In August, President Donald Trump announced that the United States had signed a massive oil deal with Venezuela, but since then the administration has provided few details. What little information the White House has shared has been contradicted by Venezuelan officials as well as other officials in the Trump administration. After invading the country and kidnapping the country’s former president, Nicolás Maduro, in January, the administration has repeatedly claimed that it is now in control of billions of dollars’ worth of Venezuelan assets, everything from the country’s oil reserves to its gold. When Trump officials have appeared before Congress, however, they have refused to answer basic questions about these assets, how they are governed, and the money associated with them: How much money has the United States collected from Venezuelan oil sales? Where is it being held? How much has gone back to Venezuela versus pocketed by the U.S. government? Under what legal authority?
Given the forceful U.S. intervention in Venezuela, there is also the question of whether there could be any agreement that would be considered valid if it were in effect agreed to under duress. The threat of further U.S. force is not hypothetical. As reported in The Atlantic:
President Donald Trump issued a not-so-veiled threat against the new Venezuelan leader, Delcy Rodríguez, saying that “if she doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro,” referring to Nicolás Maduro, now residing in a New York City jail cell.
This situation would appear to be an astoundingly transparent, textbook example of the type of coercion that is universally held to invalidate an international agreement, as spelled out in articles 51 and 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which cover agreements procured through “coercion of [a state’s] representative through acts or threats” and agreements “procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”). To date, the administration has not made any public attempt to explain why recent arrangements made with Venezuela should be considered valid despite the blatant threats, coercion, and unlawful use of military force against the country and its leaders. This ought to, at the very least, chill any private companies from relying on an agreement between the United States and Venezuela regarding its oil revenue or other assets.
A handful of Democratic lawmakers appear to be tracking this issue. On Sept. 15, Congressman Sean Casten (D-IL) asked Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent about the funds. Bessent claimed that “this is one of the largest assets maybe ever to go on the U.S. balance sheet.” But then seemed to know little else. According to the Washington Post, Sens. Ron Wyden (D-OR), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) have also sent a letter asking Bessent and Secretary of State Marco Rubio for basic information about the money. “This arrangement, particularly given the lack of transparency, raises concerns that the Administration may use its control over the revenues to direct billions in funds without congressional authorization or approval,” they write.
In addition to finding out where at least $13 billion in Venezuelan oil revenues has gone, Congress should pose the following questions to the administration.
The Missing Venezuelan Oil Revenue
1. The Financial Times estimated in July that the Trump administration had collected more than $13 billion in Venezuelan oil sales in 2026. When questioned about that report, Trump indicated the total could be more than that. How much money has the United States collected from Venezuelan oil sales?
2. How much of that money has been disbursed back to Venezuela?
3. Is there a written agreement with the Venezuelan government that governs how these funds will be spent? Has it been provided to Congress as required by law?
4. How much money has been retained by the U.S. government? Based on what legal authority has that money been retained? Has the U.S. government spent any of that money? On what?
5. Which part of the U.S. government is overseeing disbursement of the funds to Venezuela?
6. Where is the money being held? Is a Qatari account Rubio referenced in January still operational? Is it interest-bearing, and who retains any interest earned?
7. In January, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) said, “There is no basis in law for a president to set up an offshore account that he controls so that he can sell assets seized by the American military.” Under what authority did the U.S. government set up the Qatari account?
8. Under what authority is the Treasury Department controlling Venezuelan oil funds today?
9. Which U.S. banks are now holding the money associated with Venezuelan oil revenues? How much money are they holding?
- Note: In June, Rubio said the money was now being held by Citibank and that KPMG had been hired to audit the funding and track how it was being spent. He said KPMG was being paid out of the seized Venezuelan money.
10. When was the money ($500 million?) transferred from the Qatari account to Citibank?
11. Was all of the money transferred to Citibank or do some funds remain in the Qatari account?
12. When was KPMG hired?
13. How many audits has KPMG conducted since January?
14. Was KPMG able to audit the money held in the Qatari account? Was any of the money held in the Qatari account spent before KPMG came on board? What was it spent on? By whom?
15. Will KPMG’s audits be made available to Congress?
16. What is the Trump administration’s plan to address the legitimate claims that foreign creditors (including U.S. institutions) have on Venezuelan funds?
17. Has any of the Venezuelan money being controlled by the United States gone to the Pentagon or U.S. military to cover the costs of the operation to capture Maduro in January, as the president suggested?
The August Oil Deal Between the United States and Venezuela
18. Where is the agreement between the United States and Venezuela outlining the terms of the oil deal? Why hasn’t it been provided to Congress, as legally required? On what basis could it be considered valid given the coercion involved in procuring the agreement?
19. Does Venezuela’s constitution allow for foreign ownership of the country’s oil reserves?
20. Delcy Rodriguez became vice president under a fraudulent election and became interim president after Maduro was captured by the United States in January. Does she have the legal authority, or the political legitimacy, to sign such an oil deal on behalf of her country?
21. Trump said the deal would give the United States control of more than 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. Is this the amount that Venezuela agreed to?
22. How was the private sector partner – North American Blue Energy Partners – selected? What, specifically, is its role?
- Note: Alejandro Betancourt, who heads the company, has faced money laundering investigations in multiple countries.
23. Does North American Blue Energy Partners have any ties to appointed officials in the Trump administration or the Trump family?
24. Who will sit on the board of the new joint venture with North American Blue Energy Partners?
- Note: In an Aug. 31 fact sheet, the White House said, “At no cost to the American taxpayer, NABEP has granted the U.S. Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35% equity stake in its corporate parent, representing up to hundreds of billions in value and dividends for the United States.”
25. Does the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital have the legal authority to do this? What are the office’s authorities under U.S. law?
- Note: A DOD statement contradicts the White House:
“The Defense Department, through its Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), would oversee and help fund the oil field licenses, according to the person familiar with the discussions and one other with knowledge of the talks. The mission of that office is to “accelerate and scale private investment in critical supply chain technologies.”
Pentagon officials said they could not comment on any particular deals being weighed at the OSC, but they stressed that the office cannot take any ownership stake in private companies.”
Other Venezuelan Assets
26. Bessent said on Sept. 15 that the United States had asserted control over “many Venezuelan assets.” What are they?
27. Under what authority is the United States taking control of these foreign assets? What is the U.S. government’s plan for them?
28. How much money associated with Venezuelan assets has flowed through U.S. Treasury accounts?
29. Bessent declined to say whether funds associated with those assets are flowing to U.S. persons. Are they? If they are, to which U.S. persons or institutions?
Documents That Should Be Requested/Subpoenaed:
1. The text of any written agreements concluded with Venezuela after Maduro’s capture that granted U.S. permission to control the country’s assets or otherwise mention the disposition of Venezuela’s sovereign assets.
2. The text of the oil deal signed with Venezuela that Trump announced in August.
(Note that these first two documents are also legally required to be provided to Congress under the Case Act.)
3. KPMG’s work products related to and its audits of the accounts described above.
4. Any internal directives, guidance documents, memos, or other documents that direct, permit, or provide guidelines for the sale, collection of revenue, transfer of revenue, distribution of revenue, or other actions related to Venezuela’s oil or other sovereign assets.
5. Copies of Venezuela’s monthly budgets, which Rubio testified in January that the country would be submitting.
