondents to respond to the petition within fourteen days, making the response due Apr. 23. On Apr. 27, after no response was filed, the court wrote that “no response has been entered by the government” and ordered Respondents to respond to the petition within five days or show cause “why they should not be subject to sanctions for failure to comply with a Court order.”

Respondents then filed a show-cause response. In its Apr. 30 opinion and order, the court stated that Respondents noted Petitioner had filed “an identical counseled petition” in Suarez Rodriguez v. Warden, 2:26-cv-01062 (M.D. Fla.), and that counsel “admit that they were aware of the duplication” and had alerted Judge Chappell to it in their Apr. 15 response in the first-filed case. Respondents also represented that Judge Chappell had already granted the requested relief and asked Judge Steele to dismiss the duplicate petition as moot.

Judge Steele dismissed the petition as moot because Petitioner had received the relief requested in the first-filed case. But the court did not accept the duplicate filing as a justification for ignoring the response order. Judge Steele wrote that the court was “aware of—and sympathetic to—the number of immigration cases that have overwhelmed the U.S. Attorney’s Office this year,” but that “Petitioner’s duplicate filing did not excuse Counsel from complying with the Court’s order to respond by alerting this Court to the mistake.” The court added that “[d]oing so would have eliminated the need for issuing an order to show cause.” Judgment was entered on May 1.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to the petition despite two court orders, followed by entry of default, release relief, and an in-person sanctions show-cause hearing. Senior Judge Steele wrote that, “despite being directed to do so twice,” the government had not responded and that, after the first show-cause order, “Respondents failed to comply” again.

Petitioner Alexander Ramirez-Gabriel, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in 2013. He had been in immigration detention since Feb. 11, 2026, apparently under the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b). He filed his habeas petition on Apr. 15, 2026, challenging the legality of his continued detention.

On Apr. 17, after reviewing the petition, the court directed Respondents to file a response within 14 days demonstrating why the petition should not be granted. Respondents did not respond. On May 5, the court entered an order to show cause, writing, “[N]o response has been entered by the government,” and ordering Respondents to respond to the petition within five days “or show cause why they should not be subject to sanctions for failure to comply with a Court order.” Respondents again did not comply.

On May 12, Judge Steele granted Petitioner’s motion for entry of default and ordered release. He wrote: “Despite being directed to do so twice, the government has not responded to the petition, and the time to do so has passed.” The court explained that Rule 55(d) permits default judgment against the United States only if the claimant establishes a right to relief. Because Respondents had not argued otherwise and the Eleventh Circuit had held in Hernando Alvarez that similarly situated noncitizens were not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), the court held that Petitioner was being illegally detained. The court ordered Respondents to release him within 24 hours and temporarily restrained and enjoined Respondents from detaining him under § 1226(a) for 14 days from release. If Respondents later sought detention under § 1226(a), the court directed that Petitioner be released within ten days of detention unless he received a bond hearing before an immigration judge during that period.

The May 12 order also required the federal Respondents to appear in person on May 15 and show cause why they should not be sanctioned for failing to comply with two court orders, including by paying attorney’s fees and costs, under Rule 11, local rules, Florida Bar rules, and the court’s inherent powers. On May 15, after counsel filed a response and the court heard argument, Senior Judge Steele declined to impose sanctions “at this time.” Because counsel also reported that Respondents had released Petitioner and the parties agreed that the petition could be dismissed, the court dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice and closed the case. Judgment was then entered.

This habeas case involved an ICE detainee challenging prolonged detention without a bond hearing, Respondents’ failure to respond to Judge Dudek’s § 2243 show-cause order by the court-ordered deadline, and the later transfer of the case to the Jacksonville Division based on Petitioner’s place of confinement.

On May 13, Judge Dudek directed Respondents to show cause under § 2243 why the habeas petition should not be granted. The court ordered service on the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Attorney General, and gave Respondents until Jun. 2 to respond. After Respondents failed to respond, the court wrote on Jun. 3:

“Respondents were required to respond to this Court’s Show Cause Order by June 2, 2026, but have failed to do so. By June 10, 2026, Respondents shall show cause why this Order has not been complied with. This Order may alternatively be discharged by responding to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.”

