Days before 2,600 human rights defenders, technologists, and policymakers were expected in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 30 and with 1,100 more expected to join them online, the Zambian government called off RightsCon, the world’s largest conference on digital rights. According to the summit’s organizers, the cancellation was due to foreign interference from China “because Taiwanese civil society participants were planning to join us in person.” In a follow-on press statement, the Zambian government said the “postponement” was necessary to ensure alignment with “national values” and “broader public interest considerations,” language that many read as a coded reference to avoiding topics sensitive to Beijing. On the face of it, Zambia’s decision appeared to be a case of Chinese coercion compelling the government to change course. But a closer look reveals a more complicated picture linked to Zambia’s democratic decline.
China’s Far-Reaching Influence in Zambia
China’s economic influence in Zambia is extensive and deeply entrenched, a point reinforced by data. Copper exports dominate Zambia’s economy, generating almost 80 percent of the country’s foreign-exchange earnings, and China is embedded throughout the value chain that moves copper from the ground to global markets. As such, Beijing is Zambia’s largest official creditor, owed $5.7billion, with the debt continuing to grow. The Chinese government reports that bilateral trade reached $7.6 billion in 2025, a 13.6 percent year-on-year jump, with China absorbing more than $5.6 billion of Zambian exports, primarily copper. Starting in December 2024, China reduced tariffs on all Zambian products to zero, a concession that deepens Zambia’s structural dependence on the relationship.
China does not just buy Zambia’s copper, it digs it. China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation announced a $1.3 billion investment in 2023 alone, with cumulative investment in Zambian mining already at $1.5 billion. In 2024, the Chinese Mining Enterprise Association committed $5 billion by 2031 to help Zambia reach its copper production targets.
And copper is not the only area where Zambia exhibits dependence on China. In the energy sector, China has invested more than $2.3 billion building hydroelectric stations, solar plants, and transmission lines. Just in April, Zambia secured a $1.5 billion investment from China Machinery Engineering Corporation to boost electricity generation by 900 megawatts. That comes on top of a $3.5 billion power purchase agreement signed in 2023 between Zambia’s national power utility and China’s Integrated Clean Energy Power Company, as well as the completion in 2025 of Zambia’s largest grid-connected solar plant by PowerChina International Group.
Even in a sector like healthcare, a field traditionally dominated by the United States, China has made notable gains in Zambia. It financed the expansion of the Levy Mwanawasa University Teaching Hospital to 1,200 beds from 250, and when cholera killed more than 700 Zambians in 2023 and 2024, Lusaka turned to Beijing for emergency support. In 2024, the two countries signed a paired-hospital cooperation mechanism, establishing specialist clinical partnerships, with China donating medical equipment. The Chinese government reported at the time that 25 medical teams sent to Zambia over the years had diagnosed and treated 6.4 million patients and performed more than 39,000 operations. For a country where public health infrastructure remains stretched, these are important moves.
When a single country serves as the largest creditor, mining operator, power generator, hospital developer, and the builder of its premier conference venue (the Mulungushi International Conference Center, where RightsCon was due to be held, was financed by a $30 million grant from Beijing), the extent of Chinese influence is unmistakable.
However, solely focusing on China’s coercion captures only part of the story.
Zambia’s Troubling Democracy Record
When President Hakainde Hichilema took power in 2021, ending seven years of democratic deterioration under Zambia’s previous head of state, Edgar Lungu, there was hope that he would govern as a reformer and institute changes that would entrench respect for rights and the rule of law. At first, he seemed to follow through on these promises, abolishing repressive legislation, such as the country’s notorious defamation statute as well as its death penalty. But public discontent with his administration began to increase, owing in part to rising prices and high unemployment, causing Hichilema to reverse course. As Human Rights Foundation research fellow Wiriranai Brilliant Masara wrote last year in the Journal of Democracy, “Hichilema chose to consolidate power, and civil society groups that once celebrated his rise began sounding the alarm over shrinking civic space.”
With general elections now scheduled for August, repression in Zambia has intensified. Hichilema has increasingly weaponized the colonial-era Public Order Act of 1955 to restrict public gatherings such as protests. Reports have described arrests of opposition figures and critics exercising free expression and assembly, restrictions on opposition rallies, and ruling party supporters brandishing weapons at peaceful gatherings. Journalists in particular face growing pressure. The government has targeted prominent investigative reporter Thomas Zgambo, who as of December 2024 had been arrested three times in 13 months for publishing stories officials consider overly critical. Authorities also have sanctioned the “storming” of radio stations to intimidate broadcasters and brought a surge of defamation, libel, and sedition charges to suppress unfavorable coverage.
Also problematic, in 2025, Hichilema enacted two new laws, the Cyber Security Act and the Cyber Crimes Act, focused on cyber resilience, protecting critical information infrastructure, and curbing digital crime. While the measures addressed some legitimate concerns, critics noted that the government’s interpretation could turn them into tools for suppressing digital rights, thereby coming into conflict with RightsCon’s commitment to protecting online expression and digital privacy. (Organizers selected Zambia as the conference site in 2024, when its democracy appeared comparatively healthier; they coordinated with government officials “every step of the way” and signed an official MOU in 2025.)
Thus, many organizations saw the government’s handling of RightsCon as significant both for highlighting Chinese coercion as well as for underscoring Zambia’s own repressive direction. Groups such as the Africa Editors Forum called the cancellation “state pressure dressed as procedure” and warned that requiring a rights-focused convening to conform with “national values” would position the state as “the ultimate arbiter of acceptable speech.”
RightsCon would have placed Zambia’s record under intense international scrutiny just weeks before the official start of the election campaign (though arguably the cancelation essentially does the same and perhaps even more so). For a government in such a position, hosting the summit carried substantial risk. While China’s pressure is seen as the primary catalyst for RightsCon’s cancellation, Zambia’s anti-democratic drift should not be underestimated as a meaningful factor influencing the government’s decision.
Future Lessons
In the changing global order, China’s preferences and its willingness to throw around its weight matter more and more. From commodities to its investments in future technologies, its influence has become solidified. Moreover, Zambia represents just the tip of the iceberg; China’s investments and trading relationships with other African countries are even larger. In 2024, the five leading destinations for Chinese foreign direct investment on the continent were South Africa, Mozambique, Niger, Algeria, and Mauritius. On the debt side, Angola carries the highest loans from China by far, followed by Ethiopia, Kenya, and then Zambia. The questions raised by RightsCon’s cancellation are not unique to Lusaka. They are issues every African capital with a dependent relationship vis-a-vis Beijing will be forced to contend with.
But country context matters too. Democratic norms and governance shape to what extent political leaders will resist or comply with China’s requests. In a country like Zambia, where evidence of democratic erosion is well-documented, the government’s decision to call off RightsCon was disappointing but perhaps not surprising.
What then are the broader lessons for the global rights and democracy community? China’s growing influence, particularly in countries with democratic erosion trends, combined with Washington’s retreat from championing international values, creates conditions in which incidents like the RightsCon cancellation become more likely, not less. The convergence of Chinese structural influence and domestic democratic backsliding is not incidental. It is the terrain on which digital rights is being contested.
What happens next matters greatly. If governments across the continent observe that canceling a global civil society event, whether due to foreign pressure or domestic political calculation, carries minimal international consequences, the incentive to make similar decisions only grows. Conversely, if Zambia’s decision draws sustained condemnation, leads to the cancellation of other international events, and imposes economic costs, it could be persuasive in the region and deter other countries from making similar bargains. So far, the signals are mixed. Early in May, for example, the U.N. educational and cultural organization UNESCO proceeded with hosting a global conference in Lusaka marking World Press Freedom Day (although it moved some of the scheduled events online or to Paris). Other global events scheduled for Zambia in 2026 include a major fashion conference (FashionEVO Summit), an international gathering on machine learning, and a global convening on psychology and mental health.
Other lessons extend to technology policy. As noted above, laws designed to safeguard Zambia’s digital economy can equally serve as tools for restricting rights and civic activity. Zambia’s experience is a reminder that responsible digital governance requires more than legislation. It requires accountability, independent oversight, and a political culture willing to resist the temptation to deploy regulatory tools for political ends.
The digital rights community faces an uphill climb in the wake of the RightsCon debacle. Other leaders on the continent are watching closely, gauging whether China’s priorities outweigh competing concerns. Yet, the fallout from the summit’s cancellation is not definitive. Democracies still maintain considerable clout in Africa and can use it to demonstrate that China’s demands will not be cost-free.
