In recent weeks, thousands of Salvadoran troops have descended on Haiti in a sudden deployment ostensibly to counter the island nation’s gangs. They now outnumber the United Nations-authorized force. Initially presented as a rescue mission to recover four missing Salvadoran technicians, El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, is now casting himself as a strongman with a solution to Haiti’s intractable gang crisis.
This raises urgent questions about how Haitians’ human rights will be protected and who will answer for any abuses and civilian harms caused by the Salvadoran military. More broadly, it entrenches a security model in Haiti beyond legal constraints and U.N. guardrails, making Haiti a new frontline in the erosion of the rules-based international order.
A Complex Crisis
Bukele’s troops are entering a deep governance, security, and humanitarian crisis that has been building for decades and was hastened by the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Armed groups have amassed and maintained power through collusion with state actors, and powerful elites that have long benefited from the support of the international community. These groups control significant territory through violent extortion and brutal assaults. The insecurity has spurred the worst humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere — approximately 1.5 million people are internally displaced and more than half of Haitians need immediate humanitarian assistance.
U.N.-authorized stabilization missions have been in Haiti for most of the past 22 years, but Bukele’s deployment is the latest move away from U.N.-grounded security missions whose mandates and safeguards constrained the use of force and promised accountability, at least on paper. But the longest-running mission, MINUSTAH, became embroiled in accountability scandals related to use of excessive force, sexual exploitation and abuse, and the introduction of a devastating cholera epidemic. In October 2023, the United States co-authored a resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council for a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission that would operate outside of U.N. oversight and accountability. When that severely underfunded mission failed to deliver, the United States pushed the Security Council in September 2025 to authorize an unprecedented Gang Suppression Force. The Force operates under its own command with an aggressive mandate to kill gangs. Like the controversial structure of the Trump administration’s “Board of Peace” in Gaza, the Gang Suppression Force for Haiti pilots a new model of U.N.-sanctioned operations governed by a small group of States outside of U.N. frameworks. The Force’s structure and militarized mandate have sparked criticism that it won’t be able to protect civilians, strengthen Haitian authorities’ capacity, or address the actual causes of the crisis.
More than a year into the Gang Suppression Force’s mandate, approximately 2,000 troops out of the envisioned 5,000 have deployed to Haiti. The troops draw from a number of countries, with Chad contributing the largest contingent, and smaller contributions coming from Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Mongolia. The Salvadoran technicians ambushed on Oct. 18 were in the country as part of the original Salvadoran contribution to the Gang Suppression Force.
An Operation Above the Law?
Over the course of just 12 days, Bukele’s unilateral deployment has surpassed the entire Gang Suppression Force. Of the 2,500 troops deployed to date under the new Salvadoran offensive, only 200 are part of the Gang Suppression Force. This places the majority outside even the limited guardrails of the Force, including the requirement that States “strictly adher[e] to all international law,” and the compliance and oversight mechanisms meant to “prevent, investigate, address and publicly report violations or abuses of human rights” by troops.
While the Haitian government belatedly clarified that the Salvadoran troops are in Haiti with its consent, the agreement or terms of engagement are not public. This leaves many basic questions unanswered, including the operation’s scope of mandate, duration, objectives, command structure, and rules of engagement. The opacity heightens the prospects that human rights abuses will occur and Haitians will not get the security assistance they need.
That risk is especially concerning given Bukele’s human rights record. Under El Salvador’s prolonged “state of exception,” human rights groups have documented mass arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture, and due-process violations, all justified as a response to gangs. Security has come at the cost of a stunning crackdown on civil liberties and unchecked powers for Bukele, who appears to be exporting this model to Haiti.
On the ground in Haiti, the security operations are already taking a civilian toll. In Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, where the four Salvadorans disappeared and operations are now concentrated, about 2,000 people have already been displaced by the clashes, while others are trapped between gangs and the armed response. In the first week of El Salvador’s operations, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported treating 30 people, including women and children, injured by gunfire or drone explosions at its area hospitals. MSF called on all parties to spare civilians and ensure access to healthcare facilities for all. Just a week later, the nonprofit healthcare provider Zanmi Lasante reported that its facilities in Santo had sustained significant material damage during the armed clashes. The total number of civilian casualties is unknown.
International Law Requires Strict Protections
To prevent further harm, the operations must comply with international law. Human rights law permits force only when necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim, and intentional lethal force only when strictly unavoidable to protect life from an imminent threat.
