The “presumption of regularity” is a judicially created doctrine with a long and contested history. The doctrine affords the executive branch a distinctive advantage not enjoyed by private litigants. It generally instructs courts to presume, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary, that executive officials have “properly discharged their official duties” and that government agencies have acted with procedural regularity and with bona fide, non-pretextual reasons. In practice, the presumption can preclude discovery, limit review of the facts, and truncate cases. It can constrict (or even end) civil suits challenging government action, curb criminal defendants’ ability to claim vindictive or selective prosecution, and more.
The Supreme Court itself showed the limits of the presumption during the first Trump administration upon learning that the Commerce Department had “contrived” a false rationale for reinstating the citizenship question in the national census. In Department of Commerce v. New York, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, “[W]e cannot ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given. Our review is deferential, but we are ‘not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.’” That move was to the chagrin of Justice Clarence Thomas, who argued that the majority had given “lipservice” to the principle that “courts reviewing agency action owe the Executive a ‘presumption of regularity.’” (See Goodman and Morganstein-Foley, U.S. Supreme Court’s Rejection of the “Presumption of Regularity,” discussing a more recent Supreme Court signal on this issue.)
Over the decades, the scope and weight of the presumption has fluctuated. In the face of extraordinary executive misconduct or malfeasance, courts may choose (explicitly or implicitly) to narrow its scope, reduce its weight, or even potentially deem the presumption more generally forfeited. Indeed Judge Paul L. Friedman cautioned in an August 2025 opinion:
“Generations of presidential administrations and public officials have validated this underlying premise of the presumption of regularity: their actions writ large have raised little question that they act ‘in obedience to [their] duty.’ Over the last six months, however, courts have seen instance after instance of departures from this tradition. … In just six months, the President of the United States may have forfeited the right to such a presumption of regularity.” (emphasis added).
Months later, several federal judges – including Chief Judge Cathy Bissoon, Judge Mustafa T. Kasubhai, Judge Christine P. O’Hearn, and Judge Zahid N. Quraishi – declared that the presumption “no longer holds” and “has been undeniably eroded.” In May 2026, Judge Mary S. McElroy, wrote:
“The Court cannot help but share the sentiment that ‘[t]he presumption of regularity that has previously been extended to [DOJ] that it could be taken at its word—with little doubt about its intentions and stated purposes—no longer holds.’”
[Compare also Judge Amy Berman Jackson (“the Court is left with little confidence that the defense can be trusted to tell the truth about anything”); Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui (“Trust that had been earned over generations has been lost in weeks. … These norms being broken must have consequences. High deference is out; trust, but verify is in”); Judge Paula Xinis (“You have taken the presumption of regularity and you’ve destroyed it in my view.”); Judge Allison D. Burroughs (“the Court will not apply any presumption of regularity to conduct that is so unusual and therefore irregular on its face.”); Judge Colleen McMahon (“Where the record omits materials that were before the agency decisionmakers, the presumption of regularity gives way”); Judge Lauren King (“The ‘presumption of regularity’ is dislodged here by the numerous factual errors in Respondents’ filings and by their conflicting representations to the Court.”); Magistrate Judge William B. Porter (“In its day-to-day workings, this Court affords government attorneys a presumption of regularity. … The government’s conduct has disturbed that baseline posture of deference.”); Magistrate Judge Keri L. Holleb Hotaling (“There is and always had been a presumption of regularity. This Court is very concerned that I cannot rely on the information that is provided to me either from the U.S. Attorney’s Office or from agents”).]
In this study, we document three categories of executive branch conduct since Jan. 20, 2025 that, in Judge Friedman’s words, showed to courts “instance after instance of departures from this tradition” of public officials acting “in obedience to [their] duty.”
The three categories are judicial findings are:
1. Court findings of government noncompliance with court orders: 60 cases
2. Courts’ distrust of government information and representations: 112 cases
3. Court findings of “arbitrary and capricious” administrative action: 145 cases
(Note for the first year of the administration, Jan. 20, 2025-Jan. 19, 2026: Noncompliance = 32 cases; Distrust = 78 cases; Arbitrary and capricious conduct = 82 cases)
[The above totals do not include recent waves of habeas immigration cases. For those cases, the totals are:
1. Noncompliance: At least 740 cases (including cases documented by Minnesota District Court Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz (W. Bush appointee) and cases acknowledged by the US Attorney’s Office for New Jersey)
2. Courts’ distrust of government information and representations: At least 150 cases
3. Arbitrary and capricious conduct: 14 cases
See Siven Watt’s Immigration Habeas Tracker, published on June 22, 2026.]
Before turning to the three categories of executive conduct, we should mention four methodological notes about our research:
1. In an important respect, the above total number of the cases underestimates the amount of government misconduct before the courts. For those totals, we count cases, not each instance of government misconduct. If a single case involves multiple instances of government misconduct – such as multiple findings of noncompliance with judicial orders during the duration of litigation or multiple instances of court distrust of government factual representations – that is still counted as only one case in the above totals. That said, in the descriptions of each case below, we track each instance of government misconduct in detail.
2. Our account includes only government conduct that has come to the courts’ direct attention. We do not include internal executive branch actions that may also suggest the administration has undercut the premise for applying the presumption. We considered including those as well, but we focus here instead on what the courts themselves have found. Nor did we want to reinvent the wheel: a separate Tracker comprehensively documents internal administrative changes that have undermined the executive branch’s capacity to identify and address official misconduct and systemic irregularities.
3. The three categories above do not capture all of the judiciary’s expressed concerns about the administration’s conduct; the record is even more overwhelming than the cases we catalog. For example, we exclude judges’ concerns about Department of Justice conduct involving prosecutorial decisions that do not fit our three categories. In a September hearing, for instance, Judge Faruqui — a former federal prosecutor — criticized the government’s motion to dismiss charges against a defendant after a grand jury’s refusal to indict. In an accompanying order, the court questioned whether the U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C. was still following the DOJ Manual on when to initiate a prosecution, “[g]iven that there have been an unprecedented number of cases that the U.S. Attorney dismissed in the past ten days.” The court added, “It’s not fair to say they’re losing credibility. We’re past that now. … There’s no credibility left.”
4. We take no position on the presumption’s proper scope in ordinary circumstances. The documented cases below are not intended to indicate when we think courts should apply the presumption. Well before the Trump administration, the metes and bounds of the presumption were unsettled, and its pedigree was ripe for being questioned. Some scholars trace the presumption back to the 1926 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Chemical Foundation, where the Justices presumed that a State Department official acted with knowledge of material facts when selling patents seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Paradoxically, the application of the presumption in that case worked against the Coolidge administration, which had sought to invalidate the sale as “induced by misrepresentation.” What’s more, the Court did not explain why it was appropriate to presume the regularity of a process the government itself said was irregular.
Other scholars and courts trace the presumption further back to Martin v. Mott. In that 1827 case, the Supreme Court accorded deference to the president’s determination that an “invasion” existed in calling the New York militia into federal service during the War of 1812. If the presumption belongs to that lineage of judicial deference, our study has broader implications. However, we have reason to doubt the two forms of deference – the one in Mott and the one in Chemical Foundation – are doctrinally equivalent.
In other words, we do not attempt to resolve how far back to trace the doctrine’s origins, the doctrine’s appropriate scope, or whether it has seeped into judicial decisions in underexamined or unwarranted ways. Such an analysis would need to contend, among other things, with the logical foundations of the doctrine and to which types of government actions those foundations are applicable as well as whether a president should enjoy a presumption that his or her subordinates do not.
* * *
In sum, the presumption of regularity “credits to the executive branch certain facts about what happened and why and, in doing so, narrows judicial scrutiny and widens executive discretion over decisionmaking processes and outcomes,” as an influential Harvard Law Review Note explained. But the maintenance of the presumption rests on certain foundations, and those foundations have been eroded by the Trump administration, especially the Justice Department, in the following three ways.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Court Findings of Government Noncompliance with Court Orders
Chapter 2. Court Distrust of Government Information and Representations
Chapter 3. Court Findings of “Arbitrary and Capricious” Administrative Action
Chapter 1. Court Findings of Government Noncompliance with Court Orders
10-c. El Salvador removals: “Government repeatedly violated, or attempted to violate” court orders
Chapter 2. Court Distrust of Government Information and Representations
3. DOGE access to Treasury data: explanation “riddled with inconsistencies”
34. MS-13 prosecution dismissal: “The Government appears to be making inconsistent representations”
48. Student-activist deportation policy: ICE mask testimony deemed “disingenuous”
63. UCLA research funding: civil-rights explanations “likely pretextual”
93. Ethiopian TPS termination: government’s claim about TPS holders “demonstrably untrue”
94. Immigration courthouse arrests: a “clearly erroneous premise;” a “recent invention”
Chapter 3. Court Findings of “Arbitrary and Capricious” Administrative Action
1. Federal funding freeze: no reasoned explanation, no regard for consequences
2. HHS website takedowns: no reasoned explanation, reliance interests ignored
3-4. Foreign-aid freeze: no explanation, blanket suspension, reliance interests ignored
5. DOGE Treasury access: serious risks ignored
6. Probationary firings: false performance premise, no actual review, unexplained exemptions
7. Refugee admissions suspension: no explanation, reliance interests ignored, alternatives ignored
8. NIH indirect-cost cap: conclusory rationale, ignored research realities, no rational connection
9. Federal funding freeze: no rationality, sweeping breadth, ignored consequences
10. DEIA grant terminations: no reasoned explanation, improper factors
11. DOGE SSA access: no reasonable explanation, rushed protocol violations, no demonstrated need
13. Clean-energy grant freeze: no rational basis, freeze-first approach, reliance interests ignored
14. EPA climate grants: no explanation, generalized accusations, regulations ignored
17. Sanctuary-city DOJ funding freeze: no explanation for total freeze, reliance interests ignored
18. DEI Dear Colleague letter: unexplained policy shift, no record, reliance interests ignored
19. US Global Media defunding: unspecified court rationale
26. DEIA grant termination: no reasoned explanation, vague limitless rationale
28–32. Student visa terminations: no individualized assessment, no rational connection
33. HHS website takedowns: no rational explanation, rushed rollout, implausible compliance claim
35. DHS labor-rights rescission: ignored CBA, mischaracterized union role
37. DEI grant conditions: no explanation, rote EO incorporation, no reasoned analysis
38. AmeriCorps dismantling: no rulemaking, abrupt service cuts
40. DOGE OPM access: rushed onboarding, no credible need, cybersecurity norms ignored
41. HHS research grant cuts: conclusory directives, no reasoned basis, reliance interests ignored
42. Education Department RIF: no reasoned explanation, no evidence, operational harms ignored
44. DOT immigration funding condition: vague scope, improper factor, reliance interests ignored
48. Border cash reporting: unsupported assumptions, ignored evasion, irrational line-drawing
50. HHS restructuring and RIFs: no research, no rational basis, harms ignored
51. DOD indirect-cost cap: misunderstood indirect costs, cherry-picked data, obvious impacts ignored
52. USAGM grant rewrite: no explanation, no rational basis, governing statutes ignored
54. Job Corps shutdown: no individualized assessment, no performance plans, procedures bypassed
55. Parolee expedited-removal policy: “scattershot” legal explanations, no coherent rationale
56. DoD grant cancellation: no grant-specific facts, blanket termination, no rational connection
57. Humanities grant terminations: no factual findings, form letters, en masse decisions
58. VAWA grant conditions: vague terms, under-reasoned process, ignored impacts
59. Denial of NED Funds: unreasoned, disregard of reliance interests
60. USDA grant terminations: form letters, no specific reasons, reliance interests ignored
61. ACA marketplace rule: conclusory rationale, flawed data, burdens unexplained
62–63. Harvard funding freeze: no data, no grant-specific analysis, no rational connection
65. NEA gender-ideology bar: no policy analysis, undefined standard, EO compliance only
69. Campus-protest removal policy: unexplained reversal, no explanation, reliance interests ignored
70. Teen pregnancy policy notice: vague standard, no reasoned explanation, arbitrary enforcement
71. Shutdown-era RIFs: political retribution, haphazard rollout, reliance interests ignored
73. HHS anti-DEI grant conditions: pretext, no data, regulations ignored
78. SNAP funding cutoff: ignored consequences, implausible reasoning, partisan pretext
79. SNAP enforcement letter: untethered to record, feigned compliance, abrupt reversal
80. HUD grant conditions: no reasoning, EO compliance only, unexplained change
83. DEI disaster-grant conditions: no explanation, controversial policy shift, no reasoned basis
84. IRS address-sharing policy: unexplained departure, no reasoned basis, reliance interests ignored
86. Wind-permit moratorium: scant record, unexplained course change, reliance interests ignored
87. Re-detention policy: no original reason, post hoc legal error, reliance interests ignored
90-a. Courthouse-arrest policy: ignored prior problems, implausible reasoning
91. Childcare funding freeze: no evidence of fraud, no individualized assessment, post hoc rationale
95. Refugee detention policy: implemented policy unexplained, post hoc memo, exceeded authority
96. Public-lands highway approval: unexplained reversal, unsupported balancing test
97. VA labor-rights rescission: wrong rationale, overbroad rescission, unequal treatment
106. Supportive-housing grants: unexplained new criteria, rejected post-hoc rationalizations
108. D.C. bike lanes: conclusory explanations, unsupported safety conclusions
116. Atmospheric-research supercomputing: no explanation, promised public input disregarded
119. H-1B payment requirement: cursory explanations, reliance interests and alternatives ignored
129. FBI headquarters funding: funds redirected on a “misapprehension of existing law”
131. Disaster-relief grants: unexplained conditions, uncertain funding, reliance interests ignored
138. SNAP implementation: inadequate explanations, unfair surprise, post-hoc rationalization
140. Education-research funding: unexplained executive-order conditions, post-hoc justification
143. H-1B payment requirement: no consideration of alternatives or reliance interests
144. Voter-roll screening: known database errors, disenfranchisement risks ignored
145. Diversity Visa lottery suspension: no reasoned explanation and no account of reliance interests
Chapter 1. Court Findings of Government Noncompliance with Court Orders
According to a foundational Supreme Court judgment, the presumption of regularity assumes that executive officials have “properly discharged their official duties.” In a landmark D.C. Circuit decision this meant, “We [the Court] cannot allow a breach of the presumption of regularity by an unwarranted assumption that the President was indifferent to the purposes and requirements of the [statute], or acted deliberately in contravention of them.” Insofar as the presumption rests on such considerations – i.e., that the Executive is “following the rules” – then the cardinal duty of complying with court orders is a potential test case.
The executive branch’s flagrant noncompliance with court orders may undermine—and indeed has already undermined—judicial support for the presumption. In this Chapter, we document 60 cases in which courts have expressly found the Executive in noncompliance with judicial orders—ranging from willful disobedience and rebranding of enjoined conduct to flagrantly slow-walking compliance, missing or ignoring court-imposed deadlines, and refusing to provide court-ordered information—in several cases prompting show-cause orders, contempt warnings, and other enforcement measures.
As noted in the Introduction, the separate Habeas Tracker documented over 740 additional habeas immigration cases of noncompliance.
This Chapter does not cover the many episodes in which the record strongly suggested noncompliance but the court never made an express finding. For example, “one of the most glaring examples of noncompliance,” according to the Washington Post, is the case of Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto v. HHS, 3:25-cv-02847 (N.D. Cal.). In that litigation, the plaintiffs filed two motions to enforce a TRO requiring restoration of legal services funding for unaccompanied children, while alleging that a child was removed to Honduras without counsel during the delay. Judge Araceli Martínez-Olguín later required compliance reports and warned that “[n]on-compliance or delayed compliance may result in a contempt finding and sanctions.” However, she did not, at least on the available public record, make an express finding of noncompliance or contempt. We therefore do not code such cases as a judicial finding of noncompliance—even though the resulting harms are similar, in many respects, to cases with such a finding. Our methodology is more restrictive—recording only instances of noncompliance when there is a formal court determination.
The same is true of instances of noncompliance documented in our companion Habeas Tracker. There, too, the public record in numerous cases appeared on its face to reflect conduct that may well have violated court orders. Yet where courts did not expressly address the issue, or did not make a clear finding of noncompliance, we refrained from including those as instances of noncompliance determined by the court.
The following list is in chronological order of the relevant judicial determination.
1-a. Federal funding freezes: “continued to improperly freeze federal funds;” “These pauses in funding violate the plain text of the TRO”
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), State of New York v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00039 (D.R.I.)
The case challenged the Trump administration’s broad freeze of federal financial assistance pursuant to a Jan. 27, 2025 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directive and related executive orders.
On Jan. 31, 2025, the court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting Defendants from “paus[ing], freez[ing], imped[ing], block[ing], cancel[ing], or terminat[ing]” federal financial assistance to the states, or “imped[ing]” their “access” to such funds, except as authorized by applicable statutes, regulations, and award terms. The TRO also prohibited Defendants from “reissuing, adopting, implementing, or otherwise giving effect to the OMB Directive under any other name or title.”
On Feb. 10, granting the states’ motion to enforce, Judge McConnell found that the TRO was “clear and unambiguous” and that “Defendants in some cases have continued to improperly freeze federal funds and refused to resume disbursement of appropriated federal funds.” Rejecting Defendants’ explanation that they were “just trying to root out fraud,” the court found that “the freezes in effect now were a result of the broad categorical order, not a specific finding of possible fraud.” Judge McConnell added: “These pauses in funding violate the plain text of the TRO.” The court ordered Defendants to immediately restore frozen funding, end federal funding pauses, and clear administrative, operational, or technical obstacles to compliance.
Although a preliminary injunction issued on Mar. 6 superseded the TRO and rendered the second enforcement motion moot, Judge McConnell stressed that Plaintiffs’ “unrebutted” evidence—presented after a full hearing at which the government offered “no answer, no evidence, and no counter to the States’ extensive evidence of still frozen funds”—demonstrated “irreparable and continuing harm” and expressly barred the government from reinstating the freeze “under a different name or through other means.”
1-b. FEMA grant-payment manual review: “FEMA’s manual review process violates the Court’s preliminary injunction order;” “essentially imposes an indefinite categorical pause on payments.”
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), State of New York v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00039 (D.R.I.)
The case also involved FEMA’s use of a manual review process that Judge McConnell subsequently found imposed an unlawful categorical pause on federal grant payments to the states.
On Mar. 6, 2025, Judge McConnell issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from freezing or otherwise impeding federal funding under existing awards based on the OMB Directive, related executive orders, or “any other materially similar order, memorandum, directive, policy, or practice” imposing categorical funding freezes.
On Mar. 24, the states again moved to enforce, alleging continued freezes affecting hundreds of FEMA grants. On Apr. 4, granting the motion, Judge McConnell rejected FEMA’s explanation that its manual review process merely involved internal controls to verify the propriety of grant payments. The court held that the regulations FEMA invoked did not authorize a process that “essentially imposes an indefinite categorical pause on payments.”
The court further stated that “the States have presented evidence that strongly suggests that FEMA is implementing this manual review process based, covertly, on the President’s January 20, 2025 executive order.” Examining that executive order and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem’s subsequent Jan. 28 and Feb. 19 grant directives, Judge McConnell found that “the record makes clear that FEMA’s manual review process imposes an indefinite pause on the disbursement of federal funds to the States,” based on funding freezes dictated by the executive order and memoranda “materially similar” to it. The court concluded: “Thus, FEMA’s manual review process violates the Court’s preliminary injunction order.” It ordered FEMA to immediately cease the challenged process, notify relevant leadership and staff of its obligations, and file evidence of the required payments within ten days.
2-3. USAID funding suspension: Defendants “have not complied with the … TRO;” efforts to “evade [the preliminary injunction’s] terms through post-hoc explanations.”
Judge Amir H. Ali (Biden appointee), AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. USAID, 1:25-cv-00400 (D.D.C.) and Global Health Council v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00402 (D.D.C.) (related cases)
These two cases involve challenges to the Trump administration’s suspension of USAID funding.
On Feb. 20, 2025, Judge Ali granted in part the plaintiffs’ emergency motion to enforce the temporary restraining order “to the extent Defendants have not complied with the terms of the TRO,” namely, by “continu[ing] their blanket suspension of funds pending review of agreements, the very action that the TRO enjoined” and by seeking to “search for and invoke new legal authorities as a post-hoc rationalization for the en masse suspension” or to “replace their earlier implementations with ‘other directives’ to ‘suspend[], paus[e], or otherwise prevent[] the obligation or disbursement of appropriated foreign-assistance funds.’” The court did not make a finding of contempt, as requested by the plaintiffs, citing “Defendants’ explicit recognition that ‘prompt compliance with the order’ is required.”
On Feb. 24, plaintiffs in Global Health Council v. Trump filed a renewed emergency motion to enforce the TRO. At the close of the Feb. 25 hearing, Judge Ali granted the motion and adopted plaintiffs’ proposed relief, ordering by 11:59 p.m. on Feb. 26 that defendants “pay all invoices and letter of credit drawdown requests” for work completed before the Feb. 13 TRO; “permit and promptly pay” drawdowns and reimbursements on grants and assistance agreements; and “take no actions to impede” and “take all necessary action to ensure the prompt payment of appropriated foreign assistance funds.” The court also required that the joint status report due noon on Feb. 26 confirm steps taken and that disbursements would be made by 11:59 p.m. that day, and directed defendants to provide by noon any “directives or guidance” sent since Feb. 13 concerning TRO implementation or suspensions/terminations. Noting that the record showed payments remained frozen, the court observed: “Defendants have not rebutted that evidence, and when asked today, defendants were not able to provide any specific examples of unfreezing funds pursuant to the Court’s TRO” (emphasis added).
On Jul. 21, following a Mar. 10 preliminary injunction—which ordered the government not to withhold payment for work performed before Feb. 13—the court granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce. “The Court’s preliminary injunction did not include any exception for Defendants to evade its terms through post hoc explanations for terminations, and the Court has previously rejected similar attempts by Defendants,” Judge Ali said, adding that the government “must promptly take steps to come into compliance as to the awards at issue.” It otherwise denied or deferred further relief pending the D.C. Circuit’s decision of the government’s appeal.
4. Birthright-citizenship EO: “Defendants’ continuing inexplicable failure to comply with the Court’s Standing Order”
Judge Timothy J. Kelly (Trump appointee), OCA–Asian Pacific American Advocates v. Rubio, 1:25-cv-00287 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged President Trump’s executive order restricting birthright citizenship.
On Jan. 31, 2025, Judge Kelly issued a standing order requiring motions for extensions of time to be filed at least four days before the relevant deadline, absent an explanation for noncompliance. On Apr. 9, he denied a government extension request filed just 20 minutes before the deadline, noting its failure to explain noncompliance with the standing order. He wrote: “Defendants may renew their motion, and show ‘good cause’ for the requested extension and ‘explain why’ they failed to comply with the Court’s Standing Order.”
On June 2, granting another extension, Judge Kelly warned that “[t]he Court does not anticipate granting any further extensions” (emphasis added). Nevertheless, on July 11, after the close of business and just one business day before its response deadline, the government requested a further 30-day extension. In a July 14 minute order, Judge Kelly granted the motion only in part, stating:
“On this record, including Defendants’ continuing inexplicable failure to comply with the Court’s Standing Order, Defendants have not shown good cause for a further extension.” (emphasis added).
5-a. Abrego Garcia’s El Salvador removal: DOJ “failed to comply” with the court’s reporting instructions and would not answer “straightforward questions” concerning the steps taken to facilitate his return.
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951 (D. Md.)
The case involved the government’s admission that the administration unlawfully sent Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to El Salvador despite an immigration court order prohibiting removal to that country.
On Apr. 10, 2025, the Supreme Court affirmed Judge Xinis’ preliminary injunction to “‘facilitate’ Abrego Garcia’s release from custody in El Salvador and to ensure that his case is handled as it would have been had he not been improperly sent to El Salvador.” The Justices also wrote that the government “should be prepared to share what it can concerning the steps it has taken and the prospect of further steps.”
That same day, Judge Xinis first ordered the government to report by 9:30 a.m. on Apr. 11 what steps it was taking to secure Garcia’s return. DOJ responded that the deadline was “impracticable” and sought until Apr. 15. Rejecting that position, Xinis wrote that the claim DOJ needed days to review a four-page order “blinks at reality” and reset the deadline to 11:30 a.m. DOJ again refused, stating it was “not in a position where they ‘can’ share any information requested by the Court. That is the reality.”
At an Apr. 11 status conference, DOJ counsel admitted he lacked “personal knowledge of steps taken to comply,” could not answer the “very simple question … where is he?,” and offered no description of concrete steps. Judge Xinis replied that this suggested counsel had “no full and effective contact with your client,” which was “just not adding up.” In a written order later that day, Judge Xinis found DOJ had “failed to comply” with her instructions and would not answer “straightforward questions” (emphasis added).
5-b. Abrego Garcia’s El Salvador removal: “Defendants have not yet complied with this Court’s directives;” “uniform refusal to disclose ‘what it can’;” expedited discovery ordered “in the face of ongoing refusal to comply.”
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951 (D. Md.)
The case involved the government’s admission that the administration unlawfully sent Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to El Salvador despite an immigration court order prohibiting removal to that country.
At the Apr. 15 status conference, Judge Xinis explained she would not initiate contempt proceedings without a fuller record, stating: “I’m not going to issue a show cause today for contempt findings,” but any contempt finding “will be based on the record before me.” She ordered expedited discovery “to determine whether you are abiding by the court order … whether you intend to abide … And if not, is it in bad faith?” She also underscored the lack of concrete action: “I’ve gotten nothing. I’ve gotten no real response, nor have I gotten any legitimate legal justification for not answering,” and “what the record shows is nothing has been done. Nothing.” She added, “I just don’t think it’s that difficult. I think you want to make it that difficult.” That same day, Judge Xinis wrote that “Defendants … have done nothing at all;” she rejected efforts to “skirt this issue by redefining ‘facilitate;’” and found a “uniform refusal to disclose ‘what it can’” along with a “repeated refusal to provide even the most basic information.” She concluded. “Defendants have not yet complied with this Court’s directives” and ordered expedited discovery—depositions of ICE, DHS, and State officials and document production by month’s end.
On the same day, the court ordered expedited discovery. Judge Xinis wrote: [1] “Defendants therefore remain obligated, at a minimum, to take the steps available to them toward aiding, assisting, or making easier Abrego Garcia’s release from custody in El Salvador and resuming his status quo ante. But the record reflects that Defendants have done nothing at all” (emphasis added). [2] “Second, and more fundamentally, Defendants appear to have done nothing to aid in Abrego Garcia’s release from custody and return to the United States to ‘ensure that his case is handled as it would have been’ but for Defendants’ wrongful expulsion of him. Abrego Garcia, 604 U.S.— , slip op. at 2. Thus, Defendants’ attempt to skirt this issue by redefining ‘facilitate’ runs contrary to law and logic” (emphasis added). [3] “[T]he discovery is necessary in light of Defendants’ uniform refusal to disclose ‘what it can’ regarding their facilitation of Abrego Garcia’s release and return to the status quo ante, or present any legal justification for what they cannot disclose” and “in the face of ongoing refusal to comply” (emphasis added).
5-c. Abrego Garcia’s El Salvador removal: Fourth Circuit criticized disregard of “a court order that the government not so subtly spurns;” “The respect that courts must accord the Executive must be reciprocated by the Executive’s respect for the courts.”
Judge Stephanie Thacker (Obama appointee), Judge Robert King (Clinton appointee), Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III (Reagan appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 25-1404 (4th Cir.)
Appeal from the district court’s Apr. 10 order directing the government to “take all available steps to facilitate” Abrego Garcia’s return and to report on steps taken.
On Apr. 17, the Fourth Circuit (Wilkinson, joined by King & Thacker) denied the government’s emergency stay and mandamus, stressing that “‘facilitate’ is an active verb” and that the word’s “plain and active meaning … cannot be diluted” as the government urged. Judge Wilkinson wrote that “‘[f]acilitation’ does not permit the admittedly erroneous deportation … in disregard of a court order that the government not so subtly spurns.” It warned that “if today the Executive claims the right to deport without due process and in disregard of court orders, what assurance will there be tomorrow that it will not deport American citizens … ?” Emphasizing comity, Judge Wilkinson added:
“The respect that courts must accord the Executive must be reciprocated by the Executive’s respect for the courts. Too often today this has not been the case, as calls for impeachment of judges for decisions the Executive disfavors and exhortations to disregard court orders sadly illustrate.”
Recalling President Eisenhower’s example—his insistence that the Executive must support and ensure enforcement of federal court decisions—Judge Wilkinson quoted: “unless the President did so, anarchy would result.”
7-b
5-d. Abrego Garcia’s El Salvador removal: Defendants’ position “reflects a willful and bad faith refusal to comply with discovery obligations;” “Defendants and counsel stubbornly refuse to provide any basis for” their privilege claims
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951 (D. Md.)
The case involved the government’s admission that the administration unlawfully sent Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to El Salvador despite an immigration court order prohibiting removal to that country.
On Apr. 22, addressing DOJ’s objections to discovery, Judge Xinis wrote that its position “reflects a willful and bad faith refusal to comply with discovery obligations” (emphasis added). She found that “Defendants and counsel stubbornly refuse to provide any basis for” their privilege claims—which she said were being used “as a shield to obstruct discovery and evade compliance with this Court’s orders”—and that they relied on “boilerplate, non-particularized objections” which the court deemed “presumptively invalid” and “reflect a willful refusal to comply.” Their refusal to identify all individuals involved in Garcia’s removal and detention, she added, “reflects a deliberate evasion of their fundamental discovery obligations” and “can only be viewed as willful and intentional noncompliance” (emphasis added).
On May 7, the court ordered the government to file a privilege log by May 12. On May 13, Judge Xinis noted that “[e]vidently missing from the Defendants’ filing is the privilege log that this Court ordered to be produced,” directed the government to cure the “deficiency,” and warned that continued failure “will be construed as an intentional refusal to comply with this Court’s orders.” During the May 16 hearing on discovery motions, Judge Xinis underscored that “this Court has found more than once that you haven’t complied, and you haven’t in bad faith,” adding, “The whole reason we’re here is because I’ve said repeatedly you’ve done nothing, and now you tell the world you’re not going to do anything.” She further remarked that the court-ordered depositions from key officials had yielded a “goose egg.”
5-e. Abrego Garcia’s El Salvador removal: government “disregarded court orders” and engaged in “defiance and foot-dragging;” showed “no appetite” to restore Abrego Garcia to the “status quo ante” despite his return to the United States.
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951 (D. Md.)
The case involved the government’s admission that the administration unlawfully sent Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to El Salvador despite an immigration court order prohibiting removal to that country.
Despite Garcia’s Jun. 6, 2025 return to the United States, during a Jul. 7 hearing, Judge Xinis refused to grant the government’s motion to dismiss the case, pressed DOJ about whether the indictment and return were used to facilitate compliance with her injunction, and highlighted unresolved production gaps (including the missing arrest warrant) and incomplete compliance with her orders.
In a Jul. 23 order granting emergency relief to require Garcia’s return to Maryland pending further proceedings, she noted that, over the prior three months, the government had “disregarded court orders,” displayed “defiance and foot-dragging,” and a “persistent lack of transparency,” warranting further injunctive relief. She found that, despite the first part of her Apr. 4 preliminary injunction (to facilitate Garcia’s release from El Salvador) having been met, the government had shown “no appetite” to fulfill the second part of the injunction—“to restore Abrego Garcia to the status quo ante.” Garcia remained in U.S. Marshals’ custody in Tennessee with an ICE detainer, and the court “shared Plaintiffs’ ongoing concern” that, “absent meaningful safeguards,” he could be removed again “without having restored him to the status quo ante.” Judge Xinis maintained that she would “not hesitate to revisit” broader relief “if Defendants fail to comply with this Order or otherwise attempt to remove Abrego Garcia … without due process.”
6. Alien Enemies Act removals-El Salvador: “Bad faith” conduct and “gleeful” boasts culminated in “willful” disobedience and probable cause for criminal contempt; “Government’s responses essentially told the Court to pound sand.”
Chief Judge James E. Boasberg (Bush appointee; Obama appointee), J.G.G. v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00766 (D.D.C.)
This class action challenged the Trump administration’s mid-March removals of Venezuelan detainees to El Salvador under the claimed authority of the Alien Enemies Act.
Following his Mar. 15, 2025 temporary restraining orders barring transfers to El Salvador and requiring the return of flights that had not deboarded in El Salvador, at an Apr. 3 show-cause hearing, Judge Boasberg said there was “a fair likelihood … the government acted in bad faith throughout that day,” questioning how officials could have “ever … operated in the way [they] did” if they believed their conduct lawful.
In his Apr. 16, 2025 memorandum opinion, Judge Boasberg formally found probable cause of criminal contempt, holding that the administration “willfully disobeyed a binding judicial decree.” He described a pattern of “increasing obstructionism” and an effort to “outrun the equitable reach of the Judiciary” by launching removal flights even during a hearing. He wrote that officials had “deliberately flouted this Court’s written Order and, separately, its oral command,” conduct amounting to “deliberate or reckless disregard” and a “willful disregard” of binding orders. The opinion also pointed to “boasts” by government officials outside the courtroom, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s repost of El Salvador President Bukele’s mocking post, “Oopsie… Too late 😂,” as evidence that defiance was “deliberate[ ] and gleeful[ ].” Emphasizing that the government had “ample opportunity to rectify or explain” but instead “chose to press ahead,” the court concluded there was probable cause for criminal contempt.
After an Aug. 8 divided D.C. Circuit panel granted the government’s mandamus petition and vacated Judge Boasberg’s Apr. 16 contempt order, the full court denied rehearing en banc on Nov. 14. Six of eleven judges, however, wrote separately to criticize the panel’s mandamus ruling and to stress that the decision carries no precedential effect, while underscoring that nothing in the order prevents Judge Boasberg from renewing his contempt inquiry. (See further commentary on the rehearing denial and its implications here.)
On Nov. 17, Judge Boasberg ordered the parties to be prepared “to discuss next steps in this Court’s contempt inquiry” at a Nov. 19 hearing. During the Nov. 19 hearing, Judge Boasberg reportedly said he will move “promptly” with his contempt inquiry and that he intends to hear from witnesses under oath, including whistleblower and former DOJ attorney Erez Reuveni, as well as from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Drew Ensign, who represented DOJ at the Mar. 15 TRO hearing.
On Nov. 24, after the D.C. Circuit issued its mandate, Judge Boasberg ordered each side to file by Nov. 25 proposals on how the “contempt referral should proceed.” In its Nov. 25 proposal arguing against further proceedings, the government for the first time disclosed that Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem purportedly made the Mar. 15 decision not to recall planes. On Nov. 28, Judge Boasberg stated that, to “determine whether Secretary Noem or anyone else should be referred for potential contempt prosecution,” he would begin with declarations identifying all individuals involved in the decision not to halt transfers.
On Dec. 8, Judge Boasberg said the government’s declarations from Noem and others were “cursory” and insufficient to determine whether any violation had been willful, and he ordered evidentiary hearings directing DOJ attorneys Erez Reuveni and Drew Ensign to testify on Dec. 15 and 16. That same day, Emil Bove, who was serving as Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General at the time of the flights, submitted a sworn declaration stating that he had helped provide privileged legal advice on the issue. On Dec. 10, the government moved for reconsideration of the Dec. 8 testimony order or, alternatively, for a protective order “circumscribing” the scope of the testimony.
On Dec. 12, the government petitioned the D.C. Circuit for mandamus and immediately sought a stay from both the court of appeals and Judge Boasberg pending review. Later that day, Judge Boasberg denied reconsideration and denied a stay, but the D.C. Circuit granted an administrative stay. On Dec. 15, Judge Boasberg vacated the scheduled testimony. In denying reconsideration on Dec. 12, he emphasized:
“Approximately 137 men were spirited out of this country without a hearing and placed in a high-security prison in El Salvador, where many suffered abuse and possible torture, despite this Court’s order that they should not be disembarked.” (emphasis added)
Judge Boasberg said he must decide whether this occurred through “contumacious conduct” by officials, and that a “fresh conclusion” on probable cause was “particularly warranted” given “significant new information” in Reuveni’s whistleblower complaint bearing directly on willfulness. Rejecting the government’s effort to cabin the inquiry to Mar. 15, Boasberg noted that the Mar. 14 DOJ meeting (including Bove, Reuveni, and Ensign) may “illuminate” next-day decisions and “mental states,” and added that attorney-client privilege may not apply (no client allegedly present; policy rather than legal advice), and that—in any event—any privilege would likely be defeated by the crime-fraud exception in a future contempt posture.
Meanwhile, in a Dec. 22 order granting the Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and class certification, the court, in assessing whether the government sought to “evade judicial review,” cited Reuveni’s whistleblower disclosure, writing:
“Reuveni’s whistleblower statements corroborate the Court’s conclusion. According to his disclosure, the Principal Assistant Deputy Attorney General stated in a meeting that if courts attempted to stop the removals, DOJ would need to consider telling the courts, ‘Fuck you’ and ignore any court order.”
In the court’s Feb. 12, 2026 preliminary injunction, when ordering the government to “facilitate the return,” at its own expense, of Plaintiffs who wished to return to the United States—and to parole any Plaintiff who appeared at a U.S. port of entry, subject to the carveout for certain individuals in Venezuela to whom the order did not apply—the court stressed that, although it had found the government in “defiance” of its prior order and offered it “the opportunity to propose steps” to “facilitate hearings for class members of their habeas corpus claims” in order “to remedy the wrong that it perpetrated here and to provide a means for doing so,” “the Government’s responses essentially told the Court to pound sand.”
On Mar. 13, 2026, Judge Boasberg stayed district court proceedings pending the government’s appeal of the Feb. 12 PI.
After administratively staying Judge Boasberg’s Dec. 8 order requiring testimony from DOJ officials, on Apr. 14, 2026, a divided D.C. Circuit panel (2–1) granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus, vacated that order, and directed the district court to terminate its criminal contempt proceedings. On June 22, the full D.C. Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the Apr. 14 panel order, and maintained the administrative stay. The en banc court heard oral argument on Sept. 29, 2026.
7-a. Dismantling of CFPB: “Dressing their RIF in new clothes, and that they are thumbing their nose at both this Court and the Court of Appeals.”
Judge Amy Berman Jackson (Obama appointee), National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought, 1:25-cv-00381 (D.D.C.)
The case involved the Trump administration’s efforts to dismantle the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), including through work stoppages, mass personnel reductions, and funding-related moves affecting the Bureau’s ability to perform statutory duties.
On Mar. 28, 2025, Judge Jackson issued a preliminary injunction stating, in part, that the government (1) “shall not terminate any CFPB employee, except for cause related to the individual employee’s performance or conduct;” and (2) “shall not issue any notice of reduction-in-force [RIF] to any CFPB employee.”
On Apr. 11, the D.C. Circuit partially stayed the preliminary injunction and modified it to permit the termination and RIFs of employees who the government determined after “a particularized assessment, to be unnecessary to the performance of defendants’ statutory duties.”
Following the DC Circuit ruling, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau quickly issued RIF notices affecting roughly 80% of its workforce. On Apr. 17, 2025, the plaintiffs submitted an emergency motion to show cause why the government had not violated the modified preliminary injunction.
The following day, Apr. 18, Judge Jackson noted the “scope and speed” of the government’s action, “the apparent lack of consultation with the heads of the statutorily mandated agency components involved, and the troubling description of the RIF meetings,” at which one meeting Chief Legal Officer Mark Paoletta allegedly said “all that mattered was the numbers.” Judge Jackson went on to say she had:
“significant grounds for concern that the defendants are not in compliance with its Order as it was refined by the Court of Appeals. While the Chief Legal Counsel has intoned the phrase ‘particularized assessment,’ there is reason to believe that the defendants simply spent the days immediately following the Circuit’s relaxation of the Order dressing their RIF in new clothes, and that they are thumbing their nose at both this Court and the Court of Appeals.” (emphasis added).
While the government appealed, the D.C. Circuit on Apr. 28 sua sponte reinstated the original preliminary injunction’s full ban on RIFs.
7-b. CFPB dismantling bid: “Defendants’ unilateral decision to decline to request funding … contravenes the preliminary injunction;” “yet another attempt to achieve the very end the Court’s injunction was put in place to prevent;” “inconsistent with the text and stated purpose of the injunction as modified by the Court of Appeals”
Judge Amy Berman Jackson (Obama appointee), National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought, 1:25-cv-00381 (D.D.C.)
The case involved the Trump administration’s efforts to dismantle the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), including through work stoppages, mass personnel reductions, and funding-related moves affecting the Bureau’s ability to perform statutory duties.
After a D.C. Circuit panel vacated the preliminary injunction on Aug. 15, 2025, Plaintiffs sought rehearing en banc. On Dec. 17, 2025, the full court granted rehearing, vacated the panel decision, and noted that the Apr. 11, 2025 partial stay, as modified on Apr. 28, 2025, “remains in effect.” While en banc proceedings were pending, Defendants filed a Nov. 10, 2025 “Notice of Potential Lapse in Appropriations,” transmitting a Nov. 7 OLC memorandum and asserting that the Federal Reserve “currently lacks combined earnings” from which the CFPB can draw, meaning the Bureau expected to exhaust available funds in early 2026.
On Dec. 30, 2025, granting Plaintiffs’ motion to clarify, Judge Jackson treated Defendants’ claimed funding “lapse” as another attempt to evade an injunction that remained in force. Judge Jackson described the purported lapse as “tantamount to closing what is left of the Bureau,” said Defendants’ framing “tends to obscure what is happening” given that funding had not “lapsed,” and emphasized that any shortfall was “not the result of a legal memorandum,” but “the intended result of the defendants’ own actions.” The court clarified that Defendants’ decision not to seek Federal Reserve funding “will not only affect, but will deliberately frustrate, their obligations under the injunction,” and that their suggestion “that it takes a modification of the Order to state that they must do what is necessary to comply with it is inconsistent with the Order and defies common sense.” The court said that the Nov. 10 Notice “announcing the agency’s intention to forego asking for funding is inconsistent with the text and stated purpose of the injunction as modified by the Court of Appeals,” and made clear that no “modification” was “require[d] … to say so” (emphasis added). Judge Jackson added that the claimed lapse, “manufactured by the defendants based solely on the OLC Memo,” was “not a valid justification for the agency’s unilateral decision to abandon its obligations under the injunction.” Applying the injunction’s existing terms (as understood by the D.C. Circuit), Judge Jackson held that refusing to request funding “unquestionably achieves the outcome of a work stoppage,” and said “the decision recounted in the Notice is directly contradictory to paragraph 4 of the injunction as it was interpreted by the Court of Appeals” (emphasis added). As the court further noted:
“The defendants have not tried to suggest that compliance with their obligations under the injunction could be possible without funding from the Federal Reserve, and therefore, the requirement that they seek the funds Congress directed the Federal Reserve to provide – and which the Fed has always provided upon request – is implicit in and necessary to the injunction, and the defendants’ actions contravene paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 of the Order.” (emphasis added).
Judge Jackson described the latest action as part of a broader pattern of noncompliance and unreliable government representations. The court noted that defendants had argued “at every juncture” that “no court supervision was necessary” because they were performing statutory obligations and not trying to shutter the CFPB, but the court had already found those representations—and the Martinez declarations offered to support them—“to be inconsistent with the facts on the ground.” When defendants later sought to justify renewed disruptive steps, they “relied again on the second Martinez declaration,” “ignoring” that it had been “thoroughly discredited during the hearing,” and that Martinez “had no personal knowledge” for key assertions about compliance. The court said “nothing has changed:” defendants were “actively and unabashedly trying to shut the agency down again, through different means;” their assurances had been “belied not only by their actions,” but “once again” by Acting Director Vought’s public statement, “We want to put it out,” and “it would be foolhardy not to take Russell Vought at his word this time.” She concluded that defendants’ new reading of “combined earnings” was an “unsupported and transparent attempt to starve the CFPB of funding” and “yet another attempt to achieve the very end the Court’s injunction was put in place to prevent.” Accordingly, the court clarified “that the defendants’ unilateral decision to decline to request funding, based on an unsupported interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act, contravenes the preliminary injunction.”
8-a. USCIS asylum settlement, Cristian’s removal: removal “violates the Settlement Agreement;” Defendants “utterly disregarded” a reporting order and showed “zero effort to comply” with the facilitation order; “Defendants not only ignore the requirements of this Court’s Orders, but also make no attempt to offer any justification for their blatant lack of effort to comply.”
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), J.O.P. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 8:19-cv-01944 (D. Md.)
Judge DeAndrea Gist Benjamin (Biden appointee), joined by Judge Roger L. Gregory (Clinton recess appointee; W. Bush nominee), No. 25-1519 (4th Cir.)
This case challenges a 2019 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy governing asylum applications filed by people previously designated as unaccompanied children. In November 2024, the court approved a Settlement Agreement requiring USCIS to exercise Initial Jurisdiction over Class Members’ asylum applications and adjudicate them on the merits.
This sub-item concerns the individual removal and return proceedings involving Class Member “Cristian.” Section III.I of the Settlement Agreement provided that, for a Class Member with a final removal order, ICE would “refrain from executing” that order until USCIS issued a Final Determination on one properly filed asylum application under the terms of the Agreement.
On Mar. 15, 2025, ICE removed “Cristian,” a 20-year-old Venezuelan Class Member whose asylum application remained pending with USCIS, to El Salvador under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), even though his immigration counsel had notified ICE two days earlier that he was a member of the settlement class. On Apr. 23, 2025, granting Class Counsel’s emergency motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement, Judge Gallagher rejected the government’s contention that the AEA removed Cristian from the Class or placed his removal beyond Section III.I. The court held that “removal from the United States of a Class Member, including but not limited to Cristian, without a final determination on the merits by USCIS on the Class Member’s pending asylum application violates the Settlement Agreement.” Judge Gallagher further found that Defendants had “breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement” by removing Cristian and ordered them to “facilitate” his return, including through “a good faith request” to El Salvador to release him to the United States. The court also rejected the government’s asserted public-safety justification, writing that “Defendants have provided no evidence, or even any specific allegations, as to how Cristian, or any other Class Member, poses a threat to public safety.”
Eight days later, on May 1, USCIS issued what it called an “Indicative Asylum Decision,” which asserted that if Cristian were returned to the United States, USCIS would deny his asylum application based on terrorist-related inadmissibility grounds arising from his alleged Tren de Aragua (TdA) membership and, separately, as a matter of discretion based on the alleged TdA membership and a cocaine-possession conviction. On May 4, the government relied on that document in moving under Rule 60(b)(5) to vacate the facilitation order, arguing that Cristian’s return was “no longer equitable or appropriate.” The government characterized the Indicative Asylum Decision as an “adjudication on the merits” providing the “precise relief” Cristian sought.
On May 19, 2025, the Fourth Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay the facilitation order pending appeal. Judge Benjamin, joined by Judge Gregory, concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in rejecting the Indicative Asylum Decision as a basis for vacatur. The Indicative Asylum Decision was neither an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” nor a “Final Determination” under the Settlement Agreement. Judge Benjamin further wrote that, as Cristian argued, the document—“created five days after the district court’s facilitation order was issued—was not an authentic change in factual circumstances.” She carefully attributed the stronger characterization to Cristian: he contended that neither “USCIS regulation, policy, [n]or practice” provided for “Indicative Asylum Decisions” and called the document a “‘litigation-driven’ document—a ‘contrivance’ ‘created just for this case.’” The concurrence then emphasized: “The Government has no response to this charge—a deafening silence.”
The compliance problems continued after the stay was denied. On May 20, Judge Gallagher ordered Defendants to file by 5:00 p.m. on May 27 a declaration from a person with personal knowledge identifying Cristian’s location and custodial status, the steps already taken to facilitate his return, and the additional steps Defendants would take and when.
On May 28, after Defendants filed an untimely response that did not provide the ordered information, Judge Gallagher found that they had “utterly disregarded” the May 20 order. Their response, she wrote, was “the functional equivalent of, ‘We haven’t done anything and don’t intend to.’” It “disregarded the deadline and the substantive requests” in the May 20 order and instead repeated “well-worn talking points” about Cristian’s removal. Judge Gallagher separately found that the filing showed “zero effort to comply” with the Apr. 23 facilitation order. Merely telling the State Department about the order and requesting its assistance was “patently insufficient to comply” with the requirement to facilitate Cristian’s return, including through a good-faith request to El Salvador. The court concluded: “Defendants not only ignore the requirements of this Court’s Orders, ECF 254, 280, but also make no attempt to offer any justification for their blatant lack of effort to comply.” Judge Gallagher invited Class Counsel to propose a process to create a factual record concerning “Defendants’ lack of compliance with this Court’s Orders” and gave Defendants an opportunity to remedy their noncompliance.
On June 5, the court ordered Defendants to file weekly status reports, each Friday “on or before noon ET,” “in the form of a declaration” by a person with personal knowledge addressing Cristian’s location and the steps taken and planned to facilitate his return. The order also established an expedited-discovery process concerning Defendants’ compliance with the facilitation order. As Judge Gallagher later summarized in her Nov. 14, 2025 opinion, Defendants thereafter continued to assure the court, “in a non-specific fashion,” that the State Department was “making prompt and diligent efforts on behalf of the United States to comply” with its orders. But although some of the ensuing reports provided information about Cristian’s whereabouts and health, “none of them detailed steps being taken for his return or provided evidence that either Defendants or the State Department had made a good faith request to El Salvador for Cristian’s release.”
On July 18, while the prisoner exchange was underway, Defendants again “failed to file their court-ordered weekly status report by the noon deadline.” After Class Counsel sought information, government counsel said they were “waiting for information from the Department of State.” The court then ordered an additional report addressing whether Cristian was being transported to Venezuela. At 4:25 p.m., Defendants filed their belated weekly report, and at 5:04 p.m. filed an additional report disclosing that Cristian “is either currently in Venezuela or will arrive there shortly.” The filings disclosed that El Salvador had released Cristian and 251 other Venezuelan nationals to Venezuela as part of a prisoner exchange. As Judge Gallagher later observed, “[w]hether the United States directly negotiated the prisoner swap” or “simply ‘served as intermediary,’” “it is clear that it knowingly played a role in Cristian’s landing in the country from which he had sought asylum.”
On Nov. 14, 2025, in a memorandum opinion initially filed under seal and made public on Nov. 20, Judge Gallagher resolved three motions arising from the Cristian proceedings: Class Counsel’s motion for prompt notice of any return to the United States; Class Counsel’s motion asking the court to find probable cause that Defendants had committed criminal contempt by willfully violating its orders; and Defendants’ motion to vacate the Apr. 23 facilitation order. Gallagher denied all three: the prompt notice motion as moot without prejudice, the criminal contempt motion because the stringent probable cause standard was not met, and Defendants’ motion to vacate on the merits.
As to the requested criminal contempt proceedings over the facilitation order, Judge Gallagher emphasized the distinction between the named Defendants—DHS, USCIS, ICE, and their officials—and the State Department and Secretary Rubio, who were not parties. Although the court “shares Class Counsel’s frustration with what appears to be lack of good faith government efforts at compliance with this Court’s order,” it concluded that the Apr. 23 order could not delineate the responsibilities of both the named Defendants and the nonparty State Department “with the clarity and certainty required” to support criminal contempt. Judge Gallagher nevertheless added:
“Of course, in other times, one might assume that a federal agency not specifically named in a case would still use its best efforts to effectuate its sister agencies’ compliance with a valid order from a federal court. This Court certainly hoped, in entering the April 23 Order, that events would unfold in that manner and that the federal government as a whole would undertake compliance efforts. Its hopes were dashed.”
The court went further in addressing the State Department’s conduct. “Even if one assumes, as is reasonable,” Gallagher wrote, “that the State Department focused its efforts on using Cristian as one of many pawns in its prisoner swap instead of endeavoring to comply with this Court’s order to facilitate his return,” criminal contempt remained unavailable on that theory because the order did not, and could not, direct the nonparty State Department or Secretary Rubio to act. The court was equally explicit about the evidentiary record: “this Court agrees with the general proposition that it has seen no evidence that the United States government ever made a good faith request to the government of El Salvador for Cristian’s return.” It nonetheless could not find probable cause that the named Defendants had willfully violated the “good faith” request component of the order.
Judge Gallagher reached a different factual conclusion concerning the court-ordered status reports. “Without question,” she wrote, Class Counsel could establish that the reporting orders “were not followed to the letter.” Defendants’ responses were “often woefully deficient” and, “[o]n several occasions, they were also filed late.” Most significantly, “for the July 18, 2025 report, Class Counsel can establish that the violation of the filing deadline was willful.” Defendants conceded that they knew the report was due at noon but, at the State Department’s request, elected not to file it until later in the day to “mitigate the risk” that the prisoner swap would “fall apart from public scrutiny.”
The court stated that it had “grave concerns about the government’s apparent willingness to disregard this Court’s orders, even after previous admonition,” and about the government’s determination that shielding the prisoner swap, “apparently from prospective judicial intervention,” justified “ignor[ing] (or at least delay[ing] compliance with) a valid Court order.” Gallagher nevertheless declined to initiate the separate criminal proceedings sought by Class Counsel for the status-report violations, explaining that the “immense power” of criminal contempt had to be exercised judiciously and that the violations before her consisted of “modest filing delays and caginess about the content of the reports.” She added that “[a] more fulsome investigation” of the alleged “lack of candor to the court” or conduct potentially creating civil liability “might be appropriate in other venues.”
Finally, Judge Gallagher denied the government’s effort to vacate the Apr. 23 facilitation order. She rejected its premise that Cristian did not wish to return, stressing that “Cristian never should have been removed from this country without the bargained-for protections afforded him under the Settlement Agreement.” As his whereabouts and wishes were unclear, the court held that if Cristian resurfaced and sought to return, Defendants should “retain their existing obligation to restore him to his status quo before their breach of the Settlement Agreement.”
On Sept. 8, 2026, Judge Gallagher supplied a retrospective assessment of the same course of conduct, resolving Class Counsel’s second motion for attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act. She noted that the motion concerned fees incurred in connection with the government’s removal of Cristian to El Salvador “in violation of the Settlement Agreement.” She granted the motion in part and awarded $160,823.09 in fees and $3,704.61 in expenses. The opinion expressly reserved any question of additional fees arising from the later, broader Class Member removals.
In assessing substantial justification, Gallagher found that “Defendants’ decision to remove Cristian without warning, even after Cristian’s immigration counsel had notified them of his class membership, was unjustified and not reasonable.” She further concluded that “the government’s litigation position was not reasonable.” The unreasonable litigation conduct she identified included its “repeated unsubstantiated assertions that Cristian was a member of TdA or a threat to public safety, see, e.g., ECF 557 at 3, its attempted use of an ‘Indicative Asylum Decision’ manufactured for this litigation, and its decision to ignore this Court’s reporting deadline to facilitate its participation in the prisoner swap without court intervention.” Looking at “the totality of the circumstances,” the court held that the government’s overall litigation position “has not been substantially justified” and that “[a] reasonable person could not find that the government’s overall litigation position had reasonable basis in law and in fact.”
8-b. USCIS asylum settlement, class removals: “Defendants have squarely and substantively violated the prohibition” on removals; held “in contempt of this Court’s November 25, 2024 and April 23, 2025 orders” for removals carried out “in ignorance or disregard” of identified potential Class membership.
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), J.O.P. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 8:19-cv-01944 (D. Md.)
This sub-item concerns the broader pattern of Class Member removals that led to class-wide enforcement proceedings and, ultimately, a civil-contempt finding. On Nov. 25, 2024, the court approved and incorporated by reference the Settlement Agreement. Section III.I provided that, for a Class Member with a final removal order, ICE would “refrain from executing” that order until USCIS issued a Final Determination on one properly filed asylum application under the terms of the Agreement. To implement that protection, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations was also required to enter a stay in its system of records for identified Class Members and retain that alert until USCIS indicated that it was appropriate to remove it.
On Apr. 23, 2025, after ICE removed Class Member Cristian to El Salvador while his asylum application remained pending, Judge Gallagher granted Class Counsel’s first emergency motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement. The court held that removal of a Class Member without a USCIS final determination on the pending asylum application “violates the Settlement Agreement,” separately ordered Defendants “not to remove from the United States members of the certified ‘Class,’” and required them to facilitate Cristian’s return to the United States.
Removals continued. On Nov. 20, 2025, Judge Gallagher denied without prejudice Class Counsel’s second emergency motion to enforce because the parties had not yet completed Section V.D’s agreed noncompliance process. The court nevertheless stated:
“This Court is, of course, concerned about the number of instances of apparent non-compliance, which is significant despite representing what seems to be a tiny percentage of the overall Class Members.”
Judge Gallagher ordered a recorded meet-and-confer addressing Defendants’ procedures for identifying Class Members and entering stays in their records, and directed the parties to discuss “why those efforts failed in the cases of the individuals who were removed in violation of the Settlement Agreement.”
On Jan. 22, 2026, Class Counsel again moved to enforce the Settlement Agreement and to hold Defendants in civil contempt over additional removals. Following a February motions hearing, Judge Gallagher held evidentiary hearings in March. During the ensuing proceedings, the court also required repeated reporting concerning why additional removals had not been communicated to Department of Justice counsel. On Apr. 13, it rejected Defendants’ request to be deemed compliant with that reporting obligation, finding the information provided insufficient and requiring further submissions.
On July 29, 2026, in an order and accompanying opinion, Judge Gallagher granted in part and denied in part Class Counsel’s motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and for civil contempt, finding Defendants “in contempt of this Court’s November 25, 2024 and April 23, 2025 orders.” In assessing the underlying noncompliance, Gallagher noted that “Defendants have not disputed that removals of confirmed Class Members violated the Settlement Agreement and this Court’s April 23, 2025 Order.”
The court nevertheless distinguished the wrongful removals from alleged deficiencies in the processes used to identify Class Members before removal. Gallagher concluded that “Defendants’ chosen methodology itself” did not violate the Settlement Agreement, which did not prescribe a particular identification methodology or require ICE independently to identify potential Class Members before removal. As the court explained, Section III.I did not “mandate[] that Defendants identify Class Members;” rather, “[t]he only conduct specifically prescribed to ICE is to make entries in its systems for ‘identified Class Members’ and to honor those alerts—and the corresponding prohibition of execution of final removal orders—until USCIS indicates it is appropriate for ICE to do otherwise.” The court likewise found that “nothing in the Settlement Agreement speaks to the pace” at which ICE had to enter stays in its records, and declined to treat delays in entering banners or comments as distinct violations. It therefore concluded that “the only violations which this Court is prepared to address through exercise of its enforcement authority are the wrongful removals.”
Not every wrongful removal, however, amounted to contempt. Explaining the distinction, Judge Gallagher wrote:
“With the Settlement Agreement containing no express requirements as to the methods and/or parameters for identifying Class Members, nor any independent obligation of ICE to identify Class Members in the first instance, this Court declines to find that removals of Class Members executed as a result of alleged deficiencies in identification methods and/or parameters, despite constituting violations, amount to contempt. However, where an individual has been identified to ICE as a potential Class Member, Defendants are obligated not to remove that individual until the individual is confirmed not to be a Class Member. Any removals of individuals executed in ignorance or disregard of identification of their potential Class membership were and are in contempt of that order.”
The accompanying order formally found Defendants in contempt of both the Nov. 25, 2024 and Apr. 23, 2025 orders.
Judge Gallagher rejected Defendants’ contention that use of the settlement’s dispute-resolution procedures meant that improper removals did not breach the agreement: “Defendants’ argument appears to be that because the Agreement discussed what to do in instances of noncompliance, that noncompliance is not, in fact, noncompliance.” She characterized that assertion, borrowing Defendants’ own language, as “absurd on its face.”
The government also relied on its reporting of violations and willingness to facilitate removed Class Members’ return as evidence of good faith. The court rejected that reasoning:
“Put another way, it cannot credit purported ‘good faith’ attempts at remedying admitted non-compliance as somehow constituting a ‘good faith’ attempt at compliance in the first place.”
Nor did the number of asylum decisions issued, or the relatively small proportion of Class Members removed, establish substantial compliance. Describing the violations as no “mere technicality,” Judge Gallagher wrote:
“By removing, by Defendants’ count, more than fifty confirmed Class Members—sometimes in disregard of notifications in their EARM profiles—pursuant to a final order of removal before adjudicating their asylum applications, Defendants have squarely and substantively violated the prohibition (and deprived Class Members of a core benefit of the Settlement Agreement).”
Although the court acknowledged some good-faith measures, including creating lists of potential Class Members and entering notifications in ICE’s electronic records, it concluded that “these processes have proven inadequate to prevent noncompliance, and after becoming aware of this inadequacy, Defendants have not taken all reasonable steps to prevent future noncompliance.” Improper removals continued even after Defendants discovered that the extent of their noncompliance was substantially greater than previously understood, including 13 confirmed Class Members removed between March and June 26, 2026.
The court separately found that the scale and nature of the Section III.I noncompliance constituted an unanticipated changed circumstance warranting modification of the Settlement Agreement. In explaining why, Judge Gallagher emphasized that Section III.I imposed an unqualified prohibition rather than a quantitative performance target: “The quantitative metric for evaluating compliance, while not stated expressly, is clear by virtue of it being a prohibition: zero such removals are permitted.”
The accompanying order required ICE, whenever its records contained an alert identifying someone as a potential Class Member or ICE received such identification by another means, to “refrain from removing the individual unless and until” USCIS adjudicated the asylum application on the merits or confirmed that the individual was not a Class Member. ICE had to enter missing alerts “as promptly as possible” and “within no more than two business days,” and “affirmatively and specifically review” active and closed EARM records before executing a final removal order (emphasis added). The order also required nationwide written guidance, repeated searches every two weeks for removed potential Class Members, and biweekly compliance reports supported by declarations from persons with personal knowledge.
Those measures were imposed through the court’s enforcement, clarification, and modification authority, rather than as contempt sanctions. Judge Gallagher expressly stated:
“Ultimately, this Court orders no sanctions specifically pursuant to its finding of contempt. This Court stresses that this result in no way should be interpreted as this Court ignoring or excusing Defendants’ contumacious conduct.” (emphasis added).
Although it imposed no sanctions pursuant to the contempt finding, the court provided a mechanism for purging it. “Out of an abundance of caution,” Gallagher ordered that Defendants could purge the finding by “demonstrating to the satisfaction of this Court, through briefing and supporting declarations and evidence, their ability and willingness to comply with Section III.I and this Court’s orders; specifically, that they have refrained from removing any individual in ignorance or disregard of identification of that individual’s potential J.O.P. Class membership.”
8-c. USCIS asylum settlement, adjudication freeze: “there can be no dispute that Defendants’ unilateral cessation of adjudications violated Section III.B of the Agreement;” the “entirety of what this settlement was intended to achieve” was “rendered impossible” by the hold memorandum.
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), J.O.P. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 8:19-cv-01944 (D. Md.)
This sub-item concerns USCIS’s suspension of asylum adjudications, the court’s finding that the suspension violated Section III.B of the Settlement Agreement approved on Nov. 25, 2024, and the resulting extension of the Agreement’s May 27, 2026 termination date, which applied to nearly all of its provisions. Section III.B provided that USCIS “will exercise Initial Jurisdiction over Class Members’ asylum applications in accordance with the terms of this Settlement Agreement and adjudicate them on the merits.”
On Dec. 2, 2025, USCIS issued a memorandum (Hold Memo) directing personnel to “[p]lace a hold on all Forms I-589 (Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal), regardless of the alien’s country of nationality, pending a comprehensive review.” The Hold Memo stated that the adjudicative hold would remain in effect until lifted by the USCIS Director. Testimony at the March 2026 evidentiary hearings confirmed that the hold applied to Class Members. USCIS subsequently created exceptions, and on March 30 announced that it had lifted the hold for asylum applications from non-high-risk countries. At a May 19 hearing, however, Defendants confirmed that the hold remained in effect for applicants from 40 designated “high-risk” countries and conceded that they could not definitively estimate how many Class Members remained subject to it.
On Apr. 10, 2026, Class Counsel moved to extend the Agreement’s May 27 termination date under Rule 60(b)(5), relying on alleged noncompliance with Sections III.B and III.I as changed circumstances warranting modification. Class Counsel proposed replacing the ordinary termination date with a “performance-based termination mechanism” tied to, among other things, identifying potential Class Members, addressing previously removed Class Members, providing individualized notice, and adjudicating the applications of Class Members who opted in. At the May 19 hearing, they proposed, in the alternative, an extension of at least three years.
On May 26, 2026, in an opinion and order, Judge Gallagher granted Class Counsel’s motion to modify the Agreement in part. For purposes of Rule 60(b)(5), the court treated the Agreement—and noted that the parties did not dispute its operation—as a consent decree because it had become an order of the court in November 2024. Under Rufo, “a party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree;” if that standard is met, the court considers whether the proposed modification is “suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”
As to Section III.I, the court did not resolve in this ruling whether the alleged wrongful removals themselves constituted changed circumstances. Assuming arguendo that they did, Judge Gallagher concluded that extending the Agreement’s termination date would not be a “suitably tailored modification” to address wrongful removals during the original term, and left any appropriately tailored modifications to the then-pending motion to enforce.
As to Section III.B, Judge Gallagher first rejected Class Counsel’s broader contention that Defendants were required to complete adjudication of all Class Members’ applications by the original termination date. Class Counsel argued that Section III.B’s use of “will” “unambiguously requires Defendants to actually adjudicate Class Members’ asylum applications” during the term of the Agreement. Gallagher observed that “[t]his proposition does not seem to be in dispute,” but that “the use of the word ‘will’ provides no indication of the pace or volume of adjudication that the parties intended during the 548-day term.” The court therefore did not regard Defendants’ failure to complete all applications by May 27 as a changed circumstance warranting modification.
The court reached a different conclusion as to USCIS’s “unilateral cessation of adjudications.” Judge Gallagher wrote:
“While the parties may dispute the required pace, even if Defendants were not required to prioritize adjudications of all Class Members’ applications during the term of the Agreement, there can be no dispute that Defendants’ unilateral cessation of adjudications violated Section III.B of the Agreement in a fashion that Class Counsel could not have actually anticipated.”
She accordingly found that the Hold Memo constituted a “dramatic change in circumstances.” Recalling her remarks at the Feb. 18 hearing, she explained:
“Indeed, this Court has previously recognized that the USCIS Hold Memo constitutes a ‘massive changed circumstance’ in that ‘the entirety of what this settlement was intended to achieve’ was ‘rendered impossible by virtue of th[e] memo.’”
Having found sufficiently changed circumstances, the court then turned to whether the proposed relief was suitably tailored to them.
The court did not adopt Class Counsel’s proposed performance-based termination mechanism or alternative extension of at least three years. Instead, it imposed a narrower remedy tied to the duration of the hold. Judge Gallagher found that, during the 175 days between the Dec. 2 Hold Memo and the May 26 opinion, “some portion of the Class has been denied the benefit of the Parties’ bargain—a full 548-day window during which Defendants are obligated to adjudicate Class Members’ applications on the merits.” She concluded that an extension equal to that period of deprivation was “suitably tailored” and extended the Agreement’s termination date by 175 days, from May 27 to Nov. 18, 2026. Because adjudicative holds continued to affect at least some Class Members, Gallagher added that Class Counsel could seek a further extension if the situation persisted and continued to deprive Class Members of adjudication consistent with the Agreement.
8-d. USCIS asylum settlement, E.L.A. removal: “Defendants are hereby found to be in contempt” of three court orders following E.L.A.’s second removal to El Salvador “in violation of this Court’s orders;” government acknowledged an “erroneous removal” caused by agency miscommunication.
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), J.O.P. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 8:19-cv-01944 (D. Md.)
This sub-item concerns Class Member E.L.A.’s second removal to El Salvador after the court had imposed additional protections against further Class Member removals. Under the Settlement Agreement approved by the court’s Nov. 25, 2024 order, Section III.I provided that, for a Class Member with a final removal order, ICE would “refrain from executing” that order until USCIS issued a Final Determination on one properly filed asylum application under the terms of the Agreement.
The Apr. 23, 2025 order separately prohibited Defendants from removing members of the certified Class. Then, on July 29, after finding Defendants in civil contempt of the Nov. 25 and Apr. 23 orders, Judge Gallagher imposed additional safeguards: where ICE records contained an alert identifying an individual as a potential J.O.P. Class Member, or ICE received such identification by another means, ICE had to refrain from removal unless USCIS adjudicated the asylum application on the merits or confirmed that the individual was not a Class Member. ICE was also required, before executing a final removal order, to “affirmatively and specifically review” both active and closed EARM records for indicators of potential Class membership.
E.L.A. had already been removed to El Salvador in March 2026. He was returned to the United States on Aug. 7. The government’s later opposition recounted that history and referred to him as “Class Member E.L.A.” It also stated that ICE advised USCIS on Aug. 11 that E.L.A. was a J.O.P. Class Member. USCIS then told ICE that his asylum case “will be closed as soon as possible” because of missed biometrics appointments, and ICE subsequently requested removal of the J.O.P. banner from its EARM system. USCIS, however, had not yet closed E.L.A.’s asylum claim when ICE removed him again on Sept. 1.
On Sept. 2, Defendants filed a notice identifying E.L.A. as a “class member” and confirming that ICE had determined he was listed on a flight manifest and that the flight had landed in El Salvador the previous afternoon. Later that day, Judge Gallagher ordered Defendants to answer eight questions by noon the following day, including who was responsible for the decisions to move E.L.A. and place him on the plane; whether the responsible personnel had received ICE’s revised Aug. 13 guidance; whether ICE systems contained an alert identifying him as a potential J.O.P. Class Member; and, pointedly, “What is the plan for promptly rectifying this error?”
The government’s Sept. 3 response and accompanying ICE declaration confirmed the basic mechanism that produced the removal. ICE’s declarant stated that its systems “did contain an alert that ELA was identified as a potential J.O.P. Class Member,” but that ICE had requested removal of the J.O.P. banner after USCIS communicated that it was closing his asylum case. The government later explained that, based on this information, ICE “understood there to be no pending asylum application for adjudication on the merits before USCIS at the time of removal.” The declaration responded to the court’s question about rectification by stating that “ICE is facilitating ELA’s return and is in the process of looking at all available flight options.” The government’s filing expressly said it was considering steps “to rectify the communication errors that led to ELA’s erroneous removal.”
The government later reiterated in its Sept. 21 opposition that it did “not contest that E.L.A.’s removal from the United States on September 1, 2026, was due to a miscommunication between USCIS and ICE” regarding “whether the paperwork was sufficient to close the case out in USCIS’s systems.” Its filing also acknowledged that USCIS had not actually closed the asylum claim. Before resolving the matter, Judge Gallagher required the parties to confer daily and file daily status reports detailing the steps taken to facilitate E.L.A.’s return, and later held a hearing on Sept. 23.
On Sept. 25, 2026, in an order and sealed memorandum opinion, Judge Gallagher granted in part and denied in part Class Counsel’s motion to remedy contempt and enforce the Settlement Agreement. The court expressly found:
“Defendants are hereby found to be in contempt of this Court’s November 25, 2024, April 23, 2025, and July 29, 2026, orders as a result of their removal of E.L.A. to El Salvador in violation of this Court’s orders.” (emphasis added).
Judge Gallagher ordered Defendants to “Return E.L.A. to the United States” and “refrain from executing any final removal order against him” until USCIS issued a Final Determination on a properly filed asylum application under the Settlement Agreement or the Agreement expired. Defendants also had to provide E.L.A., his immigration counsel, and Class Counsel three days’ advance notice of the time and place of his planned arrival.
The court further ordered Defendants to “Return to E.L.A. all of his property and documents that were removed from his person at the time of his wrongful removal.” If Defendants intended to remove him again “for any reason,”they were required to provide E.L.A., his counsel, Class Counsel, and the court at least five business days’ advance notice “and the legal authority authorizing the intended removal.” All other requested relief was denied.
8-e. USCIS asylum settlement, immigration proceedings: “DHS has violated Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement” by opposing administrative-closure motions, seeking to recalendar closed proceedings, and opposing termination on grounds inconsistent with the agreement.
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), J.O.P. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 8:19-cv-01944 (D. Md.)
This sub-item concerns DHS’s conduct in Class Members’ immigration-court proceedings under Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement, approved by the court on Nov. 25, 2024. Section III.H required DHS to refrain from taking the position that USCIS lacked Initial Jurisdiction over a Class Member’s asylum application; to “join or non-oppose” motions for administrative closure made in order to await USCIS’s exercise of Initial Jurisdiction, unless administrative closure was unavailable under controlling law in a particular jurisdiction; and to “generally join or non-oppose” motions to dismiss or terminate made for that purpose. Defendants retained discretion to oppose termination where warranted by the individual facts of a case, but DHS’s opposition could not be based, “in whole or in part,” on a position that USCIS lacked Initial Jurisdiction.
On Oct. 8, 2026, Judge Gallagher entered an order, accompanied by an opinion dated Oct. 8 and publicly filed Oct. 14, granting in part and denying in part Class Counsel’s motion to enforce Section III.H. The court found violations in all three categories. In its order, Judge Gallagher found:
“(2) DHS has violated Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement by not joining or non-opposing motions for administrative closure filed by Class Members, including A.C.H.;
(3) DHS has violated Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement by filing motions to recalendar administratively closed immigration court proceedings of Class Members;
(4) DHS has violated Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement by filing oppositions to Class Members’ motions to terminate their immigration court proceedings that were not based on the individual facts of the case, and/or were based, in whole or in part, on a position that USCIS does not have Initial Jurisdiction over the Class Member’s asylum application.”
The accompanying opinion explained each finding. First, as to administrative closure, the court rejected Defendants’ argument that administrative closure was unlawful and “not available in any jurisdiction.” Gallagher concluded that the practice remained lawful outside the Sixth Circuit and then rejected Defendants’ contention that Section III.H afforded them discretion to oppose such motions. The provision’s use of “will,” she held, imposed a mandatory obligation and “a lack of discretion.” Accordingly: “Therefore, by opposing Class Members’ motions for administrative closure, Defendants have violated Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement.”
Second, as to recalendaring, Judge Gallagher rejected Defendants’ contention that the conduct could not violate the Agreement merely because the word “recalendar” did not appear in its text. The court held that “[i]mplicit in the Agreement” was a promise that, once Defendants had joined or not opposed administrative closure, they would not subsequently ask immigration judges to put those cases back on the calendar. “Such a promise is impliedly included as part of the duty of good faith.” Gallagher accordingly concluded that “Defendants’ recalendaring violated Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement.”
Third, addressing what Class Counsel characterized as DHS’s “blanket opposition” to termination motions, the court found that Defendants had opposed A.C.H.’s motion on grounds inconsistent with Section III.H: they had told the immigration judge that the immigration court had jurisdiction before USCIS exercised its initial jurisdiction and, when questioned by the district court, were unable to articulate individual facts warranting opposition. Judge Gallagher held that “Defendants’ opposition, then, violates the plain text of Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement, both as to A.C.H.’s motion to terminate and for administrative closure.” The court accordingly found that DHS had violated Section III.H by filing termination oppositions that were not based on the individual facts of the case and/or were based, in whole or in part, on a position that USCIS lacked Initial Jurisdiction.
To ensure compliance, Judge Gallagher ordered DHS to join or non-oppose A.C.H.’s forthcoming renewed motion for administrative closure. If A.C.H. moved to terminate his proceedings, DHS could oppose only if it presented to the court individual facts it deemed to warrant opposition and did not rely, in whole or in part, on a position that USCIS lacked Initial Jurisdiction. Class-wide, the court ordered DHS not to oppose qualifying administrative-closure motions unless administrative closure was unavailable under controlling law in the particular jurisdiction; “[n]ot move to recalendar the administratively closed removal proceedings of any Class Member;” and join or non-oppose qualifying termination motions unless DHS deemed opposition warranted based on the individual facts of the case and did not rely on the prohibited jurisdictional position.
The court declined, however, to impose Class Counsel’s requested additional class-wide requirement that DHS affirmatively state those individualized reasons during the immigration proceedings. Gallagher held that such a requirement would “go[] beyond the text of Section III.H” and give Class Members more than they had bargained for in the Settlement Agreement.
9. Perkins Coie executive order: disclosure requests “remained in place notwithstanding the Court’s explicit TRO direction;” derogatory statements “hardly appeared to comply with the TRO Order and raised some concern about the general presumption by courts ‘that executive officials will act in good faith;’” “This is not the first instance in this case that has raised the potential specter of noncompliance, which has only crystallized the seriousness of the issues raised;” potential “game of judicial whack-a-mole”
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Department of Justice, 1:25-cv-00716 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged President Trump’s Mar. 6, 2025 Executive Order 14230, directing federal agencies to take adverse measures against law firm Perkins Coie LLP, including suspending security clearances, reviewing government contracts, and restricting the firm’s access to federal employees and facilities.
On Mar. 12, 2025, Judge Howell issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Defendants from implementing or enforcing Sections 1, 3, and 5 of the Executive Order. Among other requirements, the TRO directed Defendants to immediately notify every recipient of a request to disclose business relationships with Perkins Coie that the request had been rescinded.
In an Apr. 25 memorandum and order, Judge Howell found that the government’s Mar. 18 status report showed that, although agencies had been instructed to suspend implementation of the enjoined provisions, they had not been directed to take the additional required step of notifying recipients that their disclosure requests were rescinded. Judge Howell stated:
“As a result, requests to government contractors for disclosure of information, as required by EO 14230, made by any federal agency other than the seven named government agencies in this lawsuit, remained in place notwithstanding the Court’s explicit TRO direction to all defendants—which included the United States, as defined in the Complaint—about the broader scope of this requirement beyond merely the seven specifically named Executive branch agencies.” (emphasis added).
Following Perkins Coie’s motion to clarify, Judge Howell issued a Mar. 19 order directing DOJ and OMB to ensure that all agencies subject to the Executive Order notified recipients of the rescission of outstanding disclosure requests. The government filed two additional status reports on Mar. 20 advising of compliance with the clarified TRO. In her subsequent May 2 opinion, Judge Howell described the government’s failure to ensure that all agencies rescinded their outstanding disclosure requests as a “shortcoming in implementing fully the TRO.”
Separately, the government’s Mar. 20 supplemental status report attached a memorandum issued by Attorney General Pamela Bondi and OMB Director Russell Vought to all agencies subject to the Executive Order. Although the memorandum communicated the court’s instructions, it added an extra paragraph asserting that the court’s order was “erroneous” and reserving the government’s right to take action against Perkins Coie’s “dishonest and dangerous” conduct—repeating language from Section 1 of the Executive Order, the implementation and use of which the TRO had specifically enjoined. Judge Howell wrote:
“This intentional additional promulgation of derogatory statements about plaintiff across all the Executive branch agencies hardly appeared to comply with the TRO Order and raised some concern about the general presumption by courts ‘that executive officials will act in good faith.’” (emphasis added).
Judge Howell also noted that government counsel had “reluctantly conceded” that the added paragraph went “beyond the minimum required” to comply with the clarified TRO (emphasis added).
The court further addressed the government’s position that agencies not individually named as defendants might not be subject to enforcement of any permanent injunction. Judge Howell warned that this could undermine the effectiveness of the court’s relief:
“This scenario—where executive departments, agencies, or entities not named as defendants proceed with implementation of any portion of EO 14230, notwithstanding any declaratory and permanent injunctive relief issued by this Court—would open the door to a game of judicial whack-a-mole, requiring either contested contempt proceedings against non-compliant agencies or for plaintiff to bring a separate lawsuit to enforce any permanent injunction order, with associated expenditure of valuable party and judicial resources in the process.” (emphasis added).
Judge Howell continued:
“This is not the first instance in this case that has raised the potential specter of noncompliance, which has only crystallized the seriousness of the issues raised.” (emphasis added).
The court added, “Luckily, forewarned is forearmed,” and on Apr. 25 granted Perkins Coie’s motion to add the other agencies and officials responsible for implementing the Executive Order as named defendants, thereby addressing the government’s concerns about the scope of any injunction.
10-a. South Sudan removals: “unquestionably violative” of court order; “no choice but to find” breach of preliminary injunction; “‘flagrant,’ willful violation of this Court’s order”
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-10676 (D. Mass.)
This class action challenged the government’s policy of removing noncitizens to third countries not designated in their removal proceedings without advance notice or a meaningful opportunity to raise claims against removal, including risk of torture.
The governing Apr. 18 preliminary injunction required written notice to affected individuals and their immigration counsel, if any, in a language the individuals could understand, and a meaningful opportunity to raise a fear-based Convention Against Torture [CAT] claim before third-country removal.
On May 20, 2025, the government placed eight class members on a removal flight bound for South Sudan via Djibouti—without the notice and meaningful opportunity to raise CAT claims required by Judge Murphy’s Apr. 18 preliminary injunction. Eight individuals were on the flight.
According to the court’s May 26, 2025 factual findings, the government initially told the eight individuals on May 19 that they would be removed to South Africa. No earlier than 5:46 p.m., the government informed them that their destination was instead South Sudan. By 9:35 a.m. the following day, the class members had left detention for the airport, having received “fewer than 16 hours’ notice before being removed, most of which were non-waking hours, none within the business day.” They had limited, if any, access to family, legal representatives, or information about South Sudan; after leaving detention, they had no communication access.
Following an emergency hearing on May 20, that day Judge Murphy ordered Defendants to maintain custody and control of the affected class members, “to ensure the practical feasibility of return if the Court finds that such removals were unlawful.” He required the government to identify the affected individuals and explain the notice and opportunity to raise fear-based claims each had received. The court subsequently learned that they were being held at a military base in Djibouti.
At the May 21, 2025 hearing, after hearing sworn testimony from senior ICE and DHS officials, Judge Murphy stated that “the Department’s actions in this case are unquestionably violative of this Court’s order.” His same-day memorandum stated:
“At today’s hearing, the Court found that Defendants violated the Preliminary Injunction entered in this case by failing to provide six non-citizen class members a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to assert claims for protection under the Convention Against Torture before initiating removal to a third country.”
Rejecting the government’s reliance on alleged ambiguity in the phrase “meaningful opportunity,” the court wrote, “To be clear, this is not one of those hard cases.” The court stated that the lack of information, hurried and confused notice, language barriers, and restrictions on attorney access “compound and confirm this Court’s finding that no reasonable interpretation of the Court’s Preliminary Injunction could endorse yesterday’s events.” It then clarified the injunction to require a minimum of ten days to raise a fear-based CAT claim before third-country removal.
In a separate May 21 order on remedy for violations of the preliminary injunction, Judge Murphy required private reasonable-fear interviews, access to counsel and interpretation, at least 72 hours’ notice of the interviews, and an opportunity to seek reopening after an adverse determination. He required weekly status reports but permitted DHS to provide the process in the United States or abroad, provided it retained custody and control under comparable conditions. The order expressly distinguished this remedy for the completed violation from the requirements for compliance before removal.
The court also ordered counsel to certify under penalty of perjury that relevant personnel had received the clarified injunction and had been warned that noncompliance could expose them to civil or criminal contempt.
On May 26, denying reconsideration and a stay, Judge Murphy reaffirmed the violation finding:
“Defendants have mischaracterized this Court’s order, while at the same time manufacturing the very chaos they decry. By racing to get six class members onto a plane to unstable South Sudan, clearly in breach of the law and this Court’s order, Defendants gave this Court no choice but to find that they were in violation of the Preliminary Injunction.”
The court emphasized that it had adopted the government’s proposed alternative to returning the individuals immediately: allowing DHS to provide the required process abroad. Government officials had confirmed that this was feasible, but subsequently challenged the resulting logistical burdens. Judge Murphy explained that he “never said that Defendants had to convert their foreign military base into an immigration facility; it only left that as an option, again, at Defendants’ request” (emphasis in original). The court also rejected the suggestion that its failure to prescribe more detailed procedures had caused the violation. It had repeatedly invited the government to propose workable procedures, and the government had declined. Judge Murphy concluded:
“From this course of conduct, it is hard to come to any conclusion other than that Defendants invite lack of clarity as a means of evasion.”
Addressing the short notice and lack of a realistic opportunity to raise a claim, he added:
“Given the totality of the circumstances, it is hard to take seriously the idea that Defendants intended these individuals to have any real opportunity to make a valid claim.”
Judge Murphy described the conduct as a “flagrant violation of the Preliminary Injunction.” As an additional reason for denying a stay, he stated that “the unclean hands doctrine bars equitable relief,” explaining that the government had, “at best, sought to get around an injunction through clever compliance.” The court nevertheless expressly reserved ruling on whether the violation warranted a contempt finding.
On June 23, the Supreme Court stayed the Apr. 18 preliminary injunction in an emergency order with no explanation. That evening, Judge Murphy’s electronic order treated the May 21 remedy as remaining in effect. On July 3, the Supreme Court clarified that its stay also rendered the remedial order unenforceable. The eight class members subsequently arrived in South Sudan on July 5, according to the South Sudanese foreign ministry’s July 8 statement.
In his Feb. 25, 2026 opinion, Judge Murphy again addressed the May 20 removal flight, describing the absence of meaningful notice or an opportunity to raise a CAT claim as “what could only be described as a ‘flagrant,’ willful violation of this Court’s order.” He also contrasted the government’s subsequent assertion to the Supreme Court that his order had forced DHS to detain the individuals in Djibouti with ICE official Marcos Charles’s sworn May 21 testimony:
“THE COURT: And they ended up in Djibouti because of my order last night?
MARCOS CHARLES: No, Your Honor. The plan was to go to Djibouti and then from Djibouti continue on to South Sudan and go from there, sir.”
The February opinion reiterated that the screening procedures had been imposed as a “remedy for Defendants’ violations of the Preliminary Injunction,” with DHS retaining the choice whether to provide that process domestically or abroad.
In the same February decision, the court dissolved the Apr. 18 preliminary injunction and entered declaratory relief and APA vacatur against the third-country removal policy. On Sept. 18, 2026, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment except for two declarations concerning the sequence of removal destinations, which it vacated for lack of standing. On Sept. 29, the Supreme Court stayed the Feb. 25 order and judgment and granted certiorari. Argument is scheduled for Dec. 9, 2026.
10-b. O.C.G. identity disclosure: government publicly disclosed Plaintiff’s identity “in violation of this Court’s Order;” exposure “a bell that perhaps cannot be un-rung”
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-10676 (D. Mass.)
On Mar. 23, 2025, Judge Murphy granted Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed under pseudonyms, ordering that “[t]he parties shall submit pleadings, briefing and evidence using Plaintiffs’ initials instead of their real names and other personally identifying information.” The court directed Plaintiffs’ counsel to submit their clients’ actual identities under seal.
On May 16, in the course of expedited discovery concerning the circumstances of O.C.G.’s removal to Mexico, Defendants filed a Notice of Errata retracting an earlier sworn assertion that O.C.G. had denied fearing removal to Mexico. The original filing included an exhibit publicly disclosing O.C.G.’s full name and other identifying information, contrary to the pseudonym order. The exhibit was subsequently replaced, and Plaintiffs raised the disclosure in their May 18 memorandum, reporting efforts to remove the information from public sources.
At the May 21, 2025 hearing, Judge Murphy expressly acknowledged the breach of his pseudonym order, stating: “We have the defendants’ admission of error in violating my order to proceed by pseudonym.” In his May 23 opinion granting a preliminary injunction directing the government to facilitate O.C.G.’s return, Judge Murphy found the government had violated his pseudonym order. He wrote:
“The Court was given false information, upon which it relied, twice, to the detriment of a party at risk of serious and irreparable harm. Defendants then exacerbated that risk by placing O.C.G.’s full name on the public docket, in violation of this Court’s Order.”
In a footnote, Judge Murphy emphasized that “Defendants’ inadvertent exposure of O.C.G.’s identity, while now remedied on the docket, only heightens concern as a bell that perhaps cannot be un-rung given the permanent nature of the internet.” He acknowledged Plaintiffs’ efforts to have the information removed from major sources. The court nevertheless accepted Defendants’ apology and found “no further action necessary.”
10-c. El Salvador removals: “Government repeatedly violated, or attempted to violate” court orders
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-10676 (D. Mass.)
This subset of the litigation concerns removals to El Salvador through Guantánamo Bay and the government’s assertion that the Department of Defense (DOD), rather than the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was responsible. It also addresses the court’s subsequent warning concerning threatened removals to Libya.
On Mar. 28, 2025, Judge Murphy issued a TRO prohibiting third-country removals without written notice and a meaningful opportunity to seek protection under the CAT. On Apr. 18, he certified a class and entered a preliminary injunction, requiring written notice to affected individuals and their immigration counsel, if any, in a language the individuals could understand, and a meaningful opportunity to raise a fear-based claim before removal.
Plaintiffs raised possible violations of the TRO in an Apr. 4 filing and submitted further allegations and supporting declarations with their Apr. 8 reply, concerning removals to El Salvador after the TRO, including through Guantánamo Bay. On Apr. 10, the court directed Plaintiffs to identify the affected individuals and required Defendants to respond to the compliance allegations. In its Apr. 23 response, the government disclosed that four individuals had been removed to El Salvador on Mar. 31, after the TRO. It maintained that DOD, rather than DHS, had conducted those removals, without DHS direction or personnel aboard the flights, and denied that DHS had violated the TRO.
On Apr. 28, the court ordered Defendants to provide information about individuals removed on flights around Mar. 31 and Apr. 13 and other Guantánamo-to-third-country flights. It also required a proposed discovery plan concerning the four post-TRO removals, the agencies’ respective roles, and the government’s supporting declaration.
Judge Murphy amended the preliminary injunction on Apr. 30. He expressly made “no finding on the accuracy of this assignment of responsibility,” but required Defendants to provide the injunction’s procedural protections before removing, or permitting another agency to remove, an individual from Guantánamo to a third country. “Defendants must comport with the terms of the April 18, 2025 preliminary injunction by providing the due-process guarantees,” the court wrote, adding:
“Given the position taken by the Government that the deportation from Guantanamo to third countries was not at the direction, behest or control of the Department of Homeland Security, a debated issue to be resolved once preliminary discovery has been conducted, this Court ORDERS that, after taking custody of an alien, Defendants may not cede custody or control in any manner that prevents an alien from receiving the due-process guarantees outlined in the April 18, 2025 preliminary injunction.”
On May 7, the court ordered expedited discovery concerning the four removals, the agencies’ respective roles, and the government’s declaration.
A related compliance concern arose that day, when Plaintiffs sought emergency relief following reports of imminent removals to Libya, including via Saudi Arabia, without the required process. Judge Murphy explained that the “motion should not be required,” because the injunction already provided the requested protection. He reiterated that DHS “may not evade this injunction by ceding control” to DOD or another entity, and emphasized:
“If there is any doubt—the Court sees none—the allegedly imminent removals, as reported by news agencies and as Plaintiffs seek to corroborate with class-member accounts and public information, would clearly violate this Court’s Order.”
On May 26, 2025, referring to the Guantánamo and Libya disputes, Judge Murphy wrote: “Twice, well-founded allegations of non-compliance or imminent non-compliance led this Court to amend or clarify the Preliminary Injunction.” Neither amendment nor clarification “changed the substance of the Preliminary Injunction,” which continued to require written notice and a meaningful opportunity to make a CAT claim.
In his Feb. 25, 2026 memorandum and order, Judge Murphy revisited the March removals and subsequent compliance disputes, stating:
“Throughout this time, the Government repeatedly violated, or attempted to violate, this Court’s orders.”
Addressing the government’s attribution of the removals to DOD, Judge Murphy quoted Justice Sotomayor’s explanation that the interagency agreement assigned DHS legal and physical custody and responsibility for immigration-related transfers and removals, while DOD provided security and logistical support. Her dissent had concluded: “The Government was unable to reconcile its representations to this evidence.” Judge Murphy then described his own response: “Notwithstanding Defendants’ asserted loophole, the Court ordered discovery on the violation” and amended the injunction to prevent Defendants from ceding custody or control to another agency to avoid its effect.
The February opinion also reiterated the May 7 warning about Libya, but expressly qualified the record: “The Court does not know what happened to these individuals, whether any of them were among those removed to South Sudan on May 20, 2025, or were part of any subsequent removal effort.”
11. Venezuela TPS Termination: government at “risk [of] being held in contempt” for disregard of discovery orders, and later “failed to comply” with submitting declaration
Judge Edward Milton Chen (Obama appointee), National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 3:25-cv-01766 (N.D. Cal.)
The case involves the Trump administration’s decision to terminate temporary protected status for Venezuelans in the United States.
On May 19, 2025, Judge Chen warned the government it was at “risk [of] being held in contempt” due to their disregard for the court’s discovery orders. He wrote:
“To be clear, the Court’s discovery order requiring production today still stands. Defendants are expected to comply with that order unless and until the Court rules otherwise. The Supreme Court’s decision stayed the Court’s postponement order but did not stay the litigation on the merits. Defendants risk being held in contempt of Court if they do not comply with the Court’s discovery order.” (emphasis added).
On May 29, the court held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion regarding alleged noncompliance with discovery orders. The court ordered the defendants to “immediately ask the 20 custodians at issue whether they used communication means outside of government email and OneDrive with respect to the TPS decisions (e.g., nongovernment email, text messaging, hard drive),” and further required that “[b]y 6/3/2025, the government shall file a declaration(s) from a person(s) with personal knowledge certifying that the inquiry was made and what the responses of each of the custodians were.” On June 4, the plaintiffs filed a notice of noncompliance with the court’s order to file declarations by June 3. On June 5, the Court ordered that the “government has failed to comply with the Court’s order and has not given a specific date by which it will comply. The Court orders the government to provide the declaration previously ordered by today, June 5” (emphasis added).
12-a. Family-separation settlement legal services: “there is no dispute Defendants are in breach;” “Defendants did not comply with the Court’s order to reinstate the task order with Acacia.”
Judge Dana M. Sabraw (Bush appointee), Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 3:18-cv-00428 (S.D. Cal.)
This case involves noncompliance with a 2023 court-approved settlement agreement made regarding a court case filed in 2018, during the first Trump administration, where the government agreed to provide reunification and other services to a class of plaintiff parents who were separated from their children at the southwest border of the United States.
On Apr. 23, 2025, members of the plaintiff class filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, alleging that the government had refused to renew the legal services contract associated with the 2023 settlement (which committed the government to “continue to contract with an independent contractor to . . . assist Ms. L. Settlement Class members and Qualifying Additional Family Members with necessary parole and employment authorization applications”).
On Jun. 10, 2025, Judge Sabraw granted the motion to enforce, stating: “there is no dispute Defendants are in breach.” On Jun. 27, Judge Sabraw filed an order following a status conference that required Defendants to “set out their position on whether the Court has authority to extend the term of the Settlement Agreement given Defendants’ decisions to cancel their contracts with the previous service providers (Acacia and Seneca), the Court’s finding that Defendants are in breach of the Settlement Agreement, and Defendants’ delay in curing that breach and complying with the Court’s June 10, 2025 Order.”
Defendants responded by filing a Rule 60(b) motion seeking temporary relief from the court order, while plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate interim relief on July 23 that stated: “During this time, Defendants have made no meaningful steps to comply with the Court’s order enforcing the Agreement. The Class has been without legal services for almost three months and Defendants in breach for as long.” Judge Sabraw denied defendants’ motion on July 24, while simultaneously granting an additional motion to enforce (“Defendants did not comply with the Court’s order to reinstate the task order with Acacia.”).
In an Aug. 20 joint status report, Plaintiffs stated that: “Defendants intend to impose new limitations on Acacia’s provision of legal services that are inconsistent with the Settlement Agreement. Under its previous contract, Acacia accepted referrals for legal services of pro bono screenings from any source… The new contract, however, requires that Acacia accept new referrals only from the Executive Office for Immigration Review.” On Aug. 22, 2025, Judge Sabraw found such conditions “contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Settlement Agreement and this Court’s June 10, 2025 Order granting Plaintiffs’ renewed motion to enforce that Agreement” and ordered that they “should not be part of the parties’ ongoing negotiations.”
The case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
12-b. Family-separation settlement removals: S.M.B.C. and her children were removed “in violation of this Court’s June 27, 2025 order;” the removals “clearly violated the spirit of the Agreement” and “involved lies, deception, and coercion.”
Judge Dana M. Sabraw (Bush appointee), Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 3:18-cv-00428 (S.D. Cal.)
This case arises from the Trump administration’s “zero tolerance” family-separation policy and the ensuing litigation, which culminated in the court-approved 2023 Ms. L. Settlement Agreement and continuing disputes over compliance, including removals of Class Members and Qualifying Additional Family Members (QAFMs).
On Dec. 11, 2023, the court granted final approval of the parties’ Settlement Agreement (as amended) and certified the settlement class—an agreement aimed at supporting reunification in the United States for families separated under the family separation policy and ensuring covered families receive the benefits and resources provided under the settlement.
In June 2025, Plaintiffs learned ICE had taken Class Members into custody and removals were imminent. On June 26, Defendants notified Plaintiffs that two Class Members—A.M.R.F. and 13-year-old M.A.J. (detained with family)—were in ICE custody. Plaintiffs asked on June 27 that Defendants not remove them, but Defendants advised that M.A.J. and three family members were removed that day. Later on June 27, after a status conference, the Court imposed an interim bar: “Defendants shall not remove any additional Class members or QAFMs defined in the Settlement Agreement.”
On Feb. 5, 2026, addressing Plaintiffs’ motion to return removed Class Members and QAFMs, the court rejected the government’s threshold arguments that it lacked “authority or jurisdiction to order Defendants to return the removed Class Members and QAFMs to the United States,” and applied a “wrongfully removed” test. For S.M.B.C., the court found Plaintiffs met their burden and concluded: “the evidence reflects they were removed despite having been granted parole and in violation of this Court’s June 27, 2025 order staying the removal of Class Members and QAFMs. Accordingly, Defendants must return S.M.B.C. and her children to the United States.” For I.Y.O.D., the court found that Defendants “do not dispute” the family had been granted parole, “do not dispute they did not comply with the INA,” and held: “On the present record, Plaintiffs have shown the removal of I.Y.O.D. and her children was unlawful. Accordingly, Defendants must return them to the United States.” For M.A.J., the court emphasized Defendants “do not address M.A.J.’s removal, or dispute the facts,” and—given that failure to refute—held Plaintiffs “have also shown the removal of this family unit was unlawful,” ordering return as well. The court further held Defendants must bear the costs of return, finding: “Each of the removals was unlawful,” and that although the Settlement Agreement “does not prohibit Defendants from enforcing the laws of the United States,” the removals “clearly violated the spirit of the Agreement,” “rendered the benefits of the Settlement Agreement illusory,” and—“in addition to being unlawful”—“involved lies, deception, and coercion.”
13. Melgar-Salmeron’s immigration removal: government’s action was “improper because it violated this Court’s order staying Petitioner’s removal from the United States;” government attributed the removal to “a confluence of administrative errors.”
Circuit Judges Richard J. Sullivan (Trump appointee), Alison J. Nathan (Biden appointee) and Maria Araújo Kahn (Biden appointee), Melgar-Salmeron v. Bondi, 23-7792 (2d Cir.)
This case involves an undocumented immigrant who was removed to El Salvador despite a court order barring his removal.
On April 17, 2025, the administration moved to expedite Melgar-Salmeron’s deportation case and removal. Petitioner moved for emergency relief and requested the government be enjoined from removing him, which the Second Circuit granted on May 7.
Despite the court order barring his removal, the petitioner was placed on a flight to El Salvador 28 minutes later, which the government stated the following day was due to an administrative error. On May 12, the Second Circuit ordered the government to provide details as to the circumstances of his removal.
On Jun. 24, 2025, the court ruled that the government must facilitate the Petitioner’s return from El Salvador as soon as possible. The court explained that the Government acknowledged that they had transferred the Petitioner, an alleged MS-13 member, to El Salvador on May 7, 2025, in defiance of a court order and despite assurances given to the court due to “a confluence of administrative errors” in the Government’s words. The government’s action was “improper because it violated this Court’s order staying Petitioner’s removal from the United States during the pendency of this matter before this Court,” the panel wrote.
14. Khalil’s immigration removal proceedings: “the June 11 preliminary injunction was not properly complied with;” “Respondents did not comply with the June 11 preliminary injunction.”
Judge Michael E. Farbiarz (Biden appointee), Khalil v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-01963 (D.N.J.)
This habeas case challenged the Trump administration’s detention and attempted removal of Mahmoud Khalil, a lawful permanent resident and pro-Palestinian student activist, based on Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s foreign-policy determination and separate allegations of misrepresentations in Khalil’s permanent-residence application.
On June 11, 2025, Judge Farbiarz granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting Respondents from seeking Khalil’s removal or detaining him based on Rubio’s determination. Nevertheless, on June 20, an immigration judge issued a written decision finding Khalil removable on that same foreign-policy ground, as well as on the separate permanent-residence application charge.
Following further briefing, Judge Farbiarz held on July 17 that “issuance of the Section 1227 finding was directly inconsistent with the June 11 preliminary injunction.” Rejecting the government’s argument that the injunction was only prospective and did not require undoing the immigration judge’s decision, he explained that the June 20 finding “should not have been made” because “the June 11 preliminary injunction was not properly complied with.” He ordered Respondents to cause the immigration judge to vacate or amend the June 20 decision insofar as it found Khalil removable based on Rubio’s determination. He also directed consideration of a possible waiver of removability concerning the separate permanent-residence charge, finding that the Secretary’s determination had likely prevented that issue from being adjudicated.
On July 25, denying the government’s motion to stay the July 17 directives, Judge Farbiarz found that Respondents “did not fully” complete the steps he had required by July 18, instead filing a stay application after the close of business. He reiterated that “their relevant actions violated the plain text of the June 11 preliminary injunction,” and that the additional specificity of his July 17 order was necessary “because the Respondents did not comply with the June 11 preliminary injunction.” The court rejected the government’s suggestion that the resulting procedural difficulties were attributable to Khalil’s decision to pursue habeas relief rather than await review through immigration proceedings. Judge Farbiarz stated:
“If there was doubt as to the meaning of the Court’s June 11 preliminary injunction, the Respondents could have sought clarification before the June 20 decision issued. They did not do so.”
He continued:
“And when a district court issues a preliminary injunction, as here, it must be complied with. The fault for non-compliance is on the party that did not comply. Not the party that brought the case.”
Judge Farbiarz denied the stay and extended the compliance deadline to Aug. 1 to permit appellate review. On July 30, the Third Circuit stayed the July 17 order only insofar as it required consideration of Khalil’s waiver-of-removability request, leaving the other directives unstayed at that stage. On Jan. 15, 2026, however, the Third Circuit held that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Khalil’s claims and ordered the June 11 injunction and July 17 enforcement order vacated, without adjudicating the underlying noncompliance findings on their merits. The appellate mandate remains stayed pending Supreme Court proceedings. Khalil’s petition for certiorari, No. 26-530, was filed on Oct. 19, 2026.
15. HHS probationary-employee termination notices: termination letters “do not comply with the terms of the preliminary injunction” because they were not individually addressed to affected employees.
Judge William Haskell Alsup (Clinton appointee), American Federation Of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Office of Personnel Management and Charles Ezell, 3:25-cv-01780 (N.D. Cal.)
The case involved the government’s efforts to significantly reduce the federal workforce’s probationary employees via termination letters that criticized workers’ “performance.”
On Jul. 23, 2025, Judge Alsup addressed “two compliance concerns relating to the existing preliminary injunction.” The first involved the government’s alleged failure to act in compliance with the court’s Apr. 18 preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to provide proper notice to certain HHS probationary employees who had been terminated. Second, the court ruled that the agency’s letters that had been sent “do not comply with the terms of the preliminary injunction” because they were not individually directed to each affected employee. Judge Alsup directed the parties to work together to resolve these compliance issues and scheduled a status hearing for Aug. 28.
On Sept. 12, Judge Alsup granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs but did not order reinstatement of the terminated employees or otherwise resolve the compliance concerns raised in the Jul. 23 order.
16. HUD retrofit-grant funding: four status conferences required “to wrangle the Government into compliance;” court warned that continued inaction could constitute “a serious violation of the Court’s order” exhibiting “blatant disregard for it.”
Judge Mary Susan McElroy (Trump appointee), Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council v. Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-00097 (D.R.I.)
This case involved a challenge to the Trump administration’s Executive Order 14154, requiring a pause on funding appropriated through the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)
On Aug. 8, 2025, responding to Plaintiffs’ fourth compliance report for the Apr. 15 preliminary injunction, Judge McElroy noted the court and parties “had to have four status conferences over the course of three subsequent weeks to wrangle the Government into compliance.” Despite government assurances that HUD had “resumed processing” Green and Resilient Retrofit Program (GRRP) awards “in the ordinary course,” plaintiffs alleged “$760 million … still inaccessible.” The Court warned: “At risk of understatement, that is serious. If no ‘Comprehensive’ funding under GRRP has been processed in the nearly four months since the injunction, the Court struggles to see how HUD’s inaction can be construed as anything other than a serious violation of the Court’s order, one that exhibits blatant disregard for it.” Directed to “explain itself,” HUD said on Aug. 13 that some GRRP streams had resumed and that “Comprehensive” awards awaited a rule amendment moving through clearance. At a status conference later that day, Judge McElroy reportedly “called out the government for appearing to ‘slow walk’ the release of the money,” and ordered biweekly status reports.
On Aug. 27, plaintiffs reported they had “seen no indication” HUD had resumed processing “Comprehensive” awards or made “any concrete progress,” calling the update “facially insufficient,” offering “little information” on steps or timing, and leaving “little basis to conclude that HUD is not slow-walking its compliance.” In a Sept. 10 status report, the plaintiffs stated they “still have seen no indication that Defendants have resumed processing Comprehensive awards under the GRRP;” and that “a date certain for complete compliance and a clear, comprehensive timeline would aid Plaintiffs and this Court in assuring HUD is not slow-walking its compliance.
17. University of California research grants: “NSF’s indefinite suspensions differ from a termination in name only;” “NSF’s actions violate the Preliminary Injunction.”
Judge Rita F. Lin (Biden appointee), Thakur v. Trump, 3:25-cv-04737 (N.D. Cal.)
This class action challenged the Trump administration’s mass termination and suspension of previously awarded federal research grants to University of California researchers
On Aug. 12, 2025, Judge Lin determined that the National Science Foundation “actions violate the Preliminary Injunction.” The Jun. 23 injunction had prohibited the NSF and other agencies from “giving effect to any grant termination that results in the termination of funding” of members of the class where the termination was communicated by a notice that lacked a “grant-specific explanation” and consideration of the “reliance interests at stake.” Following the injunction, NSF acted (through two letters on July 31 and Aug. 1) to purportedly “suspend” hundreds of UCLA grants, stating that the “awards no longer effectuate program goals or agency priorities” and citing campus allegations of “race discrimination,” “antisemitism,” and “bias.”
Rejecting NSF’s claim that its actions were not barred by the injunction because it suspended, rather than terminated, the grants, Judge Lin held that “NSF’s indefinite suspensions differ from a termination in name only,” and amounted to “indefinite, en masse funding cuts … without providing any avenue for the researchers to restore their funding.” She added that her injunction was “not unclear. It is not necessary for the order to describe every possible label an Agency could use to describe a research grant funding cut.” Judge Lin found that the suspension letters “suffer from the same infirmities as the letters considered in” her initial injunction as they “fail to provide a ‘grant- specific explanation’ for why the award has been terminated” and “[fail to] provide any grant-specific explanation of NSF’s consideration of the researchers’ reliance interests.” Accordingly, the court vacated NSF’s suspensions and ordered NSF to restore the status quo and reinstate the grants.
18-19-a. USAGM and Voice of America: Acting CEO Kari Lake “clearly hasn’t complied with my order” and was “stonewall[ing]” the court; “persistent omission and withholding of key information in this case has been a Hallmark production in bad faith.”
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Abramowitz v. Lake, 1:25-cv-00887 (D.D.C.) and Widakuswara v. Lake, 1:25-cv-01015 (D.D.C.) (related cases)
These related cases challenged the Trump administration’s attempt to dismantle the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and shut down Voice of America (VOA) and its grantee networks pursuant to Executive Order 14238, which eliminated agency functions and ordered personnel reductions.
Following an Apr. 22, 2025 preliminary injunction, Judge Lamberth repeatedly found government failures to comply with his orders to restore VOA programming, giving defendants multiple opportunities across June to August to show good-faith compliance. At a Jun. 23 hearing, he “expressed … dissatisfaction with the lack of concrete evidence regarding VOA’s current operations or future plans,” and two further rounds of supplemental briefing remained conclusory and non-responsive. On Jul. 30, Judge Lamberth granted the plaintiffs’ motion to show cause why the government was not in violation of court orders, finding the government had “consistently refused to give the Court the full story,” provided “misleading and contradictory information,” and even omitted from its filings the “monumental” decision to remove Michael Abramowitz as VOA Director. At an Aug. 25 hearing, the court concluded that USAGM acting CEO Kari Lake “clearly hasn’t complied with my order,” was “stonewall[ing]” the Court, and was “on the verge of contempt.” That same day, the court gave the government “one final opportunity” and ordered depositions of Lake, USAGM adviser Frank Wuco, and VOA’s Persian broadcasts director by Sept. 15.
After the Aug. 25 hearing—and before the court-ordered depositions—the government pressed ahead with its reduction in force (RIF) plans. Defendants notified unions “immediately following” the hearing of an impending RIF; on Aug. 28, President Trump issued an executive order stripping USAGM employees of collective-bargaining rights; on Aug. 29, USAGM terminated the AFGE/AFSCME collective-bargaining agreements (which required 60 days’ notice for a RIF); and that evening, USAGM sent RIF notices to more than 500 employees effective Sept. 30.
In response, on Sept. 8, plaintiffs filed a joint motion to enforce prong (3) of the PI and preserve the status quo by barring the RIF pending Judge Lamberth’s compliance determination. On Sept. 29, 2025, after depositions had taken place, Judge Lamberth heard the motion to enforce and later that day issued a memorandum order. While deferring his ruling pending another round of briefing, he suspended the announced RIFs in the meantime and delivered sharp criticism of the government’s “concerning disrespect [it has] shown toward the Court’s orders,” including “obfuscat[ing]” requests for information that “disregard for [the court’s] orders to produce information would more than support a trial on civil contempt” (emphasis added). He added: “[F]ollowing the ordered depositions … the Court no longer harbors any doubt that defendants lack a plan to comply with the preliminary injunction, and instead have been running out the clock on the fiscal year” (emphasis added). Although declining to pursue contempt sua sponte, Judge Lamberth stressed that this “should not be mistaken for lenience toward the defendants’ egregious erstwhile conduct” (emphasis added).
In his Mar. 17, 2026 opinion granting partial summary judgment in both cases, Judge Lamberth revisited Defendants’ withholding of information. Defendants objected to the court considering depositions taken during the earlier show-cause proceedings. Rejecting that objection, Judge Lamberth emphasized that “the depositions at issue were authorized precisely because of the defendants[’] ongoing refusal to produce basic information about USAGM and VOA’s operations and future plans.” The court added:
“Indeed, not until this Court threatened the defendants with the specter of contempt proceedings did they produce the Statutory Minimum Memorandum itself, the agency action implementing the Executive Order. The defendants’ persistent omission and withholding of key information in this case has been a Hallmark production in bad faith and is more than sufficient to justify consideration of the depositions.” (emphasis added).
18-19-b. USAGM and Voice of America: “At no point in the last seven weeks have the defendants been relieved from their obligation to produce the Reconstitution Plan and file status reports;” subsequent reports “largely uninformative,” with Defendants “determined to sing the same tune.”
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Abramowitz v. Lake, 1:25-cv-00887 (D.D.C.) and Widakuswara v. Lake, 1:25-cv-01015 (D.D.C.) (related cases)
This sub-item concerns Defendants’ compliance with the court’s post-summary-judgment obligations to produce USAGM’s Reconstitution Plan and provide recurring status reports concerning compliance with the Mar. 17 order, including the timeliness and adequacy of those disclosures.
On Mar. 17, 2026, Judge Lamberth granted partial summary judgment, holding that Defendants’ decision to dramatically downsize USAGM and Voice of America was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court vacated and set aside the Statutory Minimum Memorandum and the actions implementing it, including the placement of 1,042 employees on administrative leave, the suspension of broadcasting operations, and the termination of non-contractor staff. It separately ordered employees placed on administrative leave under the March 2025 directive to return to work.
Two days later, USAGM Chief Management Officer David Kotz stated in a sworn declaration that the agency had already developed a “detailed Reconstitution Plan” providing a phased approach to return 484 employees while maintaining mission-critical operations. On Mar. 20, Judge Lamberth denied Defendants’ request for a partial stay of summary judgment pending appeal but vacated the Mar. 23 return-to-work deadline. Relying on Defendants’ representation that the Reconstitution Plan already existed, the court ordered them to file the plan “by the close of business on April 1, 2026” and to file a status report that same day and every fourteen days thereafter describing progress toward compliance with the Mar. 17 order and any modifications to or deviations from the plan.
On Mar. 31, the D.C. Circuit stayed the March 17 orders “to the extent that” they required employees placed on administrative leave to return to work. Defendants nevertheless did not file either the Reconstitution Plan or the required status report by Apr. 1. Plaintiffs moved to enforce on April 6.
On May 14, Judge Lamberth granted the motion to enforce. He rejected Defendants’ contention that the D.C. Circuit stay relieved them of the Mar. 20 filing obligations, explaining that the stay reached only the return-to-work injunction and not the Mar. 17 vacatur provisions. As to the Reconstitution Plan Defendants had invoked in seeking relief in March, Lamberth observed: “[A]s of this date, neither the Court nor the plaintiffs have viewed it.” He further emphasized:
“At no point in the last seven weeks have the defendants been relieved from their obligation to produce the Reconstitution Plan and file status reports describing compliance with this Court’s March 17 Order.”
The court concluded that Defendants remained under a “continuing obligation to comply with the vacatur relief contained in the March 17 Order” and ordered them to file the Reconstitution Plan and a status report within seven days, with further reports every two weeks thereafter.
Defendants then filed a status report with the Reconstitution Plan attached on May 21, meeting the new seven-day deadline imposed by the May 14 enforcement order. The plan had therefore been produced approximately seven weeks after the original April 1 deadline.
The information dispute nevertheless continued. As Judge Lamberth later recounted, the May 21 status report was “mostly dedicated to legal argument rather than factual assertions.” Defendants argued that vacatur had no immediate effect and could not require concrete action. They then continued to incorporate those positions into their subsequent biweekly reports. Lamberth wrote that “Defendants have persisted in doing so despite this Court’s rejection of that very argument” and that, in opposing Plaintiffs’ next motion, they were “determined to sing the same tune.” Judge Lamberth also criticized the reports themselves, explaining that Defendants continued to insist on the same two legal propositions in successive filings and stated: “Perhaps because of Defendant’s conviction in the truth of those arguments, their status reports have been largely uninformative. Each report is nearly identical.”
