Russia’s Strikes on Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure as a Crime Against Humanity

Abstract

In October 2026, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded that Russia’s strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure constitute both the war crime of attacking civilian objects and the crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts.” This article briefly surveys the war crimes the attacks implicate and then examines, element by element under the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes, whether that crime against humanity has been committed. It concludes that it has, with respect to strikes on civilian heat and power facilities that do not qualify as military objectives, and that the Commission reached the correct result.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The War Crimes

Crimes Against Humanity

The Elements in Context

Who Is Responsible?

Concluding Thoughts

Introduction

Russia’s campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which supplies electricity and heat, has entered its fifth winter. Overnight strikes on Nov. 7-8 on energy facilities left more than 600,000 residents in the Dnipropetrovsk region without electricity as winter temperatures approached freezing.[1] The campaign has intensified every winter since it began in October 2022. Last winter, as temperatures fell below 0 degrees F, Russian strikes reduced thermal capacity to 30% in the hardest-hit areas. A single attack in January disabled three of Kyiv’s five combined heat and power plants, leaving most households in the region without power or heat.[2]

On Oct. 26, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, which was established by the Human Rights Council in 2022, submitted its latest report (dated Oct. 19) to the General Assembly’s Third Committee.[3] The report concluded that Russian authorities have committed the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects and the crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts.”[4]

It is self-evident that the Russian attacks constitute war crimes on various grounds. But the crime against humanity finding is significant, for in 2023, the Commission found only that the attacks “may have amounted” to that international crime.[5] The 2026 report makes that conclusion definitive. It also brings the Commission into line with the International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber, which in 2024 found reasonable grounds to believe that four senior Russian officials had committed that very crime.[6]

But the characterization merits deeper legal unpacking than was possible in the Commission’s report. Accordingly, after briefly surveying the war crimes that the attacks likely constituted, I turn to the crime against humanity (there are numerous types) that has been alleged. The critical issue is whether the Russian attacks satisfied each requisite element of that offense. As the report explains, the Commission members agreed that they did, although they did not detail how they reached that conclusion. Nevertheless, I believe their conclusion was sound, at least as to strikes on facilities that were not military objectives. In this piece, I explain why, and where the Commission’s reasoning falls somewhat short.

The War Crimes

At the outset, it is important to distinguish between (1) violations of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), committed by States through their organs, including the military, and (2) war crimes and crimes against humanity, which lead to individual criminal responsibility. In an earlier Articles of War piece published in October 2022, I addressed the former,[7] finding that at least some of the strikes violated LOAC under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I),[8] to which both belligerents are Party, and customary international law. Here, the issue is whether the attacks violate international criminal law, opening the door to prosecuting those involved.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court sets out the applicable law. The Court has jurisdiction even though Russia is not a Party, because it may try crimes committed on the territory of a State that has accepted its jurisdiction, whatever the nationality of the accused.[9] Ukraine did so by declaration in 2014 and 2015 and became a Party in 2025.[10] Accordingly, I rely heavily on that instrument in the discussion that follows. Note that when war crimes amount to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or of AP I, they are subject to universal jurisdiction – every Party to the treaties must search for alleged offenders, regardless of nationality, and either prosecute them or hand them over to another Party for trial.[11] Customary law also permits States, at their discretion, to prosecute other war crimes.[12] The prevailing view is that the same is true of crimes against humanity, and the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity would make prosecution or extradition mandatory when an alleged offender is present in a State’s territory.[13]

Attacks on Civilian Objects: Power stations often qualify as “military objectives,” but only if the facility struck makes an effective contribution to military action, and its neutralization offers the attacker a definite military advantage.[14] A facility that provides power to both the military (except in de minimis situations) and the civilian population is a so-called “dual-use” military objective. There is no question that this is the case with some of the Ukrainian power facilities that have been attacked. But there is equally no question that some of them do not serve military purposes, even by the permissive view of attacks taken by some States, most notably the United States.[15] Those attacks, as the Commission found, are unquestionably war crimes.[16]