Respondents filed a response on Jun. 5. On Jun. 8, Judge Dudek transferred the case to the Jacksonville Division because Petitioner was confined at the Flagler County North Florida Detention Center. See Ecoquij Perechu v. Warden, North Florida Detention Center, 3:26-cv-01455 (M.D. Fla.).

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to timely respond to the petition by the court-ordered deadline, prompting an order to “show cause” as to “why they failed to respond to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” and Petitioner’s motion for default judgment. Judge Dudek later discharged the show-cause order “[b]ased on Respondents’ response,” accepted the late response, denied the default-judgment motion as moot, and then denied the petition without prejudice as premature.

Petitioner Jarlys Rosguell Cespedes Oro, a native of Cuba, was paroled into the United States in 2013, later ordered removed, and removed to Canada. In 2018, he twice reentered the United States through the Canadian border, and his prior removal order was reinstated. After the second illegal-reentry prosecution, he was released on an order of supervision in 2020 and lived in the community under that order for five years. ICE detained him on Oct. 27, 2025, after a deportation officer determined that his 2024 arrest for Robbery Strongarm Domestic Violence violated his supervision conditions. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Feb. 11, 2026.

On Feb. 12, Judge Dudek ordered Respondents to show cause by Mar. 5 why the petition should not be granted. The court also directed Petitioner to serve the order by Feb. 19 and file proof of service. Respondents did not respond by the deadline. On Mar. 6, the court issued an endorsed order directing Respondents to “show cause” by Mar. 11 “as to why they failed to respond to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Petitioner also moved for default judgment that day.

Respondents filed a response to the order to show cause and opposition to the amended petition on Mar. 10. On Mar. 12, Judge Dudek entered an endorsed order discharging the show-cause order, stating: “Based on Respondents’ response to the Court’s order to show cause as to why they failed to timely respond to the Petition, the Court discharges its order to show cause and accepts the response. Thus, Petitioner’s motion for default judgment is denied as moot.”

On Mar. 13, Judge Dudek denied the habeas petition without prejudice. The court declined to apply a blanket rule aggregating Petitioner’s prior and current ICE detention periods under Zadvydas, explaining that aggregation may be appropriate where the record shows a calculated pattern of release and re-detention to reset the clock or evade judicial review, but that no such evidence existed in this case. The court dismissed the petition as premature because Petitioner’s current detention had lasted just over four months, while allowing refiling if current detention exceeded six months and Petitioner could show no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to respond to Judge Dudek’s show-cause order by the court-ordered deadline. The court issued a second order stating that Respondents “were required to respond” by May 11 but “have failed to do so,” and later granted habeas relief in part, ordering the statutory process required under § 1226(a), including a bond hearing.

Petitioner Oliver Jose Parra Rachid, a citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States through the Orlando airport in 2023. After a brief interview, an immigration officer paroled him into the country. His parole expired on May 18, 2025. ICE arrested him after a traffic stop on Feb. 9, 2026, and detained him under the government’s asserted § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory-detention theory. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Apr. 17.

On Apr. 21, Judge Dudek ordered Respondents to show cause by May 11 why the petition should not be granted. Respondents did not respond by that deadline. On May 12, the court entered an endorsed order:

“Respondents were required to respond to this Court’s Show Cause Order by May 11, 2026, but have failed to do so. By May 19, 2026, Respondents shall show cause why this Order has not been complied with. This Order may alternatively be discharged by responding to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.”

Respondents filed their response later on May 12, and the docket reflects that the May 12 order was not mailed or emailed because Respondents had responded.

On May 21, Judge Dudek granted the petition in part, explaining that although the court had previously held that noncitizens stopped at the border and later released into the United States fell under § 1225(b)(2), the Eleventh Circuit’s intervening decision in Hernandez Alvarez required a different result. The court wrote that “[t]he text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is clear that mandatory detention applies only to a narrower category of applicants for admission: those seeking lawful entry into the United States.” Applying that rule, Judge Dudek found that Petitioner did not fall within § 1225(b)(2) because he was not presently “seeking lawful entry”: “[t]hat question was asked and answered at the border years ago,” and Petitioner was instead “merely present in the country, meaning he falls outside the grip of § 1225(b)(2).” The court concluded that § 1226 applied because “§ 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in the interior,” and ordered the government to provide Petitioner with the statutory process required under § 1226, including a bond hearing, while denying all other relief.

