Putin, at the left of the frame, reaches out to shake hands with Kushner, as Witkoff looks on from Kushner's side, all wearing dark suits and ties, against a backdrop of a formal room with white damask striped wallpaper and taupe and gold drapes behind a table surrounded by formal white-framed and taupe-upholstered chairs.

Chasing Yalta: Putin Reverts to Goal of Dividing Europe, as U.S. Appears to Open Door

Intense U.S. diplomacy to end Russia’s war on Ukraine has again produced little beyond a possible prisoner exchange. The past week has featured a series of meetings, in various configurations, among the United States, Ukraine, Russia, some European governments, the European Union, and NATO’s international staff in Brussels, Abu Dhabi, Moscow, and Dublin. Bold predictions from U.S. President Donald Trump again fell short. This is familiar. But this time, the Kremlin emerged in a stronger position, having extracted, apparently in exchange for nothing, U.S. agreement to address the “European security order” as part of ending the war.

Russia has failed to conquer Ukraine on the battlefield. But it advanced toward President Vladimir Putin’s objective of restoring the divided Europe of Yalta, the February 1945 U.S.-U.K.-Soviet WWII Summit that has come to represent U.S. acquiescence of Soviet domination of Europe’s eastern half. That dark deal was finally undone with the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of Soviet control of Eastern Europe, and finally the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. Putin has waxed nostalgic about that era from the time he came to power in December 1999, and has inched toward it, including through military aggression, ever since.

The Trump administration’s persistent favoring of Russia’s position over Ukraine’s has only opened the door wider. Certainly a sustainable framework for ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been discussed widely among U.S., European, and Ukrainian experts in and out of government for some time. It consists, roughly, of a ceasefire in place; security arrangements for Ukraine, short (unfortunately) of NATO membership but including (in some versions) a French-U.K. led “coalition of the willing” force inside Ukraine; Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction; and, should Russia adhere to the terms of the ceasefire, reintegration of Russia into the world economy. U.S. negotiators Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff have themselves sketched out something like this plan, though perhaps with the interesting offer of Ukraine’s accession to NATO in exchange for its withdrawal from the part of Donbas that Russia claims but has been unable to conquer.

That framework, or something like it, could work: Ukraine would be free and able to develop; the United States, Europe, and most of the world would not recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of the 20 percent of Ukraine currently occupied by Russia, but Russia would remain in de facto control of these territories.

That’s not a just solution, but it could be sustainable. And it’s realistic. It recognizes that Ukraine is not likely to liberate its territory now or soon, and that Russia will not conquer Ukraine, no matter how many civilians it kills, unless the West abandons it. Putin would be able to hold victory parades in occupied Ukraine and claim success. Ukraine would become (roughly) a 21st century version of West Germany, a hopeful precedent and one Ukrainians have (mostly privately and certainly reluctantly) expressed willingness to accept.

U.S. Squanders Leverage

But Putin didn’t start the war for a few provinces of Ukraine. He wants all of Ukraine and will not accept a settlement that falls short of that. Unless he has to. That’s the problem with the U.S. approach to ending the war: it could use leverage to convince Putin that he has to take that deal because Russia’s prospects will only get worse if he does not. And the United States has leverage: it can increase pressure on the already-stressed Russian economy; it can intensify military and intelligence cooperation with Ukraine; it could invest in (and benefit from) Ukraine’s advanced defense technologies; it can resume defense assistance for Ukraine and speed up deliveries; it can maintain Starlink/StarShield support for Ukraine without shameful cuts, and it can push back – in a variety of ways – against Russia’s shadow war against Europe, instead of appearing mostly indifferent to it.

Instead, the Trump administration has been offering cooperation with Russia. At first, these were offers of investment and energy cooperation after the war ended. These could be defended as inducements, in parallel with U.S. offers to help Ukraine with post-war reconstruction. When these failed to entice the Kremlin to cooperate in ending the war, however, the United States offered even more: economic cooperation immediately, as an unconditional concession. This started with the Oct. 9 “diesel deal”: the offer to import Russian diesel to the United States and encourage its export to world markets. That offer seems to have been made in haste and poorly staffed, without regard to the U.S. law that prohibits import of Russian oil products. The Trump administration then followed the diesel deal with additional, also seemingly unconditional offers: it waived the new, potentially powerful sanctions passed in the Lindsey Graham Russia Sanctions Act; it spoke of encouraging Europe to resume energy imports from Russia, something Trump had himself opposed for years; and there was some loose talk about lifting restrictions on Russia’s Direct Investment Fund.

Those new offers didn’t work either. The Kremlin appears to have maintained its maximalist demands to end its bombardment of Ukraine.

Kremlin Negotiating Tactics

Those experienced in negotiating with the Kremlin have learned that when faced with Kremlin obduracy, it is generally fruitless to chase the Russians with even more generous offers to induce a yes. That generally encourages more maximalism. The Kremlin knows how not to negotiate; it can easily say no for as long as needed when it perceives that it can thereby gain advantage or time. American diplomats used to understand this. The Kremlin can also negotiate with creativity when it wants a deal and find practical solutions. But it usually gets from “nyet” to “let’s figure it out” only when circumstances change, i.e., when pressed or faced with a less advantageous situation — generally not in response to being chased.

Instead, the U.S. negotiators, dropped into diplomacy on this war less than 2 years ago and seemingly unschooled in the history of Kremlin negotiating tactics, expanded their concessions beyond economic offers. Just on Nov. 5, Kushner appeared to accept a Russian position that peace in Ukraine had to be linked to revision of European security arrangements in its favor.

This new U.S. offer to renegotiate European security represents a significant, unearned victory for the Kremlin. The European security order the Kremlin seeks is an arrangement for a sphere of influence that then-Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin apparently assumed he had achieved at Yalta, giving him (he supposed) the right to impose communist control east of where Soviet armies reached in 1945. The Kremlin’s imposition of that control at the time, through violence, was the original cause of the Cold War and resulted in the Iron Curtain that ran from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. “Yalta Europe” came to mean divided Europe, a term well understood in those countries that suffered under Kremlin rule. “Yalta” is a curse in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechia, and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe; Russians speak of it with warmth.

The collapse of communist rule in Soviet-occupied Europe starting in 1989 was a prelude to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself and to the end of the Cold War. After 1989, European security was reconstructed. A set of agreements from the Cold War-era Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Charter of Paris, the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement of 1990, and the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 rebuilt Europe’s security to recognize national sovereignty, freedom from coercion, human rights, and various arms control and confidence-building measures to keep the new peace. These arrangements sought to include Russia, but on the condition that it shed its aggressive designs on its neighbors. That part didn’t work out.

Putin has long regarded the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire in Europe as wrongs to be righted one way or another. He launched the first war of Kremlin reconquest in 2008 against Georgia and his second against Ukraine in 2014. In the weeks before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin made clear that its conditions for peace included Russia’s version of revising European security, which in Putin’s understanding required a rollback of NATO’s presence in those European countries, now members of NATO, which had been under Kremlin domination during the decades of the Cold War. The Biden administration did not agree to rewrite European security but offered to address any legitimate Russian concerns. Putin opted for full-scale invasion of Ukraine instead.

European countries and the United States responded by helping Ukraine defend itself. Some argue that this support for Ukraine was insufficient. But until now, neither the United States nor any major European country had expressed tolerance for his ambition to overturn the arrangements that ended the Cold War and brought freedom and increasing prosperity to the 100 million Europeans once under Kremlin domination.

Mixed Signals

This new U.S. concession understandably alarms the Europeans, and their leaders pushed back with some success, including, I’m told, at the Nov. 5 meeting in Brussels between European senior officials and the U.S. negotiators. As a result, just before the Abu Dhabi talks, the United States, Ukraine, and European representatives issued a joint statement that limited the scope of discussions of European security with the Kremlin.

The Kremlin, however, is skilled at pocketing the most forthcoming statement from its Western interlocutors and running with it. The chief Kremlin negotiator at the Abu Dhabi talks put the Kremlin demands clearly enough: “Wherever the foot of our Russian soldier has stepped, that is ours…The task is to create a system of comprehensive security that will become a new, modern Yalta and Potsdam.” A Russian “non-paper” delivered in Abu Dhabi spelled out that this meant NATO’s withdrawal from those European members that had regained sovereignty starting in 1989 and which the Kremlin claims as part of its rightful sphere of domination.

Jared Kushner noted in another X post that talks would continue. When they do, the position of Ukraine, Europe, and the United States will be weaker than before this latest round — and for no good reason. Ukraine, Europe, and the United States have the cards. But Putin can see the weakness of the U.S. negotiating position as demonstrated by its persistent willingness to make offers to the Kremlin without demanding any constructive Kremlin moves at all. And he sees Trump’s own attraction to the concept of spheres of influence. There may be a place for discussing European security in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine War. But that discussion should not start from the Kremlin position.

The mixed signals from the United States are not the only asset Putin is eyeing. He also can see that the French elections in 2027 may result in a runoff between a far-right candidate, Marine Le Pen, and one from the far left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, both of whom are sympathetic to Russia. Putin also sees that the far right and far left extremes in Germany may not have peaked, even as its government finally sees the Russian threat for what it is. He sees that in Poland, with its rapidly growing economy and military, and strong strategic culture, political fights between its president and prime minister hinder that country, a staunch foe of Kremlin aggression, from acting as a leader and partner with Germany in resisting Putin.

The U.S. negotiators may think themselves devoted to achieving peace in Ukraine. But their negotiating mistakes and lack of historical context have left them chasing after the Russians, expanding the scope of negotiations in favor of the Kremlin. As a result, the Kremlin has found that its long chase of a return to Yalta arrangements in Europe is bearing fruit.

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