The 31st Conference of the Parties (COP31) to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) begins today in Antalya, Türkiye, and runs from Nov. 9-20. It is the first COP with a split leadership: Türkiye is host and president of COP, while Australia, as “president of negotiations,” leads the formal talks. The arrangement was a compromise after protracted discussions over hosting rights, including a push for a Pacific-led COP that resulted in last month’s Pacific Pre-COP.
Indeed, this is a COP of many firsts – but firsts set among long-running tensions in global climate governance. It is the first COP since the United States’ second withdrawal from the Paris Agreement took effect in January – and likely the last before its withdrawal from the UNFCCC itself, a first from any country, takes effect in February 2027. It is the first since the U.N. Environment Programme found that overshooting the 1.5°C warming limit is imminent and unavoidable. And it is the first COP since the U.N. General Assembly voted in May – by 141-8, with 28 abstentions – to endorse the International Court of Justice’s July 2025 advisory opinion on States’ climate obligations, suggesting that even amidst these headwinds, States continue to look to multilateral institutions as fora for climate solutions.
Against this backdrop, we asked experts what they will be watching. Their responses cover the energy transition, loss and damage, mitigation and adaptation, climate-related mobility, geopolitics, inclusion of climate-affected communities, protection of environmental human rights defenders, and more.
We encourage readers to also visit the Just Security Climate Archive and keep an eye out for further coverage of COP31 in the days and weeks ahead.
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Ben Batros, Director of Legal Strategy at Strategy for Humanity; human rights and international criminal law litigator:
Three things that I’ll be watching at COP31:
What is the relationship between discussions of mitigation and adaptation? Historically adaptation has been a priority for Global Majority States. But as intensifying heat, fires, floods and storms extend their reach, impacts are increasingly being felt by communities in the Global North. Does this affect the balance between discussions of mitigation and adaptation in Antalya, including debates over whether the Mitigation Work Programme should continue? What is the interplay between these discussions, and with the ever present (and ever contentious) issue of climate finance – especially in the shadow of the devastating floods in Nepal in August?
Within mitigation discussions, does the roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels issued last week by Brazil, as part of its presidency of last year’s COP30, gain traction? While transitioning away from fossil fuels is not a formal agenda item, does the roadmap influence negotiations on the cover decision, Mitigation Work Programme or Global Stocktake preparations? Does it, or its companion roadmap on halting deforestation, continue to be taken forward through informal discussions? Or does it fall by the wayside, and any progress on mitigation is confined to increasing electrification without any link to transitioning from fossil fuels?
And to what extent will States at COP31 engage with developments in other global climate processes? In September, for example, the U.N. Environment Programme issued a report finding that overshoot of the 1.5°C warming limit is “imminent” and “unavoidable.” How do States grapple with this finding and its implications? Does it impact the discussions in Antalya? Are there any commitments to preserve or return to 1.5°C of warming, or the timeline for doing so? Or do they ignore it? And given that the next Global Stocktake formally launches at COP31, do we get any further insight on how States envisage the IPCC’s seventh assessment reports (AR7) relating to this? The failure of governments to agree on the AR7 timeline at the IPCC last month raised serious concerns. Do States at COP send any signal that they see AR7 as an important input into the Global Stocktake, and that each should be structured to enable this? Given the recent overshoot report, a strong and effective stocktake is vital.
Sue Biniaz, former Principal Deputy Special Envoy for Climate and Deputy Legal Adviser at the U.S. State Department:
Each COP is interesting in its own way. Having said that, as a former negotiator, I tend to find it less interesting what some of the Parties can agree to (in informal declarations, initiatives, etc.) and more interesting what all of the Parties can agree to (in formal consensus decisions). This has been particularly true as of late, given increasingly fraught geopolitics, the doom and gloom surrounding “climate multilateralism,” and the absence of a U.S. team that often worked closely with “un-like-minded” Parties to resolve differences.
As two examples:
- I will be watching what the Parties do with respect to the recent UNEP report on likely “overshoot” of limiting global temperature increase to 1.5°C. Australia, the president of the COP for negotiations, has signaled its intent to include this topic in the “cover decision,” i.e., the consensus decision that addresses the issues that otherwise have no mandated decision to call home. Theoretically, the possibilities extend all the way from no mention at all to agreement on the specific steps that need to be taken now to minimize the extent and duration of overshoot (e.g., a near-term focus on super-pollutants/deforestation). Given the direct relevance of the report to the Paris Agreement, the Parties should, at a bare minimum, be able to agree on referencing the report, along with a general sense of desirable next steps, e.g., with respect to methane emission reductions.