This habeas case involved Judge Dudek granting a renewed habeas petition after Respondents failed to provide the individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing the court had previously ordered after the government conceded Petitioner was entitled to that relief. Judge Dudek described what followed as a sequence that “borders on the surreal”: five days after the order, “an immigration judge refused to hold the ordered hearing,” government counsel “acquiesced in that refusal and waived any administrative appeal,” and Respondents then “casually announce[d]” that their prior concession “was in error.” The court rejected the government’s new position as “not just legally unsupportable” but “a masterclass in litigation cynicism,” writing that “[a] federal court is not a testing lab where the Executive branch can pilot a concession to get a case closed, stand by silently while its own administrative process flouts the resulting mandate, and then stroll back in demanding a clean slate. Give me a break.” Because the government had shown that it “cannot follow this Court’s explicit directions,” offered “zero assurance” that it would comply with the statutory process it had “previously championed,” and had demonstrated “a complete inability to follow judicial directions,” Judge Dudek held that “the only remedy that ‘law and justice require’” was immediate release.

Petitioner Dmitrii Iastrebov filed his first habeas petition on Apr. 19, 2026, in Iastrebov v. Warden of Florida South Soft Side South (Collier County), 2:26-cv-01289 (M.D. Fla.), while detained in immigration custody. In that case, granting relief in part on May 13, Judge Dudek ordered the government to provide him the statutory process required under § 1226(a), including a bond hearing, after Respondents conceded that he was entitled to such relief under the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hernandez Alvarez. The court rejected Respondents’ exhaustion argument, explaining that when the petition was filed, “the agency’s position was that interior aliens like Petitioner were simply ineligible for such relief.”

“Demanding that he ask an immigration judge for a hearing he was essentially barred from receiving at the time is demanding an exercise in pure futility. We do not require petitioners to run administrative obstacle courses when the finish line is preemptively blocked.”

Judge Dudek denied immediate release, but expressly preserved Petitioner’s ability to bring another habeas case if the ordered process did not occur or if he remained detained.

“If the Government does not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing as ordered or he remains in custody, he can renew his other claims in a subsequent suit.”

Five days after the order, the immigration judge refused to hold the ordered hearing, asserting that Petitioner was not covered by § 1226(a) and was ineligible for bond. On May 18, Petitioner filed his second habeas petition.

On Jun. 11, in an order granting the renewed habeas petition, Judge Dudek began with what he called a sequence of events that “borders on the surreal:”

“What happened next borders on the surreal. Five days later, an immigration judge refused to hold the ordered hearing, claiming Iastrebov is not covered by § 1226(a) and thus ineligible for bond.”

The court then focused on government counsel’s response and the government’s later reversal of position:

“Instead of defending this Court’s mandate, the Government’s counsel acquiesced in that refusal and waived any administrative appeal. Now, faced with a renewed habeas petition, the Government casually announces that its previous concession ‘was in error’ and asks this Court to reverse itself and hold that Iastrebov is instead subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.”

Judge Dudek rejected the government’s new position, stating:

“The Government was right the first time. And its request for a do-over here is not just legally unsupportable, it is a masterclass in litigation cynicism. A federal court is not a testing lab where the Executive branch can pilot a concession to get a case closed, stand by silently while its own administrative process flouts the resulting mandate, and then stroll back in demanding a clean slate. Give me a break.”

The court said it had already answered “in painstaking detail” why Petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing and that the explanation “should not have required a sequel.” The remedy turned on the government’s inability to follow the prior order, with Judge Dudek writing:

“And because the Government has shown that it cannot follow this Court’s explicit directions and offers zero assurance that it will comply with the statutory process it previously championed, Iastrebov will be immediately released.”

