How Congress Should Constrain Emergency Powers

Emergency powers are special authorities that are supposed to be reserved for extraordinary, unexpected crises. But all too often, U.S. presidents have sought to turn them into blank checks they can use whenever they want. As conservative Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch recently put it, “Everything is an emergency” now. “Through delegations of authority, through emergency legislation of all stripes,” he warned, power has increasingly moved “over to the executive branch”—a development he described as “not a recipe for a healthy democracy over the long term.” A recent report by the progressive Brennan Center for Justice similarly warns that “presidents of both parties have stretched the meaning of ‘emergency’ far beyond reason, enabling them to draw from a growing stockpile of statutory authorities with few real safeguards.” Both Gorsuch and the Brennan Center are right. 

In his second term, President Donald Trump has engaged in especially grave abuse of emergency powers. But the problem predates his return to power, and is likely to outlast his departure from the political scene. The Democrats’ massive victory in the 2026 midterm election gives Congress an opportunity to begin enacting much-needed constraints on executive emergency powers. Some of those authorities should be abolished completely. Others need tighter constraints to ensure they are limited in duration, confined to genuine emergency situations, and subject to strong, nondeferential judicial review enforcing these restrictions.

Some of the powers in question arise from the National Emergencies Act of 1976, which has been particularly prone to abuse. But others involve different legislation, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Alien Enemies Act, laws governing domestic use of the military, and various statutes delegating tariff authority to the executive. 

While Trump’s abuses of power can provide an initial impetus for reform, there is room for potential cross-ideological cooperation here. Some of the necessary reforms have previously been advocated by conservative Republicans. Given the significant likelihood that a Democratic president might be elected in 2028, conservatives might want to take the opportunity to constrain a future administration’s use of these authorities. 

The National Emergencies Act

The National Emergencies Act of 1976 is probably the most significant emergency powers law on the books. It grants the executive a vast array of powers whenever he proclaims a “national emergency,” including, as the Brennan Center notes, “powers to shut down or take over communications infrastructure, freeze Americans’ bank accounts, and control domestic transportation.” Originally, the NEA included a “legislative veto,” enabling Congress to terminate the emergency by a concurrent resolution, which was not subject to presidential veto. But that constraint was essentially eliminated when the Supreme Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional in 1983. As a result, presidents of both parties have abused the NEA, and there is potential for much greater abuse. There are now 51 active emergencies, including one concerning Iran that has lasted 47 years.

The NEA is ripe for reform. Some of the powers it grants should simply be abolished. For example, as emergency powers expert Elizabeth Goitein has long advocated, Congress should eliminate the power to potentially seize control of the internet and on-air broadcasting, and the power to test chemical and biological agents on unwilling human test subjects. Even in the event of a genuine emergency, no one person can be trusted with such power.

In addition, Congress should impose strict time limits on presidentially declared emergencies that can only be extended by new legislation. In our chapter on emergency powers in the forthcoming Cato Institute handbook on executive power, Joshua Braver and I argue for a 10- to 14-day time limit, depending on whether Congress is out of session (with exceptions for situations where the emergency in question prevents Congress from meeting). In 2023, a bipartisan group of senators including Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) and Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) proposed legislation that would create a 30-day time limit. The exact optimal time limit can be debated. But any strict limit is far preferable to the status quo, which – as Sen. Lee put it – “g[ives] the president of the United States the ability to exercise unilateral power like a king.”

In addition, Congress should make clear that emergency declarations can only be used in response to a sudden crisis, not to address ordinary policy issues that have gone on for years. Thus, President Joe Biden should not have been able to use such a declaration to engage in massive student loan forgiveness (student debt is a long standing issue), and Trump should not have been able to declare trade deficits (also a longstanding issue, and one that isn’t actually a genuine problem at all) a national emergency. The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated both of these policies on other grounds. But it is still dangerous for a president to invoke emergency powers in such situations. Congress should also revise the NEA to make clear that this constraint on invocation of the NEA is judicially enforceable, and that courts should not defer to the executive’s claim that an emergency exists. If there is a real emergency, its existence should not be difficult to demonstrate.

With Trump’s recent abuses fresh in Democrats’ minds and Republicans facing the prospect of a Democratic president after 2028, now might be a propitious moment for bipartisan cooperation on NEA reform.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) grants the president a wide range of authorities in the event of a declared “national emergency” arising from an “unusual and extraordinary” threat to the U.S. economy, national security, or foreign policy. In February, the Supreme Court ruled (in a case I helped litigate) that IEEPA doesn’t grant the power to impose tariffs, thereby invalidating Trump’s effort to use it to impose massive tariffs on imports from almost every country in the world.

But IEEPA still grants a wide range of other powers, including the power to “regulate,” “nullify,” or “prohibit” any transaction in which any foreign country or foreign citizen has an interest. Trump has suggested he can use this law to impose import bans at will. This is not true, as IEEPA is limited by the requirement that any sanctions adopted “deal with” an “unusual and extraordinary threat.” But courts sometimes take a highly deferential approach to executive claims that such a threat exists, and that executive-ordered sanctions actually deal with it. IEEPA restrictions can have ruinous effects on businesses, amounting to a “financial death sentence.”

Like NEA emergencies, IEEPA invocations should be subject to strict time limits, unless extended by Congress. A 30 or 60 day limit might work. Congress should also make clear that the requirement that sanctions “deal with” an “unusual and extraordinary threat” are subject to nondeferential judicial review. Furthermore, IEEPA should be amended to limit its reach to authoritarian states, barring presidents from using it against liberal democratic allies of the United States. This restriction would prevent presidents from using it in ways that harm U.S. allies, and poison relations with them, as Trump has done with his trade wars.

Domestic Use of the Military

A particularly dangerous type of emergency power involves the domestic use of the military. The Founding Fathers and other liberal democratic theorists rightly feared that executive use of the military for domestic law enforcement can easily be turned to oppressive purposes. In addition, troops are not trained for ordinary law enforcement among civilians, and their use for such purposes risks grave harm to the lives, property, and civil liberties of civilians.

Last year, Trump sought to federalize the National Guard on largely specious pretexts, in order to suppress protests against his mass deportation program. He relied on 10 U.S.C. § 12406, a 1903 law that allows federalization in response to an “invasion,” a “rebellion,” or “the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” The Supreme Court, and Seventh and Ninth Circuit courts of appeals ruled against Trump on various grounds, thereby forcing an end to his misuse of this law. But abusive domestic use of the military may well recur under the Insurrection Act. Experts from across the political spectrum – ranging from Jack Goldsmith on the right to Elizabeth Goitein on the left – have warned that this legislation can easily be abused.

In its current form, the Insurrection Act, allows the president to federalize the National Guard or use the military for domestic law enforcement, in a variety of circumstances, including, “Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” 

It also allows the president to use “the militia or the armed forces” or to “take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy,” if these activities result in a variety of circumstances, such as violations of constitutional rights, “opposin[g] or obstruct[ing] the execution of the laws of the United States or imped[ing] the course of justice under those laws.” Many experts believe this language gives the president “almost limitless discretion to use troops for domestic law enforcement,” as Goitein and Joseph Nunn put it.

In an important recent Emory Law Journal article, Josh Braver argues that the Act leaves more room for judicial review than is usually thought. But, he also recognizes that the language is still too permissive and needs to be reformed. In our forthcoming Cato Institute chapter on emergency powers, Braver and I advocate revising the Act to make clear that its triggering conditions are subject to nondeferential judicial review. We also recommend eliminating the vague, highly permissive language allowing use of the military whenever “domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy . . . opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States.” It should be replaced with a provision that authorizes military deployment only when a violent breakdown of law and order is widespread, severe, and overwhelms civilian authorities. Also, deployment for such purposes should only be permitted upon application by the affected state’s legislature or, when the legislature cannot be convened, its governor. The former reform would prevent the use of ordinary law-breaking as a pretext for massive domestic use of the military. The latter would block its use to intimidate or coerce partisan opponents of the incumbent president, as Trump sought to do in the blue states of California, Illinois, and Oregon. 

It is also desirable to change the language authorizing use of the military in response to “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion” to something like “rebellion or other widespread violent breakdown of law and order.” This would make it more clear the president cannot use the military in response to ordinary law-breaking. Similarly, it would be preferable to remove the language indicating that it is enough if the president merely “considers” that these circumstances exist. Congress should make clear that the courts can review (with little or no deference) whether the relevant extraordinary situations are actually present.