The Salvadoran deployment also adds to the argument that the situation in Haiti has reached the level of an armed conflict, meaning operations must comply with the laws of war. In a non-international armed conflict (“NIAC”), “all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities” require protection, as do civilian objects. Parties must take feasible precautions – including verifying intelligence before an attack, choosing weapons that reduce risk, and issuing advance warnings to civilians in targeted areas. Moreover, international law explicitly prohibits “belligerent reprisals” for another party’s unlawful conduct, meaning the gangs’ assault against the Salvadoran technicians does not justify a widespread attack on civilians. Serious violations of these rules may amount to war crimes.
For Haitians desperate for security, Bukele’s strong show of force may have some appeal. But a deployment with no clearly defined objectives, legal basis, or end date is not a path to lasting security. If it succeeds in suppressing gangs in the short term, there is grave risk of repeat brutal retaliation against civilians once it withdraws. In the long term, operating beyond clear legal and accountability frameworks risks deepening the impunity and institutional fragility that have helped drive Haiti’s crisis.
Implications Beyond Haiti
The Salvadoran surge into Haiti deals another blow to the fragile rules-based international order.
First, the Salvadoran deployment undermines the prospects that the Gang Suppression Force will comply with international law, a key requirement of its mandate necessary for its success. Rather than reinforce the Force’s struggling but methodical approach focused on reclaiming territory, seizing weapons, and providing support to the Haitian police, the Salvadoran deployment shifts the operational landscape into a more kinetic and volatile one: security force clashes and drone strikes have reportedly increased by 46 percent since the start of the deployment. These hardline operations make the Force’s strategy – and the role of international law – harder to sustain. In the eyes of Haitians, overlapping operations may also be difficult to distinguish, obscuring responsibility for civilian harm and allowing abuses by one force to undermine confidence in the other. If the Gang Suppression Force fails, it will further erode an already shaky confidence in the Security Council and U.N.-authorized responses.
Second, as we argue in a recent report, the deployment reinforces a broader shift away from international crisis response rooted in multilateral institutions constrained by international law, toward a security-first model that treats coercive power as the measure of success. Certainly, the global post-World War II order has never fully ensured that interventions are neutral or consistently respectful of sovereignty. But its central premise is that intervention should be governed by common rules – not by the ambitions of individual strongmen.
Haiti is now a testing ground for the new security-first model: in addition to the Gang Suppression Force, the Haitian government has contracted Vectus Global, a private military company run by Blackwater founder Erik Prince with U.S. defense services export licenses, to support a government task force’s counter-gang drone operations. The explosive drones already have caused severe casualties, including killing children at a birthday party.
Bukele’s deployment escalates that trend and makes it easier to obfuscate. Deadly operations have surged. And while the Vectus-supported task force tests drone systems, the Salvadorans test “armed robot dogs,” which might mark the first deployment of this new technology. U.S. President Donald Trump’s apparent blessing and logistical support only reinforce the perception that powerful States and individuals can bypass multilateral constraints in the name of security. Each such intervention moves the world further from an order in which international law constrains the use of force.
Finally, the deployment risks making accountability for international law violations even further out of reach. The Salvadorans’ opaque mandate and chain of command only complicate efforts to establish responsibility for violations. Even where responsibility can be established, access to remedies is unlikely in practice: Haiti’s justice system is under severe strain, and victims have no clear route to pursue claims against Salvadoran authorities or troops. Without explicit accountability mechanisms, legal obligation will not translate into recourse, further eroding the rule of law.
What Must Happen Now
To prevent these outcomes, States must act to protect compliance with international law. Haitian authorities should publish the agreement governing the Salvadoran deployment, including its mandate, objectives, duration, command structures, and rules for the use of force. They should clarify how the troops coordinate with Haitian security forces and how accountability will be ensured.
The U.N. Security Council and the leadership of the Gang Suppression Force should similarly press for transparency and adherence to international law throughout all operations in Haiti. To avoid a further spiral into lawlessness, the Security Council should use the full extent of its powers to ensure the Gang Suppression Force complies with its own international law mandate and implements its human rights oversight mechanism without delay, before the mandate comes up for renewal in March 2027. It should also support accountability for rights violations in Haiti by all actors, including El Salvador. Internationally unlawful conduct should not be tolerated from any actor.
Haitians need and deserve security. But a unilateral deployment with a murky and unaccountable mandate is not a durable answer to the crisis. If this operation is to help rather than hurt, those responsible must explain what the troops are there to do — and show how they will answer for what they do.








