On Nov. 9, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced a major overhaul of the nation’s senior service colleges in an address at the United States Naval War College. He made clear that the metric of success for those institutions is their contribution to “victory,” emphasizing,
To truly teach victory, our institutions must also possess the intellectual courage to confront defeat. One of the most alarming findings of our comprehensive review was that our war colleges actively avoid the rigorous study of recent American strategic failures. Faculty dismissed them as sore subjects or politically sensitive topics.
As a professor emeritus of the College, I would note that the Naval War College has studied victory and defeat at least since I graduated over three decades ago. But I could not agree more with the Secretary’s premise that case studies of both must lie at the heart of a war college curriculum. Officers destined for leadership at the highest echelons of our armed forces cannot be expected to achieve victory unless they can recognize strategic defeat, including their own nation’s. This is especially true when the forces involved have performed well, for battlefield success can conceal strategic failure.
In this article, I take up the Secretary’s call by offering a case study of what is surely the most politically sensitive candidate – the war the United States and Israel launched against Iran on Feb. 28, 2026. My conclusion is straightforward. The United States has prevailed in nearly every military engagement, yet it is losing the war. To be clear, the conflict is not over, and any assessment at this stage is necessarily provisional. Nevertheless, defeat seldom arrives in a single blow. Rather, it accumulates over time, taking shape as the war grinds on. As I will explain, the vector in this conflict leads away from victory and toward defeat.
Distinguishing Victory from Defeat
Victory is not a matter of the number of targets struck or the scale of the destruction inflicted on the enemy. Likewise, it is seldom the product of simple attrition of the enemy forces. To illustrate the point, Colonel Harry Summers, in his classic 1982 work, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, recounted a 1975 conversation he had in Hanoi.
“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. “That may be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant” (p. 1).
The exchange bears directly on the war with Iran, for there is no denying that U.S. forces have achieved tactical success in much of the campaign. Despite some failures from the inception of the conflict (most notably, the tragic errant strike on the primary school in Minab), the opening strikes succeeded in killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, together with other senior officials and military commanders (see my analysis with Marko Milanovic); U.S. and Israeli aircraft enjoy air supremacy in Iranian skies; and the Iranian armed forces have taken a severe beating. And while many more than 860 American service members have been wounded by enemy fire, roughly two dozen have died in total throughout the war, a tragic but mercifully low figure for a campaign of this scale. These achievements reflect exceptional professional skill.
What the North Vietnamese Colonel understood is that such achievements do not answer who won (or is winning) and who lost (or is losing). The answer depends on whether the objectives for which the war is fought have been attained and which side ends up in the better position when the fighting stops.
Did the United States attain its objectives?
The first question draws on Clausewitz, who emphasized that “[t]he political object – the original motive for the war – will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires” (p. 81). In other words, the starting point in assessing a war is whether the use of force achieved the purposes for which it was undertaken.
Answering that question is complicated, for, as I explained in an earlier Just Security piece, the objectives of this war have been a moving target. The decapitation strike and the President’s call on Iranians to “take over your government” when “we are finished” suggested that the objective was regime change. Within days, however, the Vice President was describing regime change as “incidental” to denying Iran a nuclear weapon, while the Secretary of State was pointing at Iran’s ballistic missiles and its navy as the campaign’s targets. On March 6, the President demanded “unconditional surrender,” to be followed by the selection of new and “acceptable” leaders. About two weeks after the war began, the White House appeared to settle on four objectives.
From the opening hours of this historic campaign, the objectives were clear: obliterate Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and production capacity, annihilate its navy, sever its support for terrorist proxies, and ensure the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism will never acquire a nuclear weapon.
Once Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, reopening it became a further objective. In my estimation, none of these objectives has been definitively achieved.
The United States has come closest with respect to degrading the Iranian armed forces. Yet they remain in action. In recent days, for instance, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed credit for drone attacks on Bahrain, and tankers were struck near the Strait of Hormuz. Nor has Iranian support for its proxies been severed. Hamas and Hezbollah had already been weakened before the war began. Still, since then, Iran has turned to the Houthis and Iraqi militias to attack, inter alia, Saudi targets and Red Sea shipping.
The nuclear objective merits particular attention, as it appears to have emerged as the war’s principal justification. Importantly, it was not a new objective, although if the purpose was indeed to target Iran’s nuclear program, that purpose was unlawful. As I noted with Tess Bridgeman and Ryan Goodman a week prior to the current war’s commencement, Iran did not have a nuclear weapons capability in February 2026, and even if it did, “merely having a weapons capability is not a ground for invoking self-defense.”
But putting aside the legal point, consider the U.S. posture towards Iran’s nuclear program in the year preceding the war, as it helps explain why attacking Iran’s nuclear program also lacks a strategic rationale.