Plaintiffs responded that the reports were inadequate and, on July 10, moved for additional information concerning the agency’s post-vacatur operations, including the authority under which USAGM continued to operate at roughly its pre-vacatur functional level and details of the Reconstitution Plan’s contemplated restoration of broadcasting and technical capacity. The motion followed repeated status reports filed from May through early July; further reports continued while the motion was pending.
After briefing and a Sept. 15 hearing, Judge Lamberth granted the motion in part on Sept. 18, writing: “Everything old is new again.” Rather than again resolving the parties’ dispute over the legal effect of vacatur, Lamberth wrote that, “[c]onsidering Defendants’ intransigence on those issues,” the court would take “a different tack” and examine whether developments at the agency had potentially rendered Plaintiffs’ APA claim moot.
The court accordingly required Defendants to produce the materials presently guiding or determining USAGM’s operations—the “authority [that] presently justifies the Agency’s operation”—because that information was relevant to determining whether new agency action or abandonment of the vacated policies had altered the controversy. It denied Plaintiffs’ four other information requests without prejudice and ordered supplemental briefing on mootness. The accompanying order required Defendants to brief the mootness issue, with Plaintiffs’ response and Defendants’ reply to follow.
20. Mangione prosecution: prejudicial public commentary by “two high-ranking staff members of the Department of Justice, including within the Office of Attorney General appear to be in direct violation of this Rule and the Court’s … Order.”
Judge Margaret M. Garnett (Obama appointee), United States v. Mangione, 1:25-cr-00176 (S.D.N.Y.)
This case involves the criminal prosecution of Luigi Nicholas Mangione.
At the Apr. 25, 2025 arraignment, Judge Garnett expressly warned the government about prejudicial public commentary under S.D.N.Y. Local Criminal Rule 23.1, stating: “given the nature of this case, I would like to just remind all counsel of the strictures of Local Criminal Rule 23.1” and “specifically direct[ed] the government to convey” that warning to Jay Clayton and have it passed on to “Attorney General Bondi and any of her subordinates at Main Justice.” On Apr. 30, the government told the court that Clayton was recused, that an acting U.S. Attorney was handling the matter, and that the court’s admonition had been conveyed to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, which confirmed it would notify the Attorney General.
After Mangione filed a Sept. 23, 2025 letter identifying public statements by senior government officials, Judge Garnett responded the next day, Sept. 24, in unusually sharp terms. The court wrote that “multiple employees at the Department of Justice may have violated Local Criminal Rule 23.1, and this Court’s [Apr. 25] order.” Referencing an X post by Chad Gilmartin III, Deputy Director of DOJ’s Office of Public Affairs, that was then reposted by Brian Nieves, Chief of Staff and Associate Deputy Attorney General to the Deputy Attorney General, the court said:
“two high-ranking staff members of the Department of Justice, including within the Office of Attorney General appear to be in direct violation of this Rule and the Court’s April 25 Order.”
Judge Garnett ordered the government to respond with “a sworn declaration from a person of suitable authority” explaining “how these violations occurred … and what steps are being taken to ensure that no future violations occur,” and directed that the Deputy Attorney General be advised that future violations could result in “personal financial penalties, contempt of court findings, or relief specific to the prosecution.”
21. National Guard deployment in Portland: “continued deployment of Oregon National Guardsmen at the Portland ICE facility in violation of the First TRO;” court “deeply troubled” by delayed communication of the order; “apparent violation.”
Judge Karin J. Immergut (Trump appointee), State of Oregon v. Trump, 3:25-cv-01756 (D. Or.)
This case challenges Secretary Hegseth’s Sept. 28 memorandum (“Hegseth Memorandum”) authorizing the federalization and deployment of National Guard forces to Portland (Memorandum citing President Trump’s Jun. 7 memorandum invoking 10 U.S.C. § 12406 to authorize nationwide Guard mobilization).
On Oct. 4, 2025, Judge Immergut granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and enjoined the Hegseth Memorandum for 14 days, finding the federal government likely lacked authority under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 to federalize Oregon National Guard members and that the action likely violated the Tenth Amendment. The federal government filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit the same day. In the early hours of Oct. 5, the Defense Department deployed federalized California National Guard personnel to Portland and began deploying Texas National Guard to Portland as well, prompting plaintiffs to move for a second TRO to preserve the status quo and “prevent circumvention of the first TRO.”
At the Oct. 5, 2025 hearing on the motion, Judge Immergut said the government’s deployment of federalized Guard members “appear[s] to be in direct contravention” of the TRO (emphasis added). She reportedly reminded counsel repeatedly that he was an “officer of the court”—asking, “You are an officer of the court. Aren’t defendants circumventing my order?” The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a second TRO, stating that the federal government is “temporarily enjoined from deploying federalized members of the National Guard in Oregon.”
(On Oct. 8, the Ninth Circuit granted the government an administrative stay of Judge Immergut’s Oct. 4 TRO on the federalization of the Guard, but did not stay the district court’s orders on the deployment of the federalized Guard.)
Before the bench trial began on Oct. 29, Justice Department lawyers acknowledged that nine Oregon National Guard troops had been deployed to the Portland ICE facility just hours before Judge Immergut issued her TRO—and fewer than 24 hours after the TRO hearing. The troops remained there for several hours before their duty ended. Judge Immergut reportedly told counsel: “We’ll discuss later whether that’s contempt and in direct violation of my TRO, but we’re moving on.” The next day, the judge pressed the issue saying, “The government deployed that very night, knowing that I told you I would issue an opinion as quickly as I could,” adding, “Does that not seem to be in bad faith?” (emphasis added). She reportedly questioned DOJ’s explanation that it “took time” to notify personnel, observing the administration’s rapid coordination elsewhere such as within hours of the TRO, DOD flew in 200 California National Guard and prepared to fly in Texas Guard if needed. “The point is that they could have gotten the message to the guardsmen if it was important,” she stated.
On Nov. 7, Judge Immergut issued a permanent injunction barring the government from federalizing and deploying Oregon’s National Guard, holding the plan was ultra vires under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 and in violation of the Tenth Amendment. She further commented on the government’s noncompliance:
“Ordinarily, this Court would be inclined to accept Defendants’ explanation for their violation of the First TRO given that ‘the first shift’ at the Portland ICE facility commenced prior to this Court’s issuance of the First TRO. However, in light of the following facts, this Court is deeply troubled by Defendants’ continued deployment of Oregon National Guardsmen at the Portland ICE facility in violation of the First TRO. In the seven hours that Defendants took to ‘convey the message’ of the First TRO ‘to people on the ground,’ Defendants simultaneously ‘convey[ed] the message’ to the U.S. Army Northern Command to send 200 of the federalized California National Guard personnel in Los Angeles to Portland. … In other words, Defendants had time to order and coordinate the transport of federalized California National Guardsmen from Los Angeles to Portland but needed more time to communicate with the Oregon National Guardsmen at the Portland ICE facility.
This Court has not issued any finding of contempt based on Defendants’ apparent violation of the First TRO. However, this Court expects Defendants will provide further explanation when ordered to do so by this Court in the future, and this court retains jurisdiction over the issue.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
22. Castañon Nava settlement agreement: ICE “unequivocally ceased compliance” with 2022 settlement agreement, committing “repeated, material violations;” and parties agreed government conduct was in “violation of the terms of the Consent Decree”
Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings (Biden appointee), Castanon Nava v. Department of Homeland Security, 1:18-cv-03757 (N.D. Ill.)
This class action challenges ICE’s warrantless-arrest practices, as part of “Operation Midway Blitz,” and seeks to enforce a court-ordered settlement (consent decree) requiring compliance with 8 U.S.C. §1357(a)(2)—including policy, training, and documentation obligations—within ICE’s Chicago Area of Responsibility.
Following a court-ordered settlement agreement (the Castañon Nava settlement) in Feb. 2022—requiring ICE to conduct warrantless arrests only in compliance with 8 U.S.C. §1357(a)(2) and to document the basis for those arrests—on Oct. 7, addressing the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce, Judge Cummings held that while ICE had been in substantial compliance for two-and-a-half years, the agency “unequivocally ceased compliance” by Jun. 11, 2025—as reflected in ICE’s Principal Legal Advisor’s agency-wide email and ICE’s own concessions—and found “by a preponderance of the evidence” that ICE arrested “twenty-two out of the twenty-six” claimant class members without warrants in violation of the Castañon Nava settlement and §1357(a)(2).
At a Nov. 12 hearing, Judge Cummings ordered the government to begin releasing hundreds of detainees, temporarily barred removals for the 615 detainees at issue, and reportedly underscored: “There would be nothing for me to do if the arrests of the people here were done in accordance with the agreement,” adding, “but in the event that there are allegations that the people are arrested in violation of this consent decree, I will react and take appropriate actions.”
Judge Cummings followed up with a written order on Nov. 13. He noted that according to the parties’ Nov. 7 status reports, “the parties have agreed—after an examination of the pertinent arrest records—that 46 class members were arrested in violation of the terms of the Consent Decree and are thus entitled to relief under the Decree.” The court added that “the majority of these class members have already been removed from the United States … and only 13 of these class members remain in detention.” Invoking § V(B)(2) of the Castañon Nava settlement, Judge Cummings reiterated his prior finding: “The Court finds, as it has found previously, … that the 46 agreed upon violations of the Consent Decree … constitute ‘repeated, material violations’” (emphasis added). The court further observed that additional violations are likely to emerge:
“Given the number of instances where the parties have agreed that the rights of class members were violated, it stands to reason that a significant number of additional violations will be uncovered as plaintiffs receive and analyze the arrest records of the remaining arrestees.” (emphasis added).
On May 5, 2026, a divided Seventh Circuit panel affirmed Judge Cummings’s 118-day extension of the consent decree, finding that he had not abused his discretion in extending it “based upon its findings of substantial noncompliance.” The court also affirmed the Nov. 13 release order for individuals whose arrests had been determined to violate the consent decree, but reversed the order insofar as it required the release of potential class members without individualized determinations or persons arrested pursuant to I-200 warrants.
23. DHS disaster-grant immigration conditions: “Defendants have done precisely what the Memorandum and Order forbids” by conditioning grants on cooperation with immigration enforcement; “Defendants’ new condition is not a good faith effort to comply with the order.”
Judge William E. Smith (Bush appointee), State of Illinois. v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1:25-cv-00206 (D.R.I.)
The case involved a lawsuit by twenty states and the District of Columbia suing to block the administration’s effort to condition federal emergency funding on compliance with federal immigration enforcement policy.
On Sept. 24, 2025, Judge Smith granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction stopping DHS from enforcing immigration-related conditions to federal disaster grants and emergency management programs.
On Oct. 14, 2025, Judge Smith held that the administration violated the court’s permanent injunction by including the contested conditions in award letters for required acceptance by the recipient. The new language included a disclaimer saying, “[i]f the injunction is stayed, vacated, or extinguished, the [contested conditions] will immediately become effective.” Judge Smith wrote:
“Defendants have done precisely what the Memorandum and Order forbids, which is requiring Plaintiff States to agree to assist in federal immigration enforcement or else forgo the award of DHS grants. The fig leaf conditional nature of the requirement makes little difference. No matter how confident Defendants may be of their chances on appeal, at present, the contested conditions are unlawful. Plaintiff States therefore have a right to accept the awards without regard to the contested conditions. Defendants’ new condition is not a good faith effort to comply with the order; it is a ham-handed attempt to bully the states into making promises they have no obligation to make at the risk of losing critical disaster and other funding already appropriated by Congress” (emphasis added).
24. TPS terminations: DHS “do not seem to have considered” the Court’s “prior rulings” in the TPS-termination case, leading to an “admonish[ment]” for re-asserting already-rejected privileges and for “glaring[ly]” “fail[ing] to make” the previously required showings.
Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim, National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 3:25-cv-05687 (N.D. Cal.)
This case involves a challenge to DHS Secretary Kristi Noem’s decisions terminating Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for certain countries.
On Oct. 16, 2025, addressing the plaintiffs’ objections to the government’s attempts to withhold TPS-related documents under the deliberative-process and attorney-client privileges, Judge Kim ordered further disclosure and criticized the government for ignoring prior rulings. She wrote:
“This is not the first time the Undersigned has reviewed documents in camera to address the parties’ disputes over Defendants’ claimed privileges. Unfortunately, Defendants do not seem to have considered the Undersigned’s prior Orders in this case and in National TPS Alliance v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01766-EMC. For example, Defendants continue to claim documents dated after Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Secretary Kristi Noem’s decisions to deprive Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) holders from Honduras, Nepal, and Nicaragua were made or that do not contain any opinions, recommendations, or advice. In the future, Defendants are admonished to consider the Undersigned’s prior rulings when determining whether to assert the attorney-client or the deliberate process privileges.” (emphasis added).
The court further noted:
“Defendants do not provide any analysis for balancing the factors and do not explain why the Plaintiffs’ need for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding should not override Defendants’ interest in non-disclosure. In light of the Undersigned’s previous orders requiring the disclosure of similar materials, Defendants failure to make this showing is particularly glaring. Nor do Defendants do not address the Court’s prior determinations and, thus, make no effort to show how the documents currently before the Court for in camera review differ from those documents the Undersigned previously ordered disclosed.” (emphasis added).
On Oct. 21, clarifying her Oct. 16 order, Judge Kim wrote that
“[t]hat Order should not have been surprising to any party because it was in line with what the Court has previously ordered. At no point has the Court determined that any document may actually be withheld based on the deliberative process privilege.” (emphasis added).
After defendants sought de novo review of the magistrate judge’s order, the District Judge directed them to resubmit the challenged documents for another in camera review. On Oct. 31, the court found that while a few portions arguably contained deliberative material, the government had “[a]gain … fail[ed] to address” the balancing factors and had made no effort to show how these documents differed from the ones the court had previously ordered disclosed.
(After repeatedly seeking emergency relief from Magistrate Judge Kim’s privilege orders, the government’s third motion was denied and Judge Thompson affirmed Judge Kim’s rulings and ordered production of the documents.)
25. Abrego Garcia criminal case: Two DOJ prosecutors “side-stepped the Court’s Order to report what they had done to comply” with notifying client of directive on extrajudicial statements
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. (Obama appointee), United States v. Abrego Garcia, 3:25-cr-00115, (M.D. Tenn.)
This case involves the federal government’s criminal prosecution of Kilmar Abrego Garcia following his filing of a legal challenge to his removal to El Salvador.
On Jul. 31, 2025, after weeks of public statements by senior officials and DHS posts that the defense said risked tainting the jury pool, the court held that for those before it, compliance with LCrR 2.01(a)(1) and (a)(4) is “not discretionary,” and that “all counsel” must ensure any proper public communications state the indictment contains only allegations and that the defendant is presumed innocent. As relevant here: LCrR 2.01(a)(1) bars any extrajudicial statement likely to be disseminated that has a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding; LCrR 2.01(a)(2)(B) lists categories “more likely than not” to be prejudicial (e.g., prior record/character, plea talks, tests, witness credibility, expected evidence, the fact of charge without a presumption-of-innocence qualifier, opinions on guilt/evidence, and inadmissible information). And LCrR 2.01(a)(4) applies the rule to “law firm(s) and government agencies or offices, and the partners and employees of such firms, government agencies or offices.”
On Sept. 26, the court ordered each counsel of record to report what they had done to comply; the government’s counsel of record—U.S. Attorneys Robert E. McGuire and Jason M. Harley—first submitted a joint filing. The court construed that as McGuire’s report and directed Harley to file his own by Oct. 15; he did so on Oct. 15.
On Oct. 27, 2025, after finding that repeated public statements by government officials threatened the defendant’s fair-trial rights, Judge Crenshaw granted relief requiring the government and its employees to comply with Local Criminal Rule 2.01(a)(4). He held that it was “implicit in” the rule that counsel of record had a duty to notify their agencies of the applicable restrictions, and found that “[i]t does not appear those agency employees have been notified by counsel of record about those employees’ obligation to adhere to the Local Rule,” adding that two government lawyers “side-stepped the Court’s Order to report what they had done to comply with Local Rule 2.01(a)(4).” The court ordered those lawyers, within two days, to provide the order and memorandum opinion to all DOJ and DHS employees, including the Attorney General and DHS Secretary, and warned that employees who violated the rule’s prohibition on prejudicial extrajudicial statements “may be subject to sanctions.”
26. 2025 SNAP benefits suspension: USDA “undermined both the intent and the effectiveness” of two orders on payments; judge was “not inclined to excuse this noncompliance”
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, 1:25-cv-00569 (D.R.I.)
This case involves a challenge to the suspension of November 2025 SNAP benefits by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), allegedly as a result of the government shutdown that began Oct. 1, 2025.
At an Oct. 31, 2025 virtual hearing, Judge McConnell granted the plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, finding them substantially likely to succeed on their APA claim because USDA’s decision to withhold SNAP funding was “contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious,” and ordering the agency to distribute funds “as soon as possible.” On Nov. 1, Judge McConnell issued a written TROoffering the government two compliance paths to address the irreparable harm the court had identified the day before—harm that “would occur if millions of people were forced to go without funds for food” during the funding lapse. Per the court’s order, first, the government could fully fund November SNAP by Nov. 3 using Section 32 and/or contingency funds—if not, the decision had to “be made in accordance with the APA” and not be “arbitrary or capricious.” Second, the government could use contingency funds to make a partial payment by Nov. 5, in which case the government had to “expeditiously resolve the administrative and clerical burdens” of doing so. The government chose the partial-payment option.
After reviewing the government’s status reports on compliance and considering the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the TRO and for a further TRO, Judge McConnell issued a Nov. 6, 2025 oral ruling from the bench granting the motion and ordering USDA to fully fund November SNAP benefits by Nov. 7. As to the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce, Judge McConnell explained in a written order later that day, “The record is clear that the Defendants … neither” acted “expeditiously” in resolving the administrative burdens of making partial payments nor ensured that such payments were actually disbursed by Nov. 5. “Far from being expeditious, the record suggests quite the opposite. As of the date of this decision [Nov. 6], SNAP recipients still have not received their benefits,” Judge McConnell wrote, further rejecting the government’s assertion that there was nothing more it could do to act “expeditiously” as “carr[ying] no weight” (emphasis added). As the court described it:
“Even before this Court’s order was entered, the Defendants were fully aware of the delay and potential errors that such a partial payment would involve … [T]he Defendants ‘could have begun working to resolve the administrative hurdles once the lapse in appropriations occurred, or even before.’ … This plainly makes clear that this is a problem that could have been avoided. The Defendants knew that, at the time they chose Option 1, they would be prolonging implementation and frustrating the very purpose of the TRO … They instead proceeded, fully aware that Option 2 provided a faster and more practical means of compliance.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
Judge McConnell observed that the President had “stated his intent to defy the Court’s order” on social media and found the government’s noncompliance inexcusable, emphasizing that “compliance is achieved when Americans are fed.” The court concluded:
“[T]he Defendants have undermined both the intent and the effectiveness of this Court’s October 31st oral order and its November 1st written order that the Defendants act ‘expeditiously.’ … The Court is not inclined to excuse this noncompliance, particularly where the obstacles the Defendants now invoke are the foreseeable result of their own choices.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
Further, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a new TRO on the basis that the government had not complied with the prior TRO’s requirement that any decision not to provide full SNAP payments be made in accordance with the APA and not be arbitrary or capricious: “The Court has already determined that irreparable harm is substantially likely to occur—harm that only increased due to the Defendants’ failure to comply with the Court’s prior order,” Judge McConnell said (emphasis added).
On Nov. 9, the First Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay the enforcement portion of Judge McConnell’s Nov. 6 order, holding that the government had not met the stay factors—particularly its burden to show a likelihood of success in challenging the district court’s noncompliance determination. The panel noted that the record showed USDA knew early on that partial payments would be technically difficult and took no preparatory steps, and further observed that the government’s briefing failed to meaningfully address the district court’s finding that it was aware partial payments would not satisfy the TRO’s requirements. At the same time, the court stayed the separate Nov. 6 TRO “so long as” the enforcement order remains in effect.
(On Nov. 7, the Supreme Court entered an administrative stay of the Oct. 31 and Nov. 6 orders, and later extended the stay. On Nov. 13, after the government shutdown ended, the government withdrew its request for a stay in the Supreme Court, with the Solicitor General explaining that the bill ending the shutdown “fully funds SNAP through the end of the fiscal year.” The defendants also filed a notice advising the district court that Congress had restored full FY 2026 SNAP funding and that USDA had directed state agencies to “take immediate steps to ensure households receive their full November allotments promptly.”)
27. November 2025 SNAP payments: USDA’s payment notice “appears” to have been “carefully crafted to feign compliance with” a TRO issued in related litigation.
Judge Indira Talwani (Obama appointee), Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-13165 (D. Mass.)
This case involves a challenge to the suspension of November 2025 SNAP benefits by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), allegedly as a result of the government shutdown that began Oct. 1, 2025.
On Nov. 12, 2025, in granting a temporary restraining order directing USDA to ensure prompt November SNAP payments, Judge Talwani found that USDA had “confused the record” by issuing—and never rescinding—a Nov. 7 notice stating that USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) was “working towards implementing November 2025 full benefit issuances in compliance with the November 6, 2025 order” and that “[l]ater today, FNS will complete the processes necessary to make funds available to support your subsequent transmittal of full issuance files to your EBT processor.” Judge Talwani added, “Indeed, in retrospect, it appears that the statement was carefully crafted to feign compliance with” the TRO Judge McConnell issued in Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, 1:25-cv-00569 (D.R.I.) (emphasis added).
(On Nov. 13, after the government shutdown ended, the government filed notices advising that Congress had restored full FY 2026 SNAP funding and that USDA had directed state agencies to “take immediate steps to ensure households receive their full November allotments promptly.”)
28-a. Southern California immigration enforcement: “Defendants still are not fully in compliance with the TRO Order” governing attorney access at B-18; repeated closures “without explanation” and “no notice;” “[O]nce again, the Court is ordering the federal government to stop.”
Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong (Biden appointee), Vasquez Perdomo v. Mullin, 2:25-cv-05605 (C.D. Cal.)
This class action challenged federal immigration-enforcement practices in Southern California, including alleged racial profiling, unlawful stops and warrantless arrests, denial of counsel, and inhumane detention conditions. This sub-item involved Defendants’ repeated violations of a temporary restraining order requiring access to counsel for individuals detained at the B-18 holding facility in Los Angeles.
On Jul. 11, 2025, Judge Frimpong granted a temporary restraining order, finding the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Fifth Amendment claims. The TRO required Defendants to permit legal visitation at B-18 “seven days per week, for a minimum of eight hours per day on business days (Monday through Friday), and a minimum of four hours per day on weekends and holidays,” and to provide “individuals detained at B-18 with access to confidential telephone calls with attorneys, legal representatives, and legal assistants at no charge to the detainee.” The Court further ordered that when “exigent circumstances require closure for the safety of human life or the protection of property, the Defendants must notify Access/Detention Plaintiffs as soon as practicable and certainly within four (4) hours to make alternative arrangements for legal visitation and/or notice to affected detainees and attorneys, legal representatives, and legal assistants.”
On Nov. 13, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Frimpong found extensive, ongoing violations of the TRO, emphasizing that “Plaintiffs have provided numerous, consistent declarations about specific statements and events that show Access/Detention Plaintiffs are still regularly being denied access to detainees such that Access/Detention Plaintiffs are unable to effectively provide meaningful legal services to the detainees.” She wrote that “lawyer visiting hours have been closed down repeatedly without letting lawyers know,” contrary to the TRO; that “officers insist on keeping the door open during lawyer visits;” that “officers sometimes will not let lawyers meet with clients;” and that individuals in B-18 are not receiving the “free, confidential phone calls with their lawyers” that the government itself says are required. At times, detainees were moved “to another location which does not allow lawyer visits at all.” The court reiterated: “once again, the Court is ordering the federal government to stop—this time for the rest of this lawsuit” (emphasis added).
Judge Frimpong further found by a preponderance of the evidence that the government had repeatedly violated the TRO by: closing B-18 “without explanation” on four occasions; providing “no notice” of closures on at least three occasions; failing to provide facilities that “allow for meaningful private communication;” and “prevent[ing] detainees from meeting “prospective clients.” The government also “moved detainees between B-18 and Santa Ana … without notice,” hindering attorney-client visitation when counsel could not locate clients.
The court emphasized that the government “continue to refuse” attorney access during regular hours, provided only “partial compliance,” and that “Defendants still are not fully in compliance with the TRO Order” (emphasis added). The court also stated that the administration “only started providing such notice after” plaintiffs filed the preliminary injunction motion, allowing the court to infer that compliance was “encouraged” by the motion, and that “a preliminary injunction may be necessary to ensure Defendants continue to provide detainees the protections stated in the TRO Order.”
28-b. Southern California immigration enforcement: “Defendants have not even partially complied” with the order to image agents’ personal phones; “clear and convincing evidence shows that Defendants have acted intentionally and not in good faith;” “The Court finds Defendants in contempt.”
Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong (Biden appointee); Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym, Vasquez Perdomo v. Mullin, 2:25-cv-05605 (C.D. Cal.)
This sub-item involved Defendants’ failure to comply with an order requiring forensic imaging of agents’ personal phones used during 15 specified immigration operations, resulting in a civil-contempt finding and monetary sanctions.
On Oct. 17, 2025, Judge Frimpong granted Plaintiffs’ and Intervenors’ motion for limited expedited discovery, permitting interrogatories and requests for production concerning agent training and 15 specified immigration operations. On Oct. 23, Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym set the discovery schedule and required Defendants to complete production of responsive materials by Nov. 21. After Plaintiff Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) moved to compel on Dec. 23, Judge Pym granted the motion on Jan. 16, 2026, finding evidence that Defendants’ searches and productions had been “inadequate” and ordering them to conduct a “complete and proper search.” The court specifically required Defendants to “[f]orensically image any cell phone used by an agent present at any of the 15 operations and review these devices for material responsive to RFP Nos. 2 and 3.” Judge Frimpong later referred to this portion of the order as the “January 16 Forensic Imaging Order.” On Feb. 13, Magistrate Judge Pym temporarily stayed the personal-phone requirement to permit the parties to meet and confer about its scope, but the stay expired on Mar. 17.
At a May 26 hearing before Judge Pym on Plaintiffs’ May 12 motion for an order to show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt for violating the Jan. 16 Forensic Imaging Order, government counsel reported that CBP had received 1,253 responses to questionnaires sent to agents associated with the operations; 885 respondents said they had used personal phones, and 88 had indicated that they would consent to forensic imaging. Defendants nevertheless had not forensically imaged any personal phones. On June 11, Judge Pym granted the motion, ordering Defendants to appear before Judge Frimpong and “to show cause why they should not be found in contempt of court and fined $500 per day until they fully comply with the court’s January 16 Order.” Plaintiffs “established that defendants violated the January 16 Order to forensically image any cell phone used by an agent at any of the 15 operations and review these devices for material responsive to RFP Nos. 2 and No. 3.,” (emphasis added) Judge Pym wrote, adding:
“Despite the court’s repeated clarifications that the order required forensic imaging of personal phones, and despite plaintiffs’ proposal to streamline the process so as to limit the number of phones that would need to be imaged, and despite the stay on personal cell phone imaging having been lifted since March 17, defendants’ conduct evidences they took minimal to no action to comply with the January 16 Order. Indeed, it is unclear when defendants even informed the ICE and CBP agents about the litigation hold and January 16 Order. It was only after plaintiffs informed defendants of their intent to file for civil contempt that defendants took some actions toward compliance in late April.” (emphasis added).
Judge Frimpong held a show-cause hearing on June 25. As of June 29, Defendants still had not forensically imaged any personal phones. Judge Frimpong also emphasized on July 1 that the Jan. 16 Forensic Imaging Order remained “in full effect unless and until … modified or clarified.” In her July 28, 2026 order, Judge Frimpong held Defendants in civil contempt for violating the Jan. 16 Forensic Imaging Order. She began by identifying the precise order at issue:
“As a threshold matter, at issue is whether Defendants have violated the January 16 Forensic Imaging Order. For the reasons below, this Court concludes by clear and convincing evidence that they have, and that they did not substantially comply.” (emphasis added).
Judge Frimpong highlighted that Defendants’ own representations confirmed the absence of compliance, including partial compliance, noting that several of their declarations “impliedly confirm[ed] that the imaging process ha[d] not yet started” (emphasis added). She stated:
“Defendants do not dispute they are not in substantial compliance with the January 16 Forensic Imaging Order. Indeed, Defendants’ representations, including at the hearing, confirm that they have not complied with the January 16 Forensic Imaging Order. But Defendants have not even partially complied, nor have they provided any estimate of how long they expect it would take to comply.” (emphasis added).
Judge Frimpong rejected Defendants’ reliance on the time and effort required to image the phones, explaining that “the fact that phone imaging would take substantial effort does not relieve Defendants from a court order, nor does it explain why those efforts have still not meaningfully started.” To the contrary, “[i]f anything, the time-consuming nature of the imaging process makes Defendants’ delay less excusable.” At the show-cause hearing, after Defendants’ counsel described efforts to arrange phone imaging, Judge Frimpong responded: “You can appreciate the Court’s skepticism that not one single phone has been imaged, despite all of this.”
Judge Frimpong further found that Defendants’ “noncompliance does not stem from a good-faith misinterpretation of the Order” (emphasis added). Judge Frimpong concluded that noncompliance did not stem from an inability to comply and that, “[i]nstead, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Defendants have acted intentionally and not in good faith” (emphasis added).
Their pending objections implicated, at most, some of the personal phones: 88 agents had consented to imaging, meaning that imaging those phones “would have no Fourth Amendment implications” and that they were within Defendants’ legal right to obtain. Nevertheless, “Defendants have not started.” Judge Frimpong explained that, “[i]nstead of beginning partial compliance in good faith pending the adjudication of their objections,” Defendants had “imaged no phones” (emphasis added). The court also found that Defendants had “unduly delayed in taking numerous actions to which their objections do not apply,” including identifying which agents had used personal phones, requesting consent, and taking steps to secure phones agents had agreed to provide (emphasis added). Judge Frimpong concluded that the Government’s actions demonstrated “undue delay and a disregard for the January 16 Forensic Imaging Order” (emphasis added).
Concluding, Judge Frimpong wrote:
“Given that Plaintiffs have shown by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendants violated a specific and definite order of the court, the burden shifted to Defendants to demonstrate why they were unable to comply. They have failed to do so. The Court finds Defendants in contempt.” (emphasis added).
As sanctions, the court ordered Defendants to pay a coercive fine of $500 per day until they fully complied with the Jan. 16 order and to pay the attorneys’ fees and costs caused by the motion to compel, the motion for an order to show cause, and the show-cause hearing. In an Aug. 17 joint status report, Plaintiffs requested $209,265.56 in attorneys’ fees and costs under the July 28 contempt order, while Defendants acknowledged Plaintiffs’ entitlement to reasonable fees and expenses but disputed the amount, arguing that some work fell outside the award’s scope and that the staffing and hourly rates were excessive.
On Aug. 31, Defendants asked Judge Frimpong to pause the $500-per-day sanction and hold resolution of the attorneys’ fees award, representing that they had “complied with respect to all phones where consent has been obtained.” A supporting declaration stated that, of the 88 agents who had initially indicated willingness to consent to forensic imaging, 83 later declined to execute consent forms; the remaining five consented, and their phones had been imaged by Aug. 13. Defendants also reported that approximately seven additional employees had since indicated willingness to have their personal phones imaged and had been sent consent forms.
On Sept. 1, Defendants filed notice that they had electronically submitted a $3,500 payment pursuant to the contempt order. On Sept. 21, Judge Pym denied Defendants’ request for a protective order limiting the personal-phone imaging requirement. On Oct. 13, she denied their renewed request to stay that requirement, stating: “For months defendants have been, and still remain, under an obligation to forensically image agents’ personal cell phones.”
On Oct. 13, 20, and 27, Defendants reported further payments of $3,500 each under the contempt order.
28-c. Southern California immigration enforcement: “ICE’s noncompliance with the January 16 Order is undisputed” and “egregious” after it limited discovery searches to selected individuals rather than all 15 operations, omitted required records, and used unduly restrictive search terms; “Counsel’s position is indefensible;” Rule 37(b) sanctions imposed and government counsel admonished.
Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym, Vasquez Perdomo v. Mullin, 2:25-cv-05605 (C.D. Cal.)
This sub-item involved ICE’s failure to comply with discovery orders requiring searches and production of records concerning 15 specified immigration operations. The court imposed Rule 37(b) sanctions for those failures and separately admonished government counsel for failing to supervise the discovery process.
On Oct. 17, 2025, Judge Frimpong granted limited expedited discovery seeking, among other things, documents concerning 15 specified immigration operations. Magistrate Judge Pym’s Oct. 23 scheduling order required Defendants to produce responsive materials on a rolling basis and complete production by Nov. 21. After further disputes, her Dec. 12 order required Defendants to produce materials concerning three September operations that they had withheld as supposedly outside the permitted scope of discovery.
On Jan. 16, 2026, granting another motion to compel, Magistrate Judge Pym found Defendants’ construction of RFP No. 2, which treated the request as seeking records about isolated individual encounters rather than each immigration operation in its entirety, “untenable.” She found that the language of RFP No. 2 was “clear,” that Defendants’ claimed reading was “implausible,” and that their actions “suggest[ed] a disregard of their duty to produce documents responsive to the requests as written, rather than as defendants wish they were written” (emphasis added). She ordered Defendants to conduct a “complete and proper search,” including collecting standardized operational materials, identifying everyone arrested and gathering their arrest documentation, collecting reports, notes, and communications from every agent present at the 15 operations, producing body-camera footage, imaging relevant cell phones, and providing affidavits detailing the document-collection process.
On June 4, Defendants forwarded via email two ICE declarations purporting to describe the agency’s compliance. The declarations disclosed that ICE had identified only 23 custodians associated with 10 of the 15 operations, restricted its date range to June 11 through Aug. 23, 2025, and used search terms consisting of 11 full legal names and eight alien-registration numbers in a single format. Defendants acknowledged during a June 10 meet-and-confer that ICE had made a “mistake” in its electronically stored information production because of a communication failure.
On June 23, Plaintiffs then moved to enforce the Jan. 16 order and for sanctions. On Aug. 14, Judge Pym granted the motion, imposing Rule 37(b) sanctions on Defendants in the form of Plaintiffs’ fees and expenses incurred in bringing the enforcement motion, with the amount to be determined, and separately admonishing Defendants’ counsel for failures in supervising the discovery process and warning that counsel could face personal sanctions if the deficiencies continued. Judge Pym stated at the outset that “ICE’s noncompliance with the January 16 Order is undisputed” and identified several distinct violations (emphasis added).
First, although the January 16 order had “unequivocally found” that RFP No. 2 sought documents concerning entire operations rather than isolated encounters, “ICE did not search for all the operations and instead limited its search to 11 individuals by full name and eight A-numbers in one format in direct contravention of the January 16 Order” (emphasis added).
Second, ICE’s date range expressly excluded the three September operations listed in RFP No. 2(m)–(o), “in violation of both the December 12 and January 16 Orders” (emphasis added). Its search terms also corresponded to individuals from only five of the 15 operations. Judge Pym observed that even under ICE’s already-rejected interpretation—limiting discovery to individual encounters—the agency had not included all identified individuals in its searches.
Third, although the January 16 order required standardized operational materials and documentation concerning everyone arrested during the 15 operations, ICE’s “declarations indicate the searches were limited to the files of 23 agents present at the operations and did not explain how the custodians were otherwise identified and what efforts were made to collect these other documents” (emphasis added).
Fourth, the court noted that “ICE failed to forensically image personal phones used by ICE agents present at any of the operations” (emphasis added). Judge Pym did not, however, use that personal-phone failure as a basis for the sanctions or deadlines imposed in the August order. She explained that Defendants’ objections concerning personal phones remained under separate consideration and that Judge Frimpong had already entered a distinct civil-contempt order addressing that portion of the Jan. 16 order.
In addition to those violations, Judge Pym found that “the ICE declarations reflect clear inadequacies with the search and collection process that has been conducted” (emphasis added). First, Judge Pym found that “ICE unreasonably limited its search terms to the full legal names of 11 individuals and A-numbers only in the following format – ‘A#########’” (emphasis added). She explained that names could appear in numerous other forms and A-numbers could likewise be written differently, and concluded:
“There is no reasonable basis for ICE’s decision to search only for the full legal name and the A-number in a single format. Counsel are experienced enough to understand these search terms were unreasonably restrictive. The only logical reason for constructing such unduly narrow searches is to limit the number of responsive documents.” (emphasis added).
Second, although ICE searched custodians’ emails, government-cell-phone texts, Microsoft Teams messages, and OneDrive accounts, the court found that “[t]his search appears to exclude other apps used by ICE agents such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Zello” and stated that “[i]t is unclear why ICE would limit its searches to only some applications” (emphasis added). Finally, “rather than collecting and producing the data collected from the government phones in RSMF format, ICE exported the data collected from the government phones into one .pdf report per phone” (emphasis added). Judge Pym found that “[t]his eliminates metadata and combines separate documents into a single document,” adding that “Defendants provide no reason why they produced them in such format” (emphasis added).
The court emphasized that, “[d]espite acknowledging the noncompliance, defendants continue to minimize its seriousness” (emphasis added). When Defendants argued that Plaintiffs had received some responsive material, that ICE had agreed to supplement its production, and that Plaintiffs had suffered no prejudice, Judge Pym responded:
“Counsel’s position is indefensible. Defendants’ noncompliance is inexcusable and they cannot minimize their dereliction by arguing no harm. Moreover, defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs were not prejudiced is entirely without basis since they do not know what responsive documents have not been produced.” (emphasis added).
Judge Pym also rejected Defendants’ request for additional time based on the volume of material requiring review, writing:
“The fact that defendants have to review a large, unspecified volume of data in a compressed timeframe is a problem entirely of their own making, after defendants repeatedly chose to disregard the plain meaning of the RFPs and multiple court orders.” (emphasis added).
The court ordered ICE to file a report identifying every relevant custodian and its method for identifying them, the agreed search terms for non-phone electronic data, and every database, file, cell phone, and application to be searched. It also ordered ICE to make a full production in a usable format that preserved meaningful information such as metadata and required affidavits explaining how the searches were performed and confirming that each affiant had read and understood both the Jan. 16 order and the August order.
In imposing Rule 37(b) sanctions, Judge Pym concluded:
“Defendants concede ICE violated the January 16 Order, but argue that sanctions are not warranted because they are generally reserved for conduct demonstrating willfulness, bad faith, or a failure to take reasonable steps to comply with court orders. …
Defendants also argue sanctions are not warranted because they are taking reasonable steps to remedy ICE’s noncompliance. The fact that ICE has finally agreed to properly conduct the searches and collections that should have been done over six months ago does not obviate the need for sanctions. ICE’s noncompliance is egregious. The January 16 Order is clear and there is no justification for ICE’s complete disregard of it. Moreover, the noncompliance with the January 16 Order is just the latest discovery dispute over defendants’ inadequate productions and unreasonable interpretations of discovery requests and court orders.” (emphasis added).
The court added that, “[g]iven the vast scope of this case and the information requested, the production has been inadequate and reflects a lack of diligence, at best” (emphasis added). It awarded Plaintiffs the fees and expenses incurred in bringing the enforcement motion, with the amount to be determined after the parties conferred. Noting that the court had already been required to intervene “three times” over Defendants’ failure to produce materials responsive to RFP No. 2, Judge Pym warned that “[f]urther failures to comply with the January 16 Order, this order, or any other discovery misconduct will result in escalating sanctions” (emphasis added).
Judge Pym separately addressed defense counsel’s responsibility for the discovery failures. Although the court was “sympathetic to the challenges counsel face in light of the reported upheavals at the Department of Justice,” it stressed that “it is not an excuse for counsel to fail to take responsibility for not abiding by their discovery obligations” and that “[u]ltimately, counsel of record are responsible for coordinating their client’s discovery efforts.” The court likewise acknowledged “the difficulty in coordinating with so many agencies,” but reiterated that “this does not excuse counsel from meeting their discovery obligations,” finding it “apparent that counsel of record has been relying on ICE and its agency counsel to respond to plaintiffs’ discovery requests.”
Judge Pym found that, when confronted with deficiencies in the production from agent G.A.’s phone, “rather than verify the deficiencies themselves, counsel simply accept[ed] ICE’s representation and consequently made misrepresentations to plaintiffs.” Counsel had represented that they had “double-checked” and confirmed that G.A.’s phone contained no responsive material, but “plaintiffs learned these representations were false when they examined G.A.’s phone at his deposition and saw the responsive messages at issue.” The court also rejected counsel’s claims that they had acted “promptly,” finding instead that “the evidence reflects that counsel simply forwarded the ICE declarations to plaintiffs and made no mention of the glaring deficiencies.”
Judge Pym concluded: “Accordingly, the court admonishes defendants’ counsel and reminds them they are ultimately responsible for supervising the discovery process.” Quoting authority that counsel’s “unquestioning reliance” on others’ representations “falls short of the requisite standard for compliance with Rule 26,” the court warned: “The court warns counsel that they may face personal sanctions if these deficiencies continue.”
On Sept. 15, the parties filed a joint report addressing the fees and expenses awarded under the Aug. 14 Rule 37 order. Plaintiffs requested $98,385. Defendants argued that the amount should be substantially reduced.
29-a. Abrego Garcia’s third-country removal: “once again, Respondents defied this Court’s orders” by producing unprepared witnesses; “[t]hese orders were ignored without justification;” government’s sixth witness’s “lack of knowledge was planned and purposeful;” “a strategy on your part, on behalf of your client, that has been present since day one.”
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-02780 (D. Md.)
This case involved the government’s re-detention of Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia after his wrongful removal to El Salvador and its basis for his continued ICE custody through changing third-country removal plans—Uganda, Eswatini, Ghana, and then Liberia—while not pursuing Costa Rica’s standing offer to receive him.
After the government admitted that it had unlawfully removed Abrego Garcia to El Salvador despite an immigration court order barring removal there, the case turned in part to whether DHS could remove him to a third country and, specifically, whether Costa Rica remained available. As the government advanced a new position that Costa Rica was no longer a viable option and that Liberia was effectively the only remaining path, Judge Xinis repeatedly ordered the government to provide a knowledgeable witness and a reliable factual basis for those assertions.
At the Nov. 17, 2025 conference call, the judge said that, at an Oct. 10 hearing, she had “specifically ordered the government to bring a person with knowledge about this very issue,” but “despite my very clear directive, you put a witness on who had no knowledge.” She said, “I don’t think there’s any other way to sugarcoat it. It was in defiance of my order.” She added that she was “unhappy with … the attorneys not being able to follow my order and bring a witness who is prepared,” and rejected the suggestion that the problem was accidental: “Did you have a witness prepared to talk about Costa Rica? Absolutely not…. You just chose to bring a witness who got on the stand and said Costa Rica, where? Had nothing for me.”
The government’s next effort only deepened the court’s concern. At the Nov. 20 hearing, DHS witness John Cantú, ICE’s acting assistant director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, admitted that he had spent “no more than five minutes” preparing, had not been given the court’s preparation order, had made no inquiry beyond speaking with “the attorneys sitting to my left,” and could not answer basic questions about the declaration he had signed. Judge Xinis interrupted to note: “This witness has zero information about the content of the declaration.”
In her Dec. 11 opinion granting habeas relief and ordering Garcia’s release, Judge Xinis treated that hearing as a further episode of deliberate noncompliance: “it became evident that once again, Respondents defied this Court’s orders,” because they “refused to prepare and produce a witness with knowledge to testify in any meaningful way.” She stressed that the court had “asked repeatedly” why the government would not use Costa Rica and had twice compelled testimony on the issue, but “[t]hese orders were ignored without justification.” The court stressed that “[a]s the pointed questions of Respondents’ counsel made clear, Cantú’s lack of knowledge was planned and purposeful.” The court further pointed to DOJ counsel’s “sidebar” remark—“I’ll just say I told you this was exactly what was going to happen”—as confirming that the witness’s “ignorance” of Costa Rica as a viable country of removal was anticipated, not accidental. Judge Xinis made clear that this was not, in her view, a one-off failure to prepare a witness, underscoring that Cantú was the sixth witness the court had ordered prepared in the Abrego Garcia litigation, and that “[e]ach witness was either unprepared or defiant in their refusal to answer questions.” During the Nov. 20 hearing, she summarized the pattern starkly:
“I issue an order … it’s not followed. I issue another one; not followed. This time, I even said, attorneys, make a good-faith effort to make sure this witness is prepared. … He was the worst of all.”
Judge Xinis linked the witness problem directly to lawyer conduct, not mere bureaucratic confusion, and remarked at the Nov. 17 conference call:
“I see it as a strategy on your part, on behalf of your client, that has been present since day one, and it is a problem.”
29-b. Abrego Garcia’s renewed ICE detention: government “appeared to make speedy plans to re-detain him, in violation of certainly the spirit, if not the letter, of that [habeas] decision.”
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-02780 (D. Md.)
This case involves the government’s effort to re-detain Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia almost immediately after the court had ordered his release, by invoking a nunc pro tunc immigration order to try to reset the removal period and evade the court’s prior habeas ruling.
After the court ordered Abrego Garcia’s release on Dec. 11, 2025, respondents “appeared to make speedy plans to re-detain him, in violation of certainly the spirit, if not the letter, of that [habeas] decision,” the court wrote, converting the TRO to injunctive relief on Feb. 17, 2026. Judge Xinis rejected the government’s effort to use a later nunc pro tunc immigration order to reset the removal period and avoid the court’s earlier habeas ruling. She explained that, “[t]o read the order otherwise, as Respondents suggest, would indeed rewrite the history of this case,” would “restart Respondents’ removal period,” and would “conveniently erase this last year of Abrego Garcia’s detention and count none of it as relevant to the Zadvydas analysis.” Because a nunc pro tunc order cannot “alter substantive rights or rewrite history,” the court said, it “must reject Respondents’ arguments.” The order also tied that re-detention effort to respondents’ broader course of conduct, noting that they had “purchased Abrego Garcia’s detention in El Salvador and disingenuously slow footed his return,” “refused to procure Abrego Garcia’s immediate removal to Costa Rica in favor of phantom removals to three (maybe four) African countries,” and still had not secured travel documents, confirming there was no “good reason to believe” removal was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
30. ICE age-out detention policy: ICE’s October 2025 custody policy and related re-arrests “violated the Permanent Injunction;” class members had not “received all relief required” under the court’s judgment.
Judge Rudolph Contreras (Obama appointee), Garcia Ramirez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 1:18-cv-00508 (D.D.C.)
The case involves a class action lawsuit alleging that ICE and DHS failed to provide required alternative detention conditions for eighteen-year-olds who came to the United States as unaccompanied minors (known as “age-outs”).
On Dec. 12, 2025, Judge Contreras granted Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the court’s September 2021 final judgment and permanent injunction governing ICE’s “age-out” custody determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B). The court held that ICE’s Oct. 1, 2025 policy and related re-arrest practices “violated the Permanent Injunction” because they failed to produce custody determinations that complied with the statute and the court’s prior rulings, with the result that class members had not “received all relief required” by the court’s earlier injunction. The court further held that the policy failed to make all age-outs eligible for alternatives to detention and that ICE’s re-arrest and detention of released age-outs, absent a material change in circumstances, also violated Section 1232(c)(2)(B).
The court also expressed broader distrust concerns. It wrote that injunctive relief remained necessary to ensure Defendants’ “meaningful compliance” with Section 1232(c)(2)(B), noted prior findings of “agency recalcitrance and resistance to the fulfillment of its legal duties,” and said it was concerned that Defendants had not been transparent about the Oct. 1 policy’s existence and implementation. The court pointed to ICE’s earlier admission that, “contrary to its representations to the Court,” it had failed to document a significant portion of age-out decisions and had misrepresented those statistics, and it said Defendants’ rapid rollout of the new policy without notice “suggests an effort to obscure or downplay the Policy’s existence.”
31. USDA bankruptcy lien-release and collection: USDA “is in civil contempt for violating this Court’s orders and the discharge injunction.”
Judge Selene D. Maddox (appointed by Eighth Circuit), Felton v. USDA-Rural Housing Service, 25-01001 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.)
This case involves an adversary proceeding alleging that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) violated bankruptcy court orders—including an Agreed Order and the discharge injunction—by failing to timely release its lien and by treating a discharged mortgage debt as still owed, prompting collection activity and related harms.
In a Dec. 23, 2025 memorandum opinion and order granting in part the plaintiff’s motion for damages, sanctions, and attorney’s fees, the court summarized the core compliance failure in straightforward terms: “The USDA did not timely release the lien as the Agreed Order required.”
The court recounted that the Debtor Jodie Felton’s counsel repeatedly sought confirmation that the lien had been released, and that the record reflected continued issues over an extended period, including the account reflecting an erroneous balance and referral for potential collection activity. The court also noted USDA’s own position in the litigation: “[T]he USDA concedes it failed to release its lien in a timely manner,” while contending that sovereign-immunity principles limited the remedies available.
On the discharge side, the court emphasized: “The USDA violated § 524(a)(2) by carrying an erroneous balance for roughly 18 months after discharge and by referring the account to the Treasury, which in turn issued a warning of impending garnishment.” The court concluded: “The USDA is therefore in contempt of both the Agreed Order and the discharge injunction.”
After considering the motion practice and submissions, the court made an express contempt finding: “Having considered the Motion, the submissions, and counsels’ arguments, the Court concludes that the USDA is in civil contempt for violating this Court’s orders and the discharge injunction.” The court granted the requested relief in part and denied it in part, explaining that sovereign immunity limited Felton’s recovery to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred to secure compliance with the Agreed Order and the Discharge Order, and denied other requested relief for the reasons set out in the opinion.
32. ICE bond-hearing denial policy: “continued noncompliance;” “consistently defied the judgment;” “ignoring decades of precedent;” “chosen not to comply with the Court’s ruling”
Judge Tiffany Cartwright (Biden appointee), Rodriguez Vazquez v. Hermosillo, 3:25-cv-05240 (W.D. Wash.)
This class action challenges the policy and practice of denying bond hearings to detained noncitizens at the Northwest ICE Processing Center (NWIPC) in Tacoma, Washington.
After certifying the Bond Denial Class on May 2, 2025, the court on Sept. 30 granted summary judgment, declared that class members are detained under § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b)(2), and held that Tacoma Immigration Court’s practice of denying bond on § 1225(b)(2) grounds violated the INA. Defendants appealed on Oct. 28, 2025, but did not seek a stay.
On Jan. 14, 2026, in an order granting Plaintiffs further relief under its Sept. 30 declaratory judgment, Judge Cartwright agreed that Defendants remained noncompliant and ordered further enforcement, finding “some form of further relief is necessary due to Defendants’ continued noncompliance with the Court’s declaratory judgment.”
The court said Defendants had “consistently defied the judgment” and that, “[a]s a result of Defendants’ noncompliance, the only way for class members to obtain relief under a judgment they have already won is to file individual petitions for habeas corpus in this Court,” and that this “high volume of habeas claims has placed a tremendous strain on the resources of both class counsel and the Court.” The court wrote, “ignoring decades of precedent, Defendants have chosen not to comply with the Court’s ruling,” “unlawfully detained” “more than 100 … noncitizens” who were “left with no other recourse due to Defendants’ noncompliance” and forced to file “habeas corpus petitions seeking enforcement of their rights as class members.” The court went on to stress that “many more class members, particularly those who cannot access legal counsel, may remain detained with no knowledge of their right to a bond hearing.” The court further noted that Defendants had “obliquely expressed an intent to also ignore the nationwide ruling in Maldonado Bautista,” rejecting Defendants’ characterization of the ruling as an “advisory opinion.” At the same time, the court did not make a transfer-evasion finding on this record, stating that although the Class submitted evidence of transfers, there was “insufficient evidence in the record” to conclude the transfers were part of an “intentional effort to evade relief” (particularly after Maldonado Bautista).
33. Lindsey Halligan’s U.S. Attorney designation: Halligan “ignored Judge Currie’s rulings;” continued use of the title “self-evidently manifests noncompliance with Judge Currie’s Orders;” DOJ “repeatedly ignore[d] court orders;” Halligan signature block “flaunts the Rule of Law;”
Judge David J. Novak (Trump appointee), United States v. Jefferson, 3:25-cr-00160 (E.D. Va.)
This case involves a criminal prosecution in which Judge Novak, on the court’s own initiative, addressed whether Interim U.S. Attorney Lindsey Halligan improperly identified herself as “United States Attorney” in an indictment, notwithstanding a prior district court ruling holding her appointment unlawful.
In a Jan. 6, 2026 order (directing a government filing), Judge Novak observed that the grand jury indictment returned on Dec. 2, 2025 identifies “Ms. Halligan” as the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judge Novak wrote that Ms. Halligan did so “despite a binding Court Order” entered by Senior Judge Cameron McGowan Currie on Nov. 24, 2025, in United States v. Comey, finding that the “appointment of Ms. Halligan as Interim U.S. Attorney violated 28 U.S.C. §546 and the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution.” Judge Novak emphasized that, although the government appealed Judge Currie’s ruling, “no stay has been issued in conjunction with that appeal,” and “[c]onsequently, it remains the binding precedent in this district and is not subject to being ignored.” The court directed Ms. Halligan to file within seven (7) days of the order—i.e., by Jan. 13, 2026—a pleading explaining the basis for identifying herself as U.S. Attorney “notwithstanding Judge Currie’s contrary ruling,” and to set forth reasons why the court should not strike that identification from the indictment. The court further ordered that the government’s pleading “shall be signed by Ms. Halligan.”
On Jan. 13, the government filed a response signed by Halligan and submitted under the names of Attorney General Pam Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche. The filing attacked the court’s sua sponte “inquisition” into Halligan’s title as contrary to the party-presentation principle and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and characterized Judge Novak’s order as a “thinly veiled threat” to use attorney discipline to “cudgel” the Executive Branch into adopting Judge Currie’s legal reasoning in other cases—calling that a “gross abuse of power.” The Government argued Judge Currie’s dismissal orders in Comey and James did not enjoin Halligan from “holding herself out” as U.S. Attorney (and, in any event, district-court decisions are not “binding precedent” even within the same district), insisting that Halligan had not “misrepresented” anything and that “the basis” for her identification as U.S. Attorney is simply that, “in the Government’s view, Ms. Halligan is the United States Attorney.” On Jan. 20, 2026, Judge Novak concluded:
“In short, Ms. Halligan has not only ignored Judge Currie’s rulings, she has also turned a blind eye to an Order from the Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit.”
The court warned that Halligan’s continued use of the “United States Attorney” title in filings “ignores a binding court order and may not continue,” emphasizing that continued use would expose her (and any co-signatory) to “potential disciplinary action.” He underscored that Halligan “elected to simply ignore valid court orders” and that the Court “cannot tolerate such obstinance.” The court wrote:
“If the Court were to allow Ms. Halligan and the Department of Justice to pick and choose which orders that they will follow, the same would have to be true for other litigants and our system of justice would crumble.”
“Simply flouting a judicial order … and acting like that order does not exist is simply not an option,” the court wrote, adding:
“The Court finds it inconceivable that the Department of Justice, which holds a duty to faithfully execute the laws of the United States — even those with which it may have disagreement — would repeatedly ignore court orders, while simultaneously prosecuting citizens for breaking the law. In the wise words of Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III of the … Fourth Circuit, ‘[w]e yet cling to the hope that it is not naive to believe our good brethren in the Executive Branch perceive the rule of law as vital to the American ethos.’”
The Court further found that insisting on the moniker “exhibits disrespect … flaunts the Rule of Law … [and] self-evidently manifests noncompliance with Judge Currie’s Orders,” and ultimately characterized any continued representation as a “false statement made in direct defiance of valid court orders,” a “charade” of “masquerading” that “must come to an end.” “Ms. Halligan has no legal basis to represent to this Court that she holds the position. And any such representation going forward can only be described as a false statement made in direct defiance of valid court orders.” The court went on to conclude that it
“recognizes that Ms. Halligan lacks the prosecutorial experience that has long been the norm for those nominated to the position of United States Attorney in this District. Consequently, and in light of her inexperience, the Court grants Ms. Halligan the benefit of the doubt and refrains from referring her for further investigation and disciplinary action regarding her misrepresentations to this Court at this time.”
The court, warned:
“However, this Memorandum Order provides notice that, should Ms. Halligan persist in ignoring Judge Currie’s Orders and this Memorandum Order in any matter before the undersigned, the Court will initiate disciplinary proceedings against Ms. Halligan and any other signatory to an offending pleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement V(A).”
34. Special immigrant visa processing: “Defendants’ suspension of COM and Form I-360 petition processing violates this court’s injunction;” “Defendants have woefully failed to meet their obligations under the Revised Adjudication Plan.”
Judge Tanya S. Chutkan (Obama appointee), Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Rubio, 1:18-cv-01388 (D.D.C.)
This litigation, filed in 2018, challenges delays in processing special immigrant visa applications submitted by Afghan and Iraqi nationals who served the United States.
On June 14, 2020, the court issued an injunction approving and adopting an Adjudication Plan, imposing processing benchmarks and reporting obligations on Defendants. On June 5, 2025, it approved a Revised Adjudication Plan, establishing processing benchmarks and reporting obligations, including completion of Afghan Chief of Mission (COM) review within 120 calendar days and adjudication of Form I-360 petitions within 60 calendar days, subject to specified exceptions.
In November 2025, following the shooting of two National Guard members and the arrest of an Afghan national, Defendants indefinitely suspended COM processing and Form I-360 adjudications for Afghan applicants. On Dec. 5, Plaintiffs moved to enforce the Plan, challenging both the suspension and Defendants’ preceding failures to meet processing and reporting requirements.
In a Feb. 6, 2026 opinion and order, Judge Chutkan granted the enforcement motion. She wrote that “Defendants have announced that they will no longer obey the court’s injunction” and held that “Defendants’ suspension of COM and Form I-360 petition processing violates this court’s injunction.” Defendants invoked their authority to address national-security concerns, but the court explained that the statutory exception permitting additional time in individual high-risk cases did not authorize a blanket suspension:
“But Defendants cite no authority—statutory or otherwise—allowing them to unilaterally suspend processes that Congress has required them to expedite.”
The court also found noncompliance predating the suspension. Defendants’ September 2025 report showed that nearly 15,000 class members awaiting COM decisions had waited an average of 663 days, against the Plan’s 120-day benchmark. Meanwhile, Defendants had reduced staffing in the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Unit by 30 percent without adequately explaining that decision. Defendants attributed delays to increased applications following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and statutory requirements to prioritize certain applications. Judge Chutkan rejected that explanation: “This explanation is seriously deficient: The court already considered and accommodated those very factors in devising the Revised Adjudication Plan.”
Judge Chutkan separately found that “Defendants have failed to satisfy their reporting obligations with respect to cases in administrative processing.” Their reports combined pending cases within the government’s control with applicant-controlled cases and permanent refusals. The court explained that this “dramatically overinclusive reporting frustrates the ability of both Plaintiffs and this court to determine whether Defendants are complying” with their processing obligations.
The court ordered Defendants to “immediately resume Chief of Mission and Form I-360 petition processing for class members,” identify meaningful measures to improve compliance, and attempt in good faith to resolve the reporting deficiencies. At a Feb. 24 status conference, the court required a senior State Department representative to attend the next hearing; Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Veprek appeared on April 1 to answer the court’s questions.
On May 8, Judge Chutkan ordered further enforcement measures “necessary and appropriate” “[t]o bring Defendants into compliance,” stating: “Defendants have woefully failed to meet their obligations under the Revised Adjudication Plan.” Defendants were directed to “endeavor” to meet escalating monthly COM-processing benchmarks, beginning with 1,000 cases in June and reaching 4,000 per month from October until the overdue backlog was eliminated. The order required monthly reports and, for any shortfall, an explanation and identification of “the concrete steps that they will take to comply.” A May 20 notice order clarified that continued processing did not exempt class members from presidential restrictions on visa issuance or entry.
Compliance remained disputed. In an Aug. 28 joint status report, Plaintiffs argued that Defendants’ processing shortfalls and proposed corrective measures were inadequate; Defendants maintained that they had complied with the obligation to “endeavor” to meet the benchmarks. On Oct. 1, the court required a further compliance report explaining staffing measures and why Defendants had limited proposed reinforcements to twenty Foreign Service Officers. Defendants subsequently reported on Oct. 7 that they had issued 1,214 COM decisions in September, against the 3,000-case benchmark, citing training demands and case complexity.
35. FEMA shelter-services funding reimbursements: “[T]he government has taken no action to cure its violation” of the preliminary injunction’s 30-day social services processing requirement, and “confirmed at oral argument that it does not intend to take any action”
Judge Matthew F. Kennelly (Clinton appointee), City Of Chicago v. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-05463 (N.D. Ill.)
This case challenges the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) termination of funding for the Shelter and Services Program (SSP).
On Feb. 9, 2026, the court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce its Nov. 3, 2025 preliminary injunction, which had barred DHS and FEMA from terminating the Shelter and Services Program or withholding SSP funds for the reasons set out in the March 11 and April 1 letters. The court emphasized that defendants had not appealed that injunction and did “not dispute that DHS/FEMA has not reimbursed any SSP grantee for reimbursement requests submitted before termination of the SSP grants,” and held “that the government … violated” both the court’s prior order and 2 C.F.R. § 200.305(b)(3). As the court put it, “[t]here is no question” the requests had been submitted long ago, “more than 30 days have passed since the Court vacated DHS’s original rationale for withholding these payments,” and “[t]o date, the government has taken no action to cure its violation and confirmed at oral argument that it does not intend to take any action.”
Rejecting the government’s attempt to pivot to a new closeout-process theory, the court explained that, once it had vacated DHS’s stated rationale for withholding reimbursement, “the agency no longer had any stated reason to withhold such funding,” and the government therefore had to either process the requests or articulate a new, lawful reason for deeming them improper. The court wrote, “DHS’s 30-day deadline came and went long ago,” “more than 90 days—three times 30—have passed,” so the court exercised its equitable authority to enforce compliance and ordered the government, by Feb. 23, to process all pre-termination reimbursement requests or state a reasonable belief—one that did not rely on the vacated March 11 and April 1 rationales—why any request was improper. The court declined, for now, to order reopening of the SSP portal for additional requests, finding that issue not yet ripe.
36. President’s House slavery exhibits: government “failure to comply with this Court’s … order … [to] restor[e] the President’s House site to its physical status”
Judge Cynthia M. Rufe (Clinton appointee), City of Philadelphia v. Burgum, 2:26-cv-00434 (E.D. Pa.)
This case challenges the National Park Service’s January 22, 2026 removal of artwork and informational displays referencing slavery at the President’s House site in Philadelphia.
On Feb. 16, 2026, Judge Rufe granted a preliminary injunction and ordered Defendants to restore the President’s House site to its physical status as of Jan. 21, 2026; preserve any removed panels, artwork, and other items; refrain from any further changes; provide “immediate, continuing, and proper maintenance;” and follow “[a]ll terms and conditions of this Order for preliminary injunctive relief … immediately, that is FORTHWITH.”
However, two days later on Feb. 18, the court entered a separate enforcement order “upon consideration of Defendant’s failure to comply with this Court’s [Feb. 16] Order,” and directed Defendants to comply by “restoring the President’s House site to its physical status as of [Jan. 21] by [Feb. 20] at 5:00 PM.” Judge Rufe added that, despite Defendants’ appeal to the Third Circuit, the court retained authority to enforce its own order because Defendants had not obtained a stay, and “[a]bsent a stay … this Court must enforce its own order.” The district court denied a stay on Feb. 20.
37. Border Patrol immigration enforcement: “Defendants have again detained people without reasonable suspicion for doing so” in violation of a judicial order; “failed to comply with the documentation requirements;” “Defendants have not complied with the PI Order”
Judge Jennifer L. Thurston (Biden appointee), United Farm Workers v. Mullin, 1:25-cv-00246 (E.D. Cal.)
This case challenges Border Patrol’s allegedly unlawful immigration enforcement practices in the Eastern District of California, including stops without reasonable suspicion, warrantless arrests without the required assessment of escape risk, and coercion into “voluntary departure.”
On April 29, 2025, Judge Thurston granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting Border Patrol from conducting immigration stops without individualized reasonable suspicion or making warrantless immigration arrests without probable cause that the person was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained. The order also imposed guidance, training, and documentation requirements. Plaintiffs moved to enforce the injunction on Aug. 29, 2025, alleging violations during a July 17 operation at a Sacramento Home Depot and deficiencies in Defendants’ guidance and arrest records.
In a Mar. 11, 2026 order entered Apr. 1, Judge Thurston granted the enforcement motion in part, finding that “Defendants have again detained people without reasonable suspicion for doing so” in violation of the PI. “Even accepting as true Defendants’ assertions that all those stopped and arrested engaged in unprovoked flight from Agents, such flight—standing alone—is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion,” the court held. Further, the arrest narratives supplied no individualized assessment, instead relying on “unsupported assumptions, hunches and generalizations” about day laborers’ immigration status.
The court separately found that “Defendants have failed to comply with the documentation requirements of the PI Order.” Defendants acknowledged that at least two arrest records had been modified to include descriptions that were “flatly incorrect.” In one instance, an agent’s account of a consensual encounter was rewritten in a Form I-213 arrest record to describe flight and pursuit. The court wrote: “These changes represent material, substantive modifications to the arresting Agent’s version of events, which is inconsistent with the PI Order.” It added that “most of the I-213s contain narratives that are so cursory that it is impossible to match the I-213 to the video footage or, indeed, to distinguish one arrest from another. The documentation also does not clearly and consistently reveal who prepared the I-213 narratives.” Judge Thurston concluded: “the Court finds Defendants have not complied with the PI Order.” She clarified the documentation requirements, requiring agents personally to record the particularized grounds for their stops, explain supporting background information and its sources, and sign and date the final justification, attesting to its accuracy. Defendants were responsible for ensuring agents received the instructions: “The Court expects immediate compliance with its orders.”
On Aug. 24, however, the Ninth Circuit lifted the preliminary injunction and remanded for the district court to determine whether Plaintiffs had standing to seek prospective relief. The appellate order did not expressly vacate the March enforcement findings or decide the legality of the July operation. The district court subsequently ordered supplemental briefing on standing.
38. DOJ lawsuit for voter records: “Plaintiff failed to comply;” “proof of an untimely service attempt without explanation;” “apparently continues to attempt service while disregarding Defendant’s waiver”
Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan; with additional remarks by Judge Kymberly K. Evanson (Biden appointee), United States v. Hobbs, 3:25-cv-06078 (W.D. Wash.).
This case concerns the Justice Department’s lawsuit under Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 to compel Washington Secretary of State Steve Hobbs to provide the State’s complete, unredacted voter-registration list, including voters’ personal identifying information.
On Mar. 10, 2026, after the deadline for serving Hobbs had passed without proof of service being filed, Judge Vaughan ordered the United States to file proof of timely service or show cause why the case should not be dismissed by Mar. 17. On Mar. 17, the government instead filed a process server’s return describing a Mar. 13 service attempt at Hobbs’s “residence or usual place of abode.” Hobbs’s attorney informed the court that the address was actually the Washington Attorney General’s Seattle office, that Hobbs had already provided a waiver of service, and that another government attorney had nevertheless made a further service attempt.
In a show-cause order on Mar. 18, 2026, Judge Vaughan stated: that “Plaintiff failed to comply, leaving the status of this case unclear and compelling further inquiry by this Court.” The court described the government’s filing as “proof of an untimely service attempt without explanation.” It remained “unclear” whether and how service had been effected, with the government “apparently continu[ing] to attempt service while disregarding Defendant’s waiver and representing to the Court that it had already served him on March 13.” Judge Vaughan ordered the government to explain its failure to comply with the March 10 order and to seek an extension supported by good cause. She also required clarification of the date and means of service and, if service occurred by a means other than that described in the filed return, an explanation of “why it made an inaccurate representation to this Court.”
In its Mar. 23 response, the government acknowledged that service was “admittedly untimely and without good cause.” It attributed the failures to “out-of-state counsel’s unfamiliarity” with Washington service procedures, “miscommunication” with local counsel, and a “mistaken[ ]” interpretation of the Mar. 10 order as extending the service deadline. Counsel apologized and stated that they “did not mean to mislead the Court or imply that service was completed within the 90-day timeframe.” In a supporting declaration, DOJ Voting Section Acting Chief Eric Neff stated that the process server’s return had been “believed at the time to be the best and most complete proof of service.” The government asked the court to allow the case to proceed because Hobbs had waived service, appeared through counsel, and suffered no prejudice.
Following reassignment of the case, Judge Evanson lifted both show-cause orders on March 26, allowing the action to proceed despite untimely service. She emphasized the preference for resolving cases on their merits and Hobbs’s acceptance of service without objection. Addressing the government’s reliance on the demands of coordinating similar litigation nationwide, Judge Evanson wrote: “Plaintiff should have considered the ‘unique requirements of litigation’ in this district before instituting this case, rather than after it missed deadlines.” She added: “In any event, the Court trusts that Plaintiff will abide by its promise to be diligent in adhering to the Local Rules and Court orders in the future.”
39. VA collective-bargaining agreement: re-termination letter “blatant disrespect for not just this Court’s order, but for the rule of law”
Judge Melissa R. DuBose (Biden appointee), American Federation of Government Employees Local 2305 v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 1:25-cv-00583 (D.R.I.)
This case challenges the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) August 2025 decision, following Executive Order 14251, to terminate the National Veterans Affairs Council’s 2023 Master Collective Bargaining Agreement (Master CBA).
On Mar. 13, 2026, Judge DuBose granted a preliminary injunction (PI) requiring Defendants to reinstate the Master CBA and its subsidiary agreements for the remainder of the agreed-upon term provided in the agreement. In the following week, although the VA stated that the agreement had been reinstated, Plaintiffs alleged that the agency continued to deny employees and union officials the Master CBA’s benefits and procedures, prompting a March 20 motion to enforce. Defendants separately moved that day to clarify whether the PI barred a later termination on a different lawful basis and whether it extended to subsidiary agreements with nonparty affiliates.
On Mar. 23, Judge DuBose granted the clarification motion but stated, “The Court does not know how to state the order any more simply or directly.” The court explained that all parties covered by the Master CBA would remain covered until it was “terminated or amended in a lawful manner,” and warned that the pending enforcement motion was “no reason to delay compliance” with its order to reinstate the agreement “in full.” Three days later, while the enforcement motion remained pending, the VA filed a status report attaching a new Mar. 26 notice purporting to re-terminate the Master CBA effective that day (the “re-termination letter”).
On Mar. 27, 2026, the court held a hearing on the enforcement motion. Judge DuBose rejected the government’s contention that the re-termination mooted the enforcement proceeding. She stated that the PI had returned the agreement to the “status quo, not just in name, but in substance,” and that the “lawful channels” available to Defendants had “not [been] followed here.” The court characterized the status report as “essentially in this Court’s view an unlawful re-termination,” stated that the “late-night re-filing of a re-termination” had “throw[n] everything that the Court attempted to do to clarify into chaos,” and said Defendants’ suggestion that the earlier proceedings could simply be disregarded reflected “blatant disrespect for not just this Court’s order, but for the rule of law.”
Judge DuBose further said that the contemplated show-cause proceeding went to “the heart of what I see as really some disingenuous actions taken by the defendant,” while adding, “I hope that’s not the case,” and giving Defendants an opportunity to explain. She orally granted the motion to enforce and stated that a written order would follow.
In a written order issued later that day, the court found that the re-termination letter was “not in compliance with this Court’s clarification” that covered parties would remain covered by the Master CBA until it was terminated or amended lawfully. Judge DuBose ordered that Defendants’ reinstatement of and compliance with the Master CBA be “in both form and substance,” required Defendants to notify bargaining units that the re-termination letter had no force or effect and to file a status report confirming compliance, and directed Defendants to show cause why the re-termination should not be considered “in blatant violation of the Preliminary Injunction Order in place and therefore in contempt of this Court.” The court scheduled a show-cause hearing for Apr. 3, but on March 30 held the contempt proceeding in abeyance following Defendants’ Mar. 27 appeal of the PI and enforcement order (Case No. 26-1321).
On May 16, the First Circuit granted Defendants’ stay motion only in part. The court stayed the first enforcement order’s directives requiring Defendants to comply with the Master CBA “in both form and substance” and to continue processing pending grievances and arbitrations, concluding that Defendants had made the required showing as to the district court’s authority to impose that form of specific performance. But it denied a stay of the preliminary injunction and denied a stay of the enforcement order’s determination that the re-termination was unlawful, concluding that Defendants had not made the required strong showing of likely success as to that distinct part of the order.
The case later produced a second enforcement dispute. On Aug. 11, 2026, Judge DuBose granted another motion to enforce, finding that Defendants’ announced intention to treat the Master CBA as “completely defunct” as of Aug. 8 was “in direct contravention” of the court’s order that the agreement remain in effect for its agreed-upon term. On Oct. 2, however, the First Circuit stayed that second enforcement order in full. The appellate court concluded that, even assuming the original injunction encompassed the possibility of an automatic extension, the August order likely modified it by resolving new, disputed questions concerning whether the agreement had automatically extended. Because the preliminary injunction was already on appeal, the district court likely lacked jurisdiction to issue that modification. The First Circuit left unresolved whether the agreement had automatically extended, distinguishing the obligation to reinstate the CBA from the obligation to comply with its individual terms. It did not determine that Defendants’ August position was lawful or vacate the original preliminary injunction.
40. California City immigration detention: “Defendants failed to comply with that order in a timely fashion” by failing to ensure timely specialist medical care, including a critical urology follow-up appointment.
Judge Maxine M. Chesney (Clinton appointee), Ruiz v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 3:25-cv-09757 (N.D. Cal.)
This class action, brought by seven ICE detainees, challenges allegedly unconstitutional medical care, other conditions of confinement, and restrictions on attorney access at California City Detention Facility.
On Dec. 22, 2025, following Plaintiffs’ request for emergency medical relief, Judge Chesney entered a stipulated order requiring Defendants to ensure that Plaintiff Fernando Viera Reyes received a “comprehensive” urology assessment, a biopsy if the urologist considered it necessary, and a treatment plan. The order also required Defendants to “ensure timely compliance with all follow-up orders for treatment and medication directed by the urologist,” including timely access to an oncologist if indicated.
On Feb. 5, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a notice of noncompliance, asserting that Defendants had failed to obtain the results of Viera Reyes’s Jan. 7 biopsy and had failed to transport him to his scheduled Feb. 2 follow-up appointment. At the Feb. 6 hearing, Defendants’ counsel confirmed that he had missed what Judge Chesney described as a “critical specialty appointment” because of an “internal scheduling error.” In subsequent explanations to the court and separately to Plaintiffs’ counsel, the government stated that the facility had not properly entered the appointment into ICE’s internal system, so the transport process “was not triggered.”
On Feb. 10, Judge Chesney granted a preliminary injunction requiring broader improvements to medical care throughout the facility, including “timely approval and access to medical specialists” and “timely completion of active medical orders, access to scheduled provider appointments, and consistent provision of medication.” The order also required access for an independent external monitor to oversee compliance.
In a Feb. 26 second notice, Plaintiffs alleged continuing noncompliance. They reported that Viera Reyes had learned at a rescheduled Feb. 12 appointment that he had prostate cancer, but had still not received the further scan, oncology appointment, or treatment indicated by his urologist. Plaintiffs asserted that he had received “no treatment whatsoever” for the cancer while his pain, weakness, and weight loss worsened.
In her Mar. 27, 2026 memorandum explaining the court’s Feb. 10 preliminary injunction, Judge Chesney expressly found noncompliance with the Dec. 22 order. Citing the first notice and the Feb. 6 hearing, she wrote:
“Indeed, even after the Court ordered Defendants to ensure that Mr. Viera Reyes received prompt attention from specialists and necessary follow-up care, Defendants failed to comply with that order in a timely fashion.” (emphasis added).
A Mar. 30 order formalized the monitor’s appointment and access.
41. Unaccompanied immigrant children: “the Government has substantially violated the letter and spirit of the Injunction” by providing coercive warnings about prolonged detention, potential prosecution of sponsors, and immigration consequences for exercising their rights.
Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald (Obama appointee), Perez-Funez v. Department of Homeland Security, 2:81-cv-01457 (C.D. Cal.)
This case concerns the Trump administration’s attempt to terminate longstanding court-ordered safeguards protecting unaccompanied immigrant children from being induced to waive their rights and accept voluntary departure.
In a Jan. 24, 1984 opinion, Judge Edward Rafeedie consolidated two cases, certified a nationwide class, and issued a preliminary injunction governing the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s voluntary-departure procedures for unaccompanied children. Following trial, the court made the injunction permanent, with modifications, on Sept. 30, 1985. The injunction prohibited efforts to persuade or dissuade children when informing them about voluntary departure and required rights notices, free legal-services lists, and telephone-contact safeguards before presentation of voluntary-departure forms. A May 16, 1986 order approved a simplified rights advisal. The government subsequently used Form I-770 to provide the required notice.
On Nov. 12, 2025, Defendants moved to terminate the permanent injunction and advisal order, arguing that intervening legal and factual changes rendered the injunction “antiquated and no longer equitable under present circumstances” and that it was “void for lack of jurisdiction.” On Jan. 6, 2026, Plaintiffs opposed termination and cross-moved to modify the injunction, seeking to prohibit a new government advisal for unaccompanied alien children (UAC), titled the “UAC Processing Pathway Advisal” (Pathway Advisal), and obtain discovery concerning compliance.
On Jan. 20, the government acknowledged that Border Patrol had begun providing the Pathway Advisal, generally orally, in September 2025. The advisal warned children who sought an immigration hearing or expressed fear of returning home that they could expect prolonged detention, possible prosecution of their sponsors (often parents or other family members), and adverse immigration consequences. Defendants maintained that the advisal supplied accurate supplemental information and did not undermine compliance because children still received Form I-770.
On Apr. 6, 2026, Judge Fitzgerald denied Defendants’ motion to terminate and granted Plaintiffs’ request to modify the injunction. In the order granting modification, he stated that the court “certainly finds credible the testimony from UAC that they have received the same information contained in the Pathway Advisal while in custody, and that because of this information they felt pressured or coerced into signing forms providing for voluntary departure or withdrawal of their applications for admission.” He added: “Moreover, these declarations are undisputed by the Government.” Judge Fitzgerald concluded:
“In sum, the information contained in the Pathway Advisal improperly coerces UAC from exercising their rights. By providing this information to UAC, the Government has substantially violated the letter and spirit of the Injunction.” (emphasis added.)
The court rejected Defendants’ reliance on their continued provision of Form I-770, explaining that compliance with that requirement did not excuse violations of the injunction’s other terms. Judge Fitzgerald wrote: “Indeed, the Government appears to argue that it could provide Form I-770 and then provide another form stating that the Form I-770 just provided should in fact be ignored.”
Addressing the threat of prolonged detention, Judge Fitzgerald observed that it mirrored the original plaintiff’s testimony that such a warning had caused him to accept voluntary departure. The court emphasized:
“The Government was thus already on notice that such a statement delivered in this environment is precisely the kind of inappropriate persuasion the Injunction sought to prevent.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Fitzgerald likewise rejected the government’s defense of the warning that, if a child sought a hearing or asylum, a sponsor without lawful immigration status could face criminal prosecution for aiding the child’s illegal entry. He wrote: “The Government’s response to the blatantly coercive nature of this provision strains credulity” (emphasis added). He explained that there was “no logical connection between” a child’s decision to seek a hearing or asylum and whether an adult sponsor should face prosecution, adding, “Here, immigration agents may well have the prerogative to investigate sponsors of UAC, but it is the act of conditioning that prosecution on the exercise of rights explained in Form I-770 that makes such a threat obviously coercive.”
The court also found the immigration-bar warnings “coercive” and, insofar as they implied a permanent bar, “misleading.” The warnings “fail[ed] to explain” that children could still seek voluntary departure and “may still avoid any bar to admission even if they choose to exercise their rights.”
In the separate order denying termination, Judge Fitzgerald relied on the noncompliance finding: “The Government’s violation of the Injunction provides an additional reason to deny this Motion.” The modified permanent injunction prohibited DHS and those acting with it from providing the Pathway Advisal orally or in writing, either alone or alongside Form I-770.
42. Pentagon press access restrictions: DOD “violated this Court’s explicit mandate,” a “blatant attempt to circumvent a lawful order of the Court” by using “slightly different language to achieve that same unconstitutional result.”
Judge Paul L. Friedman (Clinton appointee), The New York Times Company v. Department of Defense, 1:25-cv-04218 (D.D.C.)
On Mar. 20, 2026, in an order and opinion granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and entering declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, Judge Friedman held that provisions of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Pentagon Facilities Alternate Credentials (PFAC) policy violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The court vacated the challenged provisions for all regulated parties; permanently enjoined Defendants from using those provisions to deny, suspend, revoke, or decline to renew the credentials of Times journalists; and ordered the immediate reinstatement of regulated parties’ Pentagon press credentials. The court held that the original policy could not punish journalists for seeking non-public information because “obtaining and attempting to obtain information is what journalists do,” “[a] primary way in which journalists obtain information is by asking questions,” and the policy targeted “plainly lawful journalistic practices.”
On Mar. 23, DOD provided Plaintiffs with an “Interim Policy” that purported to address the provisions the court had vacated. The new policy replaced the prohibition on “solicitation” with a prohibition on “intentional inducement of unauthorized disclosure,” defined to include “encouraging, inducing, or requesting” information that a journalist knew a DOD employee was not authorized to disclose. It also created a rebuttable presumption of that knowledge whenever a journalist offered a source anonymity or privacy protection. At the same time, the Department closed the Correspondents’ Corridor, the workspace Pentagon reporters had used for years; announced that a future press workspace would be created outside the Pentagon; barred credentialed journalists from entering the Pentagon without prior approval and an escort; and limited even escorted access to scheduled briefings, press conferences, and interviews arranged through public-affairs offices. Plaintiffs moved to compel compliance the following day.
On Apr. 9, 2026, Judge Friedman granted the motion and made an express finding of noncompliance. The court’s opinion stated:
“After considering the parties’ written submissions, their oral arguments, and the relevant caselaw, the Court concludes that the defendants have failed to comply with its Order.”
The accompanying order likewise declared that, by adopting and enforcing the relevant portions of the Interim Policy, “Defendants are in violation of the Order this Court issued on March 20, 2026.” The court specified that “[t]he violation encompasse[d]” the Interim Policy’s entire section on “Intentional Inducement of Unauthorized Disclosure,” including its purported safe harbors; its use of inducement as a conduct-based ground for credential denial, revocation, or non-renewal; its new access limitations and escort requirements; and its procedures governing escort privileges. The court made plain that “[i]mposing these standards and restrictions on access to the Pentagon for PFAC holders constitutes continued implementation and enforcement of those provisions of the Department’s prior PFAC Policy that this Court vacated and that it enjoined the Defendants from enforcing,” and further declared:
“[B]y continuing to impose restrictions on the ability of PFAC holders to engage in the routine, lawful journalistic activity of asking questions, Defendants are in violation of the Court’s Order. …
[B]y imposing restrictions on PFAC holders that forbid them from entering the main Pentagon building without prior approval and an escort, Defendants have failed to reinstate the PFACs of Julian E. Barnes and the following journalists with The New York Times: Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, Greg Jaffe, John Ismay, Carol Rosenberg, and W.J. Hennigan, as ordered by this Court.”
In his opinion, Judge Friedman rejected DOD’s argument that it had taken permissible new agency action rather than continued the policy the court had vacated. The Department was free to address the issue afresh, the court explained, but only through action consistent with the constitutional principles established in the Mar. 20 opinion:
“The problem for the defendants, however, is that the Department has not in fact taken ‘new’ action, at least with respect to the proscription on the ‘inducement of unauthorized disclosure.’ …
The Department cannot simply reinstate an unlawful policy under the guise of taking ‘new’ action and expect the Court to look the other way.”
The court held that DOD had also attempted to evade the restoration-of-access requirement:
“Nor can the Department take steps to circumvent the Court’s injunction and expect the Court to turn a blind eye. But that is exactly what the defendants have done by closing the Correspondents’ Corridor and imposing an escort requirement. … Rather than comply with that Order, the Department has cut off all PFAC holders’ meaningful access to the Pentagon.”
Judge Friedman rejected Defendants’ proposed reading under which compliance required only avoiding the precise words previously vacated and physically returning the credentials while eliminating the access they conferred:
“At bottom, the defendants ask this Court to hold that so long as the Department does not reinstate the exact words of the Challenged Provisions, and so long as it restores The Times’ reporters’ physical credentials, it has done enough. If the Department immediately uses new words to do the same thing? Too bad. The plaintiffs need to start over while the Court stands idly by. If the Department immediately takes steps to undermine the purpose of the reporters’ credentials, namely, entry to the Pentagon? Again, too bad. … The Court need not embrace such a narrow interpretation of its authority and permit such a blatant attempt to circumvent a lawful order of the Court to succeed.”
Addressing the revised newsgathering restriction, the court found that DOD had reproduced precisely the conduct the Mar. 20 judgment prohibited:
“But the Department has done precisely what this Court expressly forbade it from doing: it has endeavored to ‘cure’ the impermissible restrictions on a journalist seeking information not authorized for release by providing ‘targeted clarifications.’ Specifically, the Interim Policy replaces the prohibition on ‘soliciting’ non-public or unauthorized classified or unclassified information with a prohibition on ‘encouraging, inducing, or requesting’ the disclosure of that non-public or unauthorized information. That is simply using revised language to proscribe the same ‘lawful journalistic practices’ that the vacated provisions encompassed.”
The Department itself acknowledged that it was using “more words to say the same thing,” the court observed. Judge Friedman also rejected the Department’s contention that adding a knowledge requirement and six safe harbors cured the policy’s defects. The supposed “scienter requirement” was “illusory,” “‘a mirage,’” because the policy presumed knowledge whenever a journalist offered anonymity and identified “no clear path” of rebutting that presumption. The safe harbors likewise left reporters uncertain whether merely asking questions could cause revocation of a credential. The court concluded:
“In sum, there is little daylight between the Policy’s unconstitutional ‘solicitation’ prohibition and the Interim Policy’s ‘inducement’ prohibition, and the latter is impermissible for the same reasons as the former. Simply put, the Department’s attempt to ‘clarif[y]’ the Policy did not cure its constitutional infirmities. … The Court explained that the Policy’s deficiencies were so entrenched that there was no alternative but to require the Department to scrap its prior approach and start afresh. By failing to do so, the Department has violated this Court’s explicit mandate.”
Returning to the broader First Amendment consequences at the close of the opinion, Judge Friedman wrote: “With the issuance of the Interim Policy, the Department has invoked slightly different language to achieve that same unconstitutional result.” The court separately found that the Department had failed to comply with the portion of the judgment requiring restoration of the credentials and the access accompanying them, writing:
“The Department did not comply with the Court’s Order. Rather, the very next business day, the Department announced that it was immediately closing the ‘Correspondents’ Corridor’—the area in the Pentagon from which journalists had worked for years.”
DOD asserted that the court had removed its security-screening authority and made unescorted Pentagon access impossible. Judge Friedman responded: “In short, this is nonsense.” The Times reporters had already undergone screening, Barnes had held a credential without incident for more than 20 years, and the Mar. 20 opinion had expressly left intact the security measures that had “served [the Department’s] proffered interests in safety and security for decades.” The court also found “no evidence whatsoever” that relevant security circumstances had changed in the intervening weeks and emphasized: “As Judge Leon observed in a recent decision, ‘[b]ald assertions of “national security” cannot excuse the Government’s failure to follow the law.’”
Judge Friedman went on to reject the Department’s alternative representation that closing the Correspondents’ Corridor merely fulfilled an earlier commitment unrelated to the judgment. The announcement came on the next business day after the court ordered Pentagon access restored, and the record indicated that DOD personnel were unprepared to implement the purported relocation. The court held:
“In light of all this, the Court has no choice but to conclude that the Department’s abrupt closure of the Correspondents’ Corridor and its ban on credentialed journalists traveling unescorted through the Pentagon are not security measures or efforts to make good on prior commitments but rather transparent attempts to negate the impact of this Court’s Order. The point of the Court’s injunction was to restore The Times journalists’ access to the Pentagon, not merely to ensure that they have possession of a physical credential. But the access now available to PFAC holders in the wake of this Court’s Order is not even close to as meaningful as the broad access that PFAC holders had previously been afforded. …
In short, the Department has responded to the Court’s express instruction to return the PFACs previously held by The Times’ journalists and restore the access to the Pentagon that came with those credentials by instead cutting off that access for all journalists. That response flouts the Court’s explicit directives and disregards the constitutional principles at the heart of its Opinion.”
The court therefore permanently enjoined enforcement of the identified Interim Policy provisions against Times journalists and ordered Defendants to permit them access to the Pentagon “in a manner commensurate with the access provided to PFAC holders on March 20, 2026.” It further imposed an enhanced compliance requirement: by Apr. 16, Defendants were required to file a status report, accompanied by an affidavit or declaration from a Department official with personal knowledge, describing the steps taken to ensure compliance and certifying compliance with the order. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce its judgment.
43. Warrantless immigration arrests in D.C.: ICE guidance’s “flawed definition of escape risk” and “failure to instruct officers to consider community ties” “violate the preliminary injunction order.”
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Escobar Molina v. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-03417 (D.D.C.)
This case is a challenge to the Trump administration’s warrantless civil immigration arrest campaign in the District of Columbia, alleging arrests without warrants or probable cause and seeking to enjoin the policy
On Dec. 2, 2025, Judge Howell granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (PI) and class certification, enjoining Defendants and their agents from enforcing a policy or practice of making warrantless civil immigration arrests in D.C. without a pre-arrest, individualized determination by the arresting agent of probable cause that the person was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained. The PI also required officers to document the particularized facts supporting that determination, including community ties known at the time of arrest, and required Defendants to provide the arrest documentation periodically to Plaintiffs’ counsel.
On Jan. 28, 2026, then-Acting ICE Director Todd Lyons issued a memorandum to ICE personnel nationwide providing guidance on civil immigration arrests, including how officers should assess escape risk before making warrantless arrests (the “Lyons Memo”). Defendants subsequently relied on the Memo as evidence that they were complying with the PI.
On Feb. 19, Plaintiffs moved to enforce the PI, arguing that Defendants were violating it in two principal respects: first, by continuing to make warrantless civil immigration arrests in D.C. without the required pre-arrest, individualized probable-cause determination that the person was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained; and second, by failing to comply with the PI’s reporting requirements. Plaintiffs argued that the post-injunction Form I-213 arrest records produced by Defendants showed the same allegedly unlawful practice continuing in substance, with many of those records relying on repetitive boilerplate rather than particularized escape-risk analysis, omitting key facts including community ties, and in some instances containing contradictions or inaccuracies. Plaintiffs further argued that Defendants’ productions were incomplete and untimely, including failures to provide the specific facts and arrest times the order required. The court ordered expedited briefing (Defendants’ opposition; Plaintiffs’ reply) and set a hearing for March 11.
In the Mar.11 hearing, questioning whether the Form I-213 arrest records demonstrated compliance with the PI, the court and Assistant U.S. Attorney John Bardo had the following exchange:
THE COURT: And do the defendants agree that at least some of the I-213s reflect that warrantless arrests were conducted without fully considering escape risk?
MR. BARDO: We agree that there are some forms where the escape-risk analysis could have been better.
THE COURT: Well, for example, the … form docketed at 78-23, there’s no discussion of escape risk at all. So it’s not fully, but there was none. Some of them have none. Right?
MR. BARDO: There are some, but most of them do have a documentation of escape risk, and the standard for whether to issue an enforcement on a PI is whether there’s been substantial noncompliance. And sure, there are instances where rank-and-file agents mess up and some of these could be better, but on the whole, I think the evidence we’ve submitted shows that we are making efforts to comply.” (emphasis added.)
Further, when asked at the March 11 hearing whether an arrest record relying solely on the person’s presence in a vehicle would be flagged as insufficient, Bardo also acknowledged that “that would be flagged as not compliant with the court’s order,” while maintaining the government’s disagreement with the court’s interpretation. Following the hearing, Plaintiffs narrowed their requested relief in a March 27 supplemental brief and accompanying revised proposed order, seeking to prohibit Defendants from relying on the Lyons Memo’s probable-cause standard or analytical approach when conducting warrantless civil immigration arrests in D.C.
In its May 7, 2026 opinion, Judge Howell granted Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the PI, holding that the Lyons Memo’s “flawed definition of escape risk” and “failure to instruct officers to consider community ties” “violate the preliminary injunction order.” She agreed with Plaintiffs’ assessment that “remarkably little has changed” despite the court’s order.
The court explained that the Memo repeatedly narrowed the escape-risk inquiry to whether a person would remain at the scene, without requiring consideration of whether the person could later be found at home, work, or another identifiable location. Many arrest records reflected that same approach, citing the person’s presence “at large” or in a vehicle without addressing whether officers could locate them elsewhere. Rejecting Defendants’ efforts to reinterpret the guidance through briefing, Judge Howell stated: “Whatever defendants may represent to this Court as the correct interpretation of the Lyons Memo, defendants’ officers have not received the same message.”
The Memo also “simply ignores community ties,” and the arrest records were “virtually silent” on that subject. Defendants argued that references to identification and work authorization addressed those considerations, but Judge Howell found that their arguments amounted to “little more than creative reframing of the Lyons Memo.” She concluded: “The Lyons Memo’s failure to instruct its officers to inquire about community ties pre-arrest, resulting in most of the Form I-213s containing no information about community ties, constitutes a violation of the preliminary injunction order.”
Although other challenged portions of the Memo passed muster on their face, Judge Howell held that its flawed escape-risk definition and omission of community ties “leaves no alternative but to prohibit reliance on the memorandum in its entirety.” The court therefore prohibited Defendants from relying on the Memo’s probable-cause standard or analytical approach when conducting warrantless civil immigration arrests in D.C.
44-a. Colorado ICE warrantless arrests: “materially violated the preliminary injunction” by continuing warrantless arrests without individualized flight-risk determinations; “uniformly failed to observe” documentation requirements; “manifest noncompliance”
Judge R. Brooke Jackson (Obama appointee), Ramirez Ovando v. Mullin, 1:25-cv-03183 (D. Colo.)
This class action arose from ICE’s practice in Colorado of making civil immigration arrests without warrants and without the individualized assessment of likelihood of escape required by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
On Nov. 25, 2025, Judge Jackson granted in large part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court enjoined Defendants from making warrantless arrests in the District of Colorado unless, before arrest, the arresting officer had probable cause both that the individual was unlawfully present and that the individual was “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” The court required officers to assess likelihood of escape based on the totality of the circumstances, including community ties, and required officers to document the facts and circumstances of warrantless arrests in Form I-213s. It also required production of samples of those records to permit monitoring of compliance.
After Plaintiffs moved to enforce the injunction on March 3, 2026, Judge Jackson held a two-day evidentiary hearing. On May 12, 2026, in an order granting enforcement in part, Judge Jackson found that Defendants had “demonstrated material noncompliance with the PI Order” and that further relief was “warranted and necessary.” The operative order expressly stated: “The Court finds that defendants have materially violated the preliminary injunction.” The court found that ICE officers had “continued to effect warrantless arrests without making individualized probable cause determinations of the likelihood of escape in defiance of § 1357(a)(2) and the PI,” and had “entirely failed to document these arrests in the manner prescribed.” Judge Jackson separately found that ICE had “uniformly failed to observe the documentation requirements for warrantless arrests under the PI.”
With respect to documentation failures, the court noted: “Not one of the 36 I-213s” produced under the injunction complied with the requirement to identify a warrantless arrest as such, and none recorded the required community-ties information or “the specific, particularized facts” supporting a conclusion that the individual was likely to escape. Jackson concluded that “ICE’s failure to comply with the PI’s documentation requirements for warrantless arrests is largely conceded and, in any event, established,” and that Defendants’ subsequent corrective measures “do not erase the manifest noncompliance with the PI to this point.”
Failures in ICE’s recordkeeping also created issues. The court found that ICE did not reliably distinguish between arrests made without a warrant and arrests made pursuant to a warrant. ICE “fail[ed] to document where an arrest was made on a warrant,” the court wrote, emphasizing that “ICE’s consistent failure to distinguish in the I-213s between warrantless arrests and arrests upon a warrant confounds effective oversight.” Although Judge Jackson said that failing to document whether an arrest was made pursuant to a warrant was “not itself a violation of the PI,” he made clear that ICE’s conduct “made it very difficult to discern the precise extent of ICE’s noncompliance with respect to warrantless arrests,” later adding that it “frustrates plaintiffs’ and the Court’s ability to effectively monitor compliance.”
Judge Jackson also found that Defendants had “failed to adequately train their deportation officers on the requirements of the PI.” Three officers who testified displayed inadequate understanding of their obligations, and the court concluded that existing training had not reached the officers making arrests in the field.
The court therefore ordered enhanced compliance measures. Defendants were required to develop compliant training, train officers authorized to make warrantless arrests in the District, provide monthly training certifications and materials, produce broader categories of Form I-213s and associated warrants and Notices to Appear, maintain a master arrest list, and document when and how purported field warrants were obtained. Judge Jackson also awarded Plaintiffs their reasonable fees and costs incurred in enforcing the injunction.
On Sept. 24, in an order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, the court reiterated that the May 12 ruling had found that Defendants “materially violated the preliminary injunction.” As to fees, Jackson held that the court possesses inherent authority to award attorney’s fees “as a sanction for violation of the Court’s orders, including against the United States,” and denied reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees for their work enforcing the injunction.
44-b. Colorado ICE warrantless arrests: mistaken-identity arrest “violated the Court’s enforcement order;” deficient arrest-record production “indicates noncompliance;” involved agents “should be sanctioned”
Judge R. Brooke Jackson (Obama appointee), Ramirez Ovando v. Mullin, 1:25-cv-03183 (D. Colo.)
This sub-item concerns further compliance problems addressed after the court’s May 12, 2026 enforcement order imposed additional training, reporting, and documentation requirements on ICE.
On Aug. 26, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a status report and notice alleging that Defendants were failing to comply with the preliminary injunction and the May 12 enforcement order. Defendants disputed the allegations. On Sept. 24, 2026, Judge Jackson issued an Order re Compliance Issues, explaining that, “[i]n the hope of motivating productive conferral,” he would offer comments on the disputed incidents.
As to several arrests where Plaintiffs alleged that ICE officers had not confirmed the existence of warrants before making the arrests, Judge Jackson found a “factual dispute” that could not be resolved on the parties’ submissions. He directed defense counsel to “investigate in good faith,” adding that, if the agents had not confirmed the warrants before the arrests, “they should be counseled.”
As to one mistaken-identity arrest, Plaintiffs alleged that ICE officers showed a detainee a warrant for another person and, after he told them he was not the person named, broke his car window, removed and handcuffed him, and transported him to an ICE field office without first asking his name. Judge Jackson stated that “[t]he asserted facts appear to be credible.” He found that “[t]he mistaken identity was not reasonable, the follow up conduct was not reasonable, and the warrantless arrest violated the Court’s enforcement order.” The court added: “The involved agents should be sanctioned, and the arrestee should be released if he is still in custody.”
Judge Jackson identified other potentially unlawful arrests. The detention of CRS “appears to be an unlawful warrantless arrest” because he was handcuffed before any field interview and before ICE obtained an I-200. As to SN, Jackson stated that “[b]eing handcuffed and secured in a vehicle ordinarily goes beyond an investigative detention and is an arrest,” but found it “difficult to gauge” from the parties’ submissions whether officer-safety considerations “justified” the measures in that instance. As to DRM, the court stated that, if the detainee’s account was accurate, “it was an arrest, not an investigative detention, and a subsequent field warrant would not cure the violation.”
In another incident, the court could not resolve a factual dispute concerning the driver, JDB, but separately addressed his 18-year-old passenger, DBDJ. Jackson said that DBDJ’s injuries “tend to corroborate that this was an unlawful arrest.” He added that, if DBDJ remained in custody, “he should be released, ICE should pay his medical bills, and the officers who assaulted him should be sanctioned.”
The court separately addressed ICE’s ongoing deficiencies in producing arrest records. Plaintiffs asserted that requested documentation for 29 individuals was missing or incomplete; Defendants said some requests had been withdrawn, some records had already been produced, and they would supplement their production. Judge Jackson nevertheless emphasized that “[t]he production of documentation in compliance with the Court’s orders should be an achievable baseline obligation.” He added: “Deficient production indicates noncompliance either by counsel (unlikely) or the responsible ICE officials.” Jackson directed that “[c]ounsel should meet again with appropriate ICE officials and impress on them the importance of compliant production.”
45. Cities Church prosecution: “the government did not meet its disclosure deadline” by producing unauthorized redactions; “no lack of clarity” about discovery obligations; government’s justification “simply wrong”
Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko, United States v. Levy Armstrong, 0:26-cr-00025 (D. Minn.)
This criminal prosecution arose from a January 2026 anti-ICE protest during a service at Cities Church in St. Paul. More than 30 people, putatively including civil rights activists and journalists, were charged with conspiracy against rights and interfering with religious worship.
On Mar. 20, 2026, Judge Micko set an Apr. 24 deadline for the government’s discovery disclosures. An Apr. 24 Amended Protective Order restricted the use and dissemination of protected information and required recipients to certify that they would comply. On May 7, three Defendants sought court intervention, alleging that the government had nevertheless produced heavily redacted discovery concealing witness identities and contact information. The government denied violating the order; it argued that additional redactions were permissible and necessary to protect victims and witnesses.
At the May 14 status conference, Judge Micko questioned the government’s approach:
“Help me understand how, when there’s a comprehensive court order, that the Government then unilaterally determines that it’s going to take steps separate and apart from that court order that affect a defendant’s rights to a fair trial, to effective assistance of counsel, and under Rule 16.” (emphasis added).
Addressing the disclosure deadline, he stated:
“You know, these disclosures — it’s hard for me not to say that these disclosures should have been made unredacted back on April 24th.” (emphasis added).
Ruling at the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Micko explained that the Amended Protective Order governed the characterization, use, and dissemination of discovery materials, rather than simply materials supplied in unredacted form. He concluded:
“It was intended to be more broadly used, and I don’t think that the redactions that I’ve heard about today are consistent with that amended protective order.” (emphasis added).
He then ordered corrective production:
“All of that to say, I don’t find any basis for the Government’s redactions in discovery that was produced, so I am going to order that the Government reproduce the discovery that is due and has been produced consistent with Rule 16.” (emphasis added).
Later on May 14, in an order on discovery, Judge Micko explained:
“In the Court’s view, there was no lack of clarity about the government’s discovery obligations. The Court’s Pretrial Scheduling and Litigation Management Order required government disclosures to be made no later than April 24, 2026. Those disclosures were to include all information required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a). The government’s suggestion that by not specifically ordering the disclosure of unredacted discovery the Court tacitly permitted self-help redactions is simply wrong: the presumption is full and unredacted disclosure. Deviation from that norm requires leave of court. And the Court’s prior orders did not contemplate that the government’s disclosures would be redacted to render them incomplete, since the issue was never brought to the Court (until now).” (citations omitted; emphasis added.)
The court also rejected the government’s reliance on the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, explaining that the protective order already addressed victims’ privacy interests. The court further stressed: “The statute does not, however, permit the government to take its own approach to discovery beyond the bounds of the Court’s Protective Order” (emphasis added).
In a separate scheduling order, Judge Micko also wrote:
“As explained in a separate Order issued today, the Court has concluded the government did not meet its disclosure deadline, since its disclosures included redactions not authorized by the Court’s Amended Protective Order.” (emphasis added.)
The court ordered renewed production by May 22, unredacted as to victim and witness names, addresses, and telephone numbers, and fully unredacted as to law-enforcement personal identifying information. Production remained subject to the required protective-order certifications. The court also required the parties to propose a revised schedule following the government’s compliance.
46. USDA federal grant terminations: “defendants have failed to comply with the amended deadlines;” “piecemeal” and “haphazard” production; “inexplicable and dilatory” staffing decisions; “nine outstanding deadlines for discovery”
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Urban Sustainability Directors Network v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-01775 (D.D.C.).
This case challenges the Department of Agriculture’s termination of federal grants, including an alleged policy of canceling grants associated with diversity, equity, and inclusion or climate initiatives without individualized review. The administrative-record and discovery disputes concerned the documents needed to establish how USDA selected grants for termination and whether the alleged broader policy existed.
After Defendants missed a Dec. 4, 2025 deadline for supplementing the administrative record and did not request an extension until Dec. 16, Plaintiffs moved for sanctions. In her May 29, 2026 opinion, Judge Howell granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the administrative record and authorized limited discovery, but denied their motion for sanctions. She expressly acknowledged “defendants’ failure to abide by the December 4, 2025, deadline,” while accepting “confusion and excusable neglect” following the government shutdown as explanations for that failure. Judge Howell nevertheless criticized the production more broadly:
“Nothing, however, justifies the ‘piecemeal’ and haphazard manner in which the administrative record has been produced so far. … Upon issuance of this memorandum opinion and going forward, defendants will not be able to rely on any misapprehension of their production obligations, and the administrative record is expected to be fully supplemented. Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions at this juncture is denied but may be renewed should defendants continue to fall short of their production obligations.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
The accompanying order required supplementation, a privilege log, and limited written discovery. The court’s June 12 scheduling order set nine interim deadlines and required completion by Sept. 2, 2026. After granting four extensions, Judge Howell observed on July 14 that Defendants appeared to have made “only minimal progress with production” and “prepared a privilege log that appears to be deficient.” She directed correction of the log and an explanation for their “failure” to arrange the required conferences with Plaintiffs, warning that “defendants’ failure to confer in an effort to facilitate timely discovery and production” would bear on further extension requests.
On Jul. 20, Judge Howell denied a fifth extension. Defendants had again requested more time before conferring with Plaintiffs, citing staff leave and an unfinished privilege review. The court found that explanation “insufficient given that deadlines have been in place for weeks.” Addressing USDA’s decision to assign additional attorneys only then, the court wrote:
“[O]nly assigning additional attorneys today is inexplicable and dilatory, since the necessity of a privilege review was foreseeable at the time the Scheduling Order was set, and adequate staffing should have accordingly been established.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Howell also stated that Defendants should have known “these three deadlines would be missed before 6:39 P.M. the day that production was ordered” and should have requested an extension earlier. Later in July, Defendants moved to vacate the discovery schedule altogether, and Plaintiffs renewed their request for adverse inferences, monetary sanctions, and additional discovery.
On Oct. 6, 2026, Judge Howell denied Defendants’ motion to vacate the discovery schedule and Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions and additional discovery, while granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. At the outset of her opinion, she explained:
“Since the original preliminary injunction was awarded in August 2025, production of a complete administrative record has been halting, necessitating judicial intervention in May 2026, to clarify defendants’ obligation to supplement the administrative record and comply with plaintiffs’ discovery requests, given defendants’ blanket denial of the alleged policy and practice claim. A scheduling order was entered to control the timing of this record supplementation and discovery as to the claims in this case, but even after grant of defendants’ requests for four extensions of time to accommodate the filing of the Second Amended Complaint adding additional plaintiffs, defendants have failed to comply with the amended deadlines set out in the court-ordered schedules.” (citations omitted; emphasis added.)
The opinion subsequently recounted the defaults in a section headed “Defendants’ Noncompliance with the Scheduling Order.” In addressing Defendants’ request to vacate that schedule, Judge Howell noted that they still had “nine outstanding deadlines for discovery.” She rejected their request, explaining:
“Granting defendants’ motion to vacate would leave discovery in this case in an unacceptable liminal state with no deadlines, and that requires denial of defendants’ motion.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Howell nevertheless denied the requested sanctions. Considering the increased discovery burden and Defendants’ belated staffing efforts, she concluded that “plaintiffs have not established the bad faith requisite for adverse inferences.” She also denied monetary sanctions and attorneys’ fees for lack of the required showing of bad faith.
47. New York City magnet-school grants: Defendants “dragged their feet on awarding any money;” “cannot maneuver around a forfeiture by adding in more steps into the grant process”
Judge Arun Subramanian (Biden appointee), The Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York v. United States Department of Education, 1:25-cv-08547 (S.D.N.Y.)
This case challenges the Department of Education’s discontinuation of five federal grants supporting nineteen New York City magnet schools, based on alleged Title IX violations arising from the school system’s policies concerning transgender students.
On Apr. 8, 2026, Judge Subramanian vacated the non-continuation decisions, finding that the Department had failed to follow Title IX’s required procedures. He permanently enjoined Defendants from non-continuing the grants on Title IX grounds without following those procedures and ordered new continuation determinations within ten days. The court did not order payment of a particular amount.
The Department continued the grants but delayed determining the award amounts, prompting the Board to move to enforce the judgment on May 14. Defendants maintained that deciding whether to continue the grants and determining their amounts were separate steps.
At the June 4, 2026 hearing, Judge Subramanian granted enforcement, finding that Defendants had forfeited arguments that the ten-day deadline was insufficient to determine the award amounts because they had not challenged the injunction’s scope. He explained:
“While there might have been good arguments that ten days was too short a time to make a determination of the amount to be granted, defendants did not make those arguments at that time. Those arguments were, therefore, forfeited, and defendants cannot maneuver around a forfeiture by adding in more steps into the grant process.” (emphasis added.)
The court also rejected the asserted regulatory justification for delaying the awards:
“But even setting aside the forfeiture issue, defendants have not pointed to any basis in the regulations for making a continuation determination first and then making a determination as to the amount later.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Subramanian noted that government counsel had acknowledged that he could identify no specific regulation establishing that multistep process. Defendants cited two earlier instances in which continuation and award amounts had been determined separately, but the court explained that those apparently unchallenged instances “do not allow the agency to otherwise avoid following these regulations.”
In his June 4 written order, Judge Subramanian required Defendants to determine the appropriate awards by June 9 and issue grant-award notifications reflecting those determinations. He specified that “defendants must make any determination that serves as the predicate for the funding of the grants by this deadline.”
Recounting this sequence in his Oct. 5, 2026 opinion, Judge Subramanian wrote that Defendants “dragged their feet on awarding any money, which led the Board to file a motion to enforce the Court’s judgment.”
48. DOGE access to SSA records: “flagrant disregard;” government “admitted misconduct and lack of compliance” with a court order: “serious if not egregious misrepresentations”
Judge Ellen Lipton Hollander (Obama appointee), American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Social Security Administration, 1:25-cv-00596 (D. Md.)
On appeal: American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Social Security Administration, No. 25-1411 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 2026) (en banc).
This case challenges DOGE’s access to highly sensitive Social Security records. On Mar. 20, 2025, Judge Hollander issued a temporary restraining order restricting DOGE’s access to SSA records containing personally identifiable information (PII). A preliminary injunction replaced the TRO on Apr. 17; the Supreme Court stayed that injunction on June 6. On Jan. 16, 2026, SSA filed a “Notice of Corrections to the Record,” disclosing previously unreported conduct that was “potentially outside of SSA policy and/or noncompliant with” the TRO.
The Notice identified three episodes directly concerning compliance. First, although SSA had certified compliance on Mar. 24, 2025, a DOGE team member ran PII searches that morning, with the last search occurring at approximately 9:30 a.m.; access to all PII was not terminated until approximately noon, before the certification was filed. Second, a DOGE team member received access to ten database schemas containing PII from Mar. 26 to Apr. 2, although SSA said the employee never used that access to search or view PII. Third, a DOGE team member received access to a call center profile permitting access to PII from Apr. 9 to June 11; SSA said it did not know whether PII had been accessed. SSA stated that both employees receiving the later grants of access had previously been informed of the TRO and its restrictions. The Notice also disclosed inaccuracies or omissions concerning DOGE’s systems access, data handling and activities at SSA.
On June 26, 2026, Judge Hollander denied Defendants’ motion to rescind or stay her Apr. 14 order authorizing limited discovery. She characterized the Notice as reporting “serious if not egregious misrepresentations by members of DOGE and SSA,” adding: “The seriousness of the Notice cannot be overstated.” She quoted the account of repeated TRO violations in Judge Robert B. King’s earlier appellate opinion, discussed below, and she independently explained:
“Moreover, the pendency of the Motion to Dismiss does not preclude discovery, particularly where discovery pertains to defendants’ admitted misconduct and lack of compliance with a prior Court order. In particular, defendants have admitted that DOGE Team members ran PII searches on SSA systems on the morning of the very day compliance with the TRO was certified, and that DOGE personnel received PII access on at least two occasions after the TRO was issued.”
Those admissions, she continued, presented the significant questions about noncompliance necessary to establish good cause for discovery. Rejecting Defendants’ argument that the inquiry must be confined to the administrative record, she wrote:
“Rather, the discovery is aimed at defendants’ conduct in regard to the TRO, including their lack of compliance with the TRO and the candor of defendants’ representations to the Court. Defendants’ insistence that the parties and the Court must consider only the APA record that defendants previously produced is a red herring.”
Hollander further stated that the Notice “suggests that the conduct of the DOGE Team transformed a potential concern into reality by flagrant disregard of the TRO.” The inquiry concerned conduct and compliance with judicial orders, rather than solely the agency decision under APA review. She invoked the court’s inherent authority to investigate possible fraud upon the court and ensure compliance with its orders, explaining:
“Moreover, defendants’ failure to comply with the terms of the TRO could lead to a contempt hearing.”
The requested discovery overlapped with matters Hollander had intended to investigate herself, “out of concern that DOGE appears to have considered itself above the law.” For the time being, she allowed Plaintiffs’ discovery to proceed instead of initiating a separate inquiry.
The court nevertheless expressly reserved factual questions concerning the disclosures and additional allegations reported in newspaper articles:
“The Court need not resolve here whether the allegations asserted in the Notice and in the Washington Post articles are true.”
The inconsistencies with Defendants’ earlier representations warranted investigation. Hollander concluded that Plaintiffs could seek discovery concerning “the issues surrounding defendants’ alleged noncompliance with the TRO.” The June ruling thus expressly characterized conduct as lack of compliance while authorizing further investigation; it did not resolve every alleged violation or impose contempt sanctions.
