On Sept. 23, as world leaders gathered in New York for the United Nations General Assembly’s annual “high-level week,” war erupted again in northern Ethiopia. The Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), the military force led by the region’s dominant political party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), launched a coordinated operation to seize three airports in the region. Within 10 days, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) was able to reverse those initial gains, including by retaking the regional capital, Mekelle, the location of one of the airports the TDF had seized and which had been under the control of the federal government before the renewal of fighting. The ENDF counteroffensive was coordinated with the pro-government Tigray Peace Force (TPF), which had splintered from the TPLF in the period following the 2020-2022 conflict between the Tigray region and the federal government.
Back in July, TPLF-aligned regional authorities had declared that it was their understanding that the cessation of hostilities agreement struck in Pretoria, South Africa in November 2022 had collapsed – and recent events indicate that this may indeed have been the case. Yet, despite the presence of many of the same players as during the previous war, this conflict will differ in several ways. While the previous conflict was a federal campaign to subdue the defiant region of Tigray, this new outbreak has the potential to metastasize into a wider contest over the future of the Ethiopian state. Furthermore, unlike last time, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is confronted by a loose, multi-regional coalition of anti-government armed groups that have the potential to garner the backing of an emergent, hostile axis of neighbors in the Horn of Africa. A conflict in Ethiopia, then, offers several entry points through which geopolitical rivals in that region of Africa and in the Middle East can find opportunities to weaken their adversaries. (I wrote about the domestic and regional implications of a potential conflict in Just Security back in August.)
Once Cohesive, Tigray is Divided
Unlike the relative political and military cohesion that unified Tigray during the 2020–2022 civil war, the region is currently deeply fractured. The split originated in the aftermath of the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which TPLF party hardliners under Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael viewed as a humiliating capitulation. In 2025, after TPLF hardliners ousted interim administrator Getachew Reda, who had negotiated the agreement, thousands of former Tigray Defense Forces combatants and senior commanders joined pro-government ranks, forming the Tigray Peace Force. Now an advisor to Abiy, Getachew traveled to Mekelle on Oct. 11, accompanied by Abiy’s intel chief, Redwan Hussein.
During recent clashes, the Tigray Peace Force fought alongside the Ethiopian military to repel TDF offensives. The federal government may expect the force to play a role in providing security for Mekelle and other parts of Tigray, and has already asked the citizens of Mekelle, the country’s third-largest city and an economic hub, to assist with helping restore order. These arrangements would allow the government to outsource regional control to aligned Tigrayan proxies rather than managing a full-scale military occupation, thus leaving ENDF troops to address instability in other parts of the country.
Another Siege Is Unlikely
Nearly four years after the Pretoria Agreement, renewed fighting finds civilians caught in the crosshairs. More than a million are still displaced, and reconstruction, public services, and livelihoods had yet to recover from the earlier round of fighting. Part of this is because the federal government during the previous conflict inflicted deep structural damage on the region through de facto siege conditions, with the region caught in a vice between Eritrea to the north and Amhara special forces and Fano militia, the loose, decentralized network of ethno-nationalist militia in the Amhara region, to the south and west.
However, a 2020-style siege of Tigray would be a strategic blunder, as attempting a complete physical or economic blockade of Tigray would carry immense political, economic, and military costs that risk exhausting federal troop capacity. More importantly, this time around, this approach may not even be necessary from the federal government’s standpoint, particularly because Tigray is internally fractured. In theory, the government imperative should be to win over any fence-sitters, given the population’s understandable reluctance to pay the collective price of returning to full-scale conflict.
From the federal government’s standpoint, it will be imperative to reduce the region’s threat potential, and relatedly, to minimize the resources it must expend there. During the previous conflict, holding territory in Tigray was extremely challenging for the ENDF, and resulted in their humiliating retreat from Mekelle and much of Tigray in June 2021. During that campaign, ENDF troops had also taken Mekelle from Tigrayan forces within a month of the outbreak of conflict, and the latter had melted into the highlands, targeting government forces with hit-and-run guerrilla attacks. Given the ENDF’s manpower and airpower superiority, Debretsion has implied that the plan this time around would be to shift from conventional operations to an insurgency, stating, “We operate under a strategy to strike the enemy wherever we choose.”
