A rocket arcs through the night sky, leaving a white trail slicing through the inky darkness.

The United States Has Space Weapons: How Should It Use Them?

The idea of warfare in space has been present at least since the first Gulf War was declared the “first space war,” but the potential for armed conflict in the space domain has been growing for over a decade in both urgency and public consciousness. The inception of the U.S. Space Force brought with it open discussion of space as a warfighting domain, and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine brought with it explicit discussion of potentially targeting commercial satellites on orbit. In this context, Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink recently announced that, for the first time, “the Space Force now has on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the joint force against hostile adversary action.” One initial question with this announcement may be whether such weapons are legal. They are, as comprehensively discussed here. 

This leaves us not just to consider what would be lawful targets for counter-space weapons in an armed conflict, but also what the United States, as a whole, wants the answer to be. A particular consideration is the legitimacy of commercial satellites as potential targets.

A starting point to answering these questions is the legal framework already in place. However, the law only provides a floor, or minimum requirement. It is a baseline, and the law of armed conflict–albeit with some clear red lines–contains fairly permissive rules that are focused on process for competent decision authorities (often commanders, but in the highly strategic context of space, more often senior policymakers and civilian leaders) rather than a specific outcome in a particular targeting scenario. Moreover, there are no space-specific laws for targeting; instead, rules for space are derived from general practice and rules that transcend the domains of conflict (that is, laws that apply to land, air, sea, cyber, and space generally), with domain-specific nuance either coming from explicit domain-specific agreements or the factual application of the unique aspects of the domain to the broader law. 

Given this, the United States has an opportunity to shape the development and understanding of the norms, rules, and law related to what does, and does not, constitute a legitimate military objective in space. It is important to remember that the military objective test is only one part of a targeting decision, along with a proportionality and precautions analysis, any rules of engagement, or other policy requirements; but it is a foundational, essential part of the analysis and one the United States should not take lightly as it considers what is both responsible and reasonably workable behavior in the space domain.

Targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict

So, under the law of armed conflict, what is a legitimate target (that is, a lawful military objective)? Fortunately, there is great consensus on this matter—or at least on the legal test—among parties to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (the vast majority of states, including China and Russia, but not including the United States), the United States under the DoD Law of War Manual (section 5.6.3), and the International Committee of the Red Cross’s widely-accepted assertion of customary international law: 

“military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 

To satisfy this two-part test, an attacker must determine that a space object makes an “effective contribution” to the adversary, and that its elimination offers the attacker a “definite military advantage.” 

This is fairly broad and lays out a process for the first step in a targeting decision (with additional rules such as those on proportionality and taking precautions in attack following only if this threshold test is satisfied), relying on the good faith judgement and factual assessment of an attacker. Military satellites for all warfighting purposes like Space Force- (or other Defense organization-) procured, operated, and controlled craft would clearly be military objectives (and under the DoD Law of War Manual section 5.6.4, they are “categorically recognized” as military objectives such that the test need not even be applied).

Most commercial capabilities and systems could pass the test as well. By its assertions, Russia has suggested that Starlink, as used by Ukraine in its national defense, would qualify. Similarly, recent reports of Chinese commercial imagery being used by Iran for targeting U.S. bases suggest that such commercial satellites, by their use, made an effective contribution to the Iranian war effort; if the elimination of that satellite or capability would have adversely impacted Iran’s ability to effectively strike U.S. positions, there is a strong argument that their neutralization would offer a definite military advantage under the circumstances ruling at the time. 

The Space Force is structured to incorporate civilian and commercial capabilities into its warfighting architecture under its Commercial Space Strategy, including during war. The Space Force’s Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve concept is specifically designed for commercial firms to be “called upon in wartime to surge delivery of satellite-derived capabilities,” and has conducted its own wargame events. Even if limited to support functions, those functions are essential and indispensable to the warfighter, as the new Chief of Space Operations (CSO), General Douglas Schiess, recently noted related to Operation Epic Fury. 

But this does not mean all commercial satellites supporting U.S. operations are automatically legitimate targets; the military objective analysis is complex and nuanced, and warfighting staffs consider a range of factors in the analysis—and may come to differing conclusions. 

Consider, for example, the Space Force’s Joint Commercial Operations Cell (JCO), which purports to integrate data and services from a loose conglomeration of commercial providers to execute or enhance military missions, such as Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Tracking (TacSRT), including support to “all-domain combat operations.” On its face, it appears that its commercial participants could be lawful targets. But, is it so disaggregated (with each participant providing only a negligible role, moderated through this cell) that no one participating commercial object actually makes an effective contribution? 