Attacks on Civilians: The war crime of attacking civilians requires that the perpetrator intend those civilians “to be the object of the attack.”[17] It is not enough that the harm they suffer was foreseeable; that point bears on proportionality. However, attacking an object to injure or kill those who depend on it can make those individuals the object of attack. In this case, the Commission found an “intent of the Russian authorities to inflict harm to the civilian population.”[18] If true, and if the documented deaths from the cold were the product of attacks on civilian heat and power facilities, those attacks would equally qualify as a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute and as a grave breach under AP I, Article 85(3)(a), when they result in deaths or serious injury.[19]

Disproportionate Attacks: Strikes on military objectives are unlawful if the expected civilian harm, including foreseeable illness and death from the cold, is excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage of the attack.[20] In this regard, the expected incidental injury and death from striking an already degraded grid in winter are far greater than they were when Russia began such operations in 2022. Knowingly launching a disproportionate attack is a grave breach when it results in death or serious injury and a war crime under the Rome Statute when the expected harm is “clearly excessive” relative to the anticipated military advantage.[21] In its 2023 report, the Commission found that the Russian attacks qualified,[22] a position that finds support in the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court Pre-Trial Chamber in 2024.[23]

Terror Attacks: Attacks “the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population” are both violations of AP I[24] and constitute a customary law war crime.[25] In 2022, I found no conclusive evidence that terror was the primary purpose of the attacks, although it was certainly a consequence, likely one Russia was pleased with. However, the Ministry of Defense’s Aug. 14, 2026 Telegram message, “In winter you will freeze,” is a clear indication of that intent, as are the attacks’ increased scale and frequency in subsequent winters and the regular direct attacks on the Ukrainian civilian population. Although the Commission notes this statement,[26] it does not raise the issue of terror attacks; in my estimation, the Russian strikes should be characterized as terror attacks. As terror is not among the war crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute, prosecution as such would fall to other tribunals.

Reprisals: On Sept. 1, 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced, “The Russian Armed Forces have been given instructions to prepare and carry out massive strikes on Ukraine’s energy. They are striking us — they will get a response.”[27] AP I prohibits reprisals against civilians and civilian objects by Parties to the instrument.[28] Therefore, framing the attacks as a reprisal against Ukrainian attacks has no bearing on their characterization as war crimes.

Crimes Against Humanity

The Commission relied on Article 7 of the Rome Statute to conclude that those responsible committed a crime against humanity.[29] The Statute defines a crime against humanity as certain acts “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”[30] The enumerated acts include, inter alia, “[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”[31] The ILC’s Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, which are currently the basis for treaty negotiations, are in accord.[32]

Thus, crimes against humanity are two-tiered. The first tier, common to all such crimes, requires that the act be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. The second comprises elements of the act, here, “other inhumane act.” The ICC’s Elements of Crimes combines the two tiers for this particular offense.[33]

1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.

2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of the act.

4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.

5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.

The Elements in Context

The Commission’s reasoning with respect to the crime against humanity is provided in a single paragraph.[34] Although it mentions the scale, intent, plan, and suffering, those factors are not expressly linked to the aforementioned elements in the analysis. And on two points on which the case turns – whether the attack was “directed against” the civilian population and whether the acts are of a “similar character” to the enumerated offenses – its reasoning is arguably weak. Indeed, those are the very questions the Commission flagged in 2023, when it noted, “Further time and resources are needed to investigate the attacks to clarify whether their accumulated impact becomes comparable, as it might give their magnitude, to one of the enumerated acts of crimes against humanity, and the extent to which the policy was directed against the civilian population.”[35] Unfortunately, we cannot refer to the ICC warrants for the missing analysis, as they are not publicly available and its press releases announcing them are conclusory.[36]

I will address the contextual elements (Elements 4 and 5) first, because they determine whether there is a crime against humanity at all, and then those for the specific offense (Elements 1-3).