The Fourth Circuit had already addressed the disclosures in its Apr. 10, 2026 decision vacating the preliminary injunction by a 9–6 vote and remanding for further proceedings. Nine judges accepted Plaintiffs’ preliminary showing of standing, but a different nine agreed, across separate opinions, that Plaintiffs had not established irreparable harm because damages or a permanent injunction could provide an adequate remedy.
In Part IV of his opinion, joined by Chief Judge Albert Diaz and Judge Pamela Harris, Judge Toby Heytens stated that the government admitted providing inaccurate information to the district court and “may not have fully complied with its temporary restraining order.” He wrote: “The government’s recent acknowledgments are alarming and raise serious questions about its earlier conduct before the district court.”
Although the January Notice had been added to the appellate record, Heytens confined review to the record before the district court when it issued the injunction. He separately described the later allegations Plaintiffs flagged in a March 10 filing as “even more alarming,” while noting that they were not part of the appellate record. On remand, he explained, the parties could introduce further evidence and the district court could consider requests for relief or corrective action. This passage was joined by three judges; it was not a majority finding that the TRO had been violated.
Judge Robert B. King, joined by Judges Roger L. Gregory, James A. Wynn Jr., Stephanie D. Thacker, DeAndrea Gist Benjamin and Nicole G. Berner, dissented from the judgment. King maintained that the corrected record should inform the appellate decision and stated that the Notice “confesses repeated violations” of the TRO. He identified the violations expressly:
“The TRO was violated by SSA’s failure to terminate the DOGE affiliates’ unfettered records access until approximately noon on March 24, 2025, as well as by a DOGE affiliate’s searches of SSA records for personal information earlier that morning;
The TRO was again violated when SSA gave a DOGE affiliate access to certain records containing personal information from March 26 to April 2, 2025, and yet again when SSA gave a DOGE affiliate access to different records containing personal information from April 9 to June 11, 2025, through the period that the preliminary injunction was unstayed.”
King also stated that SSA had falsely assured the district court of compliance with the TRO. Judge Hollander quoted these conclusions.
In a separate concurrence in the judgment, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III cautioned that the whistleblower report had not been substantiated and that the government should have an opportunity to respond. Nevertheless, he stated that the district court could assess that report and other new revelations when considering a permanent injunction on remand.
49. DOJ disclosures in criminal prosecution: “the sealing order was not honored by the Department of Justice;” “clear violation of the sealing order;” sealing orders “must be scrupulously honored”
Magistrate Judge Laura K. McNally, United States v. Torres, 1:26-cr-00345 (N.D. Ill.)
This criminal case involved federal charges against three alleged members of Tren de Aragua for conspiring to kidnap and murder a man in Chicago, and the Justice Department’s subsequent disclosure of information from the sealed case while the court’s sealing order remained in effect.
On June 29, 2026, at the government’s request, Judge McNally sealed the complaint, supporting affidavit, arrest warrants, and motion to seal. The government represented that public filing before the arrest warrants could be executed “could alert the defendants and result in their flight and the destruction of evidence,” and requested that the materials remain sealed “until the time of arrest of all defendants in this case or further order of the Court, whichever occurs earlier.” Judge McNally’s order adopted that limitation and permitted disclosure by law-enforcement personnel only “as necessary to facilitate the enforcement of criminal law,” including execution of the warrants, or to assist another federal official in performing official duties.
On July 1, with one defendant still at large, the government called chambers at approximately 10:05 a.m. seeking to unseal a redacted complaint and represented that it needed a ruling “within the next 15 minutes.” It then hand-delivered proposed redactions, but no formal motion had been filed. Judge McNally did not act on the request before a Justice Department press conference went forward in Washington. Later that day, the court denied the government’s request, emphasizing that when it had granted the government’s own sealing motion, “[t]he Court relied on the sincerity and truthfulness of that representation,” and that the government had “offered no reason to believe that its prior concerns regarding flight or the destruction of evidence have been addressed.”
At the July 1 press conference, U.S. Attorney Andrew Boutros appeared with Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche and FBI Director Kash Patel. As Judge McNally later recounted from the press conference at the July 9 hearing, Blanche began by announcing: “This morning in Chicago, federal and local law enforcement charged three TdA members … on a criminal complaint charging the brutal murder of another victim in the Chicago area.” Judge McNally observed: “That’s more than we allow on our docket here, that statement.” She further recounted that Boutros himself announced that “[a] criminal complaint was filed yesterday in the Northern District of Illinois charging three individuals,” identified the two defendants then in custody, and described the kidnapping and murder forming the basis of the complaint. Later in the press conference, Blanche announced that “we’re putting some photos up from the complaint from the Chicago arrests.” As Judge McNally put it, “those photos were … lifted from this under-seal complaint and put up on a screen.”
On July 2, while the case remained sealed, the Justice Department issued a press release and the criminal complaint was posted before the court had entered an order unsealing the matter. At an initial appearance at approximately 3:00 p.m., government lawyers acknowledged that no unsealing order had yet entered and that the seal had not terminated by its own terms. Judge McNally later summarized that “finally it was all unsealed on July 2nd at 3:00.” Later on July 2, after granting the government’s oral motion to unseal, the court entered a separate minute order expressing “serious concerns regarding the Government’s compliance on 7/1/26 and 7/2/26 with the order sealing this case.” On her own motion, she set a July 9 hearing “for further discussions about potential violations of the sealing order” and ordered Boutros to attend in person. On July 8, the government asked the court to strike the hearing, but Judge McNally denied the request.
At the July 9 hearing, Judge McNally stated at the outset:
“Having read [the government’s filing], I conclude that last week the sealing order was not honored by the Department of Justice. But I also find and I conclude, thank God, no concrete harm came as a result of this violation in this instance. And finally, I’m going to be today making no finding here that you acted with any nefarious purpose or that this was done in direct and open defiance of a court order.”
The court added that it would not make “a finding about what was in [Boutros’s] heart,” notwithstanding his representation that he had acted in good faith. The court’s purpose, as Judge McNally explained, was “to emphasize the critical nature of sealing orders and to admonish the department and remind it and its leadership, including you, Mr. Boutros, that … sealing court orders must be scrupulously honored.”
In explaining why the violation mattered, Judge McNally emphasized the reliance courts place on government representations supporting secrecy. She explained that sealing may be necessary to protect “safety to the community,” “safety of witnesses,” “safety of cooperators,” and “safety of law enforcement,” as well as to prevent “flight and the destruction of evidence.” She then described the court’s reliance on the Justice Department:
“As a judge, I trust and I believe the representations of the members of the department that them sealing orders are necessary. I don’t do any independent investigation of that. I trust what you say, as I should. And I take it to heart because when you tell me lives … may be at stake, I will believe you, and I do believe you. And that happened here. It was not a cavalier decision.”
On the July 1 disclosures, Judge McNally held that “it was a clear violation of the sealing order. The order was unambiguous.” She noted that the government itself had recognized the order remained operative by seeking to have it lifted, and concluded that the seal had not terminated before the press conference. “As to was there a violation, I conclude that there was a violation,” the court said.
Judge McNally rejected the government’s argument that the press conference disclosures fell within the order’s exception permitting disclosures “as necessary to facilitate the enforcement of criminal law.” She observed that the press conference had not included a request for public assistance in finding the remaining defendant; instead, “[i]t was described as a fait accompli, here are the charges we’ve made.” Accepting the government’s construction, she explained, would effectively permit the Justice Department or its law enforcement partners to decide for themselves when sealed allegations could be publicly announced. She rejected that reading:
“I would not have signed an order that permitted the full discretion of the entire law enforcement community to decide that at this point we think what we’re doing here should not be sealed. I would not have granted that motion, and I did not intend it to have that meaning.”
Judge McNally likewise rejected the suggestion that Boutros could reasonably have assumed the court would lift the seal before the press conference. The government had first contacted chambers at 10:05 a.m., seeking a ruling within 15 minutes, without a motion before the court. Judge McNally told Boutros:
“Sir, 15 minutes door to door is not a reasonable time to assume that a court will be able to receive a request without a motion, consider that request and issue a ruling. It is frankly not reasonable to assume that would happen.”
The court added that, even if Boutros may in fact have assumed the order would issue, “I am finding it was not reasonable for you to assume that would have happened,” adding, “when there is an order, the assumption should be that the order will remain in place.”
Judge McNally also rejected any suggestion that the Executive Branch could itself determine that the order had ceased to operate. “When I sign an order, I am the drafter,” she said, even when the court uses language proposed by a party. Addressing the government’s separation-of-powers argument, she told Boutros: “I certainly disagree as to whether it is your prerogative to dissolve a court order without court permission.” The government “could have sought relief” and explained why circumstances had changed, but “[t]hat didn’t happen.” She concluded:
“The orders of this court in this independent branch of government are effective until they terminate on their terms or are rescinded, and neither of those things happened here which is why I’m concluding there was a violation of the order.”
Judge McNally also made explicit where she was not assigning responsibility. Responding to Boutros’s filing, which noted that members of his team had gone to chambers seeking to unseal the complaint, she stated: “I do not hold them to have violated the sealing order. I have no evidence at all that a line assistant violated the sealing order or … spoke as precluded by the sealing order.” She distinguished those government attorneys from Boutros, noting: “What I do know is that your statement acknowledges that you were aware when you went up there that there was a sealing order in place.”
Boutros responded that “[t]he sincere hope was that by the time I landed in Washington, all three defendants were in custody,” but one remained at large. He said that, after landing, he instructed his team, “we got to get this unsealed,” and that the last communication he saw before entering the press conference was that his team was “going to chambers … to take care of this.” Boutros said he deliberately arranged to speak later in the press conference in the hope that the additional “15 or 20 minutes” would allow time for an order to be entered, while also believing that the law-enforcement exception supplied a fallback if that did not happen. He maintained that his “intentions were never to not be in compliance with the Court’s order, but to the contrary, to always follow the Court’s order and to do so at every stage.”
Judge McNally carefully limited the consequences of her finding. She reiterated that she was “not making a finding of deliberate defiance” and said that “[p]erhaps there was a misunderstanding in the meaning of the order.” Her goal was to make clear going forward that court orders remain operative until rescinded or expired and that sealing orders “must be scrupulously honored.” She then stated: “from my perspective that is the end of this. There will not be any further investigation, sanctions, consequence.” Boutros, in turn, called the episode “all very regrettable and very unfortunate,” said he took the court’s concerns seriously, and told the court that the U.S. Attorney’s Office would examine what happened from a “root cause perspective to see how we can do better and how we can try to avoid this.”
A July 9 minute entry formally memorialized the result: “the Court finds that the Government violated the sealing order on 7/1/26 and 7/2/26. The Government is admonished to maintain scrupulous adherence to all future sealing orders in this case.”
50. Environmental and climate justice grants: EPA “defying this Court’s prior order” by refusing to administer the grant program based on a statutory interpretation “which this Court specifically rejected;” “may not flout the Court’s prior order”
Judge Richard Mark Gergel (Obama appointee), The Sustainability Institute v. Trump, 2:25-cv-02152 (D.S.C.)
This case challenges the Trump administration’s freeze and termination of federal environmental and climate grants, including the Environmental Protection Agency’s Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grant Program (ECJ Program).
On June 11, 2026, Judge Gergel granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs, declaring EPA’s guidance terminating the ECJ Program unlawful and vacating it. The court rejected Defendants’ argument that the July 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act had eliminated all funding for the program, holding that it rescinded only funds unobligated when the legislation passed. Although the court denied a permanent injunction requiring EPA to implement the program, it explained that vacatur should be sufficient to restore its operation.
Plaintiffs moved to enforce and clarify the ruling on June 29, alleging that EPA refused to take steps to administer the program. In its opposition, Defendants maintained that vacatur was self-executing and “does not compel further action.” It also continued to argue that the legislation rescinded funds becoming unobligated after enactment, leaving no funding available for new grants.
On July 22, 2026, Judge Gergel granted the enforcement motion in part, rejecting EPA’s reliance on a statutory interpretation the court had already rejected. He wrote: “the EPA is defying this Court’s prior order because of an interpretation of the Act which this Court specifically rejected.” The court clarified that EPA must comply with its statutory obligations to administer the ECJ Program through September 30, 2026. Emphasizing that its interpretation was the law of the case, the court stated that “the EPA may not flout the Court’s prior order based on a legal argument which it advanced and the Court rejected.”
On Aug. 20, the Fourth Circuit stayed the Jul. 22 order pending appeal, without explaining its reasoning or expressly vacating the noncompliance finding. The court denied rehearing en banc on Sept. 23.
51. Epstein Files Transparency Act disclosures: “The Defendant’s assertions do not comply with the Court’s Order” because he failed to provide documentation supporting claims that redacted names belonged to victims or potential victims
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan (Clinton appointee), Phang v. Blanche, 1:26-cv-01417 (D.D.C.)
This case involves the Epstein Files Transparency Act and whether the Department of Justice substantially complied with the Act’s file-production requirements.
On Apr. 27, 2026, Katie Phang, a journalist, lawyer, and legal analyst who has covered Jeffrey Epstein and his network, filed a complaint alleging that Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche has failed to comply with the requirements of the Epstein Files Transparency Act to publicly produce relevant documents.
Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 28, seeking to cure Defendant’s alleged noncompliance with the Act. On June 25, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion and instructed Defendant to either produce, in their unredacted form, certain documents, and publish the redaction log in the Federal Register, or show cause as to each document why the government claimed it could not do so.
In a July 2 response, Defendant stated that certain redactions in the published version of certain documents were indeed the names of victims. In a July 25 order, Judge Sullivan ordered Defendant to provide documentation supporting any representations that certain redacted names are the names of victims
However, in his Aug. 6, 2026 order, Judge Sullivan stated:
“The Defendant did not provide such documentation; rather, he asserted that certain redacted text contains the identities of victims or potential victims whose counsel have contacted the government and requested that the persons be treated as victims. The Defendant’s assertions do not comply with the Court’s Order, which requires documentation to support the assertions.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
52. Adani foreign-bribery prosecution: DOJ’s submissions “do not cure the procedural deficiencies;” “refusal to provide additional facts as requested;” “total disregard for the procedures of this court;” “lack of respect for the Judiciary”
Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis (Clinton appointee), United States v. Adani, 1:24-cr-00433 (E.D.N.Y.)
This criminal case involved DOJ’s continuing failure to provide the factual support the court had ordered for dismissal of foreign-bribery and obstruction conspiracy charges. After repeated directions and submissions the court found deficient, Judge Garaufis denied the remaining portions of DOJ’s dismissal motion without prejudice.
On May 18, 2026, DOJ moved to dimiss all five counts against eight defendants with prejudice. The motion stated that DOJ had reviewed the case and decided, in its prosecutorial discretion, not to devote further resources to the charges.
On June 26, Judge Garaufis ordered the government to identify each reason for dismissal and provide sufficient factual support for each basis by July 13. R. Trent McCotter, then Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, responded in an unsworn July 4 letter identifying several asserted reasons for dismissal.
In an Aug. 10, 2026 opinion, the court dismissed Counts Two, Three, and Four against Gautam Adani, Sagar Adani, and Vneet Jaain, but reserved judgment on Counts One and Five because DOJ had not supplied sufficient factual support for dismissing those counts. Judge Garaufis stated:
“McCotter’s refusal to meet the procedural requirements of Rule 48(a)—even after the court’s clear direction to do so—evinces a lack of respect for the Judiciary as a co-equal branch. It also foreclosed a quick and efficient review of the requested dismissal and compelled the bifurcated resolution of the Rule 48(a) Motion.” (emphasis added.)
The court directed DOJ to identify each reason for dismissing Counts One and Five and supply sufficient factual support for each reason by Aug. 31. It separately required counsel for the five remaining defendants to confirm their clients’ consent to dismissal by that date and directed DOJ to notify counsel of that obligation.
McCotter, by then Acting Deputy Attorney General, responded on Aug. 11. He maintained that his explanations concerned matters committed to prosecutorial discretion, including evidentiary strength, enforcement priorities, victim interests, and resource allocation. He urged the court to reconsider and stated that DOJ would seek appellate relief if the remaining charges were not dismissed by Aug. 25.
In an Aug. 12 text order responding to McCotter’s Aug. 11 filing, the court wrote:
“However, it provides neither ‘factual support for each [proffered] reason’ for the decision to dismiss Counts One and Five with prejudice, nor confirmation that the Department ‘advise[d] counsel for Non-Appearing Defendants of [their] obligation’ to provide ‘the direct assurances of Non-Appearing Defendants’ consent [to the Rule 48(a) Motion] on the record.’ Thus, it does not satisfy the August 10 Order. Therefore, the Government is DIRECTED to review the Order and to comply with the requirements set forth on pages 46-47 by August 31, 2026.”
In his Aug. 14 submission, McCotter disputed the court’s assessment. He argued that his earlier explanations were sufficient and that, for matters involving policy priorities, resources, and prosecutorial discretion, “the statements of the actual decisionmaker provide any necessary evidentiary basis in full.” He also stated that he could not prove a negative concerning the absence of evidence supporting continued prosecution under DOJ’s enforcement priorities. Addressing the fact that his previous explanations were unsworn, McCotter stated:
“To the extent the Court has declined to consider those specific explanations and my previous explanations because they were previously unsworn, I hereby swear to their accuracy to the best of my knowledge, and this submission itself is made under penalty of perjury.” (emphasis added.)
McCotter otherwise stood on DOJ’s previous filings and asked the court to deny the remaining motion if it remained dissatisfied, so DOJ could seek appellate relief.
The same letter addressed the separate notification issue. McCotter confirmed that DOJ had emailed the required notice to defense counsel at 3:59 p.m. on Aug. 10, less than an hour after the order issued. He also disputed that the original order required confirmation of notification to the court. Counsel for the remaining defendants submitted confirmations of their clients’ consent on Aug. 12 and 13.
On Sept. 3, after the court’s Aug. 31 deadline passed, Judge Garaufis held:
“In light of McCotter’s refusal to provide additional facts as requested in the August 10 Order, and because the August 11 and 14 letters do not cure the procedural deficiencies identified in the August 10 Order, the court must deny the pending portions of the Rule 48(a) Motion.” (emphasis added.)
The court explained that McCotter had supplied opinions based on evidence he said he reviewed but had not submitted. Swearing to those opinions did not supply the missing factual foundation. Judge Garaufis wrote:
“Rather than heed the court’s instruction to provide additional facts in support of those reasons, McCotter asserts that the statements in his July 4 and August 11 letters—sworn to on August 14, 2026—are sufficient.
Not so.” (emphasis added.)
The court also rejected McCotter’s contention that he could not substantiate an absence of evidence. It explained that he could have submitted affidavits or reports supporting that assessment, including expert reports supporting his contention that the alleged bribes could instead be characterized as legitimate customer rebates.
Applying an earlier Rule 48(a) decision, United States v. N. V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, Judge Garaufis stated that “‘[s]uch total disregard for the procedures of this court is disheartening.’” He continued:
“And the total disregard for the procedural requirements of Rule 48(a) means that the Department’s Rule 48(a) Motion to dismiss Counts One and Five must be denied.” (emphasis added.)
The court denied the remaining dismissal request without prejudice, emphasizing that its ruling rested exclusively on procedural grounds and continuing to encourage DOJ to submit sufficient supporting evidence.
53. USPS mail-in ballot restrictions: “Defendants violated the court’s Preliminary Injunction” by completing rulemaking for the 2026 elections, “ignor[ing] the court’s explicit directive not to ‘initiat[e] or complet[e]’ rulemaking;” “Defendants cannot contend that they misunderstood the scope of the court’s order.”
Judge Indira Talwani (Obama appointee), League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. Trump, 1:26-cv-11549 (D. Mass.)
This voting-rights case challenged President Trump’s Executive Order (EO) 14399, which directed the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to adopt new requirements governing federal mail-in and absentee ballots, including restrictions on transmitting ballots that did not satisfy the prescribed requirements.
On Aug. 11, 2026, Judge Talwani granted Plaintiffs a nationwide preliminary injunction barring USPS from “implementing, giving effect to, or enforcing Section 3” of the EO with respect to the Nov. 3 midterm elections or any earlier federal election. Critically, the injunction also expressly barred USPS from “initiating or completing rulemaking to promulgate the specific regulations outlined in Section 3” for those elections.
On Aug. 21, while that injunction remained in force and without seeking a stay or filing an appeal in this case, USPS sent a Final Rule implementing Section 3 to the Office of the Federal Register, gave the rule an immediate Aug. 21 effective date, and scheduled it for publication on Aug. 26. The Final Rule acknowledged the existing injunctions and stated that USPS would not implement the rule for the 2026 election unless the government obtained relief from them. Plaintiffs moved to enforce the injunction on Aug. 22.
On Aug. 25, 2026, after Plaintiffs moved to enforce, Judge Talwani found that “Defendants violated the preliminary injunction.” Addressing their argument that the Final Rule did not violate the injunction because USPS had promised not to implement it while the injunction remained in effect, the court stated:
“These arguments ignore the court’s explicit directive not to ‘initiat[e] or complet[e]’ rulemaking. And Defendants cannot contend that they misunderstood the scope of the court’s order.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
Judge Talwani pointed to the government’s own position in related litigation, stating that Defendants had “feigned complete compliance” with an injunction in California v. Trump when seeking emergency relief from the Supreme Court. There, the government had “lamented ‘every day that the agencies are unable to take steps to carry out the Executive Order as to the November 2026 election,’” and the Supreme Court had, in Judge Talwani’s words, “accepted the government’s feigned compliance” when assessing the injunction’s effect.
Judge Talwani concluded:
“Accordingly, despite the Defendants’ protestations that ‘[t]he United States takes its obligation to comply with court orders very seriously,’ the court finds that Defendants violated the preliminary injunction in this case.”
Although Plaintiffs sought further enforcement measures, Judge Talwani found that their requested relief would “not remedy the past violation” and that the existing injunction already barred the Final Rule from having force or effect for the covered elections. The court also observed that “Defendants’ violation of the court’s order may ultimately inure to Plaintiffs’ benefit,” because the issuance of the Final Rule meant that Plaintiffs could amend their complaint to pursue their existing non-APA claims without the rule’s issuance remaining hypothetical. The court therefore concluded that “Defendants violated the court’s Preliminary Injunction” but “impose[d] no remedy other than identifying the violation.”
54. FEMA discovery: Intentional spoliation of Signal messages resulting in Rule 37(e) sanctions; “Despite numerous Court orders,” Signal messages went unproduced, deadlines and required declarations were missed, and court-ordered searches and productions were incomplete.
Judge Susan Yvonne Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 3:25-cv-03698 (N.D. Cal.)
This litigation’s supplemental claims challenged DHS’s control over FEMA staffing and planned workforce reductions.
In a Sept. 11, 2026 order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 37(e) remedies, Judge Illston identified repeated failures to carry out discovery orders concerning former DHS Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Guy and former acting FEMA head Karen Evans. Regarding Guy, the court stated:
“Despite numerous Court orders, none of Guy’s Signal messages were produced. The April 29, 2026 deadline passed without any production from Guy’s phone and without Guy’s declaration.”
The court had expressly ordered production of relevant Signal communications from high-level decisionmakers, including Guy and Evans, on March 20. Its April 22 order required searches of their personal phones, production of responsive communications and sworn preservation declarations by April 29. Although Defendants filed a “Notice of Substantial Compliance,” the court recorded that they had not supplied Guy’s court-ordered declaration. In a footnote, the court set out DOJ counsel’s explanation at the September 1 hearing:
“At the hearing on this motion, counsel explained, ‘We attempted to do so but were unable to obtain the declaration from Mr. Guy. As Department of Justice attorneys, we can ask individuals for declarations, but it’s ultimately up to those individuals to execute them.’”
On April 30, the court renewed its directions to search Guy’s phone and obtain his declaration “as previously ordered,” noting: “This declaration was also due yesterday.” Guy then submitted a declaration describing a self-search using “renewal, core, and staffing plan,” which he said found no responsive documents. The September ruling described his declaration as “literally a day late and metaphorically a dollar short:” he reported that none of his relevant Signal chats had been preserved. On May 1, the court found that “[t]he Court’s prior orders did not authorize a self-search” and that his search terms “were underinclusive.” It required defense counsel to search again.
In its September ruling, the court also described Guy’s April 30 deletion:
“While he was under a Court order to search his personal phone for relevant Signal messages, Guy—without consulting anyone, apparently—reinstalled the Signal app, thereby wiping all of his Signal message content.”
Guy testified that he reinstalled Signal on April 30 in an attempt to restore messages. The court rejected his separate preservation explanation: “Guy’s post hoc explanation that he thought someone else was preserving his messages makes little sense and does not salvage his actions.” Although he said he understood Evans to be preserving work-related messages, she was not a participant in several of his FEMA chats. The court also stated: “It is no excuse that he was not a named defendant in this case.” It called the timing of his deletion “highly suspect,” but did not find by a preponderance of the evidence that he intended to deprive Plaintiffs of the messages’ use.
Addressing Defendants’ argument that earlier discovery orders had not specified work or personal phones, the court stated: “If there was any doubt, defendants could have sought clarification from the Court.” Instead, defense counsel had taken the position during March 24 and 26 conferences that they would not search officials’ personal phones, “without any apparent basis for knowing whether the officials had used personal phones for government business.” The court added: “As it later turned out, officials had been using their personal phones for government business.”
The May 1 order also required all FEMA-related Signal chats from Evans’s phone and her planner notes reflecting meetings with Guy to be produced before Guy’s May 4 deposition. Although Defendants produced another screenshot on May 4, the court recorded: “Defendants were unable to comply with the Court’s Order regarding Evans’s personal phone and planner notes because she was traveling out of state.”
Evans’s planner records presented further problems. On April 22, the court observed that she had self-redacted her notes and “a privilege log has not yet been produced,” although “[a] privilege log was originally due March 17, 2026, with a brief extension of certain materials granted until March 20.” The court was consequently “unable to review any assertions of privilege on the present record.” The September ruling identified an omission from the ensuing court-ordered production:
“On April 27, 2026, defense counsel submitted Evans’s unredacted meeting notes for the relevant time period to the Court in camera, pursuant to Court Order. The December 3, 2025 notes were not included in that production.”
When Plaintiffs later obtained those notes, they revealed a meeting with “Joe Guy” discussing “the # for personnel.” The court found that Evans had also self-redacted highly relevant information from other planner entries, undermining her assurances about which Signal messages she had preserved.
The court emphasized that Evans shortened the auto-delete timer on the “FEMA 2.0” chat from four weeks to one week on March 11, two days after an order calling for discovery from FEMA leadership. It continued:
“Yet Evans continued to use the auto-delete feature as discovery in this case went on, such that by the time defense counsel conducted a subsequent Court-ordered search of Evans’s Signal messages on her personal phone on May 7, 2026, even the two FEMA 2.0 chats that defendants had produced in April no longer existed in Evans’s chat history.”
Evans had created a backup on April 25, but, the court observed, “the declaration she filed on April 29, in response to this Court’s Order, said nothing about the recent Signal back-up.” It found her statements about her Signal use and the evidence available “evasive and misleading.” The court concluded that “defendants’ actions were intentional under Rule 37(e)(2), on the basis of Evans’s actions with respect to her Signal messages.”
Some records were subsequently produced, including messages obtained from other custodians, but relevant messages were irrecoverably lost. The court concluded: “[P]laintiffs have been prejudiced in their ability to prove their claims due to the spoliation of Signal messages, which cannot now be recovered.”
The court granted Rule 37(e) remedies, barring specified hindsight testimony denying the staffing-reduction plan, DHS’s direction of it, or its implementation through indiscriminate separation of Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery employees. It further ordered:
“In any future proceedings in this case, the Court will presume that the lost Signal messages would have been unfavorable to Defendants because they would have been further evidence of Defendants’ plan, DHS’s control, and Defendants’ implementing actions.”
The court also held Plaintiffs entitled to “fees incurred in uncovering and addressing Defendants’ spoliation,” with the amount to be resolved by agreement or a fee application. The companion merits ruling discussed these measures under the heading “Rule 37(e) Spoliation Sanctions”.
55. HUD fair-housing grant funding: “compliance with portions of the Order” but failure to satisfy its “affirmative directive;” “indefinite period of noncompliance;” “Administrative difficulty is relevant to how compliance is accomplished; it is not a license to disregard the Court’s Order.”
Judge Myong J. Joun (Biden appointee), Massachusetts Fair Housing Center v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 3:26-cv-30117 (D. Mass.)
This case challenged the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) changes to the funding structure and allocation of grants under the Fair Housing Initiatives Program for fiscal year 2025.
On Aug. 26, 2026, Judge Joun vacated HUD’s challenged FY2025 funding notices and ordered the agency to allocate those funds using its FY2024 structure. Plaintiffs subsequently sought enforcement, arguing that HUD had stopped implementing the vacated notices but had not taken the affirmative steps necessary to distribute funding under the required structure.
On Sept. 14, 2026, Judge Joun granted the enforcement motion, with modifications, and denied HUD’s request for reconsideration. HUD had reported notifying applicants, continuing work on grant renewals, and undertaking internal analysis. The court found:
“Those actions constitute compliance with portions of the Order, but they do not satisfy the affirmative directive that HUD adopt the FY2024 structure in allocating the FY2025 funds. I will not treat the passage of time following entry of the Order as a basis for relieving Defendants of the Order altogether.” (emphasis added.)
HUD argued that statutory, regulatory, and practical requirements made Plaintiffs’ proposed implementation schedule impossible. Judge Joun recognized those requirements but stated that they “do not justify an indefinite period of noncompliance with the August 26 Order.” He explained:
“The record does not establish that compliance with the August 26 Order is impossible. Past practice is relevant but does not establish a mandatory minimum duration for every stage of the process.” (emphasis added.)
The court declined to require HUD to violate independently applicable statutory requirements. But those requirements did not excuse the agency from immediately undertaking preceding and concurrent implementation steps:
“Defendants still have not identified a date by which they commit to issuing compliant NOFOs or making the awards. Given my prior findings of irreparable harm, an indefinite process would substantially undermine the relief already ordered.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Joun also rejected HUD’s argument that intervening legislation extending the availability of equivalent funding eliminated the need for relief. Fair-housing organizations continued to experience funding gaps affecting staffing and enforcement, and “[t]he fact that equivalent budget authority may remain available at some later date does not provide those organizations the funding they need now.”
The court ordered HUD to proceed immediately and in good faith, issue replacement notices as soon as practicable, undertake legally permissible steps concurrently, and expedite pending grant renewals. Finding that “ongoing judicial supervision is warranted,” it required an initial status report within three business days and weekly reports thereafter, supported by a HUD official’s declaration identifying completed and outstanding actions, anticipated dates, and specific legal impediments. Judge Joun concluded:
“The Court expects substantial, prompt compliance. Administrative difficulty is relevant to how compliance is accomplished; it is not a license to disregard the Court’s Order.” (emphasis added.)
56. Kennedy Center renaming: Board-approved inscriptions and grounds renaming “violate the unambiguous terms of this Court’s order;” “the government plays word games;” “linguistic gymnastics cannot extricate” the Board from the injunction.
Judge Christopher R. Cooper (Obama appointee), Beatty v. Trump, 1:25-cv-04480 (D.D.C.)
This case challenges the Kennedy Center Board’s renaming of the institution, removal of voting rights from ex officio trustees, and planned two-year closure.
On May 29, 2026, Judge Cooper permanently enjoined signage and official materials identifying the institution as named for anyone other than President Kennedy, absent congressional authorization. He required Defendants to remove the Trump branding, update the website, withdraw the related trademark application, and file a sworn compliance certification within fourteen days.
On Aug. 13, the Board nevertheless adopted a resolution proposing an inscription recognizing Trump for renovating and restoring the building, a separate inscription recognizing the Trump Kennedy Center Fund once its endowment reached $100 million, and renaming the grounds the “President Donald J. Trump Plaza.” On. Aug. 20, Beatty sought enforcement of the injunction.
In his Sept. 15, 2026 opinion and order, Judge Cooper held “that the Renovation Inscription and the Grounds Renaming violate the terms of the permanent injunction.” The court explained that the injunction, read with its accompanying opinion, prohibited additional public memorials beyond the statutory exceptions. Defendants could not avoid that prohibition by calling the proposed inscription a recognition, testimonial, or acknowledgment. “Resisting this conclusion, the government plays word games,” Judge Cooper wrote. The injunction also covered the Center’s grounds. As the court summarized: “The board resolution bucks a federal court order and a statute Congress enacted.”
Judge Cooper granted enforcement and prohibited implementation of those two measures, concluding that Beatty had established that they “violate the unambiguous terms of this Court’s order.” He added: “Linguistic gymnastics cannot extricate the Kennedy Center’s Board from an operative judicial order or the governing statute it was designed to enforce.” The ruling addressed measures the Board had approved and planned to implement; it did not find that the new inscription had already been installed or hold Defendants in contempt.
The court denied relief concerning the proposed endowment inscription as unripe because the fund had not begun raising money and installation was not imminent. It nevertheless required written notification when the $100 million threshold was reached and at least sixty days’ notice before installing an inscription acknowledging Trump, the fund, or other fundraising efforts.
57. Federal Plaza immigration detention: “ICE repeatedly has violated this Court’s orders;” disregard of court orders regarding capacity limits and access to counsel “persistent, egregious, and, at a minimum, reckless;” Defendants complied with orders “only when convenient for them.”
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan (Clinton appointee), Barco Mercado v. Mullin, 1:25-cv-06568 (S.D.N.Y.)
This class action challenged conditions of confinement and restrictions on access to counsel for immigration detainees held at ICE’s 26 Federal Plaza facility in Manhattan.
On Aug. 12, 2025, Judge Kaplan issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), followed on Sept. 17 by a preliminary injunction (PI) carrying forward substantially the same requirements. The orders applied to detainees held in “any hold room or other room, cell or other space” at 26 Federal Plaza and required, among other things, at least 50 square feet of usable floor space per detainee; clean bedding mats for overnight detention; cleaning at least three times daily; adequate hygiene supplies; and confidential, unmonitored, unrecorded, temporally unrestricted and free legal calls within specified timeframes. They also required a printed Notice of Rights within one hour of arrival, access to medical personnel and prescribed medication, and accurate detainee-location information. The Sept. 17 PI imposed “substantially the same requirements,” meaning Defendants had been required by court order to comply with those protections since Aug. 12.
In his Sept. 24, 2026 opinion following a bench trial, Judge Kaplan found repeated violations of those orders. Defendants maintained that ICE had always used its best efforts to comply and, for the most part, had done so. The court rejected that account:
“But, as will become clear below, the facts show that ICE repeatedly has violated this Court’s orders either by intentionally flouting them or by employing so-called ‘best’ efforts that simply have not been good enough.” (emphasis added).
First, ICE repeatedly violated the court-ordered capacity limits. Defendants admitted that ICE exceeded the tenth-floor overall capacity limit on Sept. 11 and Oct. 1, 2025. The court identified a still “more glaring instance of ICE disregarding the maximum capacity of the tenth-floor hold rooms” on Aug. 18, when assistant field office director Nancy Zanello emailed at 9:51 a.m. that ICE needed to “drop the population” to 22 because it was “in violation of the TRO,” while reporting 48 detainees present and at least 13 more incoming. ICE did not confirm arrangements to transfer the excess detainees until 4:32 p.m. Judge Kaplan found that “ICE [was] in violation of the TRO for at least those six-and-a-half hours.”
The court found further violations in addition to those days. Contractor logbooks established further occasions when the overall tenth-floor limit was exceeded, while ICE also repeatedly violated the limits applicable to each individual hold room. Judge Kaplan found that “there were at least eighty-four days between the start of September 2025 and mid-March 2026 in which ICE detained more individuals in a hold room than was permitted by this Court’s orders.”
William Joyce, the ICE official responsible for overseeing the hold rooms and compliance with the TRO and PI, testified one week before trial that “[u]ntil recently, [he] had not remembered the individual cell limitations per se.” Judge Kaplan observed that, “had Joyce not been questioned about the terms of the PI at his second deposition, there is no reason to believe that he ever would have ‘remembered’ this Court’s orders ‘per se,’ let alone obeyed them.” The court concluded: “ICE’s disregard of this Court’s orders regarding capacity limits at 26 Fed has been persistent, egregious, and, at a minimum, reckless, if not willful.” (emphasis added).
Second, ICE violated the court’s orders by failing to provide confidential access to counsel. Despite the TRO and PI, legal calls continued to occur in the open processing area where ICE staff and contractors could hear them, and attorneys continued to encounter requirements for detainee-signed G-28 forms and substantial delays in scheduling calls. Indeed, Defendants admitted that it was not until Feb. 27, 2026, after Plaintiff moved to hold them in contempt, that ICE began ensuring that confidential legal calls actually were confidential and that attorney requests were answered promptly. Only then did ICE designate a private room and stop limiting the length of legal calls and attorneys’ ability to schedule them.
Judge Kaplan emphasized: “Yet those all were required by this Court’s August 12, 2025 TRO.” Joyce had “always understood” throughout that legal calls were supposed to be confidential and that ICE employees or contractors were “not supposed to be listening to [them].” The court found: “ICE’s disregard of this Court’s orders regarding access to counsel thus also has been persistent, egregious, and, at a minimum, reckless” (emphasis added).
Third, ICE treated the fifth- and ninth-floor spaces as though the injunction did not apply to them. The evidence showed that ICE used both floors as overflow while detainees awaited room on the tenth floor. On the fifth floor, the court found that although ICE complied with some requirements, “the fifth floor in other ways has failed to comply with the PI.” Because officials did not regard the floor as subject to the court’s orders, there were no specific policies governing detainees there and no procedures concerning confidential legal calls, bedding, blankets, hygiene supplies, food, or extra clothing; nor were medical personnel or medication readily available there.
The court also found that “there is no question that ICE has treated the ninth- floor hold rooms as overflow space to hold detainees while awaiting space in the tenth-floor hold rooms.” As late as February 2026, Joyce did not consider those rooms subject to the PI, and only after his deposition in connection with Plaintiff’s contempt motion did he recommend calculating their permissible capacities. Other responsible officials still did not know months later whether capacity limits had been established or whether the rooms had been measured, while ICE continued to detain multiple people there. Judge Kaplan rejected Defendants’ position:
“It is hard to accept defendants’ arguments regarding the purpose of the fifth and ninth floors. The terms of the PI plainly extended to them. Both the fifth-floor processing area and the ninth-floor hold rooms unambiguously constitute ‘any hold room or other room, cell or other space’ in which persons were ‘held or detained’ by ICE at 26 Fed. To deny as much disregards the plain meaning of the language of the PI.” (emphasis added).
Elsewhere, the court observed that ICE had “pretended that this Court’s orders did not apply to other floors of 26 Fed.” And when Defendants later sought to exclude those floors from the certified class, Judge Kaplan stated:
“After all, they are the ones who have chosen to detain individuals on the fifth and ninth floors while failing to comply with this Court’s orders that facially and actually apply to 26 Fed as a whole. The Court declines to bless defendants’ noncompliance by adopting their willful or reckless misreading of its previous orders.” (emphasis added).
The court also documented continuing deficiencies in other conditions after the orders took effect. Although some conditions had improved, Judge Kaplan found that “ICE’s adherence to its changed policies and practices nevertheless has been inconsistent at best.” A witness detained from Nov. 4 to 8, 2025, still lacked soap and privacy to wash, received only brief calls in the presence of ICE staff or contractors and was never told that he could make a private legal call. The court added: “Most concerningly, he did not receive medical attention for a day despite having diabetes, high blood pressure, and a broken tooth.” He also never received “any kind of paper telling [him] what [his] rights were.”
Summarizing the post-injunction record, Judge Kaplan wrote:
“The facts further are that some of these conditions changed after this Court issued the TRO and PI but only inasmuch as defendants chose to comply with this Court’s orders. They often did not. Despite the TRO and PI, defendants have continued to crowd the tenth-floor hold rooms beyond each room’s capacity limit, prevent detainees from accessing counsel in a confidential and thus fully meaningful way, and disregarded this Court’s orders by treating the fifth and ninth floors as extensions of the tenth floor to do with detainees as they wish. To the extent other conditions have improved, that improvement has been inconsistent at best.” (emphasis added).
Later, in explaining why continued judicial protection remained necessary, the court stated:
“The Court’s orders to some extent have worked. But, as described at length above, defendants have complied with its orders only when convenient for them and persistently have disregarded them in certain ways. There is every reason to believe that the deprivations that existed in the summer of 2025 would resume were this Court’s orders not in effect.” (emphasis added).
The violations also informed the permanent relief. Rejecting Defendants’ request to reduce the required floor space, Judge Kaplan stated that, “[g]iven that ICE continued to overcrowd the hold rooms after entry of the PI,” the court would not decrease the amount of space required for each detainee. More broadly, the court concluded that although the TRO and PI had abated ICE’s constitutional violations, “ICE’s ongoing noncompliance” and the danger of renewed violations “prove that a permanent fix is needed.” The court granted declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, entering a permanent injunction on Sept. 24 that was amended on Oct. 2.
58. Baltimore ICE detention conditions: officials “failed at every single turn” to comply with the court’s order; “a spectacular failure”
Judge Julie R. Rubin (Biden appointee), D.N.N. v. Liggins, 1:25-cv-01613 (D. Md.)
This class action challenges conditions in ICE’s Baltimore Hold Rooms, including overcrowding, inadequate medical care, and prolonged confinement in facilities intended for short-term detention.
In a Mar. 6, 2026 order, Judge Rubin certified a class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring at least 31 square feet of personal space per detainee, excluding floor area within eight feet of a toilet. The order also required daily cleaning, adequate hygiene supplies, medical screening, prompt access to over-the-counter pain medication, and access to necessary prescription medication within 24 hours of intake. Defendants had to provide written notice of these protections in English and Spanish within one hour of arrival, with interpretation where necessary.
On Aug. 13, Plaintiffs moved to enforce the injunction, alleging continuing overcrowding, failures to provide medication, and failures to distribute the required notices. Their expert’s updated analysis, incorporating corrected cell dimensions supplied by Defendants, identified at least one overcrowded cell on 78 of 116 days between March 7 and June 30.
Defendants opposed enforcement, challenging Plaintiffs’ analysis and detainee declarations and arguing that their procedures demonstrated substantial compliance. They acknowledged that they had calculated capacity without excluding the space surrounding toilets. In a subsequent surreply, Defendants stated: “Defendants do not dispute that the posted limits for the cells omitted the required exclusion zone.” They nevertheless maintained that their corrected analysis showed substantial compliance.
Following a Sept. 17, 2026 evidentiary hearing, Judge Rubin granted the enforcement motion in part on Sept. 28. In her oral ruling, as reported, Judge Rubin said immigration officials had “failed at every single turn” to comply with the court’s order and that Plaintiffs had established noncompliance “from the start.” Describing the government’s efforts to comply, she stated: “It has been a spectacular failure.” The court also noted that officials had exceeded capacity limits even without accounting for the required exclusion of space surrounding toilets.
The written enforcement order required Defendants to submit the notice of rights within five days and certify that it would be distributed as required. It also required the Baltimore Field Office Director or a designee to file sworn declarations “certifying under penalty of perjury” every 14 days while the injunction remained in effect. These declarations had to report daily maximum populations for each cell, prescription-medication provision relative to detainees’ intake dates, and over-the-counter medication provision; confirm complete and timely medical screenings; and attest that each detainee received the required notice.
Judge Rubin also ordered briefing by Oct. 13 on appointing a master under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a)(1)(C) “to monitor the Government’s compliance with the PI Order,” inviting the parties to suggest candidates if the court decided to make an appointment. She expressly warned:
“Finally, the parties are on notice that further violation of the PI Order, or violation of this order, may be subject to a sua sponte show cause order and associated contempt proceeding.” (emphasis added.)
59. Taxpayer-funded Trump television advertisements: government counsel admitted, “I messed up compliance with the TRO on Sunday night,”
Judge Jennifer L. Rochon (Biden appointee), Common Cause v. Department of Homeland Security, 1:26-cv-08882 (S.D.N.Y.)
This case challenges the use of federal funds for a $20 million television advertising campaign promoting President Trump ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections.
On Oct. 11, 2026, Judge Rochon granted a temporary restraining order and stay under § 705 of the APA, effective at 6:45 p.m., suspending the advertising purchase order and associated funding and prohibiting further use of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funds for the challenged advertisements. The court ordered:
“Defendants shall cancel or cause to be cancelled any slot, placement, reservation, or arrangement for the airing or dissemination of the challenged advertisements, including those placements for the evening of October 11, 2026.” (emphasis added).
The order also required Defendants to “immediately provide a copy of this order” to their advertising contractor, LMD Agency, which was itself enjoined from continuing to run or place the advertisements.
On Oct. 12, Plaintiffs reported continued broadcasts and requested “a status conference to determine Defendants’ compliance,” but stated that they were not then seeking contempt sanctions. Subsequently, citing advertising-monitoring data, Plaintiffs identified 570 airings after the order was emailed to counsel and reported 32 airings on Oct. 12, the latest at 12:17 p.m. Plaintiffs also asked about challenged advertisements remaining on the White House’s YouTube channel and whether newly uploaded videos used the restrained funding.
The government’s Oct. 12 status report acknowledged that the court had emailed the TRO to counsel at 6:46 p.m., but government counsel did not forward it to agency counsel until 7:58 p.m. Agency counsel did not become aware of that email until the following morning, when DHS provided the order to LMD. Counsel apologized while asserting: “The Government is in compliance with the TRO.”
In an Oct. 13 order requiring a conference, Judge Rochon wrote:
“On October 11, 2026 at 6:45pm, the Court entered a temporary restraining order and stay requiring that the challenged advertisements stop airing. Notwithstanding this and Defendants’ representations that the media-buys ended on October 11, 2026, Dkt. 38 (‘Mehringer Decl.’) ¶ 8, Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the challenged advertisements ran at 2:45 p.m. on October 12, 2026, Dkt. 43-2 (‘Ward-Packard Decl.’) ¶¶ 12-13.” (emphasis added).
At the Oct. 14 conference, as reported, Jeffrey Oestericher, chief of the civil division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, told the court, “It was my bad,” and acknowledged: “I messed up compliance with the TRO on Sunday night” (emphasis added). Oestericher explained that he had been attending a theater performance and did not see the order until afterward; a colleague in Washington had independently learned of it from a news report and alerted the agencies shortly before 8 p.m. He further acknowledged that he “failed to call the client agency on Sunday to ensure compliance,” and added, “On Monday, I was told the client had not seen the email” (emphasis added). Addressing the continued broadcasts, Oestericher offered a tentative explanation involving substitute advertising slots compensating for advertisements that had not aired as scheduled, stating: “My best guess is that they did not follow the instructions about ‘make goods.’” (emphasis added.)
Later on Oct. 14, following the conference, Judge Rochon ordered further evidence:
“By October 15, 2026, as discussed during the October 14, 2026 conference, Defendants shall provide the Court with one or more declarations and/or other evidence that explains why challenged advertisements were aired on October 12, 2026 given the contrary representations made by counsel and in paragraph 8 of the Mehringer Declaration, dated October 10, 2026, Dkt. 38.” (emphasis added).
The same order extended the TRO and stay through Nov. 8, permitted limited expedited discovery concerning the preliminary injunction motion, and scheduled a hearing on that motion for Nov. 4.
In an Oct. 15 declaration, Holly C. Mehringer, the senior official performing the duties of DHS’s chief financial officer, stated that the final advertisements covered by the purchase order aired at 7:32 and 7:36 p.m. on Oct. 11, before DHS received notice of the TRO. Citing the contractor’s reports and broadcast logs, she maintained that no DHS-funded advertisements, including “make good” broadcasts, aired after Oct. 11. She nevertheless acknowledged an unresolved report from related litigation of an advertisement airing at approximately 3:45 a.m. on Oct. 12 bearing the disclaimer “Paid for by the U.S. Government.” The contractor explained that its logs covered national advertisements and that it did not presently have information about that particular airing.
60. Federal prison collective-bargaining agreement: “BOP’s attempted re-termination of the CBA on October 7, 2026, violated the PI Order”
Judge Vernon D. Oliver (Biden appointee), National Council of Prison Locals, American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 3:25-cv-01907 (D. Conn.)
This case challenges the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) September 2025 termination of its collective bargaining agreement with the National Council of Prison Locals, following President Trump’s Executive Order 14251, which excluded BOP from federal collective bargaining protections.
On Sept. 29, 2026, Judge Oliver granted a preliminary injunction, ordering Defendants to “immediately reinstate the CBA” for the remainder of its agreed term, together with subsidiary agreements. On Oct. 6, Plaintiffs moved for civil contempt or enforcement, alleging that BOP had failed to implement reinstatement. The next day, BOP Director William K. Marshall III issued a new termination memorandum, invoking the executive order and national security grounds. Defendants maintained that this was a new agency action that did not require prior modification of the injunction.
Following an Oct. 13 hearing, Judge Oliver granted enforcement in part on Oct. 16, finding that “the BOP’s attempted re-termination of the CBA on October 7, 2026, violated the PI Order.” Defendants had treated the absence of an immediate response to their earlier notice of compliance as permission to terminate the agreement again. Judge Oliver wrote: “But a ‘Notice of Compliance’ is an inferior substitute for appropriately moving the Court to amend, clarify, or dissolve the PI Order” (emphasis added). The court voided the renewed termination “because Defendants unilaterally terminated the CBA without first moving the Court to modify the PI Order.” The court required the agreement to remain effective until its May 28, 2029 expiration or until the court granted a properly filed motion permitting renewed termination.
The court separately rejected the allegation that Defendants violated the injunction during the preceding week, crediting evidence that BOP had begun implementing the agreement and directing individual contractual disputes to its grievance process. It also denied civil contempt as “premature,” explaining that the enforcement order and invalidation of the renewed termination made a contempt finding “[un]necessary at that time.”
Chapter 2. Court Distrust of Government Information and Representations
A core aspect of executive officials “properly discharg[ing] their official duties,” and thus being entitled to a presumption of regularity, is that those officials telling judges the truth. Accordingly, if the government evinces an extensive inability to provide courts with accurate explanations and truthful information, the application of the presumption loses the basis for its support.
In this Chapter, we document 112 cases in which courts have identified serious defects in the government’s explanations and representations—pretextual rationales (including retaliatory motives masked by pretext), false sworn statements, contradictions with the record, refusals or failures to answer basic questions, and litigation-driven “contrivances”—prompting judges to discount government submissions, compel expedited discovery, and withhold the presumption.
As noted in the Introduction, the separate Habeas Tracker documented over 150 additional habeas immigration cases of judicial distrust of government information and representations.
We only include cases in which the court has made an explicit statement or the government has made an admission to the court.
1. OMB funding freeze: EPA out-of-court statement “contradicts Defendants’ claim;” “remarkable—and unfathomable—coincidence;” “record belies Defendants’ assertions;” “fault Plaintiffs for ‘overreading’”
Judge Loren L. AliKhan (Biden appointee), National Council of Nonprofits v. Office of Management and Budget, 1:25-cv-00239 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged OMB’s Jan. 27, 2025 memorandum directing federal agencies to temporarily pause federal financial assistance while reviewing programs for consistency with President Trump’s executive orders.
On Jan. 28, Judge AliKhan issued an administrative stay prohibiting implementation of the memorandum’s restrictions on disbursements under existing awards. OMB rescinded the memorandum the following day. On Feb. 3, 2025, granting a temporary restraining order, Judge AliKhan rejected the government’s explanations for the funding freezes and its contention that their continued effects were attributable to independent agency decisions.
In particular, Judge AliKhan pointed to a Jan. 30 statement from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), issued after the administrative stay and OMB’s rescission, that it was still “working diligently to implement [OMB]’s memorandum,” was “temporarily pausing all activities related to the obligation or disbursement of EPA Federal financial assistance,” and was “continuing to work with OMB” to do so. Judge AliKhan found that “[t]he EPA’s statement that it was freezing funds in order to ‘implement’ memorandum M-25-13 contradicts Defendants’ claim that continued pauses are only attributable to independent agency action.” Although government counsel represented that they had contacted EPA to correct any misunderstanding, the court also considered evidence that funding recipients remained unable to access previously awarded funds after the stay and rescission. Rejecting Defendants’ suggestion that those continuing restrictions were attributable solely to independent agency discretion or separate executive orders, Judge AliKhan stated: “Defendants act as if any continued freeze is merely a random coincidence that could not possibly have anything to do with their memorandum. In the court’s view, that explanation ignores both logic and fact.”
On Feb. 25, granting a preliminary injunction, Judge AliKhan again rejected Defendants’ account that individual agencies had independently decided to suspend funding. She noted that numerous agencies had begun freezing funds following the memorandum’s issuance, while payments resumed for some recipients after the Feb. 3 TRO. The suggestion that these developments arose from independent, substantially simultaneous agency decisions was a “remarkable—and unfathomable—coincidence,” the court found, explaining that “the record belies Defendants’ assertions.” She also rejected DOJ’s characterization of the original memorandum as a limited directive that left agencies to decide which funding to pause, contrasting that explanation with the memorandum’s mandatory language and its implementation. Addressing OMB’s subsequent guidance purporting to narrow its scope, Judge AliKhan found that the original memorandum and the guidance were inconsistent and that the latter had “virtually no effect on the ground.” She emphasized:
“But Defendants cannot take a memorandum that was drafted broadly, interpreted expansively, and implemented categorically and fault Plaintiffs for ‘overreading’ that directive.”
On Aug. 21, 2026, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, concluding that the challenge to OMB’s rescinded memorandum was likely moot. The appellate court expressly declined to review Judge AliKhan’s assessment of the original memorandum’s meaning and effects, but disagreed with her separate inference that OMB had rescinded the memorandum in an attempt to manipulate the court’s jurisdiction. The panel emphasized that OMB had issued guidance disclaiming an across-the-board freeze before becoming aware of the litigation and that the rescission withdrew the memorandum’s operative force. The appellate court did not separately adjudicate EPA’s Jan. 30 correspondence or determine the legal basis for individual agencies’ continuing funding freezes.
2. DOGE leadership and personnel authority: “Defense counsel is reminded of their duty to make truthful representations to the court”
Judge Tanya S. Chutkan (Obama appointee), State of New Mexico v. Musk, 1:25-cv-00429 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged Elon Musk’s exercise of executive authority through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), including allegations that his role and DOGE’s activities violated the Appointments Clause and exceeded statutory authority.
On Feb. 17, 2025, Joshua Fisher, Director of the White House Office of Administration, submitted a sworn declaration stating that Musk was employed by the White House Office as a Senior Advisor to the President, was not employed by DOGE, and was not its administrator. Fisher further stated that Musk had “no actual or formal authority to make government decisions himself” and could only advise the President and communicate his directives. In an accompanying notice, the Justice Department asserted that neither of President Trump’s executive orders concerning DOGE “contemplate—much less furnish” the agency with authority to order personnel actions at federal agencies.
On Feb. 18, 2025, denying the states’ motion for a temporary restraining order, Judge Chutkan directly challenged DOJ’s characterization of DOGE’s authority. The court noted that Executive Order 14210 required agencies to consult DOGE team leads on hiring decisions and prohibited them from filling certain vacancies unless the agency head overrode the team lead’s assessment. In a footnote, Chutkan stated:
“At a minimum, this language ‘contemplates’ DOGE’s authority over personnel actions. Defense counsel is reminded of their duty to make truthful representations to the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).” (emphasis added).
On May 27, 2025, denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Appointments Clause claim, Judge Chutkan again rejected the government’s characterization of Musk’s role for purposes of assessing the sufficiency of the states’ allegations, writing, “Defendants unsuccessfully attempt to minimize Musk’s role, framing him as a mere advisor without any formal authority.” Judge Chutkan explained that accepting that characterization would require the court to “ignore, misconstrue, or reject States’ allegations,” which it could not do on a motion to dismiss. Those allegations, she concluded, “do not describe a mere advisor.” The ruling permitted the constitutional claim to proceed but did not resolve the disputed facts concerning Musk’s actual authority or find Fisher’s declaration false.
NB: Other district courts also questioned the government’s account of DOGE’s leadership and Elon Musk’s role. In J. Doe 4 v. Musk, No. 8:25-cv-00462 (D. Md.), Judge Theodore D. Chuang described the government’s inability to identify DOGE’s previous administrator as “highly suspicious” and subsequently found, at the preliminary-injunction stage, that “Musk was, at a minimum, likely the official performing the duties and functions of the USDS Administrator.” However, a divided Fourth Circuit panel later stayed the injunction, with the majority expressly disagreeing with the district court’s assessment of the evidence concerning Musk’s authority. Separately, in Alliance for Retired Americans v. Bessent, No. 1:25-cv-00313 (D.D.C.), Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly repeatedly questioned DOJ counsel during a hearing about DOGE’s leadership and Musk’s role, but counsel was unable to provide answers.
3. DOGE access to Treasury data: explanation “riddled with inconsistencies”
Judge Jeanette A. Vargas (Biden appointee), State of New York v. Trump, 25-cv-01144 (S.D.N.Y.)
The case involved a challenge to the authority of Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to access Treasury Department systems containing personally identifiable and financial information.
Judge Vargas, granting a preliminary injunction on Feb. 21, 2025, found DOJ counsel’s claim that the President’s Executive Orders required immediate DOGE access to Treasury’s BFS systems was “riddled with inconsistencies,” noting the E.O. itself allowed 30 days and the new, untrained DOGE hires were not needed to implement the pauses.
“When asked at the preliminary injunction hearing the reason for this accelerated process, counsel for the Government pointed to the urgency sparked by the President’s Executive Orders. PI Hearing Tr. at 18:20-19:14. This explanation is riddled with inconsistencies. … the Court finds this explanation lacks credibility … artificial sense of urgency engendered by the Government’s imposition of time limits on itself.” (emphasis added)
4-5. Foreign aid funding freeze: failure “to offer any explanation, let alone one supported by the record;” court “can’t get a straight answer from you”
Judge Amir H. Ali (Biden appointee), AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. U.S. Department of State, 1:25-cv-00400 (D.D.C.) and Global Health Council v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00402 (D.D.C.) (related cases)
These related cases involved the Trump administration’s freeze on Congressionally-allocated humanitarian assistance and other foreign aid.
Following the court’s Feb. 13, 2025 TRO, Judge Ali voiced frustration at apparent noncompliance on Feb. 25, telling the government: “I don’t know why I can’t get a straight answer from you” (emphasis added). In a Mar. 10 memorandum opinion granting in part a preliminary injunction requiring the administration to pay for aid work already completed by contractors and foreign assistance groups, Judge Ali wrote that the government had “yet to offer any explanation, let alone one supported by the record, for why a blanket suspension . . . was a rational precursor to reviewing programs” (emphasis added). Judge Ali wrote that the government had “not proffered any evidence” to support their assertion that waivers offered by the Department of State “provided any meaningful relief from the blanket freeze. Further, while the government argued that the State Department exempted some programs from the freeze, Judge Ali said the “record belies the assertion that the waivers provided any meaningful relief.”
6. Probationary federal employee firings: “The ‘administrative record’ submitted by the government is a sham. It does not facilitate judicial review: It frustrates it;” judge calls out government for “lie” in termination letters, and for DOJ preventing testimony because “afraid … would reveal the truth”
Judge William Alsup (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 3:25-cv-01780 (N.D. Cal.)
The case involved the government’s efforts to significantly reduce the federal workforce’s probationary employees via termination letters that criticized workers’ “performance.”
In a Mar. 13, 2025 hearing in which Judge William Alsup issued an injunction from the bench, the court criticized the administration, calling the letters a “gimmick” and saying,
“It is sad – a sad day – when our government would fire some good employee and say it was based on performance when they know good and well that’s a lie. … That should not have been done in our country. It was a sham in order to try to avoid statutory requirements.” (emphasis added).
In a subsequent memorandum opinion, the court elaborated that the OPM’s template termination letter claiming performance problems “was an obvious pretext intended to obstruct appeal and avoid statutory and regulatory reduction-in-force procedures (for example, the honoring of veteran preferences in the order of retention).”
At the Mar. 13 hearing, responding to the government’s apparent gamesmanship—namely, submitting OPM Acting Director Charles Ezell’s sworn declaration that asserted OPM did not direct the firings, then withdrawing it and refusing to produce him for court-ordered cross-examination—Judge Alsup admonished DOJ, saying, “You can’t just say, ‘Here’s the declaration. You have to accept it without question’ whenever there is a question.” He continued:
“You will not bring the people in here to be cross-examined. You’re afraid to do so because you know cross-examination would reveal the truth. … This is the U.S. District Court. Whenever you submit declarations, those people should be submitted to cross-examination, just like the plaintiffs’ side should be. … [T]hen we get at the truth of whether that’s what — your story is actually true. I tend to doubt it. I tend to doubt that you’re telling me the truth whenever we hear all the evidence eventually. … And you withdrew his declaration rather than do that? Come on. That’s a sham. Go ahead. I’m — it upsets me. I want you to know that. I’ve been practicing or serving in this court for over 50 years, and I know how we get at the truth. And you’re not helping me get at the truth. You’re giving me press releases, sham documents. All right. I’m getting mad at you and I shouldn’t. You’re trying to do your best, and I apologize.” (emphasis added).
On Sept. 12, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The court wrote:
“The ‘administrative record’ submitted by the government is a sham. It does not facilitate judicial review: It frustrates it. …
The ‘quote’ proffered by government counsel James D. Todd Jr. is a fabrication. … The result: A statement concerning OPM authored and approved exemption categories becomes, by brackets, ellipses, and government counsel’s chicanery, a shot through the heart of plaintiffs’ case. Counsel’s ersatz evidence fails to persuade.” (emphasis added).
7. Probationary federal employee firings: “On the record before the Court, this isn’t true;” “It is simply not conceivable”
Judge James K. Bredar (Obama appointee), State of Maryland v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-00748 (D. Md.)
This case involves a challenge by nineteen states and the District of Columbia to the Trump administration’s mass termination of probationary federal employees, which the government claimed was based on individualized performance or conduct rather than a reduction in force.
On Mar. 13, 2025, granting a temporary restraining order, Judge Bredar rejected that explanation as not credible. The court wrote that the government claimed it “wasn’t required” to give the states notice because “it dismissed each one of these thousands of probationary employees for ‘performance’ or other individualized reasons,” but “[o]n the record before the Court, this isn’t true.” Instead, “[t]here were no individualized assessments of employees,” “[t]hey were all just fired. Collectively,” and “[i]t is simply not conceivable that the Government could have conducted individualized assessments of the relevant employees in the relevant timeframe.” “Accordingly,” the court concluded, “in the language of relevant law, these big government layoffs were actually ‘Reductions in Force,’ or ‘RIFs.’”
8-a. Transgender military service ban: Military experts’ summaries “cherry-picked,” “mischaracterized,” and “misrepresented” multiple studies to support the military’s transgender ban; one summary was “inexplicably misleading,” another not drawn “in good faith;” “soaked in animus and dripping with pretext”
Judge Ana Reyes (Biden appointee), Talbott v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00240 (D.D.C.)
The case involved the Trump administration’s efforts to ban transgender people from serving in the U.S. military, and to discharge currently serving transgender service members.
During a Mar. 18, 2025 hearing, Judge Reyes pressed government counsel on the military’s transgender ban, repeatedly questioning whether the military experts behind the policy had “cherry-picked” and “mischaracterized” the underlying studies and reports cited in support, had “grossly, misleadingly—whether intentionally or unintentionally—mischaracterized” them, or had “grossly misquote[d] and misuse[d]” portions of those materials. For example, she criticized how the Justice Department invoked a 2021 AMSARA report, a Department of Defense accession research study that appeared in DoD’s own Action Memo but did not support the government’s asserted justifications. Judge Reyes asked DOJ counsel, “Should I defer to the military experts who cherry-picked one part of this study, misrepresented even that and ignored the rest of it, and ignored the obvious import of it?” (emphasis added). She noted the study was actually used to support the Biden-era policy of including transgender personnel. Judge Reyes further said that “the two things that were quoted in the Hegseth policy were taken way out of context and mischaracterized even in the quotations that they had.”
During the hearing, Judge Reyes also expressed disbelief that government counsel had not read any of three key reports the Hegseth policy cited.
“THE COURT: Okay. Have you not read that report?
MR. MANION: I have not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So my clerk, Guillermo, and I had a conversation on Monday, because I had said, you know what, we should send out a minute order saying that I want counsel to be prepared to discuss the Mattis policy, the AMSARA report, and the 2025 Literature review. And there were a couple other things that we wanted you to be able to answer. And we looked at each other on Monday and was like we don’t have to do that. Of course they’re going to be prepared. The Hegseth policy cites three reports, I mean, of course, they’re going to know what those reports are. But you don’t — you didn’t read the reports.
MR. MANION: I have not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you think it’s important, when the Court is reviewing the only three reports that the Hegseth policy cites, to understand whether those reports actually say what the Hegseth policy quoted?” (emphasis added).
In a Mar. 18 preliminary injunction, Judge Reyes further underscored the government’s Action Memo had misrepresented several studies to justify the transgender military ban. The court said its summary of the AMSARA report was “inexplicably misleading,” since the data actually showed transgender troops performing “similar or better” in 10 of 11 categories (emphasis added). Likewise, its summary of the 2025 Medical Literature Review was so distorted that “no one summarizing the Review in good faith could draw these conclusions” (emphasis added). On cost, the court rejected reliance on a bare number “devoid of any context or analysis,” warning that if such reasoning were accepted “courts would have to accept any cost amount the military cites to justify any policy.”
Judge Reyes also refused to “blindly” defer to military judgment, writing:
“Yes, the Court must defer. But not blindly. The President issued EO14183 within seven days of taking office, and Secretary Hegseth issued the Policy thirty days later. There is no evidence that they consulted with uniformed military leaders before doing so. Neither document contains any analysis nor cites any data. They pronounce that transgender persons are not honorable, truthful, or disciplined—but Defense counsel concedes that these assertions are pure conjecture.” (emphasis added)
Judge Reyes found that the government’s stated justifications were pretextual, writing that the Military Ban is “littered with animus and pretext” and “soaked in animus and dripping with pretext,” its language “unabashedly demeaning, … and its conclusions bear no relation to fact” (emphasis added). The court further expressed “considerable doubt” that the ban was needed to ensure fitness, emphasizing that the policy’s “‘breadth’ [over targeting anyone considered affected by gender dysphoria] ‘so far removed’ from military health concerns, it is ‘impossible to credit’ Defendants’ justifications.’”
8-b. Transgender military service ban: DOJ counsel warned for treating the judge “like … an idiot” and attempting to “gasli[ght]” her
Judge Ana Reyes (Biden appointee), Talbott v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00240 (D.D.C.)
The case involved the Trump administration’s efforts to ban transgender people from serving in the U.S. military, and to discharge currently serving transgender service members.
During a Mar. 21 hearing, Judge Reyes reportedly admonished government counsel for asserting that the ban was focused on people with gender dysphoria, stating: “I am not going to abide by government officials saying one thing to the public—what they really mean to the public—and coming in here to the court and telling me something different, like I’m an idiot,” emphasizing, “I am not an idiot.” She reportedly said, “The idea that you all can just come in here and pretend that what’s happening isn’t actually happening is totally unacceptable,” in addition to saying, “The court is not going to be gaslit” (emphasis added).
9. Venezuelan couple’s immigration detention: providing the court with “the sorriest statement I’ve ever seen;” “This is a terrible, terrible affidavit. If this were before me in a criminal case and you were asking to get a warrant issue on this, I’d throw you out of my chambers.”
Judge Leonie M. Brinkema (Clinton appointee), Sanchez Puentes v. Charles, 1:25-cv-00509 (E.D. Va.)
The case involved a habeas challenge by a Venezuelan couple, whom ICE detained in March 2025 (while they held Temporary Protected Status) based on allegations that they were members of Tren de Aragua.
On Mar. 28, 2025, the court granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. During the hearing that day, Judge Brinkema criticized the affidavit of an ICE assistant director—the government’s only evidence offered to justify detention on the basis that the couple were alleged Tren de Aragua members—stating, “[I]t is the sorriest statement I’ve ever seen. First of all, it’s pure hearsay” (emphasis added). The court continued:
“This is a terrible, terrible affidavit. If this were before me in a criminal case and you were asking to get a warrant issue on this, I’d throw you out of my chambers. No agent should do this type of editorializing, not when people’s liberty is at stake. I expect more from the government than this kind of very shoddy work. This is assumptions and putting words in people’s mouths. … I was shocked when I saw it.” (emphasis added).
10-a. CFPB dismantling bid: providing a “highly misleading, if not intentionally false” sworn declaration to the court; “so disingenuous that the Court is left with little confidence that the defense can be trusted to tell the truth about anything”
Judge Amy Berman Jackson (Obama appointee), National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought, 1:25-cv-00381 (D.D.C.)
The case involves the Trump administration’s efforts to dismantle the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), including through work stoppages, mass personnel reductions, and funding-related moves affecting the Bureau’s ability to perform statutory duties.
In a Mar. 28, 2025 opinion granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Jackson scolded the Government for a false sworn declaration:
“This rosy depiction of events, designed to assuage the Court, was accompanied by the February 24, 2025 Declaration of Adam Martinez, the Chief Operating Officer of the CFPB, First Martinez Decl., which was a carefully worded and highly selective account that was immediately contradicted by a second series of declarations and exhibits submitted by the plaintiffs. The defendants’ witness was then placed in the awkward position of submitting another declaration, in which he acknowledged the accuracy of the facts set forth by plaintiffs’ declarants, including their accounts of his own statements, but he still voiced the assurance that the agency was complying with its statutory obligations.”
Jackson concluded:
“It is now clear to the Court that the omissions from the first declaration rendered it to be highly misleading, if not intentionally false. Defendants’ initial effort to persuade the Court in their opposition that employees were hard at work on their statutory duties even after they were ordered to stand down on February 10 has been shown to be unreliable and inconsistent with the agency’s own contemporaneous records, and the defendants’ eleventh hour attempt to suggest immediately before the hearing that the stop work order was not really a stop work order at all was so disingenuous that the Court is left with little confidence that the defense can be trusted to tell the truth about anything.”
10-b. CFPB dismantling bid: Claims used to support CFPB dismantling were “inconsistent with the facts on the ground,” “belied not only by their actions,” and “once again” by Vought’s public statements; relied on a “thoroughly discredited” government declaration; “claimed ‘lapse’ in funding … manufactured by the defendants”
Judge Jackson entered a preliminary injunction on Mar. 28, 2025; the D.C. Circuit entered a partial stay on Apr. 11, 2025, later modified on Apr. 28, 2025. A D.C. Circuit panel vacated the preliminary injunction on Aug. 15, 2025, but the court granted rehearing en banc on Dec. 17, 2025 and vacated the panel decision, noting that the April stay (as modified) “remains in effect.” Meanwhile, on Nov. 10, 2025, defendants filed a “Notice of Potential Lapse in Appropriations” transmitting a Nov. 7 OLC memorandum and asserting that the Federal Reserve “currently lacks combined earnings” from which the CFPB can draw—meaning the Bureau anticipated exhausting available funds in early 2026.
In an order on Dec. 30, 2025 granting plaintiffs’ motion to clarify, Judge Jackson repeatedly questioned the reliability of defendants’ factual and legal premises. She noted that defendants’ framing “tends to obscure what is happening,” emphasizing that funding had not “lapsed” and that any shortfall was “not the result of a legal memorandum,” but rather “the intended result of the defendants’ own actions.” The court situated that concern in a broader pattern of government representations in the litigation. It observed that defendants had “argued at every juncture” that “no court supervision was necessary” because they were performing statutory obligations and not seeking to shutter the agency—but that the Court had already found those representations (including declarations submitted to support them) “to be inconsistent with the facts on the ground.” In particular, when defendants later sought to justify additional disruptive steps, the court noted they “relied again on the second Martinez declaration,” “ignoring” that it had been “thoroughly discredited during the hearing,” and that the declarant “had no personal knowledge” for key assertions about the agency’s plans to comply with the statute.
Judge Jackson also flagged unexplained inconsistencies in defendants’ own submissions regarding the funding they claimed was required to comply with the injunction. She noted that defendants stated (in a footnote) that compliance would require a funding need of $677,493,173, but that “[t]his discrepancy is unexplained.” Against that backdrop, the court treated defendants’ latest assurances with heightened skepticism. It wrote that defendants’ repeated assertions that they were not planning to shut down the agency and “could be counted upon to perform their statutory functions” had been “belied not only by their actions,” but also “once again” by Acting Director Vought’s public statements (cited by the court), adding: “This candid statement does not mark a change in the Acting Director’s approach … and it would be foolhardy not to take Russell Vought at his word this time.”
Judge Jackson rejected the government’s premise that the claimed funding “lapse” justified abandoning obligations while litigation remained pending. She described “the claimed ‘lapse’ in funding … manufactured by the defendants based solely on the OLC Memo,” “not a valid justification” for the agency’s unilateral decision to abandon its obligations, and concluded that defendants’ new understanding of “combined earnings” “is an unsupported and transparent attempt” to starve the CFPB of funding—“yet another attempt to achieve the very end the Court’s injunction was put in place to prevent.” The government’s position, Judge Jackson wrote, “will not only affect, but will deliberately frustrate, their obligations under the injunction,” and explained that “[t]he defendants’ suggestion that it takes a modification of the Order to state that they must do what is necessary to comply with it is inconsistent with the Order and defies common sense” (emphasis added).
11. Eric Adams indictment dismissal: “Everything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the Indictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions;” “appears pretextual”
Judge Dale Ho (Biden appointee), United States v. Adams, 1:24-cr-00556 (S.D.N.Y.)
The case involved the Department of Justice’s effort to dismiss its own indictment of Mayor Eric Adams.
On Apr. 2, 2025, Judge Ho wrote that the government’s stated rationale (that there was an appearance of impropriety in bringing the case) was “unsupported by any objective evidence” and “appears pretextual.” Instead, the court concluded the true rationale appeared to be a quid pro quo. Judge Ho wrote: “Everything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the Indictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions.”
12-a. Abrego Garcia’s El Salvador removal: “Defendants’ redressability argument rings hollow;” “As a practical matter, the facts say otherwise;” government’s “naked assertion” contradicted by the record; “repeated refusal to provide even the most basic information”
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951 (D. Md.); Judge Stephanie D. Thacker (Obama appointee), joined by Judge Robert B. King (Clinton appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-1345 (4th Cir.)
This case challenged the Trump administration’s wrongful removal of Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to El Salvador despite a 2019 immigration judge’s grant of withholding of removal prohibiting his return to that country.
At an Apr. 4, 2025 hearing, DOJ attorney Erez Reuveni conceded that Abrego Garcia “should not have been removed” to El Salvador and acknowledged that he could not explain why Abrego Garcia was detained there. Asked why the United States could not secure his return, Reuveni told Judge Xinis that he had put the question to his clients but had “not received, to date, an answer that I find satisfactory.” Judge Xinis thanked counsel for his candor but questioned the government’s contention that it lacked the authority or practical ability to secure Abrego Garcia’s return.
In her Apr. 6 memorandum opinion, Judge Xinis rejected the government’s account that placing Abrego Garcia in Salvadoran custody deprived it of the power to obtain his return. The court described as a “stunning proposition” the government’s argument that it could transfer individuals to foreign prisons and then assert that it could not secure their return because it was no longer their custodian. “As a practical matter, the facts say otherwise,” she wrote. The court pointed to the United States’ agreement to pay El Salvador $6 million to house detainees pending decisions about their long-term disposition, finding that “Defendants have produced no evidence to suggest they cannot secure one such detainee, Abrego Garcia, for return to the United States.” Judge Xinis concluded:
“In the end, Defendants’ redressability argument rings hollow. As their counsel suggested at the hearing, this is not about Defendants’ inability to return Abrego Garcia, but their lack of desire.”
On Apr. 7, the Fourth Circuit unanimously denied the government’s request to stay the preliminary injunction. In a separate opinion joined by Judge Robert B. King, Judge Stephanie D. Thacker rejected the government’s account of its inability to secure Abrego Garcia’s return. She noted that the government had furnished no evidence to substantiate its claimed lack of authority over Abrego Garcia following his placement in Salvadoran custody. Judge Thacker wrote:
“In its filings before this court, the Government makes no more than a naked assertion that Abrego Garcia ‘is in the custody of a foreign sovereign over whom America has no jurisdiction.’ But the record demonstrates otherwise.”
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III separately concurred in denying the stay, agreeing that the government could be required to facilitate Abrego Garcia’s return while distinguishing facilitation from a judicial demand compelling action by a foreign sovereign.
On Apr. 10, the Supreme Court left intact the requirement that the government “facilitate” Abrego Garcia’s release from custody in El Salvador, but directed Judge Xinis to clarify the scope of the order’s “effectuate” language, which might exceed the district court’s authority, with due regard for executive authority over foreign affairs. The Court also stated that the government should share what it could about steps already taken and prospective steps. On Apr. 15, ordering expedited discovery, Judge Xinis identified “Defendants’ uniform refusal to disclose ‘what it can’” concerning efforts to secure Abrego Garcia’s return and their “repeated refusal to provide even the most basic information” about those efforts.
(In a footnote to her Apr. 7 opinion, Judge Thacker also noted contemporaneous reporting that DOJ had placed Reuveni on administrative leave following his candid answers, “ostensibly for lack of ‘zealous[] advocacy.’” She emphasized that “the duty of zealous representation is tempered by the duty of candor to the court” and other ethical obligations. The opinion did not determine DOJ’s reasons for placing him on leave.)
12-b. Abrego Garcia’s post-return supervision: “counsel’s proffers seem patently incredible;” “persistent lack of transparency with the tribunal”
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-00951 (D. Md.)
This case challenged the Trump administration’s wrongful removal of Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to El Salvador and sought restoration of his prior immigration status following his return to the United States.
After Abrego Garcia was returned to the United States on June 6, 2025, to face criminal charges in Tennessee, a dispute arose over what would happen upon his release from criminal custody. The government intended to transfer him into ICE custody in Tennessee rather than restore him to the ICE Order of Supervision under which he had previously lived in Maryland.
In a July 23, 2025 memorandum opinion, Judge Xinis noted that, although the government had fulfilled the first part of her original injunction by returning Abrego Garcia to the United States, it had demonstrated “no appetite” for fulfilling the second: restoring him to the “status quo ante.” She also cited Defendants’ “persistent lack of transparency with the tribunal” as a reason further relief was warranted.
At an earlier hearing, DOJ counsel had stated that the government intended to pursue third-country removal but could not identify a destination, maintaining that no decision could be made until Abrego Garcia entered ICE custody. Judge Xinis found that “counsel’s proffers seem patently incredible.” She then convened an evidentiary hearing to “get straight answers from the government” about its plans. But ICE Assistant Director Thomas Giles offered only “minimal insight” into the procedures Abrego Garcia would face, leaving the court with “no meaningful information” about the government’s intended actions.
The court subsequently required the government to produce the ICE detainer that purportedly authorized his impending custody in Tennessee. Rather than clarifying the legal basis for detention, the detainer “raised more questions than it answered.” It cited the “pendency of ongoing removal proceedings” despite Defendants’ admission that no such proceedings were pending. Judge Xinis found that the detainer “seemed thin cover for Defendants to take Abrego Garcia into custody in Tennessee and next transfer him to any ICE facility in the United States.” She concluded that it confirmed the government’s intention not to restore his prior supervision arrangements in Maryland.
Judge Xinis therefore ordered that, upon Abrego Garcia’s release from criminal custody, Defendants must restore his ICE supervision through the Baltimore Field Office rather than take him immediately into ICE custody in Tennessee. She also required advance written notice of any intended third-country removal to protect his opportunity to seek judicial review.
13-a. Alien Enemies Act removals: “Obscur[ing] from the Court” the movements of “rapidly dispatch[ed] removal flights” to El Salvador’s CECOT and “refusing to provide any helpful information”
Chief Judge James E. Boasberg (Bush appointee; Obama appointee), J.G.G. v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00766 (D.D.C.)
The case involved the Trump administration’s invocation of the Alien Enemies Act to deport alleged members of the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang.
On Apr. 3, 2025, Judge Boasberg repeatedly asked the government’s counsel for information on the flights the administration was using to transport alleged gang members to El Salvador, and was told that the DOJ had no additional information. In an Apr. 16, 2025, memorandum opinion finding probable cause for criminal contempt, Boasberg wrote that he believed “that the Government might be rapidly dispatching removal flights in an apparent effort to evade judicial review while also refusing to provide any helpful information.” Recounting the March 15 hearing, he added, “Those later-discovered flight movements, however, were obscured from the Court when the hearing resumed shortly after 6:00 p.m. because the Government surprisingly represented that it still had no flight details to share.”
13-b. CECOT detention and U.S. control: “[M]indful of the possibility … that the Government has adopted and presented its arrangement with El Salvador as a ‘ruse — and a fraud on the court’”
Chief Judge James E. Boasberg (Bush appointee; Obama appointee), J.G.G. v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00766 (D.D.C.)
In a Jun. 4, 2025 preliminary injunction, Judge Boasberg held that the plaintiffs had not yet provided “robust evidence” disproving the government’s claim that El Salvador was responsible for the CECOT detainees, but he nevertheless expressed serious doubt about the Government’s account and the consistency of its representations.
“[t]he Court must therefore at this point accept the Government’s representations as to the nature of the CECOT Plaintiffs’ ongoing detention, despite their incongruity with multiple public statements made by both Salvadoran and U.S. officials …
The Court is nonetheless mindful of the possibility, raised by Plaintiffs, that the Government has adopted and presented its arrangement with El Salvador as a ‘ruse — and a fraud on the court — designed to maintain control over the detainees beyond the reach of the writ.’ …
The Court nonetheless reminds the Government that any official who makes knowingly false statements in a sworn declaration subjects himself to perjury prosecution.” (emphasis added).
13-c. CECOT detention and U.S. control: government representation “at odds with the undisputed record … belies reality.”
Chief Judge James E. Boasberg (Bush appointee; Obama appointee), J.G.G. v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00766 (D.D.C.)
On Dec. 22, 2025, granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their due-process claim, certifying a class, and rejecting the government’s jurisdictional position, Chief Judge Boasberg concluded that the United States had maintained constructive custody over the CECOT detainees notwithstanding the government’s declarations to the contrary. The court rejected the government’s attempt to minimize U.S. control over the July 2025 Venezuela exchange, writing:
“The Government tries to downplay its role in Plaintiffs’ release and its corresponding legal significance, arguing that it was up to the discretion of the El Salvadoran government. But that argument is at odds with the undisputed record. If that were the case, why would El Salvador not arrange an exchange where it benefited? To find that the swap was coordinated solely between Venezuela and El Salvador, but with no benefit to the latter, belies reality.” (emphasis added).
14-a. Third-country removals: Representations about available relief and governing law were “either an effort to prevaricate or is deeply disingenuous;” “either dangerously uninformed or blatantly dishonest”
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-10676 (D. Mass.)
This class action challenged the government’s policy of removing noncitizens to third countries not designated in their removal proceedings without advance notice or a meaningful opportunity to raise claims against removal, including risk of torture. This subsection of the litigation concerns the government’s representations about the availability of administrative and judicial relief to challenge those removals and the due process protections applicable to affected individuals.
In disputing the district court’s jurisdiction, the government maintained that individuals facing third-country removal could seek protection by reopening immigration proceedings and then obtaining appellate review.
In his Apr. 18, 2025 opinion, Judge Murphy examined that proposed route, including the government’s suggestion that review remained available where an individual faced removal over a weekend. He wrote: “This claim is either an effort to prevaricate or is deeply disingenuous.”
Murphy described the suggestion that an individual could reopen immigration proceedings at 6 a.m. on a Saturday before removal that weekend as “preposterous on its face.” He explained that the government had supplied no evidence or authority establishing the proposed avenue of relief and had failed to address evidence that requests concerning undesignated third countries were routinely denied as speculative.
In his Feb. 25, 2026 opinion, Murphy returned to the government’s contention that plaintiffs had failed to engage with the administrative remedies available to them:
“Defendants claim that Plaintiffs ‘fail to grapple with the real paths to administrative relief available to them.’ … However, that argument is either dangerously uninformed or blatantly dishonest.”
The court explained that it had already examined those purported paths to relief and continued to find them illusory. An individual could not obtain adjudication of a fear-based claim concerning a country to which the government had not proposed to remove them.
The government also asserted that Plaintiffs could move to reopen proceedings “at any time.” Murphy responded: “As a matter of law, this is a misstatement.” He explained that such motions were generally limited to one motion filed within 90 days of the removal order becoming final.
Murphy further observed that government counsel appeared to acknowledge the need for a designated destination during the First Circuit’s Feb. 3 oral argument. Counsel had described a motion to reopen based on the government having newly designated a particular country. Murphy remarked that “their candor may have been only an unintentional slip of the truth.”
In the February decision, Murphy entered declaratory relief and vacated the government’s third-country removal policy. On Sept. 18, 2026, the First Circuit affirmed except for two declarations concerning the sequence of removal destinations, which it vacated for lack of standing. On Sept. 29, the Supreme Court stayed the judgment and the February order and granted certiorari. Argument is scheduled for Dec. 9, 2026.
14-b. O.C.G.’s third-country removal: “The Court was given false information, upon which it relied, twice, to the detriment of a party at risk of serious and irreparable harm;” “Defendants lied about it;” “overwhelming series of errors that this case, in its short life, has already experienced;” “the Department ran away from it only when the veracity of its statements were about to be tested. Hours before the veracity of the statements were about to be tested.”
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-10676 (D. Mass.)
This subsection of the litigation concerns the government’s false account that O.C.G., a Guatemalan national, had been asked whether he feared removal to Mexico and had said he was not afraid—information on which the court twice relied when declining to order his return.
In opposing Plaintiffs’ request for emergency relief, the government submitted a Mar. 2, 2025 sworn declaration from Brian Ortega, an assistant field office director in ICE’s Phoenix Enforcement and Removal Operations office. Ortega stated that, before O.C.G.’s removal, officers had asked whether he feared return to Mexico and that O.C.G. “stated he was not afraid of returning to Mexico.” Government counsel repeated that account in briefing. O.C.G.’s own sworn account stated that he had received no opportunity to explain his fear and had unsuccessfully begged to speak to his attorney.
In his Mar. 29 memorandum, Judge Murphy noted that the government’s declaration did not appear to come from anyone directly involved in O.C.G.’s handling, but declined to order his return. On Apr. 18, the court again declined that relief, describing whether O.C.G. had received notice as “hotly contested” factual dispute between the government’s “hearsay” declaration and O.C.G.’s sworn account, and ordered expedited discovery.
During that discovery, the government canceled the scheduled May 16 deposition of the officer it had identified as having questioned O.C.G. On May 16, the government filed a Notice of Errata, withdrawing the assertion that O.C.G. had denied fearing return to Mexico. The government stated that it could not “identify any officer who asked O.C.G. whether he had a fear of return to Mexico[, nor could it identify] the officer who O.C.G. states ‘told [him] that he was being deported to Mexico.’” Ortega’s corrected declaration explained that the original assertion rested on entries in ICE’s ENFORCE Alien Removal Module database.
At the May 21, 2025 hearing, Murphy described information on which the court had relied as “demonstrably untrue.” Although he did not fault government counsel for relying on Ortega’s declaration, he expressed concern that “the Department ran away from it only when the veracity of its statements were about to be tested. Hours before the veracity of the statements were about to be tested.” The court stated:
“It was, I believe, it was 5:37 in the evening before a deposition for the next morning.
That doesn’t appear, to me, that that is replete with forthrightness. And it raises the question to me that there was some malfeasance occurring. Not on your part, Ms. Larakers — that’s not what I’m saying. But within the Department itself.
And I don’t know that, but, given the overwhelming series of errors that this case, in its short life, has already experienced, I have some serious questions about that.”
The court authorized further depositions and examination of the database records, while expressly reserving any finding of malfeasance.
In his May 23 opinion, Judge Murphy wrote:
“Finally, it must be said that, while mistakes obviously happen, the events leading up to this decision are troubling. The Court was given false information, upon which it relied, twice, to the detriment of a party at risk of serious and irreparable harm.”
The court explained that the government could identify no witness supporting its account, leaving O.C.G.’s account uncontroverted. It granted a preliminary injunction requiring the government to take immediate steps to facilitate his return to the United States. The government subsequently facilitated his return.
In his Feb. 25, 2026 opinion, Murphy again stated that defendants had “misrepresented material facts” concerning O.C.G.’s removal and repeated his finding that the court had relied twice on false information. Returning to O.C.G.’s treatment later in the opinion, he added: “And then Defendants lied about it.”
14-c. South Sudan and Djibouti: defendants “mischaracterized this Court’s order” while “manufacturing the very chaos they decry”
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-10676 (D. Mass.)
This subsection of the litigation concerns the government’s representations about Judge Murphy’s remedial orders following the South Sudan removal flight, including its claim that his orders had forced DHS to detain the affected individuals in Djibouti and conduct immigration proceedings there.
After finding on May 21, 2025 that the government had violated his preliminary injunction by initiating removals toward South Sudan without the required process, Judge Murphy ordered a remedy for six class members. At the government’s suggestion, he allowed DHS to provide the required process abroad rather than requiring their immediate return to the United States. Government officials confirmed that this was feasible.
The government subsequently sought reconsideration and a stay, citing the burdens of conducting immigration proceedings abroad. In his May 26, 2025 opinion, Murphy wrote: “Defendants have mischaracterized this Court’s order, while at the same time manufacturing the very chaos they decry.”
Quoting the May 21 hearing at length, the court explained that Defendants had proposed the overseas process and, after consulting internally, had confirmed that it could be provided. Murphy emphasized that the court had never required them to convert a foreign military base into an immigration facility. They remained free to return the individuals to the United States or choose another location for the required proceedings.
The court also rejected the government’s assertion that it had not been allowed to propose more specific procedures. Murphy explained that he had repeatedly invited proposals and that defendants had failed to supply them. He concluded: “From this course of conduct, it is hard to come to any conclusion other than that Defendants invite lack of clarity as a means of evasion.”
In his Feb. 25, 2026 opinion, Murphy addressed the government’s subsequent representation to the Supreme Court that his order had interrupted the removal flight and forced DHS to detain the individuals at a military base in Djibouti. He contrasted that account with ICE official Marcos Charles’s sworn May 21 testimony:
“THE COURT: And they ended up in Djibouti because of my order last night?
“MARCOS CHARLES: No, Your Honor. The plan was to go to Djibouti and then from Djibouti continue on to South Sudan and go from there, sir.”
The court reiterated that Defendants had chosen to keep the class members in Djibouti. The remedial order had left DHS discretion to provide the required process either in the United States or abroad.
15. Voter registration citizenship requirements: representation that “does not reflect the level of diligence the Court expects from any litigant—let alone the United States Department of Justice;” “The contradiction between [Government’s] factual representations and the facts on the ground is particularly striking.”
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (Clinton appointee), League of United Latin American Citizens v. Executive Office of The President, 1:25-cv-00946 (D.D.C.); Democratic National Committee v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00952 (D.D.C.); and League of Women Voters Education Fund v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00955 (D.D.C.) (consolidated cases)
These cases involve challenges by nonpartisan voting rights organizations and Democratic Party committees to President Trump’s Executive Order 14248, including Section 2(a), which directs the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to “take appropriate action” within 30 days to require “documentary proof of United States citizenship” on the national mail voter registration form and to have states record detailed information about the citizenship document used.
On Apr. 24, 2025, granting the plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctions as to Section 2(a) of the EO, Judge Kollar-Kotelly rejected the government’s timing argument—what the court described as “a critical factual representation”—that the suits were premature because Section 2(a) “has not even begun to be implemented” and implementation “may never occur.” The argument was advanced in their oppositions, supported by a declaration from EAC Executive Director Brianna Schletz, and repeated by DOJ counsel at the hearing on the motion. The court explained that the record showed the opposite: three days before DOJ filed its oppositions, EAC Executive Director Brianna Schletz had sent a letter to state election officials quoting from Section 2 and asking how they would implement those requirements “if required,” thereby confirming that the EAC had already begun acting on Section 2(a). As the court wrote:
“The letter reveals that—contrary to Defendants’ representations to the Court—the EAC has, in fact, already begun to implement Section 2(a). The letter further reveals that—contrary to Defendants’ arguments in their Oppositions—the EAC is not interpreting Section 2(a) as an open-ended suggestion to consider including a documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement of an unknown form. Instead, the EAC, like the Court and Plaintiffs, reads Section 2(a) as an ‘instruction’ to adopt the precise documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement outlined in the Executive Order.” (emphasis added).
Notably, the court criticized Executive Director Schletz’s declaration and DOJ’s diligence, writing:
“The contradiction between Defendants’ factual representations and the facts on the ground is particularly striking because Executive Director Schletz authored a declaration supporting Defendants’ Oppositions that was filed three days after she sent the letter to the States. … When pressed, counsel for Defendants asserted that he ‘had no knowledge of the letter.’ … Indeed, even after receiving a copy of the letter from Plaintiffs’ counsel, counsel for Defendants appeared to be operating under the ‘understanding that the letter is dated three days after we submitted our opposition.’ … When the Court explained to counsel that he had the dates exactly backwards, he replied: ‘Fair enough.’ … The Court is not currently of the mind that counsel for Defendants intentionally misrepresented the facts by failing to mention a letter authored by a declarant with whom he surely consulted. But the Court must remark that this exchange does not reflect the level of diligence the Court expects from any litigant—let alone the United States Department of Justice.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
16. Venezuelan couple’s immigration detention: “This Court takes clear offense to Respondents wasting judicial resources to admit to the Court it has no evidence;” “contradict[ing] themselves throughout the entire record;” providing “shoddy affidavits and contradictory testimony.”
Judge David Briones (Clinton appointee), Sanchez Puentes v. Garite, 3:25-cv-00127 (W.D. Tex.)
This case involved a habeas corpus challenge by a Venezuelan couple whom the government alleged to be Tren de Aragua members.
On Apr. 21, 2025, denying the government’s motion to extend time to respond to Petitioners’ amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Judge Briones said:
“To date, Respondents have not provided this Court with a single reason as to why Petitioners have been designated as Alien Enemies. To date, Respondents have not provided this Court with a single reason as to whether Petitioners’ ‘circumstances have materially change[d]’ which would warrant rearrest and incarceration by ICE. To date, Respondents have not provided the Court with any information that would be materially helpful in determining whether Petitioners are being unlawfully detained in violation of their TPS protections during the appeal period. Respondents have known about the instant habeas petition for at least six days. Respondents could have filed their response, which was due on April 21, 2025, providing the Court with even a reason or two as two (sic) why Petitioners’ habeas petition should be denied, while also requesting an extension of time, but rather than putting in the slightest bit of effort, Respondents instead just asked for more time. To date, Respondents have not provided the Court with anything useful.”
On Apr. 25, 2025, granting Petitioners’ amended petition, Judge Briones wrote:
“Respondents declare, without providing this Court with a single piece of meaningful evidence, that ‘Petitioners are members of Tren de Aragua.’ … Of great concern to this Court is that Respondents contradict themselves throughout the entire record. … [T]he April 23, 2025 Habeas Corpus hearing in this Court, Respondents and the Government based the entirety of their case on multiple levels of hearsay, hidden within declarations of declarants who have no personal knowledge about the facts they are attesting to. … What is astonishing is that these declarants cannot even so much as identify what government official did receive the alleged information directly. Respondents ask this Court to accept their claims, going off of nearly nothing, to substantiate their mammoth claims. … The Court would not accept this evidence even in a case where only nominal damages were at stake, let alone what is at stake here. Beyond these shoddy affidavits and contradictory testimony, Respondents haven’t provided ‘membership’ at all as it relates to Petitioner Sanchez Garcia … This Court takes clear offense to Respondents wasting judicial resources to admit to the Court it has no evidence, yet seek to have this Court determine Petitioner Sanchez Puentes is ‘guilty by association.’ This Court found no need to even allow closing arguments as to Petitioner Sanchez Puentes at the April 23, 2025 Habeas Corpus Hearing. … It is this Court’s finding that Respondents’ Response and testimony was replete with conclusions, declarations, and accusations, completely and wholly unsubstantiated by anything meaningful in the record.” (emphasis added).
17. Federal collective bargaining exclusions: evidence “strongly suggest[s]” a “mere pretext for retaliation;” presumption of regularity “rebutted”
Judge Paul L. Friedman (Clinton appointee), National Treasury Employees Union v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00935 (D.D.C)
This case was brought by the National Treasury Employees Union following President Trump’s Mar. 27 Executive Order (EO) terminating multiple departments’ employees’ statutory collective bargaining rights.
On Apr. 28, 2025, Judge Friedman granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Section 2 of the EO. Judge Friedman held:
“The Court concludes that NTEU has rebutted the presumption of regularity by presenting clear evidence that ‘the President was indifferent to the purposes and requirements of the [FSLMRS], or acted deliberately in contravention of them.’ Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Reagan, 870 F.2d at 728. The Court reaches this conclusion for three reasons: (1) the Executive Order and the Administration’s surrounding statements are at odds with Congress’s findings in the FSLMRS; (2) the White House Fact Sheet reflects retaliatory motive; and (3) the Administration’s guidance related to the Executive Order – specifically, the OPM Guidance – suggests that the invocation of Section 7103(b)(1) was in furtherance of unrelated policy goals rather than based on the statutory criteria.”
Judge Friedman further wrote:
“In the instant case, the evidence rebutting the presumption of regularity is a significant reason to believe NTEU will prevail on its claim. The scope of the Executive Order when compared with the intent of Congress in passing the FSLMRS, coupled with the surrounding statements in the Fact Sheet and OPM Guidance – which strongly suggest that President Trump’s invocation of Section 7103(b)(1) was mere pretext for retaliation and for accomplishing unrelated policy objectives – are persuasive reasons to believe NTEU likely will be successful on the merits of its claim.” (emphasis added).
On May 16, 2025, the D.C. Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal, concluding that NTEU had not established irreparable harm sufficient to justify preliminary relief. Case No. 25-5157. The panel expressly declined to address the government’s arguments concerning NTEU’s likelihood of success on the merits. A merits decision is pending.
18. Perkins Coie executive order: “façade of discrimination allegations;” “pretextual nature;” “explanation simply is not credible”
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Perkins Coie LLP v. U.S. Department of Justice, 1:25-cv-00716 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged President Trump’s Mar. 6, 2025 executive order targeting Perkins Coie LLP, which accused the firm of “dishonest and dangerous activity,” an “unethical lack of candor,” and unlawful racial discrimination, and directed federal agencies to take adverse measures concerning the firm’s security clearances, government contracts, and access to federal officials and facilities.
On May 2, 2025, granting summary judgment and a permanent injunction, Judge Howell found the order unconstitutional, expressly rejecting several of the government’s factual assertions and explanations. Addressing DOJ’s characterization of the executive order’s allegations as “not seriously contested” and “matters of public record,” Judge Howell found that “[t]his description is inaccurate,” noting that Perkins Coie “vigorously contests” the discrimination allegations. The court separately rejected the government’s contention that the order merely expressed presidential opinions rather than directed punitive government action, stating: “The government’s attempt to reframe this case as about governmental speech is subterfuge.”
Addressing the executive order’s allegations of unlawful racial discrimination, Judge Howell examined the government’s reliance on a previously dismissed lawsuit concerning Perkins Coie’s fellowship program and the firm’s adoption of the Mansfield Rule. The court found that the former provided “no support for the claim that plaintiff currently discriminates against any staff or applicants,” while the government had “provided no evidence” that the Mansfield Rule was implemented unlawfully or that Perkins Coie had engaged in any activity violating anti-discrimination law. Judge Howell then expressly identified pretext in the government’s justification:
“Instead, the government’s briefing reveals the true motivation lurking behind the façade of discrimination allegations: the administration’s disapproval of plaintiff’s speech in favor of diversity. This revelation makes clear the pretextual nature of EO 14230’s cited reason regarding plaintiff’s purported discrimination.”
The court emphasized that “the government provides no evidence to suggest” the firm’s statements supporting diversity reflected unlawful conduct, and that “public statements supporting diversity, standing alone, as they do here, provide not even a scintilla of evidence of impropriety, let alone illegality.” Judge Howell concluded that “a fair reading of the record, and taking the government at its word, requires finding that the justification for EO 14230 stemming from plaintiff’s purported ‘racial discrimination’ was motivated only by plaintiff’s First Amendment protected speech in support of diversity.”
Judge Howell also rejected the government’s asserted national-security rationale for suspending security clearances, finding that “[t]he government cannot credibly claim that targeting plaintiff’s current employees would remedy any national security concerns related to Fusion GPS when none of those employees were involved with Fusion GPS.” In her equal-protection analysis, Judge Howell further rejected the government’s explanation for singling out Perkins Coie while leaving other law firms participating in the same diversity initiatives untouched. She noted that more than 360 law firms had obtained Mansfield certification in 2023–2024, yet Perkins Coie was among the few targeted for adverse treatment. The court found that “[t]he government has given no plausible explanation for the specific targeting of plaintiff as opposed to other signatories to the Mansfield Rule or the SEO Fellowship.” Citing the principle that “[j]udges are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free,” Judge Howell concluded that “the government’s explanation simply is not credible.” She ultimately found that “this record firmly supports the finding that EO 14230 serves no legitimate government interest, but only the interest of retaliation.”
19-a. Hoque’s student status and detention: events “appear to be reverse-engineered justifications for speech-based targeting and enforcement”
Judge Jerry W. Blackwell (Biden appointee), Mohammed H.(Hoque) v. Trump, 0:25-cv-01576 (D. Minn.)
This case involves a lawfully present international student whom ICE detained and moved to remove after the government terminated his student status and SEVIS record, in a case alleging, among other things, retaliation for protected pro-Palestinian speech, due process violations, First Amendment violations, and APA violations.
On May 5, 2025, granting Petitioner’s temporary release on bail pending adjudication of his habeas petition, the court found that petitioner had made “a clear case” that the government violated the APA, “at a minimum, by terminating his SEVIS record.” The court separately held, in its due process and First Amendment analyses, that the automatic-stay mechanism “operates by fiat and has the effect of prolonging detention even after a judicial officer has determined that release on bond is appropriate,” and that, “[i]n the absence of any individualized justification,” its use here rendered the detention “arbitrary as applied.” The court also stressed:
“The factual record is substantial: an unrefuted IJ finding that Petitioner posed no danger; credible allegations of retaliatory motive following protected speech; and shifting post hoc explanations to justify the arrest unsupported by any contemporaneous explanation demonstrating the reason for it.”
The court also noted unrebutted evidence that petitioner was suffering serious and worsening medical harm in custody, including multiple hernias, “worsening bloody stools, pain, and fatigue,” and a growing risk of complications while needed surgery was delayed. It further observed that detention prevented him from participating in coursework for which he had paid tuition, impaired his access to counsel, and created a risk of transfer to a remote ICE facility that could “frustrate meaningful judicial review even if jurisdiction technically remains intact.”
On Jun. 17, 2025, Judge Blackwell granted habeas relief, holding, inter alia, that petitioner had been subjected to arbitrary detention in violation of the APA in a “case [that] tests the constitutional limits of Executive Branch power,” explaining that “[t]he record reflects a coordinated series of executive actions—retaliatory in focus, opaque in their justification, and deficient in process—that collectively offend foundational constitutional protections.” Judge Blackwell further emphasized:
“Simply by fiat—without introducing any proof and without immediate judicial review—the Government effectively overruled the bond decision and kept Petitioner detained. In doing so, the automatic stay rendered Petitioner’s continued detention arbitrary and gave him no chance to contest the Government’s case for detention.”
The court further wrote:
“Government has not explained its rationale at the time of visa revocation or its rationale for altering the charges against Petitioner. On this record, these events appear to be reverse-engineered justifications for speech-based targeting and enforcement.”
Granting Petitioner’s APA claim, the court wrote that, “[u]pon review, none of the proffered reasons (failure to maintain status, foreign policy, criminal records, or visa revocation) provides a satisfactory explanation for terminating Petitioner’s SEVIS record,” and that “the record lacks evidence that the Government relied on any of these legitimate bases for terminating Petitioner’s SEVIS record.” Indeed, “[t]he vague ‘foreign policy’ ground requires notification in the Federal Register, 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d), and the record here reflects that it was utilized as pretext to target students who expressed views favoring Palestinian human rights,” the court wrote, further explaining:
“The record shows that DHS’s reason for terminating Petitioner’s SEVIS record was a shifting sand, changing weeks after he was detained. Immediately after his arrest, Petitioner’s SEVIS record showed that it was terminated for failure to maintain status under 237(a)(1)(C)(i) and foreign policy under § 237(a)(4)(C). But then weeks later, his SEVIS record listed the termination reason as “OTHER – Individual identified in criminal records check and/or has had their visa revoked.” The shift is not adequately explained in the record. The Government’s claim that the SEVIS record was simply ‘corrected’ is not supported by the cited declarations and exhibit. Neither declarant characterizes the initial entry as an error or the change as a correction. The evidence at most shows that the foreign policy ground was inconsistent with State Department records. It still does not explain why foreign policy was cited or even address the citation for failure to maintain status.
… At most, the evidence shows that DHS found Petitioner after running a search that flagged his 2023 misdemeanor, which DHS somehow elevated into a present public safety threat. Terminating Petitioner’s status and SEVIS record based on public safety suffers from multiple flaws. … The record separately establishes that Petitioner’s SEVIS termination violates DHS policies. The first is a policy against targeting protected speech. … The same record evidence that establishes Petitioner’s First Amendment claim also establishes the DHS policy violation. The second is a policy that visa revocation does not justify SEVIS termination.”
The court concluded:
“The Constitution prohibits arbitrary detention, even in the immigration context. This case is not about open borders or executive discretion. It is about whether a young man can be jailed and nearly deported because of what he said. The law answers no. … But that authority is not a blank check. The Constitution still governs—even, and especially, when the target is unpopular or politically disfavored.”
19-b. Hoque’s immigration rearrest: “apparent inconsistencies” prolonged proceedings; submissions must rest on “facts, truth, and diligence—not inference, assumption, or speculation”
Judge Jerry W. Blackwell (Biden appointee), Mohammed H. (Hoque) v. Trump, 0:25-cv-01576 (D. Minn.)
This subsequent proceeding concerned conflicting government declarations about ICE’s records and the circumstances in which officers re-arrested Petitioner despite a federal court order requiring that he remain released from immigration custody.
On Jan. 15, 2026, ICE officers arrested Hoque at his Minnesota residence and detained him for approximately seven hours, despite Judge Blackwell’s June 17, 2025 habeas order requiring that he “shall remain released from custody.” The government conceded that the arrest violated the court’s order. On Apr. 20, 2026, Judge Blackwell declined to impose sanctions for the government’s noncompliance but ordered a limited evidentiary inquiry into whether the arresting officers knew of the release order, what systems they had consulted, and what measures had been implemented to prevent recurrence. The court noted:
“Respondents concede that this arrest and detention occurred notwithstanding this Court’s prior order requiring that Petitioner remain released.
The parties offer materially different accounts of how that violation occurred.”
The court emphasized that government counsel’s assurances of future compliance, without supporting documentation, did not resolve those questions.
In a Jan. 30 declaration, ICE deportation officer Sarwar Hussain stated that his team had been unaware of the habeas order because it was recorded in an ICE system they had not checked before arresting Hoque. In a May 27 declaration, Assistant Field Office Director John H. Albert similarly wrote that the Enhanced Leads Identification and Targeting for Enforcement (ELITE) system consulted by the officers “did not contain information about the bond or habeas orders.” However, in a subsequent declaration filed June 2, Assistant Field Office Director Corey McMahon stated that ICE’s ELITE and ENFORCE Alien Removal Module (EARM) systems reflected both orders and that the information had been entered into those systems in 2025, shortly after the orders were issued.
In a June 2 letter, Petitioner’s counsel identified the apparent contradictions between these sworn accounts, while expressly stating that Petitioner did not contend government counsel had knowingly submitted false information. Counsel also informed the court that the government’s subsequent assurances and system safeguards were sufficient to resolve Petitioner’s request for prospective relief. In its June 3 response, the government maintained that the January arrest resulted from human error and that corrective measures had been implemented.
On June 4, Judge Blackwell ordered Respondents to address the “apparent inconsistencies” in the declarations, explain whether the accounts were consistent, identify any statements requiring clarification, and provide supporting records, screenshots, policies, or other evidence. Following further submissions from the parties, Judge Blackwell concluded on July 31, 2026, that no additional proceedings were warranted. He explained:
“The apparent inconsistencies in Respondents’ evidentiary submissions introduced uncertainty and protracted these proceedings by prompting multiple orders for additional briefing. Although the inquiry will not proceed further here because the record does not clearly show intentional wrongdoing, it serves as a reminder of the professional duty of candor. In accordance with that duty, counsel must ensure that characterizations of evidence are fairly supported and do not serve as a substitute for the evidence itself, and that declarants attest to facts or actions that the witness has actually confirmed or performed.”
Judge Blackwell concluded:
“This Court depends on attorneys, as officers of the court, to assist with the orderly administration of justice. Submissions from counsel that are vague, inconsistent, or appear to lack confirmation interfere with that process. As counsel know, their filings and representations must rest on facts, truth, and diligence—not inference, assumption, or speculation. Anything less threatens the integrity of judicial review.”
20. International student’s immigration detention: “Respondents ask the Court to close its eyes to reality;” ICE agents “misrepresented the date of service”
Judge Angel Kelley (Biden appointee), Ercelik v. Hyde, 1:25-cv-11007 (D. Mass.)
This habeas case challenged ICE’s arrest and detention of a Turkish international student following his participation in a pro-Palestinian campus counterprotest and the subsequent revocation of his student visa.
On May 8, 2025, granting preliminary injunctive relief, Judge Kelley ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, finding that he had demonstrated a high likelihood of success on his First Amendment retaliation claim and a likelihood of success on his Fifth Amendment due process claim. The court pointed to the sequence of events following a November 2023 campus confrontation, including the appearance of Petitioner’s profile on websites targeting pro-Palestinian activists, his subsequent visa revocation, and ICE’s pursuit of detention. The State Department’s memorandum cited Petitioner’s political “activities” and “rhetoric” as grounds for revoking his visa. Judge Kelley found that “every fact points to Petitioner’s protected conduct as the substantial or motivating factor for Respondents’ pursuit of detention.”
The court also questioned the government’s justification for continuing to detain Petitioner despite his intention to return voluntarily to Turkey, for which he had already purchased an airline ticket. Judge Kelley contrasted ICE’s insistence on detention with the administration’s contemporaneous policy encouraging voluntary departure as a faster, safer, and less expensive means of removal. She wrote:
“It rises to the level of near absurdity that Respondents are working to deport many people quickly and at minimal expense to the American taxpayer, but absent an improper purpose, intend to extend Petitioner’s detention. While the Court must offer due deference to ICE’s enforcement prerogative, it is not a leap that it is Petitioner’s protected conduct (political viewpoint) that keeps Respondents so thoroughly intent on his detention. Instead, the Court is simply following the breadcrumbs left by the Government itself.”
In its due process analysis, Judge Kelley further questioned the government’s stated basis for detention, noting that DOJ counsel had asserted at a hearing that ICE was seeking detention because “actions have consequences.” The court rejected that justification, explaining that “[i]mmigration detention cannot be a punitive ‘consequence’ for actions addressed in the state criminal court.”
The court also identified a factual misrepresentation in the immigration charging documents. An Apr. 10 arrest warrant referred to the execution of a charging document initiating removal proceedings, although the Notice to Appear (NTA) was not completed until Apr. 25, nine days after ICE first attempted to detain Petitioner. The NTA contained an agent’s certification that it had been personally served on Apr. 25, although the court found that service occurred no earlier than May 7. Judge Kelley stated: “This cannot be true.” She continued that “not only was there no charging document when Respondents attempted to detain Petitioner on April 16, agents then misrepresented the date of service, which is no earlier than May 7.”
Concluding that Respondents had failed to dispel the inference that continued detention was intended as punishment, Judge Kelley wrote:
“Respondents have done nothing to disabuse the Court of the most obvious conclusion: prolonging the Petitioner’s detention was intended to be punitive. Thus, Petitioner is likely to succeed on his Fifth Amendment claim. Respondents have claimed nothing but ICE’s discretion as a talisman of protection. In the name of discretion, Respondents ask the Court to close its eyes to reality. The guarantees of the Constitution allow no such thing.”
Judge Kelley ordered Petitioner’s immediate release and required advance notice and an opportunity to be heard before any renewed detention based on grounds not already litigated, so the court could assess whether the asserted justification constituted a pretext for retaliation. These findings arose at the preliminary-injunction stage. The parties subsequently stipulated to dismissal on May 21, 2025.
21. Harsono’s immigration detention: “Likely indicates pretext, while the true reason for taking him into custody and detaining him during the ongoing removal proceedings is retaliation for his public expression of support for Palestinian human rights.”
Judge Katherine M. Menendez (Biden appointee), Harsono v. Trump, 0:25-cv-01976 (D. Minn.)
This case involved a habeas corpus challenge arising from the Trump administration’s efforts to combat antisemitism and protest activity.
On May 14, 2025, Judge Menendez granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, stating:
“[O]n this record, and with the showing made by Petitioner, it … likely indicates pretext, while the true reason for taking him into custody and detaining him during the ongoing removal proceedings is retaliation for his public expression of support for Palestinian human rights. … Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. H has shown that he is in custody in violation of the First Amendment and is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus for his immediate release. … [T]he Court concludes that Mr. H prevails on his First Amendment retaliation claim.” (emphasis added).
22. DOJ termination of ABA grants: “proffered justification … is pretextual;” “real reason was retaliation;” “different treatment of other grantees suggests this justification is pretextual”
Judge Christopher R. Cooper (Obama appointee), American Bar Association v. U.S. Department of Justice, 1:25-cv-01263 (D.D.C.)
This case concerns the DOJ’s termination of grants to the ABA Commission on Domestic and Sexual Violence, which the ABA contends was intended as retaliation for its support of law firms targeted by the Executive Orders.
On May 14, 2025, Judge Cooper granted a preliminary injunction on the First Amendment retaliation claim arising from the termination of grants, stating:
“The ABA has made a strong showing that Defendants terminated its grants to retaliate against it for engaging in protected speech. …
[T]he ABA’s allegations, accepted as true, plausibly plead that the government’s proffered justification for terminating the grants is pretextual, and that the real reason was retaliation. The Blanche Memo explicitly spells out how DOJ will be changing its approach toward the ABA in light of the ABA’s lawsuit against the United States. And the temporal proximity between the Blanche Memo and the termination of the ABA’s grants is probative of Defendants’ retaliatory motive. …
The government claims that it had a nonretaliatory motive for terminating the grants: They no longer aligned with DOJ’s priorities. But the government has not identified any nonretaliatory DOJ priorities, much less explained why they were suddenly deemed inconsistent with the goals of the affected grants. And the government’s different treatment of other grantees suggests this justification is pretextual” (emphasis added).