Judge Dudek granted the renewed habeas petition. Although the court stated that Petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing, it held that another order requiring one would not be enough: “But because the Government has shown a complete inability to follow judicial directions, the only remedy that ‘law and justice require’ is immediate release.”

The court ordered the government to release Petitioner within 48 hours, required Respondents to facilitate transportation from the detention facility by notifying counsel when and where he could be collected, directed the clerk to enter judgment, and closed the case.

This habeas case involved a Venezuelan noncitizen whom Judge Williams ordered to receive an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a) or be released, only to later find that the hearing held under that order “did not comply” with the habeas order “or due process.” Granting enforcement, Judge Williams held that the immigration judge had “deviated from” the required procedural safeguards by relying on unsupported allegations, including a child sexual abuse material allegation presented “without any supporting evidence, let alone probative and specific evidence,” treating a “vague, unsworn hearsay statement from an unknown source” as “compelling evidence” of Tren de Aragua affiliation, failing to apply the required evidentiary standards, and failing to review or consider Petitioner’s rebuttal evidence. The court ordered a new bond hearing, required production of the evidence underlying the government’s allegations, barred Petitioner’s removal pending further order, and later reiterated that those defects “deprived [Petitioner] of the individualized bond hearing required by the Court’s Habeas Order.”

Petitioner, a Venezuelan citizen, had resided in the United States since December 2020. At the time of his Oct. 2, 2025 arrest, he held a valid driver’s license and work permit. He was arrested while traveling in his work van after a stop allegedly based on a missing license plate on a trailer, but the stop did not result in any criminal charge, traffic citation, or municipal code citation. ICE initially detained him at Florida Soft-Sided Facility South before transferring him to the Miami Federal Detention Center. On Oct. 17, more than two weeks after his arrest, ICE served him with a Notice to Appear, and on Oct. 24 an IJ denied bond without conducting a dangerousness or flight-risk determination after concluding that detention was mandatory.

On Nov. 13, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. On Nov. 21, Judge Williams granted the petition in part after rejecting the government’s position that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and ordered Respondents to “afford [Petitioner] an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before Nov[.] 24,” “or otherwise release [Petitioner] by that time.” But at the Nov. 24 hearing, the IJ denied bond, finding “[d]anger, flight risk, and denied as a matter of discretion,” and stating that Petitioner “failed to meet his burden to demonstrate he is neither a danger or flight risk.” Petitioner moved to enforce the same day, arguing that the bond hearing violated due process and the habeas order because counsel received inadequate notice and the IJ relied on unsupported gang-affiliation and child sexual abuse material (CSAM) allegations.

Judge Williams granted the enforcement motion during a Dec. 11 hearing on the motion. In a paperless order that followed, the court wrote that the Nov. 24 bond hearing “did not comply” with the Nov. 21 order “or due process,” required a new hearing “consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), due process, and all law that is applicable at such bond hearings,” and specifically directed that the IJ make determinations based on “‘probative and specific’ evidence.” Judge Williams also ordered Respondents to turn over all evidence supporting the government’s claims that Petitioner was gang-affiliated, had gang markings, consented to a phone search, and had CSAM on his phone, and barred his removal from FDC Miami pending further order.

In her Dec. 19 written enforcement order, Judge Williams reiterated that the bond hearing “did not comply” with the habeas relief order because the IJ “deviated from” the “binding procedural safeguards” that order required. Judge Williams explained that the IJ had, inter alia, considered the CSAM allegation “without any supporting evidence, let alone probative and specific evidence;” treated as “compelling evidence” of Tren de Aragua affiliation only a “vague, unsworn hearsay statement from an unknown source,” which the court viewed as “especially problematic;” acknowledged he “ha[d] not had a chance to review anything that’s been filed,” and refused counsel’s offer to show Petitioner’s tattoos. Those failures, the court concluded, “deprived [Petitioner] of the individualized bond hearing required by the Court’s Habeas Order and mandate a rehearing.” Judge Williams further emphasized that that the immigration judge’s “failure to consider the correct evidentiary standards was compounded by his apparent failure to view or consider any of the” “packet of evidence” “Petitioner submitted in support of his bond request,” as well as “his affirmative rejection of Petitioner’s proffered rebuttal evidence.” The court further noted that it “need not address whether the late notice to Petitioner’s counsel of the Bond Hearing and Respondents’ submitted evidence” independently “violate[d] the Habeas Order,” because Petitioner would receive a new hearing and the Dec. 11 order “ensure[d]” that the notice problem would “not be a repeated issue.”