Widespread or Systematic Attack Directed Against a Civilian Population: Element 4 requires an “attack directed against any civilian population.” That phrase denotes “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 [here the acts of a similar character] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”[37] Here, the attack in question is not the entire four-year campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. That is because strikes on military objectives, even when in violation of the rule of proportionality, do not factor into the crime against humanity analysis (although a pattern of disproportionate strikes may be evidence that the population was the primary object, see below).[38] Rather, the attack to be considered consists only of those strikes on facilities that did not qualify as military objectives, most notably civilian heat and power facilities serving residential areas in winter.

There is no question that those operations amount to a “course of conduct,” as Russia has conducted waves of attacks since 2022 “using hundreds of drones and missiles at a time.”[39] As to the status of the targets, the Commission observed, “Considering the wide geographic spread of the attacks, their demonstrated consequences on the population over time, and the fact that some of the objects targeted have a civilian use, the Commission has concluded that the facilities targeted included objects that were not military objectives, but civilian.”[40] This is perhaps the weakest part of the report, one that could have been strengthened both in its analysis and given the factual record. It is not clear what import the Commission draws from the geographic spread of attacks, but that feature of the attacks has no bearing on whether specific power or heating facilities individually qualify as military objectives. Moreover, the “consequences on the population” appear to include incidental harm for proportionality purposes, not military objective status. And, most importantly, civilian use is part of the definition of a dual-use military objective; only when a facility does not qualify as a military objective does a strike on it form part of a “course of conduct.” The Commission’s conclusion that there were attacks that were appropriately considered in a crime against humanity analysis is correct because Russia has surely attacked energy infrastructure that did not qualify as military objectives. But the reasoning provided lacks the necessary legal and factual specificity.

The key question is whether those attacks were directed at the civilian population. In this regard, the civilian population must be the “primary object of the attack,” not merely incidental victims.[41] A population that is “predominantly civilian” qualifies, so the presence of soldiers in Ukrainian cities does not bar satisfaction of this requirement.[42] To determine whether an attack is directed at the civilian population, it is appropriate to consider such factors as “the means and method used in the course of the attack, the status of the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the nature of the crimes committed in its course, … and the extent to which the attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war,” in the words of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber.[43]

The Commission provides ample justification for finding that the strikes on civilian heat and power facilities were directed against the civilian population. For instance, it noted that in the winter of 2025-2026, Russian strikes “targeted plants crucial for the central heating system,” leaving “hundreds of thousands of households” without heating for “days or weeks during the coldest months.”[44] It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how facilities that provide heat to apartment blocks contribute effectively to military action, or how damaging them yields a definite military advantage. Moreover, weakening the population’s morale is clearly not a “definite military advantage” in the sense of the military objective definition. Combined with the Russian Ministry of Defence’s declaration that “[i]n winter you will freeze,”[45] this makes it difficult to reach any conclusion other than that the population was the primary target of strikes on civilian heat and power facilities.

This is where the role of accumulated effects, upon which the report focuses, matters. A single strike reveals little about purpose. But a pattern of strikes that intensifies “during cold periods, as the predictable impact of the damage on civilians manifested itself,” winter after winter, reveals much.[46] It is evidence of what the attacker was aiming at. The report would have benefited from stating this point directly, as well as noting the absence of any evidence that Russia took precautions to minimize harm to civilians.[47]

And given the number of strikes on civilian heat and power facilities and the pattern of striking them during winter, it is apparent that the Russian attacks were both widespread and systematic. Widespread refers to the “large-scale nature of the attack and the number of victims,” whereas systematic denotes “patterns of crimes – that is the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis.”[48] The Commission finds both, and rightly so.[49]

As noted in Article 7(2)(a), the attacks must also be in furtherance of a State or organizational policy, a point encompassed in Element 4.[50] It is clear that Russia has a policy of striking energy infrastructure. Indeed, on the first day of the large-scale strikes, President Putin announced that they were mounted “at the proposal of the Defence Ministry and in accordance with the plan of [the] General Staff.”[51] In its 2023 Report, the Commission left open “the extent to which the policy was directed against the civilian population.”[52] In the current Report, it finds that “[m]ultiple official declarations by the Russian authorities concerning the attacks, the existence of a plan for their commission, and the evolution of the modus operandi over four years, demonstrate that the attacks have been committed pursuant to a state policy to deprive civilians from essential energy supplies and cause suffering.”[53] The willingness to find a policy directed against the civilian population by 2026 can be explained by the pattern of the attacks, which include cold-weather intensification and the targeting of urban heating facilities. Combined with the Ministry of Defence’s “in winter you will freeze” statement, the policy appears unambiguous.