In June 2025, following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the President announced that “Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.” If that were so, it is difficult to understand why, eight months later, the United States needed to go to war again to ensure that Iran would never acquire a nuclear weapon. The likeliest explanation is that the damage inflicted in the 2025 strikes was mistaken for the achievement of the objective, that is, denying Iran the possibility of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability in the future. It seems that error may be happening again.
Consider what is known. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) latest estimate, as of June 2025, put Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium at a level not far from that required for a weapon. Since then, the IAEA has been unable to verify the stockpile. Indeed, a few months into the current war, it reported,
the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. In addition, due to the lack of access since February 2021 to Iran’s centrifuge component manufacturing, centrifuge assembly and testing workshops for the Agency to perform verification activities, the Agency cannot provide any information on Iran’s current inventory of centrifuges or whether it has suspended their manufacture, assembly and testing. (¶ 26).
Thus, after two campaigns, no one outside Iran seems to know how much of the material survives, where it is located, or whether the program can be reconstituted. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the objective seems to have been scaled back from eliminating Iran’s capability to securing an agreement that limits it.
Next, if regime change was an objective, at least in these initial nine months, it clearly has not been achieved. Within days of Khamenei’s death, Iran named his son, Mojtaba, as his successor. It was an outcome that Trump labeled “unacceptable,” explaining, “Khamenei’s son is a lightweight. I have to be involved in the appointment, like with Delcy [Rodriguez] in Venezuela.” Today, the regime appears even more hardline than before the war.
Finally, the Strait of Hormuz, which was open when the United States launched its attack, remains largely closed nearly nine months later, with vessels needing to transit at night under U.S. Navy escort. Iran has created a body to manage the waterway and insists that it will not fully reopen until its conditions are met. Last week, Iran’s chief negotiator, parliament speaker Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, warned that the Strait will “never return” to its pre-war status.
In short, U.S. objectives have not been met. Moreover, the way those objectives evolved is itself significant. The United States began by demanding unconditional surrender but is now weighing Iranian proposals to reopen a strait that was open when the war started. That is not an adaptation of objectives to changed circumstances. Rather, it is their abandonment.
Did Iran attain its objectives?
Strategic assessment calls for taking stock not only of one’s own objectives, but also of the enemy’s. Clausewitz cautioned against overlooking the point.
War, however, is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all) but always the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war, as formulated here, must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. (p. 77)
This assessment is particularly important when a much stronger power fights a weaker one that regards the conflict as existential. Iran’s overriding objective was just that – to survive. And it has.
A further objective was to preserve its nuclear option, or at least control the extent to which it would relinquish it. In this regard, Iran’s facilities have been struck repeatedly, and its program has undoubtedly been set back. Nevertheless, it has not surrendered its enriched uranium, or its claimed right to enrich, and, as noted, the stockpile is unaccounted for. The nuclear option remains intact, albeit dormant and farther from realization.
And Iran’s objectives in the conflict appear to have expanded. According to Ghalibaf, Iran has seven conditions for ending the conflict, including lifting the U.S. blockade, ending sanctions, and releasing frozen funds. Also critical for Iran is international recognition of its control over the Strait of Hormuz, perhaps by levying fees on shipping. Iran may even be eyeing a longer-term objective, a less militarized and smaller U.S. presence in the region.
Whether Iran will achieve these objectives remains to be seen. But observers should not lose sight of the fact that Iran does not believe it is losing. Having achieved its core objective – survival – Iran has decided to pursue ever more ambitious ones. In my estimation, it is likely to achieve at least some of them. As Ghalibaf put it, “[t]he ball is now in the American court.”
Who is better positioned?
Beyond the mere achievement of objectives, whether victory has been achieved or defeat suffered depends on whether the respective belligerents emerge from the war better or worse positioned than before it began. As the British strategist B.H. Liddell Hart observed in his landmark 1954 treatise, Strategy, “[t]he object in war is to attain a better peace–even if only from your own point of view” (2d ed., p. 351). Whereas the previous assessment of U.S. and Iranian objectives compared the outcome with what each State sought, this comparison contrasts where each State stood when the conflict broke out with where it stands now.
Judged against this standard, the United States is worse off in at least four respects. First, the United States has taken an economic blow. Although it is a net oil exporter, oil is priced on the global market, and the near closure of the strait through which much of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes has been reflected at every American gas station. And diesel hit a record high. These are costs that cascade through the entire economy. Tellingly, the Vice President attributed his party’s midterm losses to both the war and the cost of living; the former drives, in large part, the latter.
Second, the war has consumed weapons on which deterrence elsewhere depends. There are reports that the United States has expended weapons, including cruise missiles and air defense interceptors, at a rate far faster than it can replace them, and that weapons had to be shifted to the Middle East from stockpiles in Europe and Asia. In this regard, Senator Jack Reed has warned, “[a]t current production rates, reconstituting what we have expended could take years.” This is strategically risky, for as the Secretary acknowledged in his Naval War College address, the Pacific is “the decisive theater of the 21st century.” In other words, a war of choice is drawing down capabilities where we may have no choice but to fight.
Third, the war has severely strained U.S. alliances. When the President asked allies to help secure the Strait, most declined. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius explained, “This is not our war, we have not started it.” Similarly, U.S. requests to launch strikes against Iran from British bases in the United Kingdom and on Diego Garcia were refused (although consent was later granted for missions dedicated solely to protecting Gulf States from Iranian attacks). Meanwhile, the Gulf States that host U.S. forces have paid a heavy price, as have others in the region. Iran has struck targets in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Cyprus, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Those States (and others) will likely consider carefully when weighing future U.S. requests for basing and access rights.
Fourth, and distinct from the strain on alliances, the war has cost the United States “soft power.” The late Joseph Nye, who coined the term, explained that soft power
is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.
…
But attraction can turn to repulsion if we act in an arrogant manner and destroy the real message of our deeper values. (Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, p. x)
The legitimacy of this war has been contested from the outset. The United States resorted to force without Security Council authorization and in the absence of an Iranian armed attack that would have triggered the right of self-defense. As I have explained, it thereby violated the prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter and customary international law. The result? The United States is hemorrhaging soft power. A Pew Research Center survey of 36 countries (including 12 NATO members) found that 57% of respondents had an unfavorable opinion of the United States, 50% considered it an unreliable power, 57% believed the United States contributes little to peace and security, and 66% felt it seldom takes other countries’ interests into account.
Moreover, U.S. adversaries are unsurprisingly exploiting this self-inflicted soft-power wound. For instance, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has asserted that “[f]or the United States, the Charter no longer seems to be a binding framework.” The statement is at the pinnacle of hypocrisy considering Russia’s nearly 13-year-long aggression against Ukraine, but it makes the point. Coming on the heels of the boat strikes against alleged drug runners and the forcible seizure of Venezuela’s president, the practical consequence is that the United States’ ability to invoke international law against others has been badly damaged.
Iran’s position at this point is mixed. Its losses should not be understated. Thousands have died, its leadership was decimated early in the conflict, its military has been badly battered, and the Iranian economy is in shambles. That said, Iran has gained in three respects that are likely to endure.
First, through its attacks on U.S. bases in the region and flexing of its asymmetric capabilities, including effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has shown it is capable of exacting a high price when attacked. Most significantly, its drones, missiles, and mines have proven effective in disrupting passage through the Strait of Hormuz despite the presence of the world’s most powerful navy. Although the Iranian operations are unlawful (my analysis here), its demonstrated capability to impose costs in this manner will loom large during any future crisis involving Iran. Moreover, that price is paid by the attacker, by Iran’s neighbors in the region, and by consumers throughout the integrated global economy that relies on the transit of petroleum and other industrial commodities. In other words, Iran has demonstrated that deterrence is, at minimum, a two-way street.
Second, Iran has gained the upper hand on how the war ends. A State that initiates a war of choice ordinarily retains the ability to end it. The United States lost that ability when Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz. If U.S. operations ended tomorrow, the strait would remain largely closed, and Iran’s demands would still be on the table. The long and short of it is that the United States can no longer end the war on acceptable terms without Iran’s acquiescence, and time is on Iran’s side. Indeed, with Democratic majorities taking control of Congress in January, pressure on the administration to end the conflict will only grow.
Third, the war may have strengthened Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran, a Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was attacked twice in eight months over a program that has not yet produced a weapon. Both times, the attacks came while negotiations on a new agreement were underway, one meant to replace the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran generally complied with that agreement until 2019, a year after the first Trump administration withdrew from it.
The Iranians could now conclude that having the capacity to build a weapon invites attack, whereas possessing one might deter it. Indeed, there are hints that Iran may be drawing that conclusion. On Nov. 15, for instance, the spokesperson for the parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission described withdrawal from the NPT as a “serious national demand,” asking, “Is the NPT meant for wartime, when the United States attacks nuclear facilities, or for peacetime?”
On balance, Iran is better positioned than it was as hostilities began, at least as matters now stand. Its losses are largely material and recoverable over time; its gains are strategic. For the United States, the opposite is true. Its immediate losses are recoverable, but it has forfeited strategic advantage. Whatever its record on the battlefield, a State that emerges weaker than when it started, while its opponent has benefitted strategically, is not victorious.
Why the War Went Wrong
A case study of defeat must identify its causes. In my estimation, four strategic failures, none unique to this conflict, are primarily responsible.
The first is that the United States went to war without a defined political objective or desired end state; Clausewitz was clear on the need for both.
