From Jan. 19–30, the first Preparatory Committee for the Diplomatic Conference on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity (the “PrepCom” or “PrepCom I”) met, marking the next step in the process toward a treaty to codify such crimes under international law.
The purpose of the PrepCom is to organize, negotiate, and discuss the substantive and procedural groundwork for the diplomatic conference that will follow, including deciding on modalities of participation and rules of procedure—many of which have the potential to materially shape outcomes.
Anticipation was high as delegates and members of civil society gathered in the Trusteeship Council at U.N. Headquarters in New York for the historic opening session, formally starting the process to close this 80-year-old legal gap. Despite dismal weather and frigid temperatures, State delegates arrived in large numbers, while members of civil society waited cheerfully outside the U.N. pass office, clutching hot coffees, to obtain their badges. Yet while 117 CSOs had managed to register despite a last-minute scramble to submit accreditation requests, many fewer could travel to New York on short notice, especially given difficulties obtaining visas and financing, and at the end of the day, only 14 civil society representatives presented remarks during the general debate.
The two of us have been following this process for years (and one of us, Leila, founded the Crimes against Humanity Initiative, which drafted the first model treaty on Crimes against Humanity in 2008), and were present for the entirety of the PrepCom. You can find previous pieces from us on the treaty process here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.
The Mood in New York, the Tasks of the PrepCom, and the Election of the Chair
The PrepCom was established by Resolution 79/122, adopted in December 2024 after fierce negotiations in the U.N. Sixth Committee, during which opponents of the crimes against humanity treaty, led by the Russian Federation, interposed both procedural and substantive objections to its negotiation. The Resolution, which created a four-year long pathway to the treaty’s final adoption, was nonetheless adopted by consensus, with Russia dissociating from the text in both the Sixth Committee and later in the General Assembly.
With actual treaty negotiations still two years out, the PrepCom had five tasks before it. First, to elect a Chair. Second, to elect the other officers of the Bureau, who are tasked with organizing the procedural and organizational work of the PrepCom (a separate Bureau will be elected for the diplomatic conference). Third, to adopt the agenda and organization of work. Fourth, to allow States, both in the general debate and during Working Group meetings, to comment on the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2019 Draft Articles, the treaty as a whole, or raise new proposals. Finally, the PrepCom needed to take a decision on the participation of non-ECOSOC accredited stakeholders, an issue that had been deferred during the difficult negotiations surrounding the adoption of Resolution 79/122.
During the prior Sixth Committee meeting in October 2025, of 127 State interventions, the vast majority were positive, with only 10 States voicing opposition, suggesting that PrepCom I might go smoothly. This was not to be the case.
Indeed, less than five minutes into the opening Plenary session, the Russian Federation challenged the election of the Chair, Declan Smyth of Ireland, and a somewhat testy debate ensued. Ultimately, after much back-and-forth, including an intervention by U.N. Legal Counsel Elinor Hammerskjöld, the Preparatory Committee elected Smyth as the Chair, who then turned to the election of the Bureau.
Again, a handful of States, led by Russia, China and Egypt challenged the process, and proposed expanding the Bureau from one to three representatives per regional group. This was an issue that had been raised and (it was thought) settled in the fall. This threatened to derail the PrepCom (which may have been at least one motivating factor for these objections). The Chair, however, moved swiftly to resolve the impasse by postponing the election and proceeding directly to the general debate, while engaging in informal consultations with States about the Bureau. These procedural skirmishes lasted nearly 90 minutes, but more significant than the time lost was the negative tone and frustration engendered. Fortunately, although the Bureau was not elected until the 7th meeting of the PrepCom on Jan. 27, once the general debate began, the generally constructive tone of the fall 2025 Sixth Committee session returned.
The Working Group of the Whole and General Takeaways on Substance
(a) What is the Working Group of the Whole, and what did it discuss?
One of the more confusing aspects of Resolution 79/122 is that operative paragraph 7 contemplated a Working Group of the Whole that would operate within the PrepCom to “meet for the entire first session of the Preparatory Committee to facilitate consultations on the draft articles, and to enable Governments to prepare formal proposals for amendments to the draft articles . . . to be included in the compiled text” to be submitted to the Diplomat Conference. This modality, which to some seemed to be duplicative of the resumed sessions held in 2023 and 2024, was a last-minute compromise introduced into Resolution 79/122. Overall, 61 States and two regional groups spoke during the Working Group sessions, indicating that many are still considering their views on the treaty’s substance.
The programme of work included a combination of Working Group and Plenary sessions, plus time reserved for side events and informal consultations. The Working Group meetings were “closed,” meaning that, unlike the Plenary meetings, they would not be webcast and would be open only to States and ECOSOC-accredited civil society physically present in New York, although accredited members of civil society were allowed to observe and take notes, and some States have posted their interventions online.