Finally, Element 5 requires knowledge of the attack. For those who planned and directed the strikes, or, as in Putin’s case, announced them, this element is self-evidently satisfied.

Inhumane Act: The remaining elements concern the specific offense. “Other inhumane acts” is a residual category of crimes against humanity. This begs the question of why the Commission did not instead focus on the specific crimes against humanity categories of murder or extermination, given the deaths from the cold.[54] Murder is plausible. Intent under the Statute includes awareness that a consequence “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”[55] Those planning midwinter strikes on civilian heat and power facilities could hardly have been unaware that civilians would die. The difficulty is evidentiary, for murder requires proof that particular strikes caused particular deaths, and the report documents deaths from the cold without attributing them to specific attacks.[56]

And extermination encompasses “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.”[57] The evidentiary record at present does not appear to establish an intent to inflict conditions calculated to destroy a particular part of the population. “Other inhumane acts” was therefore the right characterization.

Element 1 requires an inhumane act that inflicts great suffering or serious mental or bodily injury. Drawing on accounts from 255 people, the Report documents deaths from cold weather in homes and hospitals, as well as frostbite and hypothermia resulting from being in unheated residences, in most cases among the elderly living alone. Prolonged exposure to the temperatures caused many to develop other conditions, such as respiratory and cardiovascular illnesses, heart attacks, and strokes among people of all ages, including children. The elderly or those with reduced mobility, fearing they might be trapped in elevators during power cuts, remained in freezing apartments and could not reach shelter during air raids. The psychological toll was likewise severe. As one witness explained, “the scariest thing was to fall asleep and not to wake up; it was like torture to be scared of dying from cold.”[58]

Importantly, serious mental and bodily injury can be assessed in light of the attendant circumstances, which may include, for instance, “the nature of the act or omission, the context in which it occurred, the personal circumstances of the victim including age, sex, and health, and the physical, mental, and moral effects of the act or omission upon the victim.”[59] In this case, children and the elderly were at exceptional risk from the Russian attacks. It is likewise important to note that the fact that the harm suffered by the Ukrainian population resulted from a loss of power and heat instead of, for instance, blast and fragmentation, is irrelevant. The causal chain between the attacks and the harm is short, foreseeable, and obvious. The attacks undoubtedly qualified as inhumane acts.

Element 2 requires the act in question to be “of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1,” which contains the other offenses. “Character” refers to “the nature and gravity of the act”[60] and thus requires comparing the nature and gravity of the act – conducting attacks depriving the population of heat and power during winter – with murder, extermination, and torture. This is less a question of aggregating harm, which was addressed above vis-a-vis the “scale” aspect of the crime, than it is about the nature and gravity of harm suffered by individual victims. The Commission did not unpack the comparison, but it seems clear that the element is satisfied. Some victims died, which is the gravest harm the enumerated acts address. And extermination can occur through the deprivation of the necessities of life. There is no question that depriving humans of heat as temperatures plunged to below 0 degrees F is such a deprivation. And the harm to affected individuals, and to the civilian population as a collective, became ever more severe as the strikes caused longer and longer outages.

Finally, Element 3 requires that the perpetrator have been aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of the act. And Article 7(1)(k) requires that the suffering or injury be caused “intentionally,” that is, that the person “means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”[61] The Commission found that “the commanders ordering the attacks had the knowledge that the heating facilities that were targeted in large civilian agglomerations were indispensable to the civilian population, in particular during the winter,” and that in light of the “extensive public coverage,” the “perpetrators had ample knowledge about the suffering of the population.”[62] Although that finding related to the war crime of attacking civilian objects, it applies equally to the crime against humanity.

As to intent, it is self-evident that the deaths, exacerbation of medical conditions, and mental and bodily injury would result in the ordinary course of events from the attacks on civilian heat and power facilities in the middle of the winter.