The Alien Enemies Act of 1798

The Alien Enemies Act of 1798 is the sole remaining provision of the notorious Alien and Sedition Acts. It authorizes the president to detain and deport non-citizen natives of relevant nations (including legal immigrants) “[w]henever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or government.” 

Before Trump, it was only used during three major declared wars: the War of 1812, World War I, and World War II. Trump has sought to use it to detain and deport supposed members of a Venezuelan drug gang, claiming that illegal migration and drug smuggling qualify as “invasion,” and that the president is entitled to absolute deference when he declares an “invasion” exists. The claimed deference is so broad that Trump’s Justice Department has even asserted in court that the president could invoke the AEA in response to the “British Invasion” of rock stars like the Beatles. As explained in detail in my article “Immigration is Not Invasion,” this is at odds with the original understanding of “invasion” in the AEA and the Constitution. As James Madison noted in 1800, “invasion is an operation of war.” Most judges who have considered this issue have ruled against Trump on that basis. But, as discussed in my article, a few, including prominent Fifth Circuit judges Andrew Oldham and James Ho, have advocated sweeping deference to the president, even to the point of deferring when “the odds of invasion are 0.0000000%,” as Oldham put it. Others have advocated less extreme, but still problematic, levels of deference.

Ideally, Congress should simply abolish the AEA. Even in the event of an actual war or invasion, there is no justification for detaining and deporting all citizens of the nation in question, including innocent civilians who pose no threat and – in many cases – have lived in the United States for years. Indeed, the AEA is a product of a different century and before the advent of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Other domestic legal authorities amply allow for detention of spies, saboteurs, terrorists, and enemy combatants. 

During World War I and World War II, the AEA and related authorities were used to detain many thousands of German, Italian, and Japanese immigrants. This internment caused great harm, with little or no benefit to national security, and led to such absurdities as the detention of 29 members of the Boston Symphony Orchestra during World War I. During World War II, baseball Hall of Famer Joe DiMaggio’s father (an Italian immigrant) was barred from working at his job as a fisherman, even as two of his sons (Joe and Boston Red Sox star Dom) were serving in the armed forces.

If the AEA is not repealed entirely, it should be reformed to make clear that “invasion” is a military attack and that courts should not defer to executive claims that one has occurred. The vague and potentially manipulable “predatory incursion” language should be eliminated entirely. A small-scale attack (the likely original meaning of “predatory incursion”) can be dealt with without invoking extraordinary emergency powers.

AEA reform may not be easy to sell to Republicans. But the issue can be linked to Trump’s harsh mass deportation campaign, which even Trump himself has admitted went too far, and became unpopular. That might draw at least some bipartisan support.

An Outdated Emergency Tariff Power 

Congress would also do well to eliminate outdated emergency powers, such as Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows imposition of massive tariffs in response to “fundamental international payments problems” that cause “large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits,” of a kind that can only exist in fixed-exchange rate monetary system of the kind that ended in 1973. After his IEEPA tariffs were struck down by the Supreme Court, Trump sought to use Section 122 to recreate them, in large part. The U.S. Court of International Trade invalidated Trump’s Section 122 tariffs in a decision issued in May. But appellate litigation continues, and it would be good to eliminate any ambiguity by getting rid of Section 122 entirely. Abolishing Section 122 can be linked to the more general unpopularity of Trump’s tariffs, which many Republicans have come to realize was a major factor in their defeat in the 2026 election.

Conclusion

The United States has accumulated multiple potentially dangerous emergency powers that are in dire need of reform. While judicial review has curtailed or limited some abuses, it cannot be relied on exclusively, and must be supplemented by legislative reform, which in many cases is needed to make judicial review itself more effective. The current political moment provides a valuable opportunity to at least begin that process. 

In some cases, especially when it comes to the NEA and tariffs, there could well be opportunities for bipartisan cooperation. By contrast, Republicans may be unwilling to support repeal or reform of the Alien Enemies Act. But that issue can at least be put on the legislative agenda, to develop momentum for reform after 2028. At the very least, the new Congress should make this issue a major priority. A window of opportunity like this may not open again anytime soon.

Filed Under

, , , , , , , ,
Send A Letter To The Editor

DON'T MISS A THING. Stay up to date with Just Security curated newsletters: