The Trilateral Framework Agreement signed by Israel and Lebanon on June 26 established a road map to end the conflict between the two countries. The agreement, which the United States also signed, was predated by other attempts to regulate the long-term relations between Israel and Lebanon, including a 2022 maritime boundary agreement, a 1983 peace agreement (which never entered into force), and Security Council Resolutions 1701 (2006), 425 (1978) and 242 (1967). The new agreement proclaims the parties’ mutual interest in ending the state of war and establishing peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon, creating conditions that would allow the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to reassert its exclusive authority over the territory of Lebanon and facilitate Israeli withdrawal from the country. It identifies Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite militia, as the underlying cause of the current conflict. It is against this broad political framework, where both parties have decided to put aside their mutual grievances and work jointly – with American support – toward changing conditions on the ground and tackling a common adversary, that the terms of the agreement should be evaluated.
The Main Aspects of the June 26 Agreement
The Trilateral Framework Agreement is an interim pact between Israel and Lebanon, seen as a first step in a historical process designed to “end conflict between them, ensure the sovereignty and security of both countries, and establish peaceful neighborly relations between the two countries.” In article 12 of the agreement, Israel and Lebanon commit to establish working groups “to draft the full comprehensive peace and security agreement” and to resort to complementary tracks of direct engagement to give effect to the Trilateral Framework Agreement. Both countries commit to proceed to negotiate in good faith until “full and lasting peace” is achieved. In order to facilitate the negotiations, article 13 provides that the two states will adopt confidence-building measures, including “cessation of all hostile or adverse actions in international political or legal fora.” They also agree to work toward the “search for and return of remains” (the remains of Ron Arad, an Israeli air force pilot who was captured in Lebanon in 1986, are believed to still be in Lebanese territory) and the release of detainees (Israel is reportedly detaining several dozen Lebanese citizens). The language of Article 13 has created controversy in some circles, and several NGOs and human rights groups criticized this aspect of the agreement for allegedly absolving Israel from incurring international accountability for the many civilian harms it caused during its military operations in Lebanon (the NGOs’ statement also briefly mentions harm inflicted on Israeli citizens in Northern Israel). Indeed, it has already been suggested that article 13 may complicate, if not derail, the work of the recently created United Nations High Commission for Human Rights Assessment Mission for Lebanon.
Another key feature of the agreement involves the elaboration of several reciprocal, inter-dependent and verifiable obligations. According to article 2, the verifiable disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantlement of associated infrastructure will enable the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to “progressively redeploy out of Lebanese territory” and allow the LAF to reassert control over the entire territory of Lebanon. Upon the reassumption of LAF control, reconstruction efforts can begin and the civilian population that was evacuated from these areas may safely return (the linkage between civilian return and the milestones identified in the agreement was also criticized in the NGOs’ statement because it further prolongs the displacement of Lebanese civilians). The specific details of the process by which measures, security arrangements, and verification will be taken are spelled out in a security annex. According to the annex, the LAF will “lead the implementation” of the disarmament process. Article 3 of the Trilateral Framework Agreement already provides, however, that the process will begin in two “pilot zones,” and article 4 stipulates that Lebanon will seek international assistance, including by Arab partners, and under the leadership of the United States to verify and support the process.
Unsurprisingly, the pilot withdrawals began with fits and starts. On July 21, the LAF started deploying its forces in the “pilot zones” and a few civilian families returned to their homes. Yet, on July 26, the LAF put out a statement accusing Israel of obstructing its attempts to take control of Southern Lebanon and preventing its soldiers from taking control of villages as agreed. Israel has not yet formally responded to this claim.
In the agreement, Israel and Lebanon set out their intentions vis-à-vis one another. The government of Lebanon is committed to achieving a monopoly on the use of force in its territory (art. 4) and reaffirms its exclusive sovereign authority over war and peace (art. 6). As part of this stated intention, Lebanon will prevent funding of non-state armed groups, such as Hezbollah, and will take measures to proscribe their operations. Israel declares that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and that its military actions in Lebanese territory are directed only against threats posed to it by non-state actors. The United States, for its part, declares its willingness to support the reconstruction of Lebanon, provide it with humanitarian assistance and with economic recovery programs and investment.