Accordingly, with respect to strikes on facilities that did not qualify as military objectives, each element of the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts is satisfied. But crimes are committed by individuals, not States, which raises the question of who bears responsibility.

Who Is Responsible?

The Commission’s conclusion that “the Russian authorities have committed the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts” is somewhat imprecise, or at least could be much clearer to avoid some pitfalls.[63] War crimes and crimes against humanity are committed by individuals. As the International Law Commission has observed, “States themselves do not commit crimes.”[64] Russia’s responsibility is instead anchored in the law of State responsibility.[65] The conduct of its military forces is attributable to it,[66] and the strikes on civilian heat and power facilities breach, inter alia, the Additional Protocol I prohibition on attacking civilian objects.[67] They also breach, to the extent they apply extraterritorially, Russia’s human rights obligations, in particular its obligation to respect the right to life.[68] Based on these “internationally wrongful acts,” Russia is obliged to terminate the attacks and make full reparation to Ukraine.[69]

As to the individuals involved, criminal responsibility depends on the applicable mode of liability, an issue the Commission did not address. Under Article 25 of the Rome Statute, individuals may be held liable for committing an international crime, individually, jointly, or through another person; ordering, soliciting, or inducing a crime; aiding and abetting one; or for contributing to a crime’s commission by a group acting with a common purpose.[70] Military commanders are also subject to command responsibility for crimes committed by their forces when they “knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known” of them and failed to take “all necessary and reasonable measures” to put an end to them or pursue prosecution.[71]

In this regard, the ICC warrants for the former Defence Minister and senior Russian military officers are based on committing and ordering the offenses and on command responsibility.[72] Although Putin enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign national courts while a sitting head of State,[73] he does not enjoy that immunity before the ICC.[74] There is no question that other Russian officers are also subject to prosecution for their involvement in the attacks.

Concluding Thoughts

The Commission reached the correct result. Those Russian officials who planned, ordered, and oversaw the strikes on Ukraine’s civilian heat and power facilities have committed the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts, in addition to multiple war crimes. Each element of that crime against humanity is satisfied. The strikes comprised a widespread and systematic attack directed against Ukraine’s civilian population pursuant to a Russian State policy, and the cold, illness, and death the operations have inflicted winter after winter amount to great suffering of a gravity comparable to the other crimes against humanity. Although the Commission’s legal reasoning could have been more fully developed, its conclusion rests on firm factual grounds and is consistent with that of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, which has already issued arrest warrants on the same basis.[75] As the campaign enters its fifth winter, the question is no longer how to characterize the unlawful Russian strikes, but instead how to hold those responsible accountable, whether before the ICC or in national courts exercising universal jurisdiction.