23. Foreign Service collective-bargaining exclusions: “AFSA has rebutted the presumption by clear evidence;” evidence “reflects retaliatory motive towards certain unions;” government positions “directly conflict”
Judge Paul L. Friedman (Clinton appointee), American Foreign Service Association v. Trump, 1:25-cv-01030 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged President Trump’s March 27, 2025 executive order removing State Department and USAID Foreign Service employees from statutory collective-bargaining protections under a national-security exception.
On May 14, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction against Section 3 of the executive order, Judge Friedman expressly found that “AFSA has rebutted the presumption [of regularity] by clear evidence.” The court adopted its earlier analysis in National Treasury Employees Union v. Trump, involving another provision of the same executive order. In that case, the court found that the executive order’s unprecedented scope, together with the White House Fact Sheet and OPM’s implementing guidance, reflected that “the President was either indifferent to or acted in contravention of the requirements of the FSLMRS.” Judge Friedman stated that “[t]he analysis is identical here,” because the two cases involved the same executive order and contemporaneous government explanations.
The court also considered additional evidence of retaliatory motive. AFSA pointed to the administration’s decision to preserve collective-bargaining protections for Customs and Border Protection employees, whose union had endorsed President Trump, and the VA’s selective restoration of those protections to particular unions rather than agency subdivisions. In explaining the VA’s decision, its press secretary stated that the unions receiving restored protections had “filed no or few grievances against VA” and had not impeded its operations. Judge Friedman concluded that this additional evidence “bolsters the Court’s earlier conclusion” that the White House Fact Sheet and other contemporaneous materials “reflect[ ] retaliatory motive towards certain unions.” Although Judge Friedman considered evidence of retaliatory motive in finding the presumption of regularity rebutted, the preliminary injunction rested on AFSA’s likelihood of success on its ultra vires claims. The court expressly declined to decide whether AFSA was entitled to preliminary relief on its separate First Amendment retaliation claim.
Judge Friedman separately identified an inconsistency in the government’s representations concerning the White House Fact Sheet. Although DOJ argued at oral argument that the document was irrelevant because it concerned the federal civil-service statute rather than the Foreign Service statute, the government had relied on that same document in its written opposition to defend the President’s Foreign Service determinations. In a footnote, Judge Friedman stated:
“This contention directly conflicts with the government’s arguments made in its opposition memorandum, where the government argued that the statements in the Fact Sheet support the President’s Section 4103(b) determinations.”
Rejecting the government’s national-security defense, Judge Friedman also reiterated his concern that the administration’s asserted national-security determinations could instead represent “a recasting of decisions related to ‘the general welfare’ as ‘national security’ determinations.” He concluded that AFSA was likely to succeed on its claim that the executive order exceeded the President’s statutory authority. The court did not separately decide AFSA’s First Amendment retaliation claim.
On June 20, 2025, the D.C. Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. Unlike its stay in NTEU, the panel concluded that the government was likely to succeed on the merits of its ultra vires defense, emphasizing the President’s broad statutory discretion in national-security matters. The panel did not separately adjudicate the district court’s findings concerning retaliatory motive or inconsistent government litigation positions, but its contrary assessment of the statutory national-security authority materially qualified the district court’s reasoning. The appeal remains pending.
24. Border cash reporting: “it just looks so much like an after-the-fact document to me;” appellate court says “the presumption of regularity is rebutted as to the March XX Memo;” “highly irregular”
Judge Janis L. Sammartino (W. Bush appointee), Novedades y Servicios, Inc. v. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 3:25-cv-00886 (S.D. Cal.); Circuit Judges Lucy H. Koh and Ana de Alba (Biden appointees), No. 25-4238 (9th Cir.)
This case, brought by a San Diego money services business and its owner, challenges the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) March 2025 Southwest Border Geographic Targeting Order (SWB GTO), which lowered the threshold for filing currency transaction reports (CTRs) from $10,000 to $200 in 30 California and Texas ZIP codes.
The government relied on an internal FinCEN memorandum dated “March XX, 2025” to establish the agency’s reasoning. At the May 15, 2025 preliminary-injunction hearing, Judge Sammartino asked: “It could be an after-the-fact rationalization and quick job to justify what was done?” Government counsel invoked the presumption of regularity and said she had no evidence it was created afterward, but acknowledged: “I don’t have any factual information about the reason for the xx.” The judge later stated:
“[I]t just looks so much like an after-the-fact document to me. Once a document is issued, you put a date on it. Once it goes forward, you put a date on it.” (emphasis added.)
In her May 21 written opinion, Judge Sammartino assumed for purposes of the preliminary-injunction motion that the memorandum predated the order, while emphasizing that the assumption “rests on shaky grounds.” She separately rejected the government’s contention that FinCEN had considered its estimated reporting burden when adopting the order:
“The Government’s insistence that it considered the eight-minute CTR time burden (by FinCEN’s estimate) at the time FinCEN issued the SWB GTO is belied by the record. … There is, from the Court’s review, no mention of or reference to that time burden in the record.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
On July 13, 2026, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. Judge Koh, joined by Judge de Alba, emphasized that the memorandum “affirmatively indicates that it is in draft form.” It lacked a completed date, contained redline edits, and left the dates of legal clearance and approval by FinCEN’s director blank. The majority added: “The document is also highly irregular and is heavily redacted.” Those redactions included the entire “Analytic Plan.”
The majority also addressed the government’s repeated failure to substantiate FinCEN’s reliance on the memorandum:
“Furthermore, despite being given multiple opportunities to do so, the government failed to present any evidence that FinCEN relied upon the March XX Memo in issuing the Border GTO.” (emphasis added.)
It added that the government had “repeatedly declined to even provide the district court with any explicit assurance” that FinCEN relied on the memorandum. On appeal, the government again invoked the presumption of regularity but “still provides no clear answers as to the March XX Memo.”
The majority held that “the presumption of regularity is rebutted as to the March XX Memo,” relying on the document’s “irregularities” and “the government’s own behavior throughout this litigation.” It concluded: “Accordingly, we may not treat the March XX Memo as a justification for the Border GTO.” In dissent, Judge Kenneth K. Lee disputed the majority’s treatment of the memorandum, arguing that further district-court factfinding was necessary.
25-a. USCIS asylum settlement and Cristian’s removal: Government’s “Indicative Asylum Decision” was “manufactured for this litigation;” Fourth Circuit noted unrebutted charge that it was a “contrivance” “created just for this case”
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), J.O.P. v. DHS, 8:19-cv-01944 (D. Md.)
Judge DeAndrea Gist Benjamin (Biden appointee), joined by Judge Roger L. Gregory (Clinton recess appointee; W. Bush nominee), No. 25-1519 (4th Cir.)
This case challenged a 2019 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy requiring reassessment of whether asylum applicants previously designated as unaccompanied children remained eligible for special asylum procedures. A court-approved settlement protected class members from removal before USCIS adjudicated their asylum applications on the merits.
This sub-item concerns the government’s representations about “Cristian,” a class member removed to El Salvador, including allegations that he was a Tren de Aragua member or public-safety threat and the government’s subsequent reliance on an “Indicative Asylum Decision” issued after the court ordered it to facilitate his return.
On Apr. 23, 2025, Judge Gallagher ordered the government to facilitate the return to the United States of “Cristian,” a pseudonymous member of the class covered by the agreement who had been deported to El Salvador. At the time, Gallagher wrote that “Defendants have provided no evidence, or even any specific allegations, as to how Cristian, or any other Class Member, poses a threat to public safety.”
On May 1, after the district court ordered the government to facilitate Cristian’s return, USCIS issued an “Indicative Asylum Decision” stating that, if he “were returned to the United States, it would deny his asylum application based on (1) terrorist-related inadmissibility grounds . . . and (2) as a matter of discretion.” The Justice Department presented the document to the court as an “adjudication on the merits” supplying the “precise relief” Cristian sought.
In a May 19, 2025 order denying the government’s motion for a stay of Judge Gallagher’s order pending appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that
“the Indicative Asylum Decision—created five days after the district court’s facilitation order was issued—was not an authentic change in factual circumstances. Cristian contends that neither ‘USCIS regulation, policy, [n]or practice’ provides for ‘Indicative Asylum Decisions,’” and that the decision was “a ‘litigation-driven’ document—a ‘contrivance’ ‘created just for this case.’ The Government has no response to this charge—a deafening silence.” (emphasis added; citations omitted).
On Sept. 8, 2026, resolving a second motion for attorney’s fees and costs, Judge Gallagher wrote:
“This Court also concludes, however, that the government’s litigation position was not reasonable. Setting aside the issue of its interpretation of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, during the course of the litigation of this matter, the government has engaged in other unreasonable conduct, including but not limited to its repeated unsubstantiated assertions that Cristian was a member of TdA or a threat to public safety, see, e.g., ECF 557 at 3, its attempted use of an ‘Indicative Asylum Decision’ manufactured for this litigation, and its decision to ignore this Court’s reporting deadline to facilitate its participation in the prisoner swap without court intervention. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, even if portions of the government’s positions might have been reasonable, its overall litigation position has not been substantially justified. A reasonable person could not find that the government’s overall litigation position had reasonable basis in law and in fact.” (emphasis added).
25-b. USCIS asylum settlement records: government’s claims that records checks were “burdensome” or “cumbersome” were “glaringly contradicted.”
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), J.O.P. v. DHS, 8:19-cv-01944 (D. Md.)
This sub-item concerns the government’s representations about the difficulty of reviewing agency records to identify potentially wrongful removals of class members, which Judge Gallagher subsequently found were contradicted by the capabilities of the government’s electronic records systems.
In a July 29, 2026 opinion, made public Aug. 6, Judge Gallagher found Defendants in civil contempt for removals carried out despite identification of potential class membership. The proceedings also exposed discrepancies between the government’s representations about investigating those removals and the capabilities of its records systems.
The court had sought to determine whether alerts identifying potential class members were missing when ICE removed them or had been present but disregarded. Defendants told Class Counsel that checking USCIS’s lists and records would require a “cumbersome” manual review. They told the court that their computer systems were “built for operation as opposed to litigation,” making historical checks on when alerts were entered “difficult.” Judge Gallagher described the government’s February hearing presentation as “woefully inadequate” and subsequently required an evidentiary hearing.
In the opinion, Judge Gallagher wrote that “previous assertions by Defendants of ‘burdensome’ or ‘cumbersome’ tasks have been glaringly contradicted.” Explaining the contradiction, she observed that “it was later revealed that both tasks could, in fact, be performed with minimal effort using electronic search tools.” USCIS’s lists were Excel spreadsheets searchable by an individual’s immigration identification number; ICE’s database could likewise be queried to determine when a class-membership banner had been added or removed.
The court also questioned Defendants’ reliance on their voluntary reporting of removals as evidence of good faith. By February and March, they had learned of “a slew of additional potential wrongful removals” but “failed to promptly notify Class Counsel (or their own counsel, for that matter).” After recounting explanations involving agency counsel’s workload and concerns about the accuracy of the information, Judge Gallagher observed: “That information was first revealed as part of sworn testimony given at the evidentiary hearing convened by this Court.”
Ordering continued searches to identify removed potential class members, the court returned to the government’s representations about the burden involved. The accounting had proved “readily doable” and, the court qualified, “it appears, has identified previously unreported removals each time it has been run.” Defendants were required to repeat the search every two weeks and report its results, along with other potentially wrongful removals they discovered, to the court and Class Counsel.
25-c. Class member E.M.P.’s departure: “contradicting previous testimony,” ICE officer acknowledged records of his inability to read or write
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), J.O.P. v. DHS, 8:19-cv-01944 (D. Md.)
This sub-item concerns contradictory ICE testimony regarding records documenting class member E.M.P.’s inability to read or write, in proceedings challenging the circumstances of his departure to Guatemala and whether he knowingly agreed to waive his rights.
In a July 29, 2026 opinion, made public Aug. 6, Judge Gallagher addressed a motion to compel the return of E.M.P., whom ICE had transported to Guatemala on Feb. 4 after he signed a voluntary-departure form while in detention. Class Counsel disputed whether his agreement was knowing and voluntary, asserting that E.M.P. had an intellectual disability, could not read or write in any language, and understood the document to be a habeas petition.
The court identified a contradiction in the testimony of ICE Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer Boyd, writing:
“At the March 23, 2026 evidentiary hearing, ICE Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer Boyd acknowledged, contradicting previous testimony that he had ‘no indication’ that E.M.P. was unable to read or write, that June and July, 2018 notations in E.M.P.’s EARM profile referenced that inability. The EARM record attached as Exhibit G to Class Counsel’s motion reflects, in June 29 and July 3, 2018 narratives, that E.M.P. ‘stated he does not know how to read or write so his fingerprint was taken instead of his signature.’ Officer Boyd testified that these records would have been available to the ICE officers who presented E.M.P. with the Form I-210.” (citations omitted).
Although Judge Gallagher shared Class Counsel’s concerns about the circumstances of E.M.P.’s departure, she denied the motion to compel his return. The court held that the settlement agreement’s prohibition on executing final removal orders did not encompass departures pursuant to grants of voluntary departure, and that determining whether E.M.P.’s election was genuinely voluntary fell outside the scope of its authority to enforce that agreement. The court did not resolve whether E.M.P. knowingly waived his rights or foreclose other avenues of relief.
26. New Mexico military-zone prosecutions: “not a single bit of evidence” establishing entry into the National Defense Area; government conduct “very, very disturbing;” “charges are far from a slam dunk;” “Several judges of this Court, and others, have expressed extreme skepticism as to whether the factual basis as alleged by the Government could legally sustain a conviction under these statutes;” admissions of mistaken land-transfer assumptions
Chief Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth, United States v. Flores-Penaloza, 2:25-cr-01075 (D.N.M.); Judge Margaret I. Strickland (Biden appointee), United States v. Escobedo-Molina, 2:25-cr-01430 (D.N.M.); and related government admissions in United States v. Jimenez-Santiz, 2:25-cr-01047, United States v. Luna-Martinez, 2:25-cr-01003, and United States v. Duque-Duran, 2:25-cr-00991 (D.N.M.).
These proceedings arose from the Trump administration’s prosecution of individuals for unlawful entry into the United States and additional charges alleging entry into the newly designated New Mexico National Defense Area (NMNDA), under 50 U.S.C. § 797 and 18 U.S.C. § 1382.
At a June 17, 2025 bench trial in Flores-Penaloza, Chief Magistrate Judge Wormuth found that the government had failed to establish that Defendant had entered the NMNDA. In a subsequent July 11 opinion in the separate case of Escobedo-Molina, Judge Strickland recounted the proceedings, observing that “in the only case thus far to proceed to trial on these charges in this District, the Government conceded that it had no evidence as to essential elements of the crimes.” After questioning by Judge Wormuth about whether the government had established the status of the land where the defendant allegedly entered the United States, Assistant U.S. Attorney Randy Castellano conceded:
“I’ll agree with the Court, we do have nothing more on that. I don’t dispute that at all.”
Judge Wormuth then stated:
“the United States has come in here and put on not a single bit of evidence that allowed me to find that he even entered the National Defense Area, based on the witnesses I heard. And obviously I’m going to be granting directed verdict on Counts 2 and 3.”
Judge Wormuth also described the government’s conduct as “very, very disturbing.” He granted a directed verdict in the defendant’s favor on the two military-zone charges, while finding him guilty of unlawful entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 and sentencing him to time served.
Citing those proceedings in Escobedo-Molina, Judge Strickland likewise expressed concern about the evidentiary basis for the military-zone prosecutions, noting:
“Several judges of this Court, and others, have expressed extreme skepticism as to whether the factual basis as alleged by the Government could legally sustain a conviction under these statutes.”
She emphasized that the charges required “detailed and highly contestable facts,” including proof that the defendant had entered land within the NMNDA, concluding: “Put simply, these charges are far from a slam dunk.”
Indeed, in three other prosecutions—Jimenez-Santiz, Luna-Martinez, and Duque-Duran—the government acknowledged that it had proceeded on an incorrect understanding of which portions of the international border had been transferred to the Army. On May 22, 2025, responding to court orders seeking explanations for amended charging documents, the U.S. Attorney’s Office stated in each case:
“On or about May 15, 2025, the United States Attorneys Office learned from the United States Border Patrol that portions of the international border previously understood as encompassed by the NM NDA were not, in fact, transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army. Agents with the United States Border Patrol began reviewing previously filed complaints to identify cases in which there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant crossed through the NM NDA. Once those defendants were identified, the United States filed amended informations removing the NM NDA-related charges.”
The government confirmed that it had withdrawn the military-zone charges against the defendants because it lacked sufficient evidence to proceed, leaving only the unlawful-entry charges under 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
Separately, in Escobedo-Molina, Judge Wormuth had previously dismissed the military-zone charges in the criminal complaint without prejudice on May 14, finding insufficient probable cause that the defendant knew he was entering the restricted military area. The court criticized the government’s “cut-and-paste approach to factual allegations in the complaints” across hundreds of prosecutions and the “remarkable tone and content” of its objection to being required to brief the applicable law. Although prosecutors subsequently filed an information containing the same military-zone charges, Judge Strickland later cited Flores-Penaloza in her July 11 opinion to illustrate their contested factual elements and the prejudice resulting from the government’s deportation of Escobedo-Molina while those charges remained pending. She dismissed the remaining charges with prejudice because the deportation impaired the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, including his ability to consult counsel and obtain a speedy trial.
27. Jenner & Block executive order: “doesn’t even feign at national security;” “sincerity of the invocation;” “untested factual accusations;” “there’s no doubt that the President ordered the Jenner-specific process in retaliation for Jenner’s protected speech.”
Judge John D. Bates (Bush appointee), Jenner & Block LLP v. U.S. Department of Justice, 1:25-cv-00916 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged President Trump’s Mar. 25, 2025 executive order targeting the law firm Jenner & Block through security-clearance suspensions, threatened termination of government contracts involving the firm, restrictions on federal access and employment, and scrutiny of its employment practices. On Mar. 28, Judge Bates granted a temporary restraining order against significant portions of the executive order. On May 23, granting summary judgment, he held that the order was “an unconstitutional act of retaliation” against Jenner for its protected speech and permanently enjoined its operation. Judge Bates observed that the order “makes no bones about why it chose its target: it picked Jenner because of the causes Jenner champions, the clients Jenner represents, and a lawyer Jenner once employed.” Beyond this express finding of retaliation, the court scrutinized the government’s asserted national-security and antidiscrimination justifications and the evidence offered to support them.
Addressing the security-clearance provisions, Judge Bates found that “there’s no doubt that the President ordered the Jenner-specific process in retaliation for Jenner’s protected speech.” He further concluded that the challenged process implicated “no national security concern to speak of.” The government argued that Jenner’s previous employment of Andrew Weissmann, who worked on the Mueller investigation, and its public praise for him established a “national security nexus” justifying special scrutiny of the firm’s employees. Judge Bates rejected that explanation: “This speech-based justification doesn’t even feign at national security, nor do the defendants articulate a cogent argument that it does.” Weissmann had not worked at Jenner for four years, and the government offered no explanation for why praising him could justify subjecting every Jenner employee to a special security-clearance process. Judge Bates then expressly questioned “the sincerity of the invocation of national security,” pointing to the administration’s rescission of a comparable executive order against Paul Weiss after that firm agreed to changes concerning its former partner, hiring, client selection, and pro bono work—concessions that “had not even a glancing relationship to national security.” Rather than protecting classified information, the court found, the government sought to leverage its control over security clearances to change speech the President disliked.
Judge Bates also examined the government’s alternative justification for terminating contracts involving Jenner: its accusation that the firm engaged in unlawful racial discrimination. Although the executive order and accompanying White House fact sheet alleged discrimination, neither supplied evidence supporting the accusation. The court observed: “Though this case presents no occasion to determine the lawfulness of Jenner’s employment practices, it is worth pausing to examine the defendants’ bases, factual and legal, for accusing Jenner of discrimination. Factually there is very little.” The government’s evidence principally established Jenner’s participation in diversity initiatives used by hundreds of other law firms. “Legally there is not much more,” Judge Bates continued, noting that “[t]he defendants point to no case holding such diversity initiatives illegal.” Indeed, the government itself acknowledged uncertainty over whether those initiatives violated antidiscrimination law. Judge Bates concluded that “[t]he defendants thus seek unilaterally to effectuate their novel legal theory on untested factual accusations, all while evading the due process that would normally accompany such a step.” He further wrote: “So too here, the government has simply decreed that Jenner discriminates without affording any due process.”
Turning to the proposed EEOC investigation, Judge Bates rejected the government’s argument that Jenner could not establish retaliation because the EEOC was ordinarily authorized to investigate employment discrimination. “But the defendants fail to offer any reason that would justify singling Jenner out for investigation aside from its speech,” he wrote. The government relied on Jenner’s adoption of the Mansfield Rule, a diversity-certification initiative, even though more than 360 other firms had obtained the same certification. The court observed: “What is remarkable is the shared characteristic of the firms now threatened with EEOC investigations: speech the President dislikes.” Judge Bates emphasized that the government remained free to investigate genuine discrimination complaints through ordinary legal procedures, but could not single out Jenner for investigation in retaliation for its protected expression.
Judge Bates separately rejected the government’s justification for restrictions on Jenner employees’ access to federal buildings, communications with government officials, and federal employment. The government had “nearly nothing to say” in defense of those provisions, which the court found “inexplicable by anything other than a pure desire to inflict pain on Jenner.” Unlike the contracting and investigation provisions, which bore at least a purported connection to discrimination allegations, the personnel restrictions had “no plausible legitimate rationale.” Judge Bates accordingly held that the executive order violated the First Amendment and permanently enjoined it in full. His decision did not adjudicate whether Jenner’s employment practices were discriminatory or find that government officials knowingly submitted false information.
28. WilmerHale executive order: DOJ’s dispute over client losses “absurd;” “unsupported assertion of national security;” “plainly motivated” by retaliation
Judge Richard J. Leon (Bush appointee), Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP v. Executive Office of the President, 1:25-cv-00917 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged President Trump’s Mar. 27, 2025 executive order targeting WilmerHale through the suspension of employees’ security clearances, threatened termination of government contracts involving the firm, and restrictions on its employees’ access to federal buildings and officials.
On Mar. 28, 2025, Judge Leon granted a temporary restraining order against Sections 3 and 5 of the executive order, finding that its retaliatory nature was “clear from its face.” On May 27, 2025, granting summary judgment on eight of WilmerHale’s eleven claims, Judge Leon held the order unconstitutional and permanently enjoined it in full.
Judge Leon found that “[t]he WilmerHale Order is, on its face, retaliation for the firm’s protected speech,” pointing to its express criticism of the firm’s pro bono practice, immigration and election litigation, and association with former Special Counsel Robert Mueller. He emphasized: “The Order shouts through a bullhorn: If you take on causes disfavored by President Trump, you will be punished!” The Justice Department disputed that the order constituted retaliation or punishment, arguing that each provision represented a valid exercise of executive discretion. Judge Leon rejected that characterization, finding that the order’s language and context “prove otherwise.” He concluded that “[e]ach of the provisions is crafted to cripple the firm,” including by threatening to restrict its lawyers’ access to federal courthouses.
Judge Leon also expressly rejected DOJ’s factual argument disputing the relationship between the executive order and WilmerHale’s loss of clients. In his standing analysis, he wrote: “While defendants dispute the causal relationship between the Order and any client’s decision to terminate its relationship with WilmerHale, this argument is absurd!” The court explained that the order restricted the firm’s ability to serve clients and threatened federal contracts involving entities doing business with WilmerHale. Moreover, several clients had expressly cited the order when terminating or curtailing their relationships with the firm. In a separate footnote, Judge Leon noted that “Defendants dispute this fact but provide no basis for that dispute,” referring to evidence of clients ending or curtailing engagements, and found no genuine dispute of material fact.
The court was particularly critical of the government’s national-security justification for restricting WilmerHale’s ability to represent clients and interact with federal officials. Judge Leon observed that Section 2’s security-clearance provisions invoked the broader concept of “national interest,” rather than “national security.” Addressing the government’s defense of the restrictions on WilmerHale’s right to petition, he wrote:
“Other than a passing reference to WilmerHale’s involvement in election and immigration litigation, the Order does not explain how WilmerHale’s conduct has threatened national security or how restricting its access to federal buildings or federal employees would remedy those threats.”
Judge Leon concluded: “Instead, and as I have already found, the Order is plainly motivated by the President’s desire to retaliate against WilmerHale for its protected activity.” He continued: “This is not a legitimate Government interest, and the Order’s unsupported assertion of national security will not save it!”
Judge Leon also questioned the government’s contracting rationale. Defendants invoked interests in managing federal contracts and preventing taxpayer funds from benefiting entities engaged in racial discrimination. But the court found that they had not explained how requiring contractors to disclose “any business” with WilmerHale, including matters unrelated to government contracts, advanced those interests. “It is certainly not clear to this Court!” Judge Leon observed. Separately, the court noted the government’s concession that WilmerHale had received no advance notice of the executive order and no opportunity to respond to its allegations, finding that this violated procedural due process. The court did not separately adjudicate the truth of the executive order’s discrimination accusations.
29. Sealed search-warrant proceedings: pretext concerns; “High deference is out; trust, but verify is in.”
Judge Zia Faruqui (appointed by D.D.C.), In re: Search of One Device and Two Individuals, 25-sw-82 (D.D.C.)
The case involved efforts to unseal documents related to a search warrant for a defendant’s phone and cloud-based data.
In a May 29, 2025 order denying the government’s attempt to keep the entire case under seal, Judge Zia Faruqui doubted the government’s explanation (suggesting it was a pretext): “Given how weak the government’s argument of harm to the investigation is, the Court cannot help but ask if there are other reasons animating its request. Perhaps the government is embarrassed about trying to forcibly search an innocent [redaction] or having a warrant rejected given how rare that is?” Judge Faruqui also rejected the claim that courts should be highly deferential to the government’s determination that unsealing would impede the investigation, in which he wrote: “High deference is out; trust, but verify is in.”
The judge also doubted the government’s claim of urgency to search the individual’s phone: “On April 24, 2025, the government claimed there was great urgency surrounding its request to search [redacted] phone. But its actions reflect otherwise. Over a month has passed, and the government still has not filed an appeal of the May 6 Order denying the request to search [redacted] phone.”
30. TSA collective-bargaining rescission: Noem’s claims “mischaracterize[] the CBA;” claim of benefits to AFGE alone “simply not true;” “threadbare justification” for rescission
Judge Marsha J. Pechman (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Noem 2:25-cv-00451 (W.D. Wash.)
This case challenged DHS Secretary Kristi Noem’s Feb. 27, 2025 determination rescinding the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) 2024 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) and ending collective bargaining rights for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). Noem asserted that the prior arrangements had benefited AFGE at employees’ expense, undermined workforce flexibility, and failed to advance TSA’s security mission. On June 2, 2025, Judge Pechman granted a preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims. The court found that “the Noem Determination here fails to put forward a reasoned explanation for the 180-degree departure from prior DHS/TSA policy embracing collective bargaining for TSOs.”
Addressing Noem’s asserted security rationale, Judge Pechman contrasted her determination with TSA’s earlier decisions, which had relied on employee surveys, workforce data, and consideration of the agency’s security mission. The court found that “Noem has not explained why collective bargaining has threatened the safety of the transportation system or travelers in America.” Such an explanation was “particularly needed here, given the prior positions taken by TSA as to why collective bargaining benefits overall traveler safety and furthers TSA’s congressionally-mandated safety mission.” Judge Pechman further found that “the Noem Determination fails to explain why the prior Determinations’ conclusions about the merits of the CBA are no longer valid or that circumstances have changed,” noting the absence of any acknowledgment of the facts and circumstances underlying those decisions.
The court also directly rejected Noem’s assertion that collective bargaining had “solely benefited” AFGE “at TSOs’ expense.” Judge Pechman explained that union membership was voluntary and that “Noem also fails to acknowledge that TSOs who join the union enjoy benefits from the Union in collective bargaining over wages, employment protections, and representation in disputes concerning employment.” She found that this “undermines her purported rationale, as the CBA does not just benefit AFGE.” Addressing the same assertion in her First Amendment analysis, Judge Pechman stated:
“This statement mischaracterizes the CBA and further highlights a direct antipathy towards AFGE. It is simply not true that the AFGE has solely benefitted from the CBA or that the CBA has come at TSOs’ expense.”
Judge Pechman separately found Noem’s claim that Congress intended TSOs to remain at-will employees “far from convincing.” Rejecting the government’s argument that the new determination merely reflected an ordinary policy disagreement between administrations, she wrote that the argument “does not pay any heed to the substantial and factually-supported reasons why TSA allowed collective bargaining in the first instance.” The court concluded that “the Noem Determination’s threadbare justification for termination of the CBA exposes the retaliatory nature of the decision,” and that the determination appeared arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
31. Khalil’s immigration detention: “overwhelmingly likely” detention would not rest solely on permanent-residence charge; “almost surely flows” from Secretary of State’s determination
Judge Michael E. Farbiarz (Biden appointee), Khalil v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-01963 (D.N.J.)
This habeas case challenged the Trump administration’s detention and attempted removal of Mahmoud Khalil, a lawful permanent resident and pro-Palestinian student activist, on two grounds: Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s determination that his presence or activities would compromise a compelling U.S. foreign-policy interest, and allegations that he had omitted material information from his permanent-residence application.
On May 28, 2025, Judge Farbiarz found that Khalil was likely to succeed on his claim that the foreign-policy removal provision was unconstitutionally vague as applied through Rubio’s determination. The court observed that the determination did not identify an impact on U.S. relations with another country, notwithstanding its invocation of a compelling foreign-policy interest. However, the ruling concerned the legal and constitutional sufficiency of the determination, not the accuracy of its factual allegations. Judge Farbiarz expressly stated that he had taken the Secretary’s determination “entirely as a given” and had “not at this stage questioned it.” He separately denied preliminary relief concerning the permanent-residence application charge because Khalil had not sufficiently developed the relevant factual and legal arguments.
On June 11, 2025, granting preliminary injunctive relief, Judge Farbiarz examined whether Khalil would remain detained independently of Rubio’s determination because the government was also pursuing the permanent-residence application charge. He acknowledged that “[m]aybe the Petitioner would be detained, in any event, on that second basis,” but concluded that “that argument does not work.” Relying on declarations from three experienced immigration practitioners—Kerry Doyle, Stacy Tolchin, and Ira Kurzban—which Respondents did not contest, the court found that permanent residents were rarely detained pending removal for alleged omissions of the kind charged against Khalil. Judge Farbiarz made an express factual finding:
“[I]t is overwhelmingly likely that the Petitioner would not be detained based solely on the lawful-permanent-resident-application charge. Rather, the Court finds, the Petitioner’s detention almost surely flows from the charge that is based on the Secretary of State’s determination.”
The court accordingly enjoined Respondents from seeking Khalil’s removal or detaining him based on Rubio’s determination, while expressly leaving unaffected efforts to remove him on other grounds.
On June 13, however, the government represented that Khalil was now being detained on the separate permanent-residence application charge. Judge Farbiarz acknowledged that representation and declined to order his release because the second charge had not been enjoined. A further dispute subsequently arose over whether Rubio’s determination had affected the immigration judge’s handling of Khalil’s eligibility for a waiver of removability on the separate charge. On July 16, the court requested additional evidence before deciding whether the June 11 injunction required further relief.
On July 17, having considered additional uncontested declarations from experienced immigration practitioners, Judge Farbiarz found as a factual matter that “the Respondents’ efforts to remove the Petitioner from the United States on the LPR Charge ‘meaningfully rely on the Secretary’s determination.’” The court found that “the Secretary of State’s determination is the likely reason that the Section 1227(a)(1)(H) waiver has not been ruled on” and that the failure to consider the waiver meaningfully increased the likelihood of Khalil’s removal. Judge Farbiarz therefore ordered Respondents to ensure that the immigration judge considered the waiver and whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted, without relying on Rubio’s determination.
On Jan. 15, 2026, the Third Circuit held that, although the district court had properly acquired habeas jurisdiction, the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived it of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Khalil’s claims. The appellate court ordered the relevant substantive rulings, including the May 28, June 11, and July 17 orders, vacated without deciding the merits of the district court’s factual findings or constitutional conclusions. The Third Circuit subsequently stayed its mandate pending Supreme Court review. Khalil filed a petition for certiorari, No. 26-530, on Oct. 19, 2026, which remains pending.
32. Harvard international-student restrictions: stated justifications “pretextual;” government’s account “so selective as to border on absurd;” presumption of regularity rejected
Judge Allison D. Burroughs (Obama appointee), President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-11472 (D. Mass.)
This case challenged the Department of Homeland Security’s revocation of Harvard University’s Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) certification and President Trump’s subsequent June 4, 2025 proclamation suspending entry into the United States for foreign nationals intending to study at Harvard.
On June 20, 2025, Judge Burroughs issued a preliminary injunction against the SEVP revocation. On June 23, she separately granted a preliminary injunction against the presidential proclamation, finding that Harvard was likely to succeed on its First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint-discrimination claims.
In her June 23 opinion, Judge Burroughs scrutinized the proclamation’s stated national-security and public-safety justifications, finding that they bore little connection to the restrictions imposed. Although the proclamation cited rising crime rates at Harvard, it identified no evidence linking those crimes to international students. Judge Burroughs noted that DOJ relied on a student-newspaper article rather than federal law-enforcement statistics and found the asserted justification completely “divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests.” The proclamation also cited Harvard’s alleged connections with China, including research that could advance Chinese military capabilities, yet barred international students generally rather than the individuals or activities said to pose a threat. Likewise, its concern about students from “non-egalitarian nations” did not explain why those students could attend other American universities but not Harvard. The court repeatedly found that the “sheer breadth” of the restrictions was “discontinuous with the reasons offered for it.” Judge Burroughs concluded:
“All told, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the reasons offered in support of the Proclamation are anything other than pretextual.”
The court also rejected the government’s account that the proclamation was unrelated to Harvard’s refusal to accept the administration’s earlier demands concerning university governance, academic programs, and admissions. DOJ argued that the lapse of several weeks between Harvard’s rejection of those demands and the proclamation, together with the involvement of different federal agencies, undermined any inference of retaliation. Judge Burroughs found that “Defendants’ reading of the record is so selective as to border on absurd,” pointing to successive funding restrictions, threats, investigations, presidential statements, and attempts to curtail Harvard’s ability to host international students. She concluded that “[f]ar from rebutting a finding of retaliation, the Administration’s concerted campaign entirely supports such a finding.” Rejecting DOJ’s characterization of the alleged connection as a “massive and impermissible inference,” the court stated that any other conclusion would require it to “blind [itself] to reality,” given that government officials had repeatedly linked Harvard’s rejection of the administration’s demands to subsequent measures against it.
Addressing the government’s reliance on the presumption of regularity, Judge Burroughs wrote:
“As a last gasp, Defendants argue that the Proclamation should get the ‘presumption of regularity’ of government activity. See [ECF No. 67 at 28 (citing United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926))]. Putting aside whether the text of § 1182(f) permits the Proclamation, the use of that text here is hardly regular. As Harvard notes, it has never been used to target the conduct or actions of domestic entities. [ECF No. 57 at 30]. And it has never been used to completely eliminate a legitimate university’s ability to host international students. [ECF No. 52 at 18:12–14]. Thus, the Court will not apply any presumption of regularity to conduct that is so unusual and therefore irregular on its face.”
33. Susman Godfrey executive order: “Defendants point to no evidence;” “without even an ounce of supporting evidence;” “no plausible explanation”
Judge Loren L. AliKhan (Biden appointee), Susman Godfrey LLP v. Executive Office of President, 1:25-cv-01107 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged President Trump’s Apr. 9, 2025 executive order targeting the law firm Susman Godfrey LLP, which accused the firm of undermining U.S. elections, funding activities detrimental to military effectiveness, and engaging in unlawful racial discrimination. The order directed federal agencies to suspend employees’ security clearances pending review, examine and potentially terminate government contracts involving the firm, and restrict its employees’ access to federal buildings and officials.
On June 27, 2025, Judge AliKhan granted summary judgment for Susman and permanently enjoined the order, finding that it unconstitutionally retaliated against the firm for its protected activities. In reaching that determination, the court repeatedly rejected the factual grounds asserted in the executive order and the government’s supporting justifications.
First, Judge AliKhan noted that the order offered no explanation of its accusation that Susman had sought to “weaponize” the legal system and “degrade” American elections. The parties agreed that the accusation referred to Susman’s representation of Dominion Voting Systems and state election officials in litigation concerning the 2020 election, which the court found was protected First Amendment activity. Addressing the separate accusation that Susman engaged in unlawful racial discrimination by offering financial awards and employment opportunities exclusively to students of color, Judge AliKhan found that “the parties agree that the Susman Godfrey Prize is a cash prize, which does not include an offer of employment, and it is thus not covered by Title VII.” She emphasized that government counsel had conceded that “the Susman Prize is not an example of unlawful racial discrimination.” The government also pointed to the firm’s diversity committee and commitment to gender parity, but the court found that “Defendants point to no evidence” of any unlawful quota, concluding that there were no “plausible allegations of unlawful discrimination” based on those practices. In its equal-protection analysis, the court reiterated that “Defendants have not established that Susman engages in unlawful discrimination practices.” It likewise rejected the justification for a threatened EEOC investigation, finding that the government could identify no basis for investigating Susman beyond the firm’s lawful statements concerning diversity.
Second, Judge AliKhan rejected the government’s asserted national-security justifications. The executive order accused Susman of funding groups engaged in dangerous efforts to undermine the military’s effectiveness. The government relied on the firm’s donation to GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders (GLAD Law), which had challenged a Department of Defense policy. Judge AliKhan wrote that “Defendants offer absolutely no evidence to support their claim that this donation is a ‘dangerous effort[] to undermine the effectiveness of the United States military.’” She also contrasted the government’s treatment of Paul Weiss, against which a comparable security-clearance directive had been rescinded after the firm agreed to changes concerning its hiring, client selection, and pro bono work. “No facet of this agreement touches on national security at all,” Judge AliKhan observed. Examining the wholesale suspension of Susman employees’ security clearances rather than individualized assessments, she concluded:
“The government’s departure from the well-trodden path of individualized determination in favor of wholesale revocation—without even an ounce of supporting evidence for the court to evaluate—raises red flags and leads the court to believe that the only plausible motivation for Section 2 is retaliation.”
Third, the court rejected the government’s attempts to minimize the threatened restrictions on Susman employees’ access to federal facilities. DOJ characterized the prospect of all Susman attorneys being barred from courtroom practice as “the stuff of imagination.” Judge AliKhan was “unconvinced,” pointing to the White House’s accompanying fact sheet, which stated that the government “will … restrict” Susman employees’ access to government buildings and that agencies “will also refrain from hiring Susman employees unless specifically authorized.” The court further found that “Defendants offer no evidence to remotely support the idea that there is any interest (national-security-related or otherwise)” implicated by Susman employees’ access to federal buildings, interactions with federal officials, or employment by the government. Given that Defendants had “offered no plausible explanation” for the restrictions, Judge AliKhan concluded that “the record can only support the conclusion that Section 5 was motivated by retaliatory intent.”
The court separately found that the order had tarnished Susman’s reputation through “salacious allegations of wrongdoing” without giving the firm prior notice, the factual basis for the action, or an opportunity to rebut the accusations, in violation of procedural due process. Judge AliKhan thus rejected not only the constitutionality of the order but also the evidentiary foundation for its accusations and purported justifications.
34. MS-13 prosecution dismissal: “The Government appears to be making inconsistent representations”
Judge Joan M. Azrack (Obama appointee), United States v. Arevalo-Chavez, 2:22-cr-00429 (E.D.N.Y.)
This case involved the government’s effort to keep under seal its motion to dismiss criminal charges against alleged MS-13 leader Vladimir Antonio Arevalo-Chavez so he could be sent to El Salvador.
On Jul. 16, 2025, Judge Azrack explained her earlier decision to unseal the government’s motion to dismiss charges against Vladimir Antonio Arevalo-Chavez, rejecting DOJ’s effort to remove the motion from public view while seeking to send him to El Salvador. The court emphasized the contradiction between DOJ’s public statements hailing the prosecution of MS-13 leaders and its subsequent sealed dismissal request: after announcing that MS-13 members would face “swift American justice” in a Long Island courtroom, the government moved less than two weeks later to dismiss the charges and send Arevalo-Chavez to El Salvador before the public could see the motion. Judge Azrack concluded that “the Government appears to be making inconsistent representations” and that “the public has a right to know about this motion before its resolution,” especially given the significant public interest in the prosecutions, the government’s “contradictory” public messaging, and the “insufficiency” of its “largely conclusory” claims about operational security, foreign relations, and sealing.
35-a. Federal workforce reductions: Solicitor General’s overstatement of the injunction’s reach “not insignificant”
Judge Susan Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 3:25-cv-03698 (N.D. Cal.)
The case involved a challenge to the administration’s reductions in force across several departments and agencies.
On Jul. 28, 2025, in an unusual step, the district court judge submitted a statement to the Ninth Circuit explaining that the U.S. Solicitor General had presented overstated figures to the U.S. Supreme Court in a stay application in the litigation. The government had claimed that the district court injunction prohibiting reductions in force of government employees included several agencies and positions that were not actually subject to the injunction. Judge Illston called the discrepancy “not insignificant,” and said it underscored the need for accurate fact-finding overriding any deliberative-process privilege.
35-b. FEMA staffing: “Defense counsel presented a version of the facts markedly different from what is contained in the sworn declaration” by FEMA administrator
Judge Susan Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 3:25-cv-03698 (N.D. Cal.)
On Mar. 3, 2026, in an order granting expedited discovery on Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion concerning FEMA CORE staff non-renewals, Judge Illston noted that “defense counsel presented a version of the facts markedly different from what is contained in the sworn declaration” by FEMA administrator Karen S. Evans. The court explained that defense counsel had represented that DHS adopted 100% of FEMA’s renewal recommendations and that any non-renewals were made by FEMA itself. Evans, by contrast, declared under penalty of perjury that DHS had decided not to reappoint 192 of 303 CORE employees whose terms expired in January 2026. Judge Illston held that this “significant factual dispute” went “to the core question in this case” — whether DHS ordered or directed FEMA staffing cuts — and, citing Defendants’ “changing position,” ordered expedited document discovery, communications discovery, and depositions of Secretary Noem, Evans, and senior DHS and FEMA human-capital officials, as well as a sworn declaration identifying the individuals who made the renewal decisions.
35-c. FEMA staffing: court refused to credit former FEMA head Karen Evans’s testimony; her “evasive and misleading” statements and “intentional” Signal-message destruction; Defendants’ “false” representation; former DHS deputy chief of staff Joseph Guy’s deletion timing “highly suspect”
Judge Susan Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 3:25-cv-03698 (N.D. Cal.)
On Sept. 11, 2026, in the litigation’s supplemental challenge to DHS’s control over FEMA staffing and planned workforce reductions, Judge Illston granted Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 37(e) remedies for the destruction of relevant Signal messages. In the companion partial-summary-judgment ruling, under the heading “Rule 37(e) Spoliation Sanctions,” the court explained:
“The factual findings at this stage must be viewed against the backdrop that plaintiffs have been hamstrung in their ability to prove their claims, and the Court in its ability to evaluate the claims, by defendants’ intentional deletion of relevant Signal messages, as detailed further in the Court’s Order granting remedies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e).”
The Rule 37(e) order addressed the conduct of Karen Evans, then the Senior Official Performing the Duties of FEMA Administrator, and DHS Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Guy. The court found that these officials “not only failed to take reasonable steps to preserve their work-related Signal chats but actively took steps to delete those chats in violation of DHS policy, the Federal Records Act, and their obligations due to the litigation in this case.” It emphasized: “Evans should not have been deleting any messages related to FEMA staffing because there was a litigation hold in this case.”
On March 11, Evans shortened the auto-delete timer on the “FEMA 2.0” chat from four weeks to one week, two days after a discovery order and one day after DHS circulated preservation instructions. The court noted that she continued allowing messages to disappear during discovery. “Evans should have known better,” it stated. “She previously served as Chief Information Officer at DHS, in charge of the agency’s records preservation policies.” The court found: “Here, the conduct goes beyond gross negligence. As in Jones, ‘ample circumstantial evidence’ supports a finding that Evans deleted relevant Signal messages with the intent to deprive the opposing side of the messages’ use in this litigation.” It expressly rejected a characterization limited to negligence or recklessness: “But here the Court makes no finding that Evans’s actions were only reckless or negligent, even grossly so.” It concluded:
“For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that defendants’ actions were intentional under Rule 37(e)(2), on the basis of Evans’s actions with respect to her Signal messages.”
The court also found: “Evans was also evasive and misleading in her statements about what she had used Signal for and what evidence existed.” At her March 31 deposition (see deposition excerpts), Evans did not disclose the existence of the FEMA 2.0 chat, despite having emailed herself a screenshot on March 11; in her court-ordered Apr. 29 declaration, she omitted the backup of her Signal data that she had made four days earlier.
Her selective disclosure of other records also undermined her assurances about Signal. The court found that “Evans in particular has shown her propensity for self-redacting information that goes directly to plaintiffs’ claims,” including planner notes identifying Guy’s involvement in staffing discussions. It explained: “Thus, Evans’s later assurance that she preserved all Signal messages that she deemed relevant does not assuage the spoliation concerns given Evans’s flawed self-redaction of her meeting notes.” The resulting loss directly impaired Plaintiffs’ proof:
“Taking these together, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have been prejudiced in their ability to prove their claims due to the spoliation of Signal messages, which cannot now be recovered.”
The court separately identified an inaccurate government representation. Defendants had represented to the court that the relevant custodians did not use personal phones to communicate about CORE renewals or target staffing reductions. The court observed, “This statement turned out to be false.” It also rejected Guy’s preservation explanation: “Guy’s post hoc explanation that he thought someone else was preserving his messages makes little sense and does not salvage his actions.” In a footnote, it found it “not believable that Guy did not know relevant communications were on his personal phone” and called the timing of his deletion “highly suspect.” The court nevertheless distinguished his intent from Evans’s, writing that “the record does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that Guy deleted messages with the intent to deprive plaintiffs of their use in this litigation.”
In the companion merits ruling, declined to “credit Evans’s hindsight testimony denying DHS’s direction over a plan to substantially reduce FEMA.” It identified an additional credibility ground: “Evans’s testimony regarding who made the decision not to renew the COREs cannot be credited for the additional reason that she has taken multiple, conflicting stances on this matter before this Court and before Congress.”
The court also questioned the basis for the proposed workforce target of 11,383 employees: “Frankly, the FEMA staffing plan number appears as if pulled from thin air.” It concluded that the record indicated “Evans submitted the 11,383 figure first and then worked backwards to figure out how to support it.” Connecting that evidentiary gap to the spoliation, the court added: “It is possible the deleted Signal messages would have shed light on how this number came about.”
The Rule 37(e) order granted remedies under both Rule 37(e)(1) and (2). It barred Defendants from relying on hindsight testimony denying the plan to substantially reduce FEMA staffing, DHS’s direction of that plan, or its implementation through indiscriminate separation of Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery (CORE) employees. It further ordered:
“In any future proceedings in this case, the Court will presume that the lost Signal messages would have been unfavorable to Defendants because they would have been further evidence of Defendants’ plan, DHS’s control, and Defendants’ implementing actions.”
The court also held that “Plaintiffs are entitled to fees incurred in uncovering and addressing Defendants’ spoliation,” directing the parties to confer on the amount and Plaintiffs to submit a fee application by Oct. 9 if agreement could not be reached.
36-37-a. VOA broadcasting restoration: “Flip-flopping—in sworn declarations—rais[ing] severe concern,” “consistently refused to give … the full story,” providing “cagey answers,” “omitting key information,” and “repeated[ ] represent[ations]” that “strain credulity.”
Judge Royce Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Abramowitz v. Lake, 1:25-cv-00887 (D.D.C.) and Widakuswara v. Lake, 1:25-cv-01015 (D.D.C.) (related cases)
These cases involved the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for Global Media and the firing of journalists from the Voice of America (VOA) media outlet.
On Jul. 30, 2025, in a show-cause order addressing both cases, Judge Lamberth wrote that the government had
“consistently refused to give the Court the full story regarding personnel actions. … the defendants continue to provide cagey answers and omit key information. … And perhaps more shockingly, on July 8—the day this Court ordered a second round of supplemental briefing, and a full ten days before the defendants filed the second supplemental memorandum—the defendants informed Plaintiff Michael Abramowitz that he would be removed from his position as Director of VOA. … However, the defendants made no mention of this monumental personnel decision in their filings to this Court.” (emphasis added).
Lamberth further wrote that the government was
“providing misleading and contradictory information … The defendants’ descriptions of their activities are cryptic and even misleading … And troublingly, the crumbs of data provided suggest the defendants are ignoring several statutory mandates. … [T]he defendants have also made contradictory representations to the Court. … This sort of flip-flopping—in sworn declarations— raises severe concern and provides yet another basis for entering a show cause order for the defendants to provide a truthful, accurate, and detailed plan regarding VOA’s ongoing operations.”
In a Sept. 29 memorandum order addressing enforcement of the Apr. 22 PI, Judge Lamberth wrote that defendants and DOJ counsel “repeatedly represented”—both on paper and at the Aug. 25 hearing—that any reduction in force (RIF) was only a “possibility” and subject to “uncertainty.” Given what followed, he concluded those representations “strain credulity.”
36-37-b. VOA broadcasting restoration: Defendants’ assertion that they revived operations “on their own initiative” would require the court to “credit the incredible”
Judge Royce Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Abramowitz v. Lake, 1:25-cv-00887 (D.D.C.) and Widakuswara v. Lake, 1:25-cv-01015 (D.D.C.) (related cases)
In his March 17, 2026 opinion granting partial summary judgment, Judge Lamberth addressed Defendants’ reliance on the “limited restoration of employees and broadcasting operations” in arguing that the challenged agency action was not final for purposes of APA review. The court observed that broadcasting operations had resumed only following “protracted litigation to enforce the preliminary injunction” and stated: “The defendants thus strain the boundaries of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy to the extent they assert that they revived such operations on their own initiative.” Judge Lamberth continued that, “even if the Court were to credit the incredible,” the possibility of later revision would not make an otherwise definitive agency decision nonfinal.
38. Nepal, Honduras and Nicaragua TPS terminations: presumption of regularity “does not apply;” agency’s reasons “pretextual;” Secretary “relied on skewed data;” “preordained determination;” “showing of bad faith” supports discovery
Judge Trina L. Thompson (Biden appointee) and Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim, National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 3:25-cv-05687 (N.D. Cal.)
This case challenges DHS’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Nepal, Honduras and Nicaragua.
On July 31, 2025, Judge Thompson postponed the terminations, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims. She concluded that Plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence that the terminations “were based on a preordained determination to end the TPS program, rather than an objective review of the country conditions.” The court pointed to Secretary Kristi Noem’s statements before reviewing country-conditions reports, the termination notices’ reliance on President Trump’s executive order concerning an invasion, and their omission of conditions previously considered relevant to TPS determinations.
On Aug. 20, the Ninth Circuit stayed the July 31 postponement order pending further appellate order, but denied the government’s request to stay the district-court proceedings.
On Aug. 21, Judge Kim granted Plaintiffs’ request for extra-record discovery on their APA and equal-protection claims. Relying on Thompson’s assessment and applying the exception permitting discovery upon a showing of agency bad faith, she wrote: “Here, Plaintiffs have made a similar showing of bad faith.”
Judge Kim noted that Secretary Kristi Noem had expressed her intention to alter the TPS program before taking office and before reviewing the country-conditions reports. She also cited the Secretary’s statements stereotyping immigrants as criminal invaders, which she said “suggest her decisions were based on racism, not country conditions.” The court separately permitted discovery on the equal-protection claim, explaining that the alleged discriminatory intent could not be assessed exclusively through the administrative record.
Addressing documents withheld under the deliberative-process privilege, Judge Kim held that the “presumption of regularity” concerning the agency’s designation of the administrative record “does not apply.” She cited evidence of improper classification of documents and agency misconduct, and stated that “plaintiffs have demonstrated that the reasons offered by the agency are pretextual.” The court required a privilege log and production of the withheld documents for in camera review to determine whether they were predecisional and deliberative and whether Plaintiffs’ need for them outweighed the government’s interest in nondisclosure.
On Dec. 31, 2025, Judge Thompson granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their APA claims, in a judgment subsequently vacated on reviewability grounds. Examining the developed record, she concluded: “The Court agrees that the Secretary’s Honduras, Nicaragua, and Nepal TPS termination decisions were preordained.”
The court identified decision memoranda prepared before updated State Department country-conditions reports had been received. For Nepal, it cited internal communications acknowledging the absence of an updated report but favoring proceeding because the recommendation supported termination. Thompson further stated: “The record reflects that the Secretary relied on skewed data to terminate TPS for Honduras, Nicaragua, and Nepal.” She cited instructions to shorten country-conditions reports, include improvements, and omit environmental concerns or climate change. The opinion also examined internal discussion of how to explain terminating TPS for both Honduras and Nicaragua despite their markedly different conditions.
Thompson concluded:
“The record specifically reflects that, before taking office, the Secretary made a pre-ordained decision to end TPS and influenced the conditions review process to facilitate TPS terminations for Honduras, Nicaragua, and Nepal.”
The court granted summary judgment on the APA claim concerning predetermination and the absence of an objective review following interagency consultation. It separately denied the government summary judgment on equal protection, finding a genuine dispute of material fact concerning racial animus.
On Mar. 23, 2026, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal from the July 31 preliminary order as moot following entry of partial final judgment, expressly declining to vacate that preliminary order.
On June 25, the Supreme Court held in Mullin v. Doe that the TPS statute barred review of nonconstitutional challenges to termination decisions. Applying that decision on July 14, the Ninth Circuit vacated Thompson’s December partial final APA judgment. Plaintiffs conceded that Mullin foreclosed those claims, and the appellate court explained that no other claims were before it.
39. National Endowment for Democracy funding: Offering an “official justification … [that] is not plausible”
Judge Dabney L. Friedrich (Trump appointee), National Endowment for Democracy v. United States, 1:25-cv-00648 (D.D.C.)
The case involved the administration’s withholding congressionally appropriated funds from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
On Aug. 11, 2025, Judge Friedrich granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on their APA claims, including that the government violated the NED Act:
“[R]ecord evidence clearly shows that the defendants are withholding funding for impermissible policy reasons. The State Department’s full-year spending plan—the sole document in the administrative record not created for purposes of this litigation—explicitly states that the withheld funds are being ‘subject to review for alignment with Administration priorities.’ … Around that time, the Director of OMB urged the Senate to entirely defund the Endowment because of its alleged support of media organizations critical of the President and his allies. … An affidavit from the Director of the Bureau of Budget Planning at the State Department highlights that the withholding decision was made ‘in consultation with OMB.’ … Taken as a whole, that evidence leaves little doubt as to the defendants’ motivations—the Endowment’s work does not align with ‘Administration priorities.’ …
The defendants’ official justification for that withholding—preserving the Endowment’s funding stability for the coming year—is not plausible. … These actions vitiate any inference that the defendants’ concern has been to “ensure” the Endowment’s “level of funding in the coming fiscal year.” … Indeed, counsel for the State Department provided that rationale to the Endowment for the first time in a June 11 email, well after this litigation began. … In light of the defendants’ repeated maneuvers to impede the Endowment’s flow of funds, the Court does not find credible an explanation offered in the shadow of pending litigation.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
40. Maxwell grand-jury disclosure: submissions “belied the Government’s claim” about significant undisclosed information
Judge Paul Engelmayer (Obama appointee), United States v. Maxwell, 1:20-cr-00330 (S.D.N.Y.)
The case involves the Trump administration’s efforts to unseal grand jury transcripts and exhibits in the case against Ghislaine Maxwell, who was convicted of five felonies stemming from her role in Jeffrey Epstein’s child sex trafficking conspiracy.
On Aug. 11, 2025, Judge Engelmayer denied the motion to unseal exhibits. In the opinion accompanying the order, Engelmayer wrote that the government’s “invocation of special circumstances” justifying unsealing the documents “fails at the threshold.” Engelmayer wrote that “[t]he Government’s submissions” supporting the motion “were telling” in that they “belied the Government’s claim, in its motion to unseal, that the Maxwell grand jury materials contained significant, undisclosed information about Epstein’s and Maxwell’s crimes, or the investigation into them.” Specifically, the submissions indicated that, contrary to the administration’s assertions, the grand juries “were not used for investigative purposes” and that the evidence before them “is today, with only very minor exceptions, a matter of public record.” Engelmayer concluded that, “[i]nsofar as the motion to unseal implies that the grand jury materials are an untapped mine lode of undisclosed information about Epstein or Maxwell or confederates, they definitively are not that,” and that someone seeking new information, as the government suggested, “would come away feeling disappointed and misled.”
Judge Engelmayer’s opinion suggested the victims may have been misled by the mischaracterization of the grand jury materials in the Government’s motion to unseal:
“The victims’ interest in reviewing the grand jury materials appears to be premised on the understandable but mistaken belief that these materials would reveal new information. The Government had, after all, publicly portrayed these as ‘critical pieces of an important moment in our nation’s history.’ Motion to Unseal at 3. Had the Government’s motion made clear that these records are redundant of the evidence at Maxwell’s public trial, the victims’ responses to the motion to unseal might well have been different.”
41. Federal educators’ collective-bargaining rights: “Plaintiffs have rebutted the presumption of regularity;” “In just six months, the President of the United States may have forfeited the right to such a presumption of regularity;” government’s claimed national-security harm “entirely untethered from the injunction”
Judge Paul L. Friedman (Clinton appointee), Federal Education Association v. Trump, 1:25-cv-01362 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged President Trump’s Mar. 27, 2025 executive order excluding numerous federal agencies and subdivisions from statutory collective-bargaining protections under a national-security exception, including the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA), which operates schools for the children of military personnel.
On Aug. 14, 2025, Judge Friedman granted a preliminary injunction preventing implementation of the executive order against DoDEA, finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the President exceeded his statutory authority.
Drawing on his earlier decisions in National Treasury Employees Union v. Trump and American Foreign Service Association v. Trump, Judge Friedman expressly found that “the Union Plaintiffs have rebutted the presumption of regularity.” The court identified three reasons: the executive order and administration statements conflicted with Congress’s findings concerning federal collective bargaining; the White House Fact Sheet reflected retaliatory motives toward unions opposing President Trump; and OPM’s implementing guidance suggested that the order served unrelated policy objectives rather than the statute’s national-security criteria. Rejecting the government’s argument that the court should examine only whether the exclusion of the Department of Defense was lawful, Judge Friedman explained that the contemporaneous evidence demonstrated that “the entire Executive Order likely was motivated by considerations outside of those identified in the statute: the exclusions were intended as retaliation against labor organizations that have opposed President Trump or in furtherance of unrelated policy goals.” The court found that this evidence negated the presumption that individualized determinations had been made concerning each excluded agency or subdivision. Discussing the doctrine more broadly, Judge Friedman also observed: “In just six months, the President of the United States may have forfeited the right to such a presumption of regularity.”
The court separately rejected the government’s asserted national-security rationale for DoDEA’s exclusion. Defendants maintained that educating servicemembers’ children supported military recruitment and retention and therefore constituted a primary national-security function. Judge Friedman acknowledged the importance of that work but found the asserted connection insufficient: “Pre-kindergarten to 12th grade educators and support staff may have a function that tangentially benefits ‘national security work,’ but such an incidental relationship is hardly sufficient to conclude that DoDEA has a ‘primary function’ of ‘national security work.’” The court further found that the executive order’s sweeping exclusions and surrounding statements “negate any inference that an individualized national security determination was made with respect to each agency and subdivision.”
Judge Friedman also rejected the government’s contention that the unions faced only speculative harm because their collective-bargaining agreements had not formally been terminated. DoDEA had already stopped negotiations and grievance proceedings, curtailed union representation, and discontinued other activities required by the agreements. It had also argued before the Federal Labor Relations Authority that the executive order deprived that body of jurisdiction over DoDEA labor disputes, despite DOJ’s position in district court that the unions should pursue administrative remedies there. Judge Friedman concluded that the agreements had effectively been terminated, stating: “The Court simply cannot accept that where the DoD has admitted to failing to abide by the collective bargaining agreements and has contested the jurisdiction of the FLRA to enforce those agreements that somehow, the collective bargaining agreements are still in force.” When the government requested a substantial injunction bond to cover the cost of restoring benefits under those same agreements, the court described its positions as “perplexing.”
On Sept. 2, 2025, the D.C. Circuit administratively stayed the preliminary injunction pending consideration of the government’s emergency stay application. On Sept. 25, however, a divided panel dissolved that administrative stay and denied a stay pending appeal, finding that the government’s alleged irreparable national-security harm was “entirely untethered from the injunction” and that it had not demonstrated how restoring collective-bargaining protections to DoDEA would cause imminent injury. The majority assumed without deciding that the government was likely to succeed on the merits. In a separate concurrence, Judge Florence Y. Pan went further, agreeing with the district court’s ultra vires analysis and stating that “record evidence supports the district court’s presumption-of-regularity findings” and that they were “unlikely to be clearly erroneous.” Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson dissented, concluding that the government had demonstrated a likelihood of success and irreparable harm. The appeal, No. 25-5303, was argued on Dec. 15, 2025, alongside the related NTEU and AFSA appeals.
42. FTC investigation of Media Matters: “evidence of pretext” in investigation of criticism of Musk’s X
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan (Biden appointee), Media Matters for America v. Federal Trade Commission, 1:25-cv-01959 (D.D.C.)
This case involves Media Matters’ challenge to an FTC investigation, alleging it was retaliation for its reporting on Elon Musk’s platform “X”.
On Aug. 15, 2025, Judge Sooknanan granted a preliminary injunction, finding “that Media Matters is likely to succeed on its First Amendment retaliation claim. … Media Matters engaged in quintessential First Amendment activity when it published an online article criticizing Mr. Musk and X. And the Court finds that the FTC’s expansive CID [(civil investigative demands)] is a retaliatory act.” In making this determination, she noted that the government offered “no declaration explaining why they have decided to investigate Media Matters” until after the present lawsuit commenced. For this reason, she concluded, “given the comments by Chairman Ferguson and his colleagues about Media Matters, the timing of the CID, and evidence of pretext, Media Matters is likely to show that retaliatory animus was the but-for cause of the FTC’s CID.” (emphasis added).”
43-44. Harvard research-funding freeze: government statements “flatly inconsistent with what Defendants now contend;” antisemitism used as a “smokescreen;” “at worst, pretextual.”
Judge Allison D. Burroughs (Obama appointee), President and Fellows of Harvard College v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 1:25-cv-11048 (D. Mass.), and American Association of University Professors–Harvard Faculty Chapter v. United States Department of Justice, 1:25-cv-10910 (D. Mass.) (related cases)
These cases challenged the Trump administration’s freeze and termination of approximately $2.2 billion in federal research grants to Harvard University following the university’s refusal to accept government demands concerning its governance, hiring, admissions, academic programs, and response to antisemitism.
On Sept. 3, 2025, Judge Burroughs granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their First Amendment retaliation claims, finding that Harvard’s protected conduct was “a substantial and motivating factor in the Freeze Orders and Termination Letters.” The government maintained that the funding decisions were independently justified by a nonretaliatory purpose: combating antisemitism. Judge Burroughs rejected that explanation, stating: “This argument does not carry the day. Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show they acted with a non-retaliatory purpose for several reasons.” She pointed to the government’s April 11 letter, which conditioned continued funding on Harvard accepting ten demands, only one of which concerned antisemitism, while several others concerned ideological and academic matters. The first funding freeze followed within hours of Harvard rejecting those demands. Although the court acknowledged that combating antisemitism was an important and worthy objective, it found that “nothing else in the administrative record supports Defendants’ contention that they were primarily or even substantially motivated by that goal” or that withdrawing the funding would advance it. The court explained that the government had not conducted the promised funding review, assessed individual grants, gathered relevant information about antisemitism at Harvard, or considered whether terminating research funding would improve conditions for Jewish students. Judge Burroughs concluded that “the sudden focus on antisemitism was, at best (and as discussed infra), arbitrary and, at worst, pretextual.”
Judge Burroughs further rejected the government’s litigation position that Harvard’s rejection of its demands and subsequent lawsuit had not motivated the funding cuts. She noted that the administrative record independently established retaliation, but also identified contemporaneous public statements by President Trump and senior administration officials contradicting the explanation offered in court. She wrote:
“Although Defendants now contend that Harvard’s April 14 rejection and subsequent lawsuit had nothing to do with their decision to cut its funding, numerous government officials spoke publicly and contemporaneously on these issues, including about their motivations, and those statements are flatly inconsistent with what Defendants now contend. These public statements corroborate that the government-initiated onslaught against Harvard was much more about promoting a governmental orthodoxy in violation of the First Amendment than about anything else, including fighting antisemitism.”
The court also questioned the government’s alternative reliance on federal grant-termination regulations rather than Title VI. Judge Burroughs observed that neither of the funding-freeze orders invoked 2 C.F.R. § 200.340, and that her examination of the administrative record had not identified a single document predating the grant-termination letters citing that regulation as a basis for ending Harvard’s funding. Instead, the contemporaneous documents repeatedly invoked Title VI and civil-rights enforcement. She found that the government’s asserted regulatory justification was “incongruent with what the record reveals about the agenc[ies’] priorities and decisionmaking process,” and rejected the attempt to rely on the regulation to avoid Title VI’s procedural requirements.
In her conclusion, Judge Burroughs acknowledged that Harvard had experienced serious antisemitism and had fallen short in addressing it. Nevertheless, she found little connection between those concerns and the research affected by the funding decisions, stating:
“In fact, a review of the administrative record makes it difficult to conclude anything other than that Defendants used antisemitism as a smokescreen for a targeted, ideologically-motivated assault on this country’s premier universities, and did so in a way that runs afoul of the APA, the First Amendment and Title VI.”
The court further concluded that “[t]he idea that fighting antisemitism is Defendants’ true aim is belied” by the predominance of demands concerning Harvard’s governance, staffing, hiring, and admissions policies. Judge Burroughs held that the funding-freeze orders were arbitrary and capricious and that the freezes and grant terminations violated the First Amendment. She separately found that the grant terminations violated Title VI, while declining jurisdiction over the arbitrary-and-capricious challenges to the individual termination letters. On Oct. 20, 2025, the court entered final judgment, vacating the challenged funding actions and permanently enjoining retaliatory funding restrictions. The government appealed to the First Circuit, Nos. 25-2230 and 25-2231. The related appeals were argued on Oct. 5, 2026, and remain pending.
45. Venezuela and Haiti TPS actions: “unreasoned and pretextual explanations;” appellate concurrence describes a rationale “affirmatively contradicted” by the evidence
Judge Edward M. Chen (Obama appointee), National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 3:25-cv-01766 (N.D. Cal.)
This case challenges DHS’s actions undoing an extension of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuela, shortening an extension for Haiti, and subsequently terminating their TPS designations.
On Sept. 5, 2025, Judge Chen granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenges to the Venezuela vacatur and termination and Haiti partial vacatur. The appellate judgment affirming that relief was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court.
Addressing the Venezuela vacatur, Judge Chen wrote:
“Finally, the Secretary’s decision to vacate was arbitrary and capricious because it was pretextual – i.e., it was not animated by a concern about, e.g., novelty or confusion as professed, nor was it otherwise the result of reasoned agency decision making. Instead, the Secretary – acting with unprecedented haste and in an unprecedented manner – issued the vacatur for the preordained purpose of expediting termination of Venezuela’s TPS.”
The court explained that DHS had prepared a draft termination notice before the vacatur was finalized. On the day Secretary Kristi Noem approved the vacatur, staff were instructed to “focus on any improvements in Venezuela;” the termination was approved three days later. Judge Chen described the Secretary’s criticism of the prior extension and the confusion it supposedly caused as “entirely baseless,” adding that “there is no evidence of any reasoned decision making behind Secretary Noem’s vacatur.”
In denying dismissal of the claims concerning Haiti’s July 2025 termination, the court separately held that Plaintiffs plausibly alleged pretext. It pointed to their allegations that a DHS press release invoked improved country conditions and national interest, while the subsequent Federal Register notice relied on national interest and described continuing instability in Haiti.
On Oct. 3, 2025, the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order insofar as it applied to Venezuelan TPS. On Jan. 28, 2026, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment on statutory-authority grounds. In a concurrence joined by Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw as to Parts I and II, Judge Salvador Mendoza, Jr. concluded that the Secretary’s decisions were “both preordained and rooted in pretext.” He wrote:
“The Secretary’s mischaracterization of the prior TPS consolidation and extension as irregular and confusing was therefore not only entirely unsupported but was affirmatively contradicted by Plaintiffs’ evidence of past practice.”
Mendoza also described the instruction to focus on improvements in Venezuela as “effectively manufacturing an after-the-fact termination rationale.” Addressing racial and national-origin animus in Part III, which Wardlaw did not join, he added: “The APA does not tolerate such an overt deception of the judicial and public audience.”
On Mar. 11, the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. In a separate concurrence, Mendoza, joined by Wardlaw, defended the pretext analysis: “The Administrative Procedure Act does not require courts to shut their eyes and ears to unreasoned and pretextual explanations.”
On Oct. 5, 2026, however, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision Mullin v. Doe. In that June 25 decision, the Supreme Court barred nonconstitutional challenges to TPS termination decisions and held that the Haiti plaintiffs in the consolidated Miot case were unlikely to establish that race motivated the termination.
In an Oct. 14 order, Judge Chen permitted Plaintiffs to drop their APA challenges to Haiti’s July and November 2025 terminations because those claims were no longer viable under Mullin. He recorded that the existing equal-protection claims remained and that the Venezuela vacatur, Haiti partial vacatur, and Venezuela termination insofar as dependent on the vacatur remained on appeal. He denied leave to add three proposed claims concerning due process, bare animus and the Secretary’s statutory authority. The government also sought a renewed stay in the appellate proceedings.
46-a. ICE detention at 26 Federal Plaza: ICE statistics “concealed more than they disclosed, despite the availability … of much more illuminating data” and “gives no confidence that the defendants are seriously interested in making a full disclosure”
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan (Clinton appointee), Barco Mercado v. Noem, 1:25-cv-06568 (S.D.N.Y.)
This class action, brought by a detainee at ICE’s 26 Federal Plaza facility, alleges overcrowding, inadequate medical care, and denial of access to counsel.
On Sept. 17, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction and provisionally certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class of all immigration detainees held 12+ hours in ICE’s 26 Federal Plaza hold rooms, Judge Kaplan criticized the government’s evidentiary showings. The court wrote that declarations by the assistant field office director at ERO’s New York City field office, “in substantial measure avoided the thrust of plaintiff’s factual showing and offered unpersuasive statistics that concealed more than they disclosed despite the availability to defendants of much more illuminating data” (emphasis added). He added, “The response to the motions thus gives no confidence that the defendants are seriously interested in making a full disclosure of conditions in the 26 Fed Hold Rooms” (emphasis added).
46-b. ICE detention at 26 Federal Plaza: Defendants and an official “either intentionally concealed or recklessly disregarded the truth;” “not credible” testimony, attempts to “sanitize the record,” and an “insidious and duplicitous” practice of describing detainees as “in transit”
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan (Clinton appointee), Barco Mercado v. Mullin, 1:25-cv-06568 (S.D.N.Y.)
This class action challenged conditions of confinement and restrictions on access to counsel for immigration detainees held at ICE’s 26 Federal Plaza facility in Manhattan.
On Aug. 12, 2025, the court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO), followed by a preliminary injunction (PI) on Sept. 17, 2025. The orders required minimum floor space, bedding and hygiene protections, and confidential calls to counsel. ICE calculated that the space requirement permitted no more than 22 detainees across the four tenth-floor hold rooms, subject to lower limits for each individual room.
Following a May 2026 bench trial, Judge Kaplan issued a Sept. 24, 2026 opinion granting permanent injunctive relief and making final findings of fact and conclusions of law. Those findings repeatedly rejected government accounts of the number of detainees, their treatment, access to attorneys, and compliance with the court’s previous orders.
One central issue concerned an Aug. 18, 2025 declaration by Nancy Zanello, then the assistant field office director responsible for day-to-day supervision of the tenth-floor hold rooms, which the government submitted in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. At 9:51 a.m. that morning, Zanello had emailed that ICE was “in violation of the TRO,” with 48 detainees present and at least 13 more expected. Yet at 4:06 p.m. she signed a declaration under penalty of perjury stating that, “[a]s of 11:59p.m. EDT August 15, 2025, there are currently 8 aliens in custody at the 26 Federal Plaza ERO Field Office.” Judge Kaplan found that ICE’s records showed 60 detainees when she signed the declaration, and 22 at the earlier Aug. 15 time identified in it.
In a letter dated June 15, 2026, and filed the following day, the government corrected and withdrew the eight-detainee statement, acknowledging that contemporaneous contractor logs showed 22 detainees at the specified Aug. 15 time. It stated: “We deeply regret this error and thank the Court for its consideration of this letter.”
In his September opinion, Judge Kaplan found:
“Not only was ICE in violation of the TRO for at least those six-and-a-half hours on August 18, 2025, but defendants and Zanello then either intentionally concealed or recklessly disregarded the truth in their subsequent submissions to this Court.” (emphasis added).
The court rejected Defendants’ “attempt[ ] to recast the inaccuracy in Zanello’s declaration as an accidental byproduct of litigating in the face of a ‘constant flow in and out of detainees throughout the day.’” Judge Kaplan responded: “But that dog won’t hunt.” “Defendants knew” they would submit the declaration on Aug. 18, yet used an Aug. 15 headcount “and, even worse, described that headcount as current.” Even as an account of Aug. 15, Zanello’s statement was “false,” the court wrote: “ICE at that time actually was holding twenty-two detainees in the tenth-floor hold rooms. Again, not eight like Zanello said.”
Judge Kaplan explained the statement’s significance to the litigation:
“One of their primary arguments against the proposed PI relied on Zanello’s false statement to assert that ICE had resolved the issues necessitating the TRO, including overcrowding, and that the then-current ‘conditions of confinement at [26 Fed] d[id] not violate the Constitution.’ That was incorrect. Zanello knew before she signed her declaration that it was incorrect, and she knew, or should have known, that it was incorrect when she signed it. Defendants knew, or should have known, the same.” (emphasis added).
The court’s credibility findings extended beyond that declaration. Judge Kaplan found “ICE officials – particularly Zanello – at other points in this case have attempted to downplay the level of overcrowding that existed during the summer of 2025.” Although Zanello supervised the hold rooms and was present on most days, “she was quite evasive about how many people generally were held there at a time. She would not provide even an estimate.” The court described her claimed inability to recall approximate numbers, and her insistence that there was no such thing as an average number, as “unbelievable claims.” Footnote 114 reproduced her repeated refusals during questioning to provide even a rough estimate.
Judge Kaplan found expressly:
“Zanello’s testimony with respect to the number of detainees in the hold rooms during the summer of 2025 is not credible. It plainly is contradicted by the testimony of several other ICE officials, staff, and contractors who also were on the tenth floor and who admitted how crowded the hold rooms were.” (emphasis added).
Zanello also maintained that the rooms were not overcrowded unless the number of detainees exceeded the fire-department occupancy limit of 154. Judge Kaplan rejected that position: “And it is ridiculous to claim that a space is not crowded until its fire occupancy is hit.” He distinguished occupancy by people free to leave from confinement for entire days and concluded: “In any event, the numbers do not lie, and they show that ICE detained in the hold rooms far more people than the hold rooms were intended to hold.”
The court separately rejected Zanello’s claim that most detainees were transferred out within 72 hours during the summer of 2025: “That testimony, like her testimony with respect to the overcrowding, is not credible” (emphasis added). Judge Kaplan contrasted her account with her own admissions, deputy field office director William Joyce’s testimony about when transfer times improved, and detainees’ accounts. He concluded that “Zanello’s testimony is inconsistent with the reality described by those who actually were detained in the tenth-floor hold rooms during that period” (emphasis added).
The court also examined ICE’s purported 72-hour limit under its internal detention policy, finding that “the new seventy-two-hour period was no true limit at all” (emphasis added). Officials treated “exceptional circumstances” as encompassing situations in which continued detention was necessary or convenient. Judge Kaplan wrote:
“ICE officials thus defined ‘exceptional circumstances’ as they saw fit. They consistently decided that such circumstances existed whenever they found it necessary or convenient to hold detainees at 26 Fed for longer than seventy-two hours. In other words, the evidence made clear that, so far as those responsible for the 26 Fed hold rooms were concerned, pretty much anything was an ‘exceptional circumstance.’” (emphasis added).
Judge Kaplan likewise rejected broader accounts offered by ICE officials, staff, and contractors concerning hygiene supplies, clean clothing, regular cleaning, and privacy, writing: “These claims, however, cannot be reconciled with the accounts of plaintiff’s witnesses – none of which defendants assert is false (emphasis added). The court explained that “the claims of ICE officials, staff, and contractors all paint with a broad brush.” They described general practices without specifying how often detainees actually received the relevant supplies or assistance. By contrast, the detainees’ accounts were “specific and detailed, and thus should be afforded more weight,” and were “corroborated” by documentary evidence and some government witnesses. As to ICE’s claim that soap was available in a restroom near the nurses’ office, the court found: “There is no evidence that the detainees had regular access to that restroom.”
Zanello’s “refus[al] to admit that the hold rooms ever smelled bad” was, the court found, “belied” by her own response to detainees’ complaints: she had personally purchased empty water bottles (which she filled with warm tap water) and baby shampoo so they could wash themselves. The claimed privacy afforded by the half walls around toilets was “dispelled” by photographs and by ICE’s own explanation that the walls permitted staff to maintain sight supervision. Judge Kaplan concluded:
“Thus, despite some attempts by ICE personnel to sanitize the record, the facts show that the living conditions in the hold rooms through the summer of 2025 were anything but sanitary. They were woefully inadequate, and detainees were denied basic privacy.” (emphasis added).
The court identified the same problem in ICE’s account of food provision. The testimony of ICE employees that detainees always received three meals daily was “undercut” by the policy described by Joyce and Zanello and by detainees’ accounts. As for assertions that additional or alternative food would have been available upon request, Judge Kaplan called this “yet another example of ICE employees trying to sanitize the record after the fact.” Joyce had “admitted” that detainees were not told they could request additional meals, and there was no evidence that they otherwise knew or did so.
On water, Judge Kaplan found that “ICE failed also to provide sufficient water to detainees despite claims to the contrary by ICE officials, staff, and contractors.” After recounting detainees’ descriptions of insufficient water and refused requests, he stated: “Defendants have not disputed the truth of any of these accounts, which the Court credits.”
The court identified a further evidentiary gap concerning medical screening. After describing ICE’s account of the circumstances in which screenings occurred, including when someone had been detained for at least 12 hours, Judge Kaplan stated: “Nor is there any evidence that medical screenings actually were conducted for detainees who had been detained at least twelve hours.”
Judge Kaplan also rejected ICE’s accounts of access to counsel. Officials, staff, and contractors claimed that detainees had numerous opportunities to make calls and that attorneys could arrange calls through established channels. Judge Kaplan explained: “There are several ways in which this supposed system did not work as described through the summer of 2025. Some appear to have been intentional and the rest perhaps reckless or merely negligent.” Among the failures were discretionary rather than reliably scheduled calls, undisclosed contact arrangements, and demands for representation forms or detainee signatures that supposedly were not required.
Of particular concern to the court, ICE staff told detainee attorneys for days that detainees were “in transit,” preventing legal calls even though the detainees remained at the facility. Judge Kaplan wrote:
“This practice in particular was insidious and duplicitous since it was intentional – i.e., ICE staff knew that the detainees were at 26 Fed and yet purposefully ‘continue[d] to answer [in] the same way’ and declined to provide detainees with an opportunity to speak to an attorney.” (emphasis added).
ICE also failed to update detainees’ locations in its online tracker, leaving attorneys or relatives unable to find them. In other instances, staff claimed that responding to attorney outreach would take at least five to ten business days, then transferred the detainee before any consultation occurred. Calls that did take place were conducted in the presence of staff, contractors, or other detainees.
The court concluded:
“Claims that detainees were offered ample opportunities to contact their friends, families, and attorneys before this case was filed simply are unsupported by the record. The evidence shows instead that ICE – deliberately at times and recklessly or negligently at others – prevented detainees from having meaningful contact with the outside world and particularly with attorneys who might have been able to obtain their release or at least hamper ICE’s efforts to transfer or deport them with as little procedure as possible.” (emphasis added).
Returning to the issue in his merits analysis, Judge Kaplan stated: “Despite insistence by ICE officials, staff, and contractors that detainees were offered numerous opportunities to contact counsel at the outset of and during their detention, the evidence proves otherwise.” He added that “26 Fed essentially was a black site before this Court issued the TRO and PI.” Among the practices he identified was “lying and saying that a detainee currently being held at 26 Fed was ‘in transit.’” The court further observed: “Detainees often were transferred out of 26 Fed in the course of ICE’s stalling.”
Judge Kaplan also rejected Defendants’ accounts of detention on the fifth and ninth floors. Although Defendants denied using the fifth floor to hold people who otherwise would have been held on the tenth, government witnesses confirmed its use as “overflow space.” Defendants characterized use of the ninth-floor rooms as a means of continuing, rather than avoiding, compliance. The court responded: “It is hard to accept defendants’ arguments regarding the purpose of the fifth and ninth floors.” It found that ICE had “pretended that this Court’s orders did not apply to other floors of 26 Fed.” In rejecting Defendants’ proposed geographic limitation on the class, Judge Kaplan further stated: “Defendants’ argument regarding its proposed spatial limitation is wrong as a factual matter.”
These credibility findings also informed the court’s assessment of the need for continuing judicial relief. Defendants did not oppose converting the PI into a permanent injunction. Instead, they asserted that ICE was now complying with the PI and argued that any permanent relief should not exceed the PI’s existing terms. In examining whether the controversy remained live, Judge Kaplan observed that the asserted compliance was untrue “in some respects.” He further explained:
“Additionally, any argument regarding ICE’s commitment to maintaining improved conditions of confinement absent court order would be inconsistent with its failures to comply with the PI, Zanello’s sometimes inaccurate and at other times evasive testimony, and Joyce’s nonsensical argument that the PI did not apply to 26 Fed beyond the tenth-floor hold rooms.” (emphasis added).
The court granted permanent injunctive relief for all current and future ICE detainees at 26 Federal Plaza. The judgment, as amended on Oct. 2, requires accurate detainee-location information, subject to a specified statutory nondisclosure exception, and permits class counsel, upon request no more frequently than monthly, to inspect and copy the contractors’ detention logbooks or comparable records.
47. Unaccompanied Guatemalan children’s removals: “reunification” rationale “crumbled like a house of cards” and “turned out not to be true”
Judge Timothy James Kelly (Trump appointee), L.G.M.L v. Mullin, 1:25-cv-02942 (D.D.C.)
This putative class action challenged the administration’s plan to send unaccompanied Guatemalan children in ORR custody back to Guatemala under a purported “reunification” process, without following the TVPRA’s ordinary removal or voluntary-departure procedures and based in part on the claim that parents or guardians had requested the children’s return.
On Sept. 18, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction and provisionally certifying a class of certain unaccompanied Guatemalan children, Judge Kelly held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their statutory claim and repeatedly highlighted that the government’s factual justification for the operation had collapsed. The court noted that, at the Aug. 31 emergency hearing, government counsel had said it was “fairly outrageous” to sue because Defendants only wanted “to reunify children with parents who had requested their return,” but “that explanation crumbled like a house of cards about a week later.” As Judge Kelly put it, “[t]here is no evidence before the Court that the parents of these children sought their return,” and the Guatemalan Attorney General’s report showed that officials “could not even track down parents for most of the children” and that “none of those that were located had asked for their children to come back to Guatemala.” The court added:
“While Defendants plunged ahead in the middle of the night with their ‘reunification’ plan and then represented to a judge that a parent or guardian had requested each child’s return, that turned out not to be true.”
Judge Kelly went further, saying the government’s asserted factual basis “has no support” in the record. He wrote that, even if Defendants possessed the reunification authority they claimed, “the record shows that they likely have not lawfully exercised it as to most class members,” because their representation that parents or guardians had requested reunification “has no support,” and Defendant’s counsel later withdrew it at the Sept. 10 hearing. The court also said the “record and Defendants’ conduct suggest that they are not applying their criteria accurately, consistently, or in ways that reflect good faith,” and concluded: “[O]n this record, it appears that Defendants intend to send back to Guatemala many unaccompanied children without an identified parent or legal guardian there,” contrary even to the government’s own stated criteria.
48. Student-activist deportation policy: ICE mask testimony deemed “disingenuous”
Judge William G. Young (Reagan appointee), American Association of University Professors v. Rubio, 1:25-cv-10685 (D. Mass.)
This case involves a challenge to the Trump administration’s deportation policy, under Executive Orders 14161 and 14188, which allegedly authorizes sweeping arrests, detentions, and deportations of noncitizen students and faculty participating in pro-Palestinian protests or related forms of expression and association.
On Sept. 30, 2025, following a nine-day bench trial, Judge Young held that the administration violated the First Amendment in efforts to deport non-citizens involved in pro-Palestinian campus protests. The court specifically addressed the government’s testimony—provided by defendant Todd Lyons, Acting Director of ICE, and by the masked ICE agents who seized student Rümeysa Öztürk—which claimed that agents wore masks for legitimate operational and safety reasons. Judge Young wrote that the court “rejects this testimony as disingenuous, squalid and dishonorable” and found that ICE uses masks to intimidate people into “quiescence.”
After a nine-day bench trial, the court found that plaintiffs had shown by “clear and convincing evidence that Secretaries Noem and Rubio have intentionally and in concert implemented Executive Orders 14161 and 14188 in a viewpoint-discriminatory way to chill protected speech,” and that the enforcement policy violated the First Amendment and the APA. In its January 2026 annotated judgment (and memo and order) the court imposed a remedial sanction, later stayed pending appeal, under which covered noncitizen members of the plaintiff organizations could trigger a presumption that later adverse immigration-status changes were retaliatory. The court wrote:
“Upon such proof, it shall be presumed that the alteration in immigration status is in retribution for the exercise during the course of the present case of their First Amendment rights.”
“Such proof is conclusive and voids the alteration in immigration status unless the government proves … by clear and convincing evidence that …”
The court also addressed deliberative-process privilege in light of the same misconduct finding:
“In light of the Defendants’ intentional abridgement of Constitutional rights, this Court advises that the government ought not avail itself of the Deliberative Process Privilege as to such alteration of immigration status prior to the commencement of the Sanction Action.”
“The reason for such advice is that, upon reflection, this Court gave the Defendants far too much latitude in asserting such privilege throughout the course of the trial herein, in derogation of the truth.”
“The Government Misconduct exception to the Deliberative Process Privilege should thus be presumed.”
49. Abrego Garcia prosecution: “half-truth;” “self-serving interpretation;” “loses credibility;” “abuse of prosecuting power;” “the Government has failed to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness”
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. (Obama appointee), United States v. Abrego Garcia, 3:25-cr-00115 (M.D. Tenn.)
This criminal case involved the Justice Department’s prosecution of Kilmar Abrego Garcia on human-smuggling charges following his unlawful removal to El Salvador and successful legal challenge seeking his return to the United States.
The charges arose principally from a November 2022 traffic stop that Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) had investigated without bringing criminal charges. After Abrego was removed to El Salvador in March 2025, HSI closed its investigation on Apr. 1. Following an Apr. 10 Supreme Court decision upholding the requirement that the government facilitate Abrego’s return, HSI reopened the investigation on Apr. 17. A grand jury indicted Abrego on May 21, and the government returned him to the United States on June 6 to face the charges.
On Oct. 3, 2025, Judge Crenshaw found that Abrego had made a prima facie showing of a “realistic likelihood of vindictiveness,” entitling him to discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The court emphasized Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche’s public statements linking the investigation to Abrego’s successful Maryland lawsuit. Judge Crenshaw wrote that Blanche’s “remarkable statements could directly establish that the motivations for Abrego’s criminal charges stem from his exercise of his constitutional and statutory rights,” rather than a genuine desire to prosecute alleged criminal misconduct. Although the remarks fell short of establishing actual vindictiveness at that stage because they required an inference connecting them to the charging decisionmakers, the court stressed that “[e]ven assuming the individual motive of Acting U.S. Attorney McGuire was pure, others’ motives, like fruit from a poisonous tree, may taint this prosecution.”
On Dec. 3, 2025, following an in camera review of more than 3,000 documents produced by the government, Judge Crenshaw ordered disclosure of internal DOJ communications potentially bearing on the prosecution’s motivation. The court explained that “[t]hese documents show that McGuire did not act alone” and that the government’s documents “may contradict its prior representations that the decision to prosecute was made locally and that there were no outside influences.” The communications revealed that Associate Deputy Attorney General Aakash Singh, who reported to Blanche, had pressed for updates on potential charges and described the prosecution as a “top priority” for Blanche’s office. The court also identified communications indicating that senior DOJ officials wanted Abrego charged promptly and that the prosecution team was instructed to await “clearance” before proceeding.
On May 22, 2026, following a February evidentiary hearing at which former Acting U.S. Attorney Robert McGuire and former HSI official Rana Saoud testified, Judge Crenshaw dismissed the indictment. The court rejected both explanations the government advanced to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness: that the reopened investigation had produced newly discovered evidence justifying prosecution, and that McGuire had independently decided to seek an indictment without improper influence. Addressing the government’s characterization of evidence obtained through McGuire’s investigation, Judge Crenshaw wrote, “That is a half-truth.” Much of the evidence was previously available, had been obtained through the reopened investigation before McGuire became involved, or had been developed after he began preparing charges. The court concluded:
“In sum, the Government’s explanation gets the sequence backwards. Instead of investigating the November 2022 traffic stop to identify who was responsible for the human smuggling, Blanche started the investigation to implicate Abrego. He did so to justify the Executive Branch’s decision to remove him to El Salvador.”
Judge Crenshaw also rejected the government’s contention that McGuire exercised independent charging authority. Addressing DOJ’s argument that Singh’s instruction to await “clearance” concerned only whether the indictment would be sealed, the court “reject[ed] that narrow, self-serving interpretation” and found the instruction demonstrated that Main Justice exercised control over the charging decision. Responding to the government’s insistence that McGuire acted free of influence or direction from senior officials, Judge Crenshaw found that “the persuasive, credible, objective evidence shows otherwise” and that “McGuire’s subjective good faith explanations are at odds with all the other evidence before the Court.” The court further questioned McGuire’s testimony, noting that an earlier affidavit had denied correspondence with Blanche concerning the prosecution, while McGuire subsequently acknowledged a telephone call from Blanche. Judge Crenshaw wrote:
“The Government’s characterization of McGuire’s communications with Main Justice as a ‘one-way street’ loses credibility when McGuire himself acknowledged dependence on Main Justice for Abrego’s return, direction from Singh, congratulatory contact from Blanche, and uncertainty about what was being asked of him. These contradictions undermine how much consideration McGuire’s testimony deserves.”
Judge Crenshaw separately questioned Saoud’s testimony, finding that it “creates more questions than answers” and that her inaccurate characterization of an existing HSI investigation “further damag[ed] her credibility.” Ultimately, the court held: “While the Court finds insufficient evidence of actual vindictiveness, the Court concludes that the Government has failed to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness.” The court concluded that “[t]he Government’s independence theory fails at every level” and that McGuire’s “subjective rationales dressed up as objective explanations do not rebut the presumption as a matter of law.” Describing the evidence as reflecting “an abuse of prosecuting power,” Judge Crenshaw found that “absent Abrego’s successful lawsuit challenging his removal to El Salvador, the Government would not have brought this prosecution,” and that “[t]he indictment then provided the Executive Branch cover to comply with Judge Xinis’ order to facilitate Abrego’s return to the United States as soon as possible.” The government appealed the dismissal to the Sixth Circuit, No. 26-5555, where the appeal remains pending.
50-a. Portland National Guard federalization: President’s determination “simply untethered to the facts” and not “conceived in good faith;” “no credible evidence” of more than minimal interference with immigration enforcement
Judge Karin J. Immergut (Trump appointee), State of Oregon v. Trump, 3:25-cv-01756 (D. Or.)
This case challenged President Trump’s Sept. 27, 2025 decision to federalize Oregon’s National Guard and Secretary Hegseth’s Sept. 28 memorandum authorizing its federalization and deployment to Portland, pursuant to the President’s earlier June 7 memorandum invoking 10 U.S.C. § 12406.
On Oct. 4, 2025, Judge Immergut granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and enjoined the Hegseth Memorandum for 14 days, finding that the federal government likely lacked authority under § 12406 to federalize Oregon’s National Guard. The court rejected the government’s reliance on § 12406(3), which authorizes federalization when the President is “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” Assessing whether the President had invoked § 12406(3) based on “a colorable assessment of the facts,” Judge Immergut found that he lacked a “colorable basis” because “the situation on the ground belied an inability of federal law enforcement officers to execute federal law.” She concluded: “The President’s determination was simply untethered to the facts.” Although the President was entitled to “a great level of deference,” the court emphasized that such deference “is not equivalent to ignoring the facts on the ground.” Judge Immergut further found that “the President’s own statements regarding the deployment of federalized National Guardsmen further support that his determination was not ‘conceived in good faith’” or directly related to quelling the claimed disorder. In particular, she contrasted his description of Portland as “War ravaged” and its ICE facilities as “under siege” with the absence of evidence that the alleged disorder was occurring nightly in the days or weeks preceding the federalization decision.
Following a three-day bench trial, Judge Immergut’s Nov. 7 findings of fact and conclusions of law provided further support for the contradiction between the administration’s descriptions and conditions in Portland. Although President Trump had asserted that federal officers “have not been able to enforce the Laws in Oregon,” the court found that the protests had been predominantly peaceful since mid-June, with isolated and sporadic violence. From Sept. 19 to 28, immediately preceding the federalization, there was “[n]othing much” happening outside the ICE facility. The court further found:
“The Court finds that there is no credible evidence that protest activities at the ICE facility created more than a minimal interference with Defendants’ ability to enforce Title 8 immigration laws in Portland.”
The trial evidence also showed that federal officials responsible for protecting the ICE facility had not requested National Guard assistance. Major General Timothy Rieger, who prepared a memorandum preceding federalization, had no firsthand knowledge of conditions at the facility and had not been briefed on them. The court separately rejected the claimed danger of rebellion, finding “no credible evidence that an organization coordinated the movement or actions of ICE facility protesters” and no evidence of an organized effort to overthrow federal authority. Addressing the government’s arguments about threats to federal personnel, Judge Immergut found that “Defendants overstate the degree of physical danger they faced at the ICE facility.” Applying even the “highly deferential standard of review,” the court concluded that the President lacked a “colorable basis” under either § 12406(2) or § 12406(3). It held that the federalization exceeded statutory authority and violated the Tenth Amendment, and entered a permanent injunction.
50-b. Portland National Guard federalization: federal testimony “not … reliable,” “internally inconsistent,” “speculative and inconsistent with the evidence;” claims about police assistance “not … credible”
Judge Karin J. Immergut (Trump appointee), State of Oregon v. Trump, 3:25-cv-01756 (D. Or.)
This sub-item concerns the reliability of the federal government’s evidence and testimony offered to justify the National Guard federalization.
Following a three-day bench trial, Judge Immergut’s Nov. 7, 2025 findings of fact and conclusions of law repeatedly identified inconsistencies between federal officials’ testimony, contemporaneous records, and the accounts of state and local law enforcement. The court repeatedly credited Portland Police Bureau (PPB) evidence over conflicting federal accounts.
For example, where federal and local crowd-size estimates diverged, Judge Immergut found “the PPB reporting more credible,” citing PPB’s greater experience estimating crowds and its more comprehensive coverage of the surrounding area. The court also rejected Federal Protective Service (FPS) officers’ claims that PPB failed to respond to requests for assistance or that FPS had stopped calling altogether. Judge Immergut expressly found: “The Court does not find this testimony to be credible. FPS did call PPB for help, and PPB routinely responded to these calls for help.” Although the court acknowledged that PPB had not responded promptly or forcefully to every lower-priority request, it rejected the suggestion that local police were generally unwilling or unable to assist federal officers facing danger.
The court also rejected portions of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Field Office Director Camilla Wamsley’s testimony concerning damage to the facility and whether protesters had breached it. Wamsley described extensive damage, including broken windows, doors, and gates, but the court found that her account lacked corroboration from other witnesses and contemporary FPS records. Judge Immergut stated that, “[t]o the extent that it lacks corroboration from other sources of evidence, the Court does not find reliable” Wamsley’s characterization of the damage. The court extended that finding to Wamsley’s testimony that protesters had entered the lobby, which was “inconsistent with every other piece of evidence received on the subject.” It found that protesters had never breached the facility and subsequently referred to Wamsley’s “general lack of reliability on other issues related to the protests.”
The court separately identified contradictions in federal testimony and records concerning injuries to officers and reported incidents at the facility. Judge Immergut observed that “Defendants’ witnesses and the contemporaneous reports of federal agencies paint an uneven picture” concerning the existence and severity of injuries to federal officers. FPS Commander W.T.’s testimony was “internally inconsistent,” and some alleged injuries were not reflected in the agency’s contemporaneous incident reports. The court also considered PPB records documenting difficulty obtaining accurate information from federal officers. One contemporaneous PPB report stated: “Difficult to get accurate information from them. What they say is happening is frequently contradicted by video feeds and subsequent activity. Air 1 shows no fire.” The report further noted that a door federal officials had described as barricaded was being used for employee entry and exit. Other reports showed that an alleged fire was in fact candles at a vigil. In light of these contradictions, the court found “PPB’s version of events more credible.” Judge Immergut also rejected FPS Director R.C.’s prediction that PPB would not provide adequate assistance during larger future protests, finding that his testimony was “speculative and inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial.”
The court separately questioned the government’s explanation for allowing nine Oregon National Guardsmen to remain deployed at the Portland ICE facility after the Oct. 4 TRO prohibited their deployment. Government counsel attributed the delay to the time required to communicate the order through the chain of command. Judge Immergut explained that she would “[o]rdinarily … be inclined to accept Defendants’ explanation” because the deployment had begun before the TRO issued. However, she was “deeply troubled by Defendants’ continued deployment of Oregon National Guardsmen at the Portland ICE facility in violation of the First TRO.” The court noted that, during the same seven-hour period in which Defendants said they were communicating the order to personnel on the ground, they had successfully coordinated the movement of California National Guard personnel from Los Angeles to Portland. Judge Immergut emphasized that she had not made a contempt finding, but expected further explanation if ordered and retained jurisdiction over the issue.
The court also identified a discrepancy between the government’s representations to the Ninth Circuit and staffing information subsequently disclosed in district-court discovery. In its Nov. 7 opinion, Judge Immergut observed that the government’s interrogatory response indicated that the number of FPS officers diverted to the Portland ICE facility ranged from 20 to 31 between June 16 and Oct. 5, 2025, “contrary to the Ninth Circuit majority’s reliance on Defendants’ earlier representation that ‘115 FPS officers—nearly 25% of FPS officers nationwide—were diverted to Portland.’” Separately, in an Oct. 27 letter to the Ninth Circuit, DOJ acknowledged that it “wish[ed] to correct a factual discrepancy.” It explained that the figure of 115 represented deployment instances, some involving the same personnel, rather than individual officers; the actual number of unique FPS officers was 86. DOJ also corrected its representation that nearly a quarter of the agency’s inspector capacity had been diverted, explaining that only 65 of those individuals were inspectors, approximately 13.1% of the total. DOJ expressly acknowledged that its earlier percentage assertion “was incorrect” and regretted the errors. The figures concerned different measures of staffing and deployment; the court did not make a finding that the discrepancies resulted from deliberate falsification.
The government appealed the district court’s orders. Although a divided Ninth Circuit panel initially stayed the October TRO, the court granted rehearing en banc on Oct. 28, 2025, and vacated the panel’s ruling. On Feb. 17, 2026, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the government’s consolidated appeals, Nos. 25-6268 and 25-7194, at the government’s request, without disturbing the district court’s findings or permanent injunction.
51. Illinois National Guard federalization: The “perceptions” of three government declarants “are not reliable,” and their declarations contain “unreliable information” that reflects “a potential lack of candor” and “call[s] into question their ability to accurately assess the facts”
Judge April M. Perry (Biden appointee), Illinois v. Trump, 1:25-cv-12174 (N.D. Ill.)
This case involves a challenge to the federalization and deployment of National Guard troops in Illinois under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, alongside Tenth Amendment and Posse Comitatus claims.
On Oct. 9, 2025, Judge Perry issued a temporary restraining order after finding that the government’s version of facts were not credible. In an Oct. 10 opinion, the court said it “cannot conclude that Defendants’ declarations are reliable,” citing omissions and inaccuracies that “demonstrat[e] a potential lack of candor by these affiants” and “call into question their ability to accurately assess the facts,” as well as a “troubling trend” of equating peaceful protest with riotous conduct and “bias and a lack of objectivity” (emphasis added). For example, two DHS/CBP declarants referenced arrests from Sept. 27 but failed to disclose that federal grand juries declined to indict, calling into question their factual assessments. A third declaration claimed the Federal Protective Service had requested a federalized Guard to protect the federal courthouse—an “incendiary” assertion the court found inaccurate, after which the Government submitted a corrected declaration. The court concluded all three declarations contained “unreliable information” (emphasis added). The court also noted that internal DHS emails to the Illinois State Police tracked more closely with state and local accounts than with DHS’s own declarations, and that the Government’s affidavits overstated violence and were “impossible to align” with on-the-ground accounts (emphasis added). “Ultimately, this Court must conclude that Defendants’ declarants’ perceptions are not reliable,” the court wrote (emphasis added).
52. Abrego Garcia’s immigration detention: government witness “knows nothing about Costa Rica;” “no indicia of reliability” for affidavit; “lack of knowledge was planned and purposeful;” Respondents “affirmatively misled the tribunal;” “I see it as a strategy on your part, on behalf of your client, that has been present since day one, and it is a problem.”
Judge Paula Xinis (Obama appointee), Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 8:25-cv-02780 (D. Md.)
This habeas case challenged ICE’s re-detention of Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia following his release from federal criminal custody in Tennessee, including the legal basis for his continued detention and the government’s shifting plans to remove him to third countries.
After Abrego Garcia was taken into ICE custody on Aug. 25, 2025, the government identified Uganda, then Eswatini, and subsequently Ghana as potential removal destinations, while taking no steps to pursue Costa Rica’s offer to receive him. During an Oct. 10, 2025 evidentiary hearing, Judge Xinis questioned the government’s efforts and the testimony of John Schultz, ICE’s Deputy Assistant Director for Removal, whom the court had specifically ordered to be prepared to address the steps taken or planned toward removal, including to Costa Rica. Addressing DOJ counsel, she stated: “Now, you come today with a witness who knows nothing about Costa Rica. I mean less than nothing. And so that seems to be in contravention of this order.”
The court also challenged the government’s differing treatment of Abrego Garcia’s fear claims concerning Uganda and Eswatini as “totally inconsistent.” Judge Xinis described as “very troubling” counsel’s suggestion that Abrego Garcia had maintained before an immigration judge that he feared removal to Costa Rica, without acknowledging that he had sought to designate Costa Rica as his preferred destination. She told counsel: “And I had to now spend 15 to 20 minutes getting the record straight. And I don’t appreciate it.” Addressing the government’s failure to produce a properly prepared witness, she stated: “It’s not a genuine effort to abide by court orders,” explaining that her earlier witness-preparation orders had been ignored and “we have the same problem today.”
A further dispute arose after the government identified Liberia as another removal destination and began asserting that Costa Rica was no longer willing to receive Abrego Garcia and that Liberia was effectively the only realistic option. At a Nov. 17 status conference, Judge Xinis made clear that she would not simply accept the government’s account on executive say-so. She objected that the government wanted her to take the Executive’s word that Costa Rica was no longer a reasonable option, even though the affiant lacked firsthand knowledge. Recalling that the government had previously disregarded her direction to produce a knowledgeable witness, she stated: “I don’t think there’s any other way to sugarcoat it. It was in defiance of my order.” She continued: “So now you want me to credit information about Costa Rica without putting it to the test of an evidentiary hearing. In light of the prior conduct, I’m not inclined to do that.” Judge Xinis went further, describing the government’s repeated production of unprepared witnesses as a strategy pursued by counsel on behalf of their client:
“I see it as a strategy on your part, on behalf of your client, that has been present since day one, and it is a problem.”
The Nov. 20 evidentiary hearing reinforced that distrust. John Cantú, ICE’s Acting Assistant Director for the Removal Division, appeared to support the government’s Costa Rica account but admitted that he had spent “no more than five minutes” speaking with a State Department attorney about the information incorporated into his declaration, had made no inquiry beyond “the attorneys sitting to my left,” and had not been shown the court’s preparation order. He was unable to explain basic assertions in the declaration he had signed, including references to “certain understandings,” “contingencies,” and “interim developments” concerning Costa Rica’s willingness to accept Abrego Garcia. Judge Xinis responded bluntly: “This witness has zero information about the content of the declaration.”
The court then addressed the declaration itself as unreliable, calling it “absurd” and “the quintessential triple hearsay.” Judge Xinis explained that the witness’s account effectively amounted to: “I was given the words by a guy, and I don’t know if that guy is the guy who knows it or not. He got it from another guy. I don’t know that guy’s name.” She concluded: “It doesn’t get more empty than that.” The court further stated that the declaration was “not a reliable declaration,” emphasizing: “You have zero in front of me from Costa Rica. You’ve given me no indicia of reliability that what’s in this affidavit, which is triple hearsay, is accurate.”
As argument continued, Judge Xinis repeatedly refused to accept the government’s new Costa Rica and Liberia account absent reliable evidence. When counsel argued that Costa Rica was no longer available, she responded: “I don’t have any evidence of that, frankly.” Later, when the government again characterized Costa Rica as closed off, she stated: “Well, I don’t have any factual basis for that because the government elected not to give me any.” She contrasted the issue with other third-country removal disputes in which the government had supplied the underlying evidence, telling counsel: “You have shown me the work. You have not shown me the work here.” Instead, she said, the government had offered “[t]his affidavit that says nothing” and “[t]his witness said nothing today.” Judge Xinis pressed the government to produce the underlying evidence so she could be assured that the filing was not “just an empty word salad of an affidavit.”
On Dec. 11, 2025, granting habeas relief and ordering Abrego Garcia’s immediate release, Judge Xinis concluded that no valid removal order existed to authorize his detention. Separately, she re-emphasized the government’s repeated failure to provide reliable information concerning third-country removal. After the court had “asked repeatedly” why Respondents would not remove Abrego Garcia to Costa Rica and had twice compelled testimony on that issue, “[t]hese orders were ignored without justification.” When the court then required testimony from Cantú about his declaration concerning Costa Rica, “it became evident that once again, Respondents defied this Court’s orders.” The court explained: “They simply refused to prepare and produce a witness with knowledge to testify in any meaningful way.”
Cantú “candidly admitted” that he had “no prior involvement in Abrego Garcia’s case” and had spent only “approximately five minutes preparing to testify.” The court added in a footnote that Cantú was the sixth witness it had directed Respondents to prepare for testimony or deposition across the Abrego Garcia litigation, and that “[e]ach witness was either unprepared or defiant in their refusal to answer questions.”
Judge Xinis went further, concluding that Cantú’s ignorance was not accidental. She found:
“Then at the hearing, Respondents showcased Cantú’s ignorance about the content of his Declaration pertaining to Costa Rica. As the pointed questions of Respondents’ counsel made clear, Cantú’s lack of knowledge was planned and purposeful.”
The court cited counsel’s remark at sidebar—“I’ll just say I told you this was exactly what was going to happen”—concerning Cantú’s inability to explain the representations about Costa Rica.
Judge Xinis then made an express finding concerning the government’s representations that Liberia was “the only viable removal option” because Costa Rica “does not wish to receive him” and would no longer “accept the transfer.” She wrote:
“Respondents did not just stonewall. They affirmatively misled the tribunal.”
In fact, “Costa Rica had never wavered in its commitment to receive Abrego Garcia,” the court found. Respondents’ “persistent refusal to acknowledge Costa Rica as a viable removal option,” together with their threats to send him to African countries that had never agreed to accept him and their misrepresentation that Liberia was the only available destination, demonstrated that whatever purpose lay behind his detention, “it was not for the ‘basic purpose’ of timely third-country removal.”
The court also expressly stated that “[t]he Court does not credit Respondents’ contention that Abrego Garcia had claimed fear of removal to Costa Rica.” It acknowledged that his counsel had mistakenly included Costa Rica in a blanket fear assertion, but credited Abrego Garcia’s written confirmation and repeated statements through counsel that he wished to be removed there without delay.
53-a. Southern California immigration-enforcement: court calls government’s discovery arguments “patently false,” “inaccurate,” and “not credible;” accusations against plaintiffs “not well taken.”
Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong (Biden appointee), Vasquez Perdomo v. Mullin, 2:25-cv-05605 (C.D. Cal.)
This case involves a class action brought on behalf of five individuals detained in the basement of 300 North Los Angeles Street, known as “B-18,” as part of immigration-raid tactics in Los Angeles, alleging intimidation, violence and anonymity, racial profiling, warrantless arrests, denial of counsel, and inhumane conditions of detainment.
On Oct. 17, 2025, in granting Plaintiffs’ and Intervenors’ motion for limited expedited discovery to support their preliminary-injunction request, Judge Frimpong used pointed language about the government’s representations. The court noted that Defendants had submitted sworn declarations and briefs asserting that officers were properly trained and that “all of the stops were legal,” while also arguing that discovery into training and stop justifications was overbroad and burdensome. The court rejected several of those positions outright, writing that Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs sought a “large-scale audit” of immigration enforcement operations “is not true,” that Defendants’ assertion that the requested discovery was not tethered to the prior TRO or renewed PI motion “is wrong,” and that Defendants’ arguments accusing Plaintiffs of delay and “gamesmanship” were “not well taken” (emphasis added).
The court sharply criticized Defendants’ description of the record and their litigation positions. The court stated that Defendants’ assertion about the Supreme Court’s stay order was “patently false,” and that it was “inaccurate” for Defendants to suggest they had argued only legal issues there, noting that they had also characterized Plaintiffs’ allegations as “speculative” and “fiction.” Most pointedly, in addressing Defendants’ proposed discovery timeline, the court said it was “wholly unjustified” and added: “It is not credible that the Defendants filed those declarations and those briefs without searching for and collecting the material used in support” (emphasis added).
53-b. Southern California immigration-enforcement discovery: Defendants’ claimed “good faith misunderstanding” that the court’s production deadline covered only training materials “lacks credibility” after they maintained that interpretation even after the court rejected it.
Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym, Vasquez Perdomo v. Mullin, 2:25-cv-05605 (C.D. Cal.)
This case involves a class action challenging federal immigration-enforcement practices in Southern California, including allegations of racial profiling, unlawful stops and warrantless arrests, denial of counsel, and inhumane conditions of detention at the B-18 holding facility in Los Angeles.
To examine the factual basis for the government’s representations concerning agent training and the legality of the challenged stops, Plaintiffs sought limited expedited discovery. On Oct. 17, 2025, Judge Frimpong granted the request, permitting Plaintiffs to serve four requests for production. On Oct. 23, Magistrate Judge Pym ordered Defendants to produce responsive materials on a rolling basis, including by Nov. 4 the documents on which they had relied in opposing Plaintiffs’ requests for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction—the “reliance materials”—and to complete the broader production by Nov. 21.
On Nov. 4, Defendants produced 35 documents, consisting only of training materials, almost all of which were redacted. Plaintiffs raised the absence of operational files the following day and again at a Nov. 14 status conference. At that conference, the court reiterated that the Nov. 4 deadline for reliance materials was not limited to a particular request for production. Defendants nevertheless continued to maintain that the Nov. 4 deadline covered only training materials responsive to RFP No. 1 and later represented that the court had confirmed their interpretation. Plaintiffs moved to compel on Nov. 21.
In a Dec. 12, 2025 order granting the motion in part, Judge Pym stated:
“Despite the unambiguous language and the court’s affirmation during the November 14 status conference that the November 4 deadline for the reliance materials was not limited to a particular RFP, defendants not only continued to maintain their position in the joint stipulation and supplemental memorandum, but also erroneously stated the court confirmed their interpretation.” (emphasis added).
Judge Pym preserved an important limitation: the court had acknowledged at the Nov. 14 conference that its Oct. 23 order did not require all reliance materials to be produced by Nov. 4, although it had assumed that the bulk would be produced by then. But, she emphasized, “nowhere did the court limit the reliance materials to those responsive to RFP No. 1.”
Defendants told the court at the Dec. 9 hearing that their interpretation “was a good faith misunderstanding.” However, Judge Pym’s Dec. 12 order expressly rejected that explanation:
“Although, at the December 9 hearing, defendants asserted their interpretation ‘was a good faith misunderstanding,’ the assertion lacks credibility given that defendants maintained their position even after the court reiterated that the October 23 order did not limit the November 4 production to materials responsive to RFP No. 1.” (emphasis added).
Although Defendants appeared by then to have produced the responsive reliance materials, Judge Pym acted on what she described as “defendants’ delays and strained interpretations of the October 23 order.” She required a verified statement certifying that all reliance materials had been produced and explaining the production process, including what documents had been collected, when collection occurred, and why no responsive operational documents had been produced by Nov. 4. She ordered the immediate production of any remaining reliance materials.
The court separately rejected Defendants’ position that documents concerning three September immigration operations fell outside the permitted scope of expedited discovery. Judge Pym held that the Oct. 17 order contemplated those additional operations and ordered Defendants to produce the responsive documents.
53-c. Southern California immigration-enforcement discovery: “The only logical reason” was “to limit the number of responsive documents;” counsel made “misrepresentations to plaintiffs” that later “were false.”
Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym, Vasquez Perdomo v. Mullin, 2:25-cv-05605 (C.D. Cal.)