Judge Williams ordered Respondents to comply by Dec. 29, or release Petitioner, and to file a notice of compliance by Dec. 31. Respondents filed a notice of compliance on Dec. 29, and on Jan. 5, 2026, the court dismissed the case. Respondents later appealed both the Nov. 21 habeas-relief order and the Dec. 19 enforcement order on Jan. 20, but voluntarily dismissed the appeal in early February.

This habeas case involved Respondents’ transfer of Petitioner from Krome to El Paso two days after Judge Becerra ordered them not to transfer him out of the Southern District of Florida, followed by contempt show-cause proceedings and a later finding that Respondents had “failed to comply” with the court’s initial habeas show-cause order. After the transfer, Judge Becerra ordered Respondents to show cause why they “should not be held in contempt for transferring Petitioner to El Paso, Texas in violation of the Court’s Order,” and later set a further hearing on why they “should not be held in contempt for remaining in violation” of the no-transfer order. The court also denied without prejudice Petitioner’s sanctions request based on “erroneous information regarding Petitioner’s location” in a deportation officer declaration, permitting renewal if Petitioner was not promptly returned. After Petitioner returned to the district, Judge Becerra ordered a supplemental response, finding that Respondents had omitted the full removal record and other required materials, included only two sentences of legal argument, and relied on Petitioner’s derivative-asylee status for one position while “disregard[ing]” that same status for another without explaining how both positions could be true.

Petitioner Angel Raul Figueroa Galeano filed his habeas petition on Feb. 4, 2026 while detained at the Krome North Service Processing Center in Miami (Krome Detention Center). That same day, Judge Becerra ordered Respondents within three days to file a response showing cause why the petition should not be granted, to produce “all documents and transcripts necessary for resolution of the Petition,” including the full removal record and materials bearing on the “true cause of the [petitioner’s] detention,” and to “refrain from transferring Petitioner out of the jurisdiction of this Court during the pendency of this proceeding.”

Two days later, on Feb. 6, after Petitioner moved for a second show-cause order, Judge Becerra ordered Respondents to “show cause” by Feb. 10 why they “should not be held in contempt for transferring Petitioner to El Paso, Texas in violation of the Court’s Order”, which had “explicitly stated” that Respondents could not move him out of the court’s jurisdiction. Respondents then sought an extension and submitted a declaration from Deportation Officer Karina Jurdi. The court granted the extension until Feb. 17. In the meantime, on Feb. 11, Petitioner again moved for an order to show cause as they had not been returned. The court then set a show-cause hearing for Feb. 13, at which Respondents would have to explain why they “should not be held in contempt for remaining in violation” of the court’s no-transfer order.

After the Feb. 13 show-cause hearing, the court ordered the government to advise by Feb. 20 whether Petitioner had been returned to the Krome Detention Center, warning that if he had “not been returned” the court would schedule an additional show-cause hearing. Judge Becerra also denied without prejudice Petitioner’s sanctions request based on “the erroneous information regarding Petitioner’s location set forth in the Declaration of Deportation Officer Karina Jurdi,” permitting renewal if Petitioner was not “promptly returned to this jurisdiction.” Petitioner then notified the court on Feb. 17 that he had been returned to the Southern District of Florida, and Respondent filed a response to the petition the same day.

The next day, Judge Becerra ordered a supplemental response by Feb. 23. She noted that Respondents were relying on Petitioner’s “derivative asylee status” to argue that he was ineligible for a reasonable-fear screening, while also “disregard[ing]” that same status to argue that his detention was proper because his “prior order of removal was reinstated,” without explaining how both positions could be true. The court also wrote that “Respondents … failed to include any legal analysis in the Response, as their ‘Argument’ section [wa]s comprised of two sentences.” The court further held that Respondents had “failed to comply” with the Feb. 4 show-cause order because they did not attach the full removal record, digital audio transcript, and other materials the court had required. However, on Feb. 20, Petitioner filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice due to his release, and the court dismissed the case without prejudice on Feb. 23.

