What to Look for in Thursday’s ICJ Judgment on Genocide

On Thursday morning, at 10:00 a.m. Hague time, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will hand down its much-anticipated judgment in a case that The Gambia brought against Myanmar for atrocities committed against Myanmar’s minority Muslim population, the Rohingya, under the Genocide Convention. With the judgment likely to run well over a hundred pages, the following provides journalists and others trying to understand the case a quick orientation on what to watch for.

Bottom Line Up Front: Did Myanmar commit genocide?

Since it began operations 80 years ago, the ICJ has rendered only two judgments under the Genocide Convention in which one state has accused another of committing genocide. These judgments decided cases brought against Serbia by Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007) and by Croatia (2015). In neither case did the ICJ conclude that Serbia was responsible for committing genocide (although in the 2007 judgment it found Serbia responsible for failing to prevent genocide). If the Court makes a final determination that Myanmar was responsible for genocide, it will be the first time that the ICJ has reached such a conclusion about a UN Member State.

In the weeds: Assessing Specific Intent

What is specific intent?

Specific intent (or, in its Latin form, dolus specialis) is the mental state that must accompany the acts of genocide, in order for the crime of genocide to occur. The evidence must show not only that the perpetrator committed some or all of the “acts of genocide” against the targeted group – such as killing, serious bodily or mental harm, inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, or forcibly transferring children from the group to another group – but also that those acts were done “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part” the targeted group. (If such acts are undertaken without that specific mental state, they may well still constitute other serious international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, including the crime against humanity of extermination, or war crimes, but just not genocide).

By the time a genocide case reaches this stage of proceedings before almost any court, there is usually an abundance of evidence to show that acts of genocide have been committed – and that is true in this case also. But evidence of such acts will not lead to a conclusion that genocide has been committed unless the Court is also convinced that these acts were done with the requisite specific intent.

What makes specific intent a flashpoint in this case?

Two reasons: the first is legal – the difficult question is about how to infer intent in this case, the second is political – namely, what the approach to inferring intent in this case might mean for pending and future genocide cases. At present, the ICJ is seized of four additional cases involving the Genocide Convention – DRC v. Rwanda, Ukraine v. Russia, South Africa v. Israel (in relation to Gaza), and Nicaragua v. Germany (also in relation to Gaza).

Beginning with the legal issue: Perpetrators of genocide rarely go around announcing their genocidal intent. In the absence of a verbal or written state policy to commit genocide, the Court is likely to have to rely on indirect evidence to infer intent. In many ways, this is not a situation unique to genocide; in U.S. domestic courts, juries are routinely asked to infer the mental state of a defendant from circumstantial evidence. Yet when ICJ judges must take on this task, the question of what circumstantial evidence they should consider, and how they should use that evidence to draw an inference about specific intent, is something they must articulate.

The paucity of past genocide cases at the ICJ has led lawyers to puzzle over the fragments of guidance set out by the Court in its 2007 case and reiterated in its 2015 case. Confusion over the issue led 10 states (Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, the U.K,, the DRC, Belgium, Ireland, and Slovenia) to lodge written submissions to the Court, arguing for different interpretations of the Court’s prior language.

Turning to the political realm, the interventions of these States cannot be divorced from the broader political context facing the Court, which also has the genocide case that South Africa has brought against Israel alleging genocide in Gaza. Interested parties on all sides will be aware that whatever the Court says in the Myanmar case will portend the approach of the Court to inferring intent. This is what accounts for the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, recently taking to social media on the topic:

“The ICJ must not be allowed to lower the legal threshold for proving genocide so that weakened and false standard can later be weaponized against American and allied soldiers whenever they raise a finger against terrorists that hide behind civilians.”

In the Weeds: Evidentiary Value of UN reports

Why is this an issue?

The ICJ judges do not do their own fact-finding and, unlike in many domestic courts, there is little in the way of evidentiary rules to screen out potential evidence in advance of it being brought into the courtroom. The judges review what the parties submit to them and make their own assessments of the probative value of that evidence.

In this case, The Gambia has relied heavily on evidence gathering by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, a three-member body of experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council. Myanmar claims that the UN mission is an unreliable source of evidence.

In its previous genocide cases that reached this stage, the ICJ had the benefit of being able to look to evidence vetted in criminal trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as well as the conclusions drawn by that tribunal. In this case though, there have been no criminal proceedings on the question of genocide in Myanmar that the ICJ can draw on. This makes the judges’ determinations about the probative value of the UN fact finding mission – and the weight to give it, so crucial in this case.

Finally, as with the other flashpoint in this case, there is a broader political context in play. Here again, the Court’s approach to assessing evidence developed by a UN mission will be read as a signal of how it is likely to assess similarly developed reporting on Gaza.

* * *

Thursday marks almost exactly seven years to the day that The Gambia instituted proceedings against Myanmar in The Hague. There is much to anticipate for this area of international law, but the most important part of Thursday’s decision is what it will mean to the Rohingya on whose behalf these proceedings were brought.

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