Members of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee sit at a long U-shaped wooden table in a Capitol Hill hearing room.

DHS’s Revolving Door: The Need for Experienced Leadership in Dangerous Times

The replacement of a Secretary of Homeland Security should be a moment for reflection and represent an opportunity for improvement. Instead, it has become routine. Kristi Noem is out. Another person, Markwayne Mullin, will now follow. And the country will largely move on as if nothing has happened. And the routineness of this is exactly the problem.

The Department of Homeland Security is the third largest agency in the federal government, with more than 260,000 personnel spanning border security, counterterrorism, disaster response, cybersecurity, maritime safety and intelligence. It was built in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks to unify a fragmented security enterprise into a coherent system capable of detecting, preventing, and responding to threats against the United States. It is not designed to be a reward or title for political allies, subject to a kind of patronage system in which “to the victor belong the spoils,” as described by Senator William Marcy in 1832. The department’s leadership is meant for highly experienced professional excellence foremost. Yet here we are, far down the wrong end of the continuum. Indeed, few past DHS secretaries from either political party meet the real requirements for the job. With that reality, there are steps Congress can take given repeated weaknesses in the Department’s leadership, and steps the Department can take as an organization.

Yes, We’ve Seen This Movie Before, But It Was Better the First Time.

During the first Trump administration, DHS became a revolving door of leadership. Secretaries came and went with remarkable speed. John Kelley was there for a matter of months. Kirstjen Nielsen was pushed out after clashing with the White House over immigration enforcement tactics. Kevin McAleenan and Chad Wolf cycled through in acting roles, raising legal and operational concerns about continuity and authority. Each transition brought new priorities, new political pressures, and new disruptions to an already complex department. And always drama, and plenty of it.

That churn was not just a management issue, it was a warning sign.

When leadership instability becomes the norm in a department tasked with defending the country, the consequences are predictable. Strategic planning deteriorates, interagency coordination weakens, sense of mission and continuity of operations suffers. Career professionals lose confidence in leadership, and often head for the doors, while those remaining may become more apathetic, disgruntled and cynical. The result is easily that the mission becomes reactive rather than proactive.

Fast forward to today, and the pattern has not changed, but in some ways it’s gotten worse. In the first Trump term, his four DHS Secretaries (Kelly, Nielsen, McAleenan, and Wolf) boasted an impressive combined ~90 years of DHS and/or national security relevant experience (with retired General Kelly holding half of that on his own). The two secretaries the president has nominated under his current term have a combination of zero years either working directly in or overseeing any of the missions for which DHS is responsible. Replacing one political ally with another does not solve the problem, it petrifies it. DHS is not an agency that can be run effectively through loyalty tests or political alignment. It requires leadership grounded in operational experience, interagency coordination, and an understanding of the complex threat environment that defines modern homeland security. While there is certainly virtue to having political acumen, as well as being a confidant of the president, that’s simply not sufficient to protect the nation on its own. Noem is a stark reminder of this.

DHS sits at the center of a rapidly converging threat landscape. That threat environment is not hypothetical, and not some hyperbolic fear stoked by people with ulterior motives. It is active, fluid, evolving and it is the most perilous that we have seen since 9/11, and quite possible even before.

The threat streams span foreign terrorist organizations, including the threat of Iranian “sleeper cells;” violent extremists and domestic terrorists whose targets include children and houses of worship; crippling cyber-attacks; and crumbling and vulnerable critical infrastructure. Competing for DHS’s attention are transnational criminal networks and narcoterrorists whose product kills almost 80,000 Americans per year (a drastic reduction from the record high of 110,000 in 2022), and the online radicalization of our youth who are inspired to commit acts of terrorism and violence in the name of ISIS and other violent ideologies or no ideology at all (in the form of nihilistic violence). All that while coming off one of the worst years in history for natural disasters, with severe storms (including the major catastrophe in Texas that killed over 130, including 25 children campers). In fact, the United States is continuing a record trend for “billion-dollar disasters,” with 27 billion-dollar disasters in 2024 totaling $182 billion in damages. And while 2025 figures have not yet been finalized by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, preliminary information indicates dozens of major disasters and tens of billions in losses. Now more than any time since DHS’s history, it begs for extraordinary leadership.

Who is Qualified to Lead This Critical Agency? Technically Anybody.

Under federal law (6 U.S. Code Section 113), there are effectively no meaningful statutory qualifications for the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary is, per statute, “appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” As one of my favorite childhood cartoon characters used to stutter, “That’s All Folks!” That is it, no requirement for experience in national or homeland security. No requirement for emergency management or intelligence expertise, no first responder or cybersecurity background, nor maritime or border protection expertise. There’s also no requirement for experience in leading large, complex organizations with enormous budgets. Note: DHS’s budget is estimated to total $448–$455 billion over the next three years, assuming future appropriations remain flat and taking into account the $170 billion in additional funding for DHS under the so-called “Big Beautiful Bill.” For reference, DHS is projected to have an annual budget that compares to the GDP of countries like Ukraine, Kuwait, and Morocco, and Slovakia.

Thus, the position that oversees the nation’s primary domestic security apparatus, with a quarter of a million employees and a budget that rivals the GDP of entire nations can be filled by anyone who meets the basic constitutional requirements for any federal office. That should give both the American public and Congress pause.

It has not always been this way for critical leadership positions. After the failures exposed by Hurricane Katrina, Congress enacted The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. That law imposed specific qualifications for the FEMA Administrator, requiring “a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management” and “not less than 5 years of executive leadership and management experience in the public or private sector.” That reform was due to the massive failure of FEMA in response to Hurricane Katrina, which still serves as somber recognition that competence matters in crisis leadership, and lack thereof can cost many lives. So in an odd twist of legislative fate, the FEMA administrator (across all administrations) is often far more qualified to run DHS than the Secretary that they work under.

Other critical departments have similar expectations, either explicitly or in practice reinforced by statute and oversight. A post-9/11 statute mandates that the Director of National Intelligence “shall have extensive national security expertise.” The Secretary of Defense must come from civilian life and, if recently retired from military service, requires a congressional waiver, reflecting concerns about civilian control of the military. The Attorney General must be a member of the bar, ensuring baseline legal competence. Positions across the national security enterprise, from intelligence to law enforcement leadership, are shaped by statutory frameworks that reflect the complexity of their missions.

DHS stands as a glaring exception and in my opinion this simply is no longer sustainable.

Recommendations for Reform

If Congress is serious about homeland security, it must move beyond performative oversight and address the structural vulnerabilities that have allowed DHS leadership to become politicized and unstable. I believe this begins with establishing clear, congressionally mandated qualifications for the DHS Secretary.

At a minimum, those qualifications should include demonstrated experience in national security, emergency management, law enforcement, or intelligence; a proven record of executive leadership in large, complex organizations; and an understanding of civil rights and civil liberties frameworks that govern domestic operations. These are baseline requirements for anyone entrusted with the safety and security of the American people. To be clear, this is not a thinly-veiled criticism of Mullen, President Donald Trump’s replacement for Noem. Time will tell if the senate was accurate in their assessment of his qualifications.

As noted at the outset, few past DHS secretaries, from both parties, would be sufficient to meet the demands that our country currently faces. It is a massive agency, with a vast and critical mission, that requires transformative, experienced, and extraordinary leadership.

DHS demands an operational leader, not a political figure. Someone who has commanded or managed real-world incidents, led large-scale disaster response, counterterrorism operations, or national security crises. This leadership can come from governors of major states that have experienced a major disaster, have exposure to the border, and have seen their state through acts of terrorism or mass casualty incidents and managed the crisis with expertise. Former high-ranking DHS, DOJ, or National Guard officials who have worked their way up through their respective agency would also be qualified.

Whoever occupies the top post, the secretary should be surrounded by an experienced executive team that has been tested. Much like the uniformed leadership of the DOD, DHS needs to have seasoned second and third-level leadership that can direct the agency in a nationwide crisis such as a pandemic or armed conflict on the homefront. A leader who knows their own weaknesses should be keen to fill in those gaps with a senior team of ready experts.

Critics will argue that imposing such qualifications limits presidential flexibility. They are correct, and that is the point. The stakes are too high to treat DHS as another cabinet-level appointment and its leadership team subject only to political considerations. I once met a young man in his mid-20’s at a homeland security conference who sat next to me at a panel discussion. We started talking, and he told me that he was a newly appointed Assistant Under Secretary at DHS. When I queried him about where he studied and worked before achieving such a high-ranking position, he told me he had a bachelor’s degree in poli-sci and had previously worked on the president’s campaign and was an intern on the Hill for a year. This was his first government job; he had no experience in homeland security or any of its missions. He said he was asked what agency he wanted to work for and he told me he thought “DHS would be cool.” 

Cool?

This is not a Democrat or Republican issue, this occurs with all administrations. The department’s mission is too critical, its scope too vast, and its margin for error too small.

DHS is More Important Today, Than the Day It Was Created

Increasingly, the notion of armed conflict reaching the homefront is becoming a reality. Gone are the days when the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were our stalwart protectors. While most Americans think it inconceivable that a kinetic (hot) war would occur on U.S. soil, relegating this to a Hollywood fantasy in the spirit of the Red Dawn movies, the reality is that we have already been involved in gray zone wars with our adversaries for well over a decade. Cyberattacks, disinformation/propaganda, maritime or territorial assertiveness and incursions (such as the Chinese “weather” balloon or harassment of ships in international fisheries), and proxy warfare (such as Iran’s utilization of the Houthis or Hezbollah to attack U.S. assets and interests) are all tools currently employed by our adversaries in the great power struggle. A “hot war” is simply one poor decision or historic error away.

For years, DHS and FEMA officials, and experts have spoken openly about the need to revisit a Cold War “civil defense” model, in response to the potential for the continental United States to become a contested battlespace. DOD officials have increasingly warned that the “homeland is no longer a sanctuary,” often vaguely referring to scenarios where the country is a “contested environment” from a myriad of foreign threats including cyber, critical infrastructure and man-made disasters. All domains of DHS.

And so my thesis is that during times of war, be it “gray zone” or “hot,” DHS needs leadership that’s not just politically savvy. It needs leadership that is robust, competent, and as experienced as that of the DOD. In sports, it’s said that defense wins championships; DHS is our defense. The best military in the history of the world does not address our continued losses at home by asymmetric and gray zone threats. 

Noem is gone, and Mullin is in. But unless Congress acts, the underlying problem that got us here remains. The cycle will continue, and DHS will continue to be vulnerable to the same instability that has defined it for years. On September 11, 2001, we had far less adversaries and threats, no online radicalization, and our notion of cybersecurity was framed by Y2K. We built the Department of Homeland Security in response to a massive failure to connect the dots. That cost people their lives and launched us into “Forever Wars.” It would be a tragic irony if a quarter century later, we fail to connect today’s dots as well.

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