This habeas case involved Respondent’s apparent transfer of Petitioner from Florida to Port Isabel, Texas after Judge Becerra ordered that “Respondent shall refrain from transferring Petitioner out of the jurisdiction of this Court during the pendency of this proceeding.” After Petitioner notified the court of the transfer, Judge Becerra ordered Respondent to show cause that same day why it “should not be held in contempt for apparently transferring Petitioner to the Port Isabel Service Detention Center in Texas in violation of the Court’s Order to Show Cause and for Production of Evidence.”

Petitioner’s wife, Arletty Pinero, filed the petition on his behalf as next friend. As she later alleged in emergency filings, Petitioner suffered from serious medical conditions, including Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, and complex anorectal fistulas, and she sought urgent release on humanitarian grounds; she also stated that they had been together since 2014, were married, and that he had long helped raise her daughter. By the time the petition was filed on Feb. 12, 2026, At the time of filing, Petitioner was detained at the Florida Soft Side facility in Ochopee (also known as Alligator Alcatraz), in the Middle District of Florida, even though the petition was filed in the Southern District of Florida against the Krome Service Processing Center in Miami.

On Feb. 13, 2026, Judge Becerra entered an order to show cause that provided that “Respondent shall refrain from transferring Petitioner out of the jurisdiction of this Court during the pendency of this proceeding.” After Petitioner filed a notice on Feb. 24 stating that he had been transferred to Port Isabel in Texas, Judge Becerra on Feb. 25 ordered Respondent to “show cause” by 5:00 p.m. that same day why it “should not be held in contempt for apparently transferring Petitioner to the Port Isabel Service Detention Center in Texas in violation of the Court’s Order to Show Cause and for Production of Evidence.” In a separate order the same day, the court added that, because Respondent was barred from transferring Petitioner out of the court’s jurisdiction, it was “necessarily prohibited from removing Petitioner from the United States during that time.”

Respondent filed a response to the show-cause order on Feb. 25. The next day, Judge Becerra deemed that response timely and, based on the declaration attached to it, noted that Petitioner had been “scheduled to be transferred out of Port Isabel to Florida by air transfer on” Feb. 27, “the first available flight.” She then ordered a status report by Mar. 2 advising the court of Petitioner’s current location. On Mar. 5, however, Judge Becerra concluded that the Southern District lacked habeas jurisdiction because, when the petition was filed, Petitioner was confined in Ochopee in the Middle District, even though by then he had been transferred back to Krome in Miami. She therefore granted Respondent’s motion to transfer venue and sent the case to the Middle District of Florida for further proceedings. See Rodriguez, Adriel v. Krome North Service Processing Center (Collier County), 2:26-cv-00648 (M.D. Fla.) The transferee court later dismissed the petition without prejudice on Mar. 26, not on the merits, but because Petitioner had not established next-friend standing and could not litigate pro se on her husband’s behalf.

This habeas enforcement case involved Respondents’ failure to file the required compliance notice after Judge Williams ordered a § 1226(a) bond hearing by Mar. 19, 2026, or release. When Petitioner moved to enforce, the court noted that Respondents had “failed to file the notice required by the Court’s Order” and directed them to confirm that a bond hearing had occurred or “otherwise immediately release him from custody.” Respondents then filed a release-related response, and the court later dismissed the case after finding that they had complied by releasing Petitioner.

Petitioner Adan Umana Ramos, a citizen of Honduras, entered the United States in 2018, later applied for asylum, and appeared for the necessary proceedings. Since then, he had lived in Key West with his wife and four children and had no criminal record. On Jan. 17, 2026, ICE took him into custody as he was leaving a church service, and he was later detained at Krome North Processing Center.

