Russia’s recent unprecedented bombardments of Kyiv constituted a brutal and indiscriminate assault on civilian life and urban infrastructure and another direct manifestation of Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine. The week prior, at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, held in Chisinau, Moldova, on May 14–15, the European Union and 36 countries adopted the Enlarged Partial Agreement (EPA), which will govern the new Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (STCA). That action moved the preparation for the tribunal from the development of the legal and institutional mechanisms to the establishment of its operations.
This commitment made in Chisinau ensures clear political legitimacy and long-term financial viability for the STCA. It also represents another monumental step toward the realization of a fully functioning tribunal. With each completed phase, the risk of political backtracking recedes, and legal inevitability grows stronger. The trajectory toward full accountability for Russia’s crime of aggression is advancing with both urgency and resolve. The progress reflects recognition of a fundamental reality: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not just an attack on a sovereign state, but on the international legal order itself.
Developing an Operational Structure
The landmark foundational agreement formally establishing the STCA, signed by Ukraine and the Council of Europe less than a year ago, marked one of the most significant developments in international criminal law since Nuremberg. Rather than a mere legal aspiration or diplomatic project, the tribunal is steadily becoming an operational mechanism for accountability for the crime of aggression.
Following the relevant domestic ratification processes by participating states, the focus will begin to shift from the current work of the “advance team” in Strasbourg, where the Council of Europe is based, toward the tribunal’s “skeleton phase” and the development of its operational structure in The Hague. This includes continued discussions concerning the tribunal’s final operational budget, including security. The Dutch government is leading this process.
During the “skeleton phase,” the STCA’s Management Committee will be constituted and will enter into a host-country agreement with the Netherlands. The Committee will function in a manner similar to that of the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court — it will make all principal decisions, including on budgetary matters, the recruitment of key personnel, and the appointment of the prosecutor and judges. It will also be able to sign agreements with states and international organizations, which will cover pivotal issues such as the arrest, transfer, or detention of indicted individuals.
The final “fully operational” phase will follow, allowing for the STCA to fully function,, including indictments, arrest warrants, and trials. This phase will require further security arrangements and formal confirmation regarding the long-term use of the court premises.
When the framers of the United Nations Charter enshrined Article 2(4) at its adoption in 1945 in the wake of the Second World War, they established one of the most enduring principles of modern international law. It provides:
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
Those 38 words capture the essential objective of the Charter. The STCA, therefore, stands as the bridge between the Charter’s aspirational promise and the practical reality of holding accountable those who choose to violate it. The Charter established the prohibition against the crime of aggression; the STCA is the mechanism through which this prohibition is finally given effect. And there is no clearer example of the crime of aggression than Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Thus, the STCA seeks to close one of the most enduring gaps in international criminal law and, in doing so, complete the trajectory that began with Nuremberg and with the promulgation of the Charter itself.
A Call for Concrete Support
It is now important that the momentum continues and that additional states, not only in Europe, but also from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, now join the EPA as full or associate members. Doing so is not simply an act of solidarity with Ukraine; it is a reaffirmation of international law. Every additional state that joins the EPA strengthens the legitimacy, universality, and deterrent power of the STCA, while reinforcing the continued vitality of the U.N. Charter itself and ensuring that international law can meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Failure to support this effort will send a dangerous signal to future leaders: that territorial conquest and aggression can succeed without consequence.