In On Guerrilla Warfare, Mao Tse-tung likened the population to water and guerrillas to “the fish who inhabit it.” Using this analogy, if the civilian population of Tigray is the ‘water’ and the TPLF/TDF are ‘fish’, it would behoove the federal government and its TPF allies to build trust, safety, and cooperation with Tigrayan civilians so they choose not to provide support to anti-government forces. As a result, this time around, the federal government may opt to overcompensate for 2020-2021 by demonstrating that it can provide services and stability in recaptured territories; it could position such social support as a stark contrast to what it likely would characterize as the violence and deprivation that TPLF leadership would visit upon the region.
Combatants Have Switched Sides
Even if Abiy wanted to physically isolate Tigray, the ENDF would not be able to do so because internal and external political-military alignments have shifted quite dramatically since the end of the previous conflict. Both former partners — the Eritrean troops and Fano militia — have turned hostile. Neither was included in the 2022 Pretoria negotiations, and both viewed Abiy’s unilateral deal with the TPLF as a profound betrayal and a threat to their own interests. For Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, Pretoria spared what was then his mortal enemy from total defeat, with Abiy allegedly agreeing to halt the conflict against Isaias’ wishes. Meanwhile, Abiy’s post-Pretoria rhetoric demanding Red Sea access further transformed Eritrea from a partner into an active antagonist.
For previously pro-government armed groups in Amhara, Pretoria ignored territorial claims over Western Tigray, and sidelined the regional special forces (paramilitary units run by each of the country’s regional governments) and Fano militia that had, in their view, served as Abiy’s most vital and committed fighters during the 2020–2022 war. Following the ceasefire, however, Abiy came to perceive this heavily armed, battle-hardened force operating outside state control as a direct obstacle to his efforts, since coming to power in 2018, to centralize authority in the federal government. In April 2023, he ordered regional special forces nationwide, including the Amhara special forces, to integrate into statutory security forces such as the army or police. Amhara communities viewed this directive as a deliberate attempt to leave the region defenseless against future Tigrayan retaliation, causing many former special forces members to join Fano. That brought training and weapons to the movement and helped transform it into an insurgency across Amhara.
In theory, Eritrea offers the TDF a rear sanctuary, through which it could funnel cross-border support. Meanwhile, with Amhara sitting between the capital Addis Ababa and Tigray, Fano could asymmetrically harass ENDF convoys passing through the region to get to the northern frontlines and block vital logistical arteries like the A2 highway, which connects central Ethiopia to the Amhara and Tigray regions. Yet this convergence highlights the deep ideological dissonance inherent in the current conflict. The possibility that the TDF would be aligned with entities such as the Fano and the Eritrean Defense Force (EDF), which in their view, have the blood of tens of thousands of their fellow Tigrayans on their hands, must be distasteful to some of the conflict-affected populations in Tigray. As a result, these linkages will likely counteract TDF efforts to foster intra-regional solidarity that could provide active, or even passive, support to their anti-government insurgency.
The Potential for Interesting New Bedfellows
Unlike the previous conflict when it faced the ENDF on its own, the TPLF is now part of an anti-government alliance called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival (EPFAS), announced days before hostilities broke out. In addition to the TPLF, the coalition consists of the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM, a merger of some of the Fano militia referenced above), Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF/Ugugumo), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement, and the Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement (GPDM). The Sidama National Liberation Front (SNLF) subsequently announced that it had also joined the coalition.
Since Tigray represents roughly 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population, the aspiration to create a cross-regional anti-government alliance echoes the TPLF’s 1980s-era playbook and may indicate the group’s intention to play the long game. The creation of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) at the time granted the TPLF’s insurgent campaign national legitimacy, which eventually contributed to the 1991 collapse of longtime Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam. This ushered in nearly three decades of TPLF dominance within the EPRDF, which became an ethno-federalist political coalition that ruled the country until Abiy dissolved it in 2019 and replaced it with the Prosperity Party.
Today’s anti-government coalition functions as an opportunistic alliance, with a rallying point to bring down Abiy’s regime, institute a temporary caretaker government, dismantle measures Abiy has taken to centralize control within the federal government, and draft a replacement for the 1995 Constitution. As some of these groups have, in the recent past, actively attempted to kill one another, what unites them is much weaker than what divides them. Across the coalition, visions for a post-Abiy Ethiopia hardly overlap, with Fano wanting a strong, unified state where Amhara cultural and political influence is restored, versus the TPLF/OLA advocating for the type of ethno-nationalist federalism that Ethiopia had between 1991 and 2019 under the EPRDF.
