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Distr.: General
14 September 2026

Original: English

Human Rights Council
Sixty-third session
7 September–9 October 2026
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council's attention

Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran*

Summary

The present report, submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to resolution S-39/1, consolidates the findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning its investigation into allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations and abuses and crimes perpetrated in relation to the protests that began on 28 December 2025. It also presents findings from the Mission's ongoing investigations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law and crimes under international law in the context of the hostilities between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America and Israel that began on 28 February 2026.

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* The present report was submitted to conference services for processing after the deadline to include the most recent information.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to resolution S-39/1 in which the Human Rights Council ("the Council") extended the mandate of the Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran ("the Mission") until the end of its sixty-seventh session, and requested the Mission to conduct an urgent investigation into allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations and abuses and crimes in relation to the protests that began on 28 December 2025.[1]

2. The Council has consistently called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully with the Mission, including by granting it unhindered access to the country. The Mission deeply regrets that the Government has never granted such access. Since its inception in 2022, the Mission has sent 47 information requests to the Government. Although the Government responded to 12 letters, the Mission regrets that the remaining 34 remain unanswered and that the responses received did not include the underlying information requested.

3. Where relevant, the Mission considered the 120 documents submitted by the Government of Iran since November 2022, including 75 submitted since 1 January 2026.

4. In June 2026, the Mission sent a request for information to the Government of the United States of America (U.S.) and two requests for meetings with U.S. government officials. It also sent a request for information to the Government of Israel during the same month. The Mission regrets that these requests remain unanswered to date.

5. The Mission encountered operational constraints in preparing this report. These include the Government of Iran's nationwide Internet shutdown and communication restrictions, and its digital surveillance and increased repression of Iranians, including through transnational repression, which generated serious fears of reprisals among victims and witnesses for cooperating with human rights investigations. The heavy bombing of Iran by the U.S. and Israel displaced the population and thus potential witnesses, and disrupted access to information and communication. Key satellite image providers have restricted access to imagery from the armed conflict in response to concerns set forth by the U.S. These factors significantly hampered the Mission's access to information and impeded its ability to interview victims, witnesses, and sources.

6. In addition, the UN-wide recruitment freeze continues to cause the Mission's Secretariat to operate with a variable staffing rate not exceeding 60 per cent.

7. These circumstances have required the Mission to focus its investigation on areas for which information was accessible and employ methods which did not endanger sources or otherwise cause harm.

II. Methodology and standard of proof

8. The Mission was guided by methodologies and best practices of the United Nations, ensuring a victim-centred approach, with specific attention paid to the gender dimensions of the violations documented, and to intersectional factors shaping survivors' experiences. It continued to ensure strict adherence to the principles of "do no harm," independence, impartiality, objectivity, transparency, and integrity in its activities.

9. In line with UN investigative bodies' general practice, the Mission applied the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard of proof.

10. For this report, it conducted interviews with 73 people (39 men, 32 women, 2 boys), including members of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran, both in and outside Iran. It also collected satellite imagery, video and photographic material, and information from credible human rights organisations and forensic, military and other subject-matter experts.

[1] S-39/1.

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III. Repression of protests

A. Restrictions on digital space

11. From 8 January, the Government imposed a nationwide Internet shutdown that lasted for more than five months, making it the longest nationwide Internet shutdown on record. The restrictions on digital space imposed during the 2025-2026 protests and their aftermath, as well as during the hostilities that began on 28 February, were implemented on an unprecedented scale.

1. Internet and communication shutdown and ongoing restrictions

12. The Government imposed a nationwide shutdown of all Internet and mobile communications from around 8 pm on 8 January, without any prior notice or warning. Unlike during previous shutdowns, where a few forms of digital communication remained available, the Government completely suspended all digital communication nationwide from 8 to 9 January, during the height of the protests, except for digital landline telephone services.

13. The Internet was partially restored from late January in some areas, after the protests had been violently repressed. However, connectivity did not exceed thirty per cent and access remained uneven and highly restricted, with most individuals across the country experiencing little or no access to the Internet.

14. The Internet and communications shutdown was tightened again without prior notice or warning on 28 February following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. Iran maintained significant restrictions on Internet access thereafter, with limited connectivity reserved for selected users and sectors, mainly government officials. Internet access was not restored on a broad scale until 27 May. However, the Government continues to unduly restrict Internet access, censor online content, and strengthen State control over digital communications.

15. Credible information indicates that the National Information Network (NIN) – Iran's state-controlled domestic internet infrastructure – remained operational throughout the shutdown, except on 8 January and the days that followed. However, other domestic digital services were reportedly affected during the shutdown, including road navigation. These disruptions – coupled with Iran's surveillance of domestic digital services – further limited access to information.

16. According to credible sources, certain authorised users retained Internet access through so-called "white sim" cards from 28 February 2026. "White sim" card users were provided with more Internet connectivity than other citizens and included mainly government officials. However, some journalists and businesspeople also benefited from this privilege. Some individuals used Starlink to bypass the shutdown, despite the ban on its unauthorised use and efforts by the authorities to confiscate terminals and arrest those involved.

2. Government position

17. On 16 January, state media reported that the Government had been compelled to implement the shutdown to "protect the public from riots."[2] It stated that Internet services would be restored gradually, acknowledging that SMS services and the NIN had been disrupted. In a report received by the Mission on 26 January 2026, the Government maintained that its restrictions on internet and telecommunications were permissible under domestic law and necessary for disrupting coordination among "violent groups" while maintaining public order and national security.

18. Information indicates that alongside the shutdown, the Government implemented a policy of tiered internet access based on prior authorisation and identity verification, which appeared to strengthen its control over digital space.

[2] https://farsnews.ir/ScientificAcademic/1768599146619568679/.

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3. Impact and consequences

19. On 8 and 9 January, at the height of the violent repression of the protests, the suspension of all digital communications deprived people of essential means for communicating, accessing information, and seeking medical and other emergency assistance. Witnesses stated that the shutdown prevented them from verifying the safety and whereabouts of family and friends. Persons injured during the protests were unable to request medical help. Health workers explained that the shutdown made it extremely difficult to reach colleagues, coordinate treatment, and follow up with individuals who had sought assistance. One witness reported being unable to message anyone despite simultaneously receiving messages accusing them of participating in protests and threatening them with prosecution.