This case involves a class action challenging federal immigration-enforcement practices in Southern California, including allegations of racial profiling, unlawful stops and warrantless arrests, denial of counsel, and inhumane conditions of detention at the B-18 holding facility in Los Angeles.
To examine the basis for the government’s representations that its agents were properly trained and had reasonable suspicion for the challenged stops, Plaintiffs obtained expedited discovery concerning agent training and 15 specified immigration operations. In December 2025, Magistrate Judge Pym had already found that Defendants’ asserted “good faith misunderstanding” of an earlier production order “lack[ed] credibility” because they maintained the same interpretation after the court had rejected it.
On Jan. 16, 2026, Judge Pym addressed a further dispute concerning RFP No. 2, which requested documents relating to the 15 immigration operations in their entirety. Defendants had instead interpreted the request as covering only individual encounters within those operations. Judge Pym found that construction “untenable,” described Defendants’ claimed reading as “implausible,” and wrote that their actions “suggest[ed] a disregard of their duty to produce documents responsive to the requests as written, rather than as defendants wish they were written.” She also found evidence that the searches themselves were inadequate and ordered Defendants to conduct a “complete and proper search” and provide affidavits detailing the document-collection process.
Two ICE declarations signed on Apr. 13, but not forwarded to Plaintiffs until June 4, purported to describe the agency’s compliance. They stated that ICE had identified 23 custodians associated with only 10 of the 15 operations and used a date range ending Aug. 23, thereby excluding three September operations. ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor directed the discovery process and supplied search terms consisting of 11 full legal names and eight alien-registration numbers. Neither declarant attested that they had read the January 16 order. Defendants’ counsel later stated that he had been unaware of the search terms ICE used until he saw the declarations.
In her Aug. 14, 2026 order, Judge Pym found that ICE had limited its searches to each individual’s full legal name and to A-numbers written in a single format. That methodology excluded obvious variations, including first or last names alone, initials, different name orders, and differently formatted A-numbers. Judge Pym concluded:
“There is no reasonable basis for ICE’s decision to search only for the full legal name and the A-number in a single format. Counsel are experienced enough to understand these search terms were unreasonably restrictive. The only logical reason for constructing such unduly narrow searches is to limit the number of responsive documents.” (emphasis added).
The court identified further deficiencies in ICE’s description of its search process. Although the agency reported searching email, government-phone text messages, Microsoft Teams, and OneDrive, the search appeared to exclude other applications used by ICE agents, including WhatsApp, Signal, and Zello. Judge Pym stated that it was “unclear why ICE would limit its searches to only some applications.” ICE also exported the data collected from each government phone into a single PDF report. The court found that this “eliminates metadata and combines separate documents into a single document,” and noted that Defendants had supplied no reason for using that format. Judge Pym concluded that “Defendants merely gloss over the inadequacies of the searches that have been conducted.”
The handling of an ICE Homeland Security Investigations agent identified as G.A. illustrated the reliability problem. Defendants had produced from another agent’s phone a WhatsApp message chain in which G.A. participated, but had produced no copy of the same chain from G.A.’s phone. When Plaintiffs questioned that omission, defense counsel represented that he had “double-checked” and confirmed that G.A.’s phone contained no responsive material. Counsel also relayed ICE’s suggestion that a WhatsApp update might have affected the forensic imaging. Plaintiffs later examined G.A.’s phone during his deposition and found the responsive messages on the device.
Judge Pym found:
“[R]ather than verify the deficiencies themselves, counsel simply accept ICE’s representation and consequently made misrepresentations to plaintiffs. When questioned about the lack of responsive documents from G.A.’s phone, counsel represented that he had ‘double-checked’ that there was no responsive material for his phone. … But plaintiffs learned these representations were false when they examined G.A.’s phone at his deposition and saw the responsive messages at issue.” (emphasis added).
The court similarly rejected counsel’s claim that they had acted “promptly” upon discovering ICE’s noncompliance:
“Counsel’s claims that their ‘prompt’ actions and agreement to supplement the production upon learning of deficiencies demonstrate they are meeting their discovery obligations also fall flat in light of the record.” (emphasis added).
Judge Pym found that counsel had merely forwarded the ICE declarations to Plaintiffs without mentioning their “glaring deficiencies.” It was Plaintiffs—not Defendants—who then contacted opposing counsel about ICE’s noncompliance.
Judge Pym acknowledged “the reported upheavals at the Department of Justice” and the difficulties inherent in coordinating discovery across several agencies. But she held that neither circumstance excused counsel from taking responsibility for the discovery process. The record made it “apparent that counsel of record has been relying on ICE and its agency counsel to respond to plaintiffs’ discovery requests,” even though counsel of record remained ultimately responsible for coordinating and supervising those efforts.
The court therefore formally admonished defense counsel:
“Accordingly, the court admonishes defendants’ counsel and reminds them they are ultimately responsible for supervising the discovery process. . . . The court warns counsel that they may face personal sanctions if these deficiencies continue.” (emphasis added).
54. Immigration-related assault prosecution: Affidavit supporting criminal complaint told a “largely fictional” story of the stop, including “blatant misstatements;” AUSA conceded the affidavit “misrepresented what was going on”
Judge Xavier Rodriguez (W. Bush appointee), United States v. Jaime Alberto Quintanilla-Chavez, 5:25-CR-388 (W.D. Tex.)
This case involves a challenge to an indictment for assaulting a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)–(b), arising from a vehicle stop and ensuing encounter.
On Oct. 20, 2025, Judge Rodriguez dismissed the indictment, finding that the government advanced “ever-shifting positions” and after-the-fact rationales for the stop (emphasis added). The court noted that a sworn affidavit by a special agent “tells a very different—and largely fictional—story” of the stop, describing the agents’ account as reflecting “blatant misstatements about the basis for the stop” (emphasis added). The court pointed out that at the Aug. 25 hearing, the prosecutor “conceded” the affidavit “misrepresented what was going on” once body-camera footage was reviewed (emphasis added). Further, the footage showed no agents or bystanders in front of the vehicle when it moved, undercutting the officer-safety rationale and testimony the court deemed “not credible.”
55. Sexual-health education grants: HHS “invented” two pretexts to support new grant conditions stripping gender-identity content from PREP/SRAE
Judge Ann Aiken (Clinton appointee), State of Washington v. Health and Human Services, 6:25-cv-01748 (D. Or.)
The case challenges new HHS grant conditions that require states to remove all references to gender identity from federally funded sexual health education programs under the PREP and SRAE statutes.
Granting a preliminary injunction on Oct. 27, 2025, Judge Aiken found that the government’s explanations were “absurd” and that it had offered at least two pretexts for its actions. The court agreed with the plaintiffs that
“the real reason behind HHS’s Gender Conditions is to ‘erase’ transgender and gender diverse people from the program materials consistent with ‘this administration’s overtly hostile comments regarding transgender people.’ … That is, Plaintiff States contend that the real reason behind HHS’s Gender Conditions is to implement the administration’s policy objectives as set out in E.O. 14,168. The Court agrees.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
HHS initially directed Plaintiff States to submit curricula for a “medical accuracy review,” but then “change[d] course” and refrained from conducting that review. The court said:
“On this record, the Court infers that, in imposing the Gender Conditions, what HHS really seeks is to implement the administration’s policy preferences. The ‘medical accuracy review’ was mere pretext.” (emphasis added).
The court further added that
“after HHS discovered that curricula materials that reference gender identity would survive a medical accuracy review, it then invented a second pretext—that “gender ideology is outside the scope of the authorizing statute.” (emphasis added).
“In sum, HHS fails to show that the new grant conditions are reasonable, let alone offer any reasonable explanation, other than pretext, for its action,” Judge Aiken concluded.
56-a. Shutdown-related federal layoffs: government’s explanations “vague and limited;” “the factual record reveals otherwise;” agency guidance “contradicts defendants’ current position”
Judge Susan Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 3:25-cv-08302 (N.D. Cal.)
This case challenged the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Sept. 24, 2025 “Lapse Memorandum” and the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Sept. 28 shutdown guidance, which directed federal agencies to consider reductions in force (RIFs) during the government shutdown that began on Oct. 1, including for programs inconsistent with the President’s priorities.
On Oct. 28, 2025, Judge Illston granted a preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their APA claims. The court rejected Defendants’ characterization of the challenged RIFs as ordinary exercises of presidential policy priorities. Although DOJ focused on the absence of evidence that particular employees had been selected because of their political affiliations, Judge Illston found that this “miss[ed] the mark,” because the President and OMB had directed agencies to target programs perceived as Democratic. The court stated that Defendants’ characterization of the measures as merely implementing policy priorities “brush[ed] over the problem.” Comparing the OMB memorandum and agency RIF notices with the President’s contemporaneous statements, Judge Illston concluded that the agencies had “sharply depart[ed] from historical practice, unilaterally acting out President Trump’s and OMB Director Vought’s retaliatory and partisan ‘policy goal’ of punishing Democrat-oriented agencies amid a government shutdown.”
The court separately rejected Defendants’ explanations concerning the planning and implementation of the RIFs. DOJ argued that agencies had considered appropriate operational factors and that certain RIFs resulted from months of preparation, citing agency declarations. Judge Illston found those explanations “vague and limited,” explaining that they were “a far cry” from the satisfactory explanations required under the APA. Addressing Defendants’ contention that the factual record disproved the allegation that the layoffs were unduly hasty, the court stated: “The factual record reveals otherwise.” It pointed to RIF notices containing errors, notices sent to furloughed employees who could not access their work email, notices issued in error and later rescinded, and human-resources personnel instructed to prepare notices terminating their own positions. The court described the process as “tumultuous,” marked by errors and uncertainty. It also observed that the full extent of the planned layoffs remained unclear from the government’s declarations and that the reported figures were likely underinclusive. The court nevertheless recognized that some agency RIFs might have been planned independently before the shutdown and reserved further factual examination of those disputes.
A separate dispute arose after Congress enacted legislation ending the shutdown and restricting further layoffs. On Dec. 17, Judge Illston granted another preliminary injunction, rejecting the government’s interpretation of the new legislation. In particular, DOJ maintained that RIFs were “effectively self-executing” once notices had been issued and that the statutory prohibition did not prevent completion of previously initiated layoffs. Judge Illston rejected this “unsupported contention,” finding that further administrative action was necessary before employees could be formally separated. She emphasized that “OPM and OMB’s own RIF guidance contradicts defendants’ current position,” because the guidance expressly distinguished the issuance of RIF notices from the later stages of implementation and separation.
The court also identified an inaccurate State Department declaration concerning compliance with its December TRO. Judge Illston noted that “Defendants have subsequently filed a supplemental declaration acknowledging an error in the State Department’s earlier declaration.” The original declaration represented that affected employees had received notice stating that their separation paperwork had been rescinded and that they had been returned to administrative leave. However, after Plaintiffs identified a discrepancy, the State Department acknowledged that “the declaration was inaccurate” and that the actual notice merely stated: “Your administrative leave status has been extended. We will be in touch with you regarding your timeline when more information is available. Thank you.”
56-b. Shutdown-related federal layoffs: government submitted “underinclusive” RIF figures in response to the court’s order; three declarations claiming months of background work on potential RIF plans were deemed contrary to the “factual record”
Judge Susan Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL CIO v. United States Office of Management and Budget, 3:25-cv-08302 (N.D. Cal.)
This case involves a challenge to the administration’s planned reductions in force of federal employees across several departments and agencies in connection with the government shutdown.
Following Judge Illston’s Oct. 15, 2025 temporary restraining order (modified on Oct. 17 and Oct. 22), which addressed OMB’s Sept. 24 “Lapse Memorandum” and OPM’s Sept. 28 shutdown guidance and directed defendants to file “an accounting of all RIFs, actual or imminent, that are enjoined by this TRO,” the government submitted agency declarations on Oct. 17. Granting a preliminary injunction on Oct. 28, Judge Illston observed that “[t]he full scope of the RIFs that have been planned or administered remains unclear based on the declarations defendants have filed.” She further explained that the agency declarations “generally do not describe other RIFs planned or administered by the defendant agencies and they do not account for the ‘north of 10,000’ people OMB Director Vought stated on Oct. 15 that he expected would be RIF’d during the shutdown.” Accordingly, the court concluded that “the figures provided below are likely underinclusive of the total number of RIFs that have been planned or administered in response to the shutdown” (emphasis added). Further, the court dismissed the government’s claim, repeated in three separate declarations, that it had spent months developing potential RIF plans, explaining that “the factual record reveals otherwise.” Judge Illston wrote:
“Finally, defendants state that the factual record refutes plaintiffs’ contention that RIFs were unduly hasty. … The Court does not agree. … Instead, here agencies are rapidly laying off thousands of public employees during a temporary lapse in funding. Defendants argue that they took sufficient time considering whether to administer RIFs, citing three agency declarations that state they have been working on potential RIF plans for months. … The factual record reveals otherwise. RIF notices are going out with errors in them; they are being sent to employees’ work e-mail addresses, which furloughed employees have been told they may not check; they are being issued in error and rescinded shortly after; they are being issued by Human Resources staff called back to work on RIFs and then ordered to RIF themselves. … In sum, it has been a tumultuous process pervaded by errors and uncertainty.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
57. Broadview ICE detention conditions: ICE Deputy Field Director declaration “contradicted pretty thoroughly” by migrants
Judge Robert W. Gettleman (Clinton appointee), Moreno Gonzalez v. Noem, 1:25-cv-13323 (N.D. Ill.)
The case involves allegations of “mass constitutional violations” at the Broadview ICE facility, including inhumane and overcrowded conditions, denial of access to counsel, and coercion of detainees to sign rights-waiving immigration forms.
During a Nov. 4, 2025 emergency TRO hearing, Judge Gettleman said that a declaration submitted by DOJ lawyers from ICE Deputy Field Director Shawn Byers regarding conditions at Broadview “has been contradicted pretty thoroughly” by hours of testimony from five undocumented migrants. He then pointed to specific examples that, in the court’s view, directly undermined Byers’s account: Byers’s statement that detainees were offered water on demand was “just not correct as far as I can tell;” his assertion that detainees received hot meals was unsupported because the court had not “heard one person say that they got a hot meal;” and his description of bench-style sleeping areas did not match the testimony the court had heard about plastic chairs and people sleeping on cold floors. The judge also pointed to the mismatch between the declaration’s portrayal of blankets and the testimony that not everyone had even seen them. He added that, “[i]f Mr. Byers were here, I would be able to ask him about some of these things.”
58. Transportation grant conditions: DOT’s “nakedly misleading characterization” of immigration-enforcement grant conditions
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), State of California v. United States Department of Transportation, 1:25-cv-00208 (D.R.I.)
This case involves a challenge by twenty States to the Department of Transportation’s “Immigration Enforcement Condition” (IEC), which predicates federal transportation grants on state cooperation with federal civil immigration enforcement.
On Nov. 4, 2025, Judge McConnell granted the States’ motion for summary judgment and denied DOT’s cross-motion, holding that the IEC violated the APA and the Spending Clause, vacating the condition from all DOT grant agreements, and permanently enjoining the government from conditioning transportation funding on state cooperation with federal civil immigration enforcement. The court emphasized that the government’s “core counterargument against the merits of the States’ APA claim [was] its repeated insistence that the IEC merely asks the States to certify compliance with federal law, and that it cannot be arbitrary or capricious for DOT to ensure this compliance.” Judge McConnell described this “gimcrack defense” as a “nakedly misleading characterization of what the IEC requires” (emphasis added).
59. November SNAP benefits: denial of benefits “entirely ‘pretextual;’” an example of “unjustifiable partisanship;” assertion it could do “nothing more” to act “expeditiously” on November SNAP benefits “carries no weight”
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, 1:25-cv-00569 (D.R.I.)
This case involves a challenge to USDA’s October 2025 suspension of November SNAP benefits during the FY 2026 shutdown and its early termination of existing ABAWD work-requirement waivers, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to set aside those actions and to compel the release of available contingency/Section 32 funds to pay November benefits and reinstate the waivers.
On Nov. 6, 2025, granting enforcement of the prior temporary restraining order, Judge McConnell rejected the government’s claim that “there is nothing more USDA could do” to act “expeditiously” in resolving the administrative burdens of making partial payments, stating that contention “carries no weight.” He emphasized that USDA already knew partial payments would entail delays and errors, that they “could have begun working to resolve the administrative hurdles once the lapse in appropriations occurred, or even before,” and that by choosing the partial-payment path they “would be prolonging implementation and frustrating the very purpose of the TRO,” even though the other option “provided a faster and more practical means of compliance.” Beyond the speed requirement, the court identified a “$600 million discrepancy” in USDA’s contingency-fund math.
The court further held that the administration’s decision not to fully fund payments was likely “arbitrary and capricious” because, inter alia, it was “entirely ‘pretextual’” and undertaken for “partisan political purposes” (emphasis added). Judge McConnell grounded that conclusion in two strands of evidence. First was USDA’s own public messaging: its website banner declared that “the well has run dry,” even though USDA’s 2019 guidance acknowledged that contingency funds can be used during a shutdown, and the banner was quietly removed after the Oct. 31 TRO. Second were President Trump’s statements, which shifted from saying it would “be my honor” to fund SNAP if directed by the court to insisting that “SNAP BENEFITS … will be given only when the Radical Left Democrats open up government … and not before!” Judge McConnell concluded:
“This Court is not naïve to the administration’s true motivations. … Far from being concerned with Child Nutrition funding, these statements make clear that the administration is withholding full SNAP benefits for political purposes. Such ‘unjustifiable partisanship’ has infected the USDA’s decision-making.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The court also emphasized in the introductory discussion of its order:
“While the President of the United States professes a commitment to helping those it serves, the government’s actions tell a different story. Faced with a choice between advancing relief and entrenching delay, it chose the latter—an outcome that predictably magnifies harm and undermines the very purpose of the program it administers. Such conduct is more than poor judgment; it is arbitrary and capricious. One cannot champion the public interest while simultaneously adopting policies that frustrate it. Discretion exercised in this manner ceases to be discretion at all—it becomes obstruction cloaked in administrative formality.” (emphasis added).
(Defendants also filed a notice advising the district court that Congress had restored full FY 2026 SNAP funding and that USDA had directed state agencies to “take immediate steps to ensure households receive their full November allotments promptly.”)
60. Chicago immigration-enforcement protests: “[I]t becomes difficult, if not impossible, to believe almost anything that Defendants represent;” “I find the defendants’ evidence simply not credible;” “belie[d]” by own evidence; “Overall, this calls into question everything that defendants say they are doing;” “outright lying”
Judge Sara Lee Ellis (Obama appointee), Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, 1:25-cv-12173 (N.D. Ill.)
This case involves challenges by protesters and journalists to the deployment of federal law enforcement officers including, ICE and CBP agents in the city of Chicago.
Following a Nov. 5 evidentiary hearing that included live testimony, Judge Ellis extended her Oct. 9 temporary restraining order on Nov. 6, 2025, granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction from the bench. Judge Ellis’s ruling made unusually sweeping credibility findings against the government’s account of events. She said, flatly, “the government would have people believe that the Chicagoland area is in a vise hold of violence, ransacked by rioters, and attacked by agitators. That simply is untrue. And the government’s own evidence in this case belies that assertion.” After reviewing “hours and hours and hours” of bodycam and helicopter footage, she added: “I find the defendants’ evidence simply not credible,” explaining that the videos defendants chose to present were “the best they could provide” and still failed to rebut plaintiffs’ declarations and testimony. She later repeated that she did “not find defendants’ version of events credible,” that “the government’s own evidence in this case belies that assertion,” and that “defendants’ allegations of riots and violence, and therefore their justification for the use of this force, lack credibility.”
Judge Ellis singled out multiple examples. She said Defendant Bovino “obviously attacks and tackles” Mr. Blackburn in video footage but then denied ever using force; she noted that “Defendant Bovino admitted that he lied,” specifically “about whether a rock hit him before he deployed tear gas in Little Village,” and said DHS’s claim that he had been struck beforehand was disproved by video. She likewise rejected the government’s effort to portray a flash-bang as crowd-thrown fireworks—“That’s simply not true”—and said DHS falsely publicized that a woman threw a bicycle at agents when the video showed “an agent throwing it out of the way.” She also corrected agent Hewson’s account of bodycam audio, stating that, contrary to his testimony that he said “get them,” “clearly what he said was ‘hit them.’” Summing up, Judge Ellis concluded:
“Overall, this calls into question everything that defendants say they are doing and their characterization of what is happening either at the Broadview facility or out in the streets of the Chicagoland area during law enforcement activities.”
In her Nov. 20, 2025 opinion and order elaborating on the preliminary injunction she had granted from the bench two weeks earlier, Judge Ellis made sweeping findings against the government’s account of events in Chicago, concluding that Plaintiffs’ video-backed evidence was far more reliable than DHS, CBP, and ICE’s oral and written accounts, that the government’s portrayal of unrest was “simply untrue” and “belied” by its own evidence, and that the record was so riddled with misstatements, including “outright” lies, that:
“While Defendants may argue that the Court identifies only minor inconsistencies, every minor inconsistency adds up, and at some point, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to believe almost anything that Defendants represent.”
She begins at the highest level, repudiating Defendants’ portrayal of Chicago as “in a vise hold of violence, ransacked by rioters, and attacked by agitators,” and answers that story with an unusually blunt finding: “That narrative simply is untrue.” She immediately adds that “Defendants’ own evidence in this case belies that assertion.” From the start, then, the opinion frames the credibility problem not as a marginal dispute over emphasis, but as a wholesale collapse of the government’s account under the weight of its own proof. Judge Ellis then converts that narrative rejection into an express evidentiary finding. After reviewing the hearing record, depositions, declarations, reports, and video, she writes that “the Court finds Defendants’ evidence simply not credible,” while plaintiffs had submitted a “mountain of evidence” that Defendants failed meaningfully to rebut. Most importantly, the court says the BWC and helicopter footage Defendants themselves highlighted as helpful “shows the opposite—supporting Plaintiffs’ claims and undermining all of Defendants’ claims,” and in many instances “evaporate[s] any factual disputes” that might otherwise remain. That point recurs across incident after incident: video disproves the claim that protesters were violent first; disproves the claim that objects were thrown “without provocation;” undercuts reports that protesters were “becoming increasingly hostile;” and even suggests that agents themselves may have created the danger narratives later invoked to justify force.
The opinion is equally severe toward particular government declarants and records. Judge Ellis shows Hott making dramatic claims in declarations about a ripped-out beard and a broken downspout, only to admit in deposition that he lacked proof for either claim. She explains that Parra had been in the field only a “handful of times,” relied heavily on use-of-force reports, could not recall what video he had reviewed, and therefore could not be trusted as a sweeping narrator of events: “the Court cannot rely on Parra’s broad generalizations.” She also treats the written record itself as suspect, noting that BWC footage repeatedly undermines what agents put in their reports and that an agent’s use of ChatGPT to generate a narrative “further undermines their credibility and may explain the inaccuracy of these reports.”
On Bovino, Judge Ellis writes that she “specifically finds his testimony not credible,” describes him as “evasive,” says he gave “‘cute’ responses” or engaged in “outright lying,” and recounts several instances where video contradicted him directly. She adds that Bovino’s and Hewson’s maroon-hoodie gang theory “strains credulity,” and, “Most tellingly,” says Bovino “admitted in his deposition that he lied multiple times” about whether a rock hit him before he deployed tear gas. From there the opinion broadens again: “Defendants, however, cannot simply create their own narrative of what happened, misrepresenting the evidence to justify their actions,” and their “widespread misrepresentations call into question everything that Defendants say they are doing.” Judge Ellis later labels Defendants’ complaints about the injunction’s burdens “disingenuous.”
(On Nov. 19, a Seventh Circuit panel stayed Judge Ellis’s Nov. 6 preliminary injunction as overbroad, while noting that her “voluminous and robust factual findings” may support a “more tailored” injunction.)
61. November SNAP benefits: USDA’s Nov. 8 SNAP letter calling States’ actions “unauthorized” was “untethered to the factual record” and government “conceded” notice was “erroneous on its face”
Judge Indira Talwani (Obama appointee), Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-13165 (D. Mass.)
This case involves a challenge to the November 2025 suspension of SNAP benefits by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), allegedly as a result of the government shutdown that began Oct. 1, 2025.
On Nov. 12, 2025, granting a TRO directing USDA to ensure prompt November SNAP payments, Judge Talwani found “USDA’s assertion—that the States took ‘unauthorized’ action when they were complying with a court order that had not yet been stayed and with the USDA’s own directive—untethered to the factual record” (emphasis added). Judge Talwani noted that “Defendants have conceded that the November 4 directive regarding 50% partial SNAP payments was erroneous on its face,” adding, “Notably, USDA has never provided any basis for setting the contingency fund payments at 50%, a figure that appears to have been pulled out of thin air” (emphasis added). She further stated that USDA had not “adequately explained” why its systems could not release contingency funds and offered only assertions “without reference to any affidavit.”
Judge Talwani also noted DOJ’s inconsistent positions: telling the court any vacatur would be “nationwide,” then telling the First Circuit states could not rely on the Rhode Island order because they were not parties, before later conceding here that Rhode Island “ordered the government to pay the States.” The court further found that USDA had “confused the record” by issuing—and never rescinding—a Nov. 7 notice stating that FNS was “working towards implementing November 2025 full benefit issuances in compliance with the November 6, 2025 order,” a communication that, in retrospect, “appears” to have been “carefully crafted to feign compliance with the D.R.I. Temporary Restraining Order” even though USDA “intended to do no such thing,” before reversing course in the Nov. 8 letter.
(On Nov. 13, after the government shutdown ended, the defendants filed a notice advising that Congress had restored full FY 2026 SNAP funding and that USDA had directed state agencies to “take immediate steps to ensure households receive their full November allotments promptly.”)
62-a. Comey grand-jury proceedings: Attorney General “could not have” reviewed missing portions of transcript before purportedly ratifying Halligan’s actions
Judge Cameron McGowan Currie (Clinton appointee), United States v. James Comey, 1:25-cr-00272 (E.D. Va.)
This case involved the criminal prosecution of former FBI Director James Comey, who challenged the indictment on the ground that interim U.S. Attorney Lindsey Halligan had been unlawfully appointed and lacked authority to present the case to the grand jury.
On Oct. 31, 2025, Attorney General Pam Bondi issued an order purporting to retroactively appoint Halligan as a Special Attorney, effective Sept. 22, and ratify her actions before the grand juries in both the Comey and Letitia James prosecutions. Bondi asserted that the ratification was “based on my review of the grand jury proceedings” in both cases. But at that time, the government had not received the complete Comey grand-jury transcript. After reviewing the materials in camera, Judge Currie ordered the government to supply the missing portions, including Halligan’s opening and closing remarks.
During a Nov. 13, 2025 hearing, Judge Currie questioned how Bondi could have ratified Halligan’s actions based on a review of materials that were not yet available. She stated:
“I was involved in receiving in camera provisions of the grand jury transcripts and tapes, and it became obvious to me that the attorney general could not have reviewed those portions of the transcript of the Comey presentation by Ms. Halligan which preceded and came after her presentation of the witness testimony in the case. There also is a missing section of what occurred between 4:28 and the return of the grand jury indictment, and it appears to me that there was no court reporter present, or if he or she was present, did not take down what happened during that time period.”
Judge Currie then asked:
“So how does the attorney general ratify and say that she has reviewed the grand jury transcripts when they did not exist in the records of the Justice Department at that time?”
DOJ attorney Henry Whitaker acknowledged: “Well, it’s true that — it is true, Your Honor, you’re right, that we didn’t have the intro and back end of the grand jury transcripts when we presented that.” He maintained, however, that ratification did not require Bondi to review every part of the proceedings and that she had reviewed the material facts. When Whitaker attempted to distinguish Bondi’s review of the proceedings from her review of the transcripts, Judge Currie responded: “She could not have.”
The following day, Halligan submitted an unsworn declaration maintaining that there were “no missing minutes,” that the period after 4:28 p.m. consisted solely of the grand jury’s private deliberations, and that she had no further contact with the grand jury during that interval. Bondi issued a new ratification order, stating that she had reviewed “the entirety of the record now available to the government.” On Nov. 24, Judge Currie dismissed Comey’s indictment without prejudice, finding that Halligan had been unlawfully appointed and that Bondi’s attempted ratifications were ineffective. The dismissal rested on Halligan’s lack of lawful authority, rather than a finding that Bondi knowingly misrepresented her review of the grand-jury materials.
62-b. Comey grand-jury proceedings: “Unusual series of events” involving two inconsistent Comey indictments and prosecutor Lindsey Halligan’s role “call into question the presumption of regularity generally associated with grand jury proceedings”
Magistrate Judge William E. Fitzpatrick, United States v. James Comey, 1:25-cr-00272 (E.D. Va.)
In a Nov. 17, 2025 memorandum opinion ordering disclosure of grand-jury materials, Judge Fitzpatrick described an “unusual series of events” surrounding the grand jury’s consideration of two inconsistent indictments in the Comey prosecution. As the court explained, the grand jury was first presented with a three-count indictment and declined to indict on Count 1, after which interim U.S. Attorney Lindsey Halligan prepared a second, two-count indictment omitting Count 1. Both indictments, fully executed by the foreperson and Halligan, were presented to the magistrate judge, who accepted the “second signed indictment,” but the court now notes that it “may not have” actually been presented to or considered by the grand jury.
The court observed that the short time between the grand jury’s vote and the return of the second indictment “could not have been sufficient” for Halligan to draft a new indictment, present it to the grand jury with legal instructions, and allow deliberation and a vote. “If the prosecutor is mistaken about the time she received notification of the grand jury’s vote on the original indictment, and this procedure did take place, then the transcript and audio recording provided to the Court are incomplete;” if instead the transcript and audio are complete, then “the indictment returned in open court was not the same charging document presented to and deliberated upon by the grand jury,” Judge Fitzpatrick wrote. He added:
“Either way, this unusual series of events, still not fully explained by the prosecutor’s declaration, calls into question the presumption of regularity generally associated with grand jury proceedings, and provides another genuine issue the defense may raise to challenge the manner in which the government obtained the indictment.” (emphasis added).
(At a Nov. 19 hearing before Judge Michael S. Nachmanoff, DOJ counsel acknowledged that the operative two-count indictment had not been presented to the full grand jury, although he emphasized that this was his understanding rather than firsthand knowledge. The government maintained that the revision merely reflected the grand jury’s vote on the original three-count indictment. Halligan confirmed that only the foreperson and another grand juror were present when the revised indictment was returned in court.)
Halligan stated in a filing later on Nov. 19 that the EDVA Grand Jury Coordinator advised her that the grand jury had voted “only on two of the proposed counts;” the Deputy Criminal Chief then instructed the Coordinator to amend the indictment to reflect that vote by “removing” the unapproved count, after which the Coordinator returned to the grand jury room and presented the “corrected indictment” exclusively to the foreperson and deputy foreperson.
63. UCLA research funding: civil-rights explanations “likely pretextual”
Judge Rita F. Lin (Biden appointee), American Association of University Professors v. Trump, 3:25-cv-07864 (N.D. Cal.).
This case challenged the administration’s suspension of $584 million in federal research funding to UCLA and its conditions for restoring funding. The National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Department of Energy suspended funding citing alleged civil rights violations. An Aug. 8, 2025 settlement offer proposed restoring funding in exchange for changes to university policies, including on student protests and gender.
In a Nov. 14, 2025 opinion granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Lin explained:
“Plaintiffs have shown that the three reasons for suspending funding and denying future funding described in the Notice of Findings and Suspension Letters were not a ‘reasoned explanation,’ and were likely pretextual.” (emphasis added.)
The court found no evidence that Defendants considered UCLA’s efforts to address antisemitism. It also described their assertions about discriminatory admissions and women’s safety as conclusory, identifying the absence of supporting findings or analysis. Discussing the administration’s proposed conditions for restoring funding, Judge Lin explained:
“Defendants have repeatedly given another reason for terminating funds to prominent universities: to stamp out certain viewpoints and speech at ‘woke’ universities. This alternate reason explains why the ‘remedial’ conditions that Defendants seek to impose via the August 8 Letter are largely mismatched from any alleged findings of discrimination, as already discussed above in Section V.C. Instead, the terms are closely tied to Defendants’ effort to target disfavored speech.” (emphasis added.)
64. Broadview assault prosecution: court cites “extraordinary judicial determinations” questioning government declarations’ reliability
Magistrate Judge Gabriel A. Fuentes, United States v. Briggs, 1:25-cr-00610 (N.D. Ill.)
This case involves a federal prosecution arising from the Sept. 27, 2025 Broadview ICE protest arrests during Operation Midway Blitz, in which the government ultimately pursued a misdemeanor 18 U.S.C. § 111 charge against Briggs after initially bringing broader felony assault-on-federal-officer allegations.
On Nov. 20, 2025, in an order dismissing the misdemeanor information with prejudice, Judge Fuentes linked the Briggs prosecution to Operation Midway Blitz and to what he called “extraordinary judicial determinations” in related Northern District of Illinois cases that DHS declarations were unreliable, that agents’ “candor” was “open to question,” and that CBP Chief Gregory Bovino had “lied multiple times.” Quoting Judge Perry’s ruling in Illinois v. Trump, Judge Fuentes stressed findings that the court “cannot conclude” the government’s declarations were reliable, that they reflected a “potential lack of candor,” and that they “call[ed] into question [the affiants’] ability to accurately assess the facts.” He also highlighted Judge Ellis’s same-day finding in Chicago Headline Club v. Noem that Bovino lied.
Judge Fuentes then underscored the striking procedural irregularities in the Broadview prosecutions themselves. He noted that, in each of the Sept. 27 cases, the magistrate judge had obtained sworn confirmation from affiants that video evidence existed, had been reviewed, and corroborated the complaint allegations—yet one misdemeanor case was dismissed after later video review, two felony cases resulted in grand-jury “no bills,” another felony was dismissed, and Briggs became the last remaining Broadview prosecution only after the government reduced the charge from a felony to a misdemeanor. The court said a grand-jury “no bill” was “virtually unheard of in this district until Operation Midway Blitz,” and that it was “unusual and possibly unprecedented” for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in this district to charge “so hastily” that it could not secure indictments or had to dismiss repeated cases of a similar nature after imposing detention and other liberty restrictions on defendants.
Against that backdrop, Judge Fuentes dismissed Briggs with prejudice. While stopping short of finding that prosecutors had struck “foul blows” under Berger v. United States, he concluded that in charging Briggs the government had sought to strike “hard blows” but had “swung and missed—multiple times,” and he invoked Berger’s reminder that federal prosecutors must proceed with the “utmost care” because their interest “is not that [they] shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” He also warned against the kind of “roller coaster” charging pattern other courts had recently condemned, and made clear that he would not permit that pattern to take hold in this district in Briggs’s case.
65. Open Technology Fund funding freeze: “attempts to shoehorn two post-hoc rationalizations into the record in defense of its conduct”
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Open Technology Fund v. Kari Lake, 1:25-cv-00840 (D.D.C.)
This case challenges the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s (USAGM) withholding of congressionally appropriated funding for the Open Technology Fund (OTF), a nonprofit supporting technologies that counter internet censorship and surveillance.
On Nov. 25, 2025, Judge Lamberth granted a preliminary injunction, finding OTF likely to succeed on its arbitrary and capricious claim and ordering USAGM to disburse approximately $19 million. Judge Lamberth rejected explanations advanced through litigation briefing and declarations from a newly installed chief financial officer whose service began after the events at issue. USAGM, Judge Lamberth wrote, “attempts to shoehorn two post-hoc rationalizations into the record in defense of its conduct, both of which are too late and, in any event, substantively deficient.” He characterized these explanations as “classic post-hoc rationalizations.” Those explanations invoked an August 2024 exchange with OTF and a Government Accountability Office report. But the report had not found the timing of OTF’s disbursements or use of funds inappropriate, and USAGM had continued funding OTF upon contractual obligation after the 2024 exchange. Lamberth concluded: “Therefore, contrary to the Murchison email, what USAGM proposes is, in fact, ‘new.’”
66. District of Columbia immigration arrests: DOJ’s “remarkable assertion … appears to be that the individuals behind these statements are ignorant or incompetent, or both;” “don’t believe either what we say or what we do, just trust whatever we tell you now;” continued silence was “particularly telling”
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Escobar Molina v. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-03417 (D.D.C.)
This case involves a challenge to the Trump administration’s warrantless civil immigration arrest campaign in the District of Columbia, alleging arrests without the required individualized probable cause determinations concerning unlawful presence and the likelihood of escape before a warrant could be obtained.
On Dec. 2, 2025, Judge Howell granted preliminary injunctive relief, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed in challenging Defendants’ policy and practice of making warrantless civil immigration arrests without individualized probable cause determinations concerning escape risk. The court enjoined that policy and provisionally certified the “Unassessed Escape Risk Class,” while denying Plaintiffs’ separate motion for class certification without prejudice.
The government denied that the challenged policy existed, relying on a 2022 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) directive and officer training. Citing James Baldwin’s “A Report from Occupied Territory” (The Nation, July 11, 1966), Judge Howell wrote:
“This defense puts a new twist on the old saying, ‘I can’t believe what you say, because I see what you do,’ by asserting the position ‘don’t believe either what we say or what we do, just trust whatever we tell you now.’ This position is unavailing for several reasons.” (footnote marker omitted; emphasis added.)
The court pointed to repeated public statements by senior Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials—including Chief Border Patrol Agent Gregory Bovino and Tricia McLaughlin, Secretary Kristi Noem’s principal communications adviser—that officers used “reasonable suspicion” to make arrests. It also cited reported instructions from White House adviser Stephen Miller to stop developing target lists and instead arrest people immediately at locations such as Home Depots and 7-Elevens. The court found the public statements corroborated by more than two dozen declarations describing roughly forty warrantless civil immigration arrests without the requisite probable cause findings, including no questions about circumstances relevant to escape risk.
Judge Howell emphasized that “neither defendants’ briefs nor their declarations disavowed these public statements.” At the Nov. 19 hearing, government counsel’s principal defense was that the statements came from nonattorneys who did not necessarily understand legal terms such as reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Judge Howell wrote:
“This is a remarkable assertion. On its face, the government’s defense appears to be that the individuals behind these statements are ignorant or incompetent, or both.” (emphasis added.)
The court rejected that explanation. These were repeated statements by high-ranking officials speaking in their official capacities to the press and through DHS’s website and social media; Bovino had expressly distinguished reasonable suspicion from probable cause. Judge Howell explained that “nothing about these statements suggests ignorance or incompetence” and that assuming otherwise would also require assuming “ignorance or incompetence from DHS’s legal counsel, who repeatedly failed to prevent these statements from being made in DHS’s official communications to the public.”
Government counsel declined the court’s offer to present witnesses under oath to correct the statements and establish that officers were applying the proper probable cause standard. Later that day, DHS again asserted that its officers used reasonable suspicion to make arrests. Defendants’ supplemental declarations likewise did not address, correct, or disavow the statements. Judge Howell described their continued silence in declarations submitted under penalty of perjury as “particularly telling,” recalling her warning at the hearing that “[s]ilence is loud in this case.”
The court therefore took the statements at face value as reflecting the government’s current policy and practice. Judge Howell identified the “better, straight-forward explanation” as an “intentional policy and practice of conducting warrantless civil immigration arrests without the requisite probable cause findings” and a “purposeful attempt to conflate such arrests with civil immigration stops,” for which a lower standard applied.
The training evidence also failed to substantiate the government’s assurances. Agreeing with Plaintiffs, the court described the training declarations as “virtually irrelevant” because the sessions identified for the officers who arrested Plaintiffs predated the challenged policy. Defendants offered no evidence of training on the correct standard following that policy’s implementation. Their declarations also did not establish what training deputized personnel outside ICE and Customs and Border Protection had received, and counsel could not supply that information at the hearing.
The government’s reliance on ICE’s 2022 directive was similarly unpersuasive. ICE’s principal legal adviser had instructed officers in June 2025 that the directive remained terminated and had been rescinded; an Illinois district court subsequently ordered its reissuance. Judge Howell wrote:
“Defendants do not address this history in their brief, and the exact status of the Broadcast remains unclear. In any event, one directive from 2022 cannot outweigh the host of more recent evidence indicating that a lower standard than probable cause is being implemented.” (emphasis added.)
In requiring arrest documentation and reporting, Judge Howell explained that the measures would help ensure compliance with the injunction, particularly because “defendants appear unable to keep their policies straight between the high-ranking DHS officials, DHS counsel, and other levels of management.” She concluded:
“Requiring defendants to put pen to paper and explain who made each arrest and why constitutes the bare minimum to ensure defendants are compliant with the Constitution, the INA, and this Court’s order, given the blatant misstatements about the INA’s requirements for such arrests repeatedly espoused by DHS high-ranking officials.” (emphasis added.)
67. Detention of immigrant teenagers turning eighteen: ICE “eventually admitted that ‘contrary to its representations to the Court, it had failed to document a significant portion of age-outs on AORW forms and had misrepresented these statistics.’”
Judge Rudolph Contreras (Obama appointee), Garcia Ramirez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 1:18-cv-00508 (D.D.C.)
This case involves a class action challenge by immigrant teenagers who entered the United States as Unaccompanied Alien Children (UACs) who allege that ICE, DHS, and related federal officials violated the APA in connection with ICE’s processing of eighteen-year-olds.
On Dec. 12, 2025, the court issued a decision noting it had been “troubled by ICE’s attempts to circumvent ‘its newly instituted reporting requirement’ by completing many AORW forms after custody determinations had actually been made,” including at times “even having officers who were entirely uninvolved in the original custody determination complete and sign off on the documentation.” The Court further emphasized ICE’s later admissions regarding the reliability of what had been presented to the Court: ICE “eventually admitted that ‘contrary to its representations to the Court, it had failed to document a significant portion of age-outs on AORW forms and had misrepresented these statistics.’” The Court characterized this as reflecting “a pattern ‘of agency recalcitrance and resistance to the fulfillment of its legal duties.’” (emphasis added)
Separately, the court stated that “[i]n addition to Defendants’ non-compliant conduct, the Court is concerned that Defendants have not been transparent about the existence and implementation of the October 1 Policy to begin with.” And it added that Defendants’ “rapid implementation of the Policy—without advance notice and without any meaningful explanation for abruptly reversing course or canceling age-outs’ post-18 plans—suggests an effort to obscure or downplay the Policy’s existence.” The court also highlighted that it was not until it ordered production of the Policy, during TRO proceedings, that Defendants provided it for review, quoting defense counsel’s response: “I . . . was advised I was not authorized to share at this time, but obviously you could order me to do so.” (TRO Hr’g Tr. 7:18–23 Court: “[I]s the new [Policy] available for the Court to review?” Defendants’ Counsel: “I . . . was advised I was not authorized to share at this time, but obviously you could order me to do so. So that’s where I’m at.”)).
68. NEH grant terminations: “[W]here the record omits materials that were before the agency decisionmakers, the presumption of regularity gives way;” “cannot accept the agency’s certification of completeness at face value;” “the Government has not undertaken a good faith review”
Judge Colleen McMahon (Clinton appointee), American Council of Learned Societies v. McDonald, 1:25-cv-03657 (S.D.N.Y.) & The Authors Guild v. National Endowment for the Humanities, 1:25-cv-03923 (S.D.N.Y.)
These consolidated APA cases challenge the agencies’ “Mass Termination” of grant awards and the government’s obligation to produce the “whole record” of that decisionmaking.
On Dec. 18, 2025, granting plaintiffs’ motions to compel, Judge McMahon built on her Oct. 1 warning that “we have no secrets here” and the government “needs to file everything publicly and needs to do so now,” concluding that the government had failed to produce a complete administrative record. Judge McMahon concluded that the government “did not conduct a fulsome search when compiling the administrative record,” with the result that the record was “demonstrably incomplete” and “largely consist[ed] of termination notices and conclusory statements.” She found that the government’s assertion that a later-produced spreadsheet was “identical” to an earlier shared version was “belied by the record itself,” placing the record’s completeness in “genuine dispute.” The court added that the missing materials were “not merely antecedent thoughts or internal musings, but the operative instruments through which the challenged action was formulated and executed,” and that “dispositive” “admissions” suggesting earlier spreadsheet iterations were not preserved. Consequently, Judge McMahon said that she “cannot accept the agency’s certification of completeness at face value,” and that “Defendants’ post-hoc supplementation of the administrative record … does not cure these deficiencies.” Rejecting the government’s “unfounded assertion” that the record could be limited to NEH-only materials, despite the “undisputed reality that NEH was but one player in this broader, multi-agency administrative decision,” the court stressed:
“[W]here the record omits materials that were before the agency decisionmakers, the presumption of regularity gives way.”
The court’s later orders reinforced that loss of confidence in the government’s account of the record. On Dec. 22, Judge McMahon found that Plaintiffs had established that the
“the so-called ‘administrative record’ produced in this case is far from complete, and that the Government has not undertaken a good faith review of files of all persons and agencies that were involved in the process of deciding to terminate the NEH Grant.”
The court overruled objections to searching beyond NEH, including as to DOGE, GSA, and other executive-branch agencies, overruled objections to producing four officials for deposition, again required a “good faith” search and production of responsive documents by Jan. 16, 2026, and warned that the court “will not entertain requests for extension of time.” Then, on Jan. 21, after the government produced about 3,700 documents while withholding or redacting roughly 400 more, the court said the government “should have produced the thousands of documents, and withheld the 400 documents, weeks ago,” rather than waiting for an order “on the eve of depositions.” At a Feb. 2 conference, Judge McMahon described many privilege assertions as “silly, stupid assertions of privilege,” said there was “no big undisclosed secret that’s hiding behind a privilege,” and called them “silly, piddling technical objections.” And on Feb. 5, after in camera review, she again granted plaintiffs’ motions to compel, overruled all asserted grounds for withholding as to 96 documents, and directed defendants to produce them in full by Feb. 10.
69. Gender-affirming care subpoena: DOJ’s assurances “cold comfort;” “the time for … benefit of the doubt, is over;” “more than a ‘whiff’ of ill-intent”
Chief Judge Cathy Bissoon (Obama appointee), In re: 2025 UPMC Subpoena, 2:25-mc-01069 (W.D. Pa.)
This case involved a challenge by current and former patients, and their parents, to a Justice Department administrative subpoena seeking personal identifiers and medical records of minors who had received gender-affirming care at UPMC Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh.
On Dec. 24, 2025, Judge Bissoon granted the motion to quash the subpoena’s requests for patients’ identifying information and medical records, while reserving consideration of whether anonymized records could be produced. DOJ maintained that the subpoena was issued pursuant to its authority to investigate potential federal healthcare-law violations, including drug misbranding. But Judge Bissoon questioned the Department’s professed investigative purpose, observing that “the government’s demand for deeply private and personal patient information carries more than a whiff of ill-intent. This is apparent from its rhetoric.” She pointed to DOJ’s public statements condemning gender-affirming care and its insistence on obtaining personal identifiers despite the availability of anonymized medical data. Drawing on Third Circuit precedent, the court explained that, even assuming DOJ had a legitimate investigative need for longitudinal records, “[l]ongitudinality may be preserved by anonymization of patients.” Addressing the government’s belated willingness to accept anonymized records after other courts had quashed similar subpoenas, Judge Bissoon suggested that “its previous demands were less legitimate than has been suggested.” The court also called DOJ’s argument that the patients’ challenge was untimely “disingenuous,” given their initial lack of awareness of the subpoena.
On Mar. 2, 2026, Judge Bissoon rejected the government’s subsequent proposal for anonymized production, finding that the patients had demonstrated that “true and effective anonymization cannot be achieved.” Addressing DOJ’s assertion that courts had long trusted its safeguards for handling sensitive information, she wrote:
“To the extent the DOJ has urged trust, moreover, it must understand why its assurances are cold comfort.”
The court continued:
“The Court will not belabor the point. The DOJ’s actions in this area are unprecedented, to say the least. Reliance on historical norms, standards and, frankly, decency, cannot be seen as given.”
Judge Bissoon further emphasized:
“The time for muscle-memory genuflection, or benefit of the doubt, is over. The subpoena exceeds the DOJ’s statutory authority. The DOJ would usurp the States’ regulation of the medical profession. Its rhetoric regarding gender-affirming care reflects callous indifference, if not abject cruelty. There is more than a ‘whiff’ of ill-intent. Doc. 52 at 3. Arguably, it is closer to a stench.”
70-a. San Francisco ICE detention conditions: government’s assertion that it lacked notice of building-wide detention relief was “belie[d]” by Plaintiffs’ motion
Judge P. Casey Pitts (Biden appointee), Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, 5:25-cv-06487 (N.D. Cal.)
In a Dec. 31, 2025 order denying the government’s motion to stay a preliminary injunction concerning detention conditions at 630 Sansome Street, Judge Pitts addressed the government’s assertion that it had lacked notice that Plaintiffs sought relief extending beyond the building’s sixth floor. In a footnote, the court stated:
“While the government suggests that it lacked notice prior to the status conference that plaintiffs sought to enjoin unconstitutional conditions of confinement beyond the sixth floor, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction belies that assertion. Nowhere does the motion refer to the sixth floor. The motion asked for building-wide relief, seeking ‘a preliminary injunction direct[ing] Defendants to bring detention conditions in Hold Rooms 630 Sansome up to constitutional minimums.’” (emphasis added).
70-b. Immigration courthouse arrests: government’s account was “contrary to its prior representations”
Judge P. Casey Pitts (Biden appointee), Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, 5:25-cv-06487 (N.D. Cal.)
This case involves class challenges to ICE and EOIR policies that removed prior limits on civil immigration arrests at immigration courthouses, ICE’s nationwide waiver of its 12-hour limit on detention in short-term hold rooms, and conditions at ICE’s San Francisco field office.
In his June 23, 2026 summary judgment ruling, Judge Pitts addressed a reversal in the government’s account of ICE’s courthouse-arrest policies. For more than a year, Judge Pitts found, the government had “explicitly and implicitly represented” that the policies applied to immigration courthouses. Furthermore, Judge Pitts noted that in African Communities Together v. Venturella, Judge Castel found that the government had similarly argued “unequivocally” and “forcefully” that the policies extended to immigration courts. Citing his Dec. 24, 2025 ruling, Judge Pitts recalled that, when he sought clarification, “the government ‘would not explain precisely how ICE interprets’ the policies’ scope but ‘strongly suggest[ed]’ that they authorize[d] civil arrests in immigration courthouses.” The government continued to defend the policies on that basis through summary judgment.
In March 2026, however, the DOJ learned that its account was mistaken. In 2025, ICE had “specifically informed” DOJ counsel that the new guidance “applied to immigration courthouse arrests.” ICE then issued an internal memorandum stating that the policies “do[] not apply to [EOIR] (Immigration) courts, regardless of their location” and informed DOJ attorneys that they “do[] not and ha[ve] never applied” to enforcement actions at immigration courts. After conferring with ICE, government counsel in this case confirmed the opposite of the position the government had previously maintained. The court described the government as having learned that it was “mistaken” and traced the reversal to ICE’s own conflicting communications to DOJ counsel; it did not find that counsel had knowingly made false representations.
Judge Pitts wrote:
“The government spent more than six months arguing to this Court that ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies represented an intentional and reasoned choice to expand arrests at immigration courthouses. The argument was unconvincing. … It is now clear that the lack of connection between ICE’s stated rationales for the 2025 courthouse-arrest policies and the expansion of arrests at immigration courthouses results not from merely unreasoned decisionmaking but a complete lack of decisionmaking. As the government recently revealed, contrary to its prior representations, ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies do not cover immigration courthouses at all.” (emphasis added).
The court further found that, for more than a year after ICE rescinded its prior guidance, “ICE itself represented to its DOJ counsel that the 2025 courthouse-arrest policies apply to immigration courthouses,” suggesting that ICE only “belatedly realized the scope of the change it had effected” (emphasis added).
Separately, Judge Pitts rejected EOIR’s reasoning that noncitizens with meritorious claims had no reason to fear courthouse arrests, noting that “nothing in the policies exempts individuals with meritorious claims from arrest” (emphasis added). He also declined to consider additional justifications offered in litigation for dismissing concerns that arrests would deter attendance at hearings, writing: “While the government offers additional criticisms of the prior policy’s approach in its briefing before this Court, the Court cannot consider such post hoc rationalizations” (emphasis added).
71. Halligan’s claimed authority as U.S. Attorney: Lindsey Halligan representation as U.S. Attorney “can only be described as a false statement”
Judge David J. Novak (Trump appointee), United States v. Jefferson, 3:25-cr-00160 (E.D. Va.)
This case involves a criminal prosecution in which Judge Novak questioned whether Interim U.S. Attorney Lindsey Halligan made a potentially false or misleading representation to the tribunal by identifying herself as the “United States Attorney” in an indictment, despite a prior binding district-court ruling that her interim appointment was unlawful.
In a Jan. 6, 2026 order issued on the court’s own initiative, Judge Novak stated that Ms. Halligan identified herself in the indictment as the U.S. Attorney for the district, notwithstanding Judge Currie’s Nov. 24, 2025 ruling in United States v. Comey that Halligan’s appointment as Interim U.S. Attorney violated 28 U.S.C. § 546 and the Appointments Clause, and that no stay had issued pending appeal—meaning the ruling remained binding precedent “not subject to being ignored.”
Judge Novak then directed Halligan to file a pleading within seven days explaining the basis for her identification and “why her identification does not constitute a false or misleading statement.” The court specifically cited (among other authorities) the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 3.3(a) (false statements to a tribunal), Rule 7.1 (false or misleading communications), Rule 8.4 (dishonesty or misrepresentation), and Rule 3.4 (knowingly disobeying a tribunal’s ruling), as well as the court’s local rules and disciplinary-enforcement provisions. The order also required that the government’s filing be signed by Ms. Halligan.
On Jan. 13, the administration filed a response signed by Halligan and submitted under the names of Attorney General Pam Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche. The filing assailed the court’s sua sponte “inquisition” into Halligan’s title as inconsistent with the party-presentation principle and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and cast Judge Novak’s order as a “thinly veiled threat” to invoke attorney discipline to “cudgel” the Executive Branch into adopting Judge Currie’s legal reasoning across other matters—an alleged “gross abuse of power.” The Government further argued that Judge Currie’s dismissal orders in Comey and James did not bar Halligan from “holding herself out” as U.S. Attorney (and, in any event, district-court decisions are not “binding precedent” even within the same district), maintaining that Halligan had not “misrepresented” anything and that “the basis” for identifying her as U.S. Attorney is simply that “in the Government’s view, Ms. Halligan is the United States Attorney.”
On Jan. 20, 2026, in a sharp rebuke, Judge Novak framed Ms. Halligan’s use of the title “United States Attorney” as both a credibility failure and a rule-of-law violation. He struck prior filings, barred her future use of the title, and denounced the “charade” of her “false assertions in pleadings,” concluding that her conduct amounted to “a false statement” and “misrepresentations,” since “[n]o matter all of her machinations, Ms. Halligan has no legal basis” to represent to the court that she holds that office. Judge Novak opened by saying Halligan’s filing—joined by the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General—contained “a level of vitriol more appropriate for a cable news talk show” and “falls far beneath the level of advocacy expected from litigants in this Court, particularly the Department of Justice,” requiring the court to “pierc[e] through the unnecessary rhetoric” to reach the merits. On the substance, he found it “Rather stunning[]” that Halligan “fails to even mention” Chief Judge Diaz’s assignment order giving Judge Currie authority to resolve all similar challenges to Halligan’s appointment, and called it “inconceivable” that the Justice Department, tasked with “faithfully execut[ing] the laws,” “would repeatedly ignore court orders, while simultaneously prosecuting citizens for breaking the law.” He said Halligan’s effort to argue Judge Currie’s rulings had no practical effect “rings hollow,” and framed DOJ’s position as effectively claiming Halligan could continue acting unlawfully because she disputed the unlawfulness—“But that’s not how our legal system works.”
The court further held that insisting on “United States Attorney” in filings “exhibits disrespect not just for this Court, but also flaunts the Rule of Law more broadly,” exercising “‘power that [she] did not lawfully possess.’” The court concluded that Halligan “has no legal basis to represent to this Court that she holds the position,” and that any such representation “can only be described as a false statement made in direct defiance of valid court orders.” He ended by declaring that this “charade” of Halligan “masquerading as the United States Attorney for this District in direct defiance of binding court orders must come to an end,” striking the words “United States Attorney” from the indictment and other government filings, barring her from using the title before the court unless lawfully appointed, and warning that continued defiance could trigger “disciplinary proceedings against Ms. Halligan and any other signatory to an offending pleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement V(A).”
72. California voter-data demand: “not obliged to accept a contrived statement and purpose,” “not required to accept pretextual, formalistic explanations untethered to the reality;” “DOJ’s obfuscation of its true motives;” “under the guise of a pretextual investigative purpose”
Judge David O. Carter (Clinton appointee), United States v. Weber, 2:25-cv-09149 (C.D. Cal.)
This case involved the Justice Department’s demand for California’s unredacted statewide voter registration records and the Department’s asserted rationale for that demand.
In a Jan. 15, 2026 order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found the Justice Department had not satisfied Title III’s requirement to provide an adequate written statement of “both the purpose and basis” for its demand. While DOJ told the court its purpose was “voter roll maintenance enforcement and compliance,” the court said that representations DOJ made elsewhere “paint a starkly different picture that this Court cannot ignore,” adding: “It appears that the DOJ is on a nationwide quest to gather the sensitive, private information of millions of Americans for use in a centralized federal database.”
The court stressed that it was “not obliged to accept a contrived statement and purpose,” explaining that it was “not required to accept pretextual, formalistic explanations untethered to the reality of what the government has said outside of the courtroom.” Citing Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, the court added that judicial review is not “an empty ritual where courts accept rationales that seem ‘to be contrived,’” and that it could not “ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given,” nor was it “required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” The court further stated: “The Court does not take lightly DOJ’s obfuscation of its true motives in the present matter,” and warned that “[i]f the DOJ wants to instead use these statutes for more than their stated purpose, circumventing the authority granted to them by Congress, it cannot do so under the guise of a pretextual investigative purpose.”
73. Minnesota immigration enforcement: Acting ICE Field Office Director declaration provided a “partial counter-factual narrative” and an account “largely contradicted by the videos”
Judge Katherine M. Menendez (Biden appointee), Tincher v. Noem, 0:25-cv-04669 (D. Minn.)
This case involves a putative class action challenging alleged First and Fourth Amendment violations during DHS’s Operation Metro Surge in Minnesota, including alleged retaliatory arrests, use of chemical irritants and force against people observing or protesting ICE activity, and suspicionless traffic stops of individuals following ICE vehicles.
On Jan. 16, 2026, granting in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, Judge Menendez made clear that she was not prepared to credit the government’s version of events on the present record. She said “the Plaintiffs’ declarations are entitled to substantial weight” because they were based on personal knowledge and “sworn under penalty of perjury,” whereas Defendants “did not provide sworn declarations from immigration officers (or others) who witnessed or were themselves directly involved in the conduct challenged by Plaintiffs,” instead relying chiefly on Acting Field Office Director David Easterwood, whose knowledge was not firsthand. As to substance, she wrote that Easterwood’s declaration offered a “partial counter-factual narrative” of the Tincher and Noor arrests and a generalized account of the Crenshaw incident, and that his accounts were entitled to “considerably less weight than Plaintiffs’ declarations.” The imbalance was not cured by Defendants’ supplemental submissions: the court found the added videos did “not provide meaningful evidentiary support” for Defendants’ position regarding Noor or Crenshaw, and the incident reports underlying Easterwood’s declaration were unsworn and thus “not entitled to the same weight” as Plaintiffs’ declarations. “In short,” Judge Menendez concluded, “what we have in this record is a qualitative imbalance.”
Judge Menendez also expressed skepticism in the merits analysis. As to Tincher, she “decline[d] to credit” defendants’ claim that Tincher tried to cross the perimeter and push an officer, concluding instead that the evidence did not support even a mistaken belief in probable cause. As to Noor, she again found Defendants’ position “unpersuasive:” Easterwood’s account was “a counter-factual narrative that is unattributed to anyone at the scene and contains unsworn hearsay from police reports,” and it was “largely contradicted by the videos.” “The full record does not provide a sound basis” to conclude that Noor “threatened to interfere, acted aggressively, pushed up into ICE officers’ faces, shouted obscenities, and threw rocks and ice at ICE officers;” rather, “it appears most likely that the ICE officers were simply fed up with the protesters generally and Mr. Noor specifically, rather than responding to any threatening conduct,” and “[o]n this record, there is no basis to conclude that officers had even mistaken probable cause to place him under arrest.” The same pattern held for the traffic stops: Defendants “do not deny Biestman, Lee, or Webb’s allegations,” offered no “objective, particularized observations” suggesting these specific Plaintiffs were engaged in criminal activity, and the court was not persuaded by the government’s appeal to the “overall climate of following,” because “no evidence in the record supports a conclusion” that these Plaintiffs acted in a hostile, menacing, or threatening way or created safety concerns. “Under these circumstances,” the court wrote, “the Court cannot find any support for reasonable suspicion of a violation of § 111,” and even crediting Easterwood’s generalized account of misconduct by others, it still did not establish reasonable suspicion “as to these particular plaintiffs.”
74. DOGE access to SSA data: district court identifies “serious if not egregious misrepresentations” and grounds to overcome the presumption of regularity for discovery
Judge Ellen Lipton Hollander (Obama appointee), American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Social Security Administration, 1:25-cv-00596 (D. Md.)
On appeal: American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Social Security Administration, No. 25-1411 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 2026) (en banc).
This case challenges DOGE’s access to highly sensitive Social Security records.
Government corrections and supplementation of the record:
On Jan. 16, 2026, Defendants filed a “Notice of Corrections to the Record” acknowledging that several factual representations previously submitted to the court were inaccurate or incomplete, and stating that SSA and DOJ were bringing the new information forward “to ensure full candor to the Court.” The notice said that, based on records reviewed during or after Oct. 2025, SSA had identified actions by the former SSA DOGE team that were “potentially outside of SSA policy and/or noncompliant with the District Court’s March 20, 2025, temporary restraining order,” including post-TRO PII searches and later grants of PII-related access. Plaintiffs then characterized the Notice as disclosing TRO violations, and DOJ later acknowledged that several corrections involved compliance issues with the earlier TRO.
The government’s filing made several concessions. First, although then-Commissioner Dudek had declared on Mar. 24, 2025 that “[a]s of Monday, March 24, 2025, SSA revoked all SSA DOGE Team members’ access to SSA systems containing personally identifiable information (PII) or systems of record,” SSA later determined that one DOGE team member in fact ran PII searches that morning, with the last search occurring at about 9:30 a.m. ET, and that access to all PII was not terminated until about noon that day. Second, although Dudek had also declared that “[t]he DOGE Defendants have never had access to SSA systems of record,” SSA disclosed that on Mar. 3, 2025 an SSA DOGE team member emailed an encrypted attachment that SSA believes contained PII derived from SSA systems of record — including names and addresses of about 1,000 people — to Steve Davis and a DOGE-affiliated Department of Labor employee, who “could have accessed” it if given the password. Third, although SSA had “believed” Russo’s Mar. 12 declaration accurately described the systems to which DOGE members had access, SSA later determined that DOGE team members had additional access not previously disclosed, including employee-record systems, personnel-access systems, shared workspaces, a data-visualization tool that “could provide access to PII,” and additional EDW schemas.
The notice also corrected the government’s account of what DOGE was doing and how SSA data were handled. Russo had attested that “[t]he overall goal of the work performed by SSA’s DOGE Team is to detect fraud, waste and abuse,” and defendants had argued that the team needed SSA records to modernize technology and “maximize efficiency and productivity.” SSA later said those statements were “largely still accurate,” but disclosed that in March 2025 a political advocacy group asked two SSA DOGE members to analyze acquired state voter rolls, that one DOGE team member signed a “Voter Data Agreement” in his capacity as an SSA employee, and that SSA first learned of that agreement only in Nov. 2025. And although SSA had represented that it had safeguards ensuring “no private or commercial servers have been integrated with SSA systems,” SSA later learned that DOGE team members had used the third-party server “Cloudflare” from Mar. 7 through Mar. 17, outside SSA security protocols, and that SSA could not determine exactly what data had been shared or whether the data still existed there.
Those corrections prompted efforts to amend the appellate record. On Jan. 21, 2026, Plaintiffs moved in district court to supplement the record on appeal, arguing that Defendants’ Jan. 16 notice disclosed “material inaccuracies” and “numerous misstatements and omissions” in prior submissions that “could not have been identified by Plaintiffs or the Court.” Judge Hollander granted that motion the same day and ordered the Clerk to transmit a supplemental record on appeal, “including Defendants’ January 16, 2026, Notice of Correction, forthwith.” Plaintiffs also notified the Fourth Circuit. Plaintiffs also sought limited discovery concerning the disclosures.
On Mar. 10, Plaintiffs informed the district court of a Washington Post report describing a whistleblower’s allegations that a former DOGE employee claimed to possess copies of two restricted SSA databases, including at least one on a thumb drive, and intended to use the information at a private-sector employer. Plaintiffs argued that these allegations reinforced the need to investigate the scope, purposes and security of DOGE’s access to SSA data.
Appellate criticism and district court findings supporting discovery
On Apr. 10, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the preliminary injunction by a 9–6 vote and remanded for further proceedings. Nine judges concluded that Plaintiffs had made the required preliminary showing of standing, but a different nine agreed that they had not established irreparable harm because damages or a permanent injunction could provide an adequate remedy.
In Part IV of his opinion, joined by Chief Judge Albert Diaz and Judge Pamela Harris, Judge Toby Heytens described the government’s acknowledgments as “alarming” and stated that they “raise serious questions about its earlier conduct before the district court.” He wrote:
“After we heard oral argument—and months after the district court entered the preliminary injunction at issue here—the government submitted a ‘Notice of Corrections to the Record.’ In that notice, the government admits: (1) that it provided inaccurate information to the district court and may not have fully complied with its temporary restraining order; (2) that DOGE used an unauthorized third-party server to share SSA data; and (3) that DOGE team members may have agreed to share SSA data with a political advocacy group that aims to ‘find evidence of voter fraud and to overturn election results in certain States.’
The government’s recent acknowledgments are alarming and raise serious questions about its earlier conduct before the district court. But even though the notice has been made part of the official record on appeal, our task in this appeal is ‘to review the record that was before the district court at the time the preliminary injunction was entered.’ … The same goes for the even more recent—and even more alarming—allegations that plaintiffs flagged in their March 10 district court filing, which have not been made part of the record on appeal and thus are not properly before us in any sense. ‘On remand, however, the parties will be able to introduce further evidence on’ these points, … and the district court will be free to consider any future requests for appropriate relief or corrective action.”
Judge Robert B. King, joined by Judges Roger L. Gregory, James A. Wynn Jr., Stephanie D. Thacker, DeAndrea Gist Benjamin and Nicole G. Berner, dissented from the judgment. He maintained that the corrected appellate record should inform the appellate decision, emphasizing: “The facts now known are much worse!” (emphasis in original). He wrote:
“From the corrected record, we now know that SSA and the other defendants provided patently false information to the district court in the preliminary injunction proceedings. We thus know that the prior rulings in this matter—the district court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction, our Court’s denial of a stay, and the Supreme Court’s grant of a stay—were rendered on a materially erroneous record. And we know that, going forward, we should not accord the defendants any benefit of the doubt or readily trust in anything they say.”
Judge King identified false assurances concerning compliance with the TRO, access by DOGE affiliates outside SSA, safeguards against unauthorized data transfers, and the purposes of DOGE’s work, as well as SSA’s failure to disclose the full extent of DOGE’s systems access. Elsewhere in his opinion, he emphasized that “the Notice of Corrections belies SSA’s entire justification for opening its records to the DOGE affiliates.”
Judge King also rejected the suggestion that SSA’s uncertainty about whether particular information had been accessed or shared rendered the corrected record “inconsequential.” He wrote: “Rather, it lays bare what are probably the most damning facts now known.” He explained:
“That is, the DOGE affiliates are not regular SSA employees working under SSA’s supervision, in accordance with its rules, and on its behalf. Rather, they are rogue actors whose activities are hidden from SSA itself.”
Judge King distinguished the corrected record concerning events preceding the preliminary injunction from the whistleblower reports concerning alleged later events, which he acknowledged were not part of the evidence before the appellate court. The corrected record, he explained, supplied the facts that should have informed the original proceedings:
“Simply put, the corrected record presents the facts as they truly were, while the erroneous original record depicts the facts as they never were.”
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, joined by Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, G. Steven Agee and Allison Jones Rushing, concurred in the judgment. Although he cautioned that the whistleblower allegations had not been substantiated, he likewise stated that the district court could assess the allegations and other revelations when considering further relief on remand.
In an Apr. 14 discovery order, Judge Hollander lifted the stay of district-court proceedings and authorized limited discovery. The court allowed Defendants to seek rescission of discovery order, which Defendants subsequently did, moving to rescind or stay it, arguing that the case was moot, that discovery beyond the administrative record was unwarranted, and that Plaintiffs’ requests were overbroad.
On June 5, Plaintiffs submitted a further notice concerning a sworn whistleblower declaration by SSA senior executive Jeremiah Schofield. It described alleged directions to enter inaccurate death information into SSA records, including a request covering 2.7 million people, and alleged that the purpose was to pressure people to self-deport or facilitate their detention. Plaintiffs argued that these disclosures also undermined the government’s assertion that no DOGE affiliates remained at SSA.
On June 26, Judge Hollander denied Defendants’ motion to rescind or stay discovery. The court’s opinion addressed the inaccuracies in the government’s earlier submissions and its resistance to further inquiry:
“Defendants attempt to minimize the significance of their Notice, in which they reported to the Court serious if not egregious misrepresentations by members of DOGE and SSA. The seriousness of the Notice cannot be overstated.”
Hollander quoted King’s account of the false assurances and the resulting erroneous record, including his warning against readily trusting Defendants’ statements. She independently explained that the Notice disclosed “several inaccuracies” in sworn declarations and revealed that DOGE personnel had accessed and transmitted information in ways previously denied or undisclosed:
“Further, the Notice established that the government’s prior representations about the scope, purpose, and containment of DOGE’s access to SSA data were inaccurate, and that sensitive personal information belonging to a large number of Americans may have traveled well beyond the walls of the Agency.”
The court rejected Defendants’ argument that the disappearance of SSA’s DOGE team and the impending expiration of the DOGE Temporary Organization rendered the case moot. Plaintiffs continued to seek corrective relief concerning information already accessed or disclosed. Hollander also pointed to the appellate judges’ reliance on the possibility of later remedies when rejecting irreparable harm:
“Defendants cannot have it both ways. If irreparable harm was not established because the alleged harm can be remedied ‘down the line,’ by way of monetary damages or a reparative injunction, then the availability of such remedies means that the case is not moot.”
She further described the government’s position as “circular:” it sought resolution of mootness before discovery, although the facts needed to assess whether DOGE’s involvement had ended, whether improperly accessed data had been retrieved or destroyed, and whether former DOGE affiliates retained influence over SSA systems were within Defendants’ control. She wrote:
“Indeed, defendants ask the Court to accept at face value their representations about the current state of affairs at SSA, in a case where defendants themselves admitted that DOGE representatives were not truthful in their prior representations to the Court.”
Defendants also argued that SSA’s voluntary disclosure demonstrated good faith and therefore defeated reliance on the APA’s bad-faith exception to the usual restriction on extra-record discovery. Hollander called that argument “misguided.” She noted that SSA and its officials were not the only defendants, yet the Notice had not been filed on DOGE’s behalf, and emphasized that the corrected declarations had been made under oath.
Judge Hollander “credit[ed] government counsel for doing what is expected of an officer of the court— disclosing the misconduct described in the Notice,” But she criticized Defendants’ subsequent request that the court effectively “ignore” the disclosures and prevent an inquiry: “In my view, the proper course is to develop the factual record, not to thwart its development.” She explained that the earlier stay and pending appeal had delayed her response to the Notice:
“But, my inaction did not mean disinterest. To the contrary, I contemplated an inquiry regarding defendants’ misrepresentations at the appropriate time.”
The court invoked its inherent authority to investigate whether it had been the victim of fraud and to ensure compliance with its orders. Judge Hollander noted that noncompliance with the TRO could lead to a contempt hearing. Plaintiffs’ discovery requests overlapped with matters she had intended to investigate herself, “out of concern that DOGE appears to have considered itself above the law.” For the time being, she allowed Plaintiffs’ discovery to proceed instead of conducting a separate court-initiated inquiry.
Hollander also rejected the government’s insistence that the inquiry be confined to the administrative record:
“Rather, the discovery is aimed at defendants’ conduct in regard to the TRO, including their lack of compliance with the TRO and the candor of defendants’ representations to the Court. Defendants’ insistence that the parties and the Court must consider only the APA record that defendants previously produced is a red herring.”
The inquiry concerned whether Defendants had obeyed the TRO, whether their representations to the court were accurate, and what happened to SSA information after it left the agency’s control. Those questions concerned Defendants’ conduct rather than the agency decision to grant DOGE access. The court therefore held that the APA’s restriction on extra-record review did not govern the requested discovery.
Hollander further held that discovery would be warranted even if the APA applied. After explaining that mere allegations of bad faith were insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity, she concluded:
“But, even if the APA applied, extra-record discovery pursuant to the APA would be warranted. Extra-record discovery is generally appropriate where the integrity of the record is impugned. … Courts have also permitted extra-record discovery where bad faith or improper behavior has been shown. … Plaintiffs have certainly made the requisite showing, for the reasons already discussed.”
The court expressly distinguished the need for investigation from resolving the truth of every allegation:
“The Court need not resolve here whether the allegations asserted in the Notice and in the Washington Post articles are true. What matters for present purposes is that the information contained in the articles is facially inconsistent with representations made by defendants to this Court about the purpose and scope of DOGE’s conduct and even its involvement at SSA. The incongruities in the articles and in defendants’ Notice confirm the need to examine defendants’ representations. In turn, that necessitates discovery.”
Finally, Hollander rejected the argument that the discovery was untethered to Plaintiffs’ complaint, emphasizing that “it was defendants, not plaintiffs, who injected the issues that make this discovery necessary.” Their Notice disclosed incomplete information, inaccurate sworn declarations, unauthorized transmissions, and an undisclosed agreement with a partisan political organization that Plaintiffs could not have anticipated when filing suit.
The court declined Defendants’ proposed limits of five document requests, five interrogatories, five requests for admission and no depositions. It directed Defendants to raise objections to particular requests, or seek a protective order, under the ordinary discovery rules rather than seek the elimination of discovery altogether.
75. Haiti TPS termination: government memorandum “riddled with other such verifiably misleading statements”
Judge Ana C. Reyes (Biden appointee), Lesly Miot v. Trump, 1:25-cv-02471 (D.D.C.)
This case challenges DHS’s termination of Haiti’s Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation. In a Feb. 2, 2026 opinion, subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, Judge Reyes postponed the termination and identified misleading statements and unsupported assertions in the government’s explanations.
Secretary Kristi Noem asserted that “data surrounding internal relocation does indicate parts of the country are suitable to return to.” Judge Reyes wrote that the Secretary “cited no data to support this proposition and failed to identify a single safe location.” When the government identified a USCIS memorandum as supporting that assertion, the court found that it “also fails to identify a single safe location by name or even geographic area.” The court explained that evidence of internal displacement did not establish that the displaced people had reached suitable places of return.
A second USCIS memorandum stated that there had been improvements in Haiti and cited government investment in security, governance and the judicial system. Judge Reyes examined the underlying source, which warned that Haiti was in full-blown conflict and that government efforts would be insufficient to significantly reduce the violence. She concluded: “This USCIS memorandum is riddled with other such verifiably misleading statements.”
The court also criticized the Secretary’s reliance on information about unlawful entrants and visa overstayers without establishing its applicability to current Haitian TPS holders. Judge Reyes wrote:
“But the Secretary cannot just throw verifiably inapposite or false assertion after inapposite or false assertion—no matter how inflammatory—against the wall and hope that something sticks.”
On June 25, 2026, the Supreme Court reversed the preliminary-relief judgment in Mullin v. Doe, decided together with Trump v. Miot. It held that the TPS statute barred review of the nonconstitutional challenges. It also rejected the district court’s assessment of the equal protection claim, concluding that Plaintiffs were unlikely to prove that race was a motivating factor in the termination decision. The majority identified the administration’s general opposition to immigration and previous TPS policies as a possible race-neutral explanation. The Court did not address those findings by the district court described above.
[Aside: Justice Elena Kagan, dissenting with Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, separately criticized the government’s account of interagency consultation concerning Haiti and Syria. She explained that the brief email exchanges addressed foreign-policy concerns rather than whether country conditions permitted safe return. Comparing the claimed consultation to a doctor asserting that he had consulted a specialist when their exchange never addressed the patient’s condition, she wrote: “you would think the doctor had lied. The emails here are in the same vein.”]
Following remand, Judge Reyes’s Aug. 5 order acknowledged that the February stay was no longer in effect, but denied the government’s request to stay discovery. On Oct. 20, the government moved for judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal of the APA and equal protection claims in light of Mullin.
76. Oregon voter-data demand: “Serious doubt as to the true purposes” of DOJ seeking states’ voter data; “the presumption of regularity … previously extended to [the Justice Department]—that it could be taken at its word … no longer holds”
Judge Mustafa Kasubhai (Biden appointee), United States v. State of Oregon, 6:25-cv-01666 (D. Or.)
This case involved a Justice Department lawsuit seeking to compel Oregon to disclose its complete, unredacted statewide voter registration list, including voters’ sensitive personal information.
On Feb. 5, 2026, granting Defendants’ and Intervenors’ motions to dismiss, Judge Kasubhai made clear that the Justice Department’s credibility problems extended well beyond a single disputed assertion in the case. Although the Justice Department repeatedly gave the court “assurance” that Oregon’s Sensitive Voter Data would be protected by privacy laws and Title III and that the Justice Department sought the data only to investigate compliance with the NVRA and HAVA, the court said those representations could no longer be accepted at face value. Pointing to DOJ’s broader campaign of lawsuits against “20 states plus the District of Columbia” seeking the same statewide unredacted voter lists, Judge Carter’s warning in Weber that DOJ appeared to be on a “nationwide quest” to gather “sensitive, private information … for use in a centralized federal database,” and Attorney General Bondi’s Jan. 24, 2026 Minnesota immigration enforcement letter demanding that the state “allow” the Justice Department access to voter rolls, Judge Kasubhai wrote that this broader conduct “rais[es] suspicion,” “casts serious doubt as to the true purposes” for which DOJ seeks the data, and makes Defendants’ and Intervenors’ concerns about DOJ’s “ulterior motives” concerns that “require attention.” Against that backdrop, the court concluded that “the presumption of regularity … previously extended to [the Justice Department]—that it could be taken at its word … no longer holds,” so any DOJ “assurances” about privacy and limited use must now be “thoroughly scrutinized” and “squared with its open and public statements to the contrary.”
At the same time, the court did not dismiss the suit because it distrusted DOJ; rather, it dismissed on statutory grounds and then separately explained why DOJ’s claimed purposes could not simply be presumed regular. The court emphasized that Oregon-specific allegations could not be viewed in isolation from the Department’s nationwide demand for the same data and the surrounding public statements suggesting that the information was being aggregated at least in part for “immigration enforcement” and that DOJ’s stated NVRA/HAVA rationale may be “pretextual.”
77. Prosecution of a Russian asylum seeker: ICE officer’s denial of intimidation “not credible;” government “failed to rebut” defendant’s testimony
Judge Sherilyn Peace Garnett (Biden appointee), United States v. Zaitsev, 2:25-cr-00154 (C.D. Cal.); related habeas proceeding, Maksim Zaitsev v. Warden, 2:26-cv-00454 (C.D. Cal.).
This criminal prosecution charged Russian asylum seeker Maksim Zaitsev with assaulting a federal employee during his Feb. 25, 2025 arrest at an ICE office in Los Angeles. Zaitsev pleaded not guilty and raised the possibility of proceeding on a self-defense theory.
Judge Garnett ordered Zaitsev’s release on bond on Apr. 2, 2025. He was released from criminal custody on Apr. 4 but immediately detained by DHS. Following a May 14 pretrial hearing, ICE Deportation Officer Hisle—one of the officers involved in the original arrest—confronted Zaitsev at an ICE holding facility. Zaitsev moved to dismiss the indictment for government misconduct on May 17. After a May 19 evidentiary hearing, Judge Garnett granted the motion and dismissed the indictment with prejudice on May 20.
Judge Garnett later recounted in her Feb. 9, 2026 habeas order that Hisle testified that his tone during the encounter was calm and denied intimidating or threatening Zaitsev. The defense also introduced Hisle’s letter to his supervisor, in which he denied making “any implied, explicit, coercive, intimidating statements” or “any threatening physical gestures or threats of any kind.” Surveillance footage, however, showed Hisle “confronting” Zaitsev at “close distance,” “pointing” a finger in his face, and “pumping his clenched fist” in Zaitsev’s direction.
Judge Garnett recounted that Hisle “admitted that he omitted information from the letter.” He also admitted coming within six inches of Zaitsev’s face and pumping his fist while looking toward him. The court added:
“Officer Hisle, however, did not explain why he approached Petitioner, why he asked if Petitioner remembered him, or why he raised his clenched fist in Petitioner’s direction.” (emphasis added.)
The government “elected not to ask any questions of Officer Hisle,” did not call other officers “within earshot” of the encounter, and “elected not to cross-examine Petitioner.” Zaitsev testified that he perceived Hisle’s tone as rude and threatening and feared retaliation by ICE officers if he testified at trial. Judge Garnett found that Hisle had acted in a “threatening and intimidating manner.” Describing her credibility findings, she wrote:
“The Court determined based on the admitted evidence that Officer Hisle’s testimony that he did not engage in any intimidating or threatening behavior towards Petitioner was not credible. Additionally, the Court found the Government failed to rebut Petitioner’s testimony that he was fearful and discouraged by Officer Hisle’s actions from testifying in Petitioner’s own defense during trial.” (citations omitted; emphasis added.)
The court concluded that Hisle’s conduct amounted to “substantial Government interference with Petitioner’s free and unhampered decision whether to testify in his own defense” and violated due process. It attributed the conduct to the government because Hisle was a central witness to both the prosecution’s case and Zaitsev’s potential self-defense arguments. The court also found dismissal warranted under its supervisory powers even if the conduct fell short of a due process violation.
78. Federal prisoners’ ADX transfers: “The Court does not lightly cast aside Assistant Director Salem’s representations” in a sworn declaration; “a gap between what Defendants say and what Defendants did”
Judge Timothy James Kelly (Trump appointee), Taylor v. Trump, 1:25-cv-03742 (D.D.C.)
This case involves a due process challenge by 20 federal death row inmates—whose sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. They challenge the Bureau of Prisons’ decision, following President Trump’s Executive Order 14164 and Attorney General Bondi’s implementing memorandum, to transfer them en masse to ADX Florence through what plaintiffs argued was a predetermined and pretextual redesignation process.
On Feb. 11, 2026, in an opinion granting a preliminary injunction barring the transfers, Judge Kelly repeatedly signaled distrust of the government’s portrayal of a neutral, individualized designation process, concluding that
“Plaintiffs have shown that it is likely that their redesignations were predetermined— and thus violated their due process rights—because officials with authority over BOP made it clear that they had to be sent to ADX Florence to punish them, no matter what result the ordinary BOP process might have yielded.”
He framed “the nature of Plaintiffs’ due process claim” as “a gap between what Defendants say and what Defendants did,” and found an “unusual array of evidence” showing that senior DOJ leadership intervened in a process already underway and dictated an across-the-board result. He relied on “largely consistent and unrebutted evidence” that BOP attorney Christopher Synsvoll told counsel the Deputy Attorney General and Attorney General were “personally involved,” that ODAG approval was unprecedented, that BOP’s own spreadsheet recommendations had been rejected, and that “all the commutees should be referred to ADX-Florence”—a directive said to be driven not by BOP’s own assessments but by “President Trump’s Executive Order and a related memorandum issued by Attorney General Bondi.” Judge Kelly concluded that “it is not hard to conclude” BOP officials understood that “everyone needed to be referred to ADX,” and that it “strains credulity” to think subordinate officials “felt free to disagree with what had been demanded at the start by officials far senior to them, with authority over their careers and livelihoods.” He also treated Bondi’s public statements as evidence of prejudgment, citing her announcement that BOP had “begun transferring the monsters Biden commuted to Supermax prisons, where they will spend the rest of their lives in conditions that match their egregious crimes.”
Judge Kelly likewise found the process itself suggestive of prejudgment rather than genuine individualized decisionmaking. He pointed to the “identical outcomes” for 35 of the 37 commutees, the “lack of coherent explanation and internal consistency” in the redesignation paperwork, and recommendation forms using the same boilerplate language across inmates with very different records. In Julius Robinson’s case, for example, despite a 23-year disciplinary record showing no infractions, sustained work, extensive programming, and even baptism, the hearing administrator still recited—“without further explanation”—the same generic ADX rationale used for everyone else. Against that evidence, Judge Kelly said: “The Court does not lightly cast aside Assistant Director Salem’s representations” – referring to the sworn declaration’s claim that the decisions were individualized; stressed that the court “must make credibility determinations;” found Salem’s submission “cursory;” and held that it “does not outweigh” the contrary proof. Invoking the Supreme Court’s warning that courts are “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free,” he added that Salem’s declaration “leaves much of Plaintiffs’ evidence unrebutted” and “says nothing” about how others in the chain carried out their duties. Most strikingly, one Plaintiff reported that the hearing administrator “admitted that . . . he had to do what [Attorney General Bondi] directed him to do” and, when asked whether he would recommend ADX “no matter what” the plaintiff said, “said yes.” Synthesizing that record, Judge Kelly concluded plaintiffs likely had “no meaningful opportunity to be heard” and that the redesignation proceedings were “an empty exercise to approve an outcome that was decided before it even began.”
79. Minnesota detainees’ access to counsel: government’s “account, however, is belied by the record;” “Defendants offer threadbare declarations generally asserting, without examples or evidence” leaving a “gulf … too wide and too deep for Defendants to overcome”
Judge Nancy E. Brasel (Trump appointee), The Advocates for Human Rights v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 0:26-cv-00749 (D. Minn.)
On Feb. 12, 2026, granting a TRO, the court foregrounded the core constitutional problem in stark terms: ICE “recognizes” detainees’ right to counsel, yet “in recent weeks” had “isolated thousands of people—most of them detained at the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building—from their attorneys,” supporting a likelihood of Fifth Amendment violations. The court treated the asserted barriers as severe enough to constitute an “unconstitutional infringement” on access to counsel (not mere inconvenience).
The court then described defendants’ evidentiary showing as fundamentally thin and unpersuasive—“Defendants offer threadbare declarations generally asserting, without examples or evidence” that access exists—while plaintiffs supplied “specifics of the opposite,” leaving a “gulf … too wide and too deep for Defendants to overcome.” The court emphasized that defendants “do not dispute” plaintiffs’ specific factual accounts, and that defendants’ submissions “add no further information” on key points (i.e., assertions without concrete support).
That skepticism was reinforced by how the record was made: after a compressed schedule, “counsel for Defendants was unable to answer many of the factual questions posed by the Court,” repeatedly emphasizing “a very short window of time,” then seeking more time “to create a more fulsome record.” The court granted additional time for supplemental declarations; plaintiffs filed them; defendants filed none—then (hours before the ruling) invoked “excusable neglect,” which the court rejected, remarking the evidentiary record was “fairly fulsome” from plaintiffs and “little” from defendants.
On the merits, the court repeatedly treated defendants’ positions as misframed, unsupported, or contradicted (government’s “account, however, is belied by the record”). It rejected defendants’ attempt to narrow the Fifth Amendment issue (“Plaintiffs do not argue…”): “To the contrary, Plaintiffs do make this argument.” And where defendants leaned on facility limitations and an “eleventh-hour declaration” grounded in “ICE Policy,” the court answered that the “United States Constitution—not … internal ICE policies—is what sets the floor,” concluding with a pointed inference: “in planning for Operation Metro Surge, the government failed to plan for the constitutional rights of its civil detainees”—and that the government’s “minimal explanation and even less evidence” did not suffice (“underwhelmed by this evidence;” defendants “do not explain these concerns or cite evidence;” “none carries the day”).
80. Search of journalist Natanson’s home: “In its day-to-day workings, this Court affords government attorneys a presumption of regularity, including by assuming that federal prosecutors have satisfied their obligation to disclose controlling and relevant authority. … The government’s conduct has disturbed that baseline posture of deference.”
Magistrate Judge William B. Porter, In the Matter of the Search of the Real Property and Premises of Hannah Natanson, 1:26-sw-00054 (E.D. Va.)
This case involves a challenge by Washington Post reporter Hannah Natanson and the Washington Post Company to the DOJ/FBI search of Natanson’s home and seizure of her devices in a leak investigation, including a motion to intervene and for return of property on First Amendment, Rule 41(g), and press-protection grounds.
On Feb. 24, 2026, in a memorandum opinion and order granting intervention, granting in part the motion for return of property, rescinding the portion of the warrant authorizing the government to review seized data, and requiring the court itself to conduct the review, Judge Porter treated DOJ’s omission of the Privacy Protection Act as a serious breach of the court’s ordinary trust in government lawyers. He wrote that the government’s failure to identify and analyze the PPA in the warrant application “seriously undermined the Court’s confidence in the government’s disclosures in this proceeding.” Stressing that many DOJ lawyers—including lawyers from “the highest levels of the DOJ”—had “multiple opportunities to identify the PPA as controlling authority and to include an analysis of it in the warrant application,” and that “[n]one of them did.” Notably, the court explained that:
“In its day-to-day workings, this Court affords government attorneys a presumption of regularity, including by assuming that federal prosecutors have satisfied their obligation to disclose controlling and relevant authority. … The government’s conduct has disturbed that baseline posture of deference.”
The court added that, although it could not say definitively it would have rejected the warrant had the PPA been disclosed, “the Court may well have rejected the search warrant application and directed the government to proceed by subpoena instead. At the very least, it would have asked more questions,” adding, but “[t]he government deprived the Court of the opportunity to make those real-time decisions.” It also rejected as “inadequate” the AUSA’s later explanation that he omitted the PPA because he believed the “suspect exception applied,” warning that “[t]he government cannot pretextually label a reporter a suspect simply to gather evidence against the actual target.”
Judge Porter’s skepticism carried through to the remedy. Relying on Baltimore Law Firm, he refused to trust the government with an unsupervised filter-team review of the seized devices, concluding that allowing the government to search “through the entirety of a reporter’s work product—when probable cause exists for only a narrow subset—would authorize an unlawful general warrant,” and leaving the government’s filter team to search a reporter’s confidential-source material would be “the equivalent of leaving the government’s fox in charge of the Washington Post’s henhouse.” He found that “the concern that a filter team may err by neglect, by malice, or by honest difference of opinion is heightened where its institutional interests are so directly at odds with the press freedom values at stake,” and therefore held that “the unique facts and circumstances of this case preclude [the government’s] Filter Team operating under [the government’s] Filter Protocol from reviewing the fruits of this search warrant.” At the same time, he said the court’s “genuine hope is that this search was conducted—as the government contends—to gather evidence of a crime in a single case, not to collect information about confidential sources from a reporter who has published articles critical of the administration,” and that it “further hopes the record ultimately bears out the government’s representations.”
81. Minnesota refugee detention: policy “actually enacted and carried out” was not the one described by the government; “impermissible post hoc rationalization”
Judge John R. Tunheim (Clinton appointee), U.H.A. v. Blanche, 0:26-cv-00417 (D. Minn.)
This case began as an individual habeas petition brought by U.H.A. after his arrest under Operation PARRIS, but within days it became a hybrid putative class action and amended habeas case challenging DHS’s broader policy of arresting and detaining Minnesota refugees who had not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status.
Judge Tunheim’s Feb. 27, 2026 opinion found Operation PARRIS likely unlawful; it also repeatedly communicated distrust of the government’s own description of what the administration was doing and why. The court said “the policy Defendants actually enacted and carried out” was not the one described in the agency memoranda: “neither the December Rescission Memo nor the February Re-Rescission Memo addresses—or even reflects—the Policy that has actually been implemented in Minnesota.” Although defendants acknowledged that the December memo merely rescinded the prior “flat ban on detention,” the court stressed that “neither memorandum explains why all refugees who have not adjusted status are (or even should be) subject to detention.” Most pointedly, the court treated ICE’s seven-page Feb. 18 memo—issued “the day before the preliminary injunction hearing”—as suspect, writing that it “appears to be an impermissible post hoc rationalization, which cannot cure an APA violation.”
The court also expressed skepticism toward the government’s factual predicates. The December rescission memo invoked protecting the public from “terrorist attacks and other national security and public safety threats,” but in the conclusion Judge Tunheim said: “The Government suggests that they are looking for terrorists, but there is not a shred of evidence in the record that the Named Plaintiffs or the putative Class they seek to represent pose serious national security risks.” He similarly rejected any suggestion that past vetting had been deficient, writing that “there is no evidence in the record or elsewhere that suggests that prior Administrations were deficient in evaluating refugees for admission.” Elsewhere, the court noted that defendants had provided “no evidence” that Operation PARRIS arrests were based on individualized probable-cause determinations and that the record suggested refugees were being arrested “simply” because “those detained were not citizens.”
82. TRICARE coverage litigation: U.S. attorneys ordered to show cause for sanctions over five filings containing a “fabricated quotation” and “false or misleading statements regarding how and why the fabricated quotations and misstatements appeared”
Magistrate Judge Robert T. Numbers II, Fivehouse v. U.S. Department of Defense, 2:25-cv-00041 (E.D.N.C.)
This case involves an Administrative Procedure Act challenge by North Carolina pro se plaintiff Derence V. Fivehouse to a Defense Health Agency policy, effective Aug. 31, 2025, that excludes TRICARE For Life beneficiaries from coverage of GLP-1 medications for weight-management indications while continuing to allow such coverage for TRICARE Prime and Select beneficiaries under the same prior-authorization criteria.
On Mar. 2, 2026, in an order to show cause, Magistrate Judge Numbers ordered Eastern District of North Carolina Assistant U.S. Attorney Rudy E. Renfer to appear on Mar. 10 at a show-cause hearing and be prepared to “show cause why he should not be sanctioned” under Rule 11 for submitting at least five filings containing a “fabricated quotation,” including one that also contained “misstatements of case holdings,” and for making “false or misleading statements regarding how and why the fabricated quotations and misstatements appeared.” The court said it had “serious concerns about the accuracy of certain quotations and representations in Renfer’s filings, and the explanation offered for their inclusion,” and rejected Renfer’s claim that the errors resulted from the inadvertent filing of an unfinished draft. Because “Rule 11(c)(1) provides that a law firm must be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its attorneys absent exceptional circumstances,” the court also ordered a representative of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of North Carolina to show cause why the office should not be “held jointly responsible” under Rule 11, asked senior leadership to attend the hearing, and urged U.S. Attorney W. Ellis Boyle to review the matter and take any appropriate “corrective action” before the court determined whether sanctions were warranted.
At the Mar. 10 hearing, according to reports, U.S. Attorney W. Ellis Boyle apologized to Judge Numbers, called the false filing “unacceptable,” and said “[t]here is no good excuse,” adding that after learning of the problem he warned staff and arranged training because “[w]e intend to make sure it is not repeated.” Rudy Renfer then took responsibility, insisting he had not knowingly filed false information, but admitted he had used AI to help draft the brief and had mistakenly sent an unfinished version to be filed, stating, “I take full responsibility for what happened.” Judge Numbers said he had “grave concerns” that the AI problem might not be confined to this one case, observed that other filings showed, “at best,” “repeated sloppiness,” pressed Renfer on why he needed shortcuts for “basic arguments,” and expressed concern that Renfer had said the office’s civil chief approved his initial responses without disclosing the AI use. Renfer replied that he saw AI “as a tool” to “be a better worker for the office,” while Boyle disputed his recollection of the civil chief’s involvement. Judge Numbers closed by saying he would decide whether to rule on the existing record or hold another hearing, but added that he was “heartened” by the remedial steps Boyle had described.
83. New York Congestion pricing: post hoc justifications and a “contrived” litigation argument; “The Secretary was not able to identify in briefing or at oral argument any administrative process or reasoning that went into the recitation of those policy concerns.”
Judge Lewis J. Liman (Trump appointee), Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Duffy, 1:25-cv-01413 (S.D.N.Y.)
This case involves a challenge to the Trump administration’s attempt to withdraw federal approval for New York City’s congestion-pricing program.
On Mar. 3, 2026, Judge Liman granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs challenging the federal government’s termination of approval for New York’s congestion-pricing program. He rejected Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy’s attempt to defend his Feb. 19 termination decision using policy justifications advanced in an April 21 letter during the litigation:
“The policy rationales in the April 21 Letter were exactly such post hoc rationalizations. The Secretary did not base his February termination and rescission on those reasons. He asserted the reasons as the basis for his action later on, only after he was staring down what promised to be a motion for a preliminary injunction in that litigation.”
Liman also rejected the factual basis offered for those explanations. Regarding the February letter, he wrote that “[t]he Secretary was not able to identify in briefing or at oral argument any administrative process or reasoning that went into the recitation of those policy concerns.” He added, “Nor can he point to any data or other analysis that he relied on in making his pronouncement.” Nor did the record support the April letter’s assertion that the program disproportionately burdened low- and middle-income drivers for the benefit of high-income drivers. Instead, the court explained, “Low-income workers are anticipated to be beneficiaries of the Tolling Program, as they are disproportionately reliant on the public transit options that the Tolling Program seeks to improve.” Liman also identified toll discounts, disability exemptions, and tax credits, observing: “The Secretary’s letter does not mention these programs at all.”
When government counsel argued in their summary-judgment reply that toll costs would be passed on to low- and middle-income workers through taxis and food deliveries, Liman wrote: “Defendants concoct a new argument in their reply brief at summary judgment.” He continued:
“Even if the Court considered the argument, it is evident that it is contrived. Even in their briefing, Defendants do not provide a single citation to support the argument in the reply brief.”
84. Baltimore ICE detention conditions: “Acknowledging that [the government official’s] sworn attestation is false, Defendants withdrew the declaration at the hearing.”
Judge Julie Rebecca Rubin (Biden appointee), D.N.N. v. Liggins, 1:25-cv-01613 (D. Md.)
This case began as a habeas and putative class action challenge by immigration detainees held in ICE’s Baltimore Hold Rooms, and later proceeded solely as a class APA and due process case after Plaintiffs withdrew their habeas claims.
On Mar. 6, 2026, Judge Rubin granted Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification and a preliminary injunction, certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class of all persons who are or will be detained at the Baltimore Hold Rooms and finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed in showing that detainees were being subjected to punitive, unsafe, unsanitary, and medically inadequate conditions.
The court’s discussion of the government’s evidence and knowledge was pointed. It noted that a sworn declaration from ICE’s Statistical Tracking Unit attested that the daily population of the Baltimore Hold Rooms was under 30 people “100% of the time,” and the court then stated: “This is untrue. Acknowledging that [the government official’s] sworn attestation is false, Defendants withdrew the declaration at the hearing.” The court also noted that, although Defendants later confirmed their contractor had created daily paper cell-count records, they did not produce them because they said the records “no longer exist;” Plaintiffs did not seek a spoliation ruling. Elsewhere, the court said it was “not persuaded” by Defendants’ attacks on Plaintiffs’ outside-source data, called those challenges “entirely speculative,” found Plaintiffs’ experts “credible and persuasive,” and said Defendants’ claim of “unfair prejudice” was “utterly devoid of description or substance.”
Judge Rubin also refused to credit the government’s account of conditions at face value. She wrote that “[t]he conditions at issue are ‘self-evident.’ They are visible. They are plain,” and that there was “irrefutable evidence of Defendants’ knowledge of the conditions” “from within Defendants’ own ranks.” Reiterating an earlier point, the court said Defendants “will not be heard” to justify unconstitutional conditions on circumstances “entirely of their own making.” And, in language directly tied to compliance with ICE’s own standards, the court wrote: “The overwhelming evidence before the court at this stage is that these requirements are not being met, and Defendants know it,” adding that Plaintiffs were well positioned to show that Defendants “have failed to follow even these standards and unconstitutional conditions are the result.”
85. Minnesota immigration stops and arrests: government explanation “is not credible;” “the senseless character of the officer’s explanation justifies the conclusion that it is pretextual”
Judge Eric C. Tostrud (Trump appointee), Hussen v. Noem, 0:26-cv-00324 (D. Minn.)
This putative class action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against DHS, ICE, CBP, and Border Patrol, alleging that during Operation Metro Surge in Minnesota officers stopped people for immigration questioning without individualized reasonable suspicion and made warrantless civil immigration arrests without probable cause that the person was removable and likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained, including by targeting Somali and Latino individuals based on race and ethnicity.
On Mar. 9, 2026, granting the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court repeatedly rejected the government’s factual explanations and policy-level defenses. It found, “On this record, Defendants’ evidence of officer training and policy carries little weight ,” that Defendants had produced “no evidence about specific factors justifying the stops” in most instances, and that Defendants’ acknowledgment that they had “no policy to make a record of Terry stops” meant “the lack of evidence downstream from that decision undermines the high-level testimony that reasonable suspicion justifies their immigration stops.” The court also found that the record was “devoid of facts” supporting reasonable suspicion for many stops and “devoid of evidence” that certain detainees posed any safety threat.
The court also repeatedly said it did not believe or credit particular explanations offered by officers or Defendants. It wrote that one asserted explanation “is not credible,” that “the agents’ stated justification for the stop was not credible,” and that “the officers’ explanation was pretextual.” In another instance, the court said the officers’ explanation “makes no sense,” that Defendants had introduced “no evidence to counter” the account, and that “the senseless character of the officer’s explanation justifies the conclusion that it is pretextual.” Elsewhere, the court said, “This record does not support this description,” found that an asserted misidentification explanation was undermined by the facts, and concluded that one officer’s account was “less credible.”
The court was similarly unwilling to defer to official after-the-fact justifications. It found that Defendants had adopted policies authorizing stops and arrests without the required constitutional predicates, noted that Defendants did not disclaim public statements that officers used “reasonable suspicion” to make arrests, and said the Lyons Memo “does little to convince otherwise because the record shows officers have not followed one of its key provisions.” The court also emphasized, “I cannot ‘defer… to the officer’s on-the-scene judgment…’ when none has been presented.”
86. New Jersey U.S. Attorney leadership: government representations “a rhetorical smokescreen, invented to serve this litigation;” court “not fooled by the Government’s superficial arguments”
Judge Matthew W. Brann (Obama appointee), United States v. Naviwala, 2:24-cr-00099 (D.N.J.); United States v. Torres, 2:24-cr-00378 (D.N.J.)
These related criminal cases challenge the authority of the officials purporting to run the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey after the earlier Giraud ruling, and were transferred and decided together because both defendants sought to disqualify the same “triumvirate” leadership structure as an unlawful exercise of the powers of the vacant U.S. Attorney’s office.
On Mar. 9, 2026, in an order finding the government’s leadership structure for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey unlawful, Judge Brann made several notable comments about the administration’s conduct and litigation position.
The court stressed that the case was “the second chapter” of the same saga, noted that the prior officeholder had already been found unlawfully serving, and warned that “any further attempts to unlawfully fill the office will result in dismissals of pending cases.” The court said the administration’s conduct was “intended to fill the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey unilaterally,” and that this was “crystal clear and not capable of factual dispute.” Rejecting the government’s necessity rationale, the court said that argument should be ignored because lawful alternatives existed and the President simply did not want to use them; the theory, it wrote, came dressed in the “sheep’s wool of administrative necessity” but “this wolf comes as a wolf.”
The court also sharply criticized the government’s litigation position, saying it offered “nothing but ipse dixit,” “may not amend the record through briefing,” and that the claim its “triumvirate” of leaders was exercising only the Attorney General’s powers was “nothing more than a rhetorical smokescreen, invented to serve this litigation, and carrying absolutely no functional effect.” More broadly, the court said: “[T]hrough its statements and actions, the Administration has made clear that it cares far more about who is running the USAO-NJ than whether it is running at all” (italics in original; bold added). But the court emphasized that “[t]his comment does not apply to the ‘loyal employees in the U.S. Attorney’s office,’ … who have clearly demonstrated that they care deeply about doing their important work and have shown an admirable commitment to that purpose.” The court said that senior Justice Department officials “appear to have rushed into making these appointments without first considering the legal strategy,” calling that “a rookie mistake attributable to no one but them.” The court was equally explicit that it was “not fooled by the Government’s superficial arguments,” and looked past formal titles to the real-world authority the arrangement was designed to exercise.
87. Federal Reserve subpoenas: government claims “so thin and unsubstantiated that the Court can only conclude that they are pretextual”
Chief Judge James E. Boasberg (Obama appointee), In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 1:26-mc-00012 (D.D.C.)
This case involves a challenge by the Federal Reserve Board to DOJ grand jury subpoenas seeking documents and testimony relating to Chair Jerome Powell and the Federal Reserve’s headquarters renovation project, which the Board argued were being used not for a legitimate criminal investigation but to pressure Powell over monetary policy.
On Mar. 11, 2026, in an order granting the Board’s motion to quash the subpoenas as “mere pretexts,” Judge Boasberg found evidence of pretext and rejected any presumption that DOJ’s grand jury subpoenas were being used for a regular law enforcement purpose. He held that there was “a mountain of evidence” that the “dominant (if not sole) purpose” of the subpoenas, which he described as part of a “‘fishing expedition,’” was “out of malice” or to “harass” and “pressure” Chair Powell, “either to yield to the President,” including by “voting for lower interest rates,” “or to resign and make way for a Fed Chair who will.” The court said there was “no credible reason to think” the government was investigating suspicious facts rather than “targeting a disfavored official,” “‘fishing’ … to either find something to pin on him or to pressure him to fold,” adding, “That harassment seems aimed at bulldozing the Fed’s statutory independence.”
Although the court acknowledged the ordinarily “heavy” burden of rebutting the “presumption of regularity attached to a grand jury’s proceeding,” it concluded that burden had been met here. The government had “offered no evidence whatsoever that Powell committed any crime other than displeasing the President;” its theories about renovation “cost overruns” and supposedly “problematic” testimony were “so thin and unsubstantiated that the Court can only conclude that they are pretextual.” As the court put it:
“Even if the Supreme Court’s caselaw should instead be read as holding that the Government need never show probable cause … the Government’s complete lack of substantiation falls short of any possible showing that could be required.”
The subpoenas were therefore quashed as having an improper dominant purpose.
88. California immigration enforcement: “admissibility does not equal infallibility;” “the Court rejects that the disputed content of the I-213s is entitled to any form of presumption of correctness.”
Judge Jennifer L. Thurston (Biden appointee), United Farm Workers v. Mullin, 1:25-cv-00246 (E.D. Cal.)
This case challenges Border Patrol’s allegedly unlawful immigration enforcement practices in the Eastern District of California, including stops without reasonable suspicion, warrantless arrests without the required assessment of escape risk, and coercion into “voluntary departure.”
On April 29, 2025, Judge Thurston granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting Border Patrol from conducting immigration stops without individualized reasonable suspicion or making warrantless immigration arrests without probable cause that the person was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained. The order also imposed guidance, training, and documentation requirements. Plaintiffs moved to enforce the injunction on August 29, alleging violations during a July 17 operation at a Sacramento Home Depot and deficiencies in Defendants’ guidance and arrest records. In opposing the motion, Defendants relied on Form I-213 arrest reports before the court to demonstrate that the challenged stops and arrests were justified. They argued that the reports were entitled to a “presumption of reliability” and that Plaintiffs had not overcome that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
In a Mar. 11, 2026 order entered Apr. 1, Judge Thurston granted the enforcement motion in part and rejected Defendants’ asserted presumption. The court stated that their argument “does not fairly represent how this Court must view this kind of evidence under the present circumstances,” adding that Defendants cited the relevant precedent “out of context.” That precedent concerned the use of I-213s in immigration proceedings. Distinguishing admissibility from evidentiary weight, Judge Thurston wrote: “But admissibility does not equal infallibility.” She concluded: “In sum, the Court rejects that the disputed content of the I-213s is entitled to any form of presumption of correctness.”
The court separately explained: “Even if a presumption of reliability applied, there are numerous reasons, some of them already outlined above, why the I-213s appear to be unreliable, inaccurate, and under-inclusive.” Defendants acknowledged that at least two reports had been modified to include descriptions that were “flatly incorrect.” In one instance, a supervisor substantially rewrote an agent’s account of a consensual encounter to describe flight and pursuit, producing what the court called “material, substantive modifications to the arresting Agent’s version of events.” In another, the government explained that an inaccurate first draft had been supplied inadvertently, but the court found that the finalized report still conflicted with video footage: it said agents wore identifying ballistic body armor when the footage showed they did not. Judge Thurston concluded: “This shows that even the finalized I-213 is at the very least materially incomplete.”
The court also questioned the records’ authorship and verification. Emails disclosed that personnel had signed for the reviewing official and author because of time constraints. Judge Thurston stated that this “further sheds light on the unreliability of the I-213s.” She required agents personally to document the grounds for their stops and to sign and date the final justification, attesting that it was true and correct.
On Aug. 24, 2026, the Ninth Circuit lifted the preliminary injunction and remanded for the district court to determine whether Plaintiffs had standing to seek prospective relief. The appellate order did not address the district court’s assessment of the arrest records or expressly vacate the March enforcement findings.
89. Kennedy Center renaming and closure: “The declaration has zero evidentiary value in any case;” “too cute by half—and belied by the record;” “the evidence of any such review is nil.”
Judge Christopher R. Cooper (Obama appointee), Beatty v. Trump, 1:25-cv-04480 (D.D.C.).
This case challenges the Kennedy Center Board’s renaming of the institution, removal of voting rights from ex officio trustees, and planned two-year closure. Across several rulings, Judge Cooper rejected Defendants’ factual characterizations and evidentiary submissions as unsupported, inconsistent, or contradicted by the record.
An early instance arose in the Mar. 14, 2026 order requiring disclosure of closure-planning materials. Judge Cooper stated that Defendants’ claim of significant harm from producing existing documents “rings hollow.” Given their representations that planning had been underway for a year, the government was “hard-pressed to argue that there is no readily-available material to provide.” He ordered production of specified materials before the Board meeting, or written confirmation that they did not exist.
In his May 29 opinion granting summary judgment against the renaming and voting changes and preliminarily enjoining the closure decision, Judge Cooper expressly rejected a proposed supplemental declaration from Executive Director Matthew Floca. Floca asserted that removing President Trump’s name would undermine fundraising and render continued operations financially nonviable. Although the court denied permission to file the declaration because of unexplained and unjustified delay, it separately assessed its substance, writing:
“The declaration has zero evidentiary value in any case. First, it lacks a factual basis and is grounded on Floca’s unsupported opinion alone. There is no proof that current or future donations hinge on President Trump’s name being on the building.” (emphasis added).
The court also found the declaration “internally inconsistent” because it described millions already raised while predicting “financial ruin” if Trump’s name were removed, and “contradicted by the record,” including earlier positive fundraising representations. It concluded: “In short, there is no competent evidence that removing the Trump name would prevent the Center from fulfilling its artistic mission, as it has done for the last sixty years.”
The same opinion rejected Defendants’ characterization of “Trump Kennedy Center” as merely a secondary name: “That convenient reframing is too cute by half—and belied by the record.” The court pointed to the announced renaming vote, altered signage, official communications, and trademark application. It likewise called the suggestion that adding Trump’s name to the building was not a memorial “risible, both in light of the record evidence and as a matter of common sense.”
The court’s closure analysis identified further evidentiary deficiencies. Addressing Trump’s announcement that closure followed a year-long review involving contractors, musical experts, arts institutions, and other advisers, Judge Cooper wrote that “the evidence of any such review is nil.” Floca’s account of an extensive analysis was unsupported by reports or other corroborating evidence. The court found that he considered “only the benefits of full closure and none of the costs,” and that most trustees had “received no document, plan, or even the vaguest of explanations” before court-ordered disclosures shortly before the vote. It described the presentation as a “stacked deck.”
Judge Cooper also rejected Floca’s explanation that a budget submission’s assurance of carefully coordinated work protecting programming was a clerical error, calling that explanation “unconvincing at best.” He found that the record and timing “strongly suggest that the Board lacked any meaningful say in this matter because the closure decision was foreordained.” Trump’s assurance that closure remained subject to Board approval “rings hollow,” the court explained, because he later acknowledged that the plan had already been announced and described approval as a minor detail.
These conclusions were specific to the evidence and decision-making before the court. Judge Cooper credited Floca’s testimony about the need for repairs and did not decide Beatty’s allegation that closure was a pretext for concealing the consequences of the renaming. He preliminarily enjoined implementation of the March closure decision after finding Beatty likely to establish a breach of the Board’s fiduciary duties.
The financial-evidence issue recurred. In a June 12 minute order denying a stay, Judge Cooper again identified the absence of record evidence linking increased donations to the changed name. His Sept. 15 opinion rejected the renewed contention that the Center might not survive without Trump’s name and noted that the D.C. Circuit had likewise rejected the asserted injury for lack of specific supporting facts or evidence. The opinion also rejected Defendants’ reading of Board minutes as showing Beatty’s acquiescence in naming the grounds for Trump, stating: “Defendants misconstrue the remarks at issue.”
An Oct. 9 discovery order addressed a distinct representation: Defendants claimed that producing current financial records would be unduly burdensome because the data were not readily available or necessarily verified. Judge Cooper responded that “the Court highly doubts that the Center has operated without core financial reporting over the past year.” He ordered production of core financial statements sufficient to show the Center’s performance and condition, while narrowing Beatty’s broader requests and permitting Defendants to identify statements as unaudited or unverified.
90. Colorado SNAP recertification: “This larger context gives the game away; the pilot project seems to be about punishment and nothing more. … USDA presents ‘contrived reasons’ that the Court cannot accept.”
Judge R. Brooke Jackson (Obama appointee), State of Colorado v. Trump, 1:25-cv-03428 (D. Colo.)
The case involved USDA’s letter to Colorado requiring the state to recertify SNAP households within 30 days or face sanctions.
On Mar. 16, 2026, Judge Jackson granted a preliminary injunction. He wrote:
“The Court also need not turn a blind eye to the fact that the Recertification Letter arrived during a week of apparent punishments and threats aimed at Colorado, nor that the identical Minnesota Letter was accompanied by a taunting social media post from the Secretary. See New York, 588 U.S. at 785 (courts, in reviewing agency action, are ‘not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free’). This larger context gives the game away; the pilot project seems to be about punishment and nothing more. Under the APA, agencies must ‘offer genuine justifications for important decisions’ so that they ‘can be scrutinized by the courts and the interested public.’ Instead, USDA presents ‘contrived reasons’ that the Court cannot accept.”