Article 7 clarifies that the two states retain a right to self-defense under international law, and that this right cannot be invoked by third parties (alluding implicitly both to Hezbollah and Iran), and article 8 identifies the safe return of Lebanese civilians to South Lebanon and the security of Israel’s northern communities as long-term goals.
Finally, the Trilateral Framework Agreement contains an affirmation of the right of both Israel and Lebanon to exist in peace (art. 2), of their intent to achieve “lasting peace and security,” and “peaceful neighborly relations” (preamble), and their appreciation for the role of the United States and the “vision and leadership of President Donald J. Trump” (art. 14).
Return to “Land for Peace”
The Trilateral Framework Agreement can be regarded as the continuation of a long-standing legal trajectory governing the Israeli-Arab conflict in the Middle East, which links measures taken by Israel–typically, withdrawals from occupied land–to security guarantees and conclusion of peace agreements. In 1967, the Security Council established through Resolution 242 a “land for peace” formula:
…the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
On that basis, Israel concluded a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, which involved land withdrawals, the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, and the deployment of a multinational force and observers. The 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan followed a similar logic–reaffirmation of the international border between Mandatory Palestine and Mandatory Transjordan and the exchange of security guarantees. In 1995, Israel concluded an Interim Agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which also reflected–like the 1993 Declaration of Principles between the same parties–the logic of land for peace: Withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and security guarantees, including measures designed to prevent terrorism and violence.
Previous attempts to regulate armed hostilities between Israel and Lebanon from 1978 onwards also tended to conform to the same formula. Security Council Resolution 425 called on Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory and established a peacekeeping force–UNIFIL– to verify the withdrawal and for “restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.” Whereas Resolution 425 was enacted against the backdrop of Israel’s security concerns stemming from the use of Southern Lebanon by the PLO to attack Israel, Security Council Resolution 1701 from 2006 was adopted against the background of Hezbollah’s use of Southern Lebanon for comparable military purposes. Resolution 1701 provided a road map for full Israeli withdrawal, redeployment of Lebanese governmental forces and UNIFIL in the South and entrusting it with the task of ensuring the disarmament of armed groups active in the area.
The Trilateral Framework Agreement follows the same logic of withdrawal/security guarantees of Resolutions 425 and 1701. It differs from them, however, in a number of key aspects. First, it is the product of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon and is not a U.N. Security Council resolution. Second, it is more ambitious than the aforementioned resolutions in that it aims to establish peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon, and not merely security arrangements. In fact, it already includes a mutual recognition of the “right of each state to exist in peace.” It does not designate a role for UNIFIL in the implementation of the agreement (the mandate of UNIFIL is planned to expire next year); and it creates “pilot zones,” which the two states will designate for initial LAF deployment with the support of the United States. As indicated above, the parties also agreed to link the safe return of Lebanese civilians to Southern Lebanon to the process of redeployment of the LAF and the gradual withdrawal of the IDF.
The Trilateral Framework Agreement and General International Law
The approach taken in the Trilateral Framework Agreement differs significantly from the approach taken by the International Court of Justice in its 2024 advisory opinion on Practices and Policies of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In that case, the Court opined that Israel must withdraw from the Palestinian territories it occupies “as rapidly as possible,” without linking that withdrawal to any specific security arrangements or the conclusion of a peace agreement. This approach appears to reflect the Court’s strong position on the illegality of Israel’s continued presence and the policies and practices associated with such presence, and its exasperation with Israel’s invocation of security concerns in connection with its settlement policy and its measures of de facto annexation. (We did criticize elsewhere the Court’s failure to meaningfully engage with Security Council Resolution 242 and the Oslo Accords as relevant legal frameworks that followed the “land for peace” paradigm).
In any event, the case for application of the “land for peace” paradigm in Lebanon is stronger. Unlike with regard to the West Bank, Israel declared it does not have territorial claims to any Lebanese territory, has withdrawn on a number of previous occasions to the international border, and its presence in Lebanon appears to have a clear security rationale. It is difficult for us to accept the critique that an agreement freely entered into by the parties and which follows past precedents, including the formula repeatedly endorsed by Security Council resolutions in relation to Israel and Lebanon, violates international law. Rather, it appears that the Trilateral Framework Agreement draws lessons from past failures to stabilize the situation across the Lebanese-Israeli border: It replaces the mechanism of full Israeli withdrawal against inadequate security guarantees in the form of UNIFIL with incremental Israeli withdrawals against gradual assumption of control over evacuated territories by the LAF with the support of the United States. This represents a clear choice by the Lebanese government to transform the security crisis into an opportunity to implement its “monopoly of arms” agenda, and the Trilateral Framework Agreement lends support to this policy. Arguably, this gradual approach is more likely to result in full Lebanese sovereign control of its territories – in accordance with basic principles of international law – than previous attempts that failed due to the power vacuum they left in place. In any event, since Lebanon and Israel may agree, in theory, on the redrawing of the border between them, it is not clear to us why an agreement on gradual withdrawal to the international border constitutes a violation of international law and not a valid agreement under international law.
The aforementioned NGOs’ statement raises, however, two specific concerns about the Trilateral Framework Agreement, which merit consideration: One, the linkage introduced between transfer of control of areas to the LAF and the safe return of civilians thereto; second, the language on “cessation of all hostile or adverse actions in international political or legal fora.” Regarding the first concern, it appears that the parties to the agreement assumed that, as a practical matter, civilians could only return to areas under the effective control of the LAF, either because in areas controlled by the IDF hostilities continue, or because they would not feel safe to return to areas controlled by a foreign army. While under both international humanitarian law (article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and international human rights law (article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), civilians have a right to return to places they were deported by an occupying power after the cessation of hostilities (subject to overriding security considerations), it appears as if a gradual–yet not excessively prolonged–program of resettlement might be deemed a reasonable implementation measure, especially when conditions in the South remain volatile and the causes for their displacement are still in place. (Cf. ICRC Customary Rule, Rule 132). What’s more, an incremental agreement that seeks to promote peace and security in the area and which affirms the right of civilians to return, could serve the long-term interests of these civilians. Still, if it turns out that civilians are not returned, and that security concerns merely serve as a pretext for the continued presence of Israel in Lebanon, preventing return would be transformed into a new violation of international law.
A more problematic aspect of the agreement is accountability. Indeed, a possible interpretation of the agreement (one no doubt supported by the Israeli government) is that the agreement closes the door on any legal activity in international courts or tribunals regarding past activities of the parties to the conflict. This interpretation, however, is not the only one possible. First, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam claimed that the duty to refrain from invoking the jurisdiction of international courts was undertaken only with respect to the time of negotiations. Second, such an undertaking cannot bar Lebanon from demanding reparations from Israel for harm to its citizens (which is likely to issue parallel reparation claims for harms caused to Israeli citizens); nor can it bar individuals and third states from taking measures to enforce the rights of individuals in foreign or international courts. We note, in this regard, that renunciation of international claims is not exceptional in international agreements having a transitional justice dimension (see e.g., the Chagos agreement, art. 11), and that states are not legally required to accept the jurisdiction of international courts–including the International Criminal Court (which Lebanon has not joined to date)–or even exercise diplomatic protection over their nationals.
Conclusion
As we have discussed previously, for almost three years, since October 7, 2023 (the date of Hamas’ attack on Israel), a multi-front war has been raging in the Middle East. The main question facing the parties to the Lebanon conflict, and, in fact, the entire international community, is how to end this prolonged and devastating multi-front conflict. The Trilateral Framework Agreement between Israel, Lebanon, and the United States represents a major step in the direction of restoring international peace and security on the Israel-Lebanese front. Although the prospects of full implementation of the Agreement are unclear, it still appears to offer the best chance in a long time for a successful cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon.
The long-term interest of the international community, and especially of civilians in Lebanon and Israel, is to lend support for the agreement and promote its implementation. Without it, civilians on both sides of the border will pay the highest price.