20. As the shutdown persisted, families inside Iran found it difficult to establish the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones. Families outside Iran experienced anguish as they waited for weeks for information from those inside the country.

21. The prolonged loss of connectivity also compounded the risks for people seeking to protect themselves and their families during the hostilities that started on 28 February. The population was left without reliable digital warning systems or sources of timely information about areas affected by US-Israeli airstrikes.

22. Information indicates that the shutdown also disrupted livelihoods, online business activities, and access to healthcare, education, legal, and other essential services.

B. Use of force resulting in deaths and injuries

1. 2025/2026 Protests

23. After spreading beyond Tehran to all 31 provinces and over 200 cities, the 2025/2026 protests evolved from a reaction to mounting economic grievances into calls for political change, drawing participation from men, women, and children – including boys and girls – older people, and entire families across Iran. The breadth and scale of the mobilisation, together with the extraordinary brutality of the state response, distinguish the 2025/2026 protests from previous demonstrations investigated by the Mission, including the protests that began in Iran on 16 September 2022 in the context of the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement. As the report will mention below, the crackdown on the 2025/2026 protests resulted in at least three and a half times the injuries and five and a half times the deaths as the repression of the protests that began on 16 September 2022. The violent suppression of the 2025/2026 protests went beyond a simple continuation of familiar patterns and represented a marked escalation in the use of lethal force and mass arrests.

24. While the Government initially adopted a conciliatory tone, it eventually characterised the protesters and their demands as a security threat. On 5 January, the Head of the Judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i, cautioned "rioters" that the Government would offer "no leniency" to them "because the main enemies of [the Iranian] people, namely the US and 'Zionist regime,' have officially and openly supported unrest in our country."[3] The Public Prosecutor of Tehran, Ali Salehi, described protesters who attacked public property as "rioters," "agitators" and "mercenaries" who could face charges of *moharebeh* ("enmity against God"), an offence carrying the death penalty.[4]

25. Late Supreme Leader Ali Khameini asserted that foreign actors, particularly the U.S. and Israel, were encouraging unrest and seeking to exploit domestic discontent to weaken Iran.[5] On 20 January 2026, the U.S. Treasury Secretary declared that the U.S. deliberately helped spark the protests in Iran by creating a U.S. dollar shortage that led to severe inflation.[6]

[3] https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2026/01/05/761920/Iran-Judiciary-rioters-lenienc.

[4] https://www.tasnimnews.ir/fa/news/1404/10/19/3491341.

[5] https://english.khamenei.ir/news/12069.

[6] https://www.c-span.org/program/international-telecasts/treasury-secretary-scott-bessent-at-world-economic-forum/671925 at 23:52-24:14. See also https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/12/what-we-know-about-the-protests-sweeping-iran and

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26. Officials further accused Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former Shah of Iran, of seeking to capitalise on the protests to promote regime change.[7] In late December 2025 and early January 2026, Reza Pahlavi issued a series of statements encouraging the protests.[8] On 23 March 2026, he publicly stated that the Government of Iran's "infrastructure of terror…must be destroyed" and "the entire regime must go."[9]

27. As demonstrations spread, reports emerged of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force by security forces. By 8 January, dozens of people, including children, were reportedly killed and hundreds injured. Between 8 and 9 January – immediately after the blanket Internet and telecommunications shutdown – security forces dramatically escalated their use of force against thousands of mainly peaceful protesters, during the deadliest period of the protests.

28. In a communication to the Mission, the Government of Iran stated that "certain groups, under the guidance of terrorist elements" had committed acts of violence, including killings, against individuals not participating in the protests, and further claimed that a "significant number" of security forces had been killed.[10] In further reports, it stated that protesters had damaged or burnt public infrastructure, private property, and medical and emergency facilities. These reports do not apply international human rights norms or standards to incidents where the Government used force to determine whether its response was necessary or proportionate.

29. Most footage reviewed and interviews with direct witnesses indicate people protesting peacefully. Nevertheless, the Mission collected independent, credible reports that some protesters behaved violently in some locations, including by burning police kiosks and throwing objects at security forces. The Mission was also able to review some videos purporting to show protesters kicking a member of the security forces and a protester directing a homemade flame thrower against security forces.

2. Scale of killings and injuries

30. Available information indicates that killings by security forces occurred on a staggering and unprecedented scale across all 31 provinces. The cities of Tehran, Karaj, Mashhad, Isfahan, and Rasht reportedly had the highest numbers of fatalities.

31. In early February, the Government settled on an official figure of 3,038 people killed.[11] It also reported that 25,000 people had been injured, with more than 50 per cent requiring surgery.[12] The Mission examined information on casualties provided by credible organisations, including lists of names that do not match those provided by the government. Given this disparity and the fact that the Government's lists do not provide disaggregated data, including on location, gender, or age, the Mission is not yet in a position to determine the number of persons killed or injured in a way that would satisfy its methodology and standard of proof. The Mission nevertheless has strong grounds to believe that the true figures for deaths and injuries are significantly higher than the Government's reported toll.

3. Weapons and tactics

32. Direct witnesses, health workers, and family members of victims provided information about killings and injuries resulting from the Government's use of force in the

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/29/world/middleeast/iran-currency-collapse-rial-inflation-protests.html.

[7] https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2026/01/11/762193/behind-riots-israel-pahlavi-nexus-delusion-regime-change-iran.

[8] https://rezapahlavi.org/en/statements/prince-reza-pahlavi-we-will-free-our-beloved-iran-from-khamenei-and-his-regime.

[9] https://rezapahlavi.org/en/statements/message-iran-free-world-peace-march-23-2026.

[10] The Government has not yet provided specific figures for members of security forces who were killed or injured.

[11] https://president.ir/fa/163429.

[12] https://www.tasnimnews.ir/fa/news/1404/11/18/3510665/.

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cities of Isfahan, Karaj, Mashhad, Rasht, and Tehran, as well as in Kerman Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Lorestan and Mazandaran provinces.

33. The Mission found a recurring pattern in which security forces used tear gas before firing shotguns loaded with metal pellets at protesters who did not present an imminent threat. Evidence from direct witnesses, healthcare workers, and medical records, including scans, established that protesters sustained metal pellet injuries to the eyes, head, chest and upper body, suggesting that security forces intended to maximise the damage caused by this type of ammunition. This is consistent with previous findings.[13]

34. Indeed, a medical doctor interviewed by the State broadcaster confirmed the deliberate use of small diameter metal shotgun pellets to kill and severely injure people:

"It can be said with certainty that these types of shells were used to cause more casualties meaning higher fatalities. They were specifically used to create injuries severe enough to cause death or permanent disability, instilling fear and terror among the people."[14]

35. Survivors of metal pellet injuries were especially impacted by serious trauma to their eyes, a pattern previously established following the 2022/2023 protests.[15] Hundreds of patients, including men, women, and children, were reportedly treated for ocular injuries. The Head of Farabi Hospital in Tehran stated that between 8 January and the morning of 10 January, more than 700 people had sought treatment for eye injuries. Some injuries resulted in severe or total loss of vision. According to one health professional, such injuries indicate that shotgun rounds were fired from close range.

36. The Mission established a pattern of security forces using other forms of lethal ammunition against protesters on 8 and 9 January, and in some locations on the days that followed. Healthcare workers and others who examined bodies of killed protesters reported gunshot wounds consistent with lethal ammunition other than small diameter metal pellets. In one instance, photographs show a high-energy, single gunshot wound to the head of a protester killed in Tehran on 8 January, just above their ear, likely from a rifle. The Mission reviewed verified video from the Kahrizak Forensic Medical Centre in Tehran, posted on social media on 13 January 2026, showing scores of bodies with visible bullet wounds.

37. Armed security forces took positions on rooftops and elevated structures, including residential buildings, and fired lethal ammunition towards protesters. In one verified video taken in the Tehran Pars neighborhood of Tehran and posted online on 10 January 2026, individuals can be seen firing weapons, likely assault rifles, from the roof of a police station for over six minutes, including with several bursts of automatic gunfire. They appear to be firing towards crowds of people, many of whom are hiding or fleeing, without any indication of return fire or other imminent threat of death or serious injury. A series of verified videos from Karaj city show figures firing assault rifles from the roof of an area immediately outside the police station in Gohardasht, without any indication of return fire or other imminent threat of death or serious injury, which is consistent with witness accounts of the event. Direct witnesses described hearing sustained automatic gunfire during demonstrations in Tehran, Karaj, Mashhad, and Abadan, and seeing protesters collapse after being shot.

38. The Mission found that security forces also shot protesters with lethal ammunition other than metal pellets in the head, eyes, neck, chest, abdomen, and lower body. Witnesses reported people participating or near protests being shot from behind, suggesting that some victims were fleeing and therefore not presenting an imminent threat.

39. Security forces also used tear gas in contravention of international norms and standards. Three direct witnesses described security forces using tear gas to force protesters into narrow side alleys in the area between Fardis and Marlik in Karaj city, blocking entry and exit routes before shooting at them. A healthcare worker described treating protesters injured after tear gas canisters were fired directly at their faces at close range.

[13] A/HRC/55/ CRP.1, paras: 466-471.
[14] https://x.com/iribnews_irib/status/2011066497620406753.
[15] A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para 470.

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4. Attacks on healthcare

40. As the Government's use of force escalated, in particular on 8, 9 and 10 January, some healthcare centres were overwhelmed by the number of injured people requiring urgent treatment. Credible information shows that medical facilities in at least nine provinces were forced to operate beyond their capacity due to the number of patients requiring urgent care. In some instances, patients were forced to lie on the ground in hallways and hospital corridors.

41. Access to medical care was further compromised by security forces in and around healthcare facilities. According to protesters who sought treatment, medical staff and other credible sources, security forces monitored hospitals, searched for injured protesters and, in some cases, arrested or detained individuals receiving treatment or accompanying those seeking treatment. This deterred victims from accessing care, adding to previous patterns of detention and harassment against healthcare workers and patients. Some injured people did not seek, or delayed seeking, hospital treatment out of fear that they would be identified, arrested and detained with some reportedly dying from their injuries as a result.

42. According to credible reports, security forces broke into Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam on 3 January and used force against injured protesters and those accompanying them. Video shows armed security officers forcing entry into the hospital, firing tear gas directly at a crowd gathered at its entrance, and beating a person filming their conduct inside the hospital who did not appear to present an imminent threat. On 5 January 2026, the Government announced that it would investigate allegations of violence at the Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam and Sina Hospital in Tehran.[16] The head of Ilam University of Medical Sciences, which oversees Imam Khomeini Hospital, later stated that police had entered the hospital solely to maintain control and restore calm amid overcrowding and "disruptive behaviour". He further asserted that no patients were harmed, citing CCTV footage and family testimonies.[17]

43. Healthcare workers played an important role in protecting injured protesters from further harm from security forces while still providing treatment. Some healthcare workers treated injured protesters without registering them as patients, registered them using different names, or deliberately omitting identifying information from medical records.

44. Credible information indicates that medical staff also faced threats, intimidation and, in some cases, arrest and detention, for providing medical care to injured protesters or protesting against the presence of security forces in medical facilities.

5. Children

45. The spokesperson of the Iranian Parliament's Education Commission stated that approximately 17 per cent of protesters were teenagers, many of them schoolchildren,[18] and that entire classes from some schools had participated in the protests. These statements are consistent with witness testimonies, and reviewed videos and photographs, which show groups of children and young people actively participating in protests across multiple locations.

46. Girls and boys were killed and injured during the protests. Witnesses reported child victims being shot while participating in the protests or observing protests from the windows of their homes. A 16-year-old girl was shot in the chest and killed while protesting in Karaj on 8 January. Direct witnesses recounted children being shot in the head, eyes, chest, abdomen, and back. Family members also described how child relatives had been shot or injured by security forces.

47. A 16-year-old boy was shot in both eyes with metal pellets and lost vision in his right eye. Another boy was blinded in one eye after being shot with metal pellets at close range, presenting pellet wounds to the upper half of his face and back of his forearm, indicating that he likely adopted a defensive posture before being shot. A healthcare professional reported

[16] https://www.irna.ir/news/86046537/.
[17] https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6716058/.
[18] https://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/910318.

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treating children as young as 10 years old for injuries caused by shotgun pellets. Other credible information indicates that children as young as five were injured.

48. A credible human rights organisation has so far collected the names of at least 221 children who were killed during the protests, including with lethal ammunition. According to the organisation, six of the children were under the age of 10 and two were only two years old. The vast majority of children killed were boys.

6. Searching for the dead and interference with burials

49. Uncertainty over the fate of loved ones compounded the pain of families, particularly when they were unable to observe important religious and cultural mourning rituals. This is consistent with a pattern previously established by the Mission during the 2022-23 protests.

50. Authorities delayed or refused to release bodies, in some instances demanding payment before release. They also refused to issue death certificates. One witness stated that their family was ordered to sign a document stating that their relative had been killed by "terrorists". Witnesses reported that some bodies were only released after relatives signed statements falsely stating that the deceased had been a member of the security forces, particularly Basij.

51. Witnesses stated that security forces instructed families to limit the number of mourners, and restricted where burials could take place. In some cases, funerals were conducted under the close supervision of security forces. Some families who sought to hold commemorative events, including traditional Muslim ceremonies marking the 40th day after a death, were threatened, intimidated, and warned not to proceed. According to one witness, security forces threatened mourners with weapons when they sought to attend a memorial ceremony.

7. Arrests and detention

52. Authorities carried out large scale arrests and detention during the protests and in their aftermath. On 16 January, state media reported the arrest of 3,000 people.[19] On 17 February, a Judiciary spokesperson stated that 10,538 people had been summoned in connection with the "recent riots" and that indictments had been issued for 8,843 people.[20] Credible human rights organisations reported that tens of thousands of people had been detained.

53. Security forces arrested people, including children, during and after the protests and detained them. Some families spent several days or weeks trying to establish the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones, whereas other families were unable to establish this information, raising concerns about enforced disappearances.

54. Credible information indicates that healthcare workers aiding protesters were arrested and lawyers aiding protesters were summoned. Individuals were reportedly arrested and detained for publicly criticising security forces' use of force during the protests.

55. Witnesses described acts of torture and ill-treatment in detention. One witness detained by police during protests in Karaj described being kicked in the mouth when he asked why he had been arrested. A woman detained shortly after the protests described being held in continuously lit solitary confinement for around one month, deprived of prescribed medication, and subjected to regular interrogation sessions lasting up to six hours each, without the presence of a lawyer. These reports are consistent with the Mission's previous findings of torture and ill treatment in detention, as well as enforced disappearance.[21]

56. Protest related arrests and detention occurred as part of a broader pattern of ongoing arbitrary detention by the Iranian authorities, including of women human rights defenders, journalists, and minority activists.

[19] https://aftabnews.ir/fa/news/1033668.
[20] https://www.isna.ir/news/1404112816673.
[21] A/HRC/55/76, paras 42-45; A/HRC/58/63, para 51.

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C. Death Penalty

57. Iran does not publish comprehensive public data on death sentences and executions, and official announcements only provide partial information. However, since the beginning of 2026, the Government has announced the execution of at least 58 individuals on security-related charges, including 14 on espionage charges; 14 for alleged membership of the Mujahedin-e Khalq or People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) and other banned opposition groups, such as Jaysh al-Adl and Ansar al-Furqan; 29 related to the 2025/2026 protests; and two on charges relating to the 2022 protests. Among them were three Kurds, two Baloch, one follower of the Yarsan faith, and four foreign nationals, all ten of them men.

1. Use of the death penalty against protesters

58. Iran intensified its use of the death penalty against protesters following the 2025/2026 protests. Since March 2026, the Government of Iran has executed at least 29 men, including at least two Kurds, in connection with the 2025/2026 protests, five of them publicly. More than 70 individuals, including at least five women and three boys, remain at imminent risk of being sentenced to death or executed in relation to the 2025/2026 protests.

59. The Mission has previously documented the Iranian authorities' increased use of the death penalty during periods of domestic upheaval, including protests, as well as during hostilities.[22]

60. In the aftermath of the 2025/2026 protests, government officials repeatedly indicated that protesters and individuals accused of "collaboration with a hostile government" could face the death penalty, including if convicted under the 2025 espionage law.

61. On 19 April 2026, the Head of the Judiciary stated that cases concerning people who had "collaborated with enemies" must be expedited.[23] On 15 July, the Prosecutor General of Tehran announced that all cases related to the 2025/2026 protests – as well as those related to the 12-day hostilities in June 2025 and the hostilities that started on 28 February 2026 – had been finalised and referred to the courts.[24] Other officials also expressed support for the expedited prosecution of protesters under provisions carrying the death penalty.[25]

62. Individuals on death row in connection with the 2025-2026 protests were explicitly excluded from the government's annual pardon and sentence reductions made in February 2026.[26]

63. Authorities brought capital charges against protesters for a range of offences, including *moharebeh* ("enmity against God"), *efsad-e-fel-arz* ("corruption on earth"), espionage, and alleged killing of security force members. Some cases involved multiple defendants being sentenced to death and executed. A least twelve young men were sentenced to death after being arrested in connection with protests that took place on 8 January 2026 in Alikhani Square, Isfahan city, during which four security force members were reportedly killed. To date, five of the men have been executed, including two foreign nationals, and two were executed publicly. Seven others remain at risk of imminent execution.

2. Due process and fair trial rights

64. In several cases investigated, proceedings were conducted on an expedited basis. Three young men publicly executed in Qom on 19 March 2026, were sentenced to death for killing two members of the security forces just three weeks after their arrest and executed within two months of being detained. In a separate case, four young men, reportedly aged between 18 and 30 years old, were sentenced to death for allegedly burning a Basij base in

[22] A/HRC/61/CRP.2; A/HRC/58/CRP.1.
[23] https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/4892867/.
[24] https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/9044254/.
[25] https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/4881353/, https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/4891189/;https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/4897133/; https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/4895767/.
[26] https://farsnews.ir/Qaysar/1770718180587236898/Irans-Leader-Pardons-Commutes-Sentences-of-Over-2000-Convicts.

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Tehran in January 2026, in which two people were reportedly killed. Approximately three weeks elapsed between the start of their trial and the issuance of the death sentences. They were executed between 2 and 6 April 2026.

65. Individuals arrested in connection with the 2025/2026 protests have been charged under Iran's newly expanded legal framework, which includes the law on "Intensifying the Punishment for Espionage and Collaboration with Israel [رژیم صیهونیستی] and Hostile States Against National Security and Interests" (2025 espionage law). The new law is vaguely formulated, and its overly broad provisions expand the power of the authorities to impose the death penalty and the scope of conduct punishable by death.[27]

66. In one case, the court imposed the death penalty on an individual for "participating in protests following calls of encouragement from political figures overseas." The court characterised the conduct as "collaboration with a hostile government." In several cases, espionage charges were brought alongside charges of *moharebeh* and *efsad-e-fel-arz*,[28] both vaguely worded offences, frequently used in death penalty cases.

67. The use of forced confessions obtained during interrogations has been a recurring feature in cases carrying the death penalty in Iran.[29] A lawyer representing one of three people accused of setting fire to a Tehran mosque during protests claimed that his client's confession had been obtained under torture, including by placing a firearm into his mouth. According to credible information, one of the three men executed in Qom had retracted his "confession", stating that it had been obtained under torture. The judge reportedly did not order further investigation, claiming that there were no visible signs of torture on the defendant's body.

68. As previously reported, defendants have been shown on state media "confessing" to alleged offences during the 2025-2026 protests.[30] The Mission reviewed video of such confessions, including a broadcast by official Iranian media on 18 January showing defendants accused of burning the Basij base in Tehran speaking without legal counsel.

69. Death sentences also followed other violations of due process and fair trial guarantees, such as denial of access to lawyers of one's choosing, lack of documentation or access to case information, and denial of the opportunity to meaningfully appeal. Trials continued to be held behind closed doors, often before Revolutionary Courts, where judges exercise broad discretion yet lack independence from other branches of government.[31]

3. Death sentences imposed against children

70. Iran has also used the death penalty against children in connection with the 2025/2026 protests, meaning individuals under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged offence. This is absolutely prohibited under international human rights law.

71. The Mission is aware of at least three people sentenced to death who were under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged offence. They include two 17-year-old boys who were sentenced to death alongside Hosseinipour Hesarlou, now a 19-year-old man. The three were accused of setting fire to the Seyyed al-Shohada Mosque in Pakdasht, Tehran on 8 January, which reportedly caused the death of two individuals. The three were sentenced to death by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court. According to credible information, the Supreme Court upheld the death sentences. A lawyer representing one of the defendants stated that he had been barred by the judge from representing his client.

4. Death sentences imposed against women

72. Credible information indicates that at least five women were sentenced to death in relation to the 2025/2026 protests. In one case, a woman was sentenced to death alongside three men on charges of "operational action in favour of the hostile government of the United States and hostile groups" after being accused of "chanting subversive slogans," and "using

[27] A/HRC/61/CRP.2, paras. 223-233.
[28] A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 925-932.
[29] A/HRC/55/CRP.1, para 953-961.
[30] A/HRC/61/CRP.2, para. 60.
[31] A/HRC/55/CRP.1, paras. 163-173.

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explosives, flammable materials, and bladed weapons," which reportedly caused injury to others, including security force personnel. The Supreme Court reportedly overturned the sentence on 22 May 2026, and the case has been referred for retrial. Available information on the two other cases remains limited.

73. According to information reviewed by the Mission, at least nine women have been sentenced to death for security-related offences as of 31 August 2026.

5. Other human rights concerns

74. Death sentences have at times been carried out in ways that cause additional suffering to families. Relatives were often informed of imminent executions at the last moment, or after they had taken place, while some were denied final visits or left waiting for months to receive their loved ones' bodies. Such practices may amount to ill-treatment under international human rights law.

75. In some cases, executions were carried out even when the underlying charges or evidence did not meet the threshold of "most serious crimes." Some of these instances involved individuals being executed for acts such as damaging property or throwing stones at police vehicles. Individuals were also sentenced to death for protected conduct such as the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of expression.

IV. Airstrikes on children and schools

A. Overview of hostilities

76. On 28 February 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched airstrikes against Iran amid ongoing U.S.–Iran negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program.

77. These strikes were followed by Iranian missile and drone attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets and allied positions in several neighbouring states, with the hostilities subsequently spreading to other countries in the region.

78. The hostilities have had a significant impact on civilians in Iran, resulting in substantial loss of life, displacement, and damage to civilian infrastructure. By 7 April, 2,362 civilians had reportedly been killed, 32,314 injured, and more than 3.2 million displaced.[32] On 9 August, the head of Iran's Tasnim news agency announced 3,519 deaths, including 517 women and 270 students. There are several reports of destroyed or damaged civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and health facilities, schools and educational facilities, residential buildings and homes, road and transport infrastructure, as well as disruptions of basic services including water and electricity.

79. The Mission's mandate enables it to assess foreign state conduct in Iran under international human rights law and other key frameworks of international law, including public international law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law. Accordingly, the Mission investigated two emblematic incidents arising from the hostilities, which reflect significant violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. If circumstances allow, it will address further incidents of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure through its investigations and findings during the remainder of its mandate.

B. Airstrike on Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab

80. On 28 February 2026, during the opening hours of the U.S.–Israeli military attack on Iran, the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School for girls and boys aged 6 to 13 was struck in Minab, Hormozgan Province between approximately 10:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. local time.

[32] https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/eha/ME-Sitrep-6-16-April-26.pdf.

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1. Clearly identifiable school

81. Based on an analysis of satellite imagery, the school was located adjacent to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) naval complex, with the nearest IRGC facility located approximately 72 metres from the school building.

