Employees work on installing a submarine cable on a beach.

The Multifunctional Seabed

On Christmas Day 2024, the Cook Islands-flagged tanker Eagle S, which Finnish customs officials and the European Commission have described as part of Russia’s sanctions-evading shadow fleet, dragged its anchor roughly 55 miles across the Gulf of Finland. It severed the submarine Estlink 2 power interconnector — which links Finland’s and Estonia’s electricity grids — and four telecommunications cables. Finnish authorities seized the ship and prosecutors later charged its captain and two officers with aggravated criminal mischief and aggravated interference with communications.

In October 2025, however, the Helsinki District Court dismissed the case, concluding that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) left jurisdiction over conduct in Finland’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with the flag state or the defendants’ states of nationality. The Helsinki Court of Appeal reversed that ruling in August, finding that the alleged offenses were committed in Finland because the damage occurred there. The court accepted that the ship may have initially dropped the anchor accidentally, but held that the dragging that followed was not an “incident of navigation” under Article 97 of UNCLOS. The ruling sends the case back to the District Court for trial on the merits, but it is not yet final, as the defendants and the ship’s operator have asked Finland’s Supreme Court for leave to appeal. The dispute exposed the difficulty in applying the law of the sea to infrastructure incidents: the legal consequences can turn on how an activity is classified and where authority over it lies.

The Estlink 2 case belongs to a growing body of analysis of enforcement gaps — including Just Security’s coverage of China’s gray-zone pressure on Taiwan’s cables — that treats cables as critical infrastructure requiring protection and asks who may investigate and prosecute when a vessel damages a cable. A second set of emerging legal questions concerns what the cables themselves are beginning to do.

Science Monitoring And Reliable Telecommunications (SMART) cables carry temperature, pressure, and seismic sensors inside the repeaters of commercial systems, which have significant value for scientific research. Together, these sensors can track deep-ocean warming, sea-level rise, and shifts in ocean circulation, as well as detect earthquakes and tsunamis early enough to send advanced warnings to the vulnerable coastal communities most exposed to them. Two cables — Portugal’s Atlantic CAM ring and the TamTam cable linking Vanuatu and New Caledonia — are racing to become the world’s first in service around 2027. For Vanuatu — among the most at-risk nations for natural disasters — TamTam will place sensors across the New Heberdes trench, one of the world’s most active plate boundaries, and feed real-time data to regional warning centers. These first systems will also be the first to test how the law of the sea treats a cable that is also an observatory. Fiber-optic sensing can already draw acoustic and seismic data from conventional cables on the seabed, and autonomous underwater vehicles can shift from scientific survey to reconnaissance with a change of payload or software. Each of these systems performs functions that UNCLOS assigns to distinct legal regimes, often simultaneously.

The Convention allocates rights over the seabed largely by activity. That architecture faces new challenges as multifunctional technologies raise questions about how established legal issues apply to systems with dual-use functions. These questions concern the circumstances in which coastal state consent may be required and how responsibility should be allocated among the actors involved. Through my work with the U.N.’s Joint Task Force on SMART Cables, I have seen these issues arise as governments, scientists, and telecommunications operators work together to advance ocean observation through submarine cables. The practical experience of developing SMART systems offers an opportunity to clarify how existing legal frameworks can accommodate new scientific capabilities, while preserving established cable freedoms.

A Cable Under Two Laws

In 1858, the Atlantic Telegraph Company laid the first sea-spanning telecommunications cable across the Atlantic Ocean. Submarine cables consequently enjoy one of the oldest and most settled protections in the law of the sea, inherited from the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables. Article 58 of UNCLOS extends to all states the freedom to lay submarine cables in any EEZ, which extends 200 nautical miles from a state’s coast, and covers fishing and other natural resources, while allowing other states freedom on navigation and cable laying. Article 79 does the same on the continental shelf, subject to limited coastal state controls, such as the right to take reasonable measures to explore the shelf and exploit its resources, and to set conditions for cables entering its territorial sea. The regime reflects the transnational character of the infrastructure, whose value depends on crossing jurisdictions without seeking consent in every EEZ along the route.