No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. (p. 579)
As I noted in July, “regime change, nuclear denial, destruction of the Iranian armed forces, and strait access were asserted, abandoned, and reasserted at different moments by different officials.” By September, the President was calling the conflict “small potatoes,” and the Vice President was declining to characterize it as a war at all, although as a matter of law it plainly is one. The difficulty with a war that lacks defined objectives is that success cannot be measured, and there is no point at which victory can be declared, absent the enemy’s capitulation.
The second failure involved the concept of a “theory of victory,” that is, the explanation, whether articulated or not, of how military action is meant to produce the desired political result. The theory here appears to have been that decapitation and an air campaign would cause the regime to collapse or surrender. I addressed the limits of that approach in an earlier analysis of the air campaign, which drew on Robert Pape’s 1996 study of coercive air power (Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War). He identified four coercive mechanisms – punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation. Of these, denial has by far the strongest record. In other words, air power is most likely to prove coercive when it persuades the enemy that its own strategy cannot succeed. But here, Iran’s strategy was to survive and to close a strait, neither of which air power or other military means seemed able to prevent, at least as the campaign was planned.
The theory also underestimated the difference in what was at stake for the belligerents. For Iran, the war was existential; for the United States, discretionary. Given this imbalance, it was to be expected that the United States, with less at stake, would tire first.
The third failure was discounting Iran’s most effective response. Iran had long threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if attacked, and it promptly carried out that threat. It then widened the conflict by striking the Gulf States that host U.S. forces. And when alternative routes through the Red Sea were established, Iran activated its proxy, the Houthis, to attack them. U.S. strategic decision-makers seemingly discounted these risks, although military planners and intelligence officials must surely have warned them of the possibilities.
Finally, the United States failed to plan for war termination. In his 1971 classic work on the subject, Every War Must End, Fred Iklé explained,
Thus it can happen that military men, while skillfully planning their intricate operations and coordinating complicated maneuvers, remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it, that determines how well their plans serve the nation’s interests. (2d ed., p. 2)
The administration’s expectations bear out the warning. Two days into the war, the President estimated the campaign would last “four to five weeks.” That was a projection for a campaign, not for a war, and it assumed that Iran would accept whatever outcome the campaign imposed. It did not, and each subsequent effort to end the war has foundered. A ceasefire took effect in April. In June, the parties reached an interim agreement declaring an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts.” It collapsed within weeks after attacks on shipping and U.S. retaliatory strikes, and the United States reimposed its blockade. In September, the President rejected an Iranian proposal to reopen the Strait.
Having never defined the terms on which it would settle, the United States began by demanding unconditional surrender and has since shifted among positions that Iran, with power over the Strait, has had little reason to accept. And having apparently given little thought to how mutual distrust might be overcome, it found that neither side was willing to act first. The United States planned how to fight Iran, but not how to stop fighting it. Iran, which planned only to outlast the United States, now holds the key to the war’s end.
Concluding Thoughts
With the war still underway, it is fair to ask whether the United States can snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. I am not optimistic. A resumption of major combat operations would face the same limitations that have hobbled the campaign to date. Enriched uranium that cannot be located cannot be destroyed, and further punishment appears more likely to harden the regime than to break it. Moreover, renewed operations would consume resources needed elsewhere, further eroding U.S. readiness and, with it, deterrence in other theaters.
Nor is reopening the Strait by force a realistic option. Although some traffic is getting through, transit remains severely limited, and clearing the Strait entirely would be a major undertaking, one that would likely require ground forces. Continued economic pressure is the most plausible means of coercion, but it works slowly, if at all, and time no longer favors the United States.
A negotiated settlement is therefore the most promising way to end the war. However, any agreement that can realistically be reached will fall short of the objectives the White House set out in March. It would presumably limit enrichment rather than end it (or it may simply punt the nuclear question down the road), provide some sanctions relief, and afford Iran a role in managing the Strait. Such an outcome would limit the defeat, not reverse it. In my estimation, the priorities in any negotiation should be international observers verifying Iran’s nuclear stockpile on an established timeframe (which may now have to be sequenced to follow, rather than precede, significant sanctions relief) and preserving the principle of free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, even if aspects of how the Strait is administered must be negotiated.
However the war ends, its lessons are already clear. At the Naval War College, Secretary Hegseth warned that “future generals and flag officers” who fail to study strategic failures “with clinical precision” are “doomed to repeat it.” He could not be more right. But the lessons of the Iran war are hardly novel. A State must define its political objective before resorting to force, test its theory of victory against what is at stake for the adversary, anticipate the adversary’s most threatening response, and plan carefully how to end the war on its own terms. Examining why those lessons went unheeded takes nothing away from what U.S. forces have accomplished. But our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Guardians are entitled to know whether the strategy they were asked to execute was sound. To date, it has not been.