91. USCIS asylum-application dismissal: government’s account of an asylum applicant’s removal status was “not credible;” court credited contemporaneous records over “post hoc rationalizations.”
Judge Michael Howard Simon (Obama appointee), E-C-R- v. Noem, 3:25-cv-01230 (D. Or.)
This case involved USCIS’s dismissal of a Colombian asylum seeker’s application based on its disputed assertion that she remained in expedited removal proceedings, despite years of contrary agency conduct and records.
In a Mar. 25, 2026 ruling granting a preliminary injunction in part, Judge Simon questioned the government’s explanation for USCIS’s June 2025 dismissal of a Colombian national’s asylum application. The government maintained that she remained in expedited removal following her initial detention in 2022, leaving USCIS without jurisdiction over the application.
The court found that account inconsistent with the agency’s records and conduct. The removal-order portion of her Form I-860 was blank; she had subsequently been released on her own recognizance; and USCIS had accepted her asylum application, processed her biometrics, and granted her work authorization as an asylum applicant. Addressing counsel’s explanation that USCIS had been unaware of her original expedited-removal processing, the court wrote:
“The Court does not find persuasive government counsel’s argument at the hearing that USCIS did not know when it accepted Plaintiff’s I-589 Application and continued to move forward with the application that Plaintiff had originally been placed in expedited removal. Her I-589 Application and all the subsequent documents relating to that application had the same identifying number as the original (not fully completed) Notice and Order of Expedited Removal and the Interim Notice Authorizing Parole.”
The court also rejected the government’s explanation that her Form I-220A merely imposed monitoring conditions and left her earlier parole unchanged. The form expressly referenced release under § 1226, without the limitation the government asserted. Judge Simon credited the contemporaneous records, “not post hoc rationalizations.”
In finding the plaintiff likely to succeed on her arbitrary-and-capricious claim, the court expressly rejected the credibility of the government’s account of her continued expedited-removal status:
“It is not credible that Plaintiff was in expedited removal in September 2023, let alone that she was in expedited removal on June 9, 2025, more than three years after she was released.” … DHS ‘offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’ DHS did not ‘articulate[] a satisfactory explanation for its action’ that included “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” (emphasis added) (citations removed).
92. White House ballroom: a “sleight-of-hand maneuver” over agency responsibility; visibility claim “pure fiction”
Judge Richard J. Leon (George W. Bush appointee), National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. National Park Service, 1:25-cv-04316 (D.D.C.)
Circuit Judges Patricia A. Millett (Obama appointee) and Bradley N. Garcia (Biden appointee), 26-5123, consolidated with 26-5134 (D.C. Cir.).
This case challenged the administration’s construction of a ballroom on the White House grounds without express congressional authorization.
In his Mar. 31, 2026 opinion granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Leon criticized Defendants’ changing account of which government entity directed the project:
“Defendants have not been entirely consistent in this litigation as to which entities remain involved with the ballroom.”
Defendants had represented that the Executive Residence (EXR) managed the project under the President’s direction and that the National Park Service (NPS) had no role in directing it. The court had previously denied preliminary relief, concluding that the Trust’s Administrative Procedure Act claims were unlikely to succeed because EXR was likely not an agency subject to the APA. When Defendants subsequently invoked NPS’s construction authority, Judge Leon wrote:
“So it came as a surprise when Defendants’ most recent brief invoked NPS’s construction authority as an independent basis for denying the National Trust’s motion. … Indeed, it is difficult to understand how Defendants can rely on NPS’s construction authority while claiming that NPS ‘had (and has) no role in directing’ the ballroom project.” (Citations omitted.)
The court characterized Defendants’ ensuing argument, that NPS had contracted with EXR under the Economy Act, as “a sleight-of-hand maneuver.” That explanation, the court observed, would suggest that NPS remained involved as a contracting party, with EXR acting as its agent.
Judge Leon also rejected Defendants’ factual contention that the ballroom would “scarcely be seen from any public vantage point.” “That is pure fiction,” he wrote, explaining that Defendants’ own renderings showed the proposed ballroom clearly visible from Lafayette Park and even from the steps of the U.S. Capitol.
On Aug. 7, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. In their jointly authored majority opinion, Judges Millett and Garcia emphasized the procedural significance of Defendants’ earlier position: they had “previously argued—and won the denial of a preliminary injunction by arguing—that the Park Service had ‘no role’ in the project” and had taken no action reviewable under the APA.
The majority also addressed Defendants’ continued assertions about the ballroom’s limited visibility. It noted that Defendants had not argued that the district court’s contrary factual findings were clearly erroneous, and explained that NPS’s own environmental assessment and findings acknowledged permanent changes to views from Lafayette Park and a visual imbalance in the White House’s historic appearance.
On Aug. 31, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction pending certiorari proceedings. The majority concluded that the government was likely to establish that the Trust lacked Article III standing and, separately, credited security declarations in finding that irreparable harm and the balance of equities favored a stay. It did not decide the project’s legality. The stay opinion did not address the criticism of Defendants’ changing account of NPS’s role or reject the factual finding that the ballroom would be visible; its standing analysis instead questioned whether the asserted aesthetic injury was legally sufficient.
93. Ethiopian TPS termination: government’s claim about TPS holders “demonstrably untrue”
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), African Communities Together v. Noem, 1:26-cv-10278 (D. Mass.)
This case challenges DHS’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Ethiopia.
In an Apr. 8, 2026 opinion – in which the postponement order was subsequently reversed by the appellate court on reviewability grounds – Judge Murphy identified a “plain disconnect between the decision to terminate Ethiopia’s TPS designation and the explanation provided.”
The termination notice asserted that a “significant portion” of Ethiopian TPS holders had been under administrative investigation for national-security or public-safety risks, or immigration fraud or misrepresentation. Judge Murphy wrote that the assertion’s irrelevance to the TPS determination suggested that Defendants were “casting about for explanations to justify a predetermined outcome.” He added:
“And even if this statement were relevant to the TPS determination, it is demonstrably untrue as revealed by the administrative record itself, which shows that of 5,524 Ethiopian TPS holders, there are zero records of fraud and only five individuals with any public safety records.”
The court also examined the termination notice’s assertion that the Secretary had acted “after consulting with appropriate U.S. Government agencies.” The two interagency communications identified in the record did not discuss conditions in Ethiopia. Judge Murphy concluded: “Together, these two brief emails cannot satisfy the statutory requirement.” Addressing the notice’s assertion of consultation, he stated: “This assertion is belied by the record, as discussed above.”
On July 29, 2026, the First Circuit summarily reversed the postponement order following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullin v. Doe, which barred nonconstitutional challenges to TPS termination decisions. The appellate court explained: “Claims of that nature were the only basis for the postponement order on appeal.”
On Aug. 18, Judge Murphy denied renewed postponement and dismissed all claims except the direct equal protection claim. In allowing that claim to proceed through discovery, he distinguished the plausibility standard governing dismissal from the likelihood-of-success standard applied in Mullin.
On Sept. 21, the court explained that the remaining equal-protection claim required factual development concerning alleged discriminatory intent, while permitting immediate appellate review of the dismissed procedural due process and ultra vires claims. Plaintiffs appealed those dismissals that day.
94. Immigration courthouse arrests: a “clearly erroneous premise;” a “recent invention”
Judge P. Kevin Castel (W. Bush appointee), African Communities Together v. Venturella, 1:25-cv-06366 (S.D.N.Y.)
This case challenges ICE’s replacement of earlier restrictions on immigration courthouse arrests and a separate policy governing the dismissal of removal proceedings.
The government defended ICE’s 2025 courthouse guidance as applying to immigration courts in its Aug. 20, 2025 opposition and at the Sept. 2 hearing, invoking its safeguards against disruption of court proceedings. In his Sept. 12 ruling, Judge Castel declined to stay the ICE courthouse-arrest policies. His analysis proceeded on the understanding that the guidance applied to immigration courts: “The guidance is not specific to immigration courthouses but has application to all courthouses.” The government maintained that position in its Dec. 3, Jan. 7, 2026, and Jan. 21 briefs. The Jan. 7 brief included the heading “The ICE Guidance Applies to Immigration Courts.”
On Mar. 24, 2026, government counsel wrote “respectfully and regrettably to correct a material mistaken statement of fact,” withdrawing portions of those four briefs and their representations at oral argument. Counsel said ICE had informed them that morning that the guidance “does not and has never applied” to civil immigration enforcement at immigration courts. An attached Mar. 19 internal communication instructed ICE personnel that the guidance did not apply to immigration courts “regardless of their location.” Explaining the earlier representations, government counsel stated:
“The undersigned were specifically informed by ICE that the 2025 ICE Guidance applied to immigration courthouse arrests. In addition, we discussed with and obtained the approval of assigned ICE counsel before filing every brief in this case and making any oral representations to the Court and Plaintiffs.” (emphasis added.)
Counsel attributed the problem to what appeared to be “agency attorney error.” Judge Castel ordered preservation of relevant communications and records on Mar. 25. At an Apr. 15, 2026 conference, according to reports, he questioned ICE’s new assertion that the guidance had never applied to immigration courts, calling it “specious” and “a post hoc construct.” The court deferred potential sanctions until after adjudication of the merits.
On May 18, revising his earlier ruling, Judge Castel stayed the rescission of the 2021 restrictions as applied to immigration courts at three Manhattan locations. He recalled that the government had argued “unequivocally” and “forcefully” that the 2025 guidance covered immigration courts. Its concession required reconsideration “both to correct a clear error and prevent a manifest injustice,” because “the Court’s stay decision relied upon the clearly erroneous premise that the 2025 policies applied to immigration courthouses.”
Judge Castel also questioned the government’s revised account. Noting the “six months of silence” between his original ruling and the government’s “mea culpa letter,” he wrote:
“Based upon the foregoing, there is substantial reason to believe that when the January 21, 2025 interim guidance rescinded the April 2021 Policy, there was no conscious decision to exclude immigration courthouses from the 2025 ICE Courthouse Arrest Policies. This supports the Court’s finding that the position expressed in 2026, i.e., that immigration courts were never within the scope of the 2025 Policies, was a recent invention and not the intent at the time of the issuance of the 2025 Policies.” (emphasis added.)
The court reaffirmed that assessment in its Sept. 30 merits ruling, which granted Plaintiffs summary judgment on their claim that rescinding the earlier immigration courthouse protections was arbitrary and capricious. Repeating its conclusion that the government’s revised position was a “recent invention,” the court added: “Nothing in the administrative record undermines that conclusion.” The ruling separately dismissed the claims concerning the removal-proceedings dismissal policy as moot.
Following Plaintiffs’ Oct. 14 renewed request for sanctions discovery, Judge Castel authorized discovery on Oct. 15. Explaining the significance of the withdrawn representations, he wrote:
“These statements went to the heart of a motion to stay under section 705 of the APA, which this Court heard and decided six months earlier. … The admitted ‘misstatements’ had many collateral consequences … But, most significant of all, was the continued arrests of individuals at or near immigration courts in circumstances that would not have been permitted under the May 18, 2026, stay issued on the basis of corrected facts.” (emphasis added.)
The court authorized document requests and depositions concerning the ICE personnel who supplied the original information, communicated the correction, approved the government’s briefs and oral representations, and issued the March 19 reminder. The document requests sought communications concerning those representations and information identifying people arrested at New York City immigration courts between the original denial of a stay and its eventual grant. Judge Castel excluded requests for those individuals’ current locations and detention status as exceeding the sanctions inquiry’s scope. He permitted sixty days of discovery and set Dec. 18 for Plaintiffs’ sanctions motion.
95. Gender-affirming care subpoena: “DOJ has proven unworthy of this trust;” “misrepresented and withheld information;” representations “clearly misleading, if not utterly false;” presumption that DOJ could be “taken at its word” “no longer holds”
Judge Mary S. McElroy (Trump appointee), In re Administrative Subpoena 25-1431-032 to Rhode Island Hospital, 1:26-mc-00007 (D.R.I.)
This case involved Rhode Island Hospital’s challenge to a Justice Department administrative subpoena seeking patient records relating to gender-affirming care, including the Department’s efforts to secure enforcement in a Texas federal court while negotiations with the Hospital were ongoing in Rhode Island.
At a May 12, 2026 hearing, Judge McElroy repeatedly questioned DOJ counsel over omissions and inaccuracies in Acting Director Lisa Hsiao’s sworn declaration to the Texas court, including its account of negotiations with Rhode Island Hospital and the failure to disclose that DOJ had accepted anonymized patient data from other providers. The court also challenged DOJ’s decision to seek enforcement in Texas without notifying the Hospital, despite ongoing negotiations. Judge McElroy expressly found that “the Department of Justice withheld relevant information from Judge O’Connor.” She expressed broader concerns about the erosion of trust ordinarily afforded to DOJ, warning that “you can’t rely on the Government to do what they’ve done over the last 50 years” and describing its conduct as “dirty pool.” Later, she observed: “I don’t know how any party can rely on a conversation with the Department of Justice that they’re working on compliance, given the tract of this case.”
In her May 14 decision quashing DOJ’s administrative subpoena to Rhode Island Hospital, Judge Mary Susan McElroy directly questioned the Department’s candor and credibility: “DOJ has proven unworthy of this trust at every point in this case. It has misrepresented and withheld information to both this Court and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.” She found that DOJ had acted to shield its investigative tactics from Rhode Island review “in favor of a distant forum that DOJ deems friendly to its political positions.” The court continued: “Its representatives have, under oath, misrepresented salient facts. It has misled the parties with whom it was negotiating in Rhode Island, who have now been placed in an untenable and unprecedented procedural position.”
The court identified specific misleading representations in Acting Director Lisa K. Hsiao’s declaration to the Texas court. Its account of communications with the hospital was “clearly misleading, if not utterly false,” and DOJ counsel’s attempted explanation was “patently untrue.” Judge McElroy stated: “This reckless disregard for the duty of candor owed to a federal court is appalling.” She also found that DOJ’s request to resume discussions, shortly before seeking an undisclosed enforcement order in Texas, “was a subterfuge to prevent RIH from realizing that DOJ had decided to go to Texas for an order compelling production of the very records that they had been discussing for months.” Hsiao also failed to disclose that DOJ had accepted anonymized data elsewhere while asserting that patient-level information was necessary. The court concluded: “Her assertion that DOJ needed this information was therefore, at best, deceptive, if not intentionally and knowingly false.”
Judge McElroy expressly connected these findings to the presumption of regularity, describing “the discrepancy between the honorable conduct expected of federal prosecutors and DOJ’s tactics in this case” as “unsettling.” Invoking Judge Kasubhai’s formulation in the Oregon voter-data litigation, she wrote: “The Court cannot help but share the sentiment that ‘[t]he presumption of regularity that has previously been extended to [DOJ] that it could be taken at its word—with little doubt about its intentions and stated purposes—no longer holds.’” She added: “It is regrettable that this is now the case.” The court nevertheless specified that its decision rested on “application of the law to the administrative subpoena at issue.”
96. Broadview Six prosecution: “What you do not do is hide it;” “the mistakes and inaccuracies were material;” “That trust has been broken;” inquiry into “lack of candor, concealment of material facts”
Judge April M. Perry (Biden appointee), United States v. Rabbitt, 1:25-cr-00693 (N.D. Ill.).
This criminal prosecution arose from allegations that six protesters impeded a federal immigration agent’s vehicle outside the ICE facility in Broadview, Illinois, on Sept. 26, 2025, during the administration’s “Operation Midway Blitz.” Then-Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Sheri Mecklenburg presented the case to the grand jury, alongside AUSA Matthew Skiba.
On Apr. 23, 2026, the government submitted redacted grand jury transcripts for Judge Perry’s review of the legal instructions underlying the conspiracy charge. Following renewed defense requests, the court obtained the unredacted transcripts on May 19. At a May 21 hearing, days before the scheduled trial of the remaining four defendants, Judge Perry said the problems were “significantly bigger” than incorrect legal instructions. Although she would not “prejudge the issue without a hearing,” she was “incredibly shocked by the redactions that were made.” She explained:
“I have read hundreds, if not thousands, of grand jury transcripts involving prosecutors who are the most junior of prosecutors to several U.S. Attorneys who appeared before the grand jury. I have never seen the types of prosecutorial behavior before a grand jury that I saw in those transcripts.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Perry identified several “potential issues” that “jumped out at me immediately and glaringly”: “improper prosecutorial vouching,” including Mecklenburg “putting her personal credibility and trustworthiness on the line in support of the charges;” “improper prosecutorial communications of a substantive nature with the grand jurors outside of the grand jury room;” and “the prosecutor excusing grand jurors who disagreed with the government’s case from the deliberations process.” The court then addressed what the government had submitted to it:
“Which brings me to problem Number 4, which is the fact that all of this was redacted out of the versions of the transcripts that I got. And frankly, it is that that I find the most problematic. Mistakes happen. They happen to all of us. But as I tell my children, you own it. You admit to it. You apologize for it, and you move on. What you do not do is hide it.” (emphasis added.)
The court expressly connected those omissions to its reliance on government representations. Judge Perry said she had relied on the prosecutors’ “personal representations” about discovery, searches for exculpatory material, and the arguments they would make. She continued:
“And I do that because, first of all, I treat every attorney who appears before me as an officer of the court. But secondly, because I put even more reliance on Department of Justice attorneys. Your sole goal is to do justice. Your client is justice itself.
I do believe deeply in the presumption of regularity and that most government attorneys are doing the best they can to do the right thing. That trust has been broken.” (emphasis added.)
The disclosures also changed the court’s assessment of the defendants’ earlier allegations of vindictive or selective prosecution. Judge Perry explained that “[w]e all took the government attorneys’ word on a great many things.” She added:
“I, at the time, was operating on a presumption of regular grand jury proceedings, which these were very clearly not.
So based upon what I’ve seen in the grand jury transcripts, the calculus has changed and it has changed considerably.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Perry said the defendants could pursue further briefing and potentially a hearing on vindictive prosecution. Separately, she raised possible “sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct and for potential ethical violations, including lack of candor to the Court.” Asked about responsibility for the redactions, AUSA William Hogan identified himself as principally responsible and said: “I’ll take responsibility for it.” AUSA Matthew Skiba also disclosed that a problem during the Oct. 16 grand jury session had been raised with the office’s criminal chief, who directed that the session end.
Explaining the public interest in disclosure, Judge Perry stated:
“United States citizens have a right to understand how their government is functioning. And when things do not function as they should, they have a right to know that. Our democracy does not work if public officials can hide what they’re doing from public inspection and judgment.” (emphasis added.)
At the hearing, U.S. Attorney Andrew Boutros orally moved to dismiss the remaining charges with prejudice, which the court granted. He denied intentional misconduct or any desire to mislead the court. When he continued to defend the prosecution, Judge Perry responded: “[Y]ou are significantly undercutting your mea culpa here by standing behind the charges and continuing to vilify these particular defendants.”
The court vacated the trial date, ordered both versions of the transcripts disclosed to the defense, and unsealed the May 21 hearing transcript, subject to limited redactions concerning grand jurors’ views.
On May 22, former defendant Brian Straw moved for an emergency preservation order, seeking to preserve records concerning the grand-jury proceedings, decisions to withhold or redact transcripts, and alleged failures to correct the court’s understanding of what those transcripts contained. The request covered communications and records on both work and personal devices.
At the May 26 hearing on that motion, the government described the litigation hold it had initiated. Judge Perry declined to enter a separate preservation order, calling it “frankly redundant given what they said.” She nevertheless directed further briefing on the former defendants’ ability to participate in proceedings concerning prosecutorial misconduct after dismissal. Addressing their reliance on Civil Rule 11 authorities, she explained: “Those don’t help me. Rule 11 is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, not a criminal procedure rule.” The resulting order required briefs addressing “standing, possible sanctions, and right to discovery at this stage of proceedings.”
On June 9, the court authorized public release of the grand jury colloquies, with limited redactions. On June 16, the former defendants requested discovery and an evidentiary hearing concerning sanctions under the court’s inherent and supervisory authority. They also argued for discovery in connection with their pending Hyde Amendment fee requests, and separately moved for appointment of outside counsel to investigate and, if warranted, prosecute criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42.
In its Aug. 4 response, the government acknowledged “mistakes” but disputed intentional misconduct and grounds for contempt. It defended the redactions as responsive to the court’s limited request for material concerning legal instructions, noted its earlier offer to provide unredacted transcripts, and described remedial training, revised procedures, and an investigation by the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility. Nevertheless, it acknowledged that, to the extent Judge Perry understood the omitted material to be insignificant or limited to technical matters, “the Government should have corrected that impression.”
The subsequent filings raised two further questions about the government’s representations. First, Boutros had told the court on May 21 that he learned of the vouching only in late April 2026. The August response disclosed that he had been emailed the Oct. 9, 2025 grand jury transcript on Oct. 14, while stating that Boutros was “quite certain he did not review the transcript at that time.” In a Sept. 24 filing, former AUSA Sheri Mecklenburg stated that Boutros himself had “directed” her to obtain an expedited transcript and that she had sent it to the office’s leadership, including Boutros. Mecklenburg had withdrawn from the prosecution in February and denied involvement in the later redactions. She acknowledged that she “should not have vouched in the October 9 grand jury session,” but denied acting in bad faith or contempt of court.
Second, the government’s accounts of communications with DOJ headquarters changed. Its Mar. 30 filing had denied outside communications concerning investigatory or charging decisions, apart from local FBI investigators, while identifying a notification to DOJ after internal approval of a draft indictment. The Aug. 4 response disclosed a Sept. 27, 2025 meeting with DOJ officials at which a video of the Broadview incident was shown, and communications after the charging decision. A Sept. 25 notice of correction acknowledged that an intervening response to defense counsel “did not accurately answer former Defendants’ request.” The government attributed that response to the First Assistant U.S. Attorney’s misunderstanding of the request’s timeframe.
At the Oct. 1 hearing on the former defendants’ pending requests for discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and appointment of a special prosecutor, Judge Perry scrutinized the government’s shifting accounts. As reported, Judge Perry said that earlier government representations had left her with the impression that “there were no relevant communications at all. Period. Hard stop,” adding that the subsequent explanations were “a mess.” Addressing the government’s privilege assertions, she stated, “You’re making a lot of claims of privilege. The constant repetition of ‘privilege’ indicates to me there is something out there that is relevant material” (emphasis added).
The court announced further fact-finding and defined its scope, reportedly stating: “My sole focus at this point is on the lack of candor, concealment of material facts or other misconduct that occurred before me” (emphasis added). She also observed: “It’s often said the cover-up is worse than the crime” (emphasis added). While Judge Perry had not yet determined whether intentional misconduct occurred, she reportedly emphasized the potential importance of the inaccuracies: “It is clear to me that the mistakes and inaccuracies were material. … It affected not only their pocketbooks, but their lives” (emphasis added).
Judge Perry also specified that the government’s response to her further questions, whether through live testimony or in writing, “has to be under oath, under penalties of perjury.”
Judge Perry also questioned whether the government’s remedial measures resolved the need for further inquiry. Its assurances about new training were “not very compelling,” she said, explaining: “Training does not fix willful or intentional misconduct.”
The court’s Oct. 1 written order denied the former defendants’ motions in part, insofar as they sought discovery or an adversarial hearing on sanctions or appointment of a special prosecutor. It expressly preserved the court’s own inquiry:
“The Court will, however, consider whether sanctions or a special prosecutor are warranted after having requested and reviewed additional evidence from the Government.” (emphasis added.)
The same order granted Mecklenburg leave to intervene to challenge possible sanctions and the appointment of a special prosecutor.
At the Oct. 1 hearing, the government reportedly argued that appointing a special prosecutor who did not ultimately answer to the Attorney General would be unconstitutional. Judge Perry ordered its brief concerning Criminal Rule 42 by Nov. 2 and appointed Professor William Baude as amicus curiae to brief the opposing legal position, with his brief due Dec. 2. That appointment did not make Baude a special prosecutor. The court separately granted the former defendants’ Hyde Amendment motions for attorneys’ fees and expenses, leaving the amount for further proceedings; it did not enter a contempt finding.
On Oct. 9, Judge Perry requested evidence to support findings concerning “potential sanctions or criminal contempt.” By Oct. 30, the government was to produce for private judicial review all communications from Sept. 26, 2025 through Mar. 30, 2026 with persons outside the local U.S. Attorney’s Office, excluding the assigned local FBI investigators, concerning investigatory or charging decisions. The request also specifically covered the Oct. 14 email transmitting the grand jury transcript to Boutros and any replies or forwards. Production had to include native electronic files, attachments, and metadata, including read receipts and message-tracking logs. Any privilege claims required a supporting log and legal explanation; responsive oral communications required identification and documentation. The court added: “Testimony from witnesses may be requested at a later time, after the Court has reviewed the relevant documents.”
97. USDA grant terminations: “Defendants’ position rests on the premise of ‘trust us;’” “why this Court should have any confidence that the administrative record is complete;” “inconsistent with the time-frame and thus unavailing;” “irregular, piecemeal production;” “more than rebutted” the presumption of regularity
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Urban Sustainability Directors Network v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-01775 (D.D.C.).
This case challenges the Department of Agriculture’s termination of grants supporting agricultural, environmental, and community-development projects, including an alleged policy of terminating DEI- and climate-related grants without individualized review. In addressing deficiencies in the administrative record, Judge Howell questioned the government’s factual representations, identified contradictions and missing documents, and expressly rejected its reliance on the presumption of regularity.
In her May 29, 2026 opinion, Judge Howell revisited assurances that had helped persuade her to deny expedited discovery in August 2025: Defendants had represented that the administrative record would contain the requested information about the grant-termination process. Following an initial production and two supplements, the government continued to maintain that the grants had received individualized review and that further production concerning the alleged agency-wide policy was unwarranted. But the court wrote:
“Defendants’ position rests on the premise of ‘trust us’ as to what the record may show, despite the evidence marshalled by plaintiffs to the contrary.” (emphasis added.)
The court cautioned:
“To the extent defendants’ effort to limit the administrative record is designed to defeat claims simply by declining to produce records that may help establish the veracity of the underlying factual allegations, this strategy will not be condoned by this Court.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Howell identified missing instructions concerning the selection of search terms, the searches themselves, and how grants flagged by those searches were selected for termination. Although Defendants had suggested that the case would be easier if Plaintiffs challenged only their individual terminations, the court said that “such wishful thinking ignores the actual claims asserted and at issue in this case.” Blank spreadsheets supplied by the government revealed “little to nothing about the process of developing or implementing policy directives.” Rejecting the government’s reliance on its own account of individualized review to withhold other grantees’ termination letters, the court stated that “Defendants’ argument is misplaced and amounts to defying their obligation to produce a fulsome administrative record.” The factual dispute could be assessed on the merits once both sides could present arguments based on a complete record. The court also said Defendants “mischaracterize” Trump v. CASA, Inc. as authority for withholding those letters, calling that reasoning “plainly wrong” because the immediate question concerned evidence of the challenged policy, rather than the scope of relief.
Judge Howell’s discussion of USDN’s administrative appeal identified a direct discrepancy between the government’s account and documents Plaintiffs produced. Defendants had represented that the “Forest Service has searched relevant systems and inquired with appropriate staff, and there is no record that USDN filed an appeal.” Plaintiffs supplied the appeal and the agency’s response, and Defendants did not dispute their authenticity and agreed that they belonged in the administrative record. Rejecting Defendants’ complaint that Plaintiffs should have provided the documents before filing their motion, Judge Howell wrote that “defendants should be offering assurances as to why this Court should have any confidence that the administrative record is complete.” She further explained that “contrary to defendants’ complaint, plaintiffs did, in fact, inform defendants of the missing appeal information on September 24, 2025.”
The court also identified a separate chronological inconsistency. In explaining the termination of Agroecology Commons’s Community Food grant, Defendants invoked the Secretary’s Mar. 13, 2025 memoranda, although the grant had been terminated on Mar. 7. Judge Howell concluded that “defendants’ assertion that the grant was terminated based on the DEI-policy articulated by the Secretary’s memorandum is inconsistent with the time-frame and thus unavailing.”
The court contrasted the assurance that the record contained all documents considered in terminating Plaintiffs’ grants with a similar certification accompanying the initial production: subsequent productions had added more than 370 previously missing pages, more than doubling the materials concerning the individual termination decisions. Addressing Defendants’ “repeated[ ]” invocation of the presumption of regularity, that an agency should be presumed to have properly designated its administrative record, Judge Howell wrote:
“The evidence of omissions and accompanying irregular, piecemeal production of the administrative record in this matter has more than rebutted any such presumption.” (emphasis added.)
The court found a substantial showing that the record was “underinclusive and incomplete” and concluded that requiring a privilege log was “well-justified.” Its accompanying order required supplementation, a detailed privilege log, and responses to two interrogatories and two document requests concerning the grant-termination policy, its implementation, and affected awards.
The court nevertheless declined to order depositions at that stage and denied adverse-inference sanctions and attorneys’ fees. Judge Howell wrote that “none of the conduct that plaintiffs ascribe to defendants, either individually or collectively, at this point rises to bad faith.” She accepted “confusion and excusable neglect” following the government shutdown as explanations for the missed December 4, 2025 production deadline, but added:
“Nothing, however, justifies the ‘piecemeal’ and haphazard manner in which the administrative record has been produced so far.” (emphasis added.)
The court warned that Defendants could no longer rely on a misunderstanding of their production obligations and permitted Plaintiffs to renew their sanctions request if the deficiencies continued.
98-a. Immigration-benefit adjudication holds: government “justifies its actions with pretextual concerns of ‘national security’”
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 1:26-cv-00132 (D.R.I.)
This case challenges four U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policies that indefinitely halted adjudication of immigration benefit requests for noncitizens from designated countries and treated nationality from those countries as a significant negative factor in that adjudication process.
In a June 5, 2026 ruling on parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, Chief Judge McConnell held all four of USCIS’s policies unlawful and vacated and set them aside. The court found the challenged policies were contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The court stated at the outset:
“In enacting its latest immigration policies, USCIS: … justifies its actions with pretextual concerns of ‘national security’ that mask anti-immigrant sentiments that it is forbidden from letting influence its decision-making.” (emphasis added).
Questioning the government’s characterization of the policies as temporary, Judge McConnell quoted Doe v. Trump: “[A]t a certain point, an agency’s ongoing characterization of its action as ‘temporary’ rings hollow.” (emphasis added). He noted that USCIS’s policies had remained in effect for over six months without a timeline for ending the hold.
The court also questioned the connection between USCIS’s asserted national security concerns and the policies:
“And yet neither the Government nor USCIS can elaborate on how the agency concluded that individuals from Travel Ban Countries pose a threat to national security or how withholding benefits from and/or reconsidering benefit approvals to these individuals would serve national security interests.” (emphasis added).
The court then separately considered whether USCIS’s asserted reasons were genuine. Citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Department of Commerce v. New York, Judge McConnell explained that a pretextual reason “that is incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process” can support setting aside agency action as arbitrary and capricious. (emphasis added). He emphasized:
“Even when judicial ‘review is deferential,’ courts are ‘not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.’ Id. at 785 (quoting United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977)). Instead, they must ‘ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public.’ Id.” (emphasis added).
Judge McConnell did not confine that inquiry to USCIS’s administrative record. He explained, quoting First Circuit authority, that a court “may supplement the record when there is ‘a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior’ by agency decision makers” (emphasis added). After reviewing public statements by the President and former DHS Secretary Kristi Noem, the court found:
“Plaintiffs here submitted many public statements that are not part of the administrative record. However, after reviewing them, the Court finds those statements meet the bad-faith exception, particularly the President and former Secretary’s numerous ‘statements of ethnic hostility and prejudice’ toward individuals from Travel Ban Countries, which ‘reveals the ugly truth of bad faith and impermissible animus.’ Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739, 775 (9th Cir. 2026) (Mendoza, J., concurring).” (emphasis added).
The government responded that none of the cited statements expressly referred to the challenged policies and that the administrative record did not identify them as informing USCIS’s predecisional guidance. Judge McConnell rejected that response, writing:
“The Government effectively invites the Court to shut its eyes and ignore the strong evidence of anti-immigrant animus before it. Doing so would require profound naiveté on the Court’s part. Unfortunately for the Government, that is an invitation that this Court will have to decline.” (emphasis added).
He continued: “It is impossible to ignore the backdrop against which the Challenged Policies were implemented.” (emphasis added).
The court emphasized the source and substance of the statements:
“The statements are also notable, not just for their animus-ridden stereotyping, but also because they were made by the head of the Executive Branch and by the then-Cabinet Secretary charged with overseeing USCIS. Their outright disdain for individuals from Travel Ban Countries seems to suggest that, in enacting the Challenged Policies, USCIS personnel seemed less concerned with matters of ‘national security’ and more so focused on targeting groups of people that their leaders told them they ‘DON’T WANT’ in the United States, ‘NOT ONE.’” (emphasis added).
Judge McConnell added: “Indeed, the timing of the President and former Secretary’s statements is highly probative evidence of USCIS’s true intentions.” (emphasis added). Quoting Judge Mendoza’s concurrence in National TPS Alliance, the court also emphasized that “animus-ridden stereotyping … can never be viewed as ‘reasonable’ decision-making.” (emphasis added).
Addressing the absence of an express reference to those statements in USCIS’s explanation, Judge McConnell wrote: “To the Government’s point, it may be so that USCIS never expressly referred to the President and the former Secretary’s statements when the agency issued the Challenged Policies, but government officials rarely share their animus toward a particular group out in the open.” (emphasis added).
The court found further support for pretext in the policies themselves, writing, with a quotation from Department of Commerce, that “the evidence tells a story that does not match the explanation [USCIS] gave for [its] decision.” (emphasis added). USCIS had described the adjudicative hold as an “operational necessity” to ensure that individuals from Travel Ban Countries “do not pose a threat to national security or public safety.” Yet it exempted athletes participating in major sporting events, their coaches, necessary support staff and immediate relatives, and later medical physicians. Judge McConnell wrote:
“It seems rather odd that USCIS would resume adjudicating benefit requests filed by individuals from Travel Ban Countries who happen to be medical physicians, athletes, or the coaches and family members of those athletes without the same concern that these individuals might ‘pose a threat to national security or public safety.’” (emphasis added).
The court also questioned why USCIS had modified the hold for physicians through a website update when its own policy required a subsequent memorandum from the USCIS Director.
Judge McConnell concluded:
“In other words, ‘[s]everal points, considered together, reveal a significant mismatch between the decision the [agency] made and the rationale [it] provided.’ Dep’t of Com., 588 U.S. at 783. For one thing, the President and former Secretary’s contemporaneous, anti-immigrant statements cannot be ignored; rather, they give the Court serious reason to doubt that the Challenged Policies were issued in furtherance of ‘national security’ concerns. Moreover, many inconsistencies in USCIS’s own logic—that athletes and medical physicians from Travel Ban Countries are somehow exempt from the adjudicative hold, that the Challenged Policies were apparently modified without the agency following procedures that it had itself established—lead the Court to conclude that the reasons USCIS gave for issuing the Challenged Policies seem to be contrived ones. See Dep’t of Com., 588 U.S. at 785 (‘Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the enterprise.’).
The Court therefore finds that USCIS issued the Challenged Policies based on impermissible pretextual reasoning. This too renders the agency’s actions arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
98-b. Immigration-benefit adjudication holds: “hard time crediting” the government’s claimed harm from resuming immigration adjudications; USCIS declaration has a “glaring problem.”
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 1:26-cv-00132 (D.R.I.)
In a July 15, 2026 order denying the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal, Chief Judge McConnell questioned a new declaration from USCIS Deputy Director Angelica Alfonso-Royals offered to establish national security harm from resuming immigration benefit adjudications. The court identified “a glaring problem with this declaration:” three of its ten examples of countries with alleged identity-document and vetting deficiencies—Ethiopia, Liberia, and Pakistan—were outside the Benefits Hold Policy, Comprehensive Re-Review Policy, and Country-Specific Factors Policy. The court stated that it had “a hard time crediting the Government’s assertions of irreparable injury” (emphasis added). Questioning the relevance of those concerns and their introduction at that stage of the litigation, the court further stated that it “struggles to see how these concerns are at all relevant, given that the Government has never previously expressed them to the Court” (emphasis added).
99. BOP gender-affirming care policy: government claim “not supported” by the record; post hoc declaration “cannot be credited;” policy was “preordained,” “reverse engineered,” and “pretextual”
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Kingdom v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00691 (D.D.C.)
This class action concerns federal restrictions on gender-affirming care for people in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody diagnosed with gender dysphoria.
In June 2025, Judge Lamberth stayed BOP’s original memoranda implementing Executive Order 14168 and enjoined their enforcement as applied to gender-affirming care. On Feb. 19, 2026, BOP issued Program Statement 5260.01, superseding those memoranda with what the court described as a “near total ban on gender-affirming care.”
In a June 17, 2026 opinion granting an updated preliminary injunction, Judge Lamberth repeatedly rejected the government’s explanations for how BOP had reached the new policy. Defendants pointed to a roughly 3,000-page administrative record and represented that BOP had conducted “extensive reviews” of medical studies, correctional policies, case law, prison-security concerns, and expert opinions. However, Judge Lamberth found that BOP had failed adequately to consider one particularly relevant source of evidence: its own experience providing gender-affirming care to inmates for nearly a decade. The 43-page Policy Memo did “not meaningfully discuss this experience anywhere;” despite years of providing the care, “the government cites in the Program Statement zero evidence from its own medical or mental health professionals to support its conclusions.” Nor did the government point the court to evidence that the care had been ineffective or harmful to BOP inmates, or that providing it had previously created security concerns.
The government nevertheless argued in litigation that senior BOP officials involved with both policies had used their “experience with the prior policy to help formulate the 2026 Policy.” But Judge Lamberth found that “this claim is not supported by the Policy Statement or the AR, and instead, it comes solely from the declaration of BOP Medical Director Dr. Elizabete Stahl, which appears in the record for the first time as an attachment to Defendants’ opposition.” The court further observed that Dr. Stahl “essentially concede[d] that the government did not consider its own experience” when she stated that BOP inmates’ treatment histories would not be helpful because there was no validated clinical instrument measuring the success or failure of gender-dysphoria treatment. Judge Lamberth found that “her declaration cannot be credited.” The court rejected the declaration as an after-the-fact basis for defending the agency decision: it was dated nearly three months after BOP announced the Program Statement and the government had not invoked that evidence in the administrative record, Judge Lamberth explained, further writing: “Post-hoc rationalizations during litigation cannot replace the type of reasoned analysis the government must undertake at the front end.” He concluded that “Dr. Stahl’s post-hoc statements cannot ameliorate the government’s failure to demonstrate that it meaningfully considered its prior experience.”
The court separately rejected significant portions of the government’s evidentiary justification for the policy. Rather than relying on BOP’s own medical or mental-health professionals, Judge Lamberth noted, the agency supported the policy with a declaration from a doctor “retained specifically for this litigation” who had limited experience treating gender dysphoria and promoted a treatment that “he himself acknowledges is not evidence based.” The court further found that “the government provides no support for its assertion that gender-affirming care could increase self-harm.”
These evidentiary deficiencies directly informed the court’s assessment of BOP’s asserted rationale. Defendants maintained that the Program Statement could not have been predetermined because it followed approximately 12 months of study and was rationally connected to the evidence collected during that process. “The Court is not convinced.” Judge Lamberth explained that, “[w]hen the record reveals that an agency ‘preordained [its] decision,’ and the agency merely ‘reverse engineered’ a policy to justify the same outcome—thereby engaging in a ‘pretextual’ action, that is itself a violation of the APA.” The court then applied that principle: “Based on the existing record, the Court finds that is the case here.”
BOP also insisted that, although EO 14168 “supports this policy, the Bureau also adopts this policy independently” of the EO. Judge Lamberth rejected that explanation. The Program Statement repeated the EO’s operative prohibition on federal funding for treatment intended to conform an inmate’s appearance to that of the opposite sex, and the court found: “It is more likely, given the record before the Court, that the government disregarded significant evidence in its possession to reach the EO’s mandated result.”
Judge Lamberth stated that his findings supplied “further evidence of pretext.” If BOP genuinely had intended to formulate a policy based on the evidence, he explained, “one would expect it to have seriously considered its own experience providing gender-affirming care to inmates in its custody.” Nor, in the court’s view, would it have concluded that gender-affirming care was “‘not medically necessary’” and created “‘security and prison-administration concerns’” “despite ample record evidence to the contrary.”
The government argued that the new policy was not “a mere repackaging” of the enjoined 2025 memoranda because BOP had spent nearly 12 months developing it, but Judge Lamberth called that argument “unavailing,” concluding:
“No length of consideration can convince the Court that a policy is anything other than pretext when the agency has not demonstrated that it considered the relevant evidence and drew a reasonable conclusion from that evidence.” (emphasis added).
The court’s skepticism also extended to BOP’s asserted prison-safety rationale. Although Defendants argued that gender-affirming care created security and prison-administration concerns, Judge Lamberth observed that “the government has not cited a single instance of gender-affirming care giving rise to safety concerns despite having provided such care for many years.” The court added, “This failure is conspicuous,” further noting that its previous injunction had been in place for more than a year and yet “the government provides no evidence of gender-affirming care giving rise to prison safety issues during this time.”
100. Fagan prosecution: “looks like I’m being told as of yesterday that it wasn’t true and accurate;” “This Court is very concerned that I cannot rely on the information that is provided to me either from the U.S. Attorney’s Office or from agents.”
Magistrate Judge Keri L. Holleb Hotaling, United States v. Fagan, 1:26-cr-00291 (N.D. Ill.)
This prosecution arose from an alleged attempted robbery of undercover ATF officers and was dismissed after the Government obtained video evidence that called into question material portions of the sworn affidavit supporting the criminal complaint and arrest warrants.
At the June 18, 2026 hearing, Judge Holleb Hotaling said she had received “inconsistent” information from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, questioned what due diligence had been performed before the affidavit was submitted, and stressed that the court had relied on the information in depriving individuals of their liberty:
“I’m only privy to what you guys provide in these affidavits. I swear them out under oath that they are true and accurate. And now I’m — looks like I’m being told as of yesterday that it wasn’t true and accurate.” (emphasis added).
Most significantly, she stated:
“I think that we all know, as other colleagues in the district court bench have recently mentioned, that there is and always had been a presumption of regularity. This Court is very concerned that I cannot rely on the information that is provided to me either from the U.S. Attorney’s Office or from agents that I’m — when I’m swearing out an affidavit now.” (emphasis added).
She repeatedly emphasized that, although an investigation may be incomplete, “what is brought to the Court should be accurate.” (emphasis added). The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice but expressly declined to decide at that stage whether the FBI affiant had acted in bad faith or made material misrepresentations, kept the matter open, and ordered a separate evidentiary hearing to determine whether sanctions or other action were warranted. The court’s unsealing order separately found that the facts offered in support of probable cause were inconsistent with the video evidence and presented “potentially conflicting narratives from that of law enforcement.”
In its June 30 sanctions hearing brief, the government conceded that the affidavit described aspects of the incident in a manner that was “less than precise,” and that it had “misidentified Edwards as the robber with the backpack,” while denying intentional or reckless misconduct and arguing that the presumption of regularity should continue to attach.
On Jul. 1, the court granted the government’s request to continue the Jul. 2 sanctions hearing, directed defense counsel to respond to the government’s sanctions brief by Jul. 10, and stated that it would reset the hearing after reviewing any responses.
On Jul. 30, the government submitted a Notice of Factual Corrections which included an apology for errors in its June 30 brief. For example, the latter had stated, “Based upon a UCV recording, at least one of the assailants fled on foot without re-entering the Dodge Dart.” The Notice stated that information was “incorrect” and instead, “The video recordings support the conclusion that, aside from Amir Fagan, all of the other individuals who arrived in the Dodge Dart attempted to flee the scene in the Dodge Dart before it became disabled, and the occupants thereafter fled on foot.”
101. DOJ’s demand for Pennsylvania voter data: Court rejects DOJ’s asserted statutory bases for obtaining sensitive voter data, cites “pretextual” justifications and “significant concerns about the true purpose” of its requests, and declares that the presumption of regularity “no longer holds”
Chief Judge Cathy Bissoon (Obama appointee), United States v. Schmidt, 2:25-cv-01481 (W.D. Pa.)
This case involved the federal government’s effort to compel Pennsylvania officials to produce unredacted voter-registration files containing voters’ sensitive personal identifiers, purportedly to assess compliance with federal election laws.
In a June 27, 2026 memorandum and order dismissing the action, Chief Judge Bissoon rejected the government’s asserted statutory bases for obtaining the data and questioned the credibility of its stated justifications. The court pointed to public statements indicating that the government’s actual aims were “to create a nationwide voter-database, for potential weaponization in future elections;” to conduct a “‘fishing expedition,’ hoped to advance unsubstantiated claims of non-citizen voting;” and to use the information “as a tool for immigration enforcement.” Citing parallel litigation, the court noted findings that DOJ was engaged in a “nationwide quest” to collect sensitive voter information, that there were “significant concerns about the true purpose” of the requests, and that the asserted NVRA and HAVA rationales were “pretextual.”
Further, Judge Bissoon stated:
“The presumption of regularity that has been previously extended to the [government] that it could be taken at its word—with little doubt about its intentions and stated purposes—no longer holds.”
She added, quoting the district court’s March 2026 decision in In re: 2025 UPMC Subpoena, 2:25-mc-01069 (W.D. Pa.): “[t]o the extent the DOJ has urged trust, . . . it must understand why its assurances are cold comfort.” The court granted the motions to dismiss, dismissing the NVRA and HAVA claims with prejudice and the Civil Rights Act claim without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
102. USCIS adjudication holds: National-security rationale was “inherently self-contradictory” and “nothing more than a talismanic invocation;” the court “cannot be blind” to the policies’ backdrop, stressed that federal courts need “not . . . exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free,” and said Executive Branch actions had “called into question” whether the Branch had “forfeited the right to . . . a presumption of regularity.”
Judge Algenon L. Marbley (Clinton appointee), Doe 1 v. Edlow, 2:26-cv-00494 (S.D. Ohio)
This litigation challenged USCIS policies indefinitely pausing final adjudication of immigration-benefit applications submitted by nationals of designated countries and requiring USCIS to treat nationality from those countries as a significant negative factor in discretionary adjudications. Policy Alert PA-2025-26 imposed the nationality-based negative-factor treatment; Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194 imposed and expanded the adjudicatory holds.
On July 6, 2026, Judge Marbley granted a preliminary injunction protecting the 25 Doe Plaintiffs, who were already living in the United States. Defendants invoked national security and public safety to defend the adjudication holds. The court described that position as “inherently self-contradictory:” Plaintiffs were already in the United States, and delaying decisions on their applications would leave any supposed security threats unresolved. It later explained:
“Defendants fail to explain how a delay of a decision on pending immigration benefit applications for foreign nationals already within the United States could ameliorate any public safety or national security concern. Their arguments amount to nothing more than a talismanic invocation of national security.”
Examining the challenged delays, the court found “there is manifest evidence of impropriety imbuing USCIS’s decision, which strongly suggests unreasonable delay.” It added that “the evidence of the impropriety lurking behind USCIS’s inaction is on display for all to see.” The public record, it explained, was “replete with direct evidence of the administration’s hostility toward immigrants, with the possible exception of Scandinavians and white Afrikaners.”
Addressing public statements by President Trump, Vice President Vance and former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, the court stated: “This Court is not and cannot be blind to the ‘backdrop against which the Challenged Policies were implemented.’” Quoting Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. USCIS, it described those statements as suggesting that USCIS personnel “seemed less concerned with matters of ‘national security’ and more so focused on targeting groups of people that their leaders told them they ‘DON’T WANT’ in the United States, ‘NOT ONE.’”
The court further explained that it was “impossible to ‘ignore the backdrop of extraordinary statements by direct decision-makers when assessing whether the agency’s proffered rationale was genuine or merely a pretext’ for an ulterior motive,” quoting Judge Mendoza’s concurrence in National TPS Alliance v. Noem. Quoting Department of Commerce v. New York, it added that “[f]ederal courts need ‘not . . . exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.’”
The court then questioned the continued entitlement to a presumption of regularity:
“But a slew of Executive Branch actions since January 2025 have called into question whether the Executive Branch has ‘forfeited the right to . . . a presumption of regularity,’ under which courts presume, absent clear evidence to the contrary, that Executive Branch officers are properly carrying out their official duties.” (emphasis added).
These concerns also informed the relief. Requiring adjudication of Plaintiffs’ pending employment-authorization applications within 30 days, the court declined Defendants’ request simply to return those applications to the ordinary queue. In footnote 32, it stated that “it is uncertain whether Defendants are maintaining an orderly queue,” explaining:
“Moreover, this Court is concerned that simply returning Plaintiffs to the pool of foreign nationals with pending immigration benefit applications could paint them with a proverbial scarlet letter in the eyes of USCIS, leading them to be singled out for further adverse treatment despite this injunction.”
103. DOJ’s demands for Portland police records: Court finds “purported reasons” were “pretext,” DOJ acted “in bad faith and with unclean hands,” and presumption of regularity rebutted
Judge Michael H. Simon (Obama appointee), United States v. City of Portland, 3:12-cv-02265 (D. Or.).
This case involved the Justice Department’s efforts to compel the City of Portland to produce extensive Portland Police Bureau records under a longstanding police-reform settlement agreement, following senior police officials’ submission of evidence supporting Oregon’s challenge to President Trump’s federalization and deployment of the National Guard in Portland.
In a July 24, 2026 opinion and order, Judge Michael H. Simon found “by clear and convincing evidence” that DOJ’s stated reasons for demanding extensive Portland Police Bureau records under a longstanding police-reform settlement agreement were “pretext.” The court described the timing of DOJ’s demands, following senior Portland police officials’ support for Oregon’s challenge to President Trump’s National Guard deployment, as “highly suspicious” and a “not-so-subtle signal” that continued assistance could make matters “quite difficult, burdensome, and expensive” for the Police Bureau. Judge Simon also found that Assistant Attorney General Harmeet Dhillon’s public statements were “neither language nor tone of a good faith investigation” but instead exhibited “all the hallmarks of a threat and attempted intimidation.”
The court concluded: “For these three reasons taken together, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the pending motion brought by the United States was not made in good faith and that the United States lacks clean hands.” Judge Simon expressly addressed the presumption of regularity, acknowledging that official acts are ordinarily presumed regular “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.” Citing Judge Paul Friedman’s conclusion in Federal Education Association v. Trump that the plaintiffs had “rebutted the presumption of regularity,” Judge Simon declared: “So too is the Court’s finding here.” The court emphasized that it “recognizes the seriousness of this conclusion and makes this finding soberly,” while observing that other judicial findings of DOJ misconduct showed that it was “not alone in making these findings.” The court denied DOJ’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
104. Adani foreign-bribery prosecution: DOJ’s dismissal explanations “not only without sufficient factual support, but also inaccurate;” “at worst misleading;” “baseless assertion is unbecoming of his office;” “unsubstantiated, self-serving pronouncements;” government’s evidence “does not match or does not support” stated reasons
Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis (Clinton appointee), United States v. Adani, 1:24-cr-00433 (E.D.N.Y.)
This criminal case involved the Department of Justice’s attempt to dismiss charges arising from alleged foreign bribery, fraud, and obstruction, and the court’s findings that several explanations for dismissal lacked factual support or contradicted the record. The indictment, returned in October 2024, charged eight defendants, including Indian businessman Gautam Adani. In May 2026, DOJ sought dismissal of all charges with prejudice. R. Trent McCotter, then Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General and subsequently Acting Deputy Attorney General, identified himself as the sole decisionmaker.
In an Aug. 10, 2026 opinion, Judge Garaufis dismissed the securities- and wire-fraud charges against Gautam Adani, Sagar Adani, and Vneet Jaain, accepting that the possibility of treating the alleged misrepresentations as nonactionable puffery supplied a sufficiently supported, substantial reason for dismissal. He reserved decision on the remaining foreign-bribery and obstruction conspiracy counts, requiring additional factual support.
The court accepted that McCotter’s stated reasons were his actual reasons for seeking dismissal and that Gautam Adani’s proposed $10 billion investment in the United States was a “non-consideration.” It nevertheless found significant deficiencies in the factual foundations offered for several of those reasons.
One central issue concerned McCotter’s assertion that India had investigated allegations in the case and found no actionable misconduct. Reviewing the three Indian decisions submitted to support that assertion, Judge Garaufis wrote:
“Further, inspection of the documents reveals that they do not provide support for, and instead contradict, McCotter’s characterization of their contents.” (emphasis added.)
The court explained:
“Not one of the documents appears to be the result of an investigation—by India or anyone else. Rather, each document appears to be a decision by an Indian government authority not to investigate. Not one of the documents meaningfully contends with the allegations in this case.” (emphasis added.)
The decisions concerned requests to investigate allegations before the Competition Commission of India and the High Courts in New Delhi and Bombay. The court explained that those allegations bore little resemblance to the conduct charged in the indictment and that none of the documents concluded that nothing inappropriate had occurred. Nor did they address the alleged misrepresentations to U.S. lenders and investors or the alleged destruction of evidence and lies to federal officials in New York. In footnote 42, the court expressly characterized McCotter’s claim that the conduct had been investigated in India as “not only without sufficient factual support, but also inaccurate.”
The court also rejected McCotter’s suggestion that officials in the previous administration had deliberately left the incoming administration a problematic prosecution. Judge Garaufis stated:
“McCotter appears to be accusing officials across four different government offices of bringing a detailed 54-page, 5-count indictment out of spite. However, he has not provided a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the timing of the unsealing of the Indictment, or the charging decisions, in this case was politically motivated.” (emphasis added.)
He added: “McCotter’s baseless assertion is unbecoming of his office.” Drawing on his experience with the agencies involved, the judge rejected McCotter’s characterization of their integrity and motives and emphasized: “Rule 48(a) requires more than unsubstantiated accusations. It demands sufficient proof.”
Other explanations similarly lacked substantiation. Addressing McCotter’s assertion that investors had lost no money, the court stated: “McCotter gives the court no way to evaluate the veracity of his statement.” His anticipated “extraordinary proof problems” were “entirely speculative,” and his assertion that Defendants lived in places offering no reasonable prospect of arrest was “completely unsubstantiated.” The court also found that describing the prosecution as a foreign case failed to address the alleged conduct in the United States, including obstruction of federal investigations.
The court identified additional contradictions between McCotter’s arguments and the indictment. Rejecting the factual support for his contention that the financial transactions were insufficiently domestic to sustain the fraud charges, it explained: “On the face of the Indictment, the only facts in the record contradict McCotter’s assertion that the Transactions were not ‘domestic.’” (emphasis added.)
The indictment alleged that investors had irrevocably committed funds in the United States and that Defendants had secured investors physically located there. Separately, examining McCotter’s reliance on DOJ’s revised Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement guidelines, the court found that the alleged substantial bribery, concealment, fraud, and obstruction appeared to implicate the very priorities those guidelines identified. It concluded that “the current record contradicts McCotter’s reasoning” for dismissing the foreign-bribery conspiracy count.
The treatment of the obstruction allegations drew further criticism. McCotter had argued that the indictment’s theory made little sense because defendants had hired expensive lawyers to investigate. The court explained that this account omitted allegations that defendants withheld information from the lawyers, destroyed or concealed evidence, and lied to federal officials. Judge Garaufis wrote:
“McCotter’s failure to address these serious allegations of the obstruction conspiracy is at best insufficient to meet Rule 48(a)’s procedural requirements and at worst misleading.” (emphasis added.)
The court further stated that McCotter provided no evidence for his “straw man argument” and “completely ignores the actual obstruction allegations” in the paragraph on which he relied. It emphasized, however, that its conclusion concerned the inadequacy of the evidence submitted; it did not establish that additional supporting information could not exist.
The opinion also questioned McCotter’s account of ordinary dismissal practice. In footnote 35, the court described as “inaccurate” his assertion that DOJ typically filed short dismissal motions that courts accepted without controversy, identifying a recent DOJ motion supported by twenty pages of argument and evidentiary exhibits.
In its conclusion, the court raised broader concerns about the decisionmaking process:
“On the current record, McCotter appears to have eschewed the professional opinions of innumerable officials from various federal offices and replaced them with his singular judgment. The fact that McCotter came to this decision largely in collaboration with defense counsel, and seemingly without input from the FBI and SEC agents who investigated the alleged misconduct, or the attorneys from the Department, SEC, and U.S. Attorney’s Office who brought the case, appears to be highly unusual.” (emphasis added.)
McCotter disputed that account on Aug. 11, stating that he had consulted extensively with DOJ attorneys, that attorneys from the U.S. Attorney’s Office and other DOJ components attended defense presentations, and that he had discussed the parallel civil claims with SEC attorneys. He maintained that the ultimate decision nevertheless rested with him.
In an Aug. 14 submission, McCotter swore to the accuracy of his earlier explanations to the best of his knowledge and argued that the decisionmaker’s statements themselves supplied the necessary evidentiary basis. Judge Garaufis rejected that position in a Sept. 3 opinion, describing those assertions as “unsubstantiated, self-serving pronouncements.” He explained that the statements’ newly sworn status did not cure their failure to supply specific supporting facts. Reiterating the contradiction involving the Indian decisions, the court stated:
“By definition, evidence that appears to contradict the government’s proffered rationale cannot serve as sufficient factual support for that stated reason to dismiss under Rule 48(a)’s procedural component.” (emphasis added.)
The court concluded:
“Here, the evidence (or lack thereof) tells a story that either does not match or does not support the reasons given for McCotter’s decision to dismiss with prejudice Counts One and Five as alleged against Non-Appearing Defendants. The court simply cannot ignore glaring insufficiencies in the record or the apparent disconnect between the decision made and the facts given. Accepting unsubstantiated reasons or reasons that appear to be directly contradicted by the evidence that is before the court, would defeat the purpose of the Rule 48(a) enterprise.” (emphasis added.)
Quoting Department of Commerce v. New York, the court added: “If judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand something better than the explanation[s] offered for the action taken in this case.”
The court denied dismissal of Counts One and Five without prejudice on procedural grounds, continuing to invite sufficient factual support.
105. Fair-housing funding: HUD’s justifications “pretextual;” “belies credulity;” assertions about continued funding “inadequate and incorrect;” “impermissible post-hoc rationalization” rejected
Judge Myong J. Joun (Biden appointee), Massachusetts Fair Housing Center v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 3:26-cv-30117 (D. Mass.)
This case challenges HUD’s restructuring of the Fair Housing Initiatives Program, including funding changes and eligibility restrictions excluding existing fair-housing organizations.
In his Aug. 26, 2026 decision granting a temporary restraining order, Judge Joun found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious claim and expressly rejected HUD’s stated reasons for its Fair Housing Organizations Initiative (FHOI) funding notice as pretextual.
HUD maintained that the notice would broaden participation, increase innovation, and strengthen the national fair-housing infrastructure. The court contrasted those explanations with a notice providing just five awards, excluding organizations with annual budgets below $5 million, and excluding nearly all existing nonprofit fair-housing organizations. Judge Joun explained:
“It belies credulity to think that five awards alone could broaden and strengthen fair housing work across the nation, and excluding almost all existing fair housing organizations will certainly not strengthen fair housing work.” (emphasis added.)
Noting that Defendants had not directly addressed Plaintiffs’ pretext argument, the court found that “the rationale does not square with its impact.” It concluded:
“I cannot ignore this disconnect, … and I find the Department’s reasons for the FHOI NOFO are pretextual.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
The court also rejected HUD’s account of the changes’ impact on existing recipients. HUD’s contemporaneous memorandum asserted that the impact would be limited because most recipients continued to operate under multi-year awards with one or two years of remaining federal support. Judge Joun found:
“This assertion from HUD is both inadequate and incorrect. Plaintiff NFHA, for example, is a current recipient continuing to operate under a multi-year PEI award, and does not have remaining federal support this year, because the NOFO does not provide any funding for its grant. … Defendants do not address this shortfall.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
Separately, the court rejected HUD’s reliance on a declaration prepared after the challenged decisions to explain its funding structure, stating: “HUD needed to adequately explain the blended structure when it took the action—not when defending the action in court.” It treated the declaration as an “impermissible post-hoc rationalization.”
On Oct. 19, the First Circuit partially granted HUD’s request for a stay pending appeal, suspending the requirement to issue new FY2025 funding notices using the FY2024 structure but denying the remainder of the request. In assessing HUD’s challenge to the arbitrary-and-capricious analysis, the panel emphasized: “As an initial matter, with their stay motion in this court, defendants-appellants did not address in any substantial way the district court’s pretext finding” (emphasis added).
106. California emissions waivers: “irreconcilable” explanations and “mind-numbing word calisthenics” concerning EPA’s own actions
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), California v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1:26-cv-02185 (D.D.C.).
This case challenges EPA’s reclassification of California’s Clean Air Act emissions-waiver orders as “rules” subject to the Congressional Review Act. EPA submitted four waivers to Congress as final rules on June 12, 2026, but argued in court that it had merely transmitted reports and had taken no separate reclassification action subject to judicial review.
In her Sept. 2, 2026 opinion, Judge Howell described EPA and its intervenor-defendants as inviting the court to engage in “Orwellian doublethink.” They maintained both that EPA had determined the waivers should be treated as rules and that no reclassification had occurred. The court concluded: “Given that the CRA requires agencies’ submission to Congress of only certain types of ‘rules,’ these two explanations are irreconcilable.”
The court compared that position with EPA’s own documents. Each original waiver decision stated that the Congressional Review Act did not apply because the action was not a rule. EPA’s June press release nevertheless announced that the agency had determined the waivers were rules under that Act, and its reports to Congress identified each as a final rule. Rejecting EPA’s attempt to characterize this as merely sending reports, Judge Howell wrote that “EPA engages in mind-numbing word calisthenics to avoid this straight-forward conclusion” (emphasis added).
The court also criticized EPA’s manipulation of the distinction between rules and orders, explaining: “Such gamesmanship may seem like a clever policy move, but undermines honest compliance with the law, which is what Americans should expect from executive branch agencies.”
The court expressly avoided concluding that the Administrator had misled Congress. Instead, it took EPA at its word in its congressional submissions: the agency had made determinations reclassifying the waivers as rules. Judge Howell treated those determinations as reviewable agency action, rejected EPA’s jurisdictional objections, and granted preliminary relief.
107. White House press ban: national-security rationale “merely a post-hoc justification;” government “scrambl[ed] to make their case with unsigned letters and a declarant who does not even work there;” “practically nothing” to warrant deference
Judge Timothy J. Kelly (Trump appointee), Cable News Network, Inc. v. Trump, 1:26-cv-03287 (D.D.C.)
This case involved President Trump’s revocation of White House press credentials held by journalists from CNN, MS NOW, and POLITICO, and the government’s asserted national-security justification for the decision.
On Sept. 24, Judge Kelly granted a temporary restraining order, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their procedural due process claim. He ordered Defendants other than the President to restore the revoked credentials immediately. Defendants argued that national-security concerns justified revoking the passes without advance notice and an opportunity to respond. The court rejected the asserted urgency, observing that some of the reporting invoked by Defendants dated back months or years and that the identified stories were routine. It stated:
“[T]he Court is skeptical—at least on this record—that Defendants’ interest in safeguarding national security is the actual motivation for, or is even advanced by, the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes.”
The court explained that “nothing in the record that predates this suit suggests that the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes was motivated by national security concerns.” Trump’s announcement instead focused on the alleged untruthfulness and negativity of their reporting. Letters sent to the organizations after the lawsuit began did not resolve that problem: they identified reporting that purportedly threatened national security “and/or” spread falsehoods, leaving open the possibility that every identified story fell into the latter category.
The supporting evidence was also deficient. Judge Kelly wrote:
“Defendants offer no declarations or other support—classified or unclassified—explaining how any of the reporting they identified in their letters to Plaintiffs damaged the national security.”
The declarations supplied general information about classified material, but their authors were Defense Department officials without direct knowledge of White House reporting operations or the facts at issue. Plaintiffs’ supplemental declarations showed that, in most instances, the journalists responsible for the cited stories did not even hold hard passes. For the remaining stories, Defendants offered no reason to believe that possession of a pass had been integral to the reporting.
On Oct. 13, Judge Kelly granted a preliminary injunction, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint-discrimination claims as well as their due process claim. Defendants argued that the passes would have been revoked for national-security reasons even without Plaintiffs’ protected speech. The court found that “the record does not come close to supporting such a conclusion.” Examining Trump’s contemporaneous explanation and subsequent statements, Judge Kelly wrote:
“All this suggests that ‘national security’ was merely a post-hoc justification for the decision, which greatly undermines the idea that President Trump ‘would have’—not ‘could have’—taken the same action in the absence of Plaintiffs’ protected speech, even if it is not dispositive on that point.”
The court also identified a discrepancy between Defendants’ characterization of the September 22 letters and what those letters actually said. Defendants asserted that the President had determined that Plaintiffs reported classified or sensitive national-security information. But the letters did not establish that he made the revocation decision for national-security reasons. Returning to that discrepancy later in the opinion, Judge Kelly stated: “the letters simply do not say that he made any such determination.”
The court separately scrutinized the declaration of Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson. Wilson described the risks of publishing classified or sensitive information and what she considered successful changes to Pentagon press access. But Judge Kelly explained:
“The problem is that Wilson’s declaration says little to nothing about President Trump’s decision to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes, or anything about White House press practices or operations.”
Wilson predicted that a similar White House policy would produce similar results, but the court observed that “she does not purport to know much about the White House or the President’s decision here.” Her assertions about the organizations’ willingness to publish sensitive information were conclusory and lacked further specifics.
Neither Wilson’s declaration nor the letters suggested that a national-security-based ban had been under consideration before Trump’s announcement. The cited reporting stretched back as far as a year and a half. Moreover, a CNN reporter’s hard pass had been renewed months after she published a story about a bunker beneath the White House East Wing that Defendants later invoked against her. Judge Kelly wrote:
“Finally, it seems likely that if President Trump or another official would have banned Plaintiffs from the White House even in the absence of their protected speech, Defendants would not have had to scramble to make their case with unsigned letters and a declarant who does not even work there.”
Quoting Department of Commerce v. New York, the court emphasized that it was “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” It concluded that Trump likely banned Plaintiffs because he believed their reporting was generally inaccurate and biased against him.
The court again examined the evidentiary deficiencies when weighing Defendants’ asserted national-security interest. Judge Kelly stated: “And strikingly, there is just about no evidence in the record to explain or justify the ‘ban’ from a national security perspective.” Although one formulation in Wilson’s declaration suggested that reporting had harmed security, she did not explain how or to what extent. The court added: “Amazingly, Defendants appear to have been unperturbed by that same story when they renewed that reporter’s hard pass back in June.”
More fundamentally, Judge Kelly wrote:
“In the end, Defendants do not even bother to identify what specific information in any of these ‘reporting incidents’ was allegedly classified or sensitive.”
Defendants had also chosen not to submit additional supporting material, whether classified or unclassified, under seal or ex parte. Acknowledging the deference ordinarily afforded to governmental national-security determinations, the court explained:
“[T]here is practically nothing national security-related in the record connected to the President’s decision to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes to which the Court can defer.”
Judge Kelly nevertheless emphasized that his ruling should not be read as suggesting that the President’s concerns about the accuracy or fairness of media reporting were necessarily unfounded, or that the government was powerless to act when its genuine aim was to protect national security against unlawful disclosures of classified information.
108. Federal prison union contract: “entirely pretextual explanation;” “contradicted by the record;” “national security was not the basis for this termination”
Judge Vernon D. Oliver (Biden appointee), National Council of Prison Locals, American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 3:25-cv-01907 (D. Conn.)
This case challenges the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ September 25, 2025 termination of its collective bargaining agreement with a union representing approximately 30,000 federal employees.
On Sept. 29, 2026, in granting a preliminary injunction and a stay under Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Judge Oliver identified contradictions between the government’s representations, its own evidence, and its contemporaneous explanations for terminating the agreement. He concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the termination was arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
The government argued that President Trump’s Executive Order 14,251 “left no room for BOP to make an independent call on ending the CBA,” making the termination unreviewable under the APA. Judge Oliver rejected that account:
“However, this argument plainly contradicts the factual record and Defendants’ concessions that Director Marshall made the decision to terminate the CBA, and that he had explicit discretion over when to terminate the agreement.” (emphasis added).
Defendants’ own declaration stated that BOP Director William K. Marshall III had made the termination decision. Government counsel acknowledged at oral argument that the Director had discretion over timing and that the executive order did not specifically direct agency heads to terminate collective bargaining agreements. Office of Personnel Management guidance likewise stated that agencies could choose whether to terminate them. Judge Oliver concluded that the government’s claim that it lacked discretion was “contradicted by the record, contradicted by other statements made by the United States, and unavailing to this Court” (emphasis added).
The court separately identified “two incongruent explanations” for the termination. BOP’s letter to the union cited the executive order as its basis. But Marshall’s public message that same day criticized the union as an obstacle to progress and said the contract had slowed or prevented changes. Judge Oliver wrote:
“Although an agency may have multiple reasons for its action, it cannot offer an entirely pretextual explanation that is undermined by its own contradictory assertions made the same day. But that is precisely what Defendants have done here. They cited the Executive Order as the only basis for cancelling the CBA in the Termination Letter, but issued a public message that same day with an entirely contrary explanation.” (emphasis added).
Quoting the Supreme Court in Department of Commerce v. New York, the court said it could not “ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given.” It therefore found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious claim.
That assessment also affected the weight the court gave the government’s asserted justification for opposing relief. The government argued that reinstatement would frustrate the President’s national-security rationale for excluding BOP from statutory collective-bargaining requirements. Judge Oliver afforded that argument little weight, emphasizing that “it is evident that national security was not the basis for this termination.” The court granted preliminary relief and ordered immediate reinstatement of the agreement and its subsidiary agreements.
109. East Potomac Golf Course: DOJ urged court “not to believe the sitting President;” government lost “all of its credibility;” declaration “misleading;” witness “not credible;” justification “pretextual;” “recent actions call into question other representations;” “concerned about Government counsel’s actions in this case;” “difficult task of weighing these conflicting accounts is made more so by DOJ attorneys”
Judge Ana C. Reyes (Biden appointee), DC Preservation League v. Department of Interior, 1:26-cv-00477 (D.D.C.)
This case challenged the administration’s plans to redevelop Washington’s East Potomac Golf Course.
As recounted in her Oct. 13, 2026 opinion, Judge Reyes had declined Plaintiffs’ repeated requests for an injunction or formal notification order. At a July hearing, she explained:
“I want to trust that people are acting in good faith and have them acting in good faith until proven otherwise, and you have not proven otherwise to me in this litigation.”
In September, the government represented that tree removals concerned only hazardous, dead, dying, or invasive trees. The court accepted those representations. But at 4:55 p.m. on Friday, Oct. 9, the government notified the court that a new tree-removal operation would begin the following day. Officials removed approximately 430 trees on Oct. 10. Judge Reyes wrote:
“The Government then did precisely what Plaintiffs feared. Sometime between the September 3 hearing and October 2, plans moved from removing only hazardous, dead, dying, or invasive trees to removing hundreds of healthy, non-invasive trees. And then it removed them without providing meaningful notice to Plaintiffs or the Court.”
The court also identified a contradiction between a declaration and subsequent testimony from Kevin Griess, superintendent of the National Mall and Memorial Parks. His declaration attributed the timing partly to newly available budgetary resources, but he later testified that he had received no additional resources and could, from a budgetary perspective, have submitted the plan at any time.
The Interior Department and National Park Service maintained that the removals implemented a 2019 Cultural Landscape Report and were unrelated to President Trump’s announced redesign. Judge Reyes observed that this explanation “asks rather a lot of coincidence.” Beyond that observation, she expressly concluded:
“The Court concludes, on this limited record, that government officials raced to undertake the TMP because President Trump demands haste on his redesign, and not because of some newfound zeal to implement a small part of a seven-year-old CLR.”
Finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their National Environmental Policy Act claim, the court barred further tree removal through Oct. 26. It also required three business days’ written notice before any irreparable modification to a permanent feature of the course during that period.
In an Oct. 18 opinion denying the government’s recusal motion, Judge Reyes recorded her statement at the Oct. 12 hearing that the government had lost “all of its credibility in this case.” Explaining the change from her earlier willingness to credit government representations, she wrote:
“Based on this record, a reasonable person would understand that the Court’s skepticism about whether Government counsel can act in good faith going forward is legitimate and not the product of bias.” (emphasis added.)
At the Oct. 19 evidentiary hearing, as reported, Judge Reyes again challenged the government’s conflicting accounts, stating: “I don’t know what to do when I keep getting different stories from the government.” She also questioned how DOJ’s representations that no final redesign or closure plan had been approved could be reconciled with President Trump’s public announcement that the course would close on Nov. 15 and work on the redesign would begin. Addressing DOJ counsel, she reportedly stated: “What I am hearing from the Department of Justice is, ‘Ignore that, just listen to what we’re telling you,’” She indicated that she would “absolutely” reject the explanation that the tree removals were prompted by the 2019 report, while expressly qualifying that assessment: “That doesn’t mean that the individuals testifying were lying.”
On Oct. 26, 2026, granting a preliminary injunction following further evidentiary proceedings, Judge Reyes made extensive findings concerning the government’s conflicting representations, the credibility of federal witnesses, and the Justice Department’s conduct. The opinion opened:
“Rarely, if ever, has the United States Department of Justice urged a federal court not to believe the sitting President. Not to believe him that a cabinet secretary has ‘developed’ a federal land project. Not to believe him that the secretary’s agency will destroy a historic golf course already on the land. Not to believe him that ‘Restoration work’ will begin ‘IMMEDIATELY!’ Not to believe him that the course ‘will be closed’ for over a year. Not to believe what the President has repeatedly told the American public.”
The court continued:
“It now forces the Court to reconcile assertions by President Donald J. Trump with the sworn testimony of multiple government employees and the argument of senior Department of Justice attorneys.”
The court contrasted President Trump’s repeated public announcements concerning the finalized redesign and imminent closure of the course with testimony from Interior Department officials who said they did not know Secretary Burgum’s position, the announced closure date, or when construction would begin. Judge Reyes emphasized:
“The Court’s difficult task of weighing these conflicting accounts is made more so by DOJ attorneys who serve the Executive but also have obligations as officers of the court.”
Recounting the Oct. 19 hearing, the court quoted its exchange with a Deputy Assistant Attorney General:
“THE COURT: I’m being told by the President of the United States that the golf course is going to close on November 15th. And you’re telling me that there is no plan to close the golf course. So who do I believe? Do I believe the President of the United States, or do I believe you?”
The court observed that the Deputy Assistant Attorney General’s response effectively invited it to disbelieve the President. When the Associate Attorney General, DOJ’s third-highest-ranking official, intervened, the court found that “[h]e did not clarify matters.” The Associate Attorney General maintained that “there is no plan to close the course,” adding that the words had their “literal meaning.” Judge Reyes responded: “How about if we use the nonliteral meaning of the words.”
Recounting the government’s earlier assurances, Judge Reyes emphasized that the court had repeatedly declined Plaintiffs’ requests for relief, relying on the government’s representations that no final redevelopment plan existed and that it would provide advance notice of significant changes. At a May 4 hearing, NPS Superintendent Kevin Griess testified that it was “business as usual,” while government counsel agreed to provide notification before removing more than ten trees or undertaking major construction work. The court explained:
“The Court would much prefer not to have to resolve Lorax v. Once‑ler redux. Indeed, for months, the Court declined to intervene. Before early October, Plaintiffs had asked for some form of relief about a dozen times. The Court denied each one. The Court acts now only because the Government did what it assured all it would not do. Without meaningful notice to Plaintiffs or the Court, on October 10, it bulldozed hundreds of trees on the Course. It did so even though, as two NPS officials have testified, there was no urgency.”
The court established that government counsel learned on Oct. 7 that tree removal might begin on Oct. 10 and knew by late Oct. 8 or early Oct. 9 that it would proceed. Yet counsel did not notify Plaintiffs and the court until 4:55 p.m. on Friday, Oct. 9, immediately before a holiday weekend. Less than eighteen hours later, the government began removing hundreds of healthy, nonhazardous trees. Judge Reyes stressed that the court had “literally warned against bulldozers bulldozing on no real notice” and had been “equally clear” that it did not want an “act-first-ask-forgiveness-later situation.”
Turning to the evidence presented at the October hearings, Judge Reyes credited the testimony of Griess and NPS Deputy Director Frank Lands, but made materially different findings concerning Acting NPS Director Jessica Bowron and Interior Department Deputy Chief of Staff Gregory Wischer. The court found: “The Court finds Bowron’s oral testimony credible. However, it concludes that her October declaration was misleading.” Bowron’s declaration, signed on Oct. 6 and filed on Oct. 9, described ongoing work as routine maintenance involving dead, dying, hazardous, or invasive trees, without mentioning the Tree Management Plan (TMP) to remove hundreds of healthy trees. The court noted that Bowron signed the declaration just twenty-four minutes before emailing her edits to the TMP. Judge Reyes stated: “Given that timeline, the omission of the TMP is not just conspicuous—it is misleading.” The court rejected Bowron’s characterization of the operation as “routine maintenance,” although it expressly declined to fault her personally. Instead, it identified the involvement of government counsel:
“The Court does not fault Bowron. At the October 19 hearing, Bowron testified that she relied on Government counsel’s advice when asked why she did not discuss the TMP in her declaration. Counsel must have known that the TMP was a material development that should have been included in any declaration attesting to NPS’s plans on the course.”
In a footnote, Judge Reyes identified this as “a key reason the Court is concerned about Government counsel’s actions in this case,” citing authority concerning “actionable misrepresentations” by “half-truths” and material omissions. The court separately noted that government counsel had reviewed and filed the officials’ declarations subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b).
As to Wischer, who had toured the course with President Trump, Secretary Burgum, and architect Tom Fazio, Judge Reyes expressly found: “The Court does not find Wischer credible.” She rejected his explanation that he had independently become interested in implementing one tree-removal recommendation from the seven-year-old Cultural Landscape Report (CLR), observing that his selective knowledge of the report undermined the government’s stated justification. The court concluded: “Wischer’s characterization of the TMP’s implementation as ‘cleaning up’ the Course is borderline farcical.”
On the disputed existence of the redevelopment plan, Judge Reyes expressly found that “the Washington National Plan—which the Court defines as a plan to destroy the current East Potomac Golf Course and to replace it with a modern, championship-style course designed by Tom Fazio—exists.” Government counsel had argued that President Trump, who had discussed the redesign at least five times, had “at most . . . given preliminary thought to” the plan. Judge Reyes rejected that account: “That claim does not square with the record.” The court also observed that Secretary Burgum had not contradicted the President’s statements, adding in a footnote: “The Court would reach the same conclusion even if it did not consider the Secretary’s silence. But his silence speaks—in the Court’s mind—volumes.” Explaining how she reconciled the conflicting accounts, she wrote: “At this preliminary posture, the Court finds that the Plan is final. If, as DOJ insists, President Trump is wrong, Secretary Burgum can just say so. He has not.” The court continued:
“The best way to reconcile everyone’s accounts is as follows. Secretary Burgum has communicated to President Trump that the Plan is final. The Secretary has not yet read the testifying witnesses in on the details. There is a plan to close the Course soon even if the implementation date remains in some flux. And DOJ cannot acknowledge the President’s account without dropping a key defense to Plaintiffs’ suit, so it has not.”
Judge Reyes emphasized:
“The Court cannot disbelieve the President’s clear, repeated statements of fact when those statements find support in the record and the Government has presented no credible evidence to contradict him.”
The court also rejected the government’s changed litigation position concerning judicial review. Having previously assured the court that major renovations would require compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the government now advanced an “alternative argument” that a course redesign was not reviewable agency action under the APA. Judge Reyes described the reversal as “troubling,” noting that the court had credited the government’s previous position when “repeatedly” declining interim relief. She explained that “parties cannot change course whenever and however the evidence suits them,” and concluded: “the Court does not credit this new argument.” Invoking Department of Commerce v. New York, Judge Reyes further emphasized that even deferential judicial review did not require a court to “exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free,” and that accepting “contrived” reasons would defeat the requirement of reasoned agency explanation.
Judge Reyes then made an express factual finding rejecting the government’s central explanation for the tree removals:
“The Court finds as a factual matter that the TMP was undertaken in furtherance of the Washington National Plan and that the Government’s proffered justification for the TMP—compliance with the CLR—is pretextual.”
The court noted that officials had rushed to implement only the tree-clearing recommendations of the seven-year-old report, while preparing to replace the historic course with a design inconsistent with that report. The court also expressed concern that the timing of the removals had been intended to frustrate judicial review, stating:
“All this is concerning. The Government appears to have set the timing of the tree removal and late notice to impede Plaintiffs’ ability to seek Court intervention. And its recent actions call into question other representations it has made to the Court over these many months.”
Judge Reyes continued:
“The Court cannot turn a blind eye. But neither will it rush to judgment.”
The court ordered the government to show cause by Oct. 28 “as to why the Court should not order it—including relevant DOJ attorneys and staff—to preserve information relevant to the existence of the Washington National Plan, the timing of the tree removal, and the notification of tree removal to Plaintiffs and the Court.”
The court found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their NEPA claim that the government had impermissibly segmented the redevelopment into smaller projects to avoid comprehensive environmental review. Granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Reyes barred further removal or damage to trees and required ten business days’ written advance notice before irreparable modifications to the park pending litigation. The court observed: “The events surrounding this case have become extraordinary. The legal result is not.”
110. Taxpayer-funded Trump advertisements: broadcasts despite “contrary representations made by counsel” and a DHS declaration
Judge Jennifer L. Rochon (Biden appointee), Common Cause v. Department of Homeland Security, 1:26-cv-08882 (S.D.N.Y.)
This case challenges the use of federal funds for a $20 million television advertising campaign promoting President Trump ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections.
In its Oct. 10 opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for emergency relief, the government asserted that the challenged broadcasts would cease on Oct. 11, 2026: “the alleged offending conduct will end tomorrow.” It relied on a declaration from Holly C. Mehringer, the senior official performing the duties of the Department of Homeland Security’s chief financial officer, stating that the contractor, LMD Agency, had purchased advertising placements through Oct. 11 and had been directed not to make additional purchases past that date.
Judge Rochon granted a temporary restraining order and APA stay on Oct. 11. In her Oct. 12 opinion explaining that relief, Judge Rochon rejected the government’s contention that its assurances made the request moot:
“But this representation is somewhat unclear and leaves open whether LMD has already purchased ad placements scheduled to air after October 11, thereby continuing the alleged harm to Plaintiffs. Given this lack of clarity, Defendants have not provided the Court with a reasonable assurance that future transmissions of the advertisements purchased with funds concededly appropriated to DHS will cease as of October 11.” (emphasis added.)
The court also described Mehringer’s qualified statement that DHS had “no plans” for further purchases as “equivocal.” The purchase agreement remained effective, the purchase order’s performance period extended into September 2027, and approximately $1 million remained unspent.
After Plaintiffs submitted evidence of continued broadcasts on Oct. 12, Judge Rochon required a conference, expressly contrasting that evidence with Defendants’ representations that the advertising purchases ended on Oct. 11:
“On October 11, 2026 at 6:45pm, the Court entered a temporary restraining order and stay requiring that the challenged advertisements stop airing. Notwithstanding this and Defendants’ representations that the media-buys ended on October 11, 2026, Dkt. 38 (‘Mehringer Decl.’) ¶ 8, Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the challenged advertisements ran at 2:45 p.m. on October 12, 2026, Dkt. 43-2 (‘Ward-Packard Decl.’) ¶¶ 12-13.” (emphasis added).
In a letter filed before the conference, Plaintiffs identified 32 airings on Oct. 12 and asked the court to examine the discrepancy between those broadcasts and the government’s earlier assurances.
At the Oct. 14 conference, as reported by Courthouse News Service, government counsel Jeffrey Oestericher acknowledged failures in implementing the TRO and offered a tentative explanation for the continued broadcasts, explaining: “My best guess is that they did not follow the instructions about ‘make goods’” (emphasis added).
He was referring to substitute advertising slots compensating for advertisements that had not aired as scheduled. Judge Rochon’s Oct. 14 written order required evidence explaining the broadcasts:
“By October 15, 2026, as discussed during the October 14, 2026 conference, Defendants shall provide the Court with one or more declarations and/or other evidence that explains why challenged advertisements were aired on October 12, 2026 given the contrary representations made by counsel and in paragraph 8 of the Mehringer Declaration, dated October 10, 2026, Dkt. 38.” (emphasis added).
In her Oct. 15 supplemental declaration, Mehringer stated that the final advertisements covered by the DHS purchase order aired at 7:32 and 7:36 p.m. on Oct. 11, after the TRO took effect at 6:45 p.m. but, she understood, before DHS received notice. She maintained, based on the contractor’s reports and broadcast logs received to date, that no advertisements funded under the purchase order, including “make good” broadcasts, aired after Oct. 11. She added that the contractor had instructed media outlets on Oct. 7 not to run any advertisements past Oct. 11.
The declaration nevertheless left unresolved the DNC’s report in Democratic National Committee v. Trump, 1:26-cv-03506 (D.D.C.), that a “Final Battle” advertisement aired on WABC-NY at 3:45 a.m. on Oct. 12. Mehringer stated that the advertisement allegedly bore the disclaimer “Paid for by the U.S. Government” and that DHS had asked the contractor whether it aired in error or used a non-DHS funding source. According to Mehringer, the contractor replied that its logs covered national advertisements and that it “does not presently have any information regarding the above referenced ad” (emphasis added).
111. DOGE access to personnel records: compliance assurance “carries little weight;” “a post hoc rationalization offered for the first time in summary judgment briefing.”
Judge Denise Cote (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees v. Office of Personnel Management, 1:25-cv-01237 (S.D.N.Y.)
This case challenges the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) provision of broad access to sensitive federal personnel records to individuals associated with DOGE.
On Oct. 20, 2026, Judge Cote granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their APA claims, holding that OPM’s grants of access violated the Privacy Act.
Rejecting the government’s contention that subsequent changes had rendered the case moot, Judge Cote questioned the reliability of its assurances. OPM had committed not to restore access for the remaining DOGE agent, Noah Peters, except in conformity with its policies and applicable law. Judge Cote explained: “That assurance carries little weight, given that the defendants engaged in the challenged conduct notwithstanding the existence of policies and law prescribing their actions.”
The court also found that the timing of OPM’s policy revisions closely tracked litigation deadlines, “suggesting that they are driven more by a desire to resolve this case than by a genuine departure from its prior conduct.” OPM repeatedly removed access permissions shortly before court reports were due and revised its safeguards during briefing. Discussing the rule against strategic changes designed to avoid judicial review, the court concluded that “OPM’s behavior, while undoubtedly commendable, appears designed to do just that.”
The opinion separately rejected the government’s explanations for the original access. Judge Cote found no record support for the government’s assertion that a modernization agenda prompted the sweeping grants, and characterized its newly asserted reliance on OPM’s organic statute as “a post hoc rationalization offered for the first time in summary judgment briefing.” She also corrected the government’s description of OPM’s annual audit as addressing DOGE access: the report did not mention the broad grants of access at issue and therefore did “not ‘touch on’ this litigation.”
112. California mail-in ballots: DOJ “allegations are not credible;” “unfounded allegations;” “a procedure rife with uncertainty and errors;” “the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s process is credible”
Judge David O. Carter (Clinton appointee), United States v. State of California, 2:26-cv-12025 (C.D. Cal.).
This case involves the Justice Department’s attempt to require California election officials to set aside mail-in ballots associated with more than 20,000 individuals the federal government identified as likely noncitizens, pending verification of their citizenship.
On Oct. 28, 2026, Judge Carter denied the government’s application for a temporary restraining order. He expressly titled a section of his analysis “Plaintiff’s allegations are not credible.”
Judge Carter wrote that “Plaintiff’s protocol raises significant concerns.” Citing expert evidence, he faulted the government for failing to disclose “the specific matching rules, the specific criteria for its confidence thresholds, [or] any detailed information about the third-party platform and their procedures.” The government waited until the night before the hearing to identify that third-party platform as Lexis Nexis, but how it conducted its analysis—including how it “linked names to Social Security numbers not available on the California public voter file”—remained unknown. The government likewise failed to explain its “enrichment process.” Judge Carter continued:
“Plaintiff also provided ‘no error rates’ or ‘validation against a reliable benchmark’ that would enable a determination of the accuracy of its findings. Omissions of this critical information prevent an evaluation of Plaintiff’s procedure, including how Plaintiff reduced its initial claim of nearly 200,000 alleged noncitizens to 20,000 individuals.”
He concluded:
“Given the vagueness of Plaintiff’s descriptions of its procedures and the unreliability of its similar claims in other states, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s process is credible. This calls into question its allegation that the individuals on the October List are ‘highly likely to be noncitizen[s].’ Given that Plaintiff’s entire claim for relief rests on the sincerity of this allegation, Plaintiff’s lack of credibility weighs against a finding in their favor.”
Judge Carter rejected the government’s characterization of the requested relief as merely temporary ballot segregation. It had supplied no process or access to information enabling state and county officials to verify citizenship and admitted that it could not complete verification before Election Day. He explained:
“If the United States, with its capabilities, could not do so, there is no reason to believe that California or the County could. Thus, a ballot segregated, in effect, would be a ballot removed.”
The court identified naturalized citizens as those most at risk of disenfranchisement. It also cited a federal whistleblower report stating that individuals were identified as noncitizens “based solely on DHS data that is unverified, inconsistent with other information, and/or is unexplained” to reviewing employees, who were reportedly given “only twelve minutes to determine if a subject is a U.S. citizen.” Judge Carter observed: “It is no surprise that citizens are wrongly identified as noncitizens.” He continued:
“Had Nevada officials accepted Plaintiff’s allegations there as true, 185 citizens would have been deprived of their vote. This Court will not deprive Californians who have met the requirements for voter registration of their fundamental right because of Plaintiff’s unfounded allegations.”
Addressing the government’s repeated assertion that the listed individuals were likely ineligible noncitizens, Judge Carter stated that “the Court does not give this allegation credence.”
The court separately rejected the asserted urgency: “Plaintiff’s theoretical risk of imminent harm is solely due to its own neglect.” Although the government had obtained voter data months earlier, it waited until shortly before the election to sue: “Plaintiff’s unexplained delay of multiple months refutes its eleventh-hour claim of irreparable harm.”
Judge Carter concluded that eligible registered voters must not lose a core right because of “unfounded allegations stemming from a procedure rife with uncertainty and errors.”
Chapter 3. Court Findings of “Arbitrary and Capricious” Administrative Action
The opposite of following the rules and acting with procedural consistency—behavior that undergirds the presumption of regularity—is arbitrary and capricious decision-making under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). In other words, since the presumption of regularity is based on the notion that agencies generally follow regular procedures, what happens if the baseline order of business is different? What if arbitrary and capricious conduct was instead widespread or pervasive? The application of the presumption would lose the basis for its support.
In this Chapter, we document 145 cases in which courts have held that the administration engaged or likely engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct since Jan. 20, 2025. Although some readers might wonder whether, in theory, findings of arbitrary and capricious conduct may not always suggest agency irregularity in the relevant sense for the presumption of regularity, the excerpted court opinions below allow one to gauge the nature and gravity of these judicial findings.
Notably, this catalog of cases reflects only a subset of instances in which courts have found the government violated required administrative procedures. In other cases, courts have set aside administrative actions that were “not in accordance with law” or that occurred “without observance of procedure required by law.” See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) & (D). In other words, the list below is arguably a conservative estimate of court findings of government wrongdoing.
As noted in the Introduction, the separate Habeas Tracker documented at least 10 additional habeas immigration cases in which courts have found arbitrary and capricious administrative action.
The following list is in chronological order of the relevant judicial determination.
1. Federal funding freeze: no reasoned explanation, no regard for consequences
Judge Loren L. AliKhan (Biden appointee), National Council of Nonprofits v. Office of Management and Budget, 1:25-cv-00239 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: OMB memo M-25-13 instituting a “temporary pause” of grants, loans, and assistance programs (memo cited a variety of relevant EOs).
On Feb. 3, 2025, Judge AliKhan granted Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent OMB memo M-25-13 from having effect. On Feb. 25, Judge AliKhan entered a preliminary injunction (PI).
In the Feb. 3 TRO, she wrote:
“Defendants have offered no rational explanation for why they needed to freeze all federal financial assistance—with less than twenty-four-hours’ notice—to ‘safeguard valuable taxpayer resources.’ … Rather than taking a measured approach to identify purportedly wasteful spending, Defendants cut the fuel supply to a vast, complicated, nationwide machine—seemingly without any consideration for the consequences of that decision. To say that OMB ‘failed to consider an important aspect of the problem’ would be putting it mildly.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In the Feb. 25 PI, Judge AliKhan offered substantially similar reasoning, concluding:
“The arbitrary-and-capricious review at this stage of the litigation remains largely unchanged from the court’s earlier opinion. The touchstone of this inquiry is rationality, and Defendants’ actions flunk that test. Defendants still cannot provide a reasonable explanation for why they needed to freeze all federal financial assistance in less than a day to ‘safeguard valuable taxpayer resources.’ …
In the simplest terms, the freeze was ill-conceived from the beginning. … Defendants’ actions were irrational, imprudent, and precipitated a nationwide crisis. Plaintiffs have therefore shown a likelihood of success on their arbitrary and capricious claim.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On May 12, 2025, the district court stayed proceedings pending appeal of the preliminary injunction. On Aug. 21, 2026, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, concluding that rescission of the challenged OMB memorandum had likely rendered the dispute moot. Following the parties’ stipulation, the district court dismissed the action without prejudice on Sept. 30.
2. HHS website takedowns: no reasoned explanation, reliance interests ignored
Judge John D. Bates (Bush appointee), Doctors for America v. Office of Personnel Management, 1:25-cv-00322 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Removal of information from HHS websites under Executive Order on “Gender Ideology Extremism” (Executive Order 14168)
On Feb. 11, 2025, Judge Bates granted a temporary restraining order, stating:
“The Court agrees that DFA has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to this claim. By removing long relied upon medical resources without explanation, it is likely that each agency failed to ‘examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’. Hand in hand with the lack of explanation, it is also likely that the agencies ‘failed to consider’ the ‘important’ issue of the substantial reliance by medical professionals on the removed webpages. Ramachandran and Liou attest that they ‘rely on webpages and datasets’ from the CDC and FDA ‘to do [their] work’ … Medical providers’ widespread and routine reliance on information is an identified and adequately alleged reliance interest. DFA has thus shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits as to its claims that CDC, HHS, and FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in removing the webpages.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
After the TRO expired on Feb. 25, plaintiffs filed an expedited motion for summary judgment (with a preliminary-injunction request) to secure merits relief on the legality of the OPM Memo and HHS Guidance—the same directives at the heart of the TRO.
On July 2, 2025, granting in part Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denying their preliminary-injunction request as moot, Bates wrote:
“Considering the scant administrative record, the answer here is clear: neither the OPM Memo nor the HHS Guidance was the product of reasoned decisionmaking. … The E.O. itself thus does not provide a reasoned explanation for these specific actions by the agencies. …
But common sense dictates there are numerous ways to remove an offending word or statement without rescinding the entire webpage. Why did the agencies choose this route? The OPM Memo, HHS Guidance, and administrative record are again silent. Similarly, although the defendants stated an intent to modify some of the removed webpages, there is silence as to why the agencies chose to remove the webpages pending mere modification. …
The defendants have not explained their decisionmaking, and from the sparse administrative record it cannot ‘reasonably be discerned.’ …
The defendants engendered the plaintiffs’ substantial reliance on the webpages and datasets. The APA thus required the defendants to weigh that reliance against competing policy concerns before adopting removal policies. … Because the defendants admittedly failed to do so, the OPM Memo and HHS Guidance were yet again arbitrary and capricious. …
The defendants’ actions were ill-conceived from the beginning. Rather than taking a measured approach to harmonizing the HHS defendants’ public-facing webpages with the Gender Ideology E.O., considering their other statutory obligations, and ascertaining and weighing the obvious reliance interests—which the E.O. left the agencies time to do—the defendants instead adopted policies of ‘remove first and assess later’ that failed to consider multiple important aspects of the situation. … In fact, the administrative record is devoid of reasoning generally, save a handful of references to the E.O. and the OPM Memo. The APA requires more. … A court must consider whether the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did, … and here the evidence did not. For these reasons, the OPM Memo and HHS Guidance were arbitrary and capricious and thus violated the APA. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
3-4. Foreign-aid freeze: no explanation, blanket suspension, reliance interests ignored
Judge Amir Ali (Biden appointee), AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. United States Department of State, 1:25-cv-00400 (D.D.C.) and Global Health Council v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00402 (D.D.C.) (related cases)
Executive Action: Foreign-aid suspension and withholding (Executive Order 14169 and implementing State Department directives).
On Feb. 13, 2025, Judge Ali issued a temporary restraining order, stating:
“There has been no explanation offered in the record, let alone a ‘satisfactory explanation … including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,’ as to why reviewing programs—many longstanding and taking place pursuant to contractual terms— required an immediate and wholesale suspension of appropriated foreign aid. Plaintiffs have also shown that implementation of the blanket suspension is likely arbitrary and capricious given the apparent failure to consider immense reliance interests, including among businesses and other organizations across the country. No aspect of the implemented policies or submissions offered by Defendants at the hearing suggests they considered and had a rational reason for disregarding the massive reliance interests of the countless small and large businesses that would have to shutter programs or shutter their businesses altogether and furlough or lay off swaths of Americans in the process. In their implementation of the blanket suspension of foreign aid, Defendants accordingly appear to have ‘entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.’”(emphasis added).
On Mar. 10, the court granted in part a preliminary injunction, reaffirming its TRO conclusion that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their APA challenge to the original blanket suspension. Judge Ali wrote that it “continues to be true with respect to the original implementing directives” that “Defendants’ implementation of a blanket suspension of congressionally appropriated foreign aid pending review was arbitrary and capricious.” He continued:
“Defendants have yet to offer any explanation, let alone one supported by the record, for why a blanket suspension setting off a shockwave and upending reliance interests for thousands of businesses and organizations around the country was a rational precursor to reviewing programs. …
Despite pointing to the possibility of waivers again in their preliminary injunction briefing, Defendants have not proffered any evidence to rebut the showing Plaintiffs made at the TRO stage. …
Because the current record does not include ‘a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’ and indicates Defendants ‘entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,’ Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their APA claims as they relate to the original directives implementing a blanket suspension of aid.” (emphasis added).
On Aug. 28, 2025, the D.C. Circuit’s amended judgment vacated the portion of the March injunction involving impoundment. The court expressly distinguished the APA claims concerning the initial funding freeze, stating that those claims were not on appeal. It also left unresolved whether the Impoundment Control Act precluded APA suits to enforce appropriations laws. The full D.C. Circuit also denied rehearing en banc that day. In an accompanying statement, Judge Bradley Garcia, joined by Judge Patricia Millett, explained that the panel’s amendments allowed the appropriations-based APA claim to proceed in district court.
On Sept. 3, Judge Ali granted a renewed preliminary injunction in both cases. He wrote:
“The Court previously concluded in granting a TRO and later a preliminary injunction that Defendants’ blanket determination to freeze foreign aid funds was likely arbitrary and capricious. … The same is true of the agency Defendants’ decision to simply not spend billions of dollars in congressionally appropriated foreign aid across numerous categories and instead let those funds expire. Defendants have not offered any explanation for the decision to ignore billions of dollars in appropriated funds rather than obligate them in a manner that aligns with both Congress’s stated purposes and the Executive’s priorities. Nor do Defendants appear to have considered the reliance interests of Plaintiffs and other organizations, or the beneficiaries of their services, who have relied on the agencies’ longstanding policies and practices.” (emphasis added).
On Sept. 26, 2025, after the district court and D.C. Circuit denied stays, the Supreme Court partially stayed the Sept. 3 injunction, as to approximately $4 billion covered by the President’s Aug. 28 rescission proposal. The Court concluded that the government had made a sufficient preliminary showing that the Impoundment Control Act precluded the APA suit to enforce those appropriations and that mandamus relief was unavailable. It expressly cautioned: “This order should not be read as a final determination on the merits.” On Feb. 18, 2026, the D.C. Circuit dismissed both consolidated appeals from the September injunction on the government’s unopposed motion, without deciding their merits.
On Sept. 25, 2026, in Global Health Council, Judge Ali allowed the APA claims, including the arbitrary-and-capricious claim, to proceed past dismissal. He rejected the government’s argument that the Supreme Court’s interim stay conclusively foreclosed those claims. The court held that Plaintiffs plausibly alleged inadequate explanations and failures to consider reliance interests and reasonable alternatives; adjudication on the administrative record remained outstanding.
5. DOGE Treasury access: serious risks ignored
Judge Jeannette A. Vargas (Biden appointee), State of New York v. Trump, 1:25-cv-01144 (S.D.N.Y.)
Executive Action: Disclosure of personal and financial records to DOGE
On Feb. 21, 2025, Judge Vargas issued a preliminary injunction, stating:
“Based upon the factual record developed to date, the Court finds that Plaintiffs will more likely than not succeed in establishing that the agency’s processes for permitting the Treasury DOGE Team access to critical BFS payment systems, with full knowledge of the serious risks that access entailed, was arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
On Sept. 23, 2026, Judge Vargas dismissed the claims challenging DOGE’s access to Treasury systems as moot after that access ended, and dismissed the remaining payment-related claims. On Oct. 5, the Second Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal pursuant to the parties’ stipulated withdrawal.
6. Probationary firings: false performance premise, no actual review, unexplained exemptions
Judge William Haskell Alsup (Clinton appointee), American Federation Of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Office of Personnel Management and Charles Ezell, 3:25-cv-01780 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Large-scale reductions in force / Termination of probationary employees (Executive Order 14210)
On Feb. 28, 2025, Judge Alsup issued an amended temporary restraining order, finding:
“Plaintiffs are also likely to show that the OPM directive was an arbitrary and capricious action. . . . The key fact here is that the template letters sent from OPM to the directed agencies stated: ‘[T]he Agency finds, based on your performance, that you have not demonstrated that your further employment at the Agency would be in the public interest.’ First, it is unlikely, if not impossible, that the agencies themselves had the time to conduct actual performance reviews of the thousands terminated in such a short span of time. It is even less plausible that OPM alone managed to do so. In at least one instance, a terminated scientist had received a glowing review… five days before he was terminated ‘for [his] performance.’ ‘Reliance on facts that an agency knows are false at the time it relies on them is the essence of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking.’” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Mar. 13, Judge Alsup granted Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, stating: “OPM’s ultra vires directive is likely to constitute an unlawful final agency action that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,’ ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,’ and ‘without observance of procedure required by law.’” Defendants filed an ex parte motion to stay the injunction pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit, but Judge Alsup denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit further denied the request for an administrative stay on Mar. 17. However, on Apr. 8, the Supreme Court granted the requested stay on the basis of standing. On Apr. 18, Judge Alsup granted another preliminary injunction, applying the original preliminary injunction to new union plaintiffs, under an unspecified provision of the APA (“OPM’ directive constituted an ultra vires act that infringed upon all impacted agencies’ statutory authority to hire and fire their own employees… No statute — anywhere, ever — has granted OPM the authority to direct the termination of employees in other agencies”).
On Jun. 5, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, leading Defendants to also cross-move for summary judgment on Jul. 3. On Sept. 12, Judge Alsup granted Plaintiffs’ motion, holding:
“The OPM directive was arbitrary and capricious: It directed the termination of over 25,000 probationers across the federal government ‘based on [their] performance’ pursuant to Sections 315.803 and 315.804 without any consideration of actual performance or conduct, or any ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ The record contains repeated, unequivocal direction to agencies that ‘agencies must identify performance or conduct deficiencies in the notice terminating a probationer’. The record does not contain a single mention of any performance deficiency on the part of any probationer terminated pursuant to OPM’s directive. Even where OPM granted agencies’ pleas for exemptions, it provided ‘no explanation at all’ for doing so… OPM lacked the authority to direct other agencies to terminate their probationary employees and violated the APA when it did so.”
Following entry of final judgment, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals from the March and April preliminary injunctions as moot on Sept. 29, 2025. The government separately appealed the final judgment. The appeal remains ongoing following August 2026 oral argument.
7. Refugee admissions suspension: no explanation, reliance interests ignored, alternatives ignored
Judge Jamal N. Whitehead (Biden appointee), Pacito v. Trump, 2:25-cv-00255 (W.D. Wash.)
Executive Action: Suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (Executive Order No. 14163) and Refugees Funding Suspension (Dept. of State Notice)
On Feb. 28, 2025, Judge Whitehead issued a preliminary injunction preventing the suspension of the Refugee Admissions Program:
“The Agency Defendants provided no explanation whatsoever for these substantive expansions of the USRAP EO. They did not, as is required under arbitrary-and-capricious review, acknowledge, let alone meaningfully consider, the reliance interests of refugees, U.S. citizens, and resettlement nonprofits harmed by their actions. Nor did they articulate any consideration of alternative options—such as the implementation of a case-by-case admissions system at the discretion of the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security—that might mitigate the harms of the Agency Suspension. Instead, they merely cite the USRAP EO as a justification for their actions. But the USRAP EO—which is itself unlawful—cannot, on its face, explain the Agency Defendants’ discretionary expansions of the USRAP EO.
The Refugee Funding Suspension likewise went far beyond the text of the Foreign Aid EO that it purported to implement. … [The] EO calls only for a pause in ‘foreign development assistance’ and says nothing about USRAP, refugee case processing, or refugee services. Nevertheless, the Agency Defendants, with no explanation, construed the Foreign Aid EO as requiring the total suspension of all funding for USRAP operations— including, contrary to reason, funding for domestic refugee resettlement support. …
As with the Agency Suspension, the Agency Defendants provided no reasoned explanation for the Refugee Funding Suspension. … Secretary Rubio issued the Suspension Notices because USRAP-related funding ‘is appropriated under the ‘Migration and Refugee Assistance’ (MRA) heading of title III of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOAA)”—which was paused in response to the Foreign Aid EO. This is no explanation at all. Defendants effectively concede that Secretary Rubio discretionarily halted USRAP funding yet give no insight into the reasons for that decision. Nor did the Agency Defendants apparently consider reasonable alternatives. …
Additionally, the State Department did not acknowledge the apparent deviation from its own regulations implementing the Refugee Act… Those regulations expressly provide that ‘[p]ayments for allowable costs must not be withheld … unless required by Federal statute, regulations, or’ if ‘[t]he recipient … has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Federal award’ or ‘is delinquent in a debt to the United States.’ None of those conditions appear to be met here.
In sum, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are likely to prove that the Agency Suspension and the Refugee Funding Suspension are arbitrary and capricious and must therefore be set aside under the APA.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Mar. 24, Judge Whitehead granted the plaintiffs’ supplemental preliminary injunction after the State Department responded to the Feb. 28 PI by issuing one-page notices terminating the resettlement agencies’ cooperative agreements as “no longer effectuat[ing] agency priorities.” In granting that relief, Judge Whitehead found the mass terminations—which dismantled USRAP infrastructure—lacked any reasoned explanation and were likely arbitrary and capricious, and it enjoined the terminations and ordered the agreements reinstated. Judge Whitehead wrote:
“The Court finds strong evidence that the Funding Termination is arbitrary and capricious. Most fundamentally, DOS provided no factual findings or bases for its termination decisions, making it impossible to ‘articulate[] a rational connection between the facts [it] found and the choice [it] made.’ … This marks the Funding Termination as arbitrary and capricious because it constitutes a shift in agency policy without any reasoned explanation.
The Government has failed to show that the Agency Defendants ever assessed the reliance interests they engendered through their longstanding USRAPinfrastructure and standard USRAP practices. Nor has the Government shown that the Agency Defendants ‘weigh[ed] any such interests against competing policy concerns,’ … or that they considered alternatives to the Funding Termination that fell ‘within the ambit of existing [policy].’” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Mar. 5, 2026, the Ninth Circuit, affirming in part and reversing in part Judge Whitehead’s Mar. 24, 2025 preliminary injunction, held that the State Department’s defunding of overseas refugee-processing operations was not arbitrary and capricious, explaining that once the executive order suspended refugee entry, it saw “no reason why the State Department should be required to maintain an overseas structure capable of processing tens of thousands of applications when the executive order has limited entry to case-by-case consideration.” But the panel reached the opposite conclusion as to other parts of the program. It held that the government likely acted contrary to law by failing to provide statutorily mandated services to refugees already admitted to the United States, and that the termination of cooperative agreements for resettlement support centers was likely arbitrary and capricious because the government “failed to provide reasoned explanations, factual findings, or bases for the termination,” and ended those agreements without considering refugees’ reliance interests.
8. NIH indirect-cost cap: conclusory rationale, ignored research realities, no rational connection
Judge Angel Kelley (Biden appointee), Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. National Institutes of Health, 1:25-cv-10338 (D. Mass.), Association of American Medical Colleges v. National Institutes of Health, 1:25-cv-10340 (D. Mass.), and Association of American Universities, et al. v. Department of Health and Human Services, 1:25-cv-10346 (D. Mass.) (consolidated cases)
Executive Action: NIH’s 15% cap on indirect-cost reimbursement for research grants (Feb. 7, 2025 guidance, NOT-OD-25-068).
On Mar. 5, 2025, Judge Kelley ruled that a preliminary injunction should be issued to prevent the reduction, stating:
“[T]he explanations for the cap of 15% on ICRs are insufficient, and thus the Rate Change Notice is arbitrary and capricious, for two reasons.
First, the explanations are conclusory. … As described above, NIH failed to provide any reasoning, rationale, or justification at all. It claims that more funds will go to direct research but fails to address how the money will actually be directed to cover direct costs and how that research will be conducted absent the necessary indirect cost reimbursements provided by the federal government. This is particularly true considering the number of universities and associations that have made clear that research will have to be cut, as other funding sources will not be able to make up the shortfall. … NIH asserts the Rate Change Notice will bring the ICRs in line with private foundations, providing no explanation for this choice in light of the fact that private organizations, like the Gates Foundation, are ‘more expansive than NIH in defining direct costs, meaning some overhead payments are wrapped in with the grant.’ … The failure to provide any type of reasoning renders the Rate Change Notice arbitrary and capricious. …
Second, NIH’s proffered ‘reasons’ fail to grapple with the relevant factors or pertinent aspects of the problem and fails to demonstrate a rational connection between the facts and choice that was made. … As the reasons in the Rate Change Notice are both conclusory and fail to grapple with the necessary factors, facts, and pertinent aspects of the problem demanded by this change from the existing ICR negotiation process, the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in their claims that the Rate Change Notice is arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added)
After the Mar. 5 PI, defendants—with the plaintiffs’ assent—moved to convert that order into a permanent injunction, telling the court there were no remaining factual or legal disputes and that conversion would allow prompt appellate review. Judge Kelley granted the motion on Apr. 4, entered a nationwide permanent injunction and final judgment and vacated the NIH Guidance (finding the guidance unlawful, including as arbitrary and capricious).
On Jan. 5, 2026, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment setting aside NIH’s 15% indirect-cost cap and permanently enjoining its implementation. The court relied on Congress’s appropriations restrictions and the regulations governing negotiated indirect-cost rates.
9. Federal funding freeze: no rationality, sweeping breadth, ignored consequences
Judge John James McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), State of New York v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00039 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: “Temporary Pause” of grants, loans, and assistance programs
On Mar. 6, 2025, Judge McConnell issued a preliminary injunction on the executive freeze of federal funds, stating:
“The Court finds that the Defendants have not provided a rational reason that the need to ‘safeguard valuable taxpayer resources’ is justified by such a sweeping pause of nearly all federal financial assistance with such short notice. Rather than taking a deliberate, thoughtful approach to finding these alleged unsubstantiated ‘wasteful or fraudulent expenditures,’ the Defendants abruptly froze billions of dollars of federal funding for an indefinite period. It is difficult to perceive any rationality in this decision—let alone thoughtful consideration of practical consequences—when these funding pauses endanger the States’ ability to provide vital services, including but not limited to public safety, health care, education, childcare, and transportation infrastructure. … Thus, the States have substantiated a likelihood of success of proving that the Agency Defendants’ implementation of the funding freeze was arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added)
On Mar. 16, 2026, in an opinion and judgment, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious challenge to the funding freeze. It also affirmed the April enforcement orders, but vacated the preliminary injunction insofar as it compelled grant-like payments over which the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.
10. DEIA grant terminations: no reasoned explanation, improper factors
Judge Julie R. Rubin (Biden appointee), American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education v. Carter, 1:25-cv-00702 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Ban on DEIA initiatives in the executive branch and by contractors and grantees (Executive Order 14168, Executive Order 14151, Executive Order 14173)
On Mar. 17, 2025, Judge Rubin issued a preliminary injunction on the ban, stating:
“[The grant termination decisions] are likely to be proven arbitrary and capricious, because the Department’s action was unreasonable, not reasonably explained, based on factors Congress had not intended the Department to consider (i.e., not agency priorities), and otherwise not in accordance with law.”
On Apr. 10, 2025, the Fourth Circuit granted a stay of the PI pending the government’s appeal. On Mar. 17, 2026, the parties stipulated to dismissing the district court proceedings.
11. DOGE SSA access: no reasonable explanation, rushed protocol violations, no demonstrated need
Judge Ellen Lipton Hollander (Obama appointee), American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Social Security Administration, 1:25-cv-00596 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Disclosure of personal and financial records to DOGE
On Mar. 20, 2025, Judge Hollander issued a temporary restraining order preventing DOGE from accessing SSA system data, writing:
“As discussed, defendants have not provided the Court with a reasonable explanation for why the DOGE Team needs access to the wide swath of data maintained in SSA systems in order to root out fraud and abuse. … [D]efendants disregarded protocols for proper hiring, onboarding, training, and access limitations, and, in a rushed fashion, provided access to a massive amount of sensitive, confidential data to members of the DOGE Team, without any articulated explanation for the need to do so. …
Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on a claim that the conduct at issue was unreasonable and capricious. Plaintiffs have therefore shown a likelihood of success on their arbitrary and capricious claim.”