- I will also be interested in whether/how the “cover decision” will reference the electrification goal that Türkiye has made one of its signature outcomes of Antalya. The “35 by 35” Global Electrification Pledge will take the form of a side declaration joined by some, but not all, of the Parties. There has often been COP resistance to referencing such non-consensus initiatives, even if they directly implement goals previously agreed by consensus. It is high time that the Parties moved past the artificial divide between the “inside” and “outside” worlds and, at a minimum, acknowledged or even welcomed the electrification initiative.
The “blue” hue of this COP is also something to watch for, given the priority that has been placed on ocean-climate linkages by Türkiye, Australia, the Pacific-hosted pre-COP, and a letter of support from over one hundred Parties. Such linkages are likely to be reflected in a variety of ways, including ocean-specific pavilions, a Turkish-led call to action, and dedicated space in the “cover decision.”
And, speaking of a “blue” hue, the mood of the COP is likely to be brightened by the U.S. mid-term elections (coming right on the heels of the Brazilian election outcome).
Tom Ellison, Deputy Director of the Center for Climate and Security (CCS); former U.S. intelligence community climate analyst:
One thing I’ll be watching for is clues about how Parties are interpreting setbacks suffered by far-right, hypernationalist, climate-obstructionist forces in the United States, Brazil, and Hungary since the last COP. Top of mind will be the U.S. midterm elections just a week prior, in which Donald Trump’s Republican Party suffered the largest U.S. legislative wipeout in more than a half-century, and Democrats took full control of Congress and key state governments. Nine days prior, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva also unexpectedly fended off a challenge from right-wing populist Flávio Bolsonaro (the son of former president and Trump ally Jair Bolsonaro who subsequently fled to the United States). And in April, a broad anti-corruption coalition ousted Hungarian far-right Prime Minister Viktor Orban after 16 years in power.
On the one hand, observers shouldn’t oversell the immediate impact. Donald Trump still controls the U.S. executive branch through 2028, during which he can continue boycotting or obstructing climate talks, and might attempt other destabilizing foreign policy moves. And U.S. partners have seen such pendulums from Washington before. Meanwhile, Lula is constrained by a right-leaning Congress; Hungary’s post-Orban government is far from a climate champion; and 2027 elections could bring shifts toward, or consolidations of, the nationalist right in France, Poland, Spain, or Italy.
On the other hand, the real and perceived freedom of action for climate spoilers has been reduced, which might modestly tilt the calculations of attendees in Antalya. Obstructionists like Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were gleeful partners in U.S. efforts to stymie international climate action since 2025, but may want to start hedging, out of concern that MAGA is a spent force or anticipating Congressional investigations might shine a light on their fossil-fueled entanglements with administration figures. The U.S. congressional delegation and subnational coalitions at COP should have more credibility. And the countries most exposed to the energy and food disruptions from the Iran war (especially Asia) may hope for a less tariff- and trigger-happy U.S. administration in considering clean energy security options. Meanwhile, initiatives of Lula’s Brazil, notably its “roadmap” to combat deforestation and its sponsorship of a U.N. initiative on combating climate disinformation, have lived to fight another day. And a European Union with a less Euroskeptic Hungary (a speed bump for the Fit for 55 package) may enjoy a bit more cohesion to negotiate collective clean energy and climate resilience commitments. Overall, we might learn how other countries are reading the future of the nationalist, climate-skeptical far right, with its climate and geopolitical implications.
Kirk Herbertson, U.S. Director of Advocacy and Campaigns at EarthRights International:
After 30 COPs, we know to manage our expectations of any headline grabbing news that comes out of Türkiye. The United Nations has reported “substantially insufficient” progress among governments in meeting their past climate commitments. Indeed, one of the most transformational outcomes from recent COPs – a political commitment to a fossil fuel phaseout – barely lasted two years.
With that said, the COPs provide a valuable space for making connections between climate change champions across the planet. This year, many civil society organizations will focus on demanding a seat at the negotiating table for grassroots environmental defenders and representatives of frontline communities who are living with the daily effects of the climate crisis. Many of these individuals have the deepest knowledge in the room about climate impacts, but also face a constant risk of retaliation for criticizing powerful economic and political interests. COPs provide local leaders with a unique opportunity to engage directly with government decisionmakers and policymakers who they might not otherwise have access to in their home countries. This is especially important as civic space, science, and free speech become more restricted across the globe, destabilizing the governance systems on which future greenhouse gas abatement technologies will rely. To that end, I’ll be watching how governments engage with climate-affected voices and civil society on questions of real impact. As the Funders Initiative for Civil Society reminded us in an important September 2026 report, “The transition away from fossil fuels is not merely a technical policy challenge: it is also a contest over political and economic power.”
Corina Heri, Associate Professor of Human Rights Law and Climate Change, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium:
As COP31 begins, there are three issues that I will especially be watching.
The first concerns the incorporation of human rights law into the COP outcome documents, including particularly the right to a healthy environment but also the many other rights threatened by climate change and related (in)action – including in the context of a just transition. Courts have already established that States have rights-based obligations of mitigation, adaptation, procedure, access to justice, cooperation and reparation concerning climate change. In other words, human rights law and international climate law both apply to climate change. As a result, I’ll be watching closely to see whether, for example, reference is again explicitly made to the right to a healthy environment in the outcomes concerning the Just Transition Work Programme – the decision in this regard adopted at COP30 last year marked the first time that this right was included in the operative text of a COP/CMA decision, as opposed to a preambular reference. Similarly, it will be relevant to see whether references to this right by the International Court of Justice in its climate advisory opinion (para. 393 of the ICJ opinion states: “a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is a precondition for the enjoyment of many human rights, such as the right to life, the right to health and the right to an adequate standard of living, including access to water, food and housing”) will be reflected in the COP31 outcomes.
The second issue to watch at this COP concerns fossil fuels. It’s not clear whether and to what extent initiatives to phase out fossil fuels will be included in the official negotiations or outcomes of this year’s COP. In 2025, the ICJ’s climate advisory opinion made it clear that a State’s continued production, consumption, licensing or subsidizing of fossil fuels “may constitute an internationally wrongful act which is attributable to that State.” However, the idea of explicitly referencing fossil fuels phaseouts in COP outputs or treaty texts has long divided States. However, momentum is building for doing so: the host country of last year’s COP, Brazil, recently published a voluntary roadmap for fossil fuel phaseout, and 57 States participated in a conference on the creation of a Fossil Fuel Treaty in Santa Marta, Colombia in April 2026, with a second conference on this topic planned for 2027.
The third issue to watch at this COP concerns the protection and space held for civil society, for environmental human rights defenders and for acts of expression and assembly. Like civic space itself, environmental human rights defenders are under pressure globally. The host country agreement signed with Türkiye concerning this COP notably includes a clause stating that participants have “the duty not to interfere in its internal affairs.” This language, while present in older host agreements for previous COPs, was not included in the agreement for COP30, so its reintroduction raises questions about the intended use of this clause. Alongside longer-standing concerns about who has access to negotiation rooms and the “Blue Zone” as a whole, this raises more specific concerns about protection of the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association.
Mark Nevitt, Associate Professor of Law with Tenure at Emory University School of Law; Commander, Judge Advocate General’s Corps (ret.):
Three things to look for as COP31 begins. First, how will other countries fill the leadership void left by the U.S. withdrawal? Second, how will U.S. midterm results affect COP, and how might other U.S. actors—including congressional delegations and sub-national governments—continue to engage? I’ll be exploring both of these in more detail in another Just Security piece this week.
Third, look for progress to be made on loss and damage, which is distinct from both mitigation and adaptation efforts. Mitigation addresses the causes of climate change and is focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Adaptation addresses climate change impacts, such as investment in climate resilient infrastructure like building sea walls to prevent flooding. Loss and damage is defined as the negative effects of climate change that occur despite mitigation and adaptation efforts.
According to one study, the world suffered at least $2.8 trillion in extreme weather costs attributable to climate change from 2000 to 2019. Loss and damage is of critical importance for developing nations, including Small Island Developing States that face existential risk from sea level rise, storm surge, and saltwater inundation of freshwater supplies. For these vulnerable nations, climate change is not simply an environmental issue, it is an existential question involving territorial integrity and potentially statehood itself.
