Three women in shawls and a man wearing a baseball cap and a striped shirt stand with their backs to the camera, looking out on the ruins of a school building. To their left can be seen banners with writing in Persian and pictures of the schoolchildren killed in the Minab school strike. Several Iranian flags can be seen blowing in the wind throughout the frame.

The United States’ Missile Strike on Minab’s Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School Part II

Acknowledgment, War Crimes, and Other Questions of Accountability

Editor’s Note

This article is the second installment in a two-part series. You can read part I here. 

At 10:30 on the first morning of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, a missile strike destroyed the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School in the southern Iran city of Minab. More than 150 persons were killed – schoolgirls and schoolboys aged 6 to 13 years old, plus a handful of school personnel, nearly all of them women. (¶93) Months after that Feb. 28, 2026, strike, mourners continued to pay daily visits to graves marked by poster-sized photos of the children. Although all public evidence indicates that the U.S. military launched the strike, to this day the United States has neither acknowledged this nor credibly shown that some other actor was responsible. We have undertaken a legal analysis of the strike and its aftermath, initially in our essay just published in the October issue of the American Journal of International Law, and now in this two-part series of Just Security articles.

Our Part I article analyzed the available evidence against international humanitarian law, especially IHL’s rules on the protection of civilians and civilian objects, including children and schools. We found a powerful case that the Minab school strike violated the principle of distinction (requiring belligerents to distinguish between civilian and military persons or objects, directly attacking only the latter and never the former) as operationalized through the rule on doubt. We found a similarly compelling case that the United States violated its IHL obligations to take precautions, including the duty to undertake feasible verification of potential targets. Finally, we drew a link between these violations and the United States’ institutional and rhetorical shifts away from preventing and mitigating civilian harm – to quote Secretary of Defense-renamed-War Pete Hegseth, shifts away from “tepid legality” and toward “maximum lethality.”

In this Part II article, we consider questions of accountability for the strike and its horrific aftermath. In the weeks since our AJIL essay went to final proof, the United Nations’ Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran IIFFM”) found “reasonable grounds to believe” that the strike constituted a “war crime” (¶ 126). That body’s report, summarized below, raises accountability questions that we consider in turn: Is it clear that the United States was responsible? If so, what forms of accountability are available? What has the United States done before in the wake of unintended attacks in other conflicts? How does the Iran IIFFM’s conclusion compare with our own findings of apparent violations of IHL? Does its war-crimes determination pertain to state responsibility under international law, to individual criminal responsibility, or both?

Before considering these questions, we note that multiple ex post accountability forums are authorized to deal with conduct of the kind under analysis here. Adjudicative forums include international criminal courts and tribunals, national criminal courts and military courts-martial, and civil lawsuits or administrative disciplinary proceedings. Additional forums include: fact-finding missions like the Iran IIFFM; state and international commissions of inquiry, claims commissions, and investigatory mechanisms; international treaty bodies and United Nations special mandate holders; regional human rights courts; and initiatives, like the Safe Schools Declaration, which bring together states, international organizations, and civil society. Within this array of options, the substantive areas of focus, applicable legal characterizations, evidentiary and proof requirements, procedural obstacles, and consequences of violation vary widely. 

The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission’s September 2026 Report

The U.N. Human Rights Council first established the Iran IIFFM in 2022, on account of “deep concern” over the “[d]eteriorating situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially with respect to women and children.” Persisting concern prompted extension of this fact-finding mission’s mandate – most recently on Jan. 23, 2026, when the Council “deplore[d] the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially the violent crackdown of peaceful protests resulting in the deaths of thousands of persons, including children, and large numbers of injured individuals” (¶1).

The Iran IIFFM, comprising legal experts Sara Hossain (Bangladesh), Viviana Krsticevic (Argentina), and Max du Plessis (South Africa), reported back to the Council in September 2026. Much of its report dwelt on the Iranian regime’s human rights violations, including against children (¶¶45-48, 53, 58, 70-71). The onset of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, however, compelled attention to that conflict’s “significant impact on civilians”; not least, to “emblematic incidents” including the February 28 strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School (¶¶78-79).