On Mar. 7, Petitioner filed his habeas petition. On Mar. 13, Judge Williams granted the petition and held that Petitioner was detained under § 1226, not § 1225. She ordered Respondents to “afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before March 19, 2026, or otherwise release Petitioner,” and to file a notice by Mar. 20 “confirming and detailing their compliance.”

Petitioner moved to enforce on Mar. 20. In a Mar. 23 paperless order, the court noted that Respondents had “failed to file the notice required by the Court’s Order” and that Petitioner alleged they had “neither given him an individualized bond hearing nor released him.” Judge Williams then ordered Respondents, by 5:00 p.m. on Mar. 24, to file a notice confirming that a bond hearing had been provided, “or otherwise immediately release him from custody.” Respondents filed a response on Mar. 24 with an exhibit described as a “Call-In Letter showing release of Petitioner.” On Apr. 6, the court dismissed the case, stating that the record reflected that Respondents had “complied with that Order by releasing Petitioner.”

This habeas case involved Respondents’ failure to promptly notify the court that they had complied with Judge Leibowitz’s order requiring either a § 1226(a) bond hearing or release, or a written showing justifying continued detention. After receiving no notice by the deadline, the court granted habeas relief and ordered release. Judge Leibowitz later clarified that Respondents had in fact provided a bond hearing and Petitioner had been released on bond, meaning Respondents had complied with the earlier order, “albeit without prompt notification.”

Petitioner Santos Berlin Salinas-Duarte, a native and citizen of Honduras, was detained at Krome North Service Processing Center in Miami. He was married to a U.S. citizen and had substantial community ties through long-term residence, consistent employment, and family relationships. He had been detained since Sept. 17, 2025. On Jan. 28, 2026, an immigration judge granted his request for cancellation of removal, finding that he satisfied the statutory requirements, including good moral character and no disqualifying criminal history, and that he merited relief as a matter of discretion. The immigration judge also found that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to Petitioner’s U.S.-citizen spouse, who depended on him for daily care and essential support. DHS appealed, staying cancellation of removal, and Petitioner remained in custody.

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on Apr. 24 and moved for an order to show cause on Apr. 28. On May 20, Judge Leibowitz first addressed jurisdiction and held that Respondent Garrett J. Ripa, the Krome warden, was properly named. On the merits, the court noted that in many prior cases involving essentially indistinguishable facts, Respondent had advanced the position that detainees like Petitioner were subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Judge Leibowitz then cited the Eleventh Circuit’s intervening decision in Hernandez Alvarez, which had rejected the government’s position and held that similarly situated detainees were detained under § 1226(a) and entitled to bond hearings.

Judge Leibowitz administratively stayed any removal proceedings and ordered that Respondent “shall not transfer or remove Petitioner outside of the geographical boundaries of the Southern District of Florida” during the proceedings and until further order. The court ordered Respondent either to provide an individualized § 1226(a) bond hearing within seven days or otherwise release Petitioner, or to show cause in writing justifying detention and produce the full record of arrest, detention, removal proceedings, and any other documents necessary for resolution of the petition by May 25. If Respondent chose to provide a bond hearing, Petitioner had to receive a meaningful opportunity to prepare and attend, including at least 72 hours’ notice to counsel of the time, date, location, and procedural requirements. If Respondent elected to show cause, the brief had to set out the factual and legal reasons why the case was distinguishable from other cases granting bond hearings.

Respondents did neither. On Jun. 4, Judge Leibowitz granted habeas relief. The court stated that Respondents had “failed to comply with either of the options ordered by the Court, or seek extension or modification of the Order.” The court held that Petitioner had been detained far longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period under Zadvydas, and that the immigration judge’s grant of cancellation of removal provided good reason to believe there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Judge Leibowitz held that, “[h]aving wholly failed to respond to the Petition, and having failed to either comply with or seek extension or modification of this Court’s Order,” Respondents had failed to rebut Petitioner’s showing or provide contrary evidence. Accordingly, the court held that Petitioner “must be released.” Judge Leibowitz ordered Respondents to release Petitioner no later than Jun. 5, certify compliance by Jun. 5, and closed the case.

Respondents then moved for clarification. On Jun. 9, Judge Leibowitz clarified that the problem was not the absence of a bond hearing or release, but the absence of notice to the court:

“On May 20, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to either (1) provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing, consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), within 7 days of the entry of the Order or otherwise release Petitioner or (2) show cause for Petitioner’s detention. … Those deadlines passed without Respondents notifying the Court of their compliance with either requirement. Having heard nothing from the Government, the Court proceeded to grant Petitioner’s habeas petition.”

Respondents later advised that Petitioner had received a bond hearing on May 27 and had been released on bond on Jun. 3. Judge Leibowitz therefore granted clarification and held that, “[b]ecause Respondents complied with this Court’s earlier order (albeit without prompt notification),” Respondents were not required to return the $2,500 bond amount.

This habeas case involved a Nicaraguan detainee whom Judge Sands had already held was detained under § 1226(a), not § 1225 mandatory detention, followed by a bond hearing that the court later found “did not comport with the minimal requirements of due process.” Granting Petitioner’s emergency motion to enforce, Judge Sands invoked the court’s inherent authority “to enforce compliance with [its] lawful orders,” explaining that when it ordered Respondents to provide a § 1226(a) bond hearing, it expected “a bond hearing that comports with due process.” The court found that the hearing was not individualized, that the immigration judge treated the mere fact of removal proceedings as “a categorical presumption of flight risk,” and that “the burden of proof was incorrectly placed on Petitioner.” In rejecting Respondents’ due-process position, Judge Sands wrote that Respondents had “either seriously misunderstood the Mathews v. Eldridge test or offered an argument bordering on bad faith.” The court ordered a new individualized bond hearing within seven days, with DHS bearing the clear-and-convincing burden and with consideration of ability to pay and alternatives to detention, or immediate release.

Petitioner D.Y.E.H., a 52-year-old citizen of Nicaragua, was previously in immigration custody in 2018, was granted voluntary departure in 2019, and later reentered the United States near Del Rio, Texas in March 2022. After that encounter, he was released on recognizance and placed in the Alternative to Detention program, including participation in ISAP. His supervision conditions included electronic ankle monitoring, photo and location check-ins, home visits, and in-person and telephonic reporting. Petitioner alleged that he had no pending criminal charges, no history of violence, no history of noncompliance with immigration supervision, and that he had complied with all supervision requirements since 2022. He lived with his U.S.-citizen fiancée, served as the primary financial provider for his household, supported his family financially and emotionally, and was active in his church.

On Dec. 5, 2025, Petitioner appeared voluntarily for a scheduled ISAP check-in in Riverdale, Georgia. ICE revoked his order of release on recognizance, terminated him from ISAP, issued a new Notice to Appear, and transferred him to the Irwin County Detention Center. He filed his habeas petition on Dec. 21 and an amended petition the next day, challenging Respondents’ refusal to provide a bond hearing and pre-removal release while removal proceedings remained pending. Respondents argued that his detention was mandatory under § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2).

On Jan. 12, Judge Sands granted habeas relief in part. The court found that Petitioner was detained under § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225, and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing to determine whether he could be released on bond under § 1226(a)(2) and the applicable regulations. The court emphasized:

“The brevity of this order is appropriate given that the issue presented is exactly the same as the issue previously decided on numerous occasions by the Court and yet Respondent insists upon denying the relief that the Court has found is required.”

After judgment was entered, EOIR held a bond hearing on Jan. 28. Petitioner submitted approximately 74 pages of evidence, including support letters, mortgage documents, and documentation of years of compliance with OREC and ISAP conditions. At the hearing, DHS did not present evidence or argument that Petitioner was a flight risk, and Petitioner alleged that flight risk was not discussed at all before the oral ruling. Immigration Judge Doughty nevertheless set bond at $40,000, payable only in full cash, stating that the amount was necessary “to appropriately mitigate” flight risk. In the written order, the immigration judge acknowledged Petitioner’s evidence but concluded that, as an alien in removal proceedings, Petitioner had a “significant incentive to abscond” and that $40,000 was the “minimal amount” necessary to mitigate flight risk and ensure his appearance and compliance.