82. According to satellite images and public reporting, the school began operating in approximately 2016, in converted IRGC structures. However, a wall constructed much earlier, sometime between 2013 and 2016, separated the school site entirely from the IRGC complex. Satellite images show that by the time of the strike on 28 February 2026, the school operated in a distinct, walled compound with its own entrance and access from the adjacent public street.

83. Photographs and videos depicting the school before and after the strike show many readily identifiable features associated with an educational facility for young children. These included child-oriented murals painted on exterior walls, school signage, and playground areas. According to public reporting, satellite imagery of the school before the strike also appears to show human figures, readily identifiable as children, gathered in its courtyard.

84. Pre-strike photographs and videos in public reporting further depict classrooms furnished with educational materials, children's artwork, learning aids, and other features characteristic of a functioning primary school. Additional imagery shows students and teachers participating in routine educational, cultural, and extracurricular activities.

85. Taken together, this material provides clear evidence that the facility was operating as a primary school before the strike. The Mission further notes that post-strike imagery and video in Iranian media continued to show the school's distinctive features among the damaged structures and rubble.

86. No information indicates that the school was used for military purposes at the time.

2. Airstrike

87. The strike on the primary school was part of an attack on several targets in the adjacent IRGC compound. CCTV footage shows munitions striking the area of the naval base and school and satellite imagery shows seven distinct detonation points at the school and nearby base. Satellite imagery and video confirm direct impacts to the centre of the school.

88. Families and survivors interviewed by Iranian media reported that the school was struck twice, with a brief interval between strikes. Several sources reported that the first munition struck the lower floor of the school, leading the principal and teachers to move the children to a prayer room on the upper floor. A second munition then struck the upper floor, killing many of the children. Several teachers and the school principal were also killed, all of them women.

89. The Mission concludes that the building of the school was the intended point of impact and that the damage did not result from an errant strike or collateral damage from the attack on the adjacent IRGC compound.

3. Identification of munition

90. On 8 March 2026, a state-affiliated Iranian news agency published video showing a munition with the distinct silhouette of a missile striking the area in the vicinity of the school.[33] Geolocation analysis confirmed that the footage was filmed near the school complex. Weapons analysis of the silhouette in the video identifies the large, mid-section "pop-out" straight wings and short tail fins that are distinctive features of a Tomahawk missile. Organisations specialising in weapons and munitions identification confirmed the munition as an RGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) based on analysis of photographs released by Iranian media of missile remnants retrieved from the site of the airstrike, including images of a steering mechanism and antenna.

[33] https://t.me/mehrnews/357281.

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4. Immediate aftermath of the strike

91. Within hours of the strike, a state-affiliated Iranian news agency released video showing widespread destruction at the site. One video shows a man holding the severed arm of a young child. Bloodied backpacks and schoolbooks can be seen in additional footage. Sources interviewed by media described burned, dismembered, and headless bodies. Several families lost more than one child, reflecting the devastating impact of the attack on families and the wider community.

5. Casualties

92. On 9 April 2026, Minab Prosecutor Ebrahim Taheri, publicly announced the final death toll as 156.[34] According to his investigation, those killed included 120 schoolchildren (73 boys and 47 girls), 26 educators, all of whom were women, seven parents of students (four men and three women), a school bus driver of unknown gender, and a male technician from a nearby pharmacy.

93. Credible independent information asserted that 157 individuals were killed at the school, including 123 children, all aged 13 years or younger, including 15 children who were six years old.

94. A Minab Red Crescent member reported to Iranian media that an additional 110 individuals were injured.

6. Attribution

95. On 11 March, the New York Times reported that a preliminary Department of Defence investigation had determined that the U.S. was responsible for the strike after target coordinates were generated using outdated intelligence identifying the school building as part of an adjacent military installation.[35] Reuters also reported that preliminary findings of the Department of Defence investigation pointed to likely U.S. responsibility.[36] On 19 May 2026, CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper confirmed that the preliminary findings of the Department of Defence investigation "correlated" the airstrike on the primary school in Minab with a U.S strike.[37]

96. Credible civil society organisations concurred that the available evidence pointed to U.S. responsibility and that failures in target verification, including reliance on outdated intelligence, were the most likely explanation for the strike on the school.

97. In a 16 June 2026 letter, the Mission requested the U.S. Government to provide information concerning the strike on the school in Minab. In two letters sent on 24 June 2026, the Mission requested the U.S. Government to facilitate meetings with CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper and the Director of the U.S. Department of Defence Civilian Protection Centre of Excellence to discuss the hostilities between the U.S. and Iran since 28 February 2026, including the airstrike on the primary school. As of the finalisation of this report, the Mission had not received a response to these requests.

98. Based on the totality of information and evidence gathered and assessed, the Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that the strike on the primary school in Minab was carried out by the U.S. The Mission considered the area of operations of the parties; its assessment of the origin and type of weapon used; several corroborated reports indicating that a preliminary U.S. military inquiry found U.S. forces responsible for the strike; the U.S. CENTCOM Commander's assertion that the strike on the school "correlates" with a U.S. strike; and the fact that the U.S. is the only party to the conflict that possesses Tomahawk missiles.

[34] https://www.isna.ir/news/1405012010615/.
[35] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/11/us/politics/iran-school-missile-strike.html.
[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pentagon-elevates-investigation-into-iran-school-strike-2026-03-13/.
[37] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2aZmuhCpmF4&t=30s from 2:09:29-2:09:38.

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C. Strike on sports center in Lamerd

99. At approximately 5:10 p.m. local time on 28 February 2026, an airstrike targeted a sports centre in Lamerd city, Fars Province.

1. Clearly identifiable sports centre

100. Based on satellite imagery, media reports, and open-source information, the sports centre is visibly separate from an adjacent IRGC compound. Imagery further shows signage at the entrance gate identifying the facility as the *Shahid Haj Khalil Naimi Cultural and Sports Complex.*

101. Additionally, a local business listing identifies it as the *Shahid Naimi Sports Hall/Gym*, located at Dehno Heikli, Moalem Boulevard. Materials published by Iranian sources and social media before the strike further document its use for sporting and other activities involving children.