As of the first few weeks of the conflict, heavy fighting has almost exclusively been sustained by the TDF, Fano, and Ugugumo across Tigray, Amhara, and Afar. However, the coalition as it stands now does not represent an actual threat to the government, but rather a latent one; should they choose to do so, the members of this alliance could present a threat in the areas in which they operate and could disperse the ENDF geographically. This gives them the potential to create chaos, tying down federal forces and preventing Abiy from sending the ENDF’s full might north to confront the TDF. For example, although not currently participating in anti-government military operations, the OLA operates in Oromia, which is the largest and most populous region and surrounds the capital itself, presenting some level of liability for Abiy.
Combined with its limited military coordination across the country as of yet, EPFAS or parts of it may end up being a coalition-in-name-only. After the alliance went live, the Oromo Liberation Army endorsed it politically based on its interest in seeing Abiy’s government removed from power, but it made a point of noting that its participation represented a “procedural consensus” rather than joining a coordinated joint military operation. Meanwhile, the Ogaden National Liberation Front has experienced internal splits, with one faction stating it supported the political goal of replacing the government but explicitly declining to resume armed struggle, while both the Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement and Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement publicly denied active membership or military involvement.
Abiy has Attracted Regional Antibodies
Ethiopia’s diplomatic and geopolitical stature is enhanced by it hosting the African Union in Addis Ababa, but it has not inoculated Abiy from the antibodies he has attracted from his counterparts in the wider region – another notable difference from the previous conflict. More dangerously though, those outside adversaries now have entry points to undermine him via the anti-government armed groups and their stated aspiration to work together to topple him. But the same applies for his capacity to fight back.
As I previously wrote, a series of Abiy’s provocative moves have simultaneously antagonized counterparts in Eritrea, Somalia, Egypt, and Sudan: his actions regarding Red Sea access, including speculation over whether he would recognize Somaliland as a state independent from Somalia in exchange for access to its Red Sea port of Berbera; Ethiopia’s aspiration to construct additional dams over the Nile; and allegations of covert support for Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In the days after the outbreak of conflict in September, these simmering diplomatic tensions boiled over into formal ruptures. On Oct. 1, Ethiopia closed its embassy in the Eritrean capital Asmara (prompting Eritrea to sever all diplomatic ties) and declared 10 of its diplomats persona non grata. The same day, Abiy expelled an Egyptian diplomat.
Days later at the Alamein Africa Forum in Egypt, president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi hosted the leaders of Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan and issued the El Alamein Joint Declaration, stating that Red Sea governance remains the exclusive domain of littoral states, i.e. not Ethiopia; that transboundary river management on the Nile requires prior consultation and consensus under international law; and that all signatories categorically reject external interference in Sudan, support for mercenaries, or recognition of breakaway regions like Somaliland.
In an Oct. 5 inaugural address following his swearing in for a second full five-year term, Abiy met his neighbors’ declaration with open defiance. Framing Red Sea access not merely as an economic preference, but as an existential and historical imperative, he asserted that “Ethiopia’s prosperity cannot be fully realized without access to the sea.” Couching his maritime ambitions in deep historical grievance, Abiy argued that the loss of coastlines was “imposed” during periods when “others” made decisions for the country – impressively, yet passive aggressively fusing 19th-century European colonial partition with the TPLF-led government’s 1990s agreement to formalize Eritrean independence (after three decades of war).
Days later, Ethiopia and Eritrea became involved in a dueling letter campaign with the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) as a result of an escalation between their militaries in Tigray. On Oct. 7, the Eritrean Defense Forces that had been deployed to support TDF positions and create a buffer against the ENDF counteroffensive came under attack from Ethiopian military drone strikes inside Ethiopian territory, suffering heavy losses. Notably, since the Pretoria Agreement was signed in November 2022, the Eritrean military reportedly has continued operating in parts of Tigray.
On Oct. 9, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos dispatched a letter to the Security Council, seen by the BBC, classifying the Eritrean incursion as a “blatant act of aggression” and asserting Ethiopia’s right to implement “preventative measures” in self-defense. Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh sent his own letter to the Council on Oct. 10, citing yet-unsourced remarks allegedly made by ENDF Deputy Chief of Staff Abebaw Tadesse in late September that “the ultimate objective of the war is to invade Assab” and that “Mekelle…was a mere stop-over towards the invasion of Eritrea.” From Eritrea’s standpoint, this would imply that Abiy’s actions transcend the pacification of Tigray, providing him a pretext for fulfilling his long-standing ambition for sovereign maritime access by forcibly annexing one of Eritrea’s Red Sea ports. Concerningly, although Eritrean forces have withdrawn closer to the border, additional incidents in which EDF and ENDF increasingly come into contact raise the possibility of a northern Ethiopia conflict adding a more overt interstate dimension.