Similarly, Starlink is not one satellite but a constellation of over 11,000 that collectively deliver its mesh capability, and with significant redundancy. Would destroying one (or some—and how many) satellite(s) offer a definite military advantage under the circumstances ruling at the time? Some have concluded that, at least at 2,000 satellites, Starlink would be a valid military objective (notwithstanding proportionality and precautions challenges), but does the five-fold increase mean the effects would be de minimus or too indefinite or attenuated to form such an advantage; is this a universal view; and, who decides?

As it stands, these determinations are in the hands of the targeting state. In terrestrial campaigns, the United States attacks networks and target systems. For instance, in the counter-ISIS effort, innumerable individuals, small weapons caches, and makeshift headquarters buildings were prosecuted piecemeal, removing perhaps only one or two fighters and a few small arms from the battlefield at a time. The specific impacts may have appeared negligible in isolation, but the aggregation of effects is a valid consideration for the military objective test under the DoD Law of War Manual (sections 5.6.7.3 and 5.12.2.1). 

While this holistic approach is generally accepted, the scope of what may constitute an effective contribution or definite military advantage will rely on nuanced national understandings and policies and, in execution, on the good faith determinations by competent commanders for any specific attack (or broader operation). Therefore, in the space context–where proliferated constellations, often providing support to other warfighting capabilities (versus direct effects), are common–varying views on a particular commercial target and its value can exist among both allies and adversaries. 

Future Practice and U.S. Leadership

International law develops through state practice, executed out of a sense of legal obligation (ICJ Statute, Article 38), and such practice can even inform established treaty text like that of the military objective test (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31). Therefore, even seemingly settled law may not be permanently so, and is ripe to be shaped or molded by States whose practice is frequent or significant in this domain. Beyond shaping the evolution of customary international law, non-binding norms can also have a significant impact on how States behave and what the international community views as legitimate. This creates an opportunity for U.S. leadership in shaping the expectations and norms of practice for what constitutes a legitimate military objective in outer space. 

A satisfactory answer to the question should not be answered by the law alone; the general law of armed conflict establishes what may be considered a lawful military objective, but it is for leaders, considering what is legal, ethical, and good policy, to factor in the whole picture—that is, what precedent do they want to set for the future of the domain? 

The United States needs to have a cogent position that takes into account more than just tactical or operational military advantage, and instead factors in what is in the holistic national interest and what makes for good, sustainable, and advantageous policy geared towards a predictable, stable domain in the future that enables all uses in the national interest: commercial, civil, scientific, and, of course, national security.

Final Thoughts

As noted at the outset, the law is a floor (not the ceiling) for protection of commercial objects. To the question of when commercial satellites are legitimate targets, the United States needs to determine what it wants the answer to be–both as a user of and potential neutralizer of others’ space assets–and actively pursue that as the rule through its practice and strategic communication. 

Following Secretary Meink’s speech, the CSO correctly noted that “[d]eterrence is strongest when we have a credible force and a resolve to do it,” and this announcement supports that credibility. Importantly, though, the CSO further noted that the Space Force must “make disciplined and responsible choices about how we build and sustain our combat advantage.” 

A race to the bottom, or minimum standards, is an option and may be expedient in some types of conflict and best serve the national interest, particularly in hostilities where a likely adversary poses a lower threat to or capacity to target U.S. space systems. If that is the case, the law as it stands will provide commanders with workable options and may be a “disciplined and responsible” choice.

However, we are still in a period where the general rules as applied to the space domain can be shaped to national advantage and to create opportunities—and the United States should do so actively and with purpose, and factoring in the potential for adversaries with significant counter-space capabilities. If it wants more predictability (from law-abiding states) or, more likely, baseline rules to hold aggressors to account for violations, the United States should work towards norms and eventual rules to better shape understanding of “effective contribution” and “definite military advantage” for space systems. Determining thresholds and generally what is in or out of bounds in considering the lawful targeting of commercial satellites in conflict is a precedential matter the United States must take seriously, and with the understanding that U.S. military space activities may fall on both sides of the ledger.

Filed Under

, , , , , , , , , , ,
Send A Letter To The Editor

DON'T MISS A THING. Stay up to date with Just Security curated newsletters: