On May 21, the United Nations Security Council convened its monthly briefing on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question – and with it, the first “accountability moment” under Resolution 2803, adopted six months earlier. That Resolution had endorsed the 20-point plan for Gaza presented by US President Donald Trump (“Trump plan”), welcomed the establishment of the “Board of Peace” (BoP) as a transitional governance administration for Gaza, and authorized the deployment of an “International Stabilization Force” (ISF). Shortly before the Resolution was issued, the United States had established a Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) in Israel to “facilitate the flow of humanitarian, logistical, and security assistance” into Gaza. The CMCC, which operates as a joint Israeli–US structure, without Palestinian representation, has reportedly been involved in a much broader range of issues, spanning reconstruction, civil governance and lawmaking.
At the May 21 meeting, the BoP submitted its inaugural six-month report to the Security Council and its High Representative for Gaza, Nickolay Mladenov, briefed United Nations member States on progress – and lack thereof. He acknowledged “near daily” ceasefire violations, and warned that the deteriorating status quo risks becoming permanent. Calling on the Security Council to press Hamas to disarm, he also urged Israel to honor its ceasefire commitments.
With violence continuing in Iran, Lebanon, Israel, and elsewhere throughout the Middle East and international attention fragmenting, the meeting served as a sharp reminder that the humanitarian conditions in Gaza continue to worsen, and that the future of the occupied Palestinian territory, including Gaza, remains deeply uncertain.
Third States have had to consider the role they are willing to play. While the United States and the BoP have called on third States to provide troops to the ISF, only five States have reportedly pledged troops to date – Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco. Meanwhile, about twenty States have reportedly contributed personnel to the CMCC.
The decisions third States make about participation in the BoP, ISF, and CMCC carry significant legal weight. This post seeks precisely to inform those decisions. It addresses the following questions: is the plan compatible with international law and, if not, what are the implications for third States? Are they required to support the Trump plan? May they lawfully do so, if they so choose? Ultimately, this piece concludes that, given the serious concerns raised by the Trump plan, a prudent approach for third States would be to refrain from participation and instead engage outside the framework of the plan. States choosing to support the implementation of the plan must do so only in a manner consistent with their obligations under international law, as Security Council endorsement of the plan does not shield them from those obligations.
This post draws from arguments developed at greater length in a legal brief recently published by the IHL Centre (where I work): International Law Parameters for Third-State Engagement in Gaza. Readers interested in the legal consequences of participation in the BoP, ISF, and CMCC (would participating States become parties to the conflict in Gaza? Would they become occupying powers alongside Israel? What are their legal obligations irrespective of these thresholds being met?) can refer to the second section of the IHL Centre’s legal brief for additional discussion beyond the scope of this post.
Resolution 2803 and the Right to Self-Determination
Some aspects of Resolution 2803 – for instance, the need to deliver humanitarian aid consistent with international law (para 3) – do not raise legal issues. Other core elements of the post-ceasefire framework, however, do. This post focuses on the latter.
At the heart of the legal concerns raised by the Trump plan and Resolution 2803 lies the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. By virtue of this right, all peoples can “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (ICCPR article 1(2); ICESCR article 1(1)). This right is widely recognised as a peremptory norm (jus cogens), from which no derogation is permitted (International Court of Justice (ICJ), July 2024 Advisory Opinion, para 233), not even by the Security Council.
Several aspects of Resolution 2803 are difficult to reconcile with this right. Most notably, it places significant political and economic decision-making powers in the hands of a foreign-led “Board of Peace,” without formal Palestinian representation (for more analysis on this see here). This is in direct contradiction with the idea of a people freely determining their own political status and economic development. It also subjects the exercise of self-determination to externally-imposed benchmarks, including vaguely-defined reform of the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Resolution 2803, para 2). It also endorses – though it does not authorize (see IHL Centre, p. 12) – the continuation of an Israeli presence in Gaza, including through the maintenance of a “security perimeter” (para 7). Such unconsented-to presence amounts to an occupation as a matter of international law, which by definition implicates the temporary denial of at least certain aspects of the right to self-determination (as aptly noted by Judge Cleveland in her Separate Opinion on the ICJ’s July 2024 Advisory Opinion, para. 33).
While some have argued that the resolution must be read as reaffirming the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination (most notably Sierra Leone as a Security Council member), doubts remain as to whether it can indeed be interpreted in a manner consistent with that right.