After describing circumstances leading to the strike as well as the strike itself, the Iran IIFFM found “reasonable grounds to believe that the strike on the primary school in Minab was carried out by the United States” (¶98); stated that “the United States failed in its obligation to do everything feasible to verify that it was a military objective,” thus violating IHL’s “obligation to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives and the prohibition of making civilian objects the object of an attack, as well as the principle of precaution” (¶124); and determined there were “reasonable grounds to believe” the strike amounted to a “war crime” (¶126). Noting that the United States had left the Iran IIFFM’s requests for meetings and information “unanswered” (¶4), the report urged U.S. assumptions of responsibility: “guarantees of non-repetition and reparations to victims,” as well as “taking immediate steps to disclose the outcomes of its internal inquiries into strikes on civilians and civilian objects” (¶129). We analyze these points below.

Attributing the Minab Strike to the United States

The Iran IIFFM report drew upon available evidence in attributing the strike to the United States. Key to its analysis were photos, videos, and other evidence identifying the weapon pointing to “the origin and type of weapon,” “an RGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile” (¶90). Our AJIL essay likewise underscored the discernible primary impact of the strike, the nature of the weapon used, and the implausibility of alternative explanations as the basis for attributing the attack to the United States (nn.68, 22). News reports indicated that within the government, U.S. responsibility had been accepted early on. In an article published shortly after our essay was in final proof, Ben Bartenstein and Krishna Karra reported in Bloomberg that some in the Pentagon knew the United States was responsible “within hours” of the strike, and that an as-yet-undisclosed preliminary internal review had reached the same conclusion less than a month later.

Nevertheless, the formal U.S. position, led by the public dissembling of President Donald J. Trump, remains equivocal on the issue of attribution (see here and here). Despite White House and Pentagon assurances that an investigation was under way, nine and a half months have passed without official word from the United States. The government has not taken a formal, public position on responsibility, and it has not issued a summary of its investigative findings, let alone a full report. Indeed, the Pentagon was said to be withholding release of its report at least until after the November 3 midterm elections. Now that those elections have taken place, this is an area to watch. In a recent interview, Ranking Member and incoming Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Adam Smith, pledged, “we can subpoena them, we can hold them in contempt. The report should be released.”

Accountability and Prior U.S. Responses

The U.S. (non)response thus far departs from recent practice. Prior U.S. strikes which were determined to have resulted from targeting errors, such as those on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and on the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Kunduz in 2015, led to several or all of the following responses: acknowledgments of responsibility, presentation or publication of investigations identifying the cause of error, identification of legal violations, apologies, disciplinary actions against responsible troops, and payments for damages and reconstruction. (nn.90-94) In both of those instances, the United States promptly released the results of its investigations; in the case involving the Chinese embassy, a presidential apology occurred within a week and the investigative findings were presented fewer than six weeks after the strike.

Following the Minab school strike, there is no indication that the United States intends either to apologize or to make any contribution to reconstruction or repair. On the contrary, the enduring failure even to acknowledge U.S. responsibility indicates a posture of evasion.

To be clear, a belligerent’s prompt internal investigation, coupled with prompt disclosure of findings on responsibility, are the bare minima of what is to be expected when targeting leads to harms against civilians and civilian objects in violation of IHL; in this case, the killing of more than a hundred schoolchildren and the destruction of their school arising from violations of distinction and precautions. Moreover, the recent U.S. practice of ex gratia payments, which are made in gesture of condolence rather than in acceptance of legal fault, is not sufficient to satisfy the United States’ reparative obligations. As the Iran IIFFM’s calls for ex ante prevention (guarantees of non-repetition) and for ex post accountability (reparations to victims) imply (¶129), release of internal investigations and condolence payments are by no means the endpoint of shouldering responsibility for IHL violations. (See International Law Commission (“ILC”) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Arts. 30-31, 34-37). But the United States is falling short of even those minimum standards.

IHL Violations

With regard to IHL, the Iran IIFFM report and our AJIL essay are in substantial agreement. Both found that the United States violated IHL’s principle of distinction as well as IHL’s precautionary duties, particularly the duty to undertake feasible verification when vetting targets. Indeed, our analysis went further. Recognizing that the United States has advanced IHL interpretations which afford states greater latitude than globally prevailing interpretations would, we applied the U.S. approach – notwithstanding our own concerns with it – and still found it “clear that the United States violated its general obligation to take constant care to spare the civilian population, as well as the specific requirement that it take feasible precautions to verify targets.”

Additionally identifying “a strong case … that the Shajareh Tayyebeh strike violated the rule of doubt” that operationalizes the principle of distinction, our Part I article proceeded to expose inadequacies in the U.S. interpretation of the rule on doubt. Section 5.4.3.2 of the United States’ Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2023) trains focus on whether individual commanders held an “honest and genuine belief” that the target of the attack was a military objective. In so doing, it fails to provide adequate ex ante guidance at the systemic or institutional level. Instead, we advocated a “whole-of-state” approach.