102. No information indicates that the sports centre was used for military purposes at the time.

2. Airstrike

103. Verified video posted by a State-affiliated Iranian news agency shows missiles exploding mid-air just above the sports centre and adjacent residential neighbourhood and elementary school, with a wide fragmentation impact radius visible across rooftops. Geolocation of video and photographic material conducted by a specialised organisation identified the location of the first strike as Isar/Eisar residential neighbourhood, close to the sports centre. A second missile reportedly exploded above the sports centre, damaging the roof and propelling debris at those present in the area.

104. A coach from the sports centre recounted how people inside the centre began running towards the exit after hearing an explosion in the nearby residential area. Within seconds, another missile exploded at the sports centre, resulting in many injuries.

3. Immediate aftermath

105. Videos published by a State-affiliated news agency show the immediate aftermath of the strike with the sports centre covered in smoke and the surrounding area pockmarked with thousands of small holes. Several other images published by Iranian news media show damage to the facility. Additional damage was reported at an adjacent elementary school.

106. The building of the Lamerd Centre of the Institute for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults was also reportedly damaged. Dozens of small holes are visible on the walls and windows of the centre.

4. Identification of munition

107. On 28 March 2026, the BBC reported that weapons experts identified the type of missile used in the Lamerd strike as the U.S.-made Precision Strike Missile (PrSM).[38] The following day, the New York Times reported that visual analysis of verified videos of the strikes and post-strike imagery, as well as an unnamed U.S. official, confirmed the missile used as a PrSM.[39]

108. Other media outlets and groups with expertise in verifying munitions and their use also identified the missile used in the attack as a PrSM.

109. Publicly available information states that the PrSM is designed to detonate above its target, dispersing approximately 180,000 tungsten pellets over a wide area and producing a distinctive perforation impact. Although the exact damage radius of the PrSM missile is not yet public, analysis of a product video created by its manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, indicates that it may reach approximately 50 meters over relatively flat ground, which is

[38] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx29mzmwdw2o.
[39] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/29/world/middleeast/us-precision-strike-missile-iran-lamerd.html.

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equivalent to an impact area of roughly 7,850 square meters. An analysis by Airwars concluded that PrSM missiles were used to strike Lamerd and at least one of them had a damage radius of 170 meters. This would be equivalent to an impact area of roughly 90,790 square meters.

110. Based on the totality of the evidence above and its weapons analysis, the Mission finds reasonable grounds to believe that the munitions used in the airstrike on and around the sports hall in Lamerd were PrSM missiles. The Mission notes key visual features of the PrSM's silhouette identifiable in verified video, namely the long and sharp nose cone, smooth fuselage, and short tail fins at the very base of the exhaust nozzle. It also observes that the missile detonations seen in verified videos occur directly above the target, and not upon impact, which is consistent with a PrSM's "airburst" mechanism. Additionally, the Mission considered verified images and video showing extensive pock marking of the surfaces of the airstrike sites, which is a hallmark of the PrSM's airburst dispersal of tungsten pellets. Lastly, verified video of the airstrike shows pellets from one missile impacting rooftops with a very similar damage radius to the one shown in Lockheed Martin's product video for the PrSM missile.[40]

5. Casualties

111. Javad Mansouri, Head of the Sports and Youth Department of Lamerd County, stated that twenty-two individuals were killed in the strike on the sports centre, including ten women and twelve men.[41] This total was confirmed by several other Iranian sources. Among those reportedly killed were two schoolgirls and two schoolboys, and a two-year-old girl who was playing in front of her home. Iran's official news agency reported that sixteen of the victims killed by the strikes were in the residential neighbourhood near the sports centre.

112. Local officials further reported that over 100 people were injured, including a number of schoolchildren who were playing at the sports centre. A credible organisation, specialised in assessing harm to civilians from airstrikes, reported close to 170 injured. Five children reportedly suffered life-threatening injuries.

6. Attribution

113. On 4 March 2026, CENTCOM publicly confirmed that PrSMs had been used for the first time in combat during its operations in Iran.[42]

114. On 31 March 2026, CENTCOM denied responsibility for the strike on the sports centre and adjacent school. It also disputed media reports attributing the strike to PrSMs, asserting that the munition visible in available footage was more consistent with an Iranian Hoveyzeh cruise missile.[43] This account was contested by weapons experts, whose analyses contrasted the very identifiable visual differences between the two missiles, including the fact that, unlike the PrSM, the Hoveyzeh missile features delta shaped wings and a large, external turbojet engine mounted on its underside.

115. In its 16 June 2026 letter, the Mission requested the U.S. Government to provide the same information on the strike on Lamerd that it had requested concerning the strike on the school in Minab. In its letters dated 24 June 2026, the Mission indicated that it also wished to discuss the airstrikes in Lamerd with U.S. officials. As of the finalisation of this report, the Mission had not received a response to these requests.

116. Based on the totality of material gathered and assessed, the Mission has reasonable grounds to believe that the strike on the sports centre in Lamerd was carried out by the U.S. The Mission considered the origin and type of weapon used; public confirmation by the U.S. that it had used PrSM missiles against Iran in March 2026; and the fact that the U.S. is the only party to the conflict that possesses PrSM missiles.

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40 https://snn.ir/fa/news/1380950/ at 0:18.

41 https://ana.ir/fa/news/1037264/.

42 https://breakingdefense.com/2026/03/centcom-confirms-first-combat-use-of-prsm-in-iran/.

43 https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4448978/centcom-refutes-media-claims-of-us-strikes-in-lamerd-iran/.

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V. Legal Findings[44]

A. International human rights law and crimes against humanity

117. Iran is responsible for gross human rights violations, including of the rights to life, freedom from torture and ill-treatment, personal security and liberty, fair trial, effective remedy, of peaceful assembly, to freedom of expression and association, and to equality and non-discrimination, privacy, and health.

118. Violating the rights to life or personal security, security forces used lethal force to kill and injure protesters and bystanders, including children, who posed no imminent threat of death or serious injury. They also used less-lethal weapons and ammunition outside of less-lethal parameters to kill or injure protesters. Inside hospitals, they subjected patients, medical staff, and family members to unnecessary use of force, arbitrary arrest, and harassment. In violation of their duty to protect life and the right to health, authorities actively interfered with protesters' ability to access essential healthcare, including by preventing access to lifesaving care or urgent treatment.