On Apr. 17, she further issued a preliminary injunction (PI) preventing DOGE team members from accessing data, stating reasoning very similar to her TRO:
“As discussed, defendants have not provided the Court with a reasonable explanation for why the entire DOGE Team needs full access to the wide swath of data maintained in SSA systems in order to undertake the projects. … [D]efendants ran roughshod over SSA protocols for proper hiring, onboarding, training, and, most important, access limitations and separation of duties. …
SSA hastily provided access to an enormous quantity of sensitive, confidential data to members of the DOGE Team, without meaningful explanation for why these members needed access to PII to perform their duties. Indeed, the Administrative Record is rife with examples of ambiguous explanations for why DOGE Team members sought access to PII. Not once did Dudek inquire further into why this access is needed. Nor did he ever reject any request for access. …
Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on a claim that the conduct at issue was unreasonable and capricious. Plaintiffs have therefore shown a likelihood of success on their arbitrary and capricious claim under the APA.”
On June 6, the Supreme Court stayed Judge Hollander’s PI pending appeal, and on Aug. 13, the district court stayed further proceedings while the Fourth Circuit considered the appeal. On Apr. 10, 2026, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the PI and remanded for further proceedings. Nine judges concluded that Plaintiffs had made the required preliminary showing of standing, but a different nine agreed that they had not established irreparable harm, reasoning that damages or a permanent injunction could provide an adequate remedy. The court did not resolve whether SSA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.
12. Public-health grant cuts: conclusory pandemic rationale, no rational connection, reliance interests ignored
Judge Mary Susan McElroy (Trump appointee), State of Colorado v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1:25-cv-00121 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Termination of public health grants
On Apr. 5, 2025, Judge McElroy granted the plaintiffs’ request for a TRO, stating:
“For starters, the mass termination of funding was likely not substantively reasonable. … As the States explain, Congress had already rescinded plenty of COVID-era public health spending in 2023. … But ‘Congress chose not to rescind the funding for the grants and cooperatives agreements at issue in this case.’ …
It is well-established that in the interpretation of statutes, the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of others. … So Congress’s decision to eliminate some COVID-era public health measures but leave alone the funding at issue here presumably signals its intent to continue that funding. … With that in mind, the Court struggles to see how HHS, an agent of the Executive, can exercise discretion to eliminate ten billion dollars’ worth of it summarily. …
Nor does it seem that the mass terminations were reasonably explained. The Court struggles to see the requisite ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ … The States had no reason to expect that the already-allocated grant money would suddenly be terminated, and they relied on this funding to support their public health programs and initiatives. Of course, agencies ‘are free to change their existing policies,’ but they must ‘provide a reasoned explanation for the change,’ ‘display awareness that [they are] changing position,” and consider ‘serious reliance interests.’ … The termination notices provided to the States on March 24 and 25 failed to provide a reasoned explanation for the sudden change in its position or consider the States’ reliance interests, which are substantial under the circumstances.
The States have thus demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on their claim that these terminations were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On May 16, Judge McElroy granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, stating:
“Merely relying on a conclusory explanation that the funds are no longer necessary because the pandemic is over does not demonstrate a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ … The Government’s determination was unreasonable in light of Congress’s direction that the appropriations at issue be used beyond the pandemic and to better prepare for future public health threats. …
Given Congress’s clear intent to keep the appropriations at issue intact, the Court cannot say HHS provided any rational basis to justify its decision to terminate the funds based on the end of the pandemic. That is sufficient to end the analysis, but to be thorough, the Court will address additional “arbitrary and capricious” arguments. …
[T]he determination that funding appropriated by Congress is no longer necessary requires an assessment of the grantees’ compliance with the agreements, which HHS declined to do. … And based on its own interpretations, HHS may terminate awards “for cause” when a party has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant under § 75.372(a). There is no evidence that happened here. …
While HHS acknowledged its change of position, it provided no explanation to the States as to why it did so suddenly and contrary to Congress’s will that certain COVID-era spending was needed beyond the immediate public health emergency that ended in May 2023. …
HHS’ Public Health Funding Decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider the States’ reliance interests on the funds and the devastating consequences that would result from abruptly terminating critical public health appropriations. … Indeed, it appears HHS gave no consideration to the programs and services that would be impacted by these terminations when it decided the funds were no longer necessary based on the end of the pandemic. …
The Court agrees that HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it applied ‘for cause’ terminations here because contrary to statutory and regulatory authority, HHS never claimed any failure on part of the States to comply with their grant agreements. …
Once again, the States have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on their claim that these terminations were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On July 29, 2025, the First Circuit granted the government assented-to motion to dismiss its appeal. On Sept. 22, 2026, the district court granted the parties’ joint request to pause proceedings through Nov. 9 while expressly preserving the preliminary injunction.
13. Clean-energy grant freeze: no rational basis, freeze-first approach, reliance interests ignored
Judge Mary Susan McElroy (Trump appointee), Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council v. Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-00097 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Unleashing American Energy (Exec. Order No. 14154); Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing (Executive Order 14151); Implementing the President’s “Department of Government Efficiency” Cost Efficiency Initiative (Executive Order 14222)
On Apr. 15, 2025, Judge McElroy granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs
“have adequately shown at least three ways that the sudden, indefinite freeze of all already awarded IIJA and IRA money was arbitrary and capricious: it was neither reasonable nor reasonably explained, and it also failed to account for any reliance interests. …
The Court finds that the Government failed to provide a rational reason that the need to ‘safeguard valuable taxpayer resources’ justifies a sweeping pause of all already-awarded IIJA and IRA funds with such short notice. …
‘The APA requires a rational connection between the facts, the agency’s rationale, and the ultimate decision.’ … Here, there is none. …
The Government also ignored significant reliance interests. … Nothing from OMB, the NEC Director, or the five Agency Defendants shows that they considered the consequences of their broad, indefinite freezes: projects halted, staff laid off, goodwill tarnished. … Instead, they ‘essentially adopted a ‘freeze first, ask questions later’ approach.’” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Aug. 7, 2026, in an opinion and accompanying judgment, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious challenge to the funding freeze because Defendants failed to consider grant recipients’ reliance interests. The court vacated the provision compelling grant payments as beyond the district court’s authority under the APA, while affirming the remaining preliminary relief.
14. EPA climate grants: no explanation, generalized accusations, regulations ignored
Judge Tanya Sue Chutkan (Obama appointee), Climate United Fund v. Citibank , 1:25-cv-00698 (D.D.C.) (and consolidated cases)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Apr. 15, Judge Chutkan granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. An Apr. 16 accompanying memorandum opinion stated:
“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claims because EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to explain its reasoning and acted contrary to its regulations in suspending and terminating Plaintiffs’ grants. …
The court finds that EPA failed to set forth the reasons for its decision because it did not say anything about its decision, for weeks. …
Though repeatedly pressed on the issue, EPA offers no rational explanation for why it suspended the grants and then immediately terminated the entire NCIF and CCIA grant programs overnight. Nor has EPA offered any rational explanation for why it needed to cancel the grants to safeguard taxpayer resources, especially when it had begun examining the grant programs to add oversight mechanisms, or why it needed to cancel every single grant to review some aspects of the GGRF program with which it was concerned. …
In the letters terminating the grant programs, EPA provided no individualized reasoning as to anything Plaintiffs themselves did—instead referencing generalized and unsubstantiated reasons for termination—’substantial concerns regarding program integrity, the award process, programmatic fraud, waste, and abuse, and misalignment with the Agency’s priorities.’ …
EPA Defendants’ actions defy the plain language of the regulations that govern its decision-making in grant funding—it can only terminate a federal award on this basis pursuant to the terms and conditions of the federal award.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Dec. 17, 2025, the D.C. Circuit granted rehearing en banc and vacated its September panel judgment vacating the preliminary injunction. On Aug. 4, 2026, the en banc court affirmed the injunction’s prohibition on implementing EPA’s March 11, 2025 termination notices by a 6–4 vote, concluding that EPA’s attempt to terminate the grants and reclaim disbursed funds solely over a policy disagreement likely contravened the Inflation Reduction Act’s mandatory appropriation. The remaining provisions of the injunction were affirmed by a 5–5 division. The judgment did not separately analyze or produce a majority ruling on the district court’s arbitrary-and-capricious rationale.
On Aug. 7, the D.C. Circuit withheld the mandate and extended the partial administrative stay through Nov. 9, 2026, directing both to continue pending the Supreme Court’s final disposition upon timely notification that a certiorari petition had been filed. On Oct. 9, the D.C. Circuit clarified that the stay did not cover funds Coalition for Green Capital had withdrawn from Treasury’s payment system or its Citibank grant accounts before the stay was entered on Apr. 16, 2025.
15-16. U.S. Global Media dismantling: no reasoned analysis, statutory duties and reliance interests ignored
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Abramowitz v. Lake, 1:25-cv-00887 (D.D.C.) and Widakuswara v. Lake, 1:25-cv-01015 (D.D.C.) (related cases)
Executive Action: Governance and Defunding Global Media and Global Internet Freedom (Executive Order 14238 – Continuing the Reduction of the Federal Bureaucracy)
On Apr. 22, 2025, Judge Lamberth granted in part a preliminary injunction in Widakuswara, which also applied to the related Abramowitz case. The court wrote:
“In short, the defendants had no method or approach towards shutting down USAGM that this Court can discern. They took immediate and drastic action to slash USAGM, without considering its statutorily or constitutionally required functions as required by the plain language of the EO, and without regard to the harm inflicted on employees, contractors, journalists, and media consumers around the world. It is hard to fathom a more straightforward display of arbitrary and capricious actions than the Defendants’ actions here.” (emphasis added).
In his Sept. 29 memorandum order enforcing the preliminary injunction, Judge Lamberth found that defendants had “thumb[ed] their noses at Congress’s commands” and offered answers “dripping with indifference to their statutory obligations,” and that some of Kari Lake’s responses during her deposition testimony were “the height of arbitrariness.” The court further noted that “the defendants still have not provided the Court a non-arbitrary justification for the proposed reduction in force. Instead, the record remains ‘a total explanatory void’” (emphasis added).
On Mar. 17, 2026, Judge Lamberth granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that “[t]he agency action is arbitrary and capricious because the defendants failed to consider statutory factors, Congressional appropriations, and reliance interests.” Revisiting the claim on the fuller record, Judge Lamberth reiterated that there had been “‘an absence of any analysis whatsoever’” supporting the agency’s actions. Although Defendants had since produced the Statutory Minimum Memorandum, which was the agency’s only contemporaneous justification, the court found that it was “little more than a list of positions that the agency concluded are necessary to fulfill minimum statutory obligations.”
The Memorandum, the court wrote, “does not mention, let alone analyze, whether such staffing would permit the agency to comply with the broadcasting standards and principles set by Congress.” Judge Lamberth held that “[t]he failure to do so is arbitrary and capricious in its own right.” The court further found that the Memorandum “fails to address many requirements established by appropriation statutes, including notification requirements and region- and medium-specific broadcasting requirements;” “[n]or does the agency explain why it considered certain statutory requirements of the CEO to the exclusion of so many others;” and “[i]t certainly does not account for reliance interests of the employees, the consuming public, or anyone else.”
Judge Lamberth also found that USAGM had “put the cart before the horse” by deciding what constituted the statutory minimum and removing staff “before consulting” the Department of State concerning the deletion of language services. He described the Memorandum as “consistent” with the court’s earlier characterization of the agency’s conduct as a “hasty, indiscriminate approach” to administrative action. Nor could Defendants justify the action simply by pointing to the Executive Order: the APA still required the agency itself to justify its decision. Judge Lamberth added that “the agency similarly failed to consider either reliance interests or relevant statutory factors.” The court concluded that “the defendants do not offer, nor does the record disclose, any discernible ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” “On the face of the Memorandum itself,” the court wrote, adding, “all signs point to arbitrariness.”
Rejecting Defendants’ argument that the relevant statutory factors were committed to agency discretion, Judge Lamberth emphasized that even a grant of discretion does not permit an agency to make an “‘unprincipled decision.’” Here, “the defendants have provided nothing approaching a principled basis for their decision.” The court granted Plaintiffs partial summary judgment on their § 706(2) claim and ultimately vacated and set aside “the Statutory Minimum Memorandum, the placement of USAGM employees on administrative leave, and the cessation of USAGM broadcasting.”
On June 8, 2026, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeals from the April 2025 preliminary injunction as moot. Separate appeals from the March 2026 judgment were held in abeyance pending National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought.
17. Sanctuary-city DOJ funding freeze: no explanation for total freeze, reliance interests ignored
Judge William Horsley Orrick III (Obama appointee), City and County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump, 3:25-cv-01350 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Immigration Policy on sanctuary cities and states (Executive order 14159)
On Apr. 24, 2025, Judge Orrick granted a preliminary injunction, holding that “the Bondi Directive’s order to freeze all DOJ funds is likely arbitrary and capricious.”
On May 3, the court issued a further order regarding its Apr. 24 preliminary injunction, stating that it was setting out its reasoning in greater detail, confirming the injunction’s scope, and explaining why the challenged directives likely violate the APA as arbitrary and capricious:
“[T]he Bondi Directive fails to offer a reasonable explanation of the breadth of funding withheld or the basis for withholding funds that Congress has already appropriated. …
The Government has not offered a plausible reason for why a total freeze on all DOJ funding is necessary to advance the 2025 Executive Orders. Nothing in the record before me suggests that the Attorney General considered the Cities and Counties’ reliance on the threatened federal funding before issuing the freeze, their expectation of reimbursement for funds already appropriated, or their need for clarity about what funding will be available in the future to support critical services and infrastructure; all this is required given the Bondi Directive’s reversal of prior DOJ policy that ‘engendered serious reliance interests.’ … This is enough for the plaintiffs to show they are likely to prevail on the merits of their APA claim, at least to the extent that they allege defendant Attorney General Bondi violated 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
18. DEI Dear Colleague letter: unexplained policy shift, no record, reliance interests ignored
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), American Federation of Teachers v. U.S. Department of Education, 1:25-cv-00628 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Department of Education “Dear Colleague Letter” banning DEI-related programming (Dear Colleague Letter)
On Apr. 24, 2025, Judge Gallagher granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction:
“Perhaps unsurprisingly, every reason Plaintiffs argue the Letter is arbitrary and capricious ultimately ties back to government’s failure to recognize that the Letter went beyond merely restating settled principles of civil rights law. Because the government insists that the Letter required no particular process, and has created no administrative record underlying it, it failed to consider a number of required factors. To affect the kind of policy change the Letter does, the government was required to carefully consider the choice it was making, the evidence underlying it, and the interests it might impact. …
The Letter also marks a significant change in position in DOE’s interpretation of SFFA. … The change in position is not explained. …
This Court is most concerned by DOE’s change in position regarding its authority to regulate curriculum, and its decision to prospectively categorize content as discriminatory. It has not acknowledged that the change occurred or explained the reasoning for that change. The agency was required to demonstrate self-awareness where it changed positions and to explain the reasons for those changes in position. It did not. This supports a finding that the Letter is arbitrary and capricious. …
The government has clarified that there is no administrative record underlying the Letter. … The Letter does not contain any factual citations or references to any facts supporting its assertions. … The Letter provides no line at all distinguishing viewpoint from binding policymaking. This too supports a finding that the Letter is arbitrary and capricious. …
[The administration] is not entitled to misrepresent the law’s boundaries, and must at a minimum acknowledge and consider the relevant legal framework as it is. It cannot blur the lines between viewpoint and law. This also supports the notion that the Letter is likely arbitrary and capricious. …
The government argues that DOE could not possibly have considered reliance interests that were not raised to it. The problem with that is, of course, that DOE did not ask for input. School districts, schools, and teachers had no opportunity to comment on the Letter before it became effective. And their reliance interests, including but not limited to existing programs, curricula, contractual obligations, and departmental structures, were not considered. Partially, perhaps, because the government seems blind to the magnitude of the change in policy the Letter announced, it failed to account for how disruptive it would be to stakeholders. The direct prohibitions on teaching certain content paired with other vague and overbroad terms raise reasonable views that broad swaths of content might be legally suspect to this administration. The government’s failure to consider reliance interests, too, counsels toward a finding that the Letter is likely arbitrary and capricious. …
Because the government has failed to acknowledge its change in position, or to promulgate the Letter using the processes necessary for a rule that effects a substantive change in policy, it failed to consider a number of factors required by the APA. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Letter is arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
On Aug. 14, Judge Gallagher issued a memorandum opinion granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part, finding that:
“No reasoned bases for the government’s decisions are apparent from the very sparse record, and this Court cannot provide them. …
There is no administrative record underlying either the Letter or the Certification Requirement. … Neither document contains any factual citations nor references any facts supporting its assertions. …
The Letter and Certification provide no line at all distinguishing viewpoint from binding policymaking. They either make factual assertions without support, or fail to consider facts at all. …
In promulgating the Letter and Certification, the government announced large-scale policy changes without considering whether they were appropriate based on existing facts and law, or the extent to which they would disrupt schools and teachers’ status quo to the detriment of students’ learning. Both the Letter and Certification are arbitrary and capricious for failing to account for facts, law, baseline conditions, or reliance interests.”(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Jan. 22, 2026, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation. On June 15, following another joint stipulation, the district court dismissed the action with prejudice and vacated its March 2026 attorneys’ fee judgment, leaving the August 2025 merits ruling undisturbed.
19. US Global Media defunding: unspecified court rationale
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Radio Free Asia v. United States, 1:25-cv-00907 (D.D.C.) and Middle East Broadcasting Networks v. United States, 1:25-cv-00966 (D.D.C.) (consolidated cases)
Executive Action: Governance and Defunding Global Media and Global Internet Freedom (Executive Order 14238 – Continuing the Reduction of the Federal Bureaucracy)
On Apr. 25, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction, the district court held that Plaintiffs were “likely to succeed on the merits” for “substantially the same reasons raised in Plaintiffs’ memoranda,” which included a claim of arbitrary and capricious conduct.
On May 3, the D.C. Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. After the en banc court vacated the stay on May 28, 2025, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the preliminary-injunction appeals as moot on June 8, 2026, without vacating the district court’s order or ruling on its merits.
[See also Judge Lamberth’s Apr. 22 opinion explicating his views on arbitrary and capricious conduct in Abramowitz v. Lake, 1:25-cv-00887 (D.D.C.) and Widakuswara v. Lake, 1:25-cv-01015 (D.D.C.)]
20. Student visa terminations: no factual explanation, incomplete fact-finding, no regulatory support
Judge Victoria Calvert (Biden appointee), Jane Doe 1 v. Bondi, 1:25-cv-01998 (N.D. Ga.)
Executive Action: ICE modified plaintiffs’ SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System) records
On May 2, 2025, Judge Calvert granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on modifications to their SEVIS status, stating:
“Defendants have not been able to articulate, clearly or otherwise, any reason why Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records were terminated beyond the vague language provided in the notice given through SEVP. When asked whether Defendants could provide the Court with any additional information about what actually happened with Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records, Defendants conceded that they could not complete the necessary factfinding to determine what took place as to each individual Plaintiff, or even as to the entire group of Plaintiffs. Further, Defendants’ briefing fails to identify any regulation to support DHS’s ability to terminate Plaintiffs’ SEVIS record in the manner it was done here.
Defendants have altogether failed to suggest any lawful grounds for termination of Plaintiffs’ SEVIS record. … Defendants’ failure to provide a single plausibly lawful explanation for its action is the exact circumstance contemplated by the arbitrary and capricious standard. … Accordingly, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the claim that the agency action is arbitrary and capricious for failing to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. …
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to show that DHS’s authority to terminate F-1 student status is narrowly circumscribed by regulation to three circumstances … And since none of those conditions are applicable here, Plaintiffs are likely to show that Defendants’ termination of their SEVIS records and F-1 status was not in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d) and was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
21. Education grant rescissions: unexplained reversal, no reasonable basis, reliance interests ignored
Judge Edgardo Ramos (Obama appointee), State of New York v. United States Department of Education, 1:25-cv-02990 (S.D.N.Y.)
Executive Action: Denial of Federal Grants
On May 6, 2025, after argument, Judge Ramos granted from the bench Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding they were likely to succeed on their APA claims and preliminarily enjoining the Department of Education from enforcing the Rescission Letter. The court also barred the Department from modifying previously approved liquidation periods without at least 14 days’ advance notice and required Department to notify all personnel of the order. Judge Ramos stated:
“I find that the plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits on both of their causes of action with respect to arbitrary and capricious. The Department of Education changed its mind. I find that the reason proffered was not a reasonable explanation. As we have discussed, Congress intended that these funds be made available to school districts and schoolchildren. There was no reason [provided by the government to terminate the grants] other than the fact that the COVID emergency had ended some two years before. However, clearly, the purpose of the funding sources of the acts that provided the funding was so that there can be funding for these programs going forward after the pandemic emergency was deemed to have ended in order to account for the loss of educational attainment that schoolchildren had suffered as a result of remote learning and other difficulties attendant to the COVID-19 pandemic.” (emphasis added).
On Jun. 3, following the Department’s May 11 “Dear Colleague” letter, Judge Ramos entered a second preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of both the Mar. 28 Rescission Letter and May 11 letter, extending the notice requirement to 30 days before any future attempt to change Plaintiffs’ liquidation periods, and directing the Department to promptly process pending and future payment requests and file a status report on outstanding requests, while again requiring notice of the order to all Department staff. Defendants filed a notice of appeal to the Second Circuit the same day. During the Jun. 3 hearing, the court decided to “abide by [its] initial finding” that plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits, “both because the Department of Education’s determination to rescind the deadlines and apply the new approval process is arbitrary and capricious and because it is contrary to law.”
Defendants appealed the Jun. 3 PI, but on Jun. 20, the Second Circuit denied Defendants’ motion to stay the district court’s order, finding the government’s actions likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA—without any particularized assessment and insufficiently attentive to reliance interests—and concluding that a stay would substantially injure the plaintiff States. “The record in this case supports the proposition that the Government’s change in position with respect to the liquidation deadline failed to meet these requirements and was therefore arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA,” the court wrote.
On Aug. 11, 2025, the Second Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal pursuant to the parties’ stipulated withdrawal. In November 2025, the parties agreed to stay the case subject to an order with stipulations for government conduct.
22. Federal agency dismantling: conclusory reasoning, reliance interests ignored, agency regulations disregarded
Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), State of Rhode Island v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00128 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Museums and Public Libraries (Executive Order 14238)
On May 6, 2025, Judge McConnell issued a preliminary injunction preventing the execution of EO 14238 to the extent it applies to IMLS/MBDA/FMCS. He held:
“This Executive Order violates the Administrative Procedures Act (‘APA’) in the arbitrary and capricious way it was carried out. …
Here, there is an absence of any reasonable explanation from IMLS, MBDA, and FMCS. The Reduction EO—with which these agencies sought to comply through their challenged policies—stated that the ‘non-statutory components and functions’ of IMLS, MBDA, and FMCS shall be ‘eliminated to the maximum extent consistent with applicable law.’ But the Defendants have not shown that any analysis was conducted to determine which components and functions of IMLS, MBDA, and FMCS are statutorily required, and which are not. …
IMLS has also offered no further explanation for the termination of thousands of its grants other than stating that the grants are ‘no longer consistent with the agency’s priorities[.]’ …
Here, the “rational connections” are absent, as IMLS’s, MBDA’s, and FMCS’s justifications for eliminating programs, terminating grants, and implementing large-scale employee RIFs have been couched in mere conclusory statements—most of which merely defer to the Reduction EO. There is no explanation about why the targeted programs or grants fell within the ambit of “non-statutory” functions or components. Such conclusory explanations, ‘devoid of data or any independent explanation, [are] grossly insufficient and fall[] far short of reasoned analysis.’ …
Additionally, ILMS, MBDA, and FMCS have failed to indicate that they considered any of the significant reliance interests of their program beneficiaries or grantees such as libraries, museums, business centers, contractors, labor unions, states, and local governments.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Nov. 21, 2025, Judge McConnell granted summary judgment for the plaintiff States. He concluded that the agencies had acted “arbitrarily and capriciously in their implementation of the Reduction EO,” and set those actions aside. Incorporating its May 2025 reasoning, the court explained:
“Because its earlier analysis pertained only to IMLS, MBDA, and FMCS, the Court will say a few words about USICH. The record demonstrates that USICH’s actions were also arbitrary and capricious. First, USICH provided no “reasoned explanation” as to why it was terminating its existing programs and operations and terminating most of its staff through a RIF. Second, USICH failed to account for the reliance interests of the constituents, including State officers, it served in addressing the nation’s homelessness problem. Rather, USICH has been telling these constituents—who have been calling in for assistance— that USICH is shut down and is no longer able to serve them.
Third, and most striking, USICH failed to follow its own regulations when it significantly reduced its workforce. In response to the Reduction EO, the agency submitted an Agency RIF and Reorganization Plan in which it stated that a minimum of thirteen USICH employees were required to fully carry out its statutory duties. Despite this, just a few weeks later, USICH—in response to a Department of Government Efficiency (“DOGE”) directive—reduced its staff to just two employees. This conduct is undoubtedly arbitrary and capricious.”
The court permanently enjoined implementation of the executive order against the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the Minority Business Development Agency, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness.
On Apr. 6, 2026, the First Circuit dismissed the Institute of Museum and Library Services and its acting head from the appeal, leaving the other defendants’ appeal pending.
23. DOE indirect-cost cap: conclusory goals, unexplained reversal, failure to acknowledge consequences
Judge Allison Dale Burroughs (Obama appointee), Association of American Universities v. Department of Energy, 1:25-cv-10912 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Reduction of indirect cost reimbursement rate for research institutions (NIH Guidance) (DOE Rate Cap Policy, Apr. 11, 2025)
On May 15, 2025, Judge Burroughs issued a preliminary injunction, finding that:
“Because the Rate Cap Policy does not offer more than conclusory policy goals, the Court need go no further: Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success in demonstrating that the Rate Cap Policy is arbitrary and capricious and therefore runs afoul of the APA. …
Missing from the Rate Cap Policy’s purported recognition of the indisputable reliance interest is a ‘reasoned explanation . . . for disregarding [that understanding, which was] engendered by the prior policy,’ and, notably, any acknowledgement of the potential consequences of the policy change. … As such, the Rate Cap Policy ‘f[alls] short of [DOE’s] duty to explain why it deemed it necessary to overrule its previous position,’ and Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the Rate Cap Policy is arbitrary and capricious for this reason as well.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On June 30, 2025, Judge Burroughs entered final judgment declaring the Department of Energy’s indirect-cost cap arbitrary and capricious, contrary to the regulation governing negotiated rates, and impermissibly retroactive. She vacated the policy. On Mar. 16, 2026, the First Circuit granted the government’s motion to voluntarily dismiss its appeal.
24. Border cash reporting: “$200 is Likely Arbitrary and Ignores the Destructive Impact on Legitimate Businesses;” “The Zip Codes are Arbitrary”
Judge Fred Biery (Clinton appointee), Texas Association of Money Services Businesses v. Bondi, 5:25-cv-00344 (W.D. Tex.)
Executive Action: FinCEN’s March 2025 Southwest Border Geographic Targeting Order (GTO).
This case challenged the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) requirement that money services businesses in designated Texas and California ZIP codes report cash transactions exceeding $200, rather than the longstanding $10,000 threshold.
On May 19, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Biery found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claim that the reporting order was arbitrary and capricious. The court’s analysis addressed the $200 threshold, its effects on legitimate businesses, and the selection of covered ZIP codes.
As to the $200 threshold, the court explained that “the FinCEN memo and administrative record identify problems but contain no evidence about the size of the problem relative to legitimate transactions.” Earlier targeting orders and criminal cases involving businesses elsewhere “do not provide substantive support to justify the $200 reporting requirement imposed by this GTO.”
Addressing compliance burdens, Judge Biery noted Defendants’ concession that the threshold would capture “all but de minimis legal transactions” as well as unlawful ones. Businesses presented evidence that monthly reporting obligations could increase from a handful of reports to thousands. The court described FinCEN’s treatment of those costs as “a sentence dismissing those burdens,” referring to its prediction that businesses would not materially alter their fees. Judge Biery wrote:
“However, the Government does not attempt to justify the immense burden Plaintiffs have shown the GTO will likely impose on them. … The Court finds Plaintiffs have successfully made their case that there is doubt that the agency considered the relevant factors.” (emphasis added).
With respect to the selected ZIP codes, FinCEN relied on proximity to the border and high numbers of existing currency transaction reports relative to population. The court explained that the agency’s theory should be supported by evidence that those reports had resulted in above-average numbers of prosecutions: “Yet, there is no such evidence in the record.” Judge Biery also wrote:
“The Court fails to see the logic or the connection between the alleged high number of $10,000 CTRs to $200 transactions being connected to money laundering.” (emphasis added.)
Under the heading “There Was No Consideration of Cartel Countermeasures,” the court discussed Plaintiffs’ argument that cartels could use uncovered locations or other laundering methods. It also recorded the government’s concession that it had “no real information” about whether FinCEN could act on the new reports or whether they had yielded usable information about cartel activity. The court preliminarily enjoined enforcement against the association’s ten existing member businesses and the individual plaintiff.
25. Border cash reporting: failure to consider compliance costs and reasonable alternatives or justify the $200 threshold
Judge Janis L. Sammartino (W. Bush appointee), Novedades y Servicios, Inc. v. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 3:25-cv-00886 (S.D. Cal.); Circuit Judges Lucy H. Koh and Ana de Alba (Biden appointees), No. 25-4238 (9th Cir.)
Executive Action: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) March 2025 Southwest Border Geographic Targeting Order (SWB GTO).
This case, brought by a San Diego money services business and its owner, challenges an order lowering the cash transaction reporting threshold from $10,000 to $200 for money services businesses in 30 California and Texas ZIP codes.
On May 21, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Sammartino found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their APA claim that the order was arbitrary and capricious. First, FinCEN “failed to consider the degree to which the SWB GTO would impose a regulatory burden on targeted MSBs.” Its memorandum acknowledged increased reporting but dismissed it as “merely a reporting obligation,” without supporting its prediction that fees would not materially change. The court explained:
“The agency, however, cites to no authority whatsoever to demonstrate its appreciation for the costs of compliance. … Even if the agency had considered industry burden at the time it issued the SWB GTO, there is no evidence that it weighed that burden against the benefits. … Because the agency failed to undertake the sensitive balancing act of weighing the burden on the private sector against the need for increased security for international remittances, the SWB GTO is likely arbitrary and capricious.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
Second, FinCEN “failed to articulate a rational basis for the $200 reporting threshold.” Its memorandum provided no analysis of typical lawful or unlawful transaction amounts or what made a $200 transaction vulnerable to abuse. Judge Sammartino wrote:
“[T]he agency leaped to the supposition that $200 is somehow a suitable dividing line between de minimis transactions and transactions vulnerable to abuse, and then it left that supposition unsupported by any concrete facts rationally leading to that conclusion.” (emphasis added.)
The court also found that FinCEN “declined to consider any other reporting thresholds” despite alternatives in the record, including a study proposing a $1,000 threshold. It additionally identified an existing law-enforcement database containing millions of subpoenaed transactions that FinCEN’s memorandum did not address as an alternative to increased reporting.
On Jul. 13, 2026, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Judge Koh, joined by Judge de Alba, held that the order was likely arbitrary and capricious because “FinCEN entirely failed to consider the cost of compliance in issuing the Border GTO.” The majority declined to treat FinCEN’s undated memorandum as a contemporaneous justification and found “no evidence that FinCEN considered the cost of compliance” in the properly considered record. It expressly did not reach the district court’s alternative grounds concerning the $200 threshold and reasonable alternatives.
26. DEIA grant termination: no reasoned explanation, vague limitless rationale
Judge Paul L. Friedman (Clinton appointee), Southern Education Foundation v. United States Department of Education, 1:25-cv-01079 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Ban on DEIA initiatives in the executive branch and by contractors and grantees (Executive Order 14168, Executive Order 14151, Executive Order 14173)
On May 21, 2025, Judge Friedman issued a preliminary injunction, holding:
“[T]he Department’s Termination Letter provides no reasoned explanation for the grant termination. In fact, the Termination Letter’s list of possible bases ‘is so broad and vague as to be limitless; devoid of import, even.’ For these reasons, the Court finds that SEF has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of Count One [that the Department’s termination of the EAC-South grant was arbitrary and capricious].” (citations omitted).
On Sept. 30, 2025, the D.C. Circuit granted voluntary dismissal of the government’s appeal. After the grant was restored, the district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the action without prejudice on Nov. 6, 2025.
27. Education Department dismantling: cursory explanation, contradictions, no evidence of reliance interests considered
Judge Myong J. Joun (Biden appointee), State of New York v. McMahon, 1:25-cv-10601 (D. Mass.) and Somerville Public Schools v. Trump, 1:25-cv-10677 (D. Mass.) (consolidated cases)
Executive Action: Dismantling/Restructuring of the Department of Education 14242 (Executive Order of Mar. 20, 2025)
On May 22, 2025, Judge Joun granted a preliminary injunction, stating that:
“As Defendants concede, the Secretary’s March 14 letter sent a few days after the announcement of the RIF also ‘includes only a cursory explanation.’ …
None of these statements amount to a reasoned explanation, let alone an explanation at all. Indeed, the March 11 Directive contains two contradictory positions. … Defendants have not shown how the RIF furthers its goals of ‘efficiency, accountability, and ensuring that resources are directed’ to ‘parents, students, and teachers.’ … For instance, Defendants have not attempted to demonstrate that cutting a certain program in half has somehow made that program more efficient or returned necessary resources to the States. There is no indication that Defendants conducted any research to support why certain employees were terminated under the RIF over others, why certain offices were reduced or eliminated, or how any of those decisions further Defendants’ purported goals of efficiency or effectiveness of the Department. … I ‘cannot ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given.’ …
Additionally, Consolidated Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Agency Defendants ‘failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem.’ … The Agency Defendants ‘entirely failed to grapple with the potential disruption to operations and interference with statutory and non-statutory functions a sudden elimination of nearly 50% of the Department’s entire workforce would cause.’ … Nothing in the record indicates a consideration of the ‘substantial harms and reliance interests for students, educational institutions, Plaintiffs, and others.’ … Defendants do not dispute this.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On July 14, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 to grant a stay of the May 22 preliminary injunction that had blocked the administration’s plans to dismantle the Department of Education and fire thousands of department employees. The majority did not provide any reasoning. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, warned that the Court’s order enables the executive branch to functionally “abolish” an entire department “by executive fiat.”
After the Supreme Court stayed the injunction and the layoffs proceeded, plaintiffs sought vacatur on Aug. 8, explaining that the injunction could no longer preserve the status quo and seeking to proceed to a final merits determination. On Aug. 11, the district court indicated that it would vacate the May 22 preliminary injunction if the case were remanded. Following dismissal of the appeal, the district court vacated the preliminary injunction on Oct. 1, 2025, on an assented-to motion, without deciding that its earlier arbitrary-and-capricious analysis was erroneous.
28–32. Student visa terminations: no individualized assessment, no rational connection
Judge Jeffrey S. White (Bush appointee), Doe v. Trump, 4:25-cv-03140 (N.D. Cal.) (and four related cases)
Executive Action: ICE modified plaintiffs’ SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System) records
On May 22, 2025, Judge White, in granting a preliminary injunction, stated:
“In the record before the Court, Mr. Watson’s testimony and the brief email exchange about the Student Criminal Alien Initiative reflect the sum and substance of Defendants’ reasons for terminating Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records. Based on Mr. Watson’s representations, the only individualized assessment made was whether an individual identified who had a positive result in the NCIC database was an individual listed within the SEVIS database. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that the decision to terminate their SEVIS records was arbitrary and capricious because the decision was not based on a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”
After a limited remand from the Ninth Circuit, Judge White modified the preliminary injunctions on Nov. 26, 2025. The amended orders permitted arrest, detention or transfer outside an affected individual’s jurisdiction of residence when based on new material information independent of the challenged SEVIS terminations. On Feb. 5, 2026, the Ninth Circuit dismissed all five consolidated appeals pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
33. HHS website takedowns: no rational explanation, rushed rollout, implausible compliance claim
Judge Leo Theordore Sorokin (Obama appointee), Schiff v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 1:25-cv-10595 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Removal of information from HHS websites under Executive Order on “Gender Ideology Extremism” (Executive Order 14168)
On May 23, 2025, Judge Sorokin issued a preliminary injunction on the removal of information from HHS websites, holding:
“[T]he plaintiffs are likely to prevail for reasons they carefully explain in their papers … detailing why agency action at issue was arbitrary and capricious in that it lacked rational explanation and why OPM Memo was ultra vires given language of statute invoked… The Court makes two further observations. …
OPM’s Director acted well outside the boundaries of the power allocated to his agency by Congress and by the President when he issued the Takedown Directive. …
[T]he time and manner in which the defendants implemented the EO belies any plausible claim that the agencies acted in anything but an arbitrary and capricious way.”
On Feb. 18, 2026, the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice under their settlement agreement.
34. Congestion pricing rescission: erroneous statutory theory, post hoc rationales, reliance interests ignored
Judge Lewis J. Liman (Trump appointee), Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Duffy, 1:25-cv-01413 (S.D.N.Y.)
Executive Action: Rescission of approval for New York City congestion pricing plan
On May 28, 2025, Judge Liman issued a preliminary injunction, finding, inter alia, that plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on their APA claim, including that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Secretary to terminate the program on the ground that the VPPP did not permit the Tolling Program, that defendants’ policy arguments were impermissible post hoc rationalizations, and that the Secretary and FHWA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing adequately to consider plaintiffs’ reliance interests. The court wrote:
“Plaintiffs show a likelihood of success on the merits of their argument that the Secretary’s decision to terminate the VPPP Agreement because the statute does not authorize cordon pricing programs was arbitrary and capricious. …
One other erroneous legal conclusion prompted the Secretary to determine that the VPPP did not permit authorization of the Tolling Program: the Secretary’s conclusion that the VPPP does not authorize tolls that are ‘calculated based on considerations separate from reducing congestion or advancing other road-related goals.’ … Congress thus has affirmatively stated that the tolling revenues may be used for other purposes; it has not stated that the tolling rates must be calculated exclusively on the basis of congestion-related considerations. … It was thus arbitrary and capricious for Defendants to act on the basis of that legal conclusion. …
Defendants’ belated attempts to reframe the motivating considerations as policy determinations rather than conclusions of illegality are unavailing both as post hoc rationalizations and because termination is not available on the grounds of shifting agency priorities. …
Plaintiffs show a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their argument that the Secretary and the FHWA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to adequately consider Plaintiffs’ reliance interests.”
On Mar. 3, 2026, Judge Liman granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs and granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion, holding that Secretary Duffy’s termination of the VPPP Agreement and rescission of federal approval for New York’s congestion-pricing plan—as set out in the Feb. 19 termination letter and later defended through the Apr. 21 letter—was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with law under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (C). The court vacated the termination letters and restored the plan, holding, inter alia, that the Secretary’s statutory theory was wrong, that acting on that theory was arbitrary and capricious, that the Apr. 21 policy rationales were impermissible post hoc rationalizations, and that defendants failed adequately to consider plaintiffs’ reliance interests. “It is difficult to imagine more arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking than that at issue here,” the court wrote, explaining:
“The Court determined at the preliminary injunction stage that the Plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on the merits of their APA claim. It did so on the basis that: (1) the February 19 Letter exceeded the FHWA or Secretary’s authority to terminate the VPPP Agreement, (2) the Secretary’s conclusion that the statute does not authorize cordon pricing programs was incorrect as a matter of law, (3) it was arbitrary and capricious for the Secretary to terminate the program on the basis that the VPPP did not permit the Tolling Program, (4) Defendants’ policy arguments were post hoc rationalizations, and (5) the Secretary and the FHWA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to adequately consider Plaintiffs’ reliance interests. …
The policy rationales in the April 21 Letter were exactly such post hoc rationalizations. The Secretary did not base his February termination and rescission on those reasons. He asserted the reasons as the basis for his action later on, only after he was staring down what promised to be a motion for a preliminary injunction in that litigation. …
The Secretary’s February 19 Letter did not grapple with any of that record; nor did the April 21 Letter engage even tangentially with the years-long process and evidence based decisionmaking upon which the VPPP Agreement was based. It contained mere ‘conclusory statements’ which ‘will not do; an agency’s statement must be one of reasoning.’”
35. DHS labor-rights rescission: ignored CBA, mischaracterized union role
Judge Marsha J. Pechman (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees AFL-CIO v. Noem, 2:25-cv-00451 (W.D. Wa.)
Executive Action: Rescission of Collective Bargaining and Other Labor Rights (Sec. Noem Memorandum Feb. 27, 2025, DHS Statement Mar. 7, 2025, Executive Order of Mar. 27, 2025)
On June 2, 2025, Judge Pechman issued a preliminary injunction against the Noem determination, stating:
“[Plaintiffs are] likely to succeed in showing the Noem Determination is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, particularly given its complete disregard for the 2024 CBA [Collective Bargaining Agreement] and its mischaracterization of AFGE’s [American Federation of Government Employees] role.”
36-a. BOP’s initial gender-affirming care memoranda: no rational basis, disparate treatment unexplained, reliance interests ignored
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Kingdom v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00691 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Gender Affirming Care of Transgender Incarcerated Individuals (Executive Order 14168)
On June 3, 2025, Judge Lamberth granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, staying BOP’s Feb. 21 and Feb. 28, 2025 memoranda implementing EO 14168’s restrictions on gender-affirming care and requiring BOP to provide hormone therapy and social accommodations in accordance with its pre-EO policies. The court stated:
“To be sure, agency action is not arbitrary and capricious merely because it is bad for some identifiable population. New policies nearly always have uneven effects on different groups; that is part and parcel of living within a democratic system. But the APA does require an agency to take actions that are rationally and demonstrably related to its stated goals, explain why it treats similarly situated people differently, and give consideration to the reliance interests of those who may be harmed by a new policy. Based on the limited information now before the Court, it appears that the implementing memoranda do none of these things, nor does the Executive Order on which they rely for their own justification. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have established a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their APA claims.” (emphasis added).
36-b. BOP’s replacement gender-affirming care policy: prior experience ignored, conclusions contrary to evidence, pretextual decisionmaking
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Kingdom v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00691 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Gender Affirming Care of Transgender Incarcerated Individuals (Executive Order 14168)
On Feb. 19, 2026, BOP issued Program Statement 5260.01, “Management of Inmates with Gender Dysphoria,” superseding its 2025 implementing memoranda with what the court described as a “near total ban on gender-affirming care.”
In a June 17, 2026 opinion, Judge Lamberth granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of Program Statement 5260.01 and requiring Defendants and their contractors to provide Plaintiffs and class members with gender-affirming medications and social accommodations in accordance with BOP’s policies and practices in effect immediately before EO 14168. Judge Lamberth found, based on several independent grounds, “that the Program Statement amounts to arbitrary and capricious action” and thus Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claim.
First, Judge Lamberth found that BOP “failed to seriously consider its own experience providing gender-affirming care to inmates for years under its prior policy.” Despite that experience, the court found, the Program Statement cited “zero evidence from its own medical or mental health professionals.” It also noted that the government failed to “point the Court to evidence that gender-affirming care was ineffective or harmful to its own inmates diagnosed with gender dysphoria, or that providing this care previously led to security concerns at BOP facilities.” Judge Lamberth also rejected BOP Medical Director Dr. Elizabete Stahl’s later declaration as a basis for defending the policy, explaining that “Post-hoc rationalizations during litigation cannot replace the type of reasoned analysis the government must undertake at the front end” (emphasis added). He concluded that “Dr. Stahl’s post-hoc statements cannot ameliorate the government’s failure to demonstrate that it meaningfully considered its prior experience” (emphasis added).
Second, the court found the Program Statement to be “arbitrary and capricious because it reaches a conclusion ‘so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise,’ as evidenced by its explanation, which ‘runs counter to the evidence before the agency.’” Judge Lamberth emphasized that agency judgment “‘must be based on logic and evidence, not sheer speculation,’” and emphasized that “[b]anning evidence-backed care for an alternative that has no evidentiary support is an ‘implausible strategy’ to treat gender dysphoria, to say the least” (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Finally, Judge Lamberth found that BOP likely “‘preordained [its] decision,’ and the agency merely ‘reverse engineered’ a policy to justify the same outcome— thereby engaging in a ‘pretextual’ action” (emphasis added). The court rejected the government’s insistence that BOP’s policy was reached independently of EO 14168, writing: “It is more likely, given the record before the Court, that the government disregarded significant evidence in its possession to reach the EO’s mandated result” (emphasis added). Further, despite the government contending that the Program Statement was not (as the court wrote) “a mere repacking of the 2025 Implementing Memoranda because it took nearly 12 months to create,” Judge Lamberth found the argument “unavailing,” stating:
“No length of consideration can convince the Court that a policy is anything other than pretext when the agency has not demonstrated that it considered the relevant evidence and drew a reasonable conclusion from that evidence.” (emphasis added).
37. DEI grant conditions: no explanation, rote EO incorporation, no reasoned analysis
Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein (Carter appointee), King County v. Turner, 2:25-cv-00814 (W.D. Wash.)
Executive Action: Ban on DEIA initiatives in the executive branch and by contractors and grantees
On June 3, 2025, Judge Rothstein granted the plaintiffs’ first two motions for a preliminary injunction, holding:
“The Court concludes that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the new funding conditions were the result of ‘reasoned decisionmaking,’ let alone have been ‘reasonably explained.’ In fact, they have not been explained at all. The CoC Program Grant Agreements and the new DOT agreements proffer no explanation for adoption of the new conditions. … For this reason, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Defendants’ insistence on the new funding conditions was arbitrary and capricious”.
On Aug. 12, 2025, Judge Rothstein additionally granted the plaintiffs’ third motion for a preliminary injunction, stating:
“Defendants do not dispute that they have not offered contemporary, reasoned explanations for the imposition of the challenged funding conditions; rather, they argue that they are not required to do so because the conditions are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking. Defendants are mistaken. …
At most, the Defendants rely on reference to the Trump Administration’s executive orders to justify the imposition of the challenged funding conditions, but as this Court previously stated ‘rote incorporation of executive orders—especially ones involving politically charged policy matters that are the subject of intense disagreement and bear no substantive relations to the agency’s underlying action—does not constitute ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’ … Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merit of their claim that Defendants’ imposition of the challenged funding conditions is arbitrary and capricious, which is an independent ground for setting aside those conditions.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Jan. 21, 2026, Judge Rothstein extended the preliminary injunction to additional plaintiffs and additional grant categories for three existing plaintiffs, again finding plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claims that the challenged funding conditions were unauthorized by statute and “arbitrary and capricious.” Incorporating her earlier reasoning, she observed that defendants had implemented their grant-related guidance “in a haphazard, piecemeal, and unpredictable manner, frequently seemingly contradicting guidance issued only weeks earlier.”
On Aug. 25, 2026, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in large part the June 3 preliminary injunction, concluding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their APA challenge to conditions exceeding the agencies’ statutory authority. It remanded for the district court to narrow the injunction to permit antidiscrimination conditions within Title VI’s lawful scope. The majority did not resolve the district court’s separate arbitrary-and-capricious rationale. Judge Patrick J. Bumatay, partially dissenting, would have held that the challenged HUD conditions were authorized by statute and “not arbitrary and capricious.” The later injunctions of Aug. 12, 2025, and Jan. 21, 2026, were separately appealed in Nos. 25-6428 and 26-1689, respectively, and were not resolved by this decision.
38. AmeriCorps dismantling: no rulemaking, abrupt service cuts
Judge Deborah L. Boardman (Biden appointee), State of Maryland v. Corporation for National and Community Service, 1:25-cv-01363 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Dismantling AmeriCorps (Executive Order 14222 – Implementing the President’s “Department of Government Efficiency” Cost Efficiency Initiative) (Goodson Memorandum and cover note Apr. 15, 2025)
On Jun. 5, 2025, Judge Boardman granted a preliminary injunction restoring AmeriCorps programs, finding:
“The termination of AmeriCorps grants and programs, the exiting of AmeriCorps members, and the removal of NCCC members constitute ‘significant changes to . . . service delivery.’ By law, the agency could only make those changes through public notice-and-comment rulemaking. Because the agency did not do so, the States have shown a likelihood of success that the agency actions were contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and without observance of procedures required by law, in violation of the APA.”
39. Unaccompanied-minor sponsor rules: preliminary finding of inadequate justification for new demands
Judge Dabney L. Friedrich (Trump appointee), Angelica S. v. Dept of Health and Human Services, 1:25-cv-01405 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Policy on Unaccompanied Minors
On June 9, 2025, Judge Friedrich granted preliminary relief, finding it “substantially likely” that the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) “acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not providing adequate justification for its new sponsor documentation requirements.” In an October 1, 2026 merits opinion, however, she upheld the identity- and income-verification requirements against the remaining arbitrary-and-capricious challenge, concluding that ORR reasonably explained its policy choices. She distinguished the later plaintiffs, who entered or re-entered custody after the requirements took effect and therefore had notice, from the original plaintiffs affected by the change without notice. The opinion expressly stated that the earlier, limited preliminary injunction “remains in effect.”
40. DOGE OPM access: rushed onboarding, no credible need, cybersecurity norms ignored
Judge Denise Cote (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees v. Office of Personnel Management, 1:25-cv-01237 (S.D.N.Y.)
Executive Action: Disclosure of personal and financial records to DOGE
On Jun. 9, 2025, Judge Cote granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent OPM from disclosing records to DOGE agents, holding:
“The plaintiffs have also shown that the OPM Defendants violated the APA by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner. OPM’s decision to give DOGE agents administrative access to multiple OPM systems containing PII was a gross departure from its obligations under the Privacy Act as well as its longstanding cybersecurity practices. The onboarding process was rushed and many of the relevant individuals did not complete required training before OPM gave them access to its systems. The DOGE agents’ wide-ranging administrative access, which they were given without any credible need for access, violated the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.”
41. HHS research grant cuts: conclusory directives, no reasoned basis, reliance interests ignored
Judge William G. Young (Reagan appointee), Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Kennedy, Jr., 1:25-cv-10814 (D. Mass.) and American Public Health Association v. National Institutes of Health, 1:25-cv-10787 (D. Mass.) (consolidated cases)
Executive Action: Denial of Federal Grants
On June 16, 2025, ruling from the bench, Judge Young said:
“the explanations are bereft of reasoning virtually in their entirety. These edicts are nothing more than conclusory, unsupported by factual development. Moreover, … there is no reasoned argument as to the reliance interests of the many parties affected.”
Judge Young underscored that he had “never seen a record where racial discrimination was so palpable,” emphasizing, “I’ve sat on this bench now for 40 years, I’ve never seen government racial discrimination like this. And I confine my remarks to this record, to health care.” On June 23, Judge Young entered partial final judgment ordering the affected grants reinstated. Defendants appealed to the First Circuit that same day.
On July 2, Judge Young issued findings of fact and rulings of law explaining that “on a fair preponderance of the evidence,” “the Challenged Directives are arbitrary and capricious under Section 706(2)(A), as are the concomitant grant terminations.” The court wrote:
“the Public Officials’ actions … under the Challenged Directives are breathtakingly arbitrary and capricious. … Based upon a fair preponderance of the evidence and on the sparse administrative record, the Court finds and rules that HHS and, in turn NIH, are being force-fed unworkable ‘policy’ supported with sparse pseudo-reasoning, and wholly unsupported statements.” (emphasis added)
The court went on to criticize then-Acting Secretary of Health and Human Services Dr. Dorothy Fink for “wordsmithing!” and faulted her for failing to provide a reasoned explanation for her statements, including remarks the court described as “utterly meaningless.” The court added:
“The Public Officials have decided that they are going to ‘eradicate’ something that they cannot define. That agency action is arbitrary and capricious. Pivoting to gender affirming care, vaccine hesitancy, COVID, Climate Change and Influencing Public Opinion, these terms evolve in the Priorities Directive, evidence that the NIH was trying to figure it out, all the while being tasked with using those same terms to wipe out grants. None of these terms have a reasonable explanation in the record.”
On July 18, 2025, the First Circuit denied Defendants’ request for a stay, writing, “we see no obvious error in the district court’s conclusion that the Department’s actions bear all the hallmarks of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.” On Aug. 21, 2025, the Supreme Court stayed the relief setting aside individual grant terminations on jurisdictional grounds, but left in effect the district court’s vacatur of the underlying NIH directives. Although Justice Kavanaugh separately questioned the merits of the arbitrary-and-capricious challenge, the Court did not resolve that issue.
42. Education Department RIF: no reasoned explanation, no evidence, operational harms ignored
Judge Myong J. Joun (Biden appointee), Victim Rights Law Center v. United States Department of Education, 1:25-cv-11042 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Dismantling/Restructuring of the Department of Education (DOE) (Executive Order of Mar. 20, 2025)
On June 18, 2025, Judge Joun issued a preliminary injunction against the RIF dismantling DOE, stating:
“Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the RIF is arbitrary & capricious under the APA. …
The June 3rd Statement does not provide a reasoned explanation under the APA. For instance, the June 3rd Statement does not set forth the Department’s reasoning as to why or how the mass terminations ‘strengthen[] oversight’ of civil rights laws, and Defendants have not submitted any evidence as to how ‘reorganize[ing] personnel by specialized topics,’ as well as a ‘dedicated task force for Title IX investigations’ is permitting the OCR to actually fulfill its statutory obligations. …
Further, to the extent that the agency believes OCR will meet its statutory functions by simply reducing its caseload by only addressing cases that align with the new administration’s policies, that is arbitrary and capricious. …
Finally, there is no indication on the record that Defendants considered the ‘important aspect of the problem.’ … There is no record evidence in the form of data, research, or even meeting minutes that may indicate that Defendants discussed or considered “the likelihood that the RIF would severely undermine OCR’s capacity to investigate and resolve its growing backlog of civil rights complaints and deliver on its statutory and regulatory mandates.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Sept. 29, 2025, the First Circuit stayed the injunction because of its substantial overlap with the injunction the Supreme Court had stayed in McMahon v. New York, without finally resolving the merits of the arbitrary and capricious claim. At Plaintiffs’ request, with Defendants’ consent, the district court vacated and dissolved the injunction on Jan. 12, 2026, so the parties could focus on a merits determination while the preliminary relief was expected to remain stayed. The appeal was dismissed on Jan. 15.
43. AmeriCorps dismantling: no policy-reversal justification, reliance interests ignored, alternatives ignored
Judge Edward Milton Chen (Obama appointee), San Francisco Unified School District v. AmeriCorps, a.k.a. the Corporation for National and Community Service, 3:25-cv-02425 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Dismantling AmeriCorps (Executive Order 14222) (Goodson Memorandum and cover note Apr. 15, 2025)
On Jun. 18, 2025, Judge Chen granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, stating:
“Plaintiffs also demonstrate a likelihood of succeeding on their claim that the AmeriCorps Directive and the new grant conditions violate the APA because they are arbitrary and capricious because AmeriCorps failed to provide a justification for its reversal of policy, and in so doing ignored significant reliance interests. It also failed to consider alternatives to imposing such an expansive and ill-defined ban on programmatic activity. …
At bottom, AmeriCorps offers no substantive reasons justifying its radical change of course other than its rote recitation of the need to implement the Executive Orders.” (emphasis added).
44. DOT immigration funding condition: vague scope, improper factor, reliance interests ignored
Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), State of California v. United States Department of Transportation, 1:25-cv-00208 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: “Temporary Pause” of grants, loans, and assistance programs
On Jun. 19, 2025, Judge McConnell granted a preliminary injunction, holding:
“The IEC, backed by the Duffy Directive, is arbitrary and capricious in its scope and lacks specificity in how the States are to cooperate on immigration enforcement in exchange for Congressionally appropriated transportation dollars–grant money that the States rely on to keep their residents safely and efficiently on the road, in the sky, and on the rails.”
On Nov. 4, Judge McConnell granted the States’ motion for summary judgment and denied the Department of Transportation’s cross-motion, declaring the immigration enforcement condition (IEC) unlawful under the APA and the Spending Clause, vacating the condition from all DOT grant agreements, and permanently enjoining the government from conditioning transportation funding on state cooperation with federal civil immigration enforcement. He found the government’s actions arbitrary and capricious, explaining that its “core counterargument against the merits of the States’ APA claim [was] its repeated insistence that the IEC merely asks the States to certify compliance with federal law, and that it cannot be arbitrary or capricious for DOT to ensure this compliance.” “Depriv[ing]” the government of its “gimcrack defense” of offering a “nakedly misleading characterization of what the IEC requires,” Judge McConnell concluded that the government’s “imposition of the IEC is patently arbitrary and capricious” (emphasis added).
The court explained:
“Of particular weight to this finding is the Supreme Court’s guidance that agency action is arbitrary and capricious when the agency ‘has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider.’ … The Court has determined that Congress could not have intended to vest DOT with the authority to impose such sweeping immigration-related conditions on federal transportation funding. It was as such impermissible for Defendants to consider factors related to State cooperation with federal civil immigration enforcement in determining conditions for federal transportation funding. The other facts cited by the States-particularly their reliance interests and the ambiguity of the extent of the IEC’s requirements-lend support to the Court’s finding that Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously in imposing the IEC across the entirety of federal transportation funding programs.”
On Nov. 18, Judge McConnell clarified that the permanent injunction applied across all plaintiff states, their instrumentalities, and local subdivisions, and ordered defendants to remove any grant conditions requiring cooperation with federal civil immigration enforcement and notify recipients accordingly. Defendants appealed to the First Circuit on Jan. 2, 2026, but on Jan. 21, the First Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal on its unopposed motion.
45. NSF indirect-cost cap: no rational connection, ignored statutory mission and consequences, reliance interests ignored
Judge Indira Talwani (Obama appointee), Association of American Universities v. National Science Foundation, 1:25-cv-11231 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Jun. 20, 2025, Judge Talwani granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement, holding:
“[B]ecause the court cannot discern from the Policy Notice how NSF concluded the 15% Indirect Cost Rate would further NSF’s stated goals, the 15% Indirect Cost Rate is arbitrary and capricious. …
The 15% Indirect Cost Rate is also arbitrary and capricious because it ignores important aspects of the problem, namely NSF’s statutory directive to ‘support basic scientific research and programs to strengthen scientific research potential and scientific education programs.’
Further, the Policy Notice offers insufficient explanation because it fails to meaningfully address Plaintiffs’ reliance interests. …
Plaintiffs offer a host of additional reasons why the 15% Indirect Cost Rate is arbitrary and capricious: it departs from the NSF’s policy against mandatory cost sharing, it rests upon unexplained factual findings that contradict those behind the NSF’s prior policy, it fails to explain why the auditing process would not achieve government efficiency, and it singles out universities without explanation. … These are all examples of the overarching problem: Defendants have not sufficiently explained why they concluded capping indirect cost rates for IHEs at 15% will further the objectives stated in the Policy Notice.” (emphasis added).
On Sept. 30, 2025, the First Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal and issued its mandate forthwith.
46. Open Technology Fund funding freeze: no contemporaneous explanation, post hoc rationalizations, reliance interests ignored
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Open Technology Fund v. Kari Lake, 1:25-cv-00840 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Governance and Defunding Global Media and Global Internet Freedom (Executive Order 14217; Executive Order 14238; Executive Order 14290)
On Jun. 20, 2025, Judge Lamberth granted Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction, holding:
“For substantially the same reasoning as explained in the Widakuswara PI, OTF is likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge. The defendants’ continuous withholding of congressionally appropriated funds, month after month, with no explanation, is a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).”
[See also Judge Lamberth’s Apr. 22 opinion explicating his views on arbitrary and capricious conduct in Abramowitz v. Lake, 1:25-cv-00887 (D.D.C.) and Widakuswara v. Lake, 1:25-cv-01015 (D.D.C.)]
On Nov. 25, 2025, Judge Lamberth granted a subsequent preliminary injunction, finding that Open Technology Fund was likely to succeed on its arbitrary-and-capricious claim. He wrote:
“[T]he refusal to disburse OTF’s appropriated funds is arbitrary and capricious because (1) USAGM provided no contemporaneous reasoning when it informed OTF of its decision; (2) the Court cannot consider the post-hoc rationalizations that USAGM urges in its briefing, and (3) even those rationalizations are substantively inadequate because they fail to address OTF’s well-founded reliance interests.” (emphasis added)
Addressing USAGM’s failure to acknowledge or explain its changed interpretation of federal regulations governing grant disbursements, the court stated: “This failure to explain is quintessential arbitrary and capricious action.”
On Apr. 15, 2026, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal from that preliminary injunction pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation.
47. University research grant terminations: form letters, no individualized analysis, reliance interests ignored
Judge Rita F. Lin (Biden appointee), Thakur v. Trump, 3:25-cv-04737 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Actions Toward Universities (Executive Order 14188, Pause or termination of Grants, Columbia Letter of demands, Harvard Letter of demands, Harvard Proclamation on student visas)
On Jun. 23, 2025, Judge Lin issued a preliminary injunction barring the EPA, NEH, and NSF from terminating UC researchers’ grants, finding:
“Plaintiffs are also likely to succeed on their claims that the en masse terminations via form letter were arbitrary and capricious. The law requires administrative agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their decisions, particularly when changing a longstanding practice and abruptly upending years of planning and work. The form termination letters here appear to be in blatant violation of that requirement. …
The record reflects that the challenged grant terminations were likely performed en masse, without individualized analysis, and without providing grantees with reasoned explanation for the terminations. …
Agency Defendants do not contest that the termination letters represent the sum-total of their ‘reasoned explanation,’ and none of the evidence Defendants have produced supplements the reasoning in the form letters. …
This guesswork is made even more difficult by the inconsistencies in the existing record.… Plaintiffs and the Court should not be left to guess at Agency Defendants’ true reasons for terminating Plaintiffs’ funding. …
Agency Defendants’ characterization of their grant termination process as ‘individualized review’ is belied by the rest of the record. … The pace of the review and the resulting large waves of terminations via form letters further suggests a likelihood that no APA-compliant individualized review occurred. These are precisely the kinds of concerns that the APA’s bar on arbitrary-and-capricious agency decisionmaking was meant to address. …
Plaintiffs have reliance interests in the research they were conducting based on the multi-year funding grants, and Defendants have not introduced any evidence that they considered those interests prior to terminating the grants. …
Defendants have had the opportunity to introduce evidence showing that they considered Plaintiffs’ reliance interests prior to terminating their grants, but have not done so. …
Similarly, Defendants have not introduced any evidence indicating that they considered other important factors, including the waste that would result from projects halted before completion, or the loss to the public of critical research that will go unpublished.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Sept. 22, the court granted a further preliminary injunction, extending relief to DoD, DoT, and HHS/NIH grants in addition to the agencies already enjoined. In her order, Judge Lin stated:
“Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their APA arbitrary and capricious claim against DoD, DoT, and HHS-NIH, largely for the same reasons described in the PI Order. …
With respect to DoD, the standardized termination letters state, with only slight variations, that the ‘grant award no longer effectuates [] program goals or DoD priorities.’ … That language again reflects ‘that the challenged grant terminations were likely performed en masse, without individualized analysis, and without providing grantees with reasoned explanation for the terminations.’ …
With respect to DoT, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their arbitrary and capricious claim because the two-page form letters terminating Plaintiffs’ grants include a brief discussion of supposedly grant-specific reasons for the termination. … However, DoT offers no explanation as to why the research at issue [constituted a DEI initiative inconsistent with DoT priorities]. … Furthermore, one of the letters appears to reference research activities of an entirely different UTC grantee (C2SMARTER) as the basis for termination, raising serious questions regarding the extent to which individualized consideration occurred. …
Moreover, DoT acknowledges that it “did not explicitly consider reliance interests.” … And nothing in the record suggests that DoT considered other important factors, such as waste of taxpayer money resulting from mid-stream funding cuts, or the public’s loss of important research. …
For similar reasons, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that HHS and NIH’s immediate and indefinite grant suspensions were arbitrary and capricious.” (citations omitted).
On May 26, 2026, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the June 23 preliminary injunction as to the DEI Termination Class, finding likely success on its First Amendment claim that EPA, NSF, and NEH terminated grants because of recipients’ perceived DEI, DEIA, or environmental justice viewpoints. It expressly declined to address that class’s contrary-to-law APA claim. The court reversed the injunction as to the Form Termination Class, concluding that the district court likely lacked jurisdiction over its APA claim under the Tucker Act, and remanded. Judge Christen concurred in full and wrote separately to explain that a claim’s contractual character does not depend on whether the plaintiff is in privity of contract with the government. The court’s August 2025 opinion denying a stay had been withdrawn and superseded. The Ninth Circuit issued its mandate on July 20. The government filed a certiorari petition on Aug. 18, and Plaintiffs filed their opposition on Oct. 19.
48. Border cash reporting: unsupported assumptions, ignored evasion, irrational line-drawing
Judge Leon Schydlower (Biden appointee), Valuta Corporation, Inc. v. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 3:25-cv-00191 (W.D. Tex.)
Executive Action: FinCEN’s March 2025 Southwest Border Geographic Targeting Order (GTO).
On Jun. 24, 2025, Judge Schydlower issued a temporary restraining order on the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s issuance of a border geographic targeting order, stating:
“Plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on their claim that the geographic targeting order published at 90 Fed. Reg. 12106 (the “Border GTO”) is arbitrary and capricious. … Here, the administrative record reflects that the government either failed to consider or offered an unsubstantiated conclusion on at least two important aspects of the problem: (1) there are simple measures that cartel members can take to render the Border GTO completely toothless, and (2) innocent businesses can be profoundly disadvantaged if they are located on the ‘wrong’ side of an El Paso street, and thus within a covered zip code, vis-a-vis their competitors across the street in an uncovered zip code.”
On July 22, 2025, Judge Schydlower granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Geographic Targeting Order against the named Plaintiffs. In an Oct. 6 opinion, he adopted Judge Biery’s reasoning in Texas Association of Money Services Businesses v. Bondi, including its arbitrary-and-capricious analysis. Judge Biery had found likely success on that claim because FinCEN inadequately justified lowering the reporting threshold from $10,000 to $200 and selecting the targeted ZIP codes, and failed adequately to consider the burdens on legitimate businesses.
49. EV infrastructure funds: conclusory explanation, post hoc rationales, relevant factors and reliance interests ignored
Judge Tana Lin (Biden appointee), State of Washington v. Dept. of Transport, 2:25-cv-00848 (W.D. Wash.)
Executive Action: Freeze of National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program funding pursuant to “Unleashing American Energy” (Executive Order 14154), implemented through FHWA’s February 6, 2025 directive.
On Jun. 24, 2025, Judge Lin granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction challenging the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) freeze of funding under the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program. Through its February 6, 2025 “Biondi Letter,” FHWA had rescinded the program’s guidance, suspended previously approved state deployment plans, and blocked new funding obligations. The court found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious claim, explaining:
“Defendants’ rescission of the NEVI Formula Program guidance and revocation of State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plans was arbitrary and capricious. Defendants attempt to rely on two paragraphs in the Biondi Letter to satisfy their burden under the APA but fall far short of adequately explaining their actions. …
It is not evident that FHWA considered relevant factors that informed its decision. …
Indeed, the Biondi Letter does not articulate any facts at all and instead provides only an implication that the current NEVI Formula Program guidance does not ‘align with current U.S. DOT policy and priorities.’ … The Biondi Letter does not explain how the current guidance is out-of-step with current policy and, therefore, does not explain why it needs to be rescinded.
Further, the Biondi Letter does not demonstrate that FHWA considered the serious reliance interests engendered by the old policy—namely, the administrative, economic, and infrastructural arrangements that the states had made based on FHWA’s approval of prior State Plans. Indeed, the Biondi Letter is again completely silent as to any reliance issues it considered (if any). …
Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants’ action was likely arbitrary and capricious, and that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their second cause of action.” (emphasis added).
On Jan. 23, 2026, Judge Lin granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their APA challenge to the same funding freeze. She held that the suspension of state-plan approvals and prohibition on new funding obligations exceeded statutory authority, were arbitrary and capricious, and failed to comply with applicable law and required procedures, and vacated those actions. On the arbitrary-and-capricious claim, the court wrote:
“Time and again, Defendants assert in their motion that they ‘acknowledged,’ ‘concluded’ (three times), and ‘determined’ various things prior to implementing the funding freeze. But beyond these bare assertions, they provide no evidence of such informed decision making. As the Plaintiff States argue, the Biondi Letter ‘does not explain how [revising NEVI Formula Program guidance] to align with new policy priorities . . . warrant[s] the retroactive revocation of all State Plan approvals and the categorical withholding of funds from obligation.’ Further, the Court reiterates its finding that ‘[i]t is not evident that FHWA considered relevant factors that informed its decision.’ As the Court stated in its Order, Congress enumerated eight specific factors to be considered when developing guidance for the NEVI Formula Program. None of these is referenced in any of the purported evidence of deliberation that Defendants have presented in support of their position. With only the Biondi Letter and Defendants’ ex-post rationales to go on, then, the Court is left with no choice but to conclude that Defendants’ action was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
50. HHS restructuring and RIFs: no research, no rational basis, harms ignored
Judge Melissa R. Dubose (Biden appointee), State of New York v. Kennedy, 1:25-cv-00196 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Large-scale reductions in force / Termination of probationary employees (Executive Order 14210)
On Jul. 1, 2025, Judge Dubose granted a preliminary injunction, finding:
“Instead of undertaking an intentional and thoughtful process for weighing the benefits and drawbacks of implementing the sweeping policy change, the Defendants hastily restructured the sub-agencies and issued RIF notices. The Defendants have failed to demonstrate how the workforce terminations and restructurings made the sub-agencies more efficient, saved taxpayer dollars, or aligned with HHS’s priority of ‘ending America’s epidemic of chronic illness, by focusing on safe, wholesome food, clean water, and the elimination of environmental toxins.’ … In fact, the record is completely devoid of any evidence that the Defendants have performed any research on the repercussions of issuing and executing the plans announced in the Communiqué. Without a modicum of evidence to the contrary, the record shows that the Defendants did not consider the “substantial harms and reliance interests” of the States and the devastating consequences that would be felt by the populations served by these critical public health programs. …
Unable to perceive any rational basis for the Agency’s actions, the Court concludes that HHS’s actions in implementing the March 27 Communiqué were both arbitrary and capricious.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Sept. 17, the First Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay of the Jul. 1 preliminary injunction pending appeal, finding that the government had “not met its burden to make a ‘strong showing’ that it will succeed on appeal in overturning the district court’s arbitrary-and-capricious ruling.” The government did not “meaningfully engage” with Judge Dubose’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ APA claims: it failed to “put forth any argument that HHS ‘examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a . . . rational connection between the facts found and the choice made;’” and it did not “refute the district court’s explicit findings that there was no such ‘exam[ination of] the relevant data’ or ‘rational connection’ here” (citations omitted).
On Oct. 30, 2025, the First Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
51. DOD indirect-cost cap: misunderstood indirect costs, cherry-picked data, obvious impacts ignored
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), Association of American Universities v. Department of Defense, 1:25-cv-11740 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Reduction of indirect cost reimbursement rate for research institutions (DOD Rate Cap Policy, May 14, 2025)
On Jul. 18, 2025, Judge Murphy granted a preliminary injunction, stating:
“[T]he underlying idea for the Policy—that indirect costs are ‘waste’ and ‘bureaucratic fat,’ Hegseth Memo at 2, that are less worthy of funding than direct costs—is at least conceptually irrational and ignores the realities of research, as demonstrated by the record evidence. The record is clear that indirect costs support critical resources and infrastructure, without which the research cannot proceed. …
Embarrassingly, it is not obvious that Defendants are even fully aware of what constitutes an indirect cost ….”
“The Rate Cap Policy assumes a one-to-one relationship between direct costs and actual research that is just fundamentally wrong. In the absence of any contrary explanation, the Court cannot conclude that the Policy has a rational basis.”
On Oct. 10, 2025, Judge Murphy granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and vacated the Department of Defense’s indirect-cost cap, holding that “Defendants’ obtuseness to the obvious effects of this policy, including on their own mission, renders it arbitrary and capricious.” Incorporating his preliminary-injunction reasoning and making additional findings, he faulted DOD for ignoring decisions invalidating similar policies, presenting cost-savings calculations “without a rational basis in the record,” and relying on research “notable for its misrepresentations and cherry-picked data.” He also rejected the claim that universities had sufficient time to adjust their operations in 29 days as “either deliberate obtuseness or breathtaking obliviousness,” concluding that “DOD failed to consider and failed to explain significant aspects and impacts of the Rate Cap Policy.” On Feb. 18, 2026, the First Circuit dismissed Defendants’ appeal on their unopposed motion for voluntary dismissal.
52. USAGM grant rewrite: no explanation, no rational basis, governing statutes ignored
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, 1:25-cv-00799 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Governance and Defunding Global Media and Global Internet Freedom (Executive Order 14217; Executive Order 14238; Executive Order 14290)
On Jul. 18, 2025, Judge Lamberth granted plaintiffs’ requested preliminary injunction, stating:
“As far as this Court is aware, it is unprecedented for an agency to demand that entirely new terms govern its decades-old working relationship with a grantee entity and then stop responding, particularly when the agency is statutorily obligated to grant yearly congressional appropriations to that specific entity by name. Clearly, USAGM has fallen short of its duty to ‘articulate a satisfactory explanation’ for its final grant agreement because it has offered no explanation at all. And without any explanation from USAGM to justify its new grant agreement, the Court cannot discern any reasonable basis to explain USAGM’s drastic change in course. …
[W]hen USAGM changed course with the presentation of the FY 2025 agreement, it never once referred to any [] federal statutes. Failure to invoke any of the governing statutes in taking such drastic action to alter the parties longstanding grantmaking relationship further confirms that the defendants’ action was arbitrary and capricious and must be ‘set aside.’” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
53. Immigrant counsel program rescission: vulnerable interests ignored, process integrity ignored, reliance interests ignored
Judge Amir H. Ali (Biden appointee), American Gateways v. U.S. Department for Justice, 1:25-cv-01370 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Access of Lawyers to Immigrants in Detention (Executive Order 14159)
On Jul. 21, 2025, Judge Ali issued a memorandum opinion accompanying a preliminary injunction on the Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s rescission of the National Qualified Representative Program (NQRP), which stated:
“Plaintiffs have developed a substantial, unrebutted record that termination of the policy was arbitrary and capricious. …
The record before the Court shows the Acting Director terminated the policy of providing representation without considering any of the substantial interests at stake, including those that explicitly motivated the agency policy in the first place. The record shows no consideration of the interests of people found mentally incompetent to represent themselves by immigration courts—that is, people who are unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings they are in—who will likely lose their current representation and, following the Acting Director’s decision, have no representation going forward. … The record also shows no consideration of the integrity of the immigration process and the ‘unique challenges’ immigration judges face in adjudicating the deportation or detention of such people, which the agency recognized in adopting the NQRP. … And the record shows no consideration of the abrupt termination’s impact on organizations that provide services to the affected population, which had organized their operations around the policy and are in the midst of these representations in court proceedings across the country. …
On this record, the Court can only conclude that the Acting Director ‘entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem’ by abruptly ending the NQRP.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
54. Job Corps shutdown: no individualized assessment, no performance plans, procedures bypassed
Judge Dabney Langhorne Friedrich (Trump appointee), Cabrera v. Department of Labor, 1:25-cv-01909 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Dismantling Job Corps
On Jul. 25, 2025, Judge Friedrich granted a preliminary injunction, stating:
“Turning to the statute itself, the WIOA requires DOL to engage in certain procedures—including a period of notice and comment—before closing any Job Corps center. … The Department failed to comply with these statutory requirements. …
The agency suspended operations at all 99 privately operated Job Corps centers without any expectation of future reopenings. … DOL failed to conduct an individualized assessment or develop a performance improvement plan for any of the 99 centers. … It instead suspended all operations based on the perceived failures of the Job Corps program as a whole.
Because DOL unlawfully ‘closed’ all 99 privately operated Job Corps centers, in violation of the WIOA, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their APA claims”. (emphasis added).
On Aug. 11, 2026, Judge Friedrich approved a settlement providing that the APA Section 705 stay of the Job Corps closures would end upon dismissal of the action. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice on Aug. 24.
55. Parolee expedited-removal policy: “scattershot” legal explanations, no coherent rationale
Judge Jia M. Cobb (Biden appointee), Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Noem, 1:25-cv-00872 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Expansion of expedited removal to people previously paroled into the United States
On Aug. 1, 2025, Judge Cobb granted a APA § 705 stay of the government’s expedited deportation practices for immigrants who are paroled into the United States, holding that the government’s “Challenged Actions do indeed fail even the ‘fundamentally deferential’ standard of arbitrary-and-capricious review. … [Its] scattershot legal explanations suffice to render them likely arbitrary and capricious in this preliminary posture” (citations omitted).
On Aug. 11, 2026, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s APA § 705 stay for lack of standing, holding that Plaintiffs had not shown likely redressability because a regulation they had not sought to stay remained available to subject their members to expedited removal. The court expressly confined its decision to jurisdiction and did not reach the arbitrary-and-capricious merits.
56. DoD grant cancellation: no grant-specific facts, blanket termination, no rational connection
Judge G. Murray Snow (Bush appointee), Launch Alaska v. Department of Navy, Office of Naval Research, 3:25-cv-00141 (D. Ala.)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Aug. 5, 2025, Judge Snow granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that they “provide[d] sufficient evidence to suggest that ONR’s termination of its grant was done in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Judge Snow noted that the government’s blanket cancellation of all DEI programs “failed to consider any facts specific to Launch Alaska in concluding that Launch Alaska’s grant was ‘not aligned with DoD priorities’ … Consequently, ONR failed to provide ‘a rational connection between any facts found,’ of which there were none, and ‘the choice made.’” (citations omitted).
On Oct. 3, 2025, the district court dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
57. Humanities grant terminations: no factual findings, form letters, en masse decisions
Judge Michael H. Simon (Obama appointee), Oregon Council for the Humanities v. United States DOGE Service, 3:25-cv-00829 (D. Or.)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Aug. 6, 2025, Judge Simon granted a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705 and granted in part a preliminary injunction, blocking the administration from terminating the plaintiffs’ federal grants and prohibiting the administration from spending the appropriated money elsewhere. Judge Simon noted:
“None of these [termination] letters set out any factual findings or reasoned bases for the NEH Defendants’ termination decisions, much less provided the Councils with any explanation. The emails contain only conclusory statements and provide no indication of reasoned decision-making. …
Adding to the arbitrary and capricious nature of the actions taken by the NEH Defendants is that the grant reductions ‘were likely performed en masse, without individualized analysis.’ … As discussed, no such reasoned explanation was provided. …
Thus, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the NEH Defendants acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in terminating the grants.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
58. VAWA grant conditions: vague terms, under-reasoned process, ignored impacts
Judge William E. Smith (W. Bush appointee); Judge Melissa R. DuBose (Biden appointee), Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence v. Bondi, 1:25-cv-00279 (D. R.I.)
Executive action: Denial of federal grants
On Aug. 8, 2025, Judge Smith granted a preliminary injunction, halting the government from imposing additional conditions on grants involving domestic violence programs under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). In granting the injunction, Judge Smith found:
“[T[he Office’s decision to impose the challenged conditions in such a vague and haphazard manner to be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). …
[O]n the present record, the Court can only conclude that the Office engaged in a wholly under-reasoned and arbitrary process. The Office provides, as the only basis for its decision, a single declaration by an Office supervisory official. … While helpful, that declaration is not a substitute for an administrative record. The Lyons Declaration likewise fails to speak to any Office considerations outside of presidential executive orders and a memorandum from the Attorney General. …
[T]he Office appears to have ‘entirely failed to consider’ many of the impacts of its decision, especially to the extent that the vague and confusing language in the challenged conditions would cause significant adverse effects on the Coalitions and the vulnerable populations that they serve.” (emphasis added)
On Sept. 29, 2026, Judge DuBose granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, concluding that Defendants engaged in arbitrary and capricious agency action in imposing the challenged VAWA grant conditions. The court wrote:
“Defendants’ lackluster—and at times nonexistent—explanation of their decision to impose the Conditions on the grantees demonstrates that they have violated the APA’s prohibition on engaging in arbitrary and capricious agency action.”
The court further explained:
“Defendants have failed to provide actual, substantive, and contemporaneous support for the idea that they considered the adverse impact of these conditions in a material manner and that—as the Court has now had the opportunity to evaluate for the third time—Defendants’ attempt to impose these Conditions on Plaintiffs served as a sweeping and chaotic overhaul of the prior way in which Defendants required grantees to comply with these programs.” (emphasis added)
Judge DuBose set aside the challenged conditions and declined to issue a permanent injunction, concluding that vacatur provided sufficient relief.
59. Denial of NED Funds: unreasoned, disregard of reliance interests
Judge Dabney L. Friedrich (Trump appointee), National Endowment for Democracy v. United States, 1:25-cv-00648 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Denial of State Department Funds
On Aug. 11, 2025, Judge Friedrich granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the government’s asserted justification for its withholding funds were “neither reasoned nor rational.” Judge Friedrich explained:
“The defendants fail to explain how funds falling 30% short of the Endowment’s anticipated budget could be ‘sufficient’ to meet its operational needs, … or ‘enable’ it ‘to carry out its purposes[.]’ … They do not address why it is ‘the most efficient and economical’ result … for the Endowment to default on current financial obligations to grantees. … Nor does the record show that the defendants weighed, assessed, or displayed any awareness of the Endowment’s reliance interests on the historical practice of routinely disbursing annual appropriations in full. …
Because the defendants’ ‘conclusory and unreasoned’ assertions … are entirely insufficient to justify their actions, the Endowment is also likely to succeed on its claim that withholding the $95 million in appropriated funds was arbitrary and capricious.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
60. USDA grant terminations: form letters, no specific reasons, reliance interests ignored
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Urban Sustainability Directors Network v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-01775 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Denial of Federal Grants
On Aug. 14, 2025, Judge Howell granted preliminary injunctive relief protecting Plaintiffs’ grant awards, finding, among other things, that Plaintiffs were
“likely to succeed in showing that the five grant terminations in the record were arbitrary and capricious (Count Four) (subsection 2(d)), despite plaintiffs not making a sufficient showing that the broader alleged policy and practice of arbitrarily terminating grants likely violates the APA.”
Judge Howell wrote:
“Plaintiffs identify several failures with defendants’ terminations, namely that they used form letters without adequate explanation, failed to identify the specific reasons for the terminations, did not consider plaintiffs’ reliance interests, and did not justify their change in course.” (emphasis added)
61. ACA marketplace rule: conclusory rationale, flawed data, burdens unexplained
Judge Brendan Abell Hurson (Biden appointee), City of Columbus v. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., 1:25-cv-02114 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Access to Health Care
On Aug. 22, 2025, Judge Hurson granted a stay of certain provisions of the Marketplace Integrity and Affordability Rule, which were to take effect on Aug. 25, 2025.
On the “Actuarial Value Policy,” Judge Hurson found:
“Such ‘[n]odding to concerns raised by commenters only to dismiss them in a conclusory manner is not a hallmark of reasoned decisionmaking.’ … Thus, the Court finds that Defendants provided an insufficient and conclusory rationale for altering the de minims[sic] variation, and Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Regarding the special enrollment period’s eligibility verification requirements, Judge Hurson said:
“The Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ principal argument that ‘CMS offered no good reason to impose this burden on enrollees.’ … As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits on their claim that instituting SEP pre-enrollment verification procedures was arbitrary and capricious.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Regarding “Income Verification When Data Shows Income Below 100 Percent of FPL”, Judge Hurson said:
“At the hearing, the Court asked counsel for Defendants how it could not be considered arbitrary and capricious for the agency to continue to rely on a report to justify its action after the author of that report indicated that the conclusions in the report do not support the agency’s action. … In response, counsel conceded, ‘[t]hat is something difficult to address,’ and noted that ‘[he] [was] not familiar with the precise facts of what the Agency was using, the proposition for which the Agency was using the study compared to what the author was disagreeing with.’ …
Against this backdrop, the Court concludes that HHS failed to meaningfully address the comments pointing out potential flaws in the data contained in the Paragon report, despite continuing to rely on such data to justify the provision in the Rule. …
In short, the agency refused to meaningfully engage with challenges to the data and reports used to justify the Rule, which began at the time of promulgating the final Rule and continues through this litigation. … Accordingly, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that CMS acted arbitrarily by instituting additional verification requirements without sufficient data justifying the need to do so.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Finally, on “Income Verification When Tax Data is Unavailable”, Judge Hurson said:
“After reviewing the agency’s reasoning in the Rule, the Court finds that CMS concluded in a conclusory fashion that program integrity benefits would outweigh the administrative burden on applicants. … The circular reasoning and conclusory statements offered to justify the policy change are not indicative of reasoned decision-making. … Given the lack of sufficient data to justify the rule, and the agency’s lack of meaningful explanation for the provision, the Court finds that this provision was not ‘reasonable and reasonably explained.’” (emphasis added).
On June 12, 2026, Judge Hurson granted summary judgment in part for Plaintiffs, finding five provisions arbitrary and capricious: widening permissible downward variations in plans’ actuarial values; expanding special-enrollment eligibility verification; shortening annual open enrollment beginning in 2027; requiring additional income verification when applicants’ projected income exceeds the poverty threshold but trusted data indicate income below it; and ending acceptance of self-attested income without further verification when IRS data are unavailable. The court faulted unsupported assumptions, inadequate explanations for imposing enrollment burdens, and failures to meaningfully address challenges to the supporting data. These provisions were vacated.
62–63. Harvard funding freeze: no data, no grant-specific analysis, no rational connection
Judge Allison Dale Burroughs (Obama appointee), President and Fellows of Harvard College v. US Department of Health and Human Services, 1:25-cv-11048 (D. Mass.) and American Association of University Professors – Harvard Faculty Chapter v. United States Department Of Justice, 1:25-cv-10910 (D. Mass.) (related cases)
Executive Action: Actions Toward Universities (Executive Order 14188, Pause or termination of Grants, Columbia Letter of demands, Harvard Letter of demands, Harvard Proclamation on student visas)
On Sept. 3, 2025, Judge Burroughs ruled, in part, that the administration’s attempt to condition Harvard University’s federal funding on changes to its campus policies violates the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court found:
“In sum, the Freeze Orders, on their face, purport to explain the decision to terminate funding as based on Harvard’s failure to address antisemitism or uphold civil rights laws. It is difficult, however, if not impossible, for this Court to view that explanation as ‘reasoned’when the administrative record reflects that, before freezing nearly $2.2 billion in federal grants, the agencies considered little, if any, data regarding the antisemitism problem at Harvard, disregarded the substantial policy and other changes Harvard had taken and was continuing to take to address the issue, and failed to weigh the importance of any particular grant or to evaluate whether a particular grant recipient had engaged in antisemitic behavior before cutting off critical research. … It is that rational connection between the grant terminations and the fight against antisemitism that is wholly lacking here. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED as to their arbitrary and capricious claims regarding the Freeze Orders, and Defendants’ corresponding motions are DENIED.” (emphasis added).
On Oct. 20, 2025, Judge Burroughs issued an order and final judgment. She wrote:
“The Freeze Orders are hereby DECLARED arbitrary and capricious in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and judgment on Count II is therefore entered in favor of Plaintiffs in part on that basis… The Freeze Orders are VACATED AND SET ASIDE as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). … Judgment shall enter in favor of Defendants in part on Count II with respect to the claim that the Termination Letters are arbitrary and capricious for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
The government appealed the final judgments in both actions, and the First Circuit heard argument on Oct. 5, 2026.
64. Head Start restrictions and cuts: unexplained changes, reliance interests disregarded, “no rational basis”
Judge Ricardo S. Martinez (W. Bush appointee), Washington State Association of Head Start and Early Childhood Education and Assistance Program v. Kennedy, 2:25-cv-00781 (W.D. Wash.)
Executive Action: Head Start eligibility restrictions, staffing cuts, regional-office closures, and DEIA restrictions
On Sept. 11, 2025, Judge Martinez granted a preliminary injunction against HHS’s directive restricting Head Start eligibility based on immigration status. Finding likely success on the arbitrary-and-capricious claim, he explained that Defendants had “not provided good reasons for the change in policy” and emphasized the “extensive reliance interests” at stake.
On Jan. 6, 2026, Judge Martinez granted a further preliminary injunction and postponed the challenged actions under APA § 705, blocking implementation of Head Start’s DEIA restrictions, mass layoffs, and regional-office closures. He expressly found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their A&C claim, agreeing with decisions faulting unsupported efficiency claims, disregard of harms and reliance interests, and DEIA restrictions extending beyond compliance with antidiscrimination law. The court wrote:
“Beyond Defendants’ bold assertion that the mass cuts are cost efficient, Defendants have provided no rational basis for these actions and have shown no consideration for how these cuts and confusing policy changes have frustrated or made it impossible for Plaintiffs to function as they are statutorily required. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their arbitrary and capricious APA claim.” (emphasis added).
65. NEA gender-ideology bar: no policy analysis, undefined standard, EO compliance only
Judge William E. Smith (W. Bush appointee), Rhode Island Latino Arts v. National Endowment for the Arts, 1:25-cv-00079 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Ban on DEIA initiatives in the executive branch and by contractors and grantees (Executive Order 14168)
On Sept. 19, 2025, Judge Smith issued an order granting and denying in part the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment, and finding that the NEA’s final decision regarding its implementation of EO 14168 (“Final Notice”) was arbitrary & capricious under the APA. He wrote:
“The NEA’s only explanation for its decision to categorically disfavor applications that promote gender ideology is that it will ‘serve the public by . . . furthering the current administration’s priorities as provided in the [EO],’ … The administrative record — which consists of the NFAHA, ‘a smattering of cases,’ the EO, the NEA’s grant application guidelines, and the Final Notice — is devoid of reasoned policy analysis … There is no examination of relevant data, there are no findings of fact, and there is zero explanation of what it means for a project to ‘promote gender ideology,’ let alone how that concept relates to artistic merit, artistic excellence, general standards of decency, or respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public. …
Because the NEA has failed to explain its action outside of complying with the EO, the Court concludes that the Final Notice is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The government appealed the judgment, and the First Circuit heard argument on Oct. 7, 2026.
66-a. First Revolution Wind stop-work order: no contemporaneous factual basis; “the height of arbitrary and capricious action”
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Revolution Wind, LLC v. Burgum, 1:25-cv-02999 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Department of the Interior / Bureau of Ocean Energy Management stop-work orders halting construction of the Revolution Wind offshore-wind project
On Sept. 22, 2025, in Revolution Wind, Judge Lamberth granted a stay and preliminary injunction against BOEM’s Aug. 22 stop-work order halting construction of the project. The court’s bench ruling found that BOEM had cited only the “mere potential” for national security concerns or interference with other uses of federal waters, without identifying “any factual findings” showing that Revolution Wind implicated those concerns or that they required construction to cease. Judge Lamberth emphasized that the same statutory factors had been considered during the project’s earlier multi-year approval process and that BOEM continued to defend that approval in related litigation. He concluded:
“Mandating an immediate pause to construction of a project whose approval the bureau continues to defend in those other cases is the height of arbitrary and capricious action. The arbitrary and capricious nature of that action is not cured by the additional reasons now provided in the Suess declaration because they were not offered at the time that BOEM issued the order.”
66-b. Second Revolution Wind stop-work order: insufficient explanation for changed position; stated national-security rationale “may have been pretextual”
Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan appointee), Revolution Wind, LLC v. Burgum, 1:25-cv-02999 (D.D.C.); State of Rhode Island v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 1:25-cv-04328 (D.D.C.) (consolidated cases)
The dispute returned after BOEM issued a second stop-work order on Dec. 22, 2025, suspending all activity on Revolution Wind for 90 days on asserted national-security grounds. By then, State of Rhode Island had been transferred to D.D.C. On Jan. 7, 2026, Judge Lamberth consolidated that action with Revolution Wind. At the Jan. 12 hearing, the court considered preliminary injunction and stay motions from both Revolution Wind and the State plaintiffs.
Judge Lamberth found that the second order again likely violated the APA. BOEM had not explained which project features or activities implicated the asserted new security concerns, how those concerns differed from matters already addressed through the project’s earlier approval process and 2024 Defense Department mitigation agreement, or why a complete construction stop was necessary. The court found that BOEM’s failure to account for its earlier assurances represented a “change in position by the government” and held that merely pointing to new classified national security information “does not constitute a sufficient explanation for the Bureau’s decision to entirely stop work on the Revolution Wind project.” BOEM’s later press release supplying additional justification could not cure the deficiency because judicial review was limited to the grounds invoked when the agency acted.
Judge Lamberth concluded:
“Because the Bureau failed to provide sufficient reasoning for its change in position, because the Bureau failed to explain why it could not take action short of a complete stop to construction, the December 22nd stop work order likely amounts to arbitrary and capricious action under the Administrative Procedure Act.”
He contrasted the second order with the first: “This time the government did provide a reason for its decision, but its failure to explain or apply that reasoning suggests that the stated national security reason may have been pretextual.” His concern was “heightened” by Secretary Burgum’s contemporaneous press appearances, “in which he criticized offshore wind projects for a variety of reasons unrelated to national security.”
67. Federal grant conditions: “rote incorporation of executive orders” and failure to consider reliance interests, public losses, and alternatives
Judge Richard G. Seeborg (Obama appointee), City of Fresno v. Turner, 3:25-cv-07070 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Federal grant conditions
This case, brought by cities, counties, and a county airport authority, challenges conditions on federal funding concerning diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), “gender ideology,” abortion, and cooperation with federal immigration enforcement.
On Sept. 23, 2025, Judge Seeborg granted a preliminary injunction in part, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claims that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of Transportation (DOT), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had imposed grant conditions that were arbitrary and capricious. The court found that HUD and HHS had provided “no substantive reasons justifying [their] radical change of course” beyond implementing the executive orders. Judge Seeborg explained:
“These announcements are not enough because ‘rote incorporation of executive orders … does not constitute “reasoned decisionmaking”’ as required by the APA.” (emphasis added.)
The court also found no showing that the agencies had considered the “hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars already spent or allocated to projects which may be jeopardized” by the conditions, or alternatives such as defining prohibited conduct more precisely. Although Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy’s April 2025 letter offered an explanation based on the administration’s interpretation of federal antidiscrimination law, Judge Seeborg concluded:
“Even if this can be said to provide a sufficiently reasoned explanation for the DOT DEI Conditions, however, the Duffy Letter still provides no record evidence that DOT considered reliance interests, possible waste or loss to the public, alternatives, or other important factors. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that the HUD, DOT and HHS Grant Conditions are arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
On Apr. 28, 2026, Judge Seeborg applied the same reasoning in finding that fourteen additional plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that the HUD, DOT, and HHS grant conditions were arbitrary and capricious. The amended injunction extended protection to those plaintiffs and also bound two newly added defendants within DOT: the Federal Railroad Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
68. Disaster-grant immigration conditions: no fact-based rationale, overbreadth, reliance interests ignored
Judge William E. Smith (Bush appointee), State of Illinois. v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1:25-cv-00206 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: “Temporary Pause” of grants, loans, and assistance programs
On Sept. 24, 2025, Judge Smith granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction for 20 states and the District of Columbia, finding the DHS’s attachment of immigration-related conditions to federal disaster grants and emergency management programs was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Smith wrote:
“DHS made no attempt to claim that it examined the relevant data or articulated a fact-based reason for its actions.
Based on the limited justifications offered in Defendants’ papers and exhibits to this Court, the Court can only conclude that DHS engaged in a wholly under-reasoned and arbitrary process. Defendants provide, as nearly the only basis for their decision, that DHS is tasked with homeland security and that many of the grants, as well as the overarching objective of DHS, are designed to prevent and potentially respond to acts of terrorism, and ‘that mission includes immigration enforcement.’ … But such platitudes cannot substitute for an actual explanation of why it is necessary to attach sweeping immigration conditions to all the grants at issue here, regardless of their statutory purpose or programmatic objectives. The indiscriminate application of these conditions across the entire spectrum of DHS-administered grants demonstrates the absence of tailoring and the failure to consider whether such conditions are appropriate for particular programs. …
The failure to even consider reasons to not impose the contested conditions highlights the arbitrariness of the process. Moreover, DHS did not meaningfully evaluate the states’ reliance interests, even though the record shows that states have structured their budgets and emergency preparedness planning for decades around consistent federal support. …
The combination of overbreadth, disregard for reliance interests, and failure to consider public safety and possible alternatives makes it clear that DHS’s decision does not comply with the APA. … The contested conditions are arbitrary and capricious and, thus, violate the APA.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Sept. 16, 2026, the First Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal and issued its mandate immediately.
69. Campus-protest removal policy: unexplained reversal, no explanation, reliance interests ignored
Judge William G. Young (Reagan appointee), American Association of University Professors v. Rubio, 1:25-cv-10685 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Habeas Corpus and Immigration Removal of Protestors (Executive Orders 14161 and 14188)
On Sept. 30, 2025, following a nine-day bench trial, Judge Young ruled that the administration violated the First Amendment in efforts to deport non-citizens involved in pro-Palestinian protests on college campuses. The court also found the administration violated the Administrative Procedure Act, stating:
“The policy is also arbitrary or capricious because it represents an unexplained reversal of the agencies’ position without accounting for reliance interests. …
Although … ‘[t]he agency retains the discretion and authority to change its position — even abruptly — in any specific case because a change in its policy does not affect the legal norm,’ here it is the legal norm itself that has been changed — pure political speech has never before been grounds for adverse immigration action — and, ‘when “bizarre” interpretations are made out of “regulatory zeal,” deference is not appropriate.’ …
The Public Officials not only do not explain this policy; they deny that it exists. Thus, the agencies have engaged in quintessential arbitrary action: an abrupt reversal of course, using statutes in new and constitutionally suspect ways, with no explanation.” (emphasis added).
70. Teen pregnancy policy notice: vague standard, no reasoned explanation, arbitrary enforcement
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Planned Parenthood of Greater New York v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1:25-cv-02453 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Denial of Federal Grants
On Oct. 7, 2025, Judge Howell granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and entered judgment for Plaintiffs the same day. The court granted summary judgment on Count IV, holding that the July 1, 2025 OASH Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program Policy Notice was “incomprehensibly vague,” “inviting arbitrary enforcement in violation of the APA.”
“The July Policy Notice’s vagueness renders the new requirements imposed on TPP grant recipients largely incomprehensible and unworkable, putting in place an opaque ‘we-know-it-when-we-see-it’ standard for HHS to assess compliance with programming content restrictions that is susceptible to discriminatory application. This Notice is therefore arbitrary and capricious and, for this reason alone, warrants vacatur. The July Policy Notice also suffers from several of the other deficiencies plaintiffs identify, including that it entirely lacks reasoned explanation and justification, which independently requires the Policy Notice to be set aside.” (emphasis added).
The court therefore vacated the notice, enjoined its enforcement, and directed the Clerk to close the case.
71. Shutdown-era RIFs: political retribution, haphazard rollout, reliance interests ignored
Judge Susan Yvonne Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL CIO v. United States Office of Management and Budget, 3:25-cv-08302 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Large-scale reductions in force / Termination of probationary employees
On Oct. 15, 2025, granting a temporary restraining order, Judge Illston wrote:
“If what plaintiffs allege is true, then the agencies’ actions in laying off thousands of public employees during a government shutdown —and in targeting for RIFs those programs that are perceived as favored by a particular political party— is the epitome of hasty, arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking. The many snafus that plaintiffs detail in their papers, some of which are outlined above, are testament to this.” (emphasis added).
On Oct. 28, granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Illston repeated the above. She noted that the government had failed to address the plaintiffs’ allegations of arbitrary and capricious conduct at the TRO stage and devoted only three pages to the issue in its preliminary-injunction briefing. The court wrote:
“Review of the OMB Memorandum, the OPM Guidance and Special Instructions, and the declarations provided by defendants do not reveal reasoned decisionmaking. The RIFs at issue here, planned and administered during a government shutdown, are likely arbitrary and capricious: they are explicitly intended for the purpose of political retribution and have been rolled out haphazardly, with no evidence of reasoned decisionmaking or consideration of the federal employees’ reliance interests. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing.” (emphasis added).
The court further said that the government’s “vague and limited articulations do not justify agency defendants’ drastic, out of the ordinary actions during a government shutdown,” described statements by President Trump as “partisan motivation [which] exemplifies arbitrary and capricious agency action,” and called out “a tumultuous process pervaded by errors and uncertainty.” Judge Illston concluded:
“The Court further agrees with plaintiffs that OMB’s directive to implement RIFs during the lapse in appropriations departs from longstanding policies without providing a reasoned explanation for doing so. It is longstanding practice for Presidents to act in concert with Congress when undertaking large-scale RIFs. … However, here, the agencies sharply depart from historical practice, unilaterally acting out President Trump’s and OMB Director Vought’s retaliatory and partisan ‘policy goal’ of punishing Democrat-oriented agencies amid a government shutdown. Unable to discern any reasoned basis for the agency defendants’ actions, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their arbitrary and capricious claim under the APA.” (emphasis added).
72. Transit-security grant reallocation: improper nonrisk factors, no contemporaneous explanation, inconsistent treatment
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan (Clinton appointee), State of New York v. Noem, 1:25-cv-08106 (S.D.N.Y.)
Executive Action: Immigration Policy – punishment of sanctuary cities and states (Executive order 14159) (DOJ “Sanctuary Jurisdiction Directives” (Feb. 5, 2025))
On Oct. 16, 2025, Judge Kaplan granted a permanent injunction, holding that DHS and FEMA’s decision to reallocate roughly $34 million in Rail and Transit Security Grant Program funding from New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) based on New York City’s “sanctuary city” policies was unlawful. DHS had initially allocated the funds to the MTA through its Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO), but FEMA later reallocated the funds to other recipients. Directing the government to release the funds to the MTA, Judge Kaplan found the reallocation to be arbitrary and capricious.
Judge Kaplan wrote:
“The government counters that it provided an explanation for its decision in the NOFO, which states that ‘[a]n immigration term and condition, including those in the DHS Standard Terms and Conditions, may be material to the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to make this grant award.’ This justification is arbitrary and capricious for at least three independent reasons.
First, the statute governing the award of TSGP funds requires that the DHS Secretary ‘select the recipients of grants based solely on risk.’ Congress’s use of the word ‘solely’ makes clear beyond any doubt that the Secretary may not consider factors unrelated to risk. The government concedes, and the Court finds, that the Reallocation Decision was not based on risk. Instead, the government argues that ‘[e]nsuring that recipients enforce federal immigration laws and policies is a rational reason in support of the agency’s denial of federal funds.’ Regardless of whether this constituted a ‘rational reason’ for the Reallocation Decision, the decision nonetheless was arbitrary and capricious because FEMA’s reliance on a non-risk factor constituted reliance on a factor proscribed by statute.
The government argues also that ‘[w]hile Congress cannot regulate the States, its constitutional powers . . . do allow it to fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States.’ The government is correct that Congress may fix terms on the disbursement of federal money to the States. But here, Congress did not authorize the DHS Secretary to fix immigration-related terms or conditions on the disbursement of TSGP funds. To the contrary, Congress prohibited DHS from imposing such terms by requiring the selection of grant recipients to be ‘based solely on risk.’ Accordingly, the asserted basis for the Reallocation Decision — the implication that the MTA, the State, or the City was not in compliance with immigration-related grant conditions — was arbitrary and capricious because Congress precluded DHS from imposing, and in any case did not authorize it to impose, such conditions on TSGP funds.
Second, … [the] blanket statement [in the NOFO] did not ‘reasonably explain[]’ the Reallocation Decision. It did not specify any particular term that might be material nor any particular term the MTA allegedly did not comply with. It did not state that the MTA might be held responsible for New York City’s status as a sanctuary jurisdiction — the basis for the decision asserted by a FEMA official in this litigation. And it did not explain what, if anything, changed with respect to compliance with immigration terms and conditions between the publication of the $33,898,500 target allocation and the Reallocation Decision. Accordingly, the Reallocation Decision was arbitrary and capricious because the government did not provide a reasonable, contemporaneous explanation for the decision.
Third, even if the enforcement of immigration-related conditions were statutorily authorized and had been given as a contemporaneous explanation for the Reallocation Decision, the government’s application of that justification exclusively to the MTA was wholly arbitrary. …
Even accepting Mr. Arnold’s purported rationale at face value, it would not reasonably explain the Reallocation Decision because that decision increased grants to some sanctuary cities or entities based in or serving them while eliminating any such grant to the MTA. Accordingly, the Reallocation Decision was arbitrary and capricious because it ‘runs counter to the evidence before the agency’ and ‘is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
73. HHS anti-DEI grant conditions: pretext, no data, regulations ignored
Judge Ann Aiken (Clinton appointee), State of Washington v. Health and Human Services, 6:25-cv-01748 (D. Or.)
Executive Action: Ban on DEIA initiatives in the executive branch and by contractors and grantees (Executive Order 14168)
On Oct. 27, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Aiken wrote:
“In sum, HHS fails to show that the new grant conditions are reasonable, let alone offer any reasonable explanation, other than pretext, for its action. HHS provides no evidence that it made factual findings or considered the statutory objectives and express requirements, the relevant data, the applicable anti-sex- discrimination statutes and its own regulations or Plaintiff States’ reliance interests.
On this record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff States are likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claim that Defendants’ actions are arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
74. Education grant discontinuations: no grant-specific explanation, no record, reliance interests ignored
Judge Kymberly K. Evanson (Biden appointee), State of Washington v. United States Department of Education, 2:25-cv-01228 (W.D. Wash.)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Oct. 27, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Evanson wrote:
“The Court finds that Plaintiff States have met their burden to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claim that the discontinuation decisions are arbitrary and capricious in at least two ways. …
First, … there is no evidence the Department considered any relevant data pertaining to the Grants at issue and it is undisputed that it provided no Grant-specific explanation of the application of the Department’s new “best interest” criteria. In the absence of any findings, the Court cannot determine whether the Department’s decision bears a rational connection to the facts. Rather, the discontinuation decisions are wholly conclusory, which prevents meaningful judicial review. …
Beyond an unsupported assertion that the decisions were ‘reasonable and reasonably explained’ …, Defendants make no effort to analogize the discontinuation decisions or the process by which the decisions were reached to the cases they cite. … Indeed, Defendants’ counsel admitted at oral argument that he had no information about how the Department decided which Grants to discontinue, and that the record contains none. … Because the Court agrees with Plaintiff States that the discontinuation decisions are unexplained and conclusory, the Court finds that Plaintiff States have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their APA claim on this basis. …
[Second,] there is no evidence before the Court that Defendants considered any reliance interests (as Defendants conceded at oral argument…).” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On Dec. 19, 2025, Judge Evanson granted Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied defendants’ cross-motion, holding, inter alia, that “Plaintiff States are entitled to summary judgment on their APA claims because the Department’s actions are arbitrary and capricious” both as to the Directive procedure and the discontinuation notices themselves. Judge Evanson vacated the Department of Education’s Directive procedure, discontinuation notices, and reconsideration-denial letters as to discontinued grantees in plaintiff states, and permanently enjoined the Department from considering new priorities or other information inconsistent with the existing rule when determining grant eligibility. The court explained:
“First, … the Department has failed to provide even the ‘minimal level of analysis’ needed to support a change in policy. … The Department’s enactment of the Directive procedure ‘is arbitrary and capricious and so cannot carry the force of law.’ …
Second, … there is no evidence before the Court that the Department considered any reliance interests (as conceded at oral argument…), the Court finds that Plaintiff States have shown that the Directive procedure is arbitrary and capricious. …
Next, … the Court agrees with Plaintiff States that the discontinuation notices are unexplained and conclusory, the Court finds that Plaintiff States have established that the discontinuation decisions are arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
On Jan. 22, 2026, Judge Evanson amended the Dec. 19 judgment to require new continuation determinations by Feb. 6 and any new continuation awards by Feb. 11, backdated to Feb. 6 to avoid a funding gap, while denying plaintiffs’ motion to enforce. Defendants appealed the Dec. 19 summary judgment on Jan. 23, but on Feb. 24, the Ninth Circuit denied the government’s emergency stay motion and remanded for the limited purpose of setting new deadlines, finding that the government had failed to show the reasoned decision-making required by the APA and failed to demonstrate irreparable injury absent a stay.
75. Annual asylum-fee guidance: conflicting policies, receipt burdens and alternatives ignored, unsupported post hoc assurance
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump appointee), Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 1:25-cv-03299 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Annual Asylum Fee
On Oct. 30, 2025, the court temporarily blocked the government from enforcing H.R. 1’s Annual Asylum Fee, which required asylum applicants to pay a $100 fee for each year their application remained pending, and found that USCIS’s and EOIR’s conflicting guidance about how and when that fee had to be paid was likely arbitrary and capricious. In concluding that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits, the court explained that, because an individual asylum applicant could be subject to both agencies’ policies and face significant penalties, the situation presented a “compelling need for interpretive uniformity,” making the other agency’s interpretation “an important aspect of the problem” that each agency was required to consider. But “neither USCIS nor EOIR did so, even though they publicized their policies only five days apart,” and the court therefore concluded that “Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits that USCIS and EOIR acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting divergent policies.”
On Feb. 2, 2026, Judge Gallagher lifted the earlier stay after the agencies revised their annual-asylum-fee instructions. On Sept. 22, she granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff, holding that EOIR’s replacement memorandum and template order “must be set aside as arbitrary and capricious agency actions.” EOIR had failed to consider the difficulties applicants faced in preserving and producing payment receipts, including after detention and confiscation of their belongings. The court found it “patently unreasonable that an asylum applicant who has paid the AAF, but cannot readily produce their receipt to an immigration judge through no fault of their own, may forfeit their asylum claims.”
Rejecting the government’s suggestion that immigration judges could resolve these problems individually, Judge Gallagher wrote: “But this post-hoc assurance, offered with no supporting details, offers too little, too late to satisfy the APA’s requirement of reasoned decision-making.” The record did not show that EOIR considered the significant compliance problems or “any alternatives to its receipt requirement,” including USCIS’s apparent practice of not requiring applicants to provide proof of payment. Judge Gallagher added: “[I]t defies logic to believe that EOIR lacks an electronic system to track AAF payments where an applicant has no proof on his person.”
76. DEI and gender grant conditions: unexplained link to grant purposes, reliance interests and practical harms ignored
Judge Barbara J. Rothstein (Carter appointee), City of Seattle v. Trump, 2:25-cv-01435 (W.D. Wash.)
Executive Action: Denial of Federal Grants
On Oct. 31, 2025, Judge Rothstein granted Seattle’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the City was likely to succeed on its APA claims that the DEI and Gender Orders exceed statutory authority and are arbitrary and capricious. The court enjoined enforcement of Section 3(b)(iv) of Executive Order 14173 and Section 3(g) of Executive Order 14168 against Seattle, ordered Defendants to treat any past enforcement as null and void, and barred them from applying those conditions to the City’s grant agreements. As the court emphasized, as it had already found on Aug. 12 in King County v. Turner that “the DEI Order does not simply require that grant recipients comply with federal antidiscrimination laws; rather, the Order is meant to advance the Trump Administration’s own interpretation of ‘discrimination’ through the threat of the loss of federal funding and/or FCA investigations and penalties.” Therefore, the court held:
“Seattle is likely to succeed on the merit of their claim that Defendants’ imposition of the DEI and Gender Orders is arbitrary and capricious, which is an independent ground for setting aside Defendants’ actions.”
On June 29, 2026, Judge Rothstein granted Seattle Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction and Shoreline’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On arbitrary and capricious decision-making, the court wrote:
“Here, the challenged conditions bear no apparent relationship to the grant programs at issue. Defendants have not adequately explained why funds appropriated for transportation infrastructure, emergency preparedness, housing, nutrition, public safety, workforce development, and similar programs must be conditioned on compliance with the challenged DEI and Gender Order requirements. Nor have Defendants shown that the agencies considered the statutory purposes of the affected grants, the reliance interests of recipients with existing awards and ongoing projects, the consequences of imposing new conditions on reimbursable grants, or the uncertainty created by broad certifications carrying potential False Claims Act consequences. Nor have they considered the effects of removing the grants on Plaintiffs’ vulnerable populations. The Court therefore concludes, as it did in its prior orders, that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that the challenged agency actions are arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
77. Shelter and Services Program cuts: no factual support, shifting rationales, no reasoned explanation
Judge Matthew F. Kennelly (Clinton appointee), City Of Chicago v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-05463 (N.D. Ill.)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Oct. 31, 2025, Judge Kennelly granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, entering a PI order on Nov. 3, enjoining Defendants from (1) eliminating the Shelter and Services Program (SSP) created in Congress’s 2023 and 2024 appropriations for DHS and (2) withholding/terminating open SSP grants based on “significant concerns that SSP funding was going to entities engaged in or facilitating illegal activities” related to “bringing in or harboring certain aliens” (Mar. 11 letter from FEMA to SSP grantees) and rationales that “grant programs that support, or have the potential to support, illegal immigration through funding illegal activities or support for illegal aliens” are not “consistent with DHS’s enforcement focus” and “do not effectuate the agency’s current priorities” (Apr. 1 letter from FEMA to SSP grantees).
The court concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their separation-of-powers and APA arbitrary-and-capricious claims because DHS/FEMA lacked legal discretion to ignore Congress’s directive that SSP funds “shall be transferred” to FEMA to support sheltering and provided no factual support and shifting rationales behind their decision to terminate or freeze SSP funding. In his Oct. 31 opinion, Judge Kennelly stated:
“On the record before the Court, DHS / FEMA provided no factual support for the assertion that SSP funding was going to SSP entities in violation of, or that facilitated violation of, federal law … DHS / FEMA also provided no reasoned explanation or factual findings to support the decision to eliminate the SSP. DHS / FEMA has changed the explanation used to support its decisions related to SSP funding at least three times from the March 11 letter through the September 22, 2025, hearing in this case. … The record is devoid of any support for the defendants’ broad conclusions.”
78. SNAP funding cutoff: ignored consequences, implausible reasoning, partisan pretext
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, 1:25-cv-00569 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Oct. 31, 2025, Judge McConnell held a virtual hearing in which he granted the plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. As he later said:
“Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiffs were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claim because the USDA’s decision to cut off SNAP funding was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The Court reasoned that the contingency funds for SNAP are appropriated funds that are necessary to carry out the program’s operation, and that USDA provided no explanation as to why the contingency funds could not be used even though the agency had previously acknowledged in 2019, during the first Trump administration, that such funds could be used during a government shutdown.”
