In April, a suspected Iranian front organization claimed credit for several arson attacks on Jewish sites in London — just the latest in a spate of alleged Iranian plots around the word since the start of the Iran war. As the United States’ war against Iran continues, the U.S. counterterrorism community’s efforts are especially crucial, both in thwarting Iranian-aligned attacks within the United States and in mobilizing other governments to act against Iran’s global terror network. But counterterrorism in general, and Iranian terrorism in particular, is not a high enough priority for the Trump administration, which has more often focused on immigration, antifa, gangs, and cartels.
Since the United States began the war in February, Iran has not been subtle about its terrorist intentions. At the start of the U.S. and Israeli attacks, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force publicly warned that “the enemy should know that their happy days are over and they will no longer be safe anywhere in the world, not even in their own homes.” Since that threat, Iran has been linked to plots in Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom, among other locales.
Although the threat environment is arguably worsening, the Trump administration does not appear to be sufficiently prioritizing counterterrorism efforts. According to multiple news reports, early in the administration, the FBI diverted significant counterterrorism resources to focus instead on immigration enforcement cases. And in the days leading up to the war with Iran, FBI Director Kash Patel reportedly fired a dozen members of a counterintelligence team focused on Iran because they had previously worked on cases involving President Donald Trump. To keep the country safe, the Trump administration must reprioritize its counterterrorism efforts before it’s too late.
Looking in the Wrong Direction
Since taking office, the Trump administration has reduced and diverted its counterterrorism workforce at the same time it has broadened the U.S. government’s reach and scope in this area by designating numerous cartels and gangs in Central America as terrorist organizations for the first time. These actions could stretch limited counterterrorism resources to monitor and investigate these cartels and gangs — at the expense of other more traditional threats such as Iran.
Furthermore, Reuters reported that the Trump administration was planning to create and lead a new global forum to counter the threat of the amorphous far-left movement known as antifa (short for “antifascist”). Antifa hardly represents the same type and level of threat as Iran-linked terrorism or global jihadist groups such as ISIS or al-Qaeda. In fact, antifa is not even a formal organization, although that didn’t stop the White House from issuing an executive order in January declaring it a “domestic terrorist organization.” Still, as a 2020 Congressional Research Service Report noted, antifa “lacks a unifying organizational structure or detailed ideology.” A senior FBI official identified antifa as the Bureau’s “most immediate violent threat” during a December 2025 congressional hearing, but he was unable to provide many details, merely describing the threat landscape as “fluid.” Many European officials are also deeply skeptical about the extent of the antifa threat, which will also limit the value of the proposed new forum. For example, after the United States designated two antifa-linked groups in Greece in November, a Greek official noted that while “antifa exists across Europe, including in Greece… until this day, they have been activists. They have not engaged in any terrorist activity.”
Danger Builds
As the Trump administration attempts to portray far-left activists and drug cartels as major terrorist threats, the United States’ traditional and most dangerous terrorist foes continue to plot attacks. Hezbollah, Iran’s longest-standing terrorist partner, could take action. In 2019, a Hezbollah operative, who described himself to the FBI as a “sleeper agent,” was convicted in New York. When the Bureau asked what circumstances could lead to his activation, he replied: a U.S. war with Iran. An attack in Michigan last month by a Hezbollah-linked individual against a synagogue and preschool was fortunately disrupted, not by the FBI, but by alert synagogue security guards. Days earlier, members of the suspect’s family were killed in an Israeli airstrike in Lebanon, including a brother that the Israeli military said was a Hezbollah commander. The narrowly averted tragedy serves as an urgent warning about the dangers Iran and its global network pose right now.
The United States should also be concerned about Hamas, which Iran has also supported for many years. The Palestinian jihadist group has never carried out a successful terrorist attack outside of Israel, the West Bank, or Gaza. But recent criminal cases in Germany and Denmark reveal that Hamas had contingency plans before its October 7, 2023, assault on Israel for strikes in Europe, stashing small arms for its operatives in multiple European countries. This is a dangerous trend well worth watching.
Meanwhile, ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to call on their followers to conduct attacks in the United States and against U.S. targets. This threat remains very real. In early April, two individuals were indicted for attacking the New York mayor’s mansion in New York City, with the New York Police Department and the FBI describing the plot as an ISIS-inspired effort to inflict mass casualties. And in March, a convicted ISIS supporter attacked an R.O.T.C. barracks at Old Dominion University in Virginia, killing one and injuring others. ISIS and al-Qaeda also could attack U.S. interests overseas, particularly in parts of Africa, where these radical groups remain both dangerous and capable.
Developing a Strategy
Discerning the Trump administration’s counterterrorism priorities can be difficult, given the administration’s disjointed counterterrorism and national security efforts and processes. The administration should take several steps to provide more clarity on its counterterrorism intentions and approach. Perhaps most notably, the administration should finalize and release its long-awaited counterterrorism strategy, which has apparently been drafted and awaiting final approval for many months. This strategy can and should make clear that countering Iran-linked terrorism is and will remain a top U.S. national security priority, even after the war ends. The administration should also move quickly to fill the job of director of the National Counterterrorism Center with a serious counterterrorism professional. It is a key position that sits vacant after Joe Kent stepped down in March in protest of the Iran war.
Publicly highlighting the ongoing U.S. commitment to addressing Iranian terrorist threats would send an important message to the Quds Force and other Iranian leaders that the United States will be closely watching their activities and will hold them accountable. It would also convey an important message to the United States’ allies and partners, who have been struggling to understand the U.S. counterterrorism posture and approach. Although the world may no longer be looking to the United States for counterterrorism leadership in the way it did after 9/11, the United States can still show that it intends to drive the international agenda against terrorism at this moment of heightened danger.