Marine scientific research, however, operates under a different framework within UNCLOS. Under Article 246 of UNCLOS, foreign research in the EEZ or the continental shelf requires coastal state consent, which states should grant “in normal circumstances” for peaceful projects. Classification as research also triggers the disclosure and data-sharing obligations of Articles 248 and 249.

In other words, laying submarine cables in an EEZ does not require coastal state consent under UNCLOS, but conducting marine scientific research in an EEZ does.

A SMART cable, however, combines telecommunications infrastructure with scientific observation capabilities, carrying traffic for 25 years while its repeaters record environmental data. Kent Bressie’s 2012 study for the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) concluded that neither UNCLOS nor customary law settles whether such dual-purpose cables constitute marine scientific research. Youri van Logchem’s recent analysis identifies a “double function” capable of activating different legal obligations depending on where a cable lies and how it is used. These questions concern the broader interpretation of international law governing multifunctional infrastructure. For SMART projects, this broader legal debate need not impede deployment: individual systems can proceed through established national procedures and cooperative arrangements governing scientific observations and data access.

The ambiguity actually predates cables, since Part XIII of UNCLOS never defines marine scientific research. The United States excludes hydrographic and military surveys, cable activities, and routine observations for forecasting and hazard warning from the category, while many coastal states define marine scientific research more broadly. Scholars like Sam Bateman and Chuxiao Yu have shown how the same measurement can fall on either side of the line depending on who collects it and why. A depth-sounding of water-temperature profile may count as a hydrographic survey when a navy charts a sea lane, and as marine scientific research when a university uses it to study ocean circulation.

The three SMART projects closest to deployment illustrate how multifunctional submarine cables can advance ocean science and disaster risk reduction across different geographic and jurisdictional settings. Portugal’s Atlantic CAM ring connects Portuguese territory, allowing scientific observation to proceed within a single national jurisdiction. TamTam, a Vanuatu-owned submarine cable developed by Prima Limited linking Vanuatu and New Caledonia, demonstrates how international telecommunications infrastructure can support scientific cooperation and disaster risk reduction across national jurisdictions by combining Vanuatu investment, including equity from the Vanuatu National Provident Fund, with financing from the European Investment Bank and Asian Development Bank, and scientific sensors funded by the French government. This international cooperation extends to the data as well, which is delivered to scientific institutions and civil protection authorities in Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and France. The Mediterranean Integrated Science and Telecom System (MISTS), a proposed Mediterranean network designed in part to strengthen tsunami warning and environmental monitoring, would extend these benefits across a much larger group of coastal states.

As SMART systems expand geographically, coordination over scientific observation and applicable legal requirements becomes increasingly important. Through my work with Pacific Peering, which serves as the SMART operator for TamTam and is co-developing MISTS, I have gained a practical perspective on these questions. Pacific Peering operates the scientific sensing infrastructure, manages the resulting oceanographic and seismic data, and makes those observations available to France’s state-funded scientific organization Ifremer for TamTam and to national scientific institutions in the countries where MISTS lands, ensuring that participating countries retain sovereignty over their scientific data. This work has brought the legal questions surrounding multifunctional submarine cables into discussions as these systems move towards deployment.

Bressie’s ITU study anticipated this gradient in 2012, separating easier deployments from those crossing states that assert expansive authority over marine data. SMART cables still give lawyers something tangible to classify, since the scientific function resides in identifiable equipment integrated into the cable’s repeaters. That physical anchor is beginning to disappear as the newest sensing techniques draw observations from the telecommunications fiber itself, which I describe in further detail below.

When Infrastructure Becomes a Sensor

Distributed acoustic sensing turns an optical fiber into a continuous line of listening points, using an interrogator at the landing station to send laser pulses down the fiber and read the light scattered back. Interferometric and state-of-polarization methods infer seabed conditions from changes in the optical signal, the latter from the commercial traffic itself. As the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) noted in a February 2026 position paper, none of these techniques requires modifying the submerged “wet plant.” A cable permitted solely for communications can therefore acquire an observational capability years later through equipment ashore.