Airpower Will be Important, but Only Occasionally Decisive
Abiy will be able to counteract some of his domestic and regional challenges by leveraging the support of external patrons – and last time, that timely support came in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Iran. As demonstrated in recent engagements, ENDF drone strikes remain extraordinarily effective at breaking and clearing conventional armored or mechanized maneuvers attempted by Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) columns in open terrain – as they were against the TDF in 2021.
The TDF’s initial capture of Tigray’s regional airports in late September may have been intended to deny the ENDF both forward staging grounds for aerial operations as well as to undermine the ENDF’s ability to rapidly transport troops and deny federal forces. Asymmetries in airpower proved decisive in November 2021, when Tigrayan forces advanced to within 100 miles of Addis Ababa before being exposed in open lowland terrain once federal forces deployed foreign-acquired UAVs.
At present, the ENDF’s airpower advantage is significantly more formidable than it was in 2021, with an aerial fleet reportedly combining foreign-supplied medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) strike platforms such as Turkish Bayraktar TB2s, Iranian Mohajer-6s, and Chinese Wing Loongs, as well as thousands of domestically assembled, weaponized First-Person View (FPV) drones produced by companies such as SkyWin Aeronautics and AeroAbay. Re-establishing federal control over airfields in Mekelle, Axum, and Shire allows the ENDF to operate these assets out of northern hubs, thus eliminating the need for long-distance transit from launch sites farther from the frontlines. This then extends UAV loiter time and surveillance over northern terrain, and expands the reach of ENDF strikes across the entire northern frontier – and potentially well across the border into Eritrea.
However, the ENDF’s monopoly on airpower during the previous conflict has already been directly contested during the current one. Anti-government forces have demonstrated the capability to strike ENDF assets far from northern frontlines. On the night of Sept. 30, what the anti-government alliance claimed to be suicide drones entered Addis Ababa’s airspace to target the Ministry of Defense and ENDF Headquarters, marking the first time anti-government forces would have successfully conducted aerial strikes inside the federal capital.
Beyond the immediate physical damage, these long-range strikes may force the ENDF to divert vital air defense systems, electronic warfare assets, and troops to protect core key infrastructure rather than projecting all available power towards the north. If the government chooses to ignore this threat, that raises the potential that the country’s urban populations could feel the impact of this conflict more than it did during the previous one, which never reached Addis. This, of course, assumes anti-government forces maintain the assets, freedom of movement, and proximity to sustain these asymmetric aerial attacks. That could, over time, erode Abiy’s legitimacy. Notably, drones were banned from flying over Addis shortly before the Sept. 30 attack, which implies the ENDF is devoting some assets to neutralizing any additional aerial incursions.
Ultimately, federal airpower alone cannot deliver a decisive military victory. Drones are most lethal against massed conventional formations in open terrain, but they are inherently ineffective at dislodging dispersed, highly mobile insurgent units operating in rugged highlands or dense rural cover. This operational boundary is evident in Amhara and Oromia, where Fano and OLA insurgents remain entrenched despite an intensive ENDF air campaign – including over 100 documented drone strikes in Amhara since 2023.
Nevertheless, despite advancements in airpower that will certainly feature in this conflict, ground forces remain indispensable for sustaining any prolonged military campaign, as they are uniquely positioned to secure supply lines and clear hostile territory, and to create the space to support the re-establishment of civil authority. If members of the anti-government coalition, or the Eritrean military for that matter, opt to fight conventionally, they will be outmatched by ENDF manpower supplemented by airpower. If, however, anti-government forces fight a prolonged, dispersed, multi-front guerrilla insurgency, Abiy could be in for a long fight in which airpower will certainly remain important, but is unlikely to be decisive.
Everything Everywhere All At Once
Clearly, this is not a replay of the 2020–2022 war: Abiy enters this round with a divided Tigray and a far stronger airpower advantage, but also with more domestic fronts and a ring of hostile neighbors with both the motive and the means to exploit Ethiopia’s internal fractures. The ENDF may therefore continue to win conventional engagements without resolving the country’s wider challenges that contribute to perpetuating cycles of civil strife. If the TDF and its allies are able to cobble together a multi-front insurgency, the conflict could play out in several dimensions at once: a conventional fight the ENDF is well-placed not to lose (but possibly not to win), drone-related civilian casualties in areas where insurgents operate, insurgencies supported by regional rivals, and an interstate confrontation with Eritrea over Red Sea access.