In its landmark July 2025 advisory opinion on States’ climate obligations, the International Court of Justice addressed these concerns directly. The ICJ observed that once a state is established, the disappearance of one of its core elements, such as territory lost to sea-level rise, would not necessarily entail the loss of its statehood. Nor are States required to update their maritime baselines as coastlines recede. But the ICJ’s advisory opinion, while legally significant, is just that—an opinion. The ICJ does not itself establish a funding mechanism or unilateral enforcement framework to protect vulnerable States from climate-driven territorial loss.
Relatedly, COP31 has an unusual geopolitical dimension, which is likely to increase attention on loss and damage. Australia built its bid around the Pacific, and the pre-COP was held in Fiji with a leaders’ event in Tuvalu. Australian Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen will lead international climate negotiations in Türkiye, and Türkiye led the development of the COP31 Action Agenda.
Dr. Marcos A. Orellana, Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law; former U.N. Special Rapporteur on toxics and human rights (2020-2026):
As the climate crisis deepens, people around the world are standing firmly in their demands of accountability of the governments and private actors responsible for the climate emergency. As their demands challenge powerful economic and political interests, many defenders have been stigmatized, threatened, attacked, and criminalized.
The importance of the work of people working in defense of the environment and human rights in the climate change context is increasingly recognized. COP30 in Brazil delivered the Belém Gender Action Plan (2026–2034), which explicitly references women environmental defenders. COP30 also delivered a strong vision for the Just Transition Work Programme, one anchored on human rights, including the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.
COP31 in Türkiye faces the challenge and opportunity to build on these achievements. Specifically, the Second Global Stocktake should gather evidence on the interface between climate action and human rights, with a view to providing guidance on how the next iteration of nationally determined contributions should integrate human rights protections, including for defenders. Similarly, COP31 discussions on the Global Goal on Adaptation should result in guidance that addresses governance and civic space, including the safety of defenders engaged in adaptation.
Jocelyn Perry, senior advocate and program manager of the climate displacement program at Refugees International:
As part of my work leading the Climate Displacement Program for Refugees International, I’ll be in Antalya following the intersection of climate change and forced displacement issues throughout COP31. I’ll be watching to see if negotiators are able to deliver scaled-up and more accessible financing and technical support for all affected communities—particularly refugees and other displaced people—including through the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) and the Santiago Network.
On adaptation, we’ll be trying to ensure that there are clear pathways to include human mobility within the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and the Baku Adaptation Roadmap. Specifically, refinements of the Belém Adaptation Indicators and the development of further GGA indicators should be informed by the identification of human mobility-related data and capacity gaps. For example, the indicators’ metadata and methodologies should distinguish between planned relocation, evacuation, and displacement, and data should be disaggregated by displacement status whenever possible.
We’ll also closely be following loss and damage. The Regular Report on Loss and Damage must dedicate a chapter to human mobility and loss and damage, including migration, displacement, planned relocation and immobilities. The FRLD also must deliver accessible financing for communities. As part and parcel of this, COP31 should send a clear message to the FRLD Board (which will meet in December to approve distribution of its first-ever round of funding) to approve funding for responses to loss and damage associated with human mobility. This will allow the pilot phase of the FRLD to test and learn from responses to human mobility that promote equitable, safe and dignified human mobility, and prevent forced displacement. Approved BIM requests should also demonstrate how the FRLD can facilitate direct and simplified access to small grants for communities affected by displacement, migration, planned relocation, and immobilities.
Finally, Refugees International will be supporting refugee leaders to be part of COP31, as those most affected by climate change should be at the table to make decisions to support their own climate resilience. The Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, which I co-coordinate on behalf of Refugees International, will be on the ground advocating for responsible inclusion of the issues surrounding displacement, migration, planned relocation, and immobilities for negotiators.