The need for a whole-of-state approach to the rule on doubt is even more acute for ex post accountability. When considering the criminal responsibility of an individual commander or leader, international standards look to that individual’s mens rea, or state of mind (as discussed further below). But when considering doubt in the context of state responsibility, for a non-criminal violation of IHL, it would be a category error to limit analysis solely to the mindset of individual officials within the state. The relevant question must be whether a level of doubt sufficient to preclude attacking was manifest across the state apparatus as a whole. If there was doubt manifest in the system, and yet it was not communicated effectively to those with decision-making responsibility, that would reflect an institutional failure pointing to the responsibility of the state as a whole. On this basis, an overwhelming case can be made that the United States bears state responsibility for a violation of the principle of distinction, as operationalized through the rule on doubt. It is this conclusion that should be the basis of immediate U.S. acknowledgment, guarantees of non-repetition, and reparation.

War Crimes

Our AJIL analysis focused only “on whether IHL has been violated, and not on whether any such violations might constitute war crimes.” (n.19). The Iran IIFFM’s subsequent report made findings on that latter question:

125. … the Mission concluded that when targeting the school building, the United States acted wilfully, that is, with the requisite mental element of recklessness (dolus eventualis). …

126. Based on available evidence, … the Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that the strike conducted under the command of the United States on the school building amounts to the war crime of making a civilian object the object of an attack. (emphasis added)

Here, we examine: first, the IIFFM’s characterization of the crime at issue; and second, the question of who, or what, might incur responsibility for it.

Characterizing the Criminal Conduct: The above italicized quotation of ¶126 – like all of this article’s quotations to the Iran IIFFM report – comes from the advance edited version dated September 21. Four days earlier, however, a U.N. press release had referred to the fact-finding mission’s identification of “reasonable grounds to believe that the United States committed a war crime by launching indiscriminate attacks that killed or injured civilians or damaged civilian objects” (emphasis added). Its quote came verbatim from ¶126 of a September 14 advance unedited version.

A September 19 Opinio Juris post by Kevin Jon Heller criticized the characterization of the strike as an “indiscriminate attack.” We agree. As emphasized in our AJIL assessment, the strike on the school was a precise strike on a specific target (nn.67-68). Available information shows the Shajareh Tayyebeh structure, located next to but not part of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) naval base, “to have been a functioning school, in session at the time of the strike – a civilian object where hundreds of civilians were present, most of them young children” (n.66). By contrast, indiscriminate attacks are not, or cannot be, directed at a specific objective (see Art. 51(4) Additional Protocol I). To assess the strike against “the war crime of making a civilian object the object of an attack,” as the September 21 version of the Iran IIFFM report does, is a better framing of the conduct under review. 

Parenthetically, an alternate characterization may be viable in U.S. federal courts. As Gabor Rona explained in a piece for Opinio Juris, Section 2441(c)(2) of the U.S. War Crimes Act defines “war crimes” to include “any conduct” prohibited by Article 27 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 – a provision requiring that in “bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes” (emphasis ours). Let us assume (plausibly, but not assuredly) that the Shajareh Tayyebeh school strike fits within the protected class. If so, it is possible that U.S. commanders’ failure to undertake feasible verification could implicate this rule – noting that the U.S. Law of War Manual (§5.11, n.385) links Article 27 and general precautionary obligations – even if no individual is found responsible for directing the attack at a civilian object. As this provision is untested, U.S.-specific, and in tension with the general exclusion of precautions from war crimes, we bracket it here.

War Crimes and Mens Rea: In common legal parlance the term “war crime” connotes a criminal offense for which a human being may be charged, put on trial, and if convicted, punished by incarceration. Under international criminal law, such individual criminal responsibility requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt not only of the requisite criminal conduct, or actus reus, but also of the requisite guilty mind, or mens rea. 

The ICC’s Rome Statute sets a high mens rea threshold. Conviction for the war crime of directing an attack against a civilian object requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused’s “intent and knowledge,” including awareness the targeted object had civilian status (Art. 30(3)). But neither the United States nor Iran is an ICC state party, and other courts and tribunals could apply a lower mens rea threshold. It is very unlikely that evidence solely of negligence would support conviction of a human being for committing war crimes, but there is support for the intermediate mens rea standard of recklessness, as a matter of customary international law (see here, here, here, here, and here). 

