Over the next two weeks, nearly 200 Parties will gather at the 31st Conference of Parties (COP) (COP31) in Antalya, Türkiye. Although Australia initially sought to host COP31, a compromise with Türkiye resulted in Antalya becoming the host city and Australia assumed responsibility for leading the formal negotiations.
COP31 comes at a pivotal moment for international climate progress and will be unfolding against an extraordinary backdrop for American climate diplomacy. The United States, the world’s largest economy and largest historical greenhouse gas emitter, is withdrawing from the international climate stage. But the rest of the world is not standing still. U.S. withdrawal creates an opening for other countries to shape the international climate agenda without American input.
Meanwhile, global emissions continue to rise, and the world is increasingly on track to overshoot the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature goal, even as nations seek to keep warming well below 2°C.
As I wrote in Monday’s roundup, three things to look for are how other countries fill the leadership void left by U.S. withdrawal, how the results of the U.S. midterm elections interact with COP, and progress on loss and damage—the last of which I wrote on in more detail there. Here, I go into more detail on the first two, both of which point to potential paths forward despite U.S. retreat.
First, look to see what nations will fill the massive leadership void left behind by U.S. withdrawal. Pay particular attention to the role China plays in climate negotiations at COP31.
COP31 marks the first Conference of Parties meeting since the United States announced its withdrawal from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the key treaty underpinning all climate negotiations (Article 7 of the UNFCCC establishes the Conference of Parties).
While the U.S. is still technically a Party until February 2027, the Trump administration has already withdrawn the United States from the Paris Agreement and the administration has chosen not to send a negotiating delegation to COP31. The abdication of U.S. climate leadership creates a leadership vacuum at a moment when international cooperation on climate change is urgent. Who will fill it?
China, the second largest economy and largest current greenhouse gas emitter, is playing a growing role, but not an outsized role in climate negotiations. At the two previous COPs, China seemed content with promoting its clean-tech industries and protecting its developing-country status without taking a major leadership role. China’s insistence on maintaining developing nation status helps shield it from mandatory climate finance obligations, but it also undermines its credibility and ability to take a more forceful international climate leadership role. China’s classification as a developing country places it outside the category of developed country parties that bear express climate finance obligations under the UNFCCC framework. After all, how long can the world’s second largest economy and largest current emitter be fairly characterized as a developing nation?
Beyond China, the European Union, which has long paired ambitious targets with significant climate finance commitments, will likely seek to anchor the negotiations. And with Australia presiding over the actual negotiations, Pacific Small Island Developing States have an opportunity and leverage to keep the priorities of the most vulnerable nations at the center. For several Pacific atoll nations, climate change is not some faraway abstract threat. Climate effects are being felt today and for the foreseeable future, with four atoll nations (Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu) at risk of the submergence of a significant portion of their territory due to sea level rise by the end of the century.
Developing-country status matters for climate finance, which will again be contentious at COP31. At COP29 in Baku, developed countries committed to mobilizing $300 billion a year by 2035. But a U.N. report released last week finds that adaptation finance remains far short. Developing countries need roughly $305 billion annually by 2035, yet international flows are only about $28 billion.
Recent events, such as Nepal’s deadly glacier floods that killed more than 1,500 people, are underscoring the devastating risks facing vulnerable developing nations and the urgent need for international cooperation and climate finance.
Second, watch how the results of the U.S. midterms affect the climate negotiations in Antalya. With Democratic victories in the House and Senate, the door may be open for a shift in U.S. climate policy starting in January 2027. To be sure, Congress cannot independently rejoin the Paris Agreement or Framework Convention, but Congress holds real levers. Its power of the purse will shape the United States’s ability to fund multilateral institutions, and new majorities can use oversight hearings to build a record on the costs of withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. And if a future president seeks to rejoin the UNFCCC, the Senate may well play a central role. Whether rejoining a treaty requires fresh advice and consent is an unsettled constitutional question, but one a Democratic Senate will help shape.
There are other encouraging signs. Representative Sean Casten (D-IL) has announced that a 19-member congressional delegation will attend COP31. Although these lawmakers cannot formally represent the United States in international negotiations, their presence sends an important signal that American climate diplomacy extends beyond the current administration. Many state and local officials will participate in COP31 through the America Is All In coalition, a secondary channel for American engagement. Whether these parallel diplomatic efforts can play a role in preserving relationships and credibility until the United States potentially reengages at the federal level remains an open question.
Expect COP31 to be judged less by its concrete outcomes than by who steps into the space the United States has left behind. The American midterm elections have introduced a new degree of uncertainty—and even optimism—about the future of U.S. climate diplomacy. Whether the United States can regain its influence when it eventually returns to the negotiating table remains an open question.