– – – – – – – –

  1. Russian Strikes Cut Power to Hundreds of Thousands in Ukraine, France 24 (Nov. 8, 2026). ↑
  2. Dominique Soguel, Their Power Grid Under Attack, Ukrainians Struggle with a Long, Cold Winter, Christian Sci. Monitor (Jan. 16, 2026); see also Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukr., Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukr., ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/81/440 (Oct. 19, 2026) (advance unedited version) [hereinafter 2026 Report] (reporting a 70 percent reduction in thermal power generation capacity in the most affected areas, according to Ukrainian authorities). ↑
  3. 2026 Report, supra note 2. ↑
  4. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. ↑
  5. Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukr., Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukr., ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/52/62 (2023) [hereinafter 2023 Report]. ↑
  6. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 33 n.9; see Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants Against Sergei Ivanovich Kobylash and Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov (Mar. 5, 2024) [hereinafter Kobylash and Sokolov Press Release]; Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants Against Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu and Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov (June 25, 2024) [hereinafter Shoigu and Gerasimov Press Release]. ↑
  7. Michael N. Schmitt, Attacking Power Infrastructure Under International Humanitarian Law, Articles of War (Oct. 20, 2022). ↑
  8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. ↑
  9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(2)(a), (3), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. ↑
  10. See Situation in Ukraine, Int’l Crim. Ct. ↑
  11. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 146–147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; AP I, supra note 8, art. 85(1). ↑
  12. 1 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law r. 157 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study]. ↑
  13. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, arts. 7(2), 10, in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/10, ch. IV (2019) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. ↑
  14. AP I, supra note 8, art. 52(2). ↑
  15. Off. of Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Department of Defense Law of War Manual § 5.6.8.5 (updated July 2023) [hereinafter DoD Manual]. ↑
  16. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(ii); 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 32. ↑
  17. Int’l Crim. Ct., Elements of Crimes art. 8(2)(b)(i), element 3 (2013) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes]. ↑
  18. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 33. ↑
  19. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(i); AP I, supra note 8, art. 85(3)(a). ↑
  20. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(5)(b); DoD Manual, supra note 15, § 5.12. ↑
  21. AP I, supra note 8, art. 85(3)(b); Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). ↑
  22. 2023 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 43. ↑
  23. Shoigu and Gerasimov Press Release, supra note 6; Kobylash and Sokolov Press Release, supra note 6. ↑
  24. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(2); DoD Manual, supra note 15, § 5.2.2. ↑
  25. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 86–98 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006). ↑
  26. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 7. ↑
  27. Id. ↑
  28. AP I, supra note 8, arts. 51(6), 52(1). ↑
  29. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 33 n.9. ↑
  30. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1). ↑
  31. Id. art. 7(1)(k). ↑
  32. Draft Articles, supra note 13, art. 2 & cmt. ↑
  33. Elements of Crimes, supra note 17, art. 7(1)(k). ↑
  34. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 33. ↑
  35. 2023 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 43. ↑
  36. See Shoigu and Gerasimov Press Release, supra note 6; Kobylash and Sokolov Press Release, supra note 6. ↑
  37. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(a). ↑
  38. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, ¶¶ 132–133. ↑
  39. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 6. ↑
  40. Id., ¶ 31. ↑
  41. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 143 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 421 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). ↑
  42. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, ¶ 144. ↑
  43. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 91 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002); see also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 153 (Mar. 21, 2016). ↑
  44. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 12. ↑
  45. Id. ¶ 7. ↑
  46. Id. ¶ 33. ↑
  47. On precautions in attack, see AP I, supra note 8, art. 57; CIHL Study, supra note 12, r. 15. ↑
  48. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, ¶ 94. ↑
  49. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 33. ↑
  50. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(a); see also Draft Articles, supra note 13, art. 2(2)(a). But see Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, ¶ 98 (finding that a plan or policy is not a legal element of crimes against humanity under customary international law). ↑
  51. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 29. ↑
  52. 2023 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 43. ↑
  53. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 33. ↑
  54. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1)(a)–(b). ↑
  55. Id. art. 30(2)(b). ↑
  56. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 19. ↑
  57. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(b). ↑
  58. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶¶ 9, 19–28. ↑
  59. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, ¶ 154. ↑
  60. Elements of Crimes, supra note 17, art. 7(1)(k) n.30. ↑
  61. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 30(2)(b). ↑
  62. 2026 Report, supra note 2, ¶ 32. ↑
  63. Id. ¶ 33. ↑
  64. Draft Articles, supra note 13, art. 3 cmt. ¶ 2. ↑
  65. Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, annex (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA]. ↑
  66. Id. art. 4. ↑
  67. AP I, supra note 8, art. 52(1). ↑
  68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. ↑
  69. ARSIWA, supra note 65, arts. 1, 30–31; AP I, supra note 8, art. 91. ↑
  70. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 25(3)(a)–(d). ↑
  71. Id. art. 28(a). ↑
  72. Shoigu and Gerasimov Press Release, supra note 6; Kobylash and Sokolov Press Release, supra note 6. ↑
  73. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 51 (Feb. 14). ↑
  74. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 27(2). ↑
  75. Kobylash and Sokolov Press Release, supra note 6; Shoigu and Gerasimov Press Release, supra note 6; see also Iryna Marchuk, Justice for Victims of Missile Attacks in Ukraine: New ICC Arrest Warrants for Russian Top Military Commanders, Opinio Juris (Mar. 15, 2024). ↑

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