119. The nationwide internet shutdown and communications restrictions that started on 8 January 2026 constitute an undue restriction of the right to seek, receive, and impart information.

120. By following summary death penalty proceedings that violated due process guarantees and fair trial rights or executing individuals for crimes not amounting to "the most serious crimes," or both, Iran unlawfully and arbitrarily deprived at least 58 men of their right to life.

121. Many gross human rights violations by Iran amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment and other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, and other inhumane acts, committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, namely protesters, including children, their supporters and perceived dissenting or opposing actors, including members of political groups, civil society organisations and professional associations.

122. The Mission highlights the serious human rights impact of the hostilities on civilians in Iran, especially in relation to the high number of civilians killed and injured and civilian objects damaged and destroyed. It recalls that practices inconsistent with IHL, entailing a risk to the lives of civilians and other persons protected by IHL, including failure to apply the principle of distinction, proportionality and precaution, also violate the right to life under human rights law. The damage or destruction of civilian infrastructure, including health and educational facilities, and residential buildings also have a negative impact on the enjoyment of the rights to education, health and adequate food and housing of civilians in Iran.

B. IHL and war crimes

123. The Mission also examined whether investigated acts carried out during the international armed conflict between Iran and the United States and between Iran and Israel violated IHL pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international law.

124. IHL prohibits directing attacks against civilian objects and provides for the obligation to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. The Mission concluded that when identifying and directing its attack against the primary school in Minab, whose civilian nature is apparent, the U.S. failed in its obligation to do everything feasible to verify that it was a military objective. Updating targeting information and acting upon such information falls within the category of feasible precautions an attacking party is required to take under IHL. Thus, the strikes are a violation of the obligation to distinguish between civilian objects

[44] See Annex I for an extended and annotated version of these legal findings, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index.

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and military objectives and the prohibition of making civilian objects the object of an attack, as well as the principle of precaution.

125. Furthermore, the Mission concluded that when targeting the school building, the U.S acted wilfully, that is with the requisite mental element of recklessness (*dolus eventualis*). Taking into account the U.S. Government's deprioritisation of civilian harm mitigation and of compliance with IHL; expressed through public statements by senior U.S. leadership, including the President and the Secretary of Defense, which dismiss binding obligations under IHL, including ahead of and in relation to the armed conflict in Iran; the apparent existence of and reliance on outdated targeting data; and the multiple features readily identifying the structure as an educational facility for young children, which were publicly available prior to the airstrike, the Mission considers that the U.S.'s failure to update information in relation to the school in its targeting databases and to verify that the building was a military objective before launching the attack went beyond mere negligence. Rather, the U.S. directed the strikes at the building of the school while being aware of a substantial risk of striking a civilian object and acting recklessly as regards the possibility that this would happen.

126. Based on the available evidence, which does not include responses by the U.S. to the Mission's requests for information, or a full and public disclosure by the U.S of the outcomes of its internal investigation into the airstrike on the school, the Mission finds reasonable grounds to believe that the U.S. committed the war crime of launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.

127. Irrespective of the intended target of the U.S. strikes in a populated area in Lamerd that hit a sports centre, an adjacent elementary school and residential buildings in the neighbourhood – all civilian objects – the Mission found that these strikes constituted an indiscriminate attack in violation of the principle of distinction. In this case, the means used and its effects on a location with many civilians and civilian objects, namely the airburst of a PrSM missile dispersing approximately 180,000 tungsten pellets over a wide area, under the prevailing circumstances, could not be directed at a specific military objective and its effects on civilian and civilian objects could not be limited as required by IHL. The U.S. was under the IHL obligation to employ weapons systems and ammunition that satisfied these requirements.

128. Accordingly, the strike on Lamerd also amounted to the war crime of launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. The Mission concluded that the U.S., by choosing to use the PrSM missile in a populated civilian area, under the prevailing circumstances, launched an attack that struck civilians and civilian objects reckless as to the likely extent of death or injury.

C. State responsibility

129. Acts attributable to a State that constitute a breach of its international obligations, i.e. internationally wrongful acts, give rise to State responsibility. The responsible State is under an obligation, as applicable, to cease that act, offer guarantees of non-repetition, and make full reparation, namely in form of restitution, compensation or satisfaction. IHRL and IHL violations and crimes under international law by Iran and the U.S., respectively, as found by the Mission, are attributable to them, as they were carried out by their state organs, and are breaches of their international treaty and customary law obligations. Iran and the U.S. thus must cease the violations and crimes and provide guarantees of non-repetition and reparations to victims and the injured State. Examples of this relief could include the Iranian judiciary refusing to aid and abet arbitrary killings resulting from death sentences following unfair trials; cessation of use of force violations by Iran against protestors; and the U.S. taking immediate steps to disclose the outcomes of its internal inquiries into strikes on civilians and civilian objects.

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VI. Conclusion

130. People in Iran are caught between intensified repression and violence by their government and renewed armed conflict and insecurity resulting from the hostilities between Iran and the U.S and Israel.

131. The Government's response to the protests cannot be understood as a mere continuation of its well-established pattern of suppressing dissent. It represents a significant escalation from the past – in the scale of violence and killings, in efforts to sever contact between communities and with the outside world, in the use of repressive laws, and in the ever-increasing use of the death penalty as a tool of intimidation and control.

132. The economic conditions that triggered the protests remain largely unresolved, and for many people, they are intensifying. The long-standing structural grievances at the root of these and previous protests remain unaddressed.

133. The parties to the conflict should immediately cease hostilities and all Member States should take prompt diplomatic action to implement a permanent peace. They should also ensure that allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by all parties are independently investigated and those responsible held to account. Member States should also guarantee protection and assistance for those fleeing or at risk of persecution, including through humanitarian visas, temporary protection or other emergency admission pathways, while ensuring access to necessary medical, psychosocial, and legal support, with particular attention given to individuals and groups at heightened risk of reprisals.

134. The Mission reiterates its previous recommendations to the Government of Iran, which regrettably have not been implemented to date. It urges all Member States to engage diplomatically with Iran to ensure implementation of these recommendations.

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