On April 23, the European Union’s 27 member states formally approved a $106 billion loan for Ukraine, as well as a 20th sanctions package against Russia. In exchange, Ukraine resumed Russian oil exports through its section of the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia. Although Hungary had been blocking the aid and sanctions measures long before Ukraine stopped the transit through Druzhba, the issues had become linked.
The deal, however imperfect, is the first result of the resounding victory of Peter Magyar’s party over that of 16-year Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Hungarian parliamentary elections on April 12. The new agreements are an opening demonstration of how Magyar’s election could represent the best chance in a generation to reset relations between Hungary, Europe, and the United States for the benefit of all three. Handled with care, the shift in Budapest could help restore credible deterrence against Russian revanchism, align European and American policy in support of Ukraine, and accelerate an energy strategy that both sides of the Atlantic have long endorsed.
While no single factor decides elections, Magyar won primarily on a domestic economic platform, which he pushed to voters via his dogged brand of retail politics. The Hungarian economy stagnated under Orban’s rule, growing a mere 0.1 percent annually since 2023, and Magyar took advantage of the many talking points supplied by the difficulties of hard-hit Hungarians who simply wanted a decent living. While Orban’s blatant disregard for the rule of law added fuel to the fire, Hungarians voted with their wallets as much as with their conscience.
As Magyar and his party seek to right that economic ship, part of the equation will involve mending relations with the EU, which has withheld tens of billions of euros from Hungary in pandemic-recovery and economic-support funding over the country’s democratic backsliding that has seriously weakened rule-of-law and other EU standards. Orban also blocked Ukraine’s expedited entry into the EU and fought to maintain Hungary’s overwhelming energy dependence on Russia, even as the EU sought to reduce its reliance on Russian oil and gas.
From Rhetoric to Rebuilding
On his way to victory, Magyar embraced some of the anti-Brussels rhetoric, especially regarding the EU’s migration policy, but the campaign is now over, and Magyar has pledged to “rebuild” Hungary’s ties with the EU. His TISZA party also won a supermajority, meaning when Magyar takes over as prime minister, likely later this week, he will have a broad mandate to shape the future of Hungarian — and transatlantic — politics.
Part of that will be addressing the issue of support to Ukraine, which Orban fought tenaciously. In a hopeful sign of change, in addition to the quick moves for the EU loan package, Magyar proposed a summit in June with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He suggested the meeting could hinge on concerns about the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine — a narrative frequently invoked by Budapest, but widely disputed by Ukraine. Still, the change in tone and tenor from Orban is unmistakable.
The next order of business for Magyar on foreign policy should be an immediate course reversal on Budapest’s pernicious ties with Moscow. Orban’s open bromance with Russian President Vladimir Putin even reportedly caused a major national security breach within the EU as the Hungarian foreign minister allegedly shared confidential information with Russia. One independent Russian media outlet also reported that nearly half of Russia’s embassy staff in Budapest are suspected spies. Magyar must put a stop to Russia’s penetration of Hungarian institutions, which included an alleged Russian disinformation campaign targeting Magyar and the Russian foreign intelligence service plotting a fake assassination against Orban in order to sway the election in his favor.
Ending Hungary’s energy dependence on Russia, in alignment with EU policy, will be a more challenging task. Magyar said on the campaign trail that he would phase out Russian imports by 2035, though he since has talked of procuring oil and gas “in the cheapest and safest way possible,” which would appear to backtrack. The EU has a goal of weaning itself from Russian energy by the end of 2027.
Brussels should work in concert with Budapest to find suitable alternatives to accelerate the Hungarian timeframe. This is also an opportunity to work with Washington, especially since President Donald Trump has opposed pro-Russia energy projects in Europe, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, and has pressed the Europeans to buy liquified natural gas from the United States.
Changed Policy Orientation
Magyar also must change Hungary’s broader policy toward Ukraine and its future in Europe. Magyar has hedged so far. While he has stated that he respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity and that “Ukraine is the victim in this war,” he also said he would oppose Ukraine’s accelerated EU accession, though he pledged to put the question to a referendum in Hungary. Combined with the approval of the long-stalled EU loan package to Ukraine, this is demonstrable progress that Kyiv, Budapest, and Brussels should build upon.
Unlike Orban, Magyar knows that Russia will never be a reliable ally for Hungary. Moscow wasted no time in ditching Orban. Within hours of the result, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared that Russia and Orban “were never friends” — erasing 16 years of mutual cultivation with a single sentence. It is the same way Syria’s Bashar al-Assad was erased from the Kremlin’s vocabulary within hours of Damascus falling.
Where does this leave the United States? The Trump administration’s close relationship with the ancien régime in Hungary is sure to leave a sour taste for the new government in Budapest, and Orban’s defeat may have left certain U.S. officials extremely disappointed. As of the time of this writing, the White House has still not congratulated Magyar on his victory. That silence is counterproductive.
Should the United States decide to engage, Magyar should embrace the opportunity to do so. The overall western-oriented course correction charted by Budapest could also reverberate in Washington and help set a new policy direction on Russia and Ukraine, on energy cooperation, and toward transatlantic unity. If Magyar can show Washington and Brussels that center-right pragmatism can effectively co-exist with populism, especially on foreign policy, all three sides may find new impetus to eventually work in concert.
It may be a tall order for Magyar’s victory to herald a new dawn of sensible center-right politics on both sides of the Atlantic that eschews raw populism and anti-institutionalism, and ends the temptation to collaborate with Moscow. But for now, the foreign policy shift in Budapest toward sensibility at least seems to be leaning in a constructive direction.