Use of Force and Other Forms of Foreign Intervention
The Trump plan and Resolution 2803 also raise significant issues under the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. The use of force and other types of intervention envisaged in the plan would be compatible with international law only if consented to or authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Neither condition can presently be clearly established, at least as regards Israel’s interventions (see more below).
Resolution 2803 engages the prohibition on the use of force (enshrined in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and in customary international law, see ICJ July 2024 Advisory Opinion, para. 95 and IHL Centre, pp. 13-15) in two ways.
First, it authorizes the deployment of a multinational force, the ISF, empowered to use “all necessary measures” (para 7) – language that encompasses the potential use of armed force. The prohibition on the use of force (and whether any available exceptions to that prohibition attach) are therefore implicated, with particular relevance for States participating in the ISF.
Second, the resolution endorses a potentially indefinite Israeli “security perimeter presence […] until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat” (para 7). Such a presence involves the use of force on foreign territory, and must therefore be justified under one of the recognised exceptions to the prohibition. Assertions based on Israel’s right to self-defence have been convincingly dismissed – either on the basis that Israel could not invoke such right following the October 7, 2023 attacks, or that, even if it did, the Israeli military response has exceeded the customary limits of necessity and proportionality attached to this right (see Milanovic, Haque, and Wilde). Even assuming, arguendo, that Israel could initially invoke self-defence following the attacks of October 7, 2023, a continued and open-ended military presence aimed at countering a broadly defined “resurgent terror threat” would not comport with the necessity requirement of the right to self-defence, which presupposes a specific (ongoing or imminent) armed attack (IHL Centre, pp. 14-15).
Beyond the use of force, the resolution entails other forms of intervention by the BoP (and States participating in it), including decisions relating to the “reconstruction” and “redevelopment” of Gaza, governance, the “delivery of public services” and security (paras 2, 4). Such measures implicate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State (U.N. Charter, article 2(7); IHL Centre, p. 16), which also protects non-member States (see Nolte) – such as Palestine as a non-member observer State of the United Nations.
Consent and Chapter VII Authorisation
As noted, the only circumstances under which the use of force and other foreign interventions in Palestinian affairs would not breach international law is if they were consented to by the sovereign – that is, the Palestinian people – or authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Serious doubt arises as to whether valid consent to the forms of foreign intervention envisaged in Resolution 2803 and the Trump plan has been granted on behalf of the Palestinian people. Under international law, in order for consent to be valid it must be expressed by a competent authority, it may not be vitiated by coercion, and it must be clearly established (see IHL Centre, pp. 16-20; International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, article 20; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 52; Tams; Nolte)
In the case of Gaza, it is unclear if Hamas, the PA or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) possesses the authority to express valid consent (see IHL Centre, pp. 16-18). The fact that the Palestinian people – in whom sovereignty over the territory ultimately vests – have yet to realize their right to self-determination, and that no democratic national elections have been held in Gaza, or indeed in the occupied Palestinian territory more widely – since 2006 (the April 2026 municipal elections “symbolically” included a city in Gaza for the first time in 20 years) may lend support to the view that there is, at present, no legitimate government with the authority to give valid consent.
While Hamas has rejected any foreign intervention, the PA (hence, arguably, the PLO) has expressed support for the foreign interventions envisaged in the Trump plan and Resolution 2803 (though not for Israeli interventions, see IHL Centre, pp. 19-20, 29), which may be interpreted as indicating consent. However, even if it was accepted that the PA – despite its deficit of structural and democratic legitimacy – possesses the authority to express consent on behalf of the Palestinian people, there are serious concerns that such consent was vitiated through coercion by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the U.N. Charter (IHL Centre, p. 18).
In light of these considerations, a prudent approach for third States would be to proceed on the basis that there is no valid Palestinian consent – at least to Israel’s presence in Gaza and other forms of interventions. Even if such consent exists, it is of uncertain scope and may be withdrawn at any time, requiring continued vigilance.
As regards Security Council authorization, Resolution 2803 is marked by ambiguity. On one view, the absence of any explicit reference to a “threat to international peace and security” or to Chapter VII itself weighs against an enforcement mandate. Yet the resolution’s use of terms such as “authorizes,” “decides,” and “all necessary measures” may suggest an implied Chapter VII authorization, consistent with some past Security Council practice (IHL Centre, pp. 20-22).
Even if the Security Council was implicitly acting under Chapter VII, Resolution 2803 cannot be read as conferring a blanket Chapter VII authorization for all foreign presences it contemplates. Any enforcement powers are confined to the specific authorizations granted to the BoP, ISF, and participating States, and only within the limits expressly set out. They do not appear to extend to Israeli presence and other forms or interventions: the Security Council did not expressly “authorize” Israeli presence (the reference to “international civil and security presences authorized by this resolution” appears to cover only the BoP and ISF, not Israel, see IHL Centre, notes 31, 156). This reading is supported by the positions expressed by certain Council members. For instance, Sierra Leone appears to consider that the Council was acting under Chapter VII specifically and only when authorizing the ISF (see reference in IHL Centre, note 110).
Importantly, a Chapter VII authorization would in any event have no bearing on concerns relating to the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, which cannot be derogated from.
Implications for Third States
Certain core elements of Resolution 2803 may conflict with the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and – absent Palestinian consent or Chapter VII authorization – with the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention, at least insofar as Israeli presence and interventions are concerned. What follows for third States? How should these concerns shape their decision whether to support the implementation of the Trump plan and Resolution 2803?
First, Resolution 2803 appears to impose few, if any, legal obligations on third States. The only paragraph directly addressing them – paragraph 9 – merely “[c]alls upon” them “to work with the BoP to identify opportunities to contribute [resources and assistance]” to its operating entities and the ISF, and “to give full recognition to its acts and documents.” Whether the verb “calls upon” is binding or recommendatory depends on context ; IHL Centre, p. 23). Here, a plausible reading is that paragraph 9 creates, at most, an obligation to accord recognition to the BoP’s acts and documents and to explore possible avenues of support, but falls short of requiring support as such. This wording suggests that States retain discretion as to whether, ultimately, to support; and those concerned about legal breaches will want to refrain and engage outside these mechanisms.
Third States that choose to provide support may do so only to the extent and in a manner compatible with international law – in particular, to the extent that the scope and temporary character of the BoP and ISF interventions can be reconciled with the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, and that any use of force and other forms of interventions remain within the bounds of the purported Chapter VII authorization. Even on the doubtful reading that Resolution 2803 creates an obligation to support the BoP and ISF (at most for States that have the capacity to do so), such an obligation cannot extend to support contrary to the right to self-determination (Article 103 of the U.N. Charter does not operate to displace peremptory norms) and, arguably, to other U.N. principles such as the prohibition to use force and the principle of non-intervention, where they are at risk of violation (Peters; IHL Centre, pp. 25-26).
Accordingly, any participation in the implementation of the Trump plan and Resolution 2803 – including through support to the BoP and ISF – is constrained by third States’ international law obligations and requires careful assessment as well as continuous review.
Finally, irrespective of their decision to participate or not in the implementation of the Trump plan, all States can – and in some regards must – take measures in response to violations of international law by Israel. In case of serious breaches of peremptory norms, such as the basic rules of IHL and the right to self-determination, they have specific obligations, including the obligation to cooperate, through lawful means, to bring those breaches to an end (see IHL Centre p. 31). In its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice gave concrete expression to these duties, holding that “it is for all States … to ensure that any impediment resulting from the illegal presence of Israel in the oPt to the exercise of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination is brought to an end” (ICJ July 2024 Advisory Opinion, paras 278–279). That obligation continues to bind all States.
Conclusion
The institutional complexity and innovation of the Trump plan for Gaza should not obscure the grave concerns the plan raises under international law, including norms as fundamental as the right to self-determination and the prohibition on the use of force. The endorsement of the plan by the UN Security Council does not shield it from the demands of international law.
For third States, participation in the plan thus carries significant risks, including the risk that they will have a hand in compounding existing violations or contributing to new ones. At the same time, disengagement is not a tenable option. Despite the ceasefire, hostilities and other acts of violence continue across the Gaza Strip; Israel has reportedly expanded its control beyond the “yellow line,” accompanied by further destruction of property and restrictions on impartial humanitarian organisations. Troubling proposals – such as the establishment of so-called “alternative safe communities” or “planned communities” – underscore that the plan’s implementation will continue to have significant legal and humanitarian implications, making clearsighted and persistent engagement by the international community essential.
While international law offers no easy solution, it requires third States to act as legal gatekeepers. Whether within or outside the framework of the Trump plan, many possess levers that must be used to ensure respect for international law. If they choose to support this framework, such support must remain strictly conditioned on compliance with international law and be continuously reassessed in light of evolving facts on the ground.