The Iran fact-finding mission invoked that intermediate standard when it wrote that the United States targeted the building “wilfully, that is, with the requisite mental element of recklessness (dolus eventualis)” vis-à-vis the building’s status as a civilian object; in other words, the United States engaged in the attack “while being aware of a substantial risk of striking a civilian object and acting recklessly as regards the possibility that this would happen.” (¶125). The Iran IIFFM thus found “reasonable grounds to believe” that the strike which had killed hundreds of schoolchildren in Minab constituted “the war crime of making a civilian object the object of an attack” (¶126). The “‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard of proof” aligns with the general practice of U.N. investigative bodies (¶ 9), as well as the ICC’s standard for issuing an arrest warrant in the context of individual criminal responsibility (Art. 58). 

We begin our assessment of these findings on the assumption that, in invoking the term “war crime,” the findings referred to a violation entailing individual criminal responsibility. 

Individual Criminal Responsibility: Establishment in a criminal case of the mens rea of recklessness – the customary international law standard, to which the Iran IIFFM referred – requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused authorized or engaged in the attack while consciously disregarding, or accepting, a substantial risk that the targeted object was in fact a civilian object. (Prior Just Security analyses here and here.) The information on which specific individuals acted, and how they understood that information, must be examined. To find individual criminal responsibility for the Shajareh Tayyebeh school attack there must be, as Heller observed in his analysis, “evidence that at least one perpetrator was subjectively aware the school might be a civilian object instead of part of the IRGC naval complex and nevertheless either attacked, ordered the attack, or contributed to the attack.” 

The Iran IIFFM’s analysis referred to “the United States act[ing] wilfully, that is, with the requisite mental element of recklessness” and to “the strike conducted under the command of the United States” (¶¶125, 126). No individuals were cited by name, or by approximate reference to their role in the strike, as persons who might have surpassed the recklessness threshold.

Meanwhile, Bartenstein and Karra wrote in Bloomberg of a “kill chain” of “roughly three dozen people” operating across essential stages, from inputting intelligence to engaging with the target. They further reported that Pentagon investigators had found “high confidence throughout” the kill chain that the Shajareh Tayyebeh structure was a military objective. If that finding is accurate, it would undercut a conclusion that individual persons acted with conscious acceptance, or disregard, of a risk that the structure was a civilian object. 

But other factors leave the question far from certain. Some publicly reported evidence may support an inference that one or more individuals engaged in or contributed to the strike without undertaking further vetting, despite knowing that they were relying on targeting data that was years out of date, and in a context in which the risk associated with directing an attack at a target based on that data would have been clear. Proof of this would establish a strong case that such individuals acted with reckless disregard of the target’s status, and thus incurred individual liability for the associated war crime.

This real possibility of individual liability for war crimes demands that authorities with jurisdiction – not least, the United States – investigate both the conduct and the state of mind of involved individuals.

State Responsibility for War Crimes?

Although the preceding analysis looked to individual criminal responsibility, the Iran IIFFM’s “war crime” analysis – even its reference to the “requisite mental element of recklessness (dolus eventualis)” – focused not on individual persons, but rather on “the United States” (¶¶125, 126). Perhaps it did not mean to refer at all to the viability of individual prosecutions. After all, just as individual state agents may commit international crimes while acting in their official capacity, states themselves may bear responsibility for violations of international law which also are defined as international crimes. 

Numerous International Court of Justice cases have concerned allegations that a state is responsible for the crime of genocide (see here, here, here and here). That said, the long-standing debate respecting the relationship between state and individual responsibility for genocide persists (see, e.g., Schabas, ch. 12). Consideration of crimes against humanity – specifically, the Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity issued by the ILC in 2019 – suggests further nuance. Article 3(1) provides: “Each State has the obligation not to engage in acts that constitute crimes against humanity” (emphasis ours). This phrasing imposes a duty of non-engagement in the relevant conduct, but makes no explicit reference to state criminal responsibility or to a notion of state criminal intent.

War crimes may stand in yet a different posture. Each war crime derives from a parallel, and underlying, rule of IHL (Prosecutor v. Tadić, ¶94; ICC Statute, Art. 8(2)). IHL was developed primarily with state responsibility in mind: without doubt, states can be responsible for violating the rules of IHL, including those that underpin specific war crimes (defined as “serious violations” or “grave breaches” of IHL). However, as war crimes, they include mens rea elements and the possibility of individual criminal responsibility (Prosecutor v. Tadić, ¶ 94). It is not clear, therefore, what it means to assert state responsibility for a war crime, as distinct from state responsibility for the underlying IHL violation, other than to assert the state’s responsibility for the conduct of one or more individuals who themselves bear individual criminal responsibility. Such an assertion could, of course, carry evidentiary weight even in the absence of identifying information about the persons who would be individually responsible. (See, e.g., October 2026 reports by inquiry commissions on Ukraine (¶¶32-33) and Palestine (¶¶43-56).) In contrast, for a state to be discernibly responsible for a war crime despite uncertainty regarding whether any human being is individually criminally responsible would require an account of the difference between state and individual responsibility for war crimes.