The Working Group followed the same five “clusters” of Draft Articles that had been employed during the resumed sessions of the Sixth Committee in 2023 and 2024 to focus attention on specific provisions of the text: introductory provisions, crimes against humanity definition and general obligations, national measures, international measures, and safeguards. In addition, for the first time, time was allocated to discuss “additional provisions.”
Across discussion of the five clusters, which were introduced by Professor Sean Murphy, Special Rapporteur on Crimes against Humanity for the International Law Commission, States were highly engaged, offering support, proposals for change, or disagreement with various aspects of the Draft Articles. Many States commented on the definition of crimes against humanity; on various legal obligations of States under the Draft Articles; on dispute settlement and the possibility of a treaty monitoring mechanism; on the need to enhance the modes of liability and prevention obligations in the text; as well as on the need to include (or not) additional gender-based crimes or provisions to better protect children.
On the “progressive side” there were proposals to prohibit amnesties; to refer specifically to State responsibility in the preamble; to add conspiracy and incitement as new modes of liability; to add the crimes of gender apartheid, reproductive violence, forced marriage, slave trade, environmental harm, starvation, and colonial crimes to Draft Article 2; to amend the definition of persecution to delete the “in connection with element;” and to modify the provisions on interstate cooperation.
On the more restrictive side, there were calls for establishing a “hierarchy” of jurisdictions under Article 7; to depart from the Rome Statute definition in fundamental ways; and to define the term “gender.” Some States suggested references to State sovereignty and principles of non-interference and non-intervention were important to them, as they worried about past and existing double standards in the application of international criminal justice. It is not clear how, and if, these considerations will be taken forward as textual changes.
One thing missing from the discussions was an acknowledgement that the treaty codification process was taking place against the backdrop of the customary international law of crimes against humanity, which has been developing steadily since the establishment of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, respectively.
(b) General Trends
We identified roughly three general trends in State interventions in the general debate and the Working Group.
First, the vast majority of the 94 States and six regional groups on the speakers list for the general debate presented their views on the historic importance of the work ahead of the Preparatory Committee and the pressing need for a treaty on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity. Most States, representing all regional groups, including Gambia and Mexico, which had served as co-facilitators for the adoption of Resolutions 77/249 and 79/122, praised the ILC Draft Articles as the starting point for the negotiations, while, at the same time reiterating their openness to additional crimes such as the slave trade, various gender crimes, including gender apartheid, and the imperative to develop a future-proofed convention to protect and promote human dignity.
Second, a smaller number of delegations offered cautionary remarks, such as Singapore, which urged the substantive outcomes of the negotiations to be adopted by “consensus,” as they had been for other aspects of this process within the Sixth Committee, with decidedly mixed results. Serbia critiqued the ILC Draft Articles and their reliance on the Rome Statute definition of crimes against humanity and the Russian Federation and, having already critiqued the process by which the PrepCom had been established and was operating, proceeded to offer substantial critiques of the ILC Draft Articles, proposed the principle of immunity of State officials be affirmed, and suggested that unilateral coercive measures and various neo-colonial practices should be added as new crimes.
Finally, a small group of Western European States, including Germany and Liechtenstein, were supportive of the treaty process and the PrepCom itself, and underscored the urgent need for the negotiation of a treaty on crimes against humanity, but appeared resistant to the introduction of any new crimes to the text or to amendments to the ILC Draft Articles.
Side Events & the Margins
States and civil society took advantage of the relatively spacious schedule over the two-week period to host side events, with the participation of legal experts and State delegates, on various aspects of the Draft Articles including protection of vulnerable groups (Poland, Republic of Korea, and Brazil), forced marriage (The Netherlands, Canada & Mexico), expert perspectives (Gambia, Mexico, Philippines and Switzerland), and facilitating enforcement (Mexico and Timor Leste). Diplomats and members of civil society were also busy on the margins, using the time in New York to engage in closed-door discussions on thematic issues, such as gender, as well as to meet bilaterally to discuss ways forward, including how to move from commentary to textual proposals by the April 30, 2026, deadline.
Returning to the Election of Officers: Drama in Conference Room 2
One of the most difficult aspects of the PrepCom turned out to be the election of the Bureau. Having postponed the decision on the election on the first day, and following intense consultations with all regional groups, the Chair proposed expanding the Bureau from one member from each regional group to two, a departure from what had been agreed over the summer. That decision was accepted on Jan. 21, and the expanded version of the Bureau, consisting of a Chair, eight Vice-Chairs, and a Rapporteur, was elected Jan. 27.
Why was this seemingly procedural step so contentious? The Bureau will preside over the second session of the PrepCom in April 2027, where it will adopt the rules of procedure for the Diplomatic Conference beginning in 2028, including how decisions will be made if consensus fails. As one seasoned diplomat has observed, the “possibility to vote has been a crucial element in enabling progress.” And given the fight over the Bureau and the election of the Chair during this first session, it is highly likely that more challenges will arise in the future. Given how procedural objections have already been used to disrupt momentum, the modalities and procedures for the Diplomatic Conference have the potential to shape outcomes.
The five original nominees from each regional group were retained, and each group was asked to put forward an additional name. The Rapporteur of the PrepCom, from Cyprus, Asia-Pacific Group, was accepted by acclamation, as were the nominees from the African Group, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Western European and Others Group, and the Asia-Pacific Group. The Eastern European States, however, had three competing nominees: from the Russian Federation, Slovenia, and Ukraine. After failed attempts at compromise, including a proposal from China that the Eastern European Group rotate between the three nominees, which Bulgaria rejected on behalf of the group, the Chair proceeded with PrepCom’s first and only vote.
Under Rule 103 of the General Assembly’s Rules of procedure a secret ballot was held, requiring the distribution of paper ballots with the names of the candidates printed on the ballot papers (and a blank line) to all States by the Conference officers, which were filled out and collected by tellers (representing all regional groups) who displayed the inside of the (empty) ballot boxes before proceedings to collect the ballots. Out of 169 ballots cast, including four abstentions, Ukraine’s candidate received 126 votes; Slovenia’s 112; and Russia’s (visibly disappointed) received 74, falling short of the required majority of 83.
The Decision on Civil Society Participation
The PrepCom’s final act was a decision on whether non-ECOSOC civil society organizations could participate in the process.
On the first day of the PrepCom, the Chair had appointed Ms. Keke Motsepe (South Africa) as the coordinator to negotiate a decision on the participation of non-ECOSOC civil society, who had the difficult task of facilitating discussions between widely divergent perspectives on the appropriate role and engagement of civil society actors. While a majority of delegations wanted the treaty-making process to be victim and survivor centered, and thus welcomed the presence of civil society, the Russian Federation, China, and Nigeria, and a handful of other States objected to their participation. Given the opening skirmish over the election of officers, when the coordinator put forward her proposal, a fight was expected. Astonishingly, however, the text was adopted immediately, by consensus, and without debate. The decision permits the representatives of “relevant non-governmental organizations, other than those in consultative status with [ECOSOC] . . . civil society organizations, academic institutions and the private sector, taking into account the principles of transparency, equitable geographical representation and gender parity, to submit requests to participate in the Conference,” with the list reviewed by U.N. Member States on a “non-objection basis.”
That said, the consensus was not complete. Following the proposal’s adoption, Argentina, Iran, Nicaragua, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, and Türkiye each registered various objections, suggesting that the fight over broadening access to the negotiations will continue in the future. Nonetheless, it was a deeply satisfying result, particularly to many who had been urging States to take this inclusive approach for some time. The process will only be strengthened by the ability of diverse, cross-regional civil society, including survivors and those from affected communities, to participate.
The Way Forward
During the two long, cold weeks of meetings in New York, it was easy to get distracted by procedural minutiae and lose sight of the historic importance of what was taking place. More than 80 years after the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters established crimes against humanity, the international community was finally engaged in an inclusive, universal process to codify these crimes in a new treaty, that would insist upon their prevention and punishment. This opportunity – to craft a new treaty for the future that would forever enshrine a peremptory norm of international law – clearly motivated States and members of civil society, who remained engaged during long hours of debate and discussion. Divisions periodically surfaced, including between States who took each other to task for historic wrongs or current conflicts and over procedural difficulties, but the mood overall was generally positive as delegates embraced the historic opportunity.
Now, of course, comes a long wait until the second PrepCom in 2027. States may submit proposals by April 30, 2026, for inclusion in the text that will be sent to the Diplomatic Conference. Yet it remains to be seen how ambitious States will be with their proposals, or even whether many will submit them, given the short deadline, complex internal and external consultation processes, and capacity constraints. State proposals are keenly anticipated, however, even if they are incomplete, as they will create a baseline for the negotiations along with the Draft Articles. Civil society has, over the last few years, put forward analyses, guidance, and proposals to support states in this process. For example, the ABILA Study Group on Crimes against Humanity (to which we both belong), has put forth 11 proposals, as well as three thematic papers on a range of topics, including starvation, modes of liability, dispute settlement, a human rights monitoring mechanism and interpretation clause, and gender competence.
As the process moves forward, the months ahead will be critical. Continued engagement from States, civil society, and other stakeholders, including through inter-sessional meetings, will be essential to maintaining the momentum of PrepCom I. Ultimately, success will depend on continued skillful leadership, an openness to diverse perspectives, and a shared commitment to justice and accountability in an increasingly divisive multilateral environment. But as we have consistently seen with this process, which seemed nearly impossible seven years ago, the need for a treaty that safeguards humanity against these crimes is too vital to fail.