Beyond the hazard and climate observations described above, SMART cable sensing could potentially monitor marine mammals and help protect the cables themselves. Fiber-optic sensing techniques, when combined with information from the Automatic Identification System, could warn of approaching vessels and preserve evidence after an anchor strike of the kind the Eagle S inflicted across the Gulf of Finland. The ICPC argues that sensing for “infrastructure protection and continuity of communications” falls within cable freedoms and outside the research regime. It also observes that national regulation remains “in its infancy.”

Consider a single segment of fiber registering the signature of a passing vessel, the tremor of an undersea earthquake, and a shift in bottom temperature. Operators analyzing vessel signatures to protect their cables have strong claims to be exercising cable freedoms; navies exploiting these signatures for their own purposes raise a different set of legal considerations. Meanwhile, a university modeling undersea earthquake tremors sits close to scientific research. Although the fiber is identical in each case, the legal questions depend on how the observations are collected and used, and by whom. Those questions may be difficult for coastal states to answer when the relevant decisions are made ashore.

Autonomous underwater vehicles present related questions about how established maritime law applies to emerging technologies. UNCLOS has no dedicated governance structure for autonomous underwater vehicles. Scholars Natalie Klein, Kate Purcell, and Jack McNally treat their status as ships as central and unresolved, and Daiana Seabra Venancio finds that national practice variously assigns them different legal statuses. When a Chinese naval vessel seized a U.S. Navy ocean glider near Subic Bay in 2016, for instance, the Pentagon called it a “sovereign immune vessel of the United States.” Beijing returned it while objecting to U.S. survey activity. Although autonomous vehicles operate differently from fixed submarine cable infrastructure, both illustrate the importance of identifying the particular activity being conducted when determining which legal rules apply.

Whose Purpose Counts?

UNCLOS already suggests the contours of an answer, since it frequently attaches rules to activities rather than assigning a single legal classification to infrastructure capable of performing multiple functions. Article 258 subjects scientific equipment to the conditions governing research in the relevant zone, while Article 259 separately addresses its status. On that logic, a SMART cable crossing a foreign EEZ retains the protections afforded to submarine cables under Articles 58 and 79 while its sensing function may engage the provisions of Part XIII depending on the nature and purpose of the activity — an approach best described as functional disaggregation.

Disaggregation depends on identifying purpose, however, and that purpose may be distributed among several participants in modern infrastructure systems. A cable may be owned by a multinational consortium, manufactured in one state, landed in others, and supply data to a variety of organizations, while an autonomous vehicle may be built by one firm, operated by a contractor, and tasked by a government. Determining which actor’s activities and intentions are legally relevant becomes more complicated when infrastructure supports multiple functions and its data serve different users.

The question extends beyond classification to responsibility. Three bodies of law link states to activities carried out by others. States are responsible for marine scientific research undertaken “by them or on their behalf” under Article 263. Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility attributes private conduct carried out “on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of” a state. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s Seabed Disputes Chamber’s 2011 advisory opinion meanwhile imposes due diligence obligations on states sponsoring contractors in the international seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Applying these principles to multifunctional infrastructure requires separating the responsibilities of the various actors involved and the activities each undertakes. Consider a hypothetical: a privately operated sensing network’s environmental observations are subsequently acquired by a defense ministry for maritime surveillance. The subsequent acquisition and use of those observations should be assessed separately from their original collection, with responsibility determined according to each actor’s conduct and the applicable legal rules.

Downstream use presents the hardest test. Records collected for tsunami warning may later prove valuable for submarine operations. Letting each subsequent use reclassify the original collection would make its legal status depend on events no one could evaluate or foresee at the outset. Without clear distinctions between the original collection and subsequent uses, coastal states may be inclined to classify systems according to their ownership or potential security applications, rather than the activities actually being conducted. This tension is increasingly relevant to U.S. maritime policy.