To the extent that such an account can be provided, pursuit of state responsibility for a war crime (as distinct from the underlying IHL violation) raises specific challenges, as Béatrice Bonafé and Nina Jørgensen have explored. There are, for example: questions of proof (If not “beyond a reasonable doubt,” then what?); questions of intent (How to conceptualize a standard analogous to the mens rea applied to humans? How to evaluate that standard given that the alleged perpetrator is a non-sentient entity? How is this affected by the integration of AI, which appears to be at play in the Minab case?); and questions of consequences (With incarceration impossible, by what measures might a state be “punished”? How, if at all, would those measures differ from the general legal consequences of state responsibility, such as countermeasures and reparation?). 

Labeling state conduct not simply an “IHL violation,” but rather a “war crime,” may convey a deeper expressive value (Amann, pp. 113-24), given the implication of heightened gravity. But precisely this may have an unintended and undesired result. To draw special attention to state war crimes (without an implication of individual responsibility) risks drawing attention away from the underlying IHL violations themselves; away, in this case, from a clear finding that the United States violated the IHL rules of distinction and precautions in its lethal strike on an elementary school.

Conclusion

The Iran IIFFM report named the February 28 attack on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School one of the “emblematic incidents” of the nine-month-old U.S.-Israel-Iran war (¶¶78-79). Our AJIL essay similarly expressed that akin to “the sinking of the Athenia on the first day of World War II, and of the Lusitania in the Great War before that,” the Minab strike “has become an awful symbol of this conflict” (n.2). Destroyed was a presumptively civilian object – a structure that housed a school, a site dedicated to education and the kind of site that is, in today’s armed conflicts, increasingly under attack. Killed were more than a hundred persons presumed civilians – boys and girls and their teachers, one “found in the rubble, her arms around children she was evidently trying to protect” (n.14). Their lost lives, and the loss to their families and their community, cannot be quantified.

This must mark a moment of reckoning for the United States, to which the attack is credibly attributed, and for U.S. military practice. Based on available evidence, we have determined that the United States violated its obligations under IHL, in particular: IHL’s foundational principle of distinction as operationalized through the rule on doubt; and precautionary duties, both to take constant care to spare civilians from the effects of military operations and to take feasible action to verify the legal status of targets.

This illegal attack occurred on the heels of ominous U.S. institutional and rhetorical shifts away from mitigating civilian harm, including a specific departure from longstanding support of U.N. initiatives to minimize attacks on schools and other wartime harms against children. Such rhetoric persists to this day. It was met by senior U.S. officials with statements and acts of evasion and obfuscation, which also continue, nine and a half months on. 

All this demands U.S. accountability. Prompt investigation of institutional failings and of the role played by AI, coupled with disclosure of results and U.S. acknowledgment, is essential. Incoming congressional leaders must follow through on their recognition of that imperative. Indications that commanders authorized the strike despite critical warnings within their targeting database are sufficiently alarming to warrant criminal investigation. 

Impeachment offers an alternative route to individual accountability, particularly given that impeachable “high crimes and misdemeanors” extend beyond codified criminal violations (here, here, and here). Directly on point in this respect, Article IV of Representative Thomas Massie’s proposed articles of impeachment against Defense Secretary Hegseth asserted that the secretary had engaged in numerous acts “ignoring laws that minimize civilian casualties.” The strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School was the foremost example of the consequent human cost. The cited actions align closely with those referenced in our AJIL analysis (nn.49-64, 88-89). With Representative Massie’s effort blocked in the 119th Congress, and Secretary Hegseth persisting in his overt contempt for legal restraint, the question now is whether the newly elected House will seek to revive the effort. A strong case can be made that doing so is an indispensable step towards discharging the international obligation to guarantee non-repetition (ILC, Art. 30).

More broadly, there is an urgent need for immediate compensation and eventual full reparation. Not least, the United States must adopt measures – beginning with restoration of civilian harm mitigation programs – aimed at assuring non-repetition of ghastly tragedies such as that visited upon the children, teachers, and families of Minab.

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