Erin Sikorsky, Director of the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) and Director of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS); former Deputy Director of the Strategic Futures Group on the U.S. National Intelligence Council:
COP31 is unfolding against a geopolitical landscape more fraught and fractured than at any time since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015. Wars in Ukraine and Iran continue with no end in sight, the U.S. remains an erratic wildcard, and fears of China’s economic dominance are scrambling global relationships. At the same time, climate impacts pose a more acute threat to security in the Global North than ever before– this summer, thousands died due to heatwaves, wildfires threatened important military installations in the United States and Europe, and drought shuttered or slowed shipping on critical shipping lanes in places like the Danube River and Panama Canal.
Given this backdrop, it’s clear that the best chances of increased climate ambition will stem from policy approaches that help manage both geopolitical risks and near-term extreme weather hazards. Back in September, COP31 President-Designate Murat Kurum made just such an argument. He noted that NATO countries have committed as much as 5 percent of GDP to defense, and argued for ambition on a similar scale for climate action. He said: “Defense spending is seen as an investment made today against future threats. We must view climate investment through the same strategic lens.”
Since Kurum’s statement, NATO has released new resilience requirements for the alliance that connect climate, energy, and defense, noting risks from extreme weather can “…compound the effects of hostile activity,” and that energy systems must be resilient to a range of threats. At COP, these types of security concerns will almost certainly play into both adaptation and electrification discussions. Host country Türkiye has argued for a focus on bridging the gap between National Adaptation Plans and implementation, and, separately, is planning to announce signatories to a new electrification pledge on November 10th. It will be interesting to see if countries most exposed to shocks from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz sign the pledge and frame their commitments about managing vulnerabilities. Electrification reduces fossil fuel dependence and builds the battery and grid capacity that competitiveness and defense now rely on. That makes it exactly the kind of climate investment Kurum described, one that countries can justify on security grounds alone, and that is where I expect to see any real ambition at COP31 derive from.
Sanjula Weerasinghe, Senior Research and Policy Associate at the Evacuations Research Hub, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, UNSW Sydney, and a member of the Pacific Technical Working Group on Human Mobility, with two decades working on displacement and forced migration:
This week’s COP might have looked very different. Australia, together with its Pacific partners, had originally sought to host it as a “Pacific COP” to shine a light on the impacts of climate change across the region, elevate Pacific perspectives and priorities, and demonstrate Pacific knowledge and innovation. While that vision was not realized, Fiji and Tuvalu, in partnership with Australia, hosted the Pre-COP meeting in October, which resulted in the Taku Pakasoa Declaration, a call for unwavering commitment to urgent climate action, united behind those on the frontlines. Taku Pakasoa, a Tuvaluan expression, conveys strength in unity and collective action.
The Pre-COP agenda focused on keeping 1.5°C within reach; enhancing access to predictable climate finance, including for adaptation and loss and damage while limiting debt burdens; and elevating ocean-based climate action and sustainable ocean management. As COP31 begins, I will be watching whether these priorities are reflected and how they are connected to Pacific perspectives on climate-related mobility, including the desire of Pacific people to remain in their homes and communities. My observations are informed in part by having attended this year’s Pre-COP; this was my second visit to Fiji and provided an opportunity to listen, learn, and reflect on how Pacific priorities and experiences can be more effectively connected to global policy discussions.
Climate-related mobility is an issue that has long been important for the region, which adopted the world-first Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility in 2023. Although climate-related mobility will not be a standalone or central issue on the formal agenda of COP31, it intersects with, and should inform, negotiations and decisions on adaptation, loss and damage, climate finance, just transition, and mitigation. At its heart, climate mobility is about human dignity, agency, choice. People want to be able to remain safely in their homes, where possible, but also to be effectively protected and assisted if they are displaced or need to move through planned relocation to safer locations. They also need opportunities and pathways to migrate with dignity. Movement away from “home” can entail profound loss and damage—financially, culturally, spiritually, psychologically, and socially. These consequences must be addressed. Pacific leadership and knowledge offer innovation, insights, and lessons for developing solutions.
Efforts to influence decision-making should not be driven solely or primarily by global conversations, pre-existing agendas, or institutional mandates. They should also be informed by what is being experienced and implemented in the Pacific and elsewhere. Effective action demands equitable, inclusive and accessible approaches to knowledge production and prioritization, including valuing community and traditional knowledge, bridging diverse knowledge systems, and promoting collaborative learning and exchange. As Palau’s president warned: “What reaches our shores today, will also reach your shores.” As COP31 begins, negotiators and advocates must listen.