In Judge McConnell’s Nov. 1 written TRO, the government was given two paths to avert a lapse in November SNAP benefits: (1) fully fund payments by Nov. 3 using Section 32 and/or contingency funds; or (2) make partial payments by Nov. 5, but only if it “expeditiously” resolved the administrative and clerical burdens associated with partial disbursements. The court added that any decision not to fully fund must be made “in accordance with the APA” and could not be “arbitrary or capricious.” The government chose to make partial payments.
On Nov. 6, Judge McConnell granted, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ motion for a second TRO, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claim that the USDA’s decision to opt for partial November SNAP payments was likely to succeed as being arbitrary and capricious on four grounds. (Judge McConnell also reportedly said during the earlier Nov. 6 hearing that “USDA arbitrarily and capriciously created this problem by ignoring the congressional mandate for contingency funds and failing to timely notify the states.”)
First, USDA failed to “account for the practical consequences” or consider the “increased harm that will befall these recipients” by attempting to issue partial payments. The court said it found “it astounding that the Defendants would even choose to go down this path if they were aware of all the difficulties and delays that such partial payment of SNAP benefits would entail.”
Second, USDA misapprehend[ed] its statutory authority under 7 U.S.C. § 2257 and congressional intent by “conflat[ing] Section 32 funds with the Child Nutrition Programs to make it seem as though they go in tandem,” claiming that Section 32 funds must be used “exclusively” to fund those programs and that using them for other purposes would “stray from Congressional intent.”
Third, the court held that USDA’s reasoning for refusing to access the Section 32 fund was “so contrary to the evidence” and “so implausible” as to be arbitrary and capricious. It found it “highly unlikely that USDA’s transfer of Section 32 funds would lead to immediate and permanent gaps in Child Nutrition Program funding, as the Defendants suggest,” emphasized that “USDA does not know how Congress will use its power of the purse, so it cannot rest on the assumption that Congress will simply do nothing,” and concluded that “it defies belief that the Defendants would prioritize a hypothetical disruption in child food assistance, projected to occur no sooner than May of 2026 (if at all), over the very real and immediate risk of children being deprived of their food assistance today” (emphasis in original).
Finally, USDA’s decision was “entirely ‘pretextual’” and undertaken for “partisan political purposes” (emphasis added). Judge McConnell concluded:
“This Court is not naïve to the administration’s true motivations. … Far from being concerned with Child Nutrition funding, these statements make clear that the administration is withholding full SNAP benefits for political purposes. Such ‘unjustifiable partisanship’ has infected the USDA’s decision-making.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The court also emphasized in the introductory discussion of its order:
“While the President of the United States professes a commitment to helping those it serves, the government’s actions tell a different story. Faced with a choice between advancing relief and entrenching delay, it chose the latter—an outcome that predictably magnifies harm and undermines the very purpose of the program it administers. Such conduct is more than poor judgment; it is arbitrary and capricious. One cannot champion the public interest while simultaneously adopting policies that frustrate it. Discretion exercised in this manner ceases to be discretion at all—it becomes obstruction cloaked in administrative formality.” (emphasis added).
On Dec. 4, 2025, the First Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal. The district-court action was dismissed by stipulation on Mar. 3, 2026, after the shutdown had ended.
79. SNAP enforcement letter: untethered to record, feigned compliance, abrupt reversal
Judge Indira Talwani (Obama appointee), Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1:25-cv-13165 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Nov. 12, 2025, Judge Talwani issued an order granting a temporary restraining order staying enforcement of USDA’s Nov. 8 letter, which asserted that States took “unauthorized” action regarding November SNAP funds. Judge Talwani found the agency’s position “untethered to the factual record” and arbitrary and capricious. The court wrote:
“USDA’s November 8 Letter asserting that States’ issuances of the full payment files were unauthorized fails to account for, or even acknowledge in much detail, the events immediately before the letter’s issuance. … Defendants, as their position is articulated in the November 8 Letter, would first have States ignore the D.R.I. District Court’s Temporary Restraining Order, even while those orders were not stayed. As noted, these orders directed Defendants to make the full SNAP benefits available to the States. States acted in reliance of these orders when they submitted payment files for full November benefits.
Further, USDA itself confused the record by issuing and not rescinding a notice on November 7, 2025, stating that FNS ‘is working towards implementing November 2025 full benefit issuances in compliance with the November 6, 2025 order’ and that ‘[l]ater today, FNS will complete the processes necessary to make funds available to support your subsequent transmittal of full issuance files to your EBT processor’ … (emphasis added). This statement provided no indication that Defendants were appealing and seeking a stay of the district court’s orders. Indeed, in retrospect, it appears that the statement was carefully crafted to feign compliance with the D.R.I. Temporary Restraining Order when the USDA intended to do no such thing. And, even after receiving an administrative stay on November 7, Defendants delayed a full day before issuing the November 8 Letter that departed from statements the agency itself made just the day before.
In light of this record, the court finds that USDA’s assertion—that the States took ‘unauthorized’ action when they were complying with a court order that had not yet been stayed and with the USDA’s own directive—untethered to the factual record. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are likely to success [sic] on the merits of their claim that the November 8 Letter is arbitrary and capricious agency action.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On May 1, 2026, Judge Talwani dismissed the complaint without prejudice under a joint stipulation in which Defendants agreed not to enforce USDA’s directive to reverse full November 2025 SNAP benefits or penalize Plaintiff States for issuing them.
80. HUD grant conditions: no reasoning, EO compliance only, unexplained change
Judge Jon S. Tigar (Obama appointee), Housing Authority of the County of San Diego v. Turner, 4:25-cv-08859 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Denial of federal grants
On Nov. 14, 2025, granting a preliminary injunction blocking the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) newly imposed funding conditions on multiple grant programs administered to city and county public-housing agencies, Judge Tigar wrote:
“Plaintiffs do not argue that the agency’s reasoning was irrational or omitted relevant considerations. Rather, they argue that the agency erred by providing no reasoning at all to support the imposition of the challenged grant conditions. In a letter to grantees and stakeholders, HUD Secretary Turner explained that the challenged conditions were imposed to ‘effectively implement’ and ‘ensure . . . complian[ce]’ with the President’s executive orders. … But this is no explanation at all. … An agency cannot change position solely based on compliance with an EO without further explanation. …
The government’s implication is that an agency acts lawfully any time it orders its grantees to certify compliance with Executive Orders. As the discussion above makes clear, that isn’t true. And even if imposing grant conditions to certify compliance with Executive Orders were an unremarkable aspect of agency practice—which is not the Court’s conclusion—those agencies would still be required to explain themselves. … Defendants have failed in that task.
The challenged grant conditions are arbitrary and capricious.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
81. UCLA research funding: failure to consider reliance interests and lost research; explanations likely pretextual
Judge Rita F. Lin (Biden appointee), American Association of University Professors v. Trump, 3:25-cv-07864 (N.D. Cal.).
Executive Action: Suspension of $584 million in UCLA research funding
This case challenged the administration’s suspension of $584 million in federal research funding to UCLA and its conditions for restoring funding. The National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Department of Energy suspended funding citing alleged civil rights violations. An Aug. 8, 2025 settlement offer proposed restoring funding in exchange for changes to university policies, including on student protests and gender.
In her Nov. 14, 2025 opinion granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Lin found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the funding suspensions, denial of future grants, and conditions for restoring funding were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), explaining:
“Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on their APA arbitrary and capricious claim on two independent theories. First, Defendants’ termination and refusal to grant ordinary course funding via the Suspension Letters was done without considering important factors such as Plaintiffs’ members’ reliance interests. Second, Defendants have not provided a reasoned explanation for the Funding Cancellation or for requiring UCLA to accept the terms of the August 8 Offer, and have instead offered pretextual reasons.” (emphasis added.)
On the consequences for researchers and the public, the court wrote:
“First, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim because the Funding Cancellation was implemented without considering important factors such as Plaintiffs’ members’ serious reliance interests, waste of taxpayer resources, and the public’s loss of important research and services. … Defendants do not argue—and nothing in the record indicates—that NSF, NIH, and Energy considered the reliance interests of the researchers whose funding they terminated mid-stream, or whose research has been disrupted by the failure to approve grants to UCLA. …
Similarly, NSF, NIH, and Energy have not introduced any evidence indicating that they considered other important factors, including the waste that would result from projects halted before completion, or the loss to the public of critical research that will go unpublished.” (emphasis added.)
Further, the court explained that “Plaintiffs have shown that the three reasons for suspending funding and denying future funding described in the Notice of Findings and Suspension Letters were not a ‘reasoned explanation,’ and were likely pretextual.” Addressing the government’s reliance on UCLA’s alleged failure to address antisemitism during the 2024 encampment, the court explained:
“However, there is no evidence that Defendants considered UCLA’s subsequent efforts to address this issue in 2024 and 2025. That UCLA has taken steps to address the alleged civil rights violations is indisputably an ‘important factor’ that Defendants should have considered before sanctioning UCLA. Its failure to consider this important factor, as the unrebutted record shows, was likely arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added.)
The court’s accompanying order blocked implementation of the challenged grant suspensions and the associated blanket policy of denying future grants to UCLA.
82. SIJS deferred-action rescission: reliance interests ignored, alternatives ignored, post hoc rationales
Judge Eric Komitee (Trump appointee), A.C.R. v. Noem, 1:25-cv-03962 (E.D.N.Y.)
Executive action: Immigration deferred action policy
This proposed class action challenges DHS’s termination of its 2022 deferred action program for young people in Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS-DA), which provided them with deportation protection and eligibility for work authorization while awaiting visas.
On Nov. 19, 2025, Judge Komitee granted partial preliminary relief and a § 705 stay of DHS’s rescission of the SIJS-DA program, holding that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious where USCIS failed to consider serious reliance interests and reasonable alternatives, and relied instead on post hoc litigation rationales not found in the administrative record. The court wrote:
“USCIS failed to consider reliance interests and reasonably obvious alternatives here, likely rendering its decision to rescind SIJS-DA arbitrary and capricious. …
First, an agency must always consider serious reliance interests, even when it concludes an earlier policy was unlawful. …
While USCIS may ultimately conclude that ‘reliance interests in benefits that it views as unlawful are entitled to no or diminished weight,’ … it must still consider them. And it failed to consider reliance on SIJA-DA. …
Second, Plaintiffs have identified reliance interests that USCIS made no attempt to contend with. …
The government does not claim that it considered these – or any other – reliance interests. … It argues only that it did not have to. … In the government’s view, any reliance interests were per se unreasonable because SIJS-DA had only existed for three years, was temporary, and was subject to a change in executive priorities. … Once more, Regents forecloses this argument.
Furthermore, the government points to no part of the administrative record to support its argument about petitioners’ reliance interests. Nowhere in either of the USCIS memos does the agency say there are no serious reliance interests at stake. Indeed, the word ‘reliance’ never appears in the two USCIS documents. And a court ‘cannot affirm based on a post hoc litigation rationalization pressed by agency counsel.’ … USCIS’s failure to consider serious reliance interests was likely arbitrary and capricious.
USCIS’s omission to consider alternatives to rescinding the 2022 Policy Alert in its entirety was also likely arbitrary and capricious under Regents. …
‘[I]n rescinding a prior action, an agency cannot simply brand it illegal and move on.’ … Rather, it first must consider reliance interests and alternatives. … Because USCIS failed to do so, its rescission of SIJS-DA was likely arbitrary and capricious.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
83. DEI disaster-grant conditions: no explanation, controversial policy shift, no reasoned basis
Judge Manish S. Shah (Obama appointee), Chicago v. Noem, 1:25-cv-12765 (N.D. Ill.)
Executive Action: Denial of Federal Grants
On Nov. 21, 2025, Judge Shah granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a policy denying disaster-preparedness funding to cities and counties that operate diversity, equity, and inclusion programs, finding that the policy was arbitrary and capricious and thus violated the APA. Judge Shah rejected the administration’s claims that the policy did not constitute a change of position and that Plaintiffs did not have a reliance interest in the change. Noting that the administration made “no… attempt to argue that they acted reasonably when considering and implementing the challenged conditions,” Judge Shah further ruled that,
“[e]ven if defendants were correct that there has been no change of position and plaintiffs did not have a reliance interest, it would not matter—failure to provide any explanation for a final agency action is arbitrary and capricious under even the most lenient standard. These provisions—apparently implemented to conform with Executive Orders changing the direction of enforcement policy from one presidential administration to the next—are controversial, and an express explanation was required. Without one, implementing the challenged conditions was likely arbitrary and capricious and thus unlawful.” (emphasis added)
On Mar. 2, 2026, Judge Shah granted Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction, extending the same relief to additional municipal and county Plaintiffs on the same grounds as the Nov. 21 order. The court explained that Defendants did “not dispute that the new plaintiffs and movants seek the same relief as the original plaintiffs” and raised “no new arguments in opposition,” and held that the new movants had likewise “established a likelihood of success in the APA challenge to the grant conditions” “[f]or the same reasons applicable to the original plaintiffs.”
84. IRS address-sharing policy: unexplained departure, no reasoned basis, reliance interests ignored
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (Clinton appointee), Center for Taxpayer Rights v. Internal Revenue Service, 1:25-cv-00457 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Disclosure of Personal and Financial Records to DOGE
On Nov. 21, 2025, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction blocking the “Address-Sharing Policy,” under which the administration sought to share confidential taxpayer information gathered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The court concluded that the IRS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting and implementing
“a policy of disclosing the confidential address information of tens of thousands of taxpayers to ICE under Section 6103(i)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, in reliance on representations from ICE that the addresses are relevant to and will be used for immigration-related criminal investigations and proceedings, even when ICE identifies only a single ICE employee (or a small number of ICE employees) as the employee(s) ‘personally and directly engaged’ in each of the tens of thousands of relevant criminal investigations or proceedings.”
Judge Kollar-Kotelly explained that Plaintiffs
“have shown that the IRS’s implementation of the Address-Sharing Policy was arbitrary and capricious because the IRS failed to acknowledge and explain its departure from its prior policy of strict confidentiality, failed to consider the reliance interests that were engendered by its prior policy of strict confidentiality, and failed to provide a reasoned explanation for implementing the new Address-Sharing Policy. Whereas the IRS’s prior disclosure policy was rooted in individualized review, segmentation, and limited, last-resort disclosure, the Address-Sharing Policy—like the broader Data Policy that the Plaintiffs allege the IRS has adopted—has shifted the IRS’s focus toward automation, consolidation, and rapid, large-scale disclosure.
The IRS did not provide a “reasoned explanation” for its implementation of the Address-Sharing Policy. In fact, the record before the Court indicates that the IRS did not even display an awareness that it was changing its position. Defendants ignore the fact that the IRS has “historically, as a matter of both law and policy, not shared taxpayers’ information with immigration authorities for the purpose of locating individuals suspected to be present in the country illegally.” … Defendants’ attempt at characterizing the IRS’s information sharing with ICE as business-as-usual is undermined by Plaintiffs’ showings regarding the IRS’s overhaul of its technical infrastructure and belied by the administrative record. …
In light of the above, Plaintiffs have shown that, through its implementation of the Address- Sharing Policy, the IRS unreasonably departed from its prior policy sub silentio. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood that the IRS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in implementing the Address-Sharing Policy.”
Judge Kollar-Kotelly additionally ruled that the government had acted arbitrarily and capriciously through “failing to consider key issues” when implementing the Address-Sharing Policy (“the record before the Court indicates that the IRS failed to consider any countervailing issues at all when adopting the new Policy”) as well as failing to consider the reliance interests of immigrants who were assured that their tax information would not be shared with ICE (“It was arbitrary and capricious for the IRS to ignore these significant reliance interests.”) The order concluded that on all three grounds, “Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that the IRS’s implementation of the Address-Sharing Policy was both arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.”
Defendants appealed this case to the D.C. Circuit on Jan. 6, 2026. On Mar. 2, Plaintiffs asked the D.C. Cir. to remand after the administration disclosed in a declaration that it had shared confidential taxpayer information with ICE in violation of the Internal Revenue Code; Judge Kollar-Kotelly had already indicated that, on remand, she would add the declaration to the record and permit further discovery.
On Sept. 8, 2026, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the preliminary relief, relying on the statutory requirements governing disclosure of confidential taxpayer information.
85. Warrantless immigration arrests: ignored statutory limits, ignored regulations, no probable-cause findings
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), Escobar Molina v. Department of Homeland Security, 1:25-cv-03417 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Immigration Raids and Arrests
On Dec. 2, 2025, Judge Howell granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification, barring DHS from making warrantless civil immigration arrests in D.C. absent probable cause that the target is removable and exigent circumstances making it impracticable to obtain a warrant, and writing:
“Defendants’ systemic failure to apply the probable cause standard, including the failure to consider escape risk, directly violates the clear statutory requirements under the INA and DHS’s implementing regulations. As such, defendants’ policy and practice of making warrantless civil immigration arrests without the requisite probable cause findings is also ‘arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law’ and ‘in excess of statutory authority,’ in violation of the APA.” (emphasis added).
The court further noted that agency action “may be set aside as arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to comply with its own regulations,” and emphasized that, although Defendants disputed the policy’s existence, they “d[id] not dispute” that, if such a “practice and policy” existed, it would violate the INA, the governing regulations, and the APA.
86. Wind-permit moratorium: scant record, unexplained course change, reliance interests ignored
Judge Patti Saris (Clinton appointee), State of New York v. Trump, 1:25-cv-11221 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Halting Wind Energy Approvals
On Dec. 8, 2025, Judge Saris granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Defendant’s January 2025 “Wind Order”—implemented pursuant to President Trump’s Wind Memo and effectuating an indefinite government-wide pause on issuing new or renewed permits, leases, rights-of-way, loans, and other authorizations for onshore and offshore wind projects—was arbitrary and capricious and therefore unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court wrote:
“Here, the administrative record consists of only two documents: the Wind Memo and the Interior Department’s written order suspending the issuance of renewable energy authorizations pursuant to the Wind Memo. The Agency Defendants have certified that these two documents constitute the entirety of the ‘evidence considered, directly or indirectly, by [the Agency] Defendants for the alleged decision’ to ‘temporarily cease issuing new approvals and other authorizations’ pursuant to the Wind Memo. …
This scant administrative record makes clear, and the Agency Defendants do not meaningfully dispute, that the Agency Defendants have not “reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably explained the[ir] decision” to implement the Wind Order…
Further, given that the Wind Order constitutes a change of course from decades of agencies’ issuing (or denying) permits related to wind energy projects, the Agency Defendants were required, at minimum, to ‘provide a reasoned explanation for the change’ and to ‘display awareness that [they were] changing position.’ They failed to do so.
And even assuming, arguendo, that the Wind Memo itself could be characterized as the Agency Defendants’ own explanation for their manner of implementing it, the Wind Memo does not provide adequate explanation: It merely includes a single sentence citing “various alleged legal deficiencies underlying” wind permitting, “potential inadequacies in various environmental reviews,” and the possibility that these vaguely defined issues “may lead to grave harm.” The Court is “unable to divine or fathom a relationship between” this cursory sentence “and the immense scope of the moratorium” on all wind energy authorizations.
The Agency Defendants also failed to account for reliance interests engendered by their previous policy of adjudicating wind permit applications. The Agency Defendants were obligated, at minimum, to ‘assess whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were significant, and weigh any such interests against competing policy … concerns.’ … They did not do so, let alone provide the ‘more detailed justification’ required upon determining that serious reliance interests exist… Accordingly, the Court finds that the Wind Order is arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
On June 15, 2026, the First Circuit ordered the government’s appeal to be voluntarily dismissed.
87. Re-detention policy: no original reason, post hoc legal error, reliance interests ignored
Judge P. Casey Pitts (Biden appointee), Garro Pinchi v. Noem, 5:25-cv-05632 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Immigration Detention Policy
This case involves a provisionally certified class APA challenge to DHS’s broader re-detention policy of re-detaining previously released noncitizens without first making an individualized determination that their material circumstances had changed, after initially beginning as an individual habeas challenge to re-arrest and re-detention.
On Dec. 19, 2025, in an order provisionally certifying the class and staying agency action, the court held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that DHS’s re-detention policy is arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court wrote:
“Plaintiffs have established a likelihood that the re-detention policy is arbitrary and capricious because (1) DHS failed to provide any reason for the policy when first implementing it; (2) DHS’s post hoc rationalizations for the policy, even if considered, rest on an erroneous view of the law; (3) those post hoc rationalizations ignore an “important aspect of the problem;” and (4) DHS failed to consider noncitizens’ ‘serious reliance interests.’” (emphasis added)
Further, beyond those “three independent reasons,” the court noted that “[P]laintiffs have raised serious questions concerning a fourth” basis, namely, that “the government failed to consider noncitizens’ protected liberty interests under the Fifth Amendment.”
88-89. Homelessness funding: unexplained policy reversal, failure to consider reliance interests and funding gaps, and disregard of a slower transition
Judge Mary Susan McElroy (Trump appointee), National Alliance to End Homelessness v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1:25-cv-00636 (D.R.I.) and State of Washington v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1:25-cv-00626 (D.R.I.) (related cases)
Executive Action: Denial of Federal Grants
These related cases challenge the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) abrupt overhaul of its Continuum of Care homelessness-assistance program. Through new notices of funding opportunity (NOFOs) issued in November and December 2025, HUD sought to replace its existing funding framework and move away from “Housing First,” which prioritized access to permanent housing without preconditions such as sobriety.
At the Dec. 19, 2025 hearing, Judge McElroy found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that HUD’s actions were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), identifying “unexplained departures from longstanding policy” and “failure to consider reliance interests.” The court’s Dec. 23 written order granted a preliminary injunction and relief under § 705 of the APA, blocking replacement of the existing funding framework.
On June 29, 2026, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge McElroy held that both NOFOs were arbitrary and capricious. Addressing the consequences of HUD’s policy reversal, she wrote:
“The Court concludes that, before it issued either NOFO, HUD failed to consider the impact that its decision to eliminate the Housing First approach would have on the existing system created by Congress and HUD itself. Although HUD acknowledges the yearslong emphasis that it had placed on strengthening its commitment to public housing, it failed to substantively consider the impact that a rapid, untimely overhaul would have on the organizations that administer these programs and the individuals that rely upon them.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
The court emphasized “HUD’s failure to consider the harm caused by the funding gaps it created” and rejected its reliance on grantees’ experience navigating previous funding gaps: “This explanation does not withstand even the bare minimum level of scrutiny.” Judge McElroy further found that “HUD did not attempt to meaningfully forecast the harm caused by the disruption these NOFOs created at any point, most notably the instability faced by individuals who would undoubtedly experience homelessness because of this breakneck transition.”
Turning to HUD’s new priorities and its failure to consider a slower transition, the court explained:
“Moreover, HUD’s explanation of its rationale behind the December 2025 NOFO gives little to no thought or analysis of the negative externalities created by its transition from a Housing First approach to one that mandates enrollment in various programs designed to address challenges other than a lack of stable housing. Relatedly, HUD failed to meaningfully balance its new emphasis on fostering a competitive environment for grantees to seek funding against HUD’s prior concern with housing stability. Even more significantly, HUD failed to meaningfully consider—during either its development of the November or the December 2025 NOFOs—the benefits it could have achieved from waiting to implement this new policy and rolling out its new priorities on a non-emergency basis.” (emphasis added.)
Judge McElroy concluded:
“Overall, the actions undertaken by HUD in attempting to hastily eliminate its Housing First approach serve as the hallmark of unreasoned decision making and HUD’s attempt to retroactively backfill its impulsive decision making lacks a rational connection between any facts that it could have found and the choices that it ultimately made in issuing these NOFOs.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
The court vacated both NOFOs, while declining to permanently prohibit HUD from including the contested conditions in future funding notices.
90-a. Courthouse-arrest policy: ignored prior problems, implausible reasoning
Judge P. Casey Pitts (Biden appointee), Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, 5:25-cv-06487 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Immigration Detention Policy
This case involves a challenge by named Plaintiffs, on behalf of two provisionally certified Rule 23(b)(2) classes, to ICE and EOIR courthouse-arrest policies and to detention-related practices at ICE’s San Francisco field office, including allegedly unconstitutional conditions in the short-term hold rooms at 630 Sansome.
On Nov. 25, 2025, the court provisionally certified both classes and granted a preliminary injunction on the detention-related claims, but denied Plaintiffs’ request to stay ICE’s waiver of its 12-hour hold-room policy. Then, on Dec. 24, the court granted Plaintiffs’ requested stay of ICE and EOIR’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies, limited to ICE’s San Francisco Area of Responsibility, finding:
“Plaintiffs have established that ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies are arbitrary and capricious because the policies (1) ignore important aspects of the problem that underlay previous ICE policies and (2) rely on implausible and illogical reasoning. …
Plaintiffs have established that EOIR’s new courthouse-arrest policy is likely arbitrary and capricious because, as with ICE’s policies, EOIR failed (1) to provide a rational explanation for its authorization of widespread arrests at immigration courthouses and (2) to address key considerations underlying the prior policy.” (emphasis added).
90-b. Courthouse-arrest and hold-room policies: “complete lack of decisionmaking,” “devoid of rational explanation,” a “false premise,” and contradictory policies
Judge P. Casey Pitts (Biden appointee), Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, 5:25-cv-06487 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Immigration Detention Policy
This case involves class challenges to ICE and EOIR policies that removed prior limits on civil immigration arrests at immigration courthouses, ICE’s nationwide waiver of its 12-hour limit on detention in short-term hold rooms, and conditions at ICE’s San Francisco field office.
On June 23, 2026, Judge Pitts granted final certification of both classes, granted Plaintiffs partial summary judgment on their APA claims, denied the government’s counter-motions, and vacated the challenged policies in full. The court found that “ICE and EOIR failed to provide reasoned explanations for their actions” and that each challenged policy was arbitrary and capricious.
Addressing ICE’s courthouse-arrest policies, the court emphasized that the government had defended them for more than six months as an intentional and reasoned expansion of arrests at immigration courthouses before revealing that the policies did not apply to immigration courthouses at all:
“The government spent more than six months arguing to this Court that ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies represented an intentional and reasoned choice to expand arrests at immigration courthouses. The argument was unconvincing. … It is now clear that the lack of connection between ICE’s stated rationales for the 2025 courthouse-arrest policies and the expansion of arrests at immigration courthouses results not from merely unreasoned decisionmaking but a complete lack of decisionmaking. As the government recently revealed, contrary to its prior representations, ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies do not cover immigration courthouses at all. Thus, the 2025 policies rescind the 2021 guidance’s express restrictions on immigration-courthouse arrests without providing any replacement, leaving no restrictions whatsoever on ICE agents’ civil enforcement actions at immigration courthouses. Even the scant limitations imposed by the 2025 policies on ICE’s actions at other courthouses—like the instruction for ICE agents to ‘minimize their impact on court proceedings’—have no application to immigration courthouses.”
The court held that, as applied to immigration-courthouse arrests, ICE’s policies were arbitrary and capricious for “three overlapping reasons”:
“First, ICE failed to ‘at least “display awareness that it [wa]s changing position”’ with respect to arrests at immigration courthouses. Nothing on the face of ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies or in the administrative record suggests that ICE recognized it was removing all prior limitations on civil enforcement activities at immigration courthouses without any substitute guidance. Indeed, the 2025 courthouse-arrest policies do not mention immigration courthouses at all. And for more than a year after the rescission of the 2021 guidance, ICE itself represented to its DOJ counsel that the 2025 courthouse-arrest policies apply to immigration courthouses, suggesting that ICE only belatedly realized the scope of the change it had effected. Such an unacknowledged change in policy necessarily violates the APA’s dictates. …
Second, ICE’s new policies ‘disregard[] facts and circumstances that underlay … the prior policy’—namely, the 2021 guidance’s concerns about the impact of widespread arrests on the functioning of immigration courts—without the requisite ‘reasoned explanation.’ Again, the 2025 policies entirely fail to address immigration courts despite rescinding the guidance that previously limited civil enforcement activities there. …
Third, and similarly, ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies make no attempt to ‘articulate[] a satisfactory explanation’ for the agency’s new approach to civil arrests at immigration courthouses. … Because ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies ‘fail[] to “show that there are good reasons for the new [approach],”’ and because the Court cannot reasonably discern such reasons, the policies are arbitrary and capricious.”
Judge Pitts stressed that merely extending the new policies to immigration courthouses would not cure their defects:
“For the avoidance of doubt, simply extending the 2025 courthouse-arrest policies to cover immigration courthouses would not cure those policies’ fatal defects. As the Court has previously detailed, the policies entirely fail to address the chilling effect of courthouse arrests on noncitizens’ attendance at court proceedings, which is both a critical factor underlying ICE’s 2021 guidance and an ‘important aspect of the problem’ in its own right. … But because the government now concedes that the 2025 policies rescinded the prior limits on immigration courthouse arrests without providing any reasoning whatsoever in support of that specific rescission, the 2025 policies fail APA review for an even more fundamental reason. …
In sum, ICE’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policies are devoid of rational explanation for (or even acknowledgement of) the agency’s choices (1) to remove its earlier restrictions on civil arrests at immigration courthouses and (2) not to extend the new policies’ limitations to immigration courthouses. The 2025 courthouse-arrest policies thus fall far short of the reasoned decisionmaking required by the APA and are ‘arbitrary’ and ‘capricious’ within the meaning of § 706(2)(A).” (citations omitted.)
Turning to EOIR’s related courthouse-arrest policy, the court found that its core assumption—that ICE had validly rescinded its 2021 guidance and thereby removed the principal basis for EOIR’s restrictions—“was wrong.” Judge Pitts summarized:
“EOIR’s 2025 courthouse-arrest policy is arbitrary and capricious for three reasons. First, it is based on a false premise. Second, even crediting EOIR’s assumptions, the policy fails to provide a rational explanation for its removal of all prior limits on civil enforcement actions at EOIR’s immigration courthouses. Third, it disregards at least one key factor underlying EOIR’s 2023 guidance without reason.” (emphasis added).
The court explained that EOIR’s policy rested on the mistaken assumption that ICE’s rescission left “no … basis to maintain” EOIR’s prior restrictions. Because ICE’s rescission was itself arbitrary and capricious and subject to vacatur, “one of the core assumptions underlying EOIR’s own 2025 courthouse-arrest policy … was wrong.” The court separately found that EOIR had failed to provide a reasoned explanation for rejecting its prior guidance’s concerns about chilling effects and access to justice.
Finally, as to ICE’s nationwide 12-hour-detention waiver—which replaced a case-by-case waiver process with blanket authorization to detain noncitizens in short-term hold rooms for up to 72 hours or longer—the court found it arbitrary and capricious for three reasons:
“First, ICE failed to consider alternative options to address its capacity issues, which were the driving force behind the 12-hour-detention waiver. … ICE therefore failed to satisfy the APA’s mandate that it give reasoned consideration to known alternatives before waiving its 12-hour limit on hold-room detentions. …
Second, the 12-hour-waiver memo is arbitrary and capricious because it expressly leaves in place contradictory policies governing hold rooms. … ICE’s failure to reconcile the 12-hour-detention waiver with its existing and still-applicable policies independently renders the waiver arbitrary and capricious. …
Third, the 12-hour-detention waiver is arbitrary and capricious due to ICE’s failure to consider an ‘important aspect of the problem’ when issuing the waiver. … Here, ICE’s obligation under the Fifth Amendment not to subject civil immigration detainees to punitive conditions of confinement was an ‘important aspect of the problem’ that ICE was required—but failed—to consider.” (citations omitted.)
91. Childcare funding freeze: no evidence of fraud, no individualized assessment, post hoc rationale
Judge Arun Subramanian (Biden appointee); Judge Vernon S. Broderick (Obama appointee), State of New York v. Administration for Children and Families, 1:26-cv-00172 (S.D.N.Y.)
Executive Action: Denial of Federal Grants
This case arises from HHS and ACF’s January 2026 decision to freeze roughly $10 billion in federal funds distributed under the Child Care Development Fund, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, and Social Services Block Grant programs, which serve low-income families, children, and individuals with disabilities.
On Jan. 9, 2026, Judge Subramanian granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and, under the APA, stayed Defendants from implementing the ACF policy, “including the entirety of the January 5 and 6 Letters,” and directed Defendants to remove restrictions on Plaintiffs’ ability to draw down ACF funds. Plaintiffs had argued, among other things, that the freeze was arbitrary and capricious because the letters offered no evidence of fraud, no reasoned explanation for an immediate and sweeping freeze, reflected partisan animus, and disregarded the states’ reliance interests.
On Mar. 10, granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Broderick agreed that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on that claim, holding that “Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious on multiple independent grounds,” and that the “agency’s attempts to recharacterize their decision as a narrowly fashioned temporary remedy to address their concerns about programmatic fraud are explicitly belied by the record and merely a post hoc litigation argument.” Agreeing that “Defendants provide no reasoned explanation for their funding decision,” the court wrote:
“There is no evidence that Defendants examined any relevant data or came to any individualized assessment for each of the states. In fact, ACF’s sudden and voluminous information requests suggest that Defendants are using this funding restriction to collect the very information that their final agency decision should have been based on.
Indeed, Defendants’ public statement provides an alternative, potentially arbitrary reason for the termination of these grants: partisan targeting.” (emphasis added)
The court added: “Because the letters and press releases associated with the childcare funding decision do not offer more than potential concerns and conclusory policy aspirations, I need not go any further, and I find that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success in demonstrating that the funding decision is arbitrary and capricious and therefore runs afoul of the APA.” The court nonetheless went on to evaluate Plaintiffs’ additional arbitrary-and-capricious arguments, writing:
“Defendants do not provide even one concrete detail about the fraud investigations or an example of misused funds in their letters to Plaintiffs. The letters only include a conclusory statement that ACF ‘has reason to believe’ that the state is ‘illicitly providing illegal aliens with [] benefits intended for American citizens and lawful permanent residents.’ …
‘Defendants have offered no rational explanation for why they needed to freeze all federal financial assistance—with less than twenty-four-hours’ notice—to’ prevent fraudulent use of these childcare funds.” (emphasis added)
The court concluded:
“In light of these facts, it is difficult for me to perceive any rationality in the decision to abruptly restrict drawdown funds and announce this conditional funding freeze to Plaintiff States, endangering the states’ abilities to provide vital family and childcare assistance. I find that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success that this agency decision is arbitrary and capricious under the APA.” (emphasis added)
92. TRIO education grants: conclusory accusations, unexplained policy shift, reliance interests ignored
Judge Tanya Sue Chutkan (Obama appointee), Council for Opportunity in Education v. U.S. Department of Education, 1:25-cv-03514 (D.D.C.) and Council for Opportunity in Education v. U.S. Department of Education, 1:25-cv-03491 (D.D.C.) (consolidated cases)
Executive Action: Denial and discontinuation of federal student-support grants under new anti-DEI policies.
On Jan. 16, 2026, Judge Chutkan granted preliminary injunctions requiring reconsideration of grant denials and discontinuations. She found likely arbitrary-and-capricious action in the Education Department’s conclusory explanations, its apparent reliance on DEI-related keywords rather than grantee performance, and its unexplained shift to new continuation criteria without considering reliance interests. She wrote:
“Even under the court’s deferential standard of review, the Department’s failure to articulate anything beyond conclusory statements regarding applicants’ noncompliance with ‘federal civil rights laws’ and the Administration’s policies does not pass muster under the APA’s reasonable explanation requirement. … In the end, the court is left to wonder what considerations, if any, led to the change in continuation criteria because the Department has yet to explain itself.” (citations omitted; emphasis added)
93. Offshore oil and gas biological opinion: “worst-case scenario assumptions” and failure to address contrary evidence
Judge James D. Cain, Jr. (Trump appointee), Louisiana v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 2:25-cv-00691 (W.D. La.)
Executive Action: National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) 2025 biological opinion and incidental take statement for offshore oil and gas activities.
This case, brought by Louisiana, the American Petroleum Institute, and Chevron, challenged NMFS’s 2025 biological opinion (BiOp) assessing the impact of offshore oil and gas activities in the Gulf of America on protected species, including Rice’s whale, and the resulting protective requirements.
On Jan. 23, 2026, Judge Cain granted Plaintiffs summary judgment, holding that the Rice’s whale jeopardy determination and resulting reasonable and prudent alternatives violated the Endangered Species Act and APA. The court found that NMFS’s estimates rested on “a series of worst-case scenario assumptions.” Addressing an expert’s criticisms of the carcass recovery rate used to estimate whale deaths, the court stated: “NMFS did not address these criticisms in issuing the final BiOp.” It also found that NMFS continued to assume existing protections were ineffective, ignoring the consulting agencies’ observation that the “absence of a report could also indicate complete compliance and effectiveness” of existing mitigation measures.
The court further identified an unexplained discrepancy in the projected number of vessel strikes:
“Without explanation, NMFS used the estimate of nine lethal or serious injury vessel strikes in its jeopardy analysis rather than the six calculated based on the new inputs. … It subsequently admitted the error but did not revise the jeopardy conclusion or the associated multi-phased RPAs.” (citations omitted; emphasis added.)
More broadly, Judge Cain wrote:
“At every turn, it reached for confirmation of jeopardy and the inefficacy of current measures by requiring proof of a negative or attempting to extrapolate from studies concerning different species in different habitats. … NMFS’s analysis appears as means in search of an end: justifying additional restrictions on offshore drilling in order to achieve a settlement with environmental group plaintiffs in the District of Maryland litigation. This is an abdication of the agency’s statutory mandate, as recently articulated in Maine Lobstermen.” (emphasis added.)
In its Feb. 20 remedy order, the court expressly declared the Rice’s whale jeopardy finding and resulting Reasonable and Prudent Alternative “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law,” and remanded the BiOp and incidental take statement without vacatur. An Apr. 29 order relieved Defendants of the requirement to complete the remand, without altering those merits determinations.
94. Public-health grant cuts: unexplained targeting, inconsistent explanations, reliance interests ignored
Judge Manish S. Shah (Obama appointee), State of Illinois v. Vought, 1:26-cv-01566 (N.D. Ill.)
Executive Action: Targeted termination of public-health funding to four states.
On Feb. 12, 2026, Judge Shah granted a temporary restraining order, finding the challenged funding cuts likely arbitrary and capricious: Plaintiffs had demonstrated “strong reliance interests on the public-health funding,” but the government supplied “no explanation for what ‘agency priorities’ justify termination.” On Mar. 12, 2026, the court granted a preliminary injunction in part, blocking OMB’s directive targeting Illinois, California, Colorado and Minnesota for HHS funding cuts. Addressing the government’s explanations, he wrote:
“While there are stated explanations for grant terminations, the government has not explained why or how plaintiffs were selected for the publicly announced cuts on February 4 before HHS could machine-generate its explanation. And where an explanation appears contrived or incongruent with what the record reveals about the process, then the agency violated the reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law. … That is likely the case here, where there is a disconnect between the government’s expressed hostility to the plaintiffs as states with certain immigration-related policies (the apparent motive for OMB’s January–February 2026 grants project) and later grant-specific explanations.” (citation omitted; emphasis added)
95. Refugee detention policy: implemented policy unexplained, post hoc memo, exceeded authority
Judge John R. Tunheim (Clinton appointee), U.H.A. v. Bondi, 0:26-cv-00417 (D. Minn.)
Executive Action: Other Habeas and Removal Actions
This case began as an individual habeas petition brought by U.H.A. after his arrest under Operation PARRIS, but within days it became a hybrid putative class action and amended habeas case challenging DHS’s broader policy of arresting and detaining Minnesota refugees who had not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status.
On Feb. 27, 2026, granting preliminary relief to a putative class of refugees in Minnesota challenging DHS’s “Operation PARRIS” refugee-detention policy, Judge Tunheim held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the policy was arbitrary and capricious under the APA, finding that the policy as actually implemented was unsupported by the agency’s rescission memoranda, exceeded defendants’ statutory authority, and appeared to “be an impermissible post hoc rationalization, which cannot cure an APA violation.” The court wrote:
“First, neither the December Rescission Memo nor the February Re-Rescission Memo addresses—or even reflects—the Policy that has actually been implemented in Minnesota. Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ ‘Refugee Detention Policy,’ a policy ‘that would subject all lawfully present refugees who have not yet obtained lawful permanent resident (‘LPR’) status to arrest and mandatory detention after being present in the United States for one year—even though refugees cannot adjust to LPR status until the one-year mark.’ … The record shows that this is the policy Defendants actually enacted and carried out.
Although Defendants acknowledge that the December Rescission Memo merely “rescind[s] the flat ban on detention for purposes of enforcing 8 U.S.C. § 1159” …, neither memorandum explains why all refugees who have not adjusted status are (or even should be) subject to detention.
Second, as previously explained, the Refugee Detention Policy exceeds Defendants’ authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1159 and infringes on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.” (emphasis added)
The court further wrote that on Feb. 18,
“the day before the preliminary injunction hearing—ICE issued a seven-page memorandum that appeared to re-rescind the 2010 ICE Guidance, which had already been rescinded by a one-sentence memorandum in December 2025. The February Re-Recission Memo appears to be an impermissible post hoc rationalization, which cannot cure an APA violation.” (emphasis added)
On Apr. 21, 2026, the Eighth Circuit granted the parties’ joint request to dismiss the appeal and vacate the preliminary injunction.
96. Public-lands highway approval: unexplained reversal, unsupported balancing test
Judge Randolph Moss (Obama appointee), Conserve Southwest Utah v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 1:26-cv-00317 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Construction on public lands
On Mar. 1, 2026, Judge Moss granted a preliminary injunction barring construction tied to the administration’s grant of a right-of-way to the Utah Department of Transportation to build a four-lane highway through the Congressionally designated Red Cliffs National Conservation Area. He wrote:
“the Bureau seems to have shifted ground (without explanation) by adopting a balancing test whereby an alternative route could be dismissed based solely on grounds of uncertainty, administrative hurdles, and cost, without offering a reasoned explanation for why that test is justified and how the relevant costs and benefits must be weighed.” (emphasis added)
97. VA labor-rights rescission: wrong rationale, overbroad rescission, unequal treatment
Judge Melissa R. DuBose (Biden appointee), American Federation of Government Employees Local 2305 v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 1:25-cv-00583 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Rescission of Collective Bargaining and Other Labor Rights
On Mar. 13, 2026, Judge DuBose granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the VA to reinstate the Master Collective Bargaining Agreement for the remainder of its agreed-upon term. The court found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on both their First Amendment retaliation claim and their APA arbitrary-and-capricious claim, concluding that the VA’s contemporaneous statements cited only operational efficiency rather than the national security rationale required by Executive Order 14,251 and 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1). The court wrote:
“Overall, the Plaintiffs’ arguments summarized above as well as the Defendants’ statements made contemporaneously with the termination letters have persuaded this Court that the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their § 706(1)(A) arbitrary and capricious claim. In addition to the Defendants’ statements are their actions, including their decision to terminate the Master CBA rather than remove specific subdivisions from Chapter 71 coverage as authorized by the EO and terminating the Plaintiffs’ contract but not that of other unions at the same time, which convinces this Court that the agency action was neither reasonable nor reasonably explained.”
98. Childhood immunization schedule: bypassed ACIP, unexplained departure, presidential directive only
Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden appointee), American Academy of Pediatrics v. Kennedy, 1:25- cv-11916 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: HHS changes to the CDC childhood immunization schedule without recommendation from Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
On Mar. 16, 2026, Judge Murphy granted a preliminary injunction. He stated:
“[T]he issuance of the January 2026 Memo was arbitrary and capricious because it abandoned the agency’s longstanding practice of getting recommendations from ACIP before changing the immunization schedules without sufficient explanation. As discussed above, the CDC cannot simply bypass ACIP in altering the immunization schedules. Even were this not a legal requirement, however, the record contains no explanation for why Defendants circumvented this decades-old practice, other than to comply with a Presidential Memorandum. …
Defendants cannot disregard the APA’s requirements simply because they are following the President’s orders.” (emphasis added)
99. SNAP recertification directive: no evidence, ignored feasibility, reliance interests, no rational connection
Judge R. Brooke Jackson (Obama appointee), State of Colorado v. Trump, 1:25-cv-03428 (D.Colo.)
Executive Action: Revocation of government contracts – USDA requiring Colorado to recertify SNAP households or face sanctions
On Mar. 16, 2026, Judge Jackson granted a preliminary injunction. He wrote:
“USDA’s directive compelling Colorado to recertify 100,000 SNAP households in 30 days with no advance warning fails even under this deferential standard of review. …
First, … [t]he Recertification Letter grounds neither the agency’s concerns about nationwide fraud nor its ‘multiple requests’ to Colorado in specific examples, much less articulates any connection between the two or the directive imposed here. The agency’s failure to ‘cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner’ renders this action arbitrary and capricious. …
Second, the Recertification Letter reflects that USDA failed “to consider important aspects of the problem,” specifically, whether Colorado could legally and practically comply with the pilot project. … At a minimum, the failure to give any thought to this problem reflects a lack of reasoned decisionmaking. …
Third, the Recertification Letter fails to consider how the pilot project violates ‘serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’ …
Fourth, and most fundamentally, the Recertification Letter fails to articulate ‘a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.’” (emphasis added)
100. Employment authorization revocation: ignored regulations, unsupported factual premise, no defense on own terms
Judge Jorge L. Alonso (Obama appointee), Bojovic v. Noem, 1:26-cv-01397 (N.D. Ill.)
Executive Action: Employment authorization / Asylum-derivative status
In October 2025, Plaintiff, a Hanover Park police officer working under valid employment authorization while his family’s asylum application remained pending, was arrested as part of Operation Midway Blitz. After USCIS renewed his work authorization in September 2025, the agency issued a December 2025 notice of intent to revoke it, asserting that he had been removed from his father’s asylum application. Plaintiff maintained that was wrong and that he remained covered as a derivative applicant.
On Mar. 17, 2026, granting a TRO, Judge Alonso held that Plaintiff had shown a strong likelihood of success on his APA claim challenging the revocation. The court wrote that, even if immigration authorities have discretion over employment authorization, they may not “ignore the resulting regulations with impunity” (emphasis added). The court stressed that the only factual basis USCIS cited for revocation was Plaintiff’s supposed removal from his father’s asylum application—“a fact that Plaintiff contends is untrue, which contention Defendants do not address in their response brief”—and concluded that Plaintiff was likely to succeed in showing “that USCIS has ignored the regulations it is bound to follow” (emphasis added). Judge Alonso added that Defendants’ brief was “most notable for what it does not say: it does not defend USCIS’s revocation decision on its own terms. That silence speaks volumes” (emphasis added). Rejecting the government’s attempt to moot the issue by reopening the matter, the court reasoned that so long as it appeared “the Government has re-opened [Plaintiff’s] case in name only,” the action remained final, and said Defendants were “shockingly cavalier about the consequences that may flow from the loss of a person’s livelihood and the interruption of a fledgling career” (emphasis added).
The court temporarily enjoined the Jan. 23 revocation decision, barred Defendants from revoking Plaintiff’s employment authorization on that basis, and restrained them from “taking any steps to remove Plaintiff from his parent’s asylum application.”
101. Student SEVIS termination: no factual basis, no satisfactory explanation, contradicted record (dismissed charge)
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan (Biden appointee), Bushireddy v. Lyons, 1:25-cv-01102 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Student-status terminations (SEVIS)
On Mar. 18, 2026, granting summary judgment and denying the government’s motion to dismiss, Judge Sooknanan held that ICE acted arbitrarily and capriciously when, as part of its new “Student Criminal Alien Initiative,” it terminated Plaintiff’s SEVIS record based on a 2023 misdemeanor shoplifting charge that had been dismissed. The court explained that ICE treated that dismissed charge as a failure to maintain F-1 status even though, as it stressed, it was “not a ‘conviction,’” “not a ‘crime of violence,’” and “not an offense that was punishable by ‘more than one year imprisonment,’” all of which was “plainly evident” from ICE’s own spreadsheet. Reviewing an administrative record consisting of only “a handful of emails and several pages of a redacted spreadsheet,” the court said “it could not be clearer” that the termination was unlawful: “ICE has offered no ‘satisfactory explanation’ for how it looked at these facts and reasonably determined that termination of [Plaintiff’s] SEVIS record was warranted.” Nor, the court added, did ICE’s determination reflect mere “less than ideal clarity” from which a permissible rationale could be discerned. Rather, “[t]here is simply nothing in the record to support that [Plaintiff] engaged in any activity that constituted a failure to maintain her status and thus justified termination of her SEVIS record.” The court therefore set the termination aside and enjoined the government from terminating Plaintiff’s SEVIS record “for any reason other than those contained in statute or regulation.”
102. Chicago transit funding: retroactive penalties, reliance interests ignored, pretextual enforcement
Judge Thomas M. Durkin (Obama appointee), Chicago Transit Authority v. United States Department of Transportation, 1:26-cv-03140 (N.D. Ill.)
Executive Action: Suspension of transit grants under revised Disadvantaged Business Enterprise requirements.
On Mar. 24, 2026, Judge Durkin granted a temporary restraining order against DOT’s retroactive application of new grant requirements to Chicago Transit Authority projects. He found likely arbitrary-and-capricious action because DOT had not justified retroactive enforcement or penalties for compliance with previous requirements, considered contractors’ and the public’s reliance interests, or explained what further steps CTA needed to take to secure its funding. Addressing enforcement confined to entities associated with Chicago and New York. The court wrote:
“This limited enforcement indicates that the reviews for compliance with antidiscrimination laws are a pretextual basis for some other interest unrelated to actual compliance with Defendants’ stated concerns. Defendants have not provided any justification for targeted enforcement of what should otherwise be a policy applicable to all DOT’s grants nationwide. This limited and targeted enforcement is likely arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
103. USCIS dismissal of asylum application: “Defendants … dismissed Plaintiff’s application without following any of the regulations’ standards”
Judge Michael Howard Simon (Obama appointee), E-C-R v. Noem, 3:25-cv-01230 (D. Or.)
Executive Action: Notice of Dismissal of Plaintiff’s I-589 Application for asylum and withholding of removal.
This case concerns a Colombian national’s challenge to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) dismissal of her asylum application after her release from immigration custody in 2022.
On Mar. 25, 2026, in an opinion and order granting a preliminary injunction in part, Judge Simon found Plaintiff was likely to succeed on her claim that the dismissal was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The government maintained that her initial detention and issuance of a Form I-860 meant she remained in expedited removal, leaving USCIS without jurisdiction over her application. The court found that account inconsistent with the agency’s records and conduct: the removal-order portion of the form was blank; she had subsequently been released on her own recognizance; and USCIS had accepted her application, processed her biometrics, and granted her work authorization as an asylum applicant.
Earlier in the same ruling, when examining her removal status, Judge Simon also rejected the government’s explanation that her later release form merely imposed monitoring conditions, crediting the contemporaneous records, “not post hoc rationalizations.” In his arbitrary and capricious analysis, he wrote:
“Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants’ conduct was arbitrary and capricious because USCIS did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s asylum application because she was in expedited removal. As discussed above, the Court rejects that argument. It is not credible that Plaintiff was in expedited removal in September 2023, let alone that she was in expedited removal on June 9, 2025, more than three years after she was released. Thus, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on her argument that Defendants’ conduct was arbitrary and capricious because DHS ‘offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’ State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. DHS did not ‘articulate[] a satisfactory explanation for its action’ that included “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” (emphasis added).
104. USCIS adjudication holds: no reasoned explanation for broad categorical hold, reasonable alternatives not considered
Judge Sara L. Ellis (Obama appointee), Doe v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 1:26-cv-02389 (N.D. Ill.)
Executive Action: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Adjudication Holds for Nationals of Designated Countries (Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194)
This case involved an Iranian national lawfully residing in the United States whose employment-based adjustment-of-status and related applications were subject to USCIS’s indefinite adjudication hold on pending immigration-benefit applications filed by nationals of nearly forty designated countries.
On Mar. 26, 2026, in granting a temporary restraining order, Judge Ellis found that Plaintiff “is likely to succeed on his claim that the adjudicatory hold component on the Policy Memoranda is arbitrary and capricious and therefore the APA requires this Court to set it aside.” Judge Ellis wrote:
“But, important here, Doe takes issue with how the adjudicatory hold ‘applies to nearly all pending benefit requests from applicants such as [Doe] who have already been admitted to the United States. There is no evidence that Defendants considered reasonable alternatives to the expansive hold policy.’ … Doe has been in the country since 2014 and the government has granted him an F-1 visa, OPT employment authorization, STEM OPT employment authorization, and an H-1B visa. He has remained in lawful status without interruption. Yet Defendants have provided no reasoned explanation ‘why such a broad hold is necessary for applications for immigration benefits’ like Doe’s or that they considered any other reasonable alternative. … ‘… The Government protects no one by delaying a decision on [an] application[.]’” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On May 26, after Defendants filed an affidavit stating that Doe’s applications were under review and that the adjudication hold had been lifted, the court granted Doe’s oral motion to dismiss the case and terminated the remaining motions as moot.
105. VA collective-bargaining rescission: unexplained reversal, post hoc national-security rationale, unsupported claim of deliberation
Judge Melissa R. DuBose (Biden appointee), United Nurses Association of California/Union of Healthcare Professionals v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 1:25-cv-00674 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Executive Action: Federal Employee Collective-Bargaining Restrictions (Executive Order 14251; VA Rescission Order)
On Mar. 27, 2026, granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, Judge DuBose found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claim that the Department of Veterans Affairs’s Nov. 13, 2025 Rescission Order was arbitrary and capricious because the agency had failed to provide a reasoned explanation for reversing its earlier decision to exempt Plaintiffs’ unions from Executive Order 14251.
Responding to Defendants’ defense that the Rescission Order was sufficiently reasoned because VA Secretary Collins had “further considered” the relevant delegation and statutory authority, Judge DuBose found that “[t]he vague phrase ‘having further considered’ the law governing the authority to take action or make a decision does not come close to being a ‘reasoned explanation.’”
Judge DuBose noted that Defendants had provided no contemporaneous statement made when the Rescission Order issued that “specifically highlight[ed] or explain[ed] that national security concerns were the impetus for the termination decision.” Defendants instead relied on a later declaration listing ways in which terminating the CBAs purportedly removed “‘obstacles’ to ‘the VA’s ability to address employees with national security-related duties who, nevertheless, demonstrate performance or conduct issues.’” Judge DuBose held that, to the extent this supplied an explanation for the reversal, “post-hoc rationalizations are insufficient to justify an agency’s reversal in course or new action.”
The court further noted that Defendants had produced no exhibits supporting their declarant’s assertion that the decision followed “weeks of planning and consideration,” while Plaintiffs’ CBAs had remained intact for almost eight months after the President authorized their termination. “With no attempt [by Defendants] to explain the changed decision about exempting some unions from the reach of the EO other than a variation of ‘we changed our mind,’” the court concluded that “Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the Rescission Order was an arbitrary and capricious action.”
On July 14, 2026, the First Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal and issued its mandate.
106. Supportive-housing grants: unexplained new criteria, rejected post-hoc rationalizations
Judge Mary S. McElroy (Trump appointee), National Alliance to End Homelessness v. Turner, 1:25-cv-00447 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: New conditions and application deadline for Continuum of Care Builds grants.
On Mar. 31, 2026, Judge McElroy granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, finding HUD’s unexplained reissuance of its supportive-housing grant competition with new criteria arbitrary and capricious. HUD had already announced awardees but reopened the competition shortly before the statutory funding deadline, allowing only one week to apply. The court rejected the government’s post-hoc rationalizations and vacated the September 5 funding notice, new criteria and application period. She wrote:
“Neither these emails nor the rest of the administrative record before the Court illuminates any ‘obscured but implicit’ reasons for HUD’s decision to reissue the CoC Builds NOFO with the New Criteria within weeks of the statutory deadline, after having already announced awardees. Absent any such reasonable explanation for its actions, its decisions were quintessentially arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added)
107. Warehouse detention facility: environmental exemptions “clearly arbitrary;” explanation “strains credulity”
Judge Brendan Abell Hurson (Biden appointee), State of Maryland v. Mullin, 1:26-cv-00733 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Conversion of a Maryland warehouse into an immigration detention facility
On Apr. 15, 2026, Judge Hurson granted a preliminary injunction against converting a Williamsport warehouse into an immigration detention facility, while permitting limited security and office-space work. The court’s Apr. 17 opinion found Maryland likely to succeed on its claim that DHS arbitrarily invoked three categorical exclusions from environmental review. Two required no change in the property’s functional use; the third required infrastructure capacity that DHS had not established. He wrote:
“Even assuming Defendants actually determined that the categorical exclusions applied to the proposed action, their application here was clearly arbitrary. … It strains credulity to argue that such a conversion does not represent a massive change in the ‘functional use’ of the property. … Accordingly, the Court concludes that there is a strong likelihood Defendants’ application of the three invoked categorical exclusions to the proposed action was arbitrary and capricious.” (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added)
108. D.C. bike lanes: conclusory explanations, unsupported safety conclusions
Judge Amy Berman Jackson (Obama appointee), Washington Area Bicyclist Association, Inc. v. Burgum, 1:26-cv-00988 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Removal of protected bicycle lanes in Washington, D.C.
On Apr. 21, 2026, Judge Jackson granted summary judgment in part, vacating and remanding the agencies’ decision to remove protected bicycle lanes on 15th Street and around the Tidal Basin. Her accompanying opinion summarized both arbitrary-and-capricious findings:
“The Court finds the decision to proceed with the 15th Street Cycle Track Removal to be arbitrary and capricious because the record does not reflect that the defendants examined the relevant data and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. It further finds that the defendants’ invocation of the highway modernization categorical exclusion, and their conclusion that the Removal Project would not have a significant impact on public health and safety, to be arbitrary and capricious as well.” (emphasis added)
109. USCIS adjudication holds: no reasoned explanation for indefinite blanket hold, reliance interests inadequately addressed, reasonable alternatives not considered
Chief Judge Timothy L. Brooks (Obama appointee), Karimi v. Mullin, 5:26-cv-05049 (W.D. Ark.)
Executive Action: USCIS adjudication holds for nationals of designated countries under Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194.
This case challenged USCIS’s indefinite hold on the employment-authorization application of an Iranian national who had lived lawfully in the United States since 2019 and held an approved National Interest Waiver. Without a decision on his application, his existing work authorization expired, and he lost his employment as a data scientist at Walmart.
On Apr. 23, 2026, Chief Judge Brooks granted a preliminary injunction in part, finding Plaintiff “likely to succeed” on his claim that the hold policy was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained:
“Here, USCIS failed to provide a reasoned explanation for disregarding the circumstances engendered by its longstanding prior policy and failed to consider alternatives within the ambit of the existing policy.” (emphasis added.)
The memoranda asserted that USCIS had weighed processing delays against national-security needs. Chief Judge Brooks found that explanation inadequate, particularly for applicants who had entered the country before the period identified as requiring comprehensive re-review:
“This discussion does not suffice as a reasonable explanation for disregarding the reliance interest of people like Mr. Karimi who have been in this country for years—before the January 20, 2021, entry date for which the memoranda find comprehensive re-review is ‘necessary.’ The memoranda do not assert that comprehensive re-review for pre-2021 entries is needed—only that USCIS may extend the process outside this timeframe ‘when appropriate’—yet they indefinitely bar adjudication of benefit requests for all aliens from the identified countries regardless of entry date and without explanation for the unlimited time horizon. This is not the reasoned explanation the law requires.” (emphasis added.)
The court also questioned the connection between the blanket hold and USCIS’s stated objectives:
“In sum, USCIS has offered no explanation for why its blanket suspension of adjudications is a rational precursor to reviewing its policies and re-reviewing applications on a case-by-case basis. … The national security interests that the Policy purports to protect can hardly be served by making beggars out of legal immigrants who are likely to remain lawfully present in the United States indefinitely.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
The court enjoined Defendants from delaying or withholding adjudication of Plaintiff’s Form I-765 based solely on his nationality under the memoranda or any internal policy operating to the same effect. It ordered Defendants to adjudicate the application within 30 days and inform Plaintiff and the court of the decision, including the reasons for any denial.
110. USCIS adjudication holds: reliance interests inadequately addressed, alternatives not considered, no reasoned explanation for extending hold to people already admitted
Chief Judge George L. Russell III (Obama appointee), Saghafi v. Edlow, 8:26-cv-00100 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: USCIS adjudication holds for nationals of designated countries under Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194.
This case involved 83 applicants for lawful permanent residence whose Form I-485 applications were placed on indefinite hold because they, or the principal applicants through whom they sought status, were from designated countries.
On Apr. 24, 2026, Chief Judge Russell granted a preliminary injunction in part, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their APA arbitrary-and-capricious claim. Addressing USCIS’s treatment of Plaintiffs’ reliance interests, he wrote:
“The Policy Memoranda’s conclusory statements that USCIS ‘considered’ the negative consequences of the adjudicatory hold and ‘weighed’ the competing interests do not constitute a ‘reasoned explanation’ where USCIS, neither in the Policy Memoranda nor the corresponding administrative records, explained how it weighed the competing interests or how it concluded that the burdens imposed by the adjudicatory hold were ‘necessary and appropriate.’ … In short, USCIS ‘provides no indication that [it] actually considered the consequence of indefinitely delaying final adjudication of pending applications.’” (citations omitted; emphasis added.)
The court cited Plaintiffs’ career changes, business investments, and research-funding opportunities among the interests USCIS had failed to address. It also found “no indication” that USCIS had considered alternatives to an indefinite hold and explained that the policy went “far beyond” the presidential proclamations’ restrictions on entry into the United States:
“The Policy Memoranda, on the other hand, impose an adjudicatory hold that extends to applications submitted by non-citizens who, like Plaintiffs, have already been admitted to the U.S. Yet, the Memoranda provide ‘no reasoned explanation, beyond conclusory statements, why such a broad hold is necessary for applicants for immigration benefits like’ Plaintiffs who have been in the U.S. for years, some for over a decade; have maintained lawful status under various programs and authorizations; and, in many cases, have contributed substantially to medical and scientific research that serves U.S. interests.” (citations omitted; emphasis added.)
Chief Judge Russell concluded:
“Edlow has failed to ‘provide a rational connection between the facts and the decision’ to implement an indefinite adjudicatory hold on Plaintiffs’ Forms I-485 due to their country of birth, and he has failed to ‘grapple with the serious reliance interests at stake based on the change in policy . . . .’”
The accompanying order prohibited application of the hold to Plaintiffs’ Forms I-485 and required adjudication to resume. The court declined to impose Plaintiffs’ requested 30-day adjudication deadline but required a status report within 90 days.
111. USCIS adjudication holds: no reasoned explanation for indefinite hold, fixed-duration alternative not considered
Magistrate Judge Alex G. Tse, Meschi v. Edlow, 3:26-cv-01993 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: USCIS adjudication holds for nationals of designated countries under Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194.
This case involved 20 plaintiffs whose Form I-765 employment-authorization applications were subject to USCIS’s indefinite adjudication hold on immigration-benefit applications filed by noncitizens from 39 designated countries.
On Apr. 29, 2026, Magistrate Judge Tse granted a preliminary injunction in part, finding Plaintiffs likely to prevail on their claim that the indefinite hold was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. He wrote:
“In addition to adopting Behdin’s reasoning, the Court also notes that USCIS put in place an indefinite hold without considering whether a hold for a specific duration (e.g., 90 days) could have sufficed. A hold with a fixed end point would have given USCIS time to review and bolster its security review processes while giving applicants some indication of how long they would need to wait. The indefinite hold leaves applicants in the dark. USCIS didn’t provide ‘a reasoned explanation’ for the indefinite hold.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
The court prohibited USCIS from applying the hold to Plaintiffs’ I-765 applications and required adjudication to resume under its non-hold policies. It declined to impose Plaintiffs’ requested 30-day deadline at the preliminary-injunction stage.
On Sept. 23, the court denied both parties’ summary-judgment motions without prejudice, deferring final resolution pending the appeal in Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. USCIS, which concerned the same adjudication hold.
112. USCIS adjudication holds: no rational connection to stated security concerns, reliance interests inadequately addressed, alternatives not considered
Judge Julia E. Kobick (Biden appointee), Akmurat O. Doe v. Trump, 1:25-cv-13946 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: USCIS adjudication holds under Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194 and nationality-based negative-factor policy under Policy Alert PA-2025-26.
This case involved approximately 200 plaintiffs challenging USCIS’s indefinite hold on benefit applications from designated countries and asylum applications regardless of nationality, alongside a separate policy treating nationality from designated countries as a “significant negative factor” in discretionary benefit adjudications.
On Apr. 30, 2026, Judge Kobick granted a preliminary injunction in part, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claim that the adjudicative hold was arbitrary and capricious. Addressing the government’s reliance on crimes involving two Afghan nationals, she wrote:
“These are thin reeds on which to rest an assertion of reasoned decisionmaking. With respect to the criminal acts planned or committed by Afghan nationals, the government makes no argument as to how two serious, but isolated, violent crimes planned by two people from one country is rationally connected with a policy stopping adjudication of benefit applications by people from 39 different countries, as well as applications for asylum by people from every country in the world. Extrapolating the criminal conduct of two noncitizens to thousands of other noncitizens, from dozens of countries around the world, does not rank as reasoned decisionmaking.” (citations omitted; emphasis added.)
Judge Kobick also found no explanation connecting the presidential proclamations’ findings about screening people for entry to a hold on applications from people already admitted, “in some cases, decades ago,” or to the suspension of asylum adjudications for applicants from every country. USCIS’s assertion that it had weighed processing delays against national security needs was “entirely conclusory.” Addressing reliance interests and alternatives, Judge Kobick wrote:
“There is no indication that USCIS meaningfully considered the consequences of throwing thousands of benefit applicants into indefinite limbo and perpetual uncertainty about whether they will be granted asylum, become a United States citizen, receive work authorization, or obtain a green card. Nor do the Policy Memoranda indicate that USCIS considered alternatives to the adjudicative hold, including, among other options, increasing investigatory scrutiny as appropriate but permitting final adjudications to occur.” (citation omitted; emphasis added.)
The court ordered the hold lifted for the 22 plaintiffs who submitted declarations establishing irreparable harm and directed the parties to confer about extending relief to other plaintiffs. It separately enjoined the significant-negative-factor policy as applied to those plaintiffs’ adjustment-of-status and work-authorization applications on contrary to law grounds. The court did not decide whether that policy was arbitrary and capricious.
113. Immigration courthouse arrests: failure to acknowledge a policy change and “no explanation, rational or otherwise” for abandoning prior restrictions
Judge P. Kevin Castel (W. Bush appointee), African Communities Together v. Venturella (formerly Lyons), 1:25-cv-06366 (S.D.N.Y.)
Executive Action: ICE’s January and May 2025 guidance rescinding the April 2021 restrictions on civil immigration enforcement at immigration courthouses.
This case challenges ICE’s removal of restrictions on immigration courthouse arrests and a separate Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) policy governing dismissal of removal proceedings. ICE’s April 2021 policy expressly covered immigration courts and limited arrests to specified circumstances.
In his Sept. 12, 2025 ruling, Judge Castel declined to stay ICE’s replacement policies, proceeding on the understanding that their provisions applied to immigration courts. He separately stayed the EOIR dismissal policy in Manhattan and the Bronx, finding The Door likely to succeed on its claim that the policy was “contrary to law” because it conflicted with the regulations governing dismissal and immigration judges’ discretion.
On Mar. 24, 2026, however, the government acknowledged that the May 2025 ICE guidance “does not and has never applied” to immigration courts. The court therefore reconsidered ICE’s removal of the April 2021 restrictions without replacement guidance governing arrests at those courts.
On May 18, 2026, Judge Castel revised his earlier ruling and granted a stay under § 705 of the APA. The court stayed the January and May 2025 ICE guidance insofar as it rescinded the April 2021 protections at three Manhattan immigration courthouse locations, finding The Door substantially likely to succeed on its claim that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious. The court identified two defects:
“It further concludes that the January 2025 rescission was arbitrary and capricious in two respects: first, it failed to display a conscious awareness that it was rescinding an arrest policy applicable to immigration courts; and second, it failed to offer even a rudimentary reason why a policy of allowing arrests unfettered by any agency guidance whatsoever was better than the policy it was rescinding.” (emphasis added).
Judge Castel explained that excluding immigration courts from the replacement guidance was not discernible from its text. Addressing the second defect—the absence of a justification for removing the April 2021 restrictions—he added:
“The rescission of the 2021 April Policy gave no explanation, rational or otherwise, for abandoning the prior policy insofar as it applied to immigration courts. The rationale offered in 2025 for expanding the criteria for arrests in or near courthouses simply had no application to immigration courts.” (emphasis added).
On Sept. 30, 2026, Judge Castel granted Plaintiffs summary judgment on the same two grounds. The court explained that the guidance made “no mention of this change in policy” and that no document in the administrative record made clear “that ICE understood that it was changing its policy in this way.” Rationales concerning other courthouses, it added, “cannot be used to supply ‘a reasoned explanation for the change’ in policy as to immigration courts.” The court held that the policy “did not provide an acknowledgment of or reasoned explanation for the change in policy. It is therefore arbitrary and capricious.” It expressly declined to reach Plaintiffs’ additional argument concerning access to justice and other important considerations. The court vacated the January and May 2025 guidance to the extent it rescinded the April 2021 protections for civil enforcement actions in or near immigration courts, without limiting relief to the three Manhattan locations covered by the earlier stay.
114. Immigration protections for crime survivors: safety and reliance interests ignored, deportation governed by arbitrary factors
Judge André Birotte Jr. (Obama appointee), Immigration Center for Women and Children v. Noem, 2:25-cv-09848 (C.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Rescission of immigration-enforcement protections for crime survivors
On May 20, 2026, Judge Birotte granted preliminary relief, including APA stays of ICE’s January 30 guidance rescinding protections for crime survivors and its policy of disregarding existing grants of deferred action. He found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious challenges: ICE had disregarded victim safety, cooperation with law enforcement, reliance interests, and its own standards governing deferred action. Judge Birotte wrote:
“Because Defendants did not give a reason for disregarding prior concerns or address other important aspects of the problem, the 2025 Guidance is arbitrary and capricious. … Plaintiffs are also likely to establish that the [De Facto Revocation Policy] is arbitrary and capricious because whether a person’s status is honored or de facto revoked appears to depend on arbitrary factors such as the speed with which ICE can deport the person.” (emphasis added).
115. Migrant shelter funding: unsupported allegations, alternatives unexplained, reliance interests ignored
Judge Barbara J. Rothstein (Carter appointee), State of Washington v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 2:25-cv-01401 (W.D. Wash.)
Executive Action: Termination of the Shelter and Services Program.
On May 26, 2026, Judge Rothstein granted summary judgment for Washington on its APA claims, finding the termination of the Shelter and Services Program contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. DHS and FEMA had not adequately explained their departure from the program’s congressionally prescribed purpose, substantiated allegations of unlawful conduct, considered less disruptive alternatives, or addressed Washington’s reliance interests. She set aside the termination policy and Washington’s award termination as applied to the state, explaining:
“Thus, Defendants did not merely fail to support their allegations; they also failed to explain why unsupported concerns about possible misuse of funds justified eliminating a congressionally funded program rather than using available compliance tools to address any actual, recipient-specific violations. Defendants also failed to grapple with reliance interests.” (emphasis added).
116. Atmospheric-research supercomputing: no explanation, promised public input disregarded
Judge R. Brooke Jackson (Obama appointee), University Corporation for Atmospheric Research v. National Science Foundation, 1:26-cv-01061 (D. Colo.)
Executive Action: Transfer of stewardship of the NCAR–Wyoming Supercomputing Center.
On June 1, 2026, Judge Jackson granted a preliminary injunction, finding UCAR likely to succeed on its claim that NSF’s decision to transfer stewardship of the NCAR–Wyoming Supercomputing Center was arbitrary and capricious. He prohibited NSF from divesting UCAR or NCAR of rights, resources or responsibilities relating to the facility, explaining:
“Even under this deferential standard of review, NSF’s divestment decision was arbitrary and capricious for at least two reasons. First, the agency has offered no explanation for its decision. Second, the agency failed to abide its own process to consider public feedback before proceeding with the transfer.” (emphasis added).
117. USCIS immigration-benefit holds, re-review, and nationality-based negative-factor policies: no rational connection, reliance interests ignored, national-security rationale pretextual
Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama appointee), Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 1:26-cv-00132 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: USCIS Immigration-Benefit Adjudication Holds, Comprehensive Re-Review, and Nationality-Based Negative-Factor Policies (Executive Order 14161; Presidential Proclamations 10949 and 10998; related USCIS policy memoranda)
This case challenged four USCIS policies: the Global Asylum Hold Policy, the Benefits Hold Policy, the Comprehensive Re-Review Policy, and the Country-Specific Factors Policy, which together halted or subjected to re-review immigration-benefit adjudications and required nationality from designated countries to be treated as a significant negative factor.
On June 5, 2026, Chief Judge McConnell granted Plaintiffs partial summary judgment and held the challenged policies collectively arbitrary and capricious because USCIS failed to provide a reasoned explanation, failed to account for reliance interests, and provided pretextual reasons for its actions.
First, the court found no rational connection between USCIS’s asserted reasons and the policies it adopted. The Government relied principally on two violent incidents involving Afghan nationals and on presidential proclamations concerning deficiencies in screening and vetting at the point of entry. Judge McConnell, quoting Doe v. Trump, called those justifications “thin reeds on which to rest an assertion of reasoned decisionmaking.” Two isolated crimes, he explained, did not rationally support halting adjudications for people from 39 countries or asylum applicants worldwide, while the proclamations concerned entry into the United States rather than applications filed by people already present. Beyond those bases, the memoranda invoked only “vague interests in national security,” yet “neither the Government nor USCIS can elaborate on how the agency concluded that individuals from Travel Ban Countries pose a threat to national security or how withholding benefits from and/or reconsidering benefit approvals to these individuals would serve national security interests.” Judge McConnell concluded: “Simply put, the Court finds that there is no rational connection between the facts found and USCIS’s choice to implement the Challenged Policies. Because they lack a reasoned explanation, the Challenged Policies are therefore arbitrary and capricious.”
Second, Judge McConnell found that USCIS failed to account adequately for the substantial reliance interests its longstanding adjudication practices had created. Plaintiffs’ members had structured employment, family life, immigration status, and future plans around those practices; as the court put it, “They followed the lawful processes that were laid out for them. They reasonably expected their applications to be considered fairly, in a manner consistent with past practices. Then, with three Policy Memoranda, USCIS pulled the rug out from under them.” USCIS’s explanation that it had weighed processing delays against national-security concerns was “merely conclusory” and provided no explanation of how the competing considerations had actually been weighed. Judge McConnell stated: “A mere two-sentence explanation that vaguely prioritizes ‘national security’ concerns over the ‘burden of processing delays’ does not cut it.” The administrative record also failed to address other reliance consequences of the re-review and nationality-based policies. The court therefore concluded that USCIS had not meaningfully considered those interests and that “[f]or this reason, too,” its actions were arbitrary and capricious.
Third, the court found USCIS’s national-security rationale pretextual. Judge McConnell invoked the bad-faith exception to ordinary administrative-record review after finding that contemporaneous statements by President Trump and then-Secretary Kristi Noem met the threshold for considering extra-record evidence. When the Government argued that those statements were unrelated to the policies, the court responded: “The Government effectively invites the Court to shut its eyes and ignore the strong evidence of anti-immigrant animus before it. Doing so would require profound naiveté on the Court’s part.” The timing of those statements was, the court said, “highly probative evidence of USCIS’s true intentions.” USCIS’s own exceptions further undermined its asserted rationale: the agency lifted holds for medical physicians and exempted athletes, coaches, support staff, and relatives attending major sporting events despite insisting that categorical holds were an “operational necessity” for national security. Judge McConnell concluded that “[s]everal points, considered together, reveal a significant mismatch between the decision the [agency] made and the rationale [it] provided,” and that the reasons USCIS supplied “seem to be contrived ones.” He therefore found that “USCIS issued the Challenged Policies based on impermissible pretextual reasoning,” independently rendering them arbitrary and capricious. The court vacated all four policies “in their entirety.”
On Aug. 14, 2026, the First Circuit partially stayed the district court’s relief pending appeal. The stay applied only to the Comprehensive Re-Review Policy, concerning previously approved immigration benefits. The court denied the remainder of the government’s stay request.
118. Renewable energy tax credits: unexplained differential treatment, reliance interests and alternatives ignored
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (Clinton appointee), Oregon Environmental Council v. Internal Revenue Service, 1:25-cv-04400 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Restrictions on wind and solar tax-credit eligibility under IRS Notice 2025-42.
On June 6, 2026, Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted summary judgment for the five Plaintiffs whose claims survived jurisdictional review, vacating and remanding IRS Notice 2025-42 in full. The Notice eliminated the Five Percent Safe Harbor method for establishing the beginning of construction for wind and large-scale solar projects seeking clean-electricity tax credits. She found that the agency failed to explain its policy change or its different treatment of those technologies, consider serious reliance interests, or evaluate alternatives. Rejecting reliance on industry commentary to explain the agency’s decision, she wrote:
“[O]utsiders’ informed speculations are not a substitute for reasoned explanation—particularly when, as here, evidence in the record leaves substantial doubt that the proffered explanation sincerely accounts for the agency’s decision. … Because the Defendants failed to articulate a reasoned explanation for this consequential decision or give due consideration to the serious reliance interests engendered by its prior policy, Notice 2025-42 is arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added)
119. H-1B payment requirement: cursory explanations, reliance interests and alternatives ignored
Judge Leo T. Sorokin (Obama appointee), State of California v. Mullin, 1:25-cv-13829 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: $100,000 H-1B petition payment requirement (Proclamation 10973)
On June 8, 2026, Judge Sorokin granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and vacated the agency policy implementing the $100,000 H-1B payment requirement. He held that the policy was arbitrary and capricious because the agencies supplied only cursory explanations, failed to consider reliance interests or reasonable alternatives, and did not explain why concerns focused on the information-technology sector justified imposing the requirement on education and healthcare employers. Judge Sorokin wrote:
“None of these cursory policy rationales offer a reasoned explanation for enacting a heavy tax on the H-1B program. … Nothing on the record indicates that Defendants accounted for reliance on the previous H-1B petition requirements when it added the new $100,000 payment obligation. Furthermore, no evidence before the Court suggests that Defendants contemplated any reasonable alternatives to the Policy, such as discounting or exempting the payment requirement for cap-exempt employers or evaluating alternative payment amounts above or below $100,000.” (emphasis added).
120. Environmental and climate justice grants: premature program termination, congressional funding mandate disregarded
Judge Richard Mark Gergel (Obama appointee), The Sustainability Institute v. Trump, 2:25-cv-02152 (D.S.C.)
This case challenges the Trump administration’s freeze and termination of federal environmental and climate grants, including the Environmental Protection Agency’s Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grant Program (ECJ Program).
In a June 11, 2026 opinion, Judge Gergel granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their APA claims challenging EPA’s guidance terminating the ECJ Program. Judge Gergel found that “Plaintiffs have established that, contrary to Congress’ will, the EPA issued guidance that shuttered the ECJ Program before its end date of September 30, 2026,” noting that, in February 2025, EPA Assistant Deputy Administrator Travis Voyles decided that the program should be terminated “for policy reasons.”
The court rejected Defendants’ argument that the One Big Beautiful Bill Act had rescinded the entire program and rendered the claims moot, explaining that the legislation “only rescinded funds which were unobligated at the time of the bill’s passage.” On the merits, Judge Gergel held:
“Last, there is no doubt that Defendants’ internal guidance terminating the ECJ Program in contravention of § 7438 was arbitrary and capricious and unlawful. Section 7438 appropriated $2.8 billion to remain available until September 30, 2026, ‘to award grants’ such as those under the ECJ Program. Defendants’ guidance closing and premature shuttering of the ECJ Program and refusal to administer it are illegal.” (footnote marker omitted; emphasis added.)
Addressing Defendants’ litigation position, Judge Gergel wrote:
“In fact, Defendants previously admitted that they violated the APA but argued that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ challenge to the termination of individual grants. (Dkt. No. 153 at 1) (‘[F]or purposes of this case only, Defendants do not contest judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ APA claims (excluding those asserted against the Secretary of Agriculture regarding grants under the Partnership for Climate-Smart Commodities (‘PCSC’), see section II below), that would require Defendants to fund or negotiate grant agreements for 32 of the 38 grant awards at issue here. Defendants maintain their jurisdictional objections . . . .’). Further, in their current briefing, Defendants do not attempt to argue that the termination of the ECJ Program was legal. See generally (Dkt. No. 205).” (emphasis added.)
The court declared the guidance closing the program illegal and vacated it. It denied Plaintiffs’ requests for a permanent injunction and mandamus, describing the requested injunctive relief as “impractical.”
121. National park displays: unexplained reversal, reliance interests ignored, contrary evidence disregarded
Judge Angel Kelley (Biden appointee), National Parks Conservation Association v. Department of the Interior, 1:26-cv-10877 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Removal and alteration of National Park Service interpretive materials under Secretary’s Order 3431 and Executive Order 14253
On June 12, 2026, Judge Kelley granted a stay under APA § 705 and preliminary injunctive relief, finding likely success on the claim that the removal directive lacked reasoned justification, abandoned prior practice without considering reliance interests, and disregarded evidence concerning public interests and the materials’ accuracy. Judge Kelley wrote:
“Here, the Secretary’s Order is an arbitrary and capricious departure from prior practice, jettisoning decades of efforts by advocates, community members, institutions, historians, and scientists without explanation. … The Secretary’s Order was issued without any indication of consideration of the substantial reliance interests at stake and is thus arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added)
On July 2, the First Circuit stayed the June 12 order pending appeal, finding an insufficient showing of irreparable harm and expressly declining to resolve the APA merits.
122. Federal union proceedings: unsupported justifications, reliance interests ignored, unexplained effective date
Judge Denise J. Casper (Obama appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 1:26-cv-11747 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Revocation of regional directors’ authority to decide federal-sector union representation matters.
On June 29, 2026, Judge Casper granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, holding that the FLRA’s rule centralizing representation decisions and its April 23 effective date were arbitrary and capricious. The agency failed to substantiate its asserted efficiency and other benefits, grapple with contrary data, consider alternatives and reliance interests, or adequately explain its implementation timetable. The court directed that the delegation-revocation provisions be set aside, writing:
“[T]he IFR’s delegation revocation provisions are arbitrary and capricious because the FLRA fails to provide adequate reasoning to support them. … [T]he Court concludes that the IFR is invalid because both its substance and its effective date are arbitrary and capricious in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).” (emphasis added)
123-124. Public-service loan forgiveness: unexplained targeting, vague standards, impermissible policy objectives
Judge Myong J. Joun (Biden appointee), National Council of Nonprofits v. McMahon, 1:25-cv-13242, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Education, 1:25-cv-13244 (D. Mass.) (related cases)
Executive Action: Restrictions on employer eligibility for Public Service Loan Forgiveness
On June 30, 2026, Judge Joun granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and vacated the rule permitting the Department of Education to exclude employers from Public Service Loan Forgiveness based on a “substantial illegal purpose.” He found the rule arbitrary and capricious because it lacked a rational connection to the asserted problem, supplied no objective standards governing eligibility, and relied on policy objectives Congress had not made relevant to the program. Addressing its selective targeting of particular activities, he wrote:
“That unexplained line-drawing undermines the Department’s asserted rationale and suggests that the Final Rule is driven by policy preferences rather than a reasoned effort to address unlawful conduct. … By failing to articulate objective standards governing what constitutes ‘substantial illegal activity,’ ‘aiding and abetting,’ or a ‘pattern’ of unlawful conduct, the Department has left employers to guess at their obligations while reserving broad discretion to determine eligibility on an ad hoc basis. That lack of ascertainable standards is itself a hallmark of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.” (emphasis added).
125. USCIS adjudication holds and nationality-based negative-factor policy: no rational connection, reliance interests ignored, first-in/first-out system abandoned without justification, indefinite hold unexplained
Judge Algenon L. Marbley (Clinton appointee), Doe 1 v. Edlow, 2:26-cv-00494 (S.D. Ohio)
Executive Action: USCIS Adjudication Holds and Nationality-Based Negative-Factor Policy (Policy Alert PA-2025-26; Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194)
This litigation challenged USCIS policies indefinitely pausing final adjudication of immigration-benefit applications submitted by nationals of designated countries and requiring USCIS to treat nationality from those countries as a significant negative factor in discretionary adjudications. Policy Alert PA-2025-26 imposed the nationality-based negative-factor treatment; Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192 and PM-602-0194 imposed and expanded the adjudicatory holds.
On July 6, 2026, Judge Marbley granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, preliminarily enjoined Defendants from applying all three challenged policies to Plaintiffs’ pending applications. On Plaintiff’s arbitrary-and-capricious claim, the court held that Plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on “four of their five theories of liability under their arbitrary and capricious APA claim.” Judge Marbley first characterized Defendants’ merits response as “perfunctory and conclusory”: Defendants asserted simply that USCIS had weighed possible adjudication delays against the need to vet applicants “to the maximum degree possible,” but the court held that this conclusory assertion was insufficient.
First, the court found “Plaintiffs are likely to show that there is no rational connection between USCIS’s factual findings and its choice of policies.” The presidential proclamations concerned screening people seeking entry into the United States; applying that rationale “in an undifferentiated manner to the Plaintiffs,” who were already lawfully present, “makes no sense.” Judge Marbley emphasized that the President’s authority to restrict entry did not permit USCIS to “disregard” the Administrative Procedure Act when adopting policies affecting people already inside the country.
Second, the court found that USCIS had failed to account adequately for Plaintiffs’ reliance interests and failed to explain the nationality-based negative-factor treatment. Many Plaintiffs had lived lawfully in the United States for years and structured their lives around the preexisting USCIS adjudicatory system. Judge Marbley described Defendants’ apparent position, that because some people already admitted into the United States might pose security concerns, USCIS should delay adjudicating their applications, as “frankly preposterous.” If the asserted security concerns were “legitimate,” the court observed, it was “unclear why adjudications” capable of identifying and resolving that concern should be delayed. Critically for PA-2025-26, the court added that “Defendants likewise fail to explain how undifferentiated treatment of Plaintiffs’ nationality as a significant negative factor addresses national security concerns.”
Third, Plaintiffs were likely to show that USCIS had changed its longstanding “first-in, first-out” adjudication system without acknowledging or adequately explaining the change. Judge Marbley found that “Defendants have not recognized their change in policy and shown a good reason for that change in deviating from a first-in, first-out adjudication of pending benefits.”
Fourth, the court found the indefinite nature of the adjudicatory hold inadequately explained. Defendants had not shown why “[a] hold with a fixed end point” could not have allowed USCIS to review and strengthen its security processes while providing applicants some indication of how long they would wait. The court therefore found Plaintiffs likely to show that USCIS “failed to provide a ‘reasoned explanation’ for the indefinite hold.”
126. 2027 ACA marketplace rule: unsupported fraud rationale, evidence disregarded, policy reversals unexplained
Judge Brendan Abell Hurson (Biden appointee), City of Columbus v. Kennedy, 1:26-cv-02215 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Changes to ACA marketplace enrollment requirements and insurance-plan standards.
On July 16, 2026, Judge Hurson stayed provisions of HHS’s 2027 marketplace rule under APA § 705. His accompanying opinion found five groups of changes likely arbitrary and capricious: additional income verification when applicants project income above the poverty threshold but government data indicate income below it; ending acceptance of income self-attestation without further verification when IRS data are unavailable; expanded special-enrollment verification; relaxation of network-adequacy and essential-community-provider requirements; and elimination of required standardized plan options and limits on nonstandardized offerings. The court faulted unsupported fraud rationales, inadequate engagement with contrary evidence and public comments, and unexplained departures from earlier policies. Addressing the first income-verification requirement, Hurson wrote:
“Accordingly, the Court finds that the agency’s chosen solution remains unmoored from the problem it seeks to address. … Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown this income verification requirement is likely arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
127. School mental-health grants: unexplained policy reversal, improper criteria, reliance interests ignored
Judge Kymberly K. Evanson (Biden appointee), State of Washington v. United States Department of Education, 2:26-cv-02409 (W.D. Wash.)
Executive Action: Planned termination of school mental-health grants under new administration priorities.
On July 27, 2026, Judge Evanson granted a temporary restraining order against the Department of Education’s plan to terminate school mental-health grants, finding the plan likely arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. On Sept. 22, she granted a preliminary injunction, explaining:
“Because the Department’s termination plan likely reflects an unexplained change in Department policy, and the Department’s plan likely violates its own regulations or the statutes identified in this section, and bases terminations on factors Congress did not intend the Department to consider, the Department’s termination plan is likely arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law and thus violates the APA. … The Department has not identified any evidence suggesting that it has acknowledged its change in position—indeed it denies that it has changed its position—or that it considered the Plaintiff States’ and/or Grantees’ serious reliance interests before directing Department personnel to re-review the Grants for termination.” (citations omitted; emphasis added).
128. Los Angeles homelessness funding: immediate suspension unexplained, consequences inadequately considered
Judge David O. Carter (Clinton appointee), Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority v. Donald J. Trump, 2:26-cv-07056 (C.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Suspension of LAHSA from federal programs and its regional homelessness-coordination roles.
On Aug. 13, 2026, Judge Carter granted a preliminary injunction in part, finding HUD’s suspension of LAHSA likely arbitrary and capricious. HUD had known of the alleged mismanagement for years but suspended LAHSA after deadlines for arranging an alternative applicant had passed, threatening the region’s access to homelessness funding. He wrote:
“The Court finds that HUD did not provide a reasoned explanation as to why an immediate suspension of LAHSA, and effectively the LA CoC, was necessary to protect the public interest after relevant deadlines for becoming a Collaborative Applicant had passed. Furthermore, HUD did not adequately demonstrate that it considered important aspects of barring the CoC from being able to apply for funding with a Consolidated Application.” (emphasis added).
129. FBI headquarters funding: funds redirected on a “misapprehension of existing law”
Judge Theodore D. Chuang (Obama appointee), State of Maryland v. Patel, 8:25-cv-03644 (D. Md.)
Executive Action: Relocation of FBI headquarters and reprogramming of appropriated funds.
On Aug. 17, 2026, Judge Chuang granted judgment on the pleadings for Plaintiffs, holding that the FBI’s decision to redirect up to $555 million toward relocating its headquarters to the Ronald Reagan Building was arbitrary and capricious. The funding decision’s sole justification was to implement a site selection that violated Congress’s statutory restrictions: the Reagan Building was outside the three permitted sites. The FBI therefore based its funding decision on authority the agencies did not possess. The court vacated the funding and site-selection decisions and permanently enjoined their implementation. On the A&C holding, Chuang wrote:
“[T]he Court finds that the FBI Reprogramming Decision was arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) because it was based on a misapprehension of existing law under which the FBI erroneously concluded that the FBI and the GSA had the authority to select the Reagan Building as the site for the consolidated FBI headquarters.” (emphasis added).
130. Teen pregnancy prevention grants: vague conditions, contrary evidence, unexplained policy changes
Judge Christopher R. Cooper (Obama appointee), Hennepin County, Minnesota v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1:26-cv-02460 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: New conditions on Teen Pregnancy Prevention grants and termination of existing awards.
On Aug. 19, 2026, Judge Cooper granted a preliminary injunction in part against HHS’s 2026 Teen Pregnancy Prevention policy, which imposed abstinence-only and “body literacy” requirements alongside restrictions concerning DEI, “gender ideology,” and discussions of teen sexual activity. Judge Cooper’s opinion found the policy likely arbitrary and capricious because of vague requirements, unsupported mandates, disregard of relevant evidence, reliance on considerations outside Congress’s intended framework, and unexplained changes to the program. The court wrote:
“Several aspects of the 2026 Policy likely run counter to the evidence before the agency; reflect HHS’s failure to consider an important part of the problem; rely on factors that Congress did not intend for the agency to consider; or suffer from some combination of these deficiencies. … Based on the unimpugned record before the Court at this stage, Plaintiffs have established that they are likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious challenge to the lawfulness of the 2026 Policy and the NOFOs and grant terminations that have implemented it.” (emphasis added).
131. Disaster-relief grants: unexplained conditions, uncertain funding, reliance interests ignored
Judge Michael J. McShane (Obama appointee), City of Salem v. Mullin, 6:26-cv-01340 (D. Or.)
Executive Action: New conditions on federal disaster-relief, preparedness, and mitigation grants.
On Aug. 20, 2026, Judge McShane granted a preliminary injunction, blocking DHS and FEMA from imposing the challenged conditions on Salem’s grants. These included restrictions concerning DEI and “gender ideology,” compliance with executive orders, and termination for convenience or shifting agency priorities. Finding Salem likely to succeed on its arbitrary-and-capricious claim, he wrote:
“DHS has made no meaningful explanation of how the Challenged Conditions relate to grant programs appropriated by Congress to fund disaster relief, preparedness, and mitigation. … The Challenged Conditions plainly represent an unexplained expansion of the conditions imposed on recipients beyond what was required in previous years. … Further, DHS plainly did not consider or appreciate the interests of grant recipients who, like Salem, rely on these funds.” (emphasis added)
132. Farmworker wage cuts: unjustified wage levels, housing deductions, flawed data, alternatives ignored
Judge Kirk E. Sherriff (Biden appointee), United Farm Workers v. United States Department of Labor, 1:25-cv-01614 (E.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Reduction of required wages under the H-2A agricultural-worker program
In an Aug. 25, 2026 order ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Sherriff held four components of DOL’s wage rule arbitrary and capricious: unjustified wage rates set at the 17th and 50th percentiles; a housing deduction that contradicted free-housing requirements, disadvantaged similarly situated U.S. workers, and could exceed housing costs; reliance on wage data excluding direct farm employment without considering corrective alternatives; and a rule assigning wages according to workers’ majority duties without addressing wage-suppression risks or alternatives. He remanded the rule without vacating it, directing DOL to produce a new methodology. On the agency’s use of Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) data, he wrote:
“The IFR’s selection of the OEWS, without adequate consideration of the problems engendered by that data source, and without consideration of reasonable alternatives to adjust that data source to more accurately reflect actual farmworker wages, is arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis added).
133. Fair-housing funding: unexplained policy changes, disregarded reliance interests, and “pretextual” justifications
Judge Myong J. Joun (Biden appointee), Massachusetts Fair Housing Center v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 3:26-cv-30117 (D. Mass.)
This case challenges HUD’s restructuring of the Fair Housing Initiatives Program, including the elimination of FY2025 funding for private enforcement and education and outreach grants, eligibility restrictions excluding existing fair-housing organizations, and new funding conditions.
On Aug. 26, 2026, Judge Joun granted a temporary restraining order, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious claim. He vacated the challenged FY2025 notices of funding opportunity (NOFOs) and ordered HUD to allocate those funds using its FY2024 structure.
The court rejected HUD’s reliance on a declaration prepared after the challenged decisions to explain its new funding structure:
“HUD needed to adequately explain the blended structure when it took the action—not when defending the action in court.” (emphasis added.)
Turning to HUD’s contemporaneous memorandum, Judge Joun found no explanation for combining funding across two fiscal years. Its substantive explanations were also inadequate: the memorandum “does not so much explain as it does claim.” Assertions about modernization and broader participation did not explain eliminating private-enforcement funding or excluding existing organizations. Nor did HUD adequately justify requiring applicants to explain how their awards would advance the administration’s priorities concerning “gender ideology,” “faith-based activities,” and immigration. The court concluded:
“Defendants attempt to justify the result, not the process. Based on the limited justifications offered in Defendants’ papers and the related exhibits, it is hard to see how or where Defendants relied on relevant data in crafting these changes. I therefore must conclude at this stage that this process was under-reasoned.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Joun separately found that the organizations’ reliance interests were “demonstrable and substantial.” They included expectations of continued funding under multi-year awards and the ability to compete for new grants. He explained:
“Defendants fail to address these reliance interests, both in their briefing and in the record. … But even considering the entirety of the record, there is no indication that Defendants acknowledge, let alone consider, what their planned NOFOs will do to Plaintiffs’ reliance interests.” (emphasis added.)
HUD’s assertion that existing recipients retained one or two years of federal support was “both inadequate and incorrect”: the National Fair Housing Alliance was operating under a multi-year award, but the challenged notice provided no funding for its next grant year.
The court also found a disconnect between HUD’s stated goals of broadening participation and strengthening fair-housing infrastructure and a notice offering only five awards while excluding nearly all existing nonprofit fair-housing organizations:
“It belies credulity to think that five awards alone could broaden and strengthen fair housing work across the nation, and excluding almost all existing fair housing organizations will certainly not strengthen fair housing work.” (emphasis added.)
Judge Joun expressly concluded that “the Department’s reasons for the FHOI NOFO are pretextual.” He also found Plaintiffs likely to succeed in challenging the separate Administrative Enforcement Initiative notice because HUD failed to explain its departure from its prior funding practice or the consequences of that change.
On Oct. 19, the First Circuit stayed the requirement to issue new FY2025 notices using the FY2024 structure, but otherwise denied a stay. It concluded that HUD had not made a strong showing of likely success in challenging the arbitrary-and-capricious analysis, noting that the government had not substantially addressed the pretext finding.
134. California emissions waivers: unexplained reversal of longstanding policy and denial that any change occurred
Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama appointee), California v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1:26-cv-02185 (D.D.C.).
This case challenges EPA’s reclassification of California’s Clean Air Act emissions-waiver orders as “rules” subject to the Congressional Review Act’s expedited disapproval process. On June 12, 2026, EPA submitted four longstanding waivers to Congress as final rules, although the original waiver decisions expressly stated that they were not rules and that the Congressional Review Act did not apply.
In a Sept. 2, 2026 opinion granting a preliminary injunction, Judge Howell found that California was likely to succeed on its arbitrary-and-capricious claim, writing:
“California establishes a likelihood that EPA’s action in reclassifying the CAA Section 209(b) waiver orders as ‘final rules’ was arbitrary and capricious because EPA not only supplies no explanation for this abrupt change in long-standing policy but also denies the fact that a change in the classification of the waivers occurred at all.” (emphasis added).
Elsewhere in the opinion, the court criticized EPA’s manipulation of the distinction between rules and orders, explaining: “Such gamesmanship may seem like a clever policy move, but undermines honest compliance with the law, which is what Americans should expect from executive branch agencies.”
The accompanying order required EPA to restore the prior status quo, withdraw or correct its public reclassifications, and refrain from giving them effect. On Sept. 12, the court extended preliminary relief, on the same reasoning, to two additional waivers EPA had reclassified on July 22.
135. Immigration restrictions on public benefits: reliance interests ignored, interpretation barely explained
Judge Mary S. McElroy (Trump appointee), State of New York v. U.S. Department of Justice, 1:25-cv-00345 (D.R.I.)
Executive Action: Expansion of immigration-status restrictions on federally funded benefits and services.
On Sept. 10, 2025, Judge McElroy granted a preliminary injunction, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claim that HHS, Education Department and Labor Department notices expanding immigration-status restrictions were arbitrary and capricious. Each agency had failed to consider reliance interests arising from longstanding access to the affected programs. Addressing the Labor Department’s notice, she wrote:
“And for the same reason—the lack of consideration of reliance interests—the Court holds that the DOL Notice is arbitrary and capricious. The Court notes also that, while the HHS and ED Notices at least attempted to justify their interpretations based on legal principles, the DOL Notice barely attempts to do that, beyond a single vague paragraph. … That makes the case that it is ‘arbitrary’ and ‘capricious’ even clearer.” (citation omitted; emphasis added).
136. FEMA staffing reductions: unexplained renewal restrictions and a workforce target “as if pulled from thin air”
Judge Susan Yvonne Illston (Clinton appointee), American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 3:25-cv-03698 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: Large-Scale Reductions in Force / Termination of Probationary Employees (Executive Order 14210)
This case challenged the Trump administration’s efforts to implement large-scale reductions in the federal workforce, including DHS’s restrictions on FEMA staffing, nonrenewal of emergency-response personnel, and planned workforce cuts.
On Sept. 11, 2026, Judge Illston granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their supplemental APA claims challenging the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) control over Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) staffing and planned workforce reductions, including nonrenewal of Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery (CORE) employees. The ruling included both arbitrary-and-capricious claims: Claim X against DHS and then-Secretary Kristi Noem, and Claim XIII against FEMA and then-acting FEMA head Karen Evans. Both officials were sued in their official capacities. The court identified three grounds for finding the challenged actions arbitrary and capricious.
First, the court held:
“DHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it revoked FEMA’s long-standing authority to renew CORE appointments. There is no evidence in the record reflecting reasoned decisionmaking for this about-face or for the subsequent conditions DHS placed on FEMA’s renewal authority.”
Although DHS was exempt from the President’s hiring freeze, it treated FEMA’s CORE term renewals as new hires under that freeze. Removing FEMA’s renewal authority “impeded FEMA’s ability to perform its functions;” when DHS temporarily restored authority for 180-day renewals, it “effectively imposed an arbitrary expiration date on that authority of December 31, 2025.”
Second, the court found that both FEMA and DHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the CORE nonrenewals that began on Jan. 1, 2026, explaining:
“The nonrenewals were not based on any assessment of agency need or of individual performance but targeted those particular employees simply because those were the ones whose NTE dates came up first when FEMA’s authority to renew COREs purportedly ‘expired.’ Rather than reasoned decisionmaking, the decision to nonrenew COREs ran counter to internal FEMA analyses, such as the recommendation of the FEMA CHCO and the request by FEMA managers that 303 COREs with NTE dates in January be renewed.”
NTE dates are the employees’ not-to-exceed appointment end dates; CHCO refers to the Chief Human Capital Officer. The court emphasized that Defendants halted the nonrenewals on Jan. 22 because of a pending severe winter storm:
“In other words, it is clear that the January 1 non-renewals began because there happened not to have been a winter storm on that date; but if the winter storm had arrived earlier or later, then the CORE nonrenewals would have halted on a different date and different employees would have been separated.”
Finally, the court found that the Dec. 4, 2025 staffing plan submitted by Evans, projecting 11,383 employees, approximately half the prior workforce, was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Illston wrote: “Frankly, the FEMA staffing plan number appears as if pulled from thin air.” DHS Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Guy “could not explain” its origin, DHS senior adviser Kara Voorhies knew of no supporting analysis of agency need, and the plan contradicted two contemporaneous staffing analyses by FEMA’s program and regional offices. The court concluded:
“In other words, rather than reflecting reasoned decisionmaking to reach the 11,383 annual staffing plan figure submitted to DHS, the record indicates that Evans submitted the 11,383 figure first and then worked backwards to figure out how to support it.”
The court also found statutory violations under the Post-Katrina Act and the continuing resolution restricting workforce reductions. It denied Defendants’ cross-motion, declined to reach Plaintiffs’ supplemental ultra vires claims, and directed the parties to confer on the scope of relief, with a joint statement identifying any remaining remedial disputes due Oct. 9.
137. Student and exchange-visitor admissions: costs ignored, alternatives unexplored, comments unanswered
Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV (George W. Bush appointee), Presidents’ Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 1:26-cv-13799 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Replacement of “duration of status” with fixed admission periods for international students, exchange visitors, and foreign journalists
On Sept. 14, 2026, Judge Saylor postponed the effective date and preliminarily enjoined implementation of a DHS rule replacing “duration of status” admissions with fixed admission periods capped at four years for international students and exchange visitors and 240 days for foreign journalists, requiring those seeking longer stays to apply for extensions. Finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious challenge, his accompanying opinion summarized the deficiencies:
“Here, the agency action is arbitrary and capricious in at least four respects: DHS failed to conduct a reasoned calculation of the benefits and costs of the Final Rule; failed to conduct a meaningful consideration of other alternatives; failed to respond to significant comments expressing substantial concerns; and failed to show that there is a rational connection between the Final Rule and its purported objectives.” (emphasis added).
138. SNAP implementation: inadequate explanations, unfair surprise, post-hoc rationalization
Judge Mustafa T. Kasubhai (Biden appointee), State of New York v. Rollins, 6:25-cv-02186 (D. Or.)
Executive Action: Implementation of statutory changes to SNAP eligibility and state payment-error calculations.
On Sept. 17, 2026, Judge Kasubhai granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. He found USDA’s retroactively imposed periods for excluding implementation errors from states’ SNAP error rates arbitrary and capricious, explaining: “Defendants’ exclusionary periods are arbitrary and capricious because they are inadequately explained, fail to consider Plaintiffs’ reliance interests, and fail to give Plaintiffs fair notice.” The court vacated those periods.
He separately found USDA’s noncitizen guidance arbitrary and capricious for failing to explain its omission of refugees, asylees and other humanitarian immigrant groups who qualified as lawful permanent residents, including their exemption from the five-year waiting period. Rejecting the government’s litigation explanation that the document was merely a quick-reference guide, he wrote: “This explanation is absent from the record, and the Court rejects it as a post hoc rationalization of past agency action” (emphasis added). The court declared the guidance unlawful and clarified the affected groups’ eligibility.
139. Teacher-training grants: undefined criteria, unexplained reversal, reliance interests and alternatives ignored
Judge Angel Kelley (Biden appointee), State of California v. U.S. Department of Education, 1:25-cv-10548 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Termination of education grants supporting DEI initiatives.
On Sept. 17, 2026, Judge Kelley granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and vacated the Department’s February 5, 2025 grant-termination directive. She found four A&C defects: failure to explain what constituted DEI or why it was discriminatory; unexplained reversal of prior policy; disregard of substantial reliance interests; and failure to consider notice and an opportunity to cure before termination. This judgment resolved the prospective challenge to the directive, rather than ordering restoration of individual terminated grants. Addressing the Teacher Quality Partnership (TQP) and Supporting Effective Educator Development (SEED) programs, she wrote:
“In sum, because the Directive provides no discernible criteria for ‘DEI,’ and thus for determining the type of programs and activities it disfavors, it fails to provide the explanation necessary to guide implementation, give TQP and SEED grantees and applicants fair notice, and permit meaningful judicial review. Accordingly, the Directive is arbitrary and capricious. … Finally, the February 2025 Directive is arbitrary and capricious because Defendants failed to consider the more moderate alternative of providing pre-termination notice and opportunity to grantees to cure rather than immediate termination.” (emphasis added)
140. Education-research funding: unexplained executive-order conditions, post-hoc justification
Judge Allison D. Burroughs (Obama appointee), National Center for Learning Disabilities v. Office of Management and Budget, 1:26-cv-13019 (D. Mass.)
Executive Action: Conditioning education-research funding on compliance with Executive Orders 14151 and 14332.
On Sept. 17, 2026, Judge Burroughs granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, finding OMB’s addition of executive-order compliance conditions to the challenged funding apportionments contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. Addressing funds expiring on September 30, the court vacated the conditions, which appeared in apportionment footnotes, because OMB had supplied no contemporaneous reasoned explanation. The court wrote:
“Here, Defendants point to the Executive Orders as a ‘post hoc rationalization,’ … but they have not directed the Court to any part of the administrative record where those orders were originally cited as a justification for the inclusion of the footnotes. And, as Plaintiffs point out, OMB did not articulate any reasoned basis for adding the footnotes. … Accordingly, the Court finds that OMB acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it added the Executive Order Footnotes to the challenged apportionments.” (citations omitted; emphasis added).
141. Magnet-school funding: unexplained grant reductions, departure from prior practice, and failure to consider consequences and reliance interests
Judge Arun Subramanian (Biden appointee), Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York v. United States Department of Education, 1:26-cv-06584 (S.D.N.Y.).
Executive Action: Non-Continuation of Magnet-School Grants over Transgender-Student Policies
This case challenges reductions to five federal grants supporting nineteen New York City magnet schools.
After the court vacated the Department of Education’s initial non-continuation decisions in an earlier action for failure to follow Title IX procedures, the Department continued the grants but substantially reduced their funding. It provided no new funding for the first nine months of the fiscal year, calculated awards for the remaining three months, and deducted remaining carryover funds.
On Sept. 24, 2026, Judge Subramanian granted summary judgment to the Board. His Oct. 5 opinion explained:
“Defendants’ grant award determinations are plainly arbitrary and capricious. There is no explanation of why defendants believed the existence of carryover funds from the prior fiscal year warranted the reduced grant awards, and there is no discussion whatsoever of any of the programs and activities that the grants were intended for. Nor is there any reasoning provided for the Department’s change in position from its prior practice, where the existence of carryover funds did not automatically reduce a grant award in a subsequent budget period.” (emphasis added.)
The court further stated: “The record before the Court certainly does not contain any example of prior practice matching what happened here, as defendants agreed at the hearing.” It recorded government counsel’s concession: “We were unable to cite to prior examples.”
The Board described reductions in planned programming and activities, alongside difficulties hiring and retaining staff, training teachers, and obtaining supplies. Judge Subramanian concluded: “Defendants’ failure to consider these consequences is further indicia that their decision was arbitrary and capricious.” Citing Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, he emphasized that, when an agency changes course, “longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.”
The court vacated the grant-award notifications and required the Department to reassess the awards, explaining how and why carryover funds affected the new awards in light of the planned uses of both years’ funding.
142. Federal prison union contract: “two incongruent explanations” and an “entirely pretextual explanation” supported likely arbitrary-and-capricious violation
Judge Vernon D. Oliver (Biden appointee), National Council of Prison Locals, American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 3:25-cv-01907 (D. Conn.).
This case challenges the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ termination of its collective bargaining agreement with the National Council of Prison Locals, American Federation of Government Employees (“CPL-33”), which represents approximately 30,000 federal employees.
On Sept. 29, 2026, in granting a preliminary injunction and a stay under Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Judge Oliver concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the termination was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Addressing BOP’s reliance on Executive Order 14,251 and its conflicting public explanation, the court wrote:
“On September 25, 2025, Defendants published two incongruent explanations for the termination of the CBA. In the termination letter sent to CPL-33 President White, BOP cited the Executive Order as the basis for the termination, stating that the termination was ‘based on the EO.’ But that same day, Director Marshall posted his message that heavily criticized CPL-33’s operations and stated that the ‘whole purpose of ending this contract’ was because the ‘union [was] an obstacle to progress’ and ‘the current contract has too often slowed or prevented changes.’ … Although an agency may have multiple reasons for its action, it cannot offer an entirely pretextual explanation that is undermined by its own contradictory assertions made the same day. But that is precisely what Defendants have done here. They cited the Executive Order as the only basis for cancelling the CBA in the Termination Letter, but issued a public message that same day with an entirely contrary explanation. The Court cannot ‘ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given,’ Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 785 (2019), and therefore, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that Defendants’ decision to terminate the CBA was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.
For the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ memorandum, there are multiple additional and independent reasons why the Government’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. At this juncture, however, the Court need only find that it is likely to prevail on one of these arguments.” (footnotes omitted; emphasis added.)
The court granted preliminary injunctive relief and relief under 5 U.S.C. § 705, ordering BOP to immediately reinstate the collective bargaining agreement and its subsidiary agreements for the remainder of the agreed term.
143. H-1B payment requirement: no consideration of alternatives or reliance interests
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam Jr. (Obama appointee), Global Nurse Force v. Trump, 4:25-cv-08454 (N.D. Cal.)
Executive Action: $100,000 H-1B petition payment requirement (Proclamations 10973 and 11069)
On Sept. 30, 2026, Judge Gilliam granted Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion in part, vacating and remanding the agency policies implementing the $100,000 H-1B payment requirement and enjoining their implementation pending notice-and-comment rulemaking and regulatory-flexibility analyses. He found Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious claim, rejecting the agencies’ contention that implementing a presidential directive excused compliance with the APA. He wrote:
“There is no question here that Agency Defendants failed to consider any alternatives or the reliance interests of the regulated parties. As such, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Agency Policies are arbitrary and capricious.” (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
144. Voter-roll screening: known database errors, disenfranchisement risks ignored
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan (Biden appointee), Common Cause v. U.S. Department of Justice, 1:26-cv-01352 (D.D.C.)
Executive Action: Collection, sharing, and screening of state voter rolls under DOJ’s Voter List Maintenance Policy.
On Oct. 9, 2026, Judge Sooknanan granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs and vacated DOJ’s policy of obtaining state voter rolls, comparing them against DHS’s SAVE database, and demanding removal of purportedly ineligible voters. On arbitrary-and-capricious review, she found that DOJ knew of the database’s limitations but failed to consider the risk of erroneously removing eligible citizens. She wrote:
“But faced with that pitfall in their predetermined approach, this administrative record demonstrates that the Division chose to look the other way. In other words, the Division entirely failed to consider the risks that its policy posed to U.S. citizens who hold a fundamental right to vote. Because the administrative record is ‘not sufficient to enable’ this Court to conclude that the Voter List Maintenance Policy ‘was the product of reasoned decisionmaking,’ the Court must set it aside as arbitrary and capricious.” (citation omitted; emphasis added)
145. Diversity Visa lottery suspension: no reasoned explanation and no account of reliance interests
Judge Jinsook Ohta (Biden appointee), Red Eagle Law, L.C. v. Rubio, 3:26-cv-04738 (S.D. Cal.).
This case challenges the State Department’s failure to open lottery registration for the fiscal year 2027 Diversity Visa Program, which provides immigration opportunities for individuals from countries with historically low rates of immigration to the United States.
On Oct. 14, 2026, Judge Ohta granted a preliminary injunction requiring the State Department to reopen registration and administer the program. In her Oct. 19 opinion explaining that relief, she found that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on its arbitrary-and-capricious claim, stating:
“The State Department’s cancellation of the 2027 Diversity Visa Program was arbitrary and capricious because it has provided no reason for its action, much less a reasoned one.” (emphasis added.)
The court noted that the Department’s original announcement postponing registration stated only that it would be “implementing certain changes,” without explaining those changes. Judge Ohta continued:
“Here, the State Department does not even attempt to argue in its briefing that it has articulated a reasoned basis for its indefinite suspension of the 2027 lottery registration period. The State Department also offered no reason as to why the temporary postponement announced in November 2025 turned into an indefinite suspension extending into the start of fiscal year 2027—a decision that effectively canceled the 2027 Diversity Visa Program because no applicant may apply for a Diversity Visa without first registering to be selected in the lottery. Because the State Department has provided no explanation for its actions, including whether it considered the reliance interests of those affected by its decision, the Court can only conclude that its suspension of the 2027 Diversity Visa Program was arbitrary and capricious.” (citations omitted; emphasis added.)
The government appealed. On Oct. 21, Judge Ohta denied its request to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. Her amended injunction, issued the same day, required the Department to announce registration dates by Oct. 29, open a 30-day registration period by Nov. 1, and notify selected entrants by Dec. 3, subject to a possible extension of the notification deadline.
