Almost a year has passed since the ceasefire in Gaza took effect, however there has been little progress toward peace: Israel has expanded its control over the territory versus withdrawn its forces, and Hamas hasn’t given up its weapons. Despite these conditions, the Board of Peace, which was created to oversee the ceasefire, announced last week a $2.4 billion recovery plan to rebuild Gaza.
A key component of the U.S.-backed plan is to create a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. On Nov. 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council welcomed the establishment of the Board of Peace and authorized the Board and Member States working with it to establish a temporary ISF in Gaza. Before the Security Council vote, the U.S. representative stated that the ISF “will deploy under a unified command to secure Gaza’s streets, oversee demilitarization, protect civilians and escort aid through safe corridors – ‘all while Israel phases out its presence and a vetted Palestinian police force takes on a new role.’” Although a handful of countries have volunteered to provide troops for the ISF, it has yet to deploy inside Gaza.
The establishment of the Board of Peace and its intent to send an international force into Gaza shares certain similarities with the situation in Iraq in 2003. There, a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established, and charged with exercising the powers of the [Iraqi] government temporarily; otherwise described as “running the occupation of Iraq.” Instead of international troops, the CPA relied predominantly upon American and British forces to execute its orders, including protecting civilians. In contrast to the Security Council resolution that recognized the CPA, UNSCR 2803 (2025), the resolution authorizing the Board of Peace, is effectively silent on the issue of occupation. However, if it looks like a duck…
This article considers (some of) the obligations that the Board of Peace and the ISF must fulfill with respect to the civilian population of Gaza, according to the Geneva Conventions. To do so, it takes a snapshot of Geneva Convention (IV) (GC (IV)), specifically Part III: Status and treatment of protected persons, Section I: Provision common to the territories of the parties to the conflict and to occupied territories, and the associated text of the revised Commentary. In conducting this analysis, I draw on my expertise in civilian protection, including as a member of the Editorial Committee that supported the development of the revised Commentary to GC (IV), although the opinions set out here are entirely my own.
Occupation of Gaza?
Under the GC (IV), one factor in determining which parties bear responsibility for civilian protection is whether, as a matter of international law, they are considered to be “occupying” the relevant territory.
The Commentary to Article 29 sets out:
A State will also be responsible for the treatment of protected persons in situations of occupation by proxy, where it exercises effective control over a territory indirectly through its overall control of local authorities or organized armed groups.
Moreover, when multiple States are involved in an occupation, otherwise described as effective control of local authorities by a multinational legal entity, the Commentary sets out:
…several States may be classified as Occupying Powers…Pursuant to Article 29, each of those States bears responsibility for the treatment accorded by its agents to protected persons who find themselves in the occupied territory.
The Security Council described the Board of Peace as a
…transitional administration with international legal personality that will set the framework…for the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan…until such time as the Palestinian Authority (PA) has satisfactorily completed its reform program…and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza.
The Board is chaired by President Donald Trump and includes an Administration-heavy Executive and an eclectic mix of ‘Founding Nations’. Other nations decided not to join the Board, including Australia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The focus of the Board of Peace is on the redevelopment of Gaza and to support the reform of the Palestinian Authority to enable it to effectively take control of Gaza. The Comprehensive Plan’s only reference to “occupation” is an assertion that “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza” (Annex 1, para. 16). However, the Board of Peace is effectively charged with exercising governmental powers over Gaza in the absence of any other effective form of government. As such, if its plan is implemented, the Board could reasonably be described as “running the occupation of Gaza.”
The architects of this plan would likely aver that the Board’s constituent parties are not and were not parties to the conflict that has raged in Gaza since October 2023. Nevertheless, where the Board exercises effective control over Gaza, by overseeing and supervising an “apolitical Palestinian committee,” it appears to satisfy the provisions of Article 29.
International Stabilization Force (ISF)
The grunt work of stabilizing the security environment in Gaza, by “ensuring the demilitarization of the Gaza strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of the military, terror and offensive infrastructure etc,” will vest with the ISF (para. 7). As a veteran of the 2003 Iraq conflict, it is difficult not to draw comparisons between the outlined objectives of the ISF and the tasks given to the troops on the ground in Iraq by the CPA. In practice, their activities might look like security patrols to maintain law and order amongst an increasingly desperate and deprived civilian population; and the demilitarization of armed groups who may be increasingly reluctant to hand over their weapons without security guarantees or, instead, intend on retaining some or all of their weapons in order to dominate their territory and challenge the control of others.
The governments of troop-contributing nations will inevitably object to the ISF being described as an occupying force. Nevertheless, when executing the orders of the Board or carrying out its own tasks, the commanders of the ISF would do well to heed the text of Part III of Geneva Convention (IV), which outlines rules for an occupying power, and to obtain robust legal advice regarding occupied territory and the treatment of protected persons.
Among the ISF’s core international law obligations are the humane treatment of protected persons and adhering to the prohibition against collective punishment.
Humane Treatment of Protected Persons
Pursuant to Article 27, protected persons, who include civilians, prisoners of war, and the sick or wounded, among others, “shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof against insults and public curiosity.”
Post-conflict operations often witness some form of security vacuum and internecine fighting as acrimony and resentment translates into violence. During this phase, ensuring the humane treatment of protected persons can seem to be an insurmountable challenge. From a military perspective, this is where leadership comes to the fore. Commanders must reinforce the fundamental obligation of humane treatment. Any suggestion of targeting particular groups or exacting revenge on a former adversary must be resisted. In the fog of war that may linger during the transition period, where there is doubt as to the meaning or extent of humane treatment, the Commentary to Article 27 provides invaluable explanation and example.
Mention of “compassionate or benevolent” treatment should resonate with many, including the most single-minded warfighter. The Commentary explains that the meaning of humane treatment is “context-specific and has to be considered in the concrete circumstances of each case, taking into account both objective and subjective elements.”
There is an emphasis upon treatment that “respects a person’s inherent dignity as a human being” with specific mention made of protected persons in occupied territory being provided with “adequate food and drinking water, clothing and medical care.” The Comprehensive Plan includes the provision of “full aid” being immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. As articulated by the Commentary, there is an obligation to provide humanitarian aid to protected persons in so far as humane treatment “often requires positive action,” where omissions, either deliberate or otherwise, “may constitute inhumane treatment.”
Prohibition of Collective Punishment Against Protected Persons
Maintaining effective control in a post-conflict environment, especially when conflict has created a situation of significant deprivation and trauma, is extremely challenging. One cannot expect the civilian population to greet a “peace-keeping” or stabilization force with open arms. This is particularly the case when the civilian population has been or perceives itself to have been besieged and denied humanitarian aid. Provocations or challenges to the authority of the ISF should be anticipated and planned for appropriately. However, the way in which the force conducts itself can set the foundation for future success.
When the ISF encounters a provocation, irrespective of its nature, the GC (IV) absolutely prohibits collective punishment. As the Commentary identifies, Hugo Grotius stressed “no one who is innocent of wrong may be punished for the wrong done by another.” Punishments are limited to offenses “personally committed” by the protected person in question. It is not acceptable to impose a punishment on a group of protected persons where the offender of a “particular violation cannot be determined or prosecuted.” To do so would defy “one of the fundamental guarantees of humane treatment.”
Where the ISF is tasked with the protection of civilians, its greatest threat may be those very same civilians. If conditions for protected persons, i.e. the civilian population, do not improve in short-order, relief can rapidly transition to frustration, then hostility and aggression. When these frustrations are exploited by armed groups, the troops on the ground become the target. Despite these provocations, it is imperative that the fundamental protections set out in Part III of GC (IV) are observed.
The Comprehensive Plan envisions the demilitarization of Gaza, with Hamas no longer having a role in the governance of Gaza and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawing based on “standards, milestones and timeframes…that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States…” (Annex 1, para. 16).
In addition to small-scale or individualized provocations, the ISF and the Board of Peace should be prepared for factions within Gaza to resist demilitarization in more organized ways, especially when the situation on the ground can be exploited to their advantage.
Again, how the ISF responds is critical. Faced by otherwise unlawful acts of an adversary, the ISF might be inclined to resort to belligerent reprisals or countermeasures as a means of enforcement. As the Commentary sets out, “Historically, injured States resorted to reprisals as a self-help or self-protection measure.”
Where reprisals are carried out with the aim of putting an end to a violation by a Party to a conflict, i.e. to induce an adversary to comply with the law, they may be considered lawful. However, the Commentary to Article 33(3) makes clear that reprisals or countermeasures “may not be directed against persons protected under the present Convention and against their property.”
As a result, if the ISF is compelled to respond to factions that have resisted demilitarization, any countermeasures will necessarily have to be precise and discriminate in order to avoid harming protected persons. This is challenging enough in “typical” urban conflict zones. However, noting the destruction of much of Gaza and the difficulty in distinguishing civilians from armed groups, organized or otherwise, the challenge is magnified.
It Never Goes as Planned
If President Trump is to be believed, it will not be long before an international force is on the ground controlling Gaza. If and when it does deploy, the ISF and the Board of Peace must be prepared for challenges against their authority. Operating in a complex environment, the ISF will likely face provocations and resistance from a population that is under humanitarian strain. Nevertheless, the imperative must be that the ISF and the Board of Peace act in accordance with international humanitarian law obligations to protected persons. Many of these obligations are in place precisely because of the challenges faced by civilian populations in such situations.
While the specific challenges the ISF may confront will vary in executing the Gaza peace plan, those responsible for civilian protection must ensure that calm heads prevail and should keep a copy of Geneva Convention (IV) and Commentary close at hand.