Washington on Both Sides

The United States has long championed broad navigational and cable freedoms, and its own guidance places a variety of maritime activities beyond Part XIII of UNCLOS. But over the past six years, U.S. policy has placed greater emphasis on national security considerations in determining which foreign actors may conduct activities in American waters. Proclamation 10071, issued in 2020, ended the 1983 practice of permitting foreign research in the U.S. EEZ without advance authorization. The Arctic Security and Diplomacy Act, introduced by Senators Mike Lee and Jeanne Shaheen last June, would codify that requirement and bar research by vessels linked to foreign adversaries. Professor Vito De Lucia argues that the bill turns consent “from an activity-based consideration into a status-based exclusion.”

Similar security considerations arise in the regulation of submarine cables. A company that wants to bring a submarine cable ashore in the United States must first obtain a cable landing license from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Applications involving foreign participation may be referred to the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector, still widely known as Team Telecom, which advises the FCC on security risk. These reviews address legitimate concerns about foreign access to critical telecommunications infrastructure, including the potential exposure of sensitive information. The expansion of oceanographic and seismic observations through submarine cables also raises questions about data access and appropriate safeguards, particularly where information could have applications beyond its original scientific purpose.

These security measures also raise broader questions for U.S. maritime interests. States along the routes of U.S. cables and in waters where U.S. survey ships and gliders operate could claim that coastal states may restrict activity based on an operator’s identity or a system’s most sensitive possible use. China has contested U.S. military surveys in its claimed EEZ for decades. An identity-based approach could provide Beijing with additional arguments for challenging allied cables and platforms. Overly restrictive approaches to scientific observation could also limit opportunities to expand seismic and tsunami coverage across the Pacific, where the hazard to U.S. territories and allies is particularly acute.

Making Function Legible

The more durable course lies in sharpening the functional distinctions UNCLOS already contains. The first principle concerns timing — so that the legal character of data collection turns on an activity’s purpose and intended uses when it occurs — as Article 248 already implies by requiring disclosure of a project’s “nature and objectives” in advance. A system designed for several functions may engage several regimes from its first day, while a later and unforeseen use should be evaluated as a separate activity under the applicable legal framework, without retroactively altering the classification of the original collection.

The second principle separates sensing that protects infrastructure from sensing conducted as an independent enterprise. Monitoring for approaching anchors bears directly on the cable’s protected function, and treating it as an incident of cable freedoms would reinforce the resilience the Eagle S case exposed as fragile. A research program drawing on the same fiber may engage Part XIII of UNCLOS depending on its purpose and the nature of the activity, and the same issue offers Washington an alternative to blanket refusal, with security review aimed at specific data flows and their recipients.

The third principle concerns process, since Part XIII was built around discrete projects and persistent systems present new questions about how its provisions should be applied over time. The Argo program offers a tested model for coordinating sustained ocean observations with coastal states. Under IOC Resolution XX-6 and its 2008 implementing guidelines, operators notify coastal states when floats may drift into their EEZs, and coastal states may request bilateral notification and the cessation of data transmission in their waters — an arrangement that has sustained a global observing network for 25 years while the underlying classification dispute remains open. Although Argo floats and fixed submarine cable operate under different technical and legal environments, the program illustrates how practical cooperation can support long-term scientific observation without requiring every question of legal classification to be resolved in advance.

SMART cables and fiber sensing networks could benefit from voluntary, project-specific cooperative arrangements where appropriate, addressing notification, coastal state participation, data access, and procedures for addressing materially new functions as systems evolve. As a multinational Mediterranean initiative, MISTS illustrates the potential value of developing common practices that facilitate scientific cooperation while providing clarity for participating governments and infrastructure operators. The Joint Task Force, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the World Meteorological Organization, and the ICPC already connect the relevant governments and operators, providing opportunities to exchange experience and develop practical guidance that supports SMART deployment. The Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement), which entered into force in January 2026, adds a forum devoted partly to the transfer of marine technology.

The cables now being laid will rest on the seabed for the next 25 years, carrying trillions of messages while registering earthquakes and feeding observations to scientists tracking a warming ocean. The law of the sea has accommodated generations of technological change through a framework that distinguishes among maritime activities and the rights and responsibilities associated with them. As submarine cables acquire new scientific capabilities, preserving those distinctions will be essential to sustaining the freedoms that enable global connectivity while expanding the continuous ocean observations needed to improve tsunami warning, understand climate change, and protect communities from natural hazards.

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