On Aug. 8, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, the then-secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, set out conditions that the Iranian government says the United States must satisfy before Iran will reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The conditions are fivefold: (1) never threaten Iran or insult its religious or national values; (2) permanently end what Iran characterizes as U.S. “war and aggression” against Iran and Iran-aligned actors in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq; (3) lift the U.S. naval blockade and withdraw U.S. naval and air forces “from around Iran;” (4) fully compensate Iran for damage from the “two imposed wars;” and (5) lift sanctions and unconditionally release frozen or seized Iranian assets. Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi stated the next day that “there is no possibility of resuming negotiations until the US’s violation of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] ends and the US makes up for what it has violated.”
The June 17 Islamabad MOU set out U.S. undertakings on several subjects that reappear in the Iranian conditions. It addressed, inter alia, the termination of military operations, the removal of the U.S. naval blockade, the movement of U.S. forces away from Iran following a final arrangement, sanctions relief, the release of frozen or restricted Iranian funds, reconstruction assistance, and temporary toll-free passage through Hormuz. Despite the MOU’s declaration of an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,” hostilities resumed on July 7.
Importantly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has stated that acceptance of the five conditions is separate from negotiations between Iran and Oman on transit procedures through the Strait. Those talks are not free of controversy, especially as they have included discussions on granting the parties substantial authority over vessels in transit, as well as the possibility of charges based on that transit.
This article assesses Iran’s demands through the lens of international law, sorting them into three categories: (a) demands with which the United States is already legally required to comply as a matter of international law; (b) demands that are legitimate subjects of negotiation; and (c) demands that cannot lawfully be satisfied by any bilateral arrangement between the United States and Iran. As will become clear, international law mandates compliance with some of Iran’s conditions and leaves most of the rest open to bargaining. But at least one demand cannot be met without violating the rights of third States.
Before turning to the demands, note that this article’s discussion offers no view as to the wisdom of any particular settlement. It is strictly limited to assessing how Iran’s conditions fit within the strictures of international law.
A. Demands that International Law Independently Requires
Cessation of Military Operations and Threats of the Use of Force: In demanding the cessation of both threats and the ongoing use of force, Iran has renewed a condition already provided for in the Islamabad MOU. Iran frames the demand as a response to “aggression,” but the legal question is narrower – whether ongoing U.S. operations and the threats the United States is making comply with the U.N. Charter and customary international law.
The applicable legal regime is the jus ad bellum, which governs when States may resort to military force. The keystone of that law is Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which provides that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” It merits emphasis that not only are actual uses of force unlawful, but so too are credible threats of unlawful force (ICJ, Nuclear Weapons, ¶ 47). There are but two exceptions within the four corners of the Charter – Security Council authorization under Chapter VII (art. 39), and the exercise of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 in response to an “armed attack.”
Despite assertions to the contrary by the State Department’s Legal Adviser, the prevailing view among international law experts is that neither exception justified the United States’ initial resort to force against Iran on Feb. 28, Operation Epic Fury (see the Just Security Iran collection, including the letter by more than 100 international law experts). There was no Security Council authorization, and Iran had not attacked the United States. Nor was an “imminent” armed attack in the works, such that the right of “anticipatory self-defense” would have allowed the United States to take forcible action to prevent that attack. That right matures only once an attack has been decided upon and is imminent, a difficult claim given the White House’s own post-strike assertion in June 2025 that “Iran’s nuclear facilities have been obliterated.” The same conclusions apply to any claim of using force in the collective self-defense of Israel.
Accordingly, the operation violated U.S. obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the use of force. The ongoing operations continue to do so, as do administration threats during the on-and-off hostilities.
There is, however, a complication. In response to the U.S. and Israeli strikes, Iran used force against other regional States that had not attacked it. Those strikes – at least the ones not directed at U.S. forces – amounted to armed attacks on those States, attacks condemned by the Security Council in Resolution 2817. They, therefore, triggered a right to request collective self-defense, including from the United States. To the extent a State subjected to the Iranian attacks requested U.S. assistance, the United States was entitled to come to its aid, subject to the customary conditions of necessity and proportionality (Paramilitary Activities, ¶¶ 176, 194, 199, 237; Nuclear Weapons, ¶ 41; Oil Platforms, ¶¶ 43, 73–74, 76). Necessity would be exhausted once those Iranian operations fully concluded.
Iran’s demand for cessation of the use and threat to use force is thus already legally required – but only to the extent that U.S. operations are not a legitimate exercise of collective self-defense on behalf of Gulf States. The law of State responsibility reinforces this point. Article 30 of the U.N. International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), a reliable restatement of customary law, requires a State responsible for an internationally wrongful act to cease the act and, as appropriate, to offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.
Termination of the Blockade: Although the Islamabad MOU committed the United States to lifting the blockade within 30 days, the United States reimposed the blockade in full after hostilities resumed in July. Iran’s demand to terminate the blockade implicates two distinct bodies of law – the law of naval warfare, which governs how a blockade is conducted, and the jus ad bellum, which governs whether establishing it was lawful in the first place.
On the publicly reported facts, U.S. blockade operations appear to have generally complied with the law of naval warfare requirements concerning notification, effectiveness, impartial application, and humanitarian considerations (see Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, § 7.7; Newport Manual, § 7.4; Newport Manual, § 7.2.3.2). Enforcement measures, including the graduated use of force against blockade runners, have likewise generally complied with that body of law (see Nevitt here and here).
The underlying resort to force is a separate matter. A blockade qualifies as a use of force under the U.N. Charter regardless of whether force is actually used against a vessel attempting to run it. For instance, Article 42 of the Charter cites “blockade” as an example of an operation that the Security Council may authorize if non-forceful measures have failed or are likely to do so. Additionally, the General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression Resolution (Res. 3314), adopted by consensus without U.S. objection, lists “[t]he blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State” as among the acts that “qualify as an act of aggression,” an acute form of the illegal use of force (art. 3(c)).
Accordingly, for a blockade to be lawful under the jus ad bellum, it must be justified as an exercise of individual or collective self-defense or be established pursuant to Security Council authorization. As explained in the preceding section, no such justifications exist for U.S. military operations against Iran, except for collective self-defense of States that Iran has attacked. The blockade plainly does not serve that purpose. It instead functions as part of the U.S. response to Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz roughly six weeks earlier. The blockade was therefore unlawful under the Charter, even though the U.S. Navy has conducted it in accordance with the law of naval warfare. The United States is already obligated, as a matter of international law, to terminate it.
Reparations under the Law of State Responsibility: Iran has demanded “complete compensation” for damage from what it calls the two “imposed wars.” (For present purposes, the following analysis is limited to the post-Feb. 28, 2026 conflict.) The Islamabad MOU included a U.S. undertaking to develop, with regional partners, a reconstruction plan worth at least $300 billion. That provision is relevant, but reconstruction assistance and legal reparation are not the same thing. States may provide reconstruction aid or ex gratia compensation without conceding legal responsibility. But the international law question here is whether the United States shoulders a legal obligation to compensate for damage.
Article 31 of ARSIWA requires a responsible State to make “[f]ull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act,” which may take the form of any combination of restitution (e.g., repairing the damage), compensation, and satisfaction (e.g., a formal apology, depending on the misconduct) (art. 34). Article 36 addresses compensation, providing that it “shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits.” These provisions restate the Permanent Court of International Justice’s finding in the 1928 Factory at Chorzów judgment that reparation “must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed” (p. 47).
Assuming the U.S. use of force breached its Charter obligations, Iran is entitled to reparations under the law of State responsibility – but only to the extent required by law. A responsible State need not compensate every loss an injured State suffers during an armed conflict, only those “caused by” wrongful acts. Direct destruction of Iranian State property is relatively straightforward. But claims for death, injury, lost revenue, and other consequential losses may raise more difficult questions of factual and legal causation and evidentiary hurdles. Moreover, account must be taken of any willful or negligent contribution to the harm by Iran, a particularly relevant point during an armed conflict (ARSIWA, art. 39).
The obligation to make reparations extends equally to violations of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), irrespective of the jus ad bellum question (ICRC Customary IHL Study, rule 150). There have been allegations of U.S. LOAC violations, most prominently with respect to the Feb. 28 strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh elementary school at Minab, which killed over 100 children (see Just Security’s treatment here and here), along with claims of strikes on civilian infrastructure not qualifying as military objectives. Regarding these and other allegations, it cannot be overstated that determining whether a LOAC violation has occurred is highly contextual. Without offering judgment on any incident, it is clear that if LOAC has been violated – which may in some cases be through negligence, not intentionality – the law of State responsibility obligates the United States to provide reparations.
Finally, it must be cautioned that the United States is not necessarily responsible for any harm caused by Israel. Article 16 of ARSIWA, addressing aid or assistance in another State’s wrongful act, sets strict conditions for attributing responsibility on that basis, including knowledge of the circumstances of the other State’s unlawful conduct. In some limited cases, a State may also bear responsibility for the full extent of harm in a jointly conducted attack (art. 47). However, mere military cooperation is generally insufficient for responsibility to attach under either basis.
Iran therefore has a sound legal basis for demanding reparation for injury caused by internationally wrongful U.S. conduct (as do the States that Iran has illegally attacked). The scope and amount, however, are complex questions best resolved through negotiation, a dedicated claims commission, or judicial proceedings (like the long-existing Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) to which both parties consent.
B. Negotiable Demands
Economic Sanctions: Iran demands that sanctions be lifted. The Islamabad MOU already contemplated comprehensive sanctions negotiations and an immediate U.S. commitment to oil-related waivers. There is no question that Iran may make sanctions relief a point of negotiation, but the question is whether the United States is already obligated to lift them.
The better and prevailing view of international law is that unilateral sanctions, even without Security Council authorization, are not per se unlawful. States enjoy broad authority to decide whether and on what terms to trade with others. In Paramilitary Activities, for instance, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected Nicaragua’s claim that U.S. economic measures amounted to unlawful intervention, focusing instead on treaty breach (¶¶ 244-45, 275-76). And extensive State practice – including the EU’s sanctions authority in the context of its Common Foreign and Security Policy – treats sanctions as a lawful exercise of sovereign authority.
There is contrary opinio juris, as in the African Union’s 2024 African Common Position on international law in cyberspace, which holds that the prohibition on intervention can extend to coercive economic measures. Similarly, the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration (GA Res. 2625) condemns using “economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State … to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.” Yet the prevailing view remains that sanctions are lawful, meaning relief is on the table for negotiation, but likely not required by law.
Release of Frozen or Seized Iranian Assets: Iran demands the release of assets that the United States has frozen or seized. The Islamabad MOU contemplated making such assets available under agreed procedures.
Legal analysis of the demand depends on the distinction between freezing assets and permanently taking them; the United States has done both. Dating back decades, the United States has long frozen Iranian government property, including assets of Iran’s central bank, Bank Markazi, without changing ownership. Separately, some Iranian assets have been subjected to judicial enforcement and transferred to judgment creditors (see, e.g., ICJ, Certain Iranian Assets).
A freeze that blocks the use or transfer of property without transferring title is distinct from judicial attachment or execution, and the former does not ordinarily engage immunity from judicial enforcement in the same manner. Its lawfulness instead turns principally on the legal authority for the freeze and any other applicable international obligations.
However, judicial attachment or execution directly engages immunity. Relevant in that regard is the 2004 U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. While not yet in force, important provisions on immunity from “measures of constraint” are regarded as reflecting customary law. Article 19 permits post-judgment measures against State property only if the State has consented, earmarked the property for the claim, or the property was used for non-governmental commercial purposes. Article 21 provides especially strong protection for central bank assets, among other specified property. In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ likewise treated immunity from enforcement as governed by customary rules distinct from immunity from jurisdiction (¶¶ 113, 117-118).
If Iranian assets were merely frozen under otherwise lawful sanctions, their release is a matter for negotiation. But if protected State property was seized or transferred in violation of immunity or another binding obligation, the United States must cease the violation and make full reparation, including “restitution” (return) where possible (ARSIWA, arts. 31, 34-35). Which category applies turns on the specific assets and measures at issue and, as a practical matter, is likely to be resolved through negotiation regardless.
U.S. Operations Against Iran-Aligned Regional Actors: Iran demands an end to U.S. attacks on actors it identifies as allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq. But this condition does not admit of a single legal answer. To begin with, the United States has used force only against the Houthis and the Iran-aligned militias in Iraq, both of which have carried out significant attacks against U.S. assets. Although there is some disagreement over whether the law of self-defense extends to forcible defensive actions against non-state actors, the prevailing view, especially among States facing such threats, is that it does (DoD Law of War Manual, § 1.11.5.4; but see Haque; Hakimi).
A separate issue is whether conducting operations in Yemen and Iraq is lawful under international law. Yemen has often consented to U.S. operations on its territory, and Iraq has on occasion done so. Where consent has not been given, the controversial “unwilling or unable” doctrine would justify striking the groups in Iraq (DoD Law of War Manual, §1.11.5.3). Rejection of the doctrine would be the sole basis for finding any of the operations unlawful. And in any event, the dispute would be between those States and the United States, not the United States and Iran.
The contrary is also important. Where the United States can rely on territorial State consent to the use of force, the question whether the law of self-defense extends to forcible defensive actions against non-state actors would not be relevant.
In sum, the United States is not obligated to halt further strikes against these groups so long as the necessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense are met or territorial State consent exists. Still, in principle, the United States could agree to refrain from further attacks.
Israel primarily conducts operations against Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. A bilateral U.S.-Iran agreement cannot, on its own, impose an obligation on Israel to terminate those operations without Israel’s consent. The United States could, however, negotiate commitments regarding its own assistance to or participation in Israeli operations.
Withdrawal of U.S. Forces “From Around Iran”: The United States maintains forces across the region, including Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, and naval forces operating throughout the Gulf.
That presence is not inherently or otherwise unlawful. Under the law of the sea, freedom of navigation permits warships of any State to operate in international waters (UNCLOS, arts. 58, 87(1)(a)), and the ICJ has recognized that a foreign military presence, maintained with the consent of the territorial State, is lawful (Armed Activities, ¶¶ 49–53). The United States could nonetheless agree to withdraw some or all of these forces, and Iran could separately urge host States to withdraw their consent.
A complicating factor is the use of regional bases for offensive operations against Iran, which, as explained above, lack a jus ad bellum basis. Under the due diligence principle articulated by the ICJ in Corfu Channel, a State must not knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States (p. 22). Moreover, Article 3(f) of the General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression characterizes a State’s placing of its territory at the disposal of a State engaged in aggression against a third State as conduct that may itself qualify as aggression. And as noted, Article 16 of ARSIWA provides for responsibility in cases of aiding and assisting another State’s unlawful actions.
But those obligations are between Iran and the host Gulf States, not between Iran and the United States. Additionally, Iran’s attacks on some of those States entitled those States to invoke collective self-defense, which relieves them of these obligations vis-à-vis the presence and operations of forces dedicated to their defense. The United States may be obligated to end its offensive operations against Iran; it is not obligated to withdraw its regional forces. The two are separate questions.
“Insults” Against Iran and Its Religion: Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the United States from making threats of unlawful force against Iran. But Iran’s demand that the United States stop making statements it regards as insulting to its religious or national values is only negotiable, nothing more. At a minimum, Iran’s abstract formulation does not sound in the register of international law.
C. Demands Contrary to International Law
Compliance with Other Demands Before Opening the Strait: One of Iran’s conditions cannot be resolved through a bilateral arrangement. Iran has linked the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to U.S. satisfaction of the demands discussed above. But whatever the merits of Iran’s grievances against the United States, third States retain an independent right of passage through the Strait that no bilateral settlement can extinguish. In other words, Iran cannot make compliance with its demands a precondition for reopening the Strait.
Free transit through an international strait traces at least to the ICJ’s 1949 Corfu Channel judgment, which held that “in accordance with international custom … States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation … without the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent” (p. 28). That rule was codified in Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which bars suspension of innocent passage through international straits, and complemented by Article 18(1), which prohibits charges levied on foreign ships by reason of their passage alone. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) built on this foundation. In straits “used for international navigation” that connect one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone to another, all ships and aircraft enjoy a “right of transit passage” (arts. 37-38). UNCLOS adds submerged transit and overflight, and unlike ordinary innocent passage, transit passage admits no such exception (compare arts. 25(3) and 44).
Neither Iran nor the United States is a party to UNCLOS (Oman is). Whether the transit passage regime binds them, therefore, depends on whether it reflects customary international law. The United States has long viewed UNCLOS’s navigational provisions, including transit passage, as restating customary international law (1983 Presidential Statement on United States Oceans Policy). The Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations specifically applies it to the Strait of Hormuz (§§ 1.3.2, 2.5.3.1). But Iran has resisted that characterization since the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1982), treating the UNCLOS regime, particularly submerged submarine transit and military overflight, as a treaty benefit negotiated among the Parties to UNCLOS (see Interpretive Declaration). The better view is that transit passage now reflects customary international law, one supported by extensive State practice and opinio juris, including through the Strait of Hormuz itself. (State Department, Limits in the Sea, No. 114).
Iran’s long-standing objection raises the question of whether it might qualify as a “persistent objector,” thereby escaping application of the customary rule. That complex question need not be resolved here. Iran’s objection dates from 1974, when the concept of transit passage first appeared in the negotiations. The prohibition on suspending passage through an international strait and on conditioning passage on coastal-State permission was settled far earlier and was not the object of the Iranian objection. Thus, Iran is bound by those rules at least. Whichever regime applies, closure and a permission requirement are unlawful. Moreover, in his classic analysis on the matter, James Kraska provides a further independent ground for rejecting the Iranian claim. Lastly, regardless of Iran’s position, the United States is bound by customary law and thus cannot enter an arrangement in violation of it.
Iran and Oman do possess limited regulatory authority under the law of the sea. UNCLOS Articles 41 and 42 – again arguably declaratory of custom – permit bordering States to propose sea lanes and traffic separation schemes through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and to legislate on specified matters such as navigational safety, consistent with international standards. Such measures may not, however, “discriminate in form or in fact among foreign ships” or “in their application have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing” transit passage (art. 42(2)).
What exceeds this regulatory competence is the claim of authority to condition entry on Iranian permission or to impose charges tied to cargo value rather than to services rendered. In July 2026, the IMO Council expressly insisted that any Iran-Oman arrangement preserve non-discriminatory, unimpeded passage through the traffic separation scheme and that passage remain free of tolls or charges. And in March, the Security Council, in Resolution 2817, condemned interference with navigation through the Strait.
This is why the demand cannot be negotiated away, regardless of what the United States is prepared to offer. The right of passage by vessels through the Strait is held by each flag State. The United States may lawfully agree to accept restrictions on the passage of U.S.-flagged vessels, for a State may, with very few exceptions, always consent to limit the exercise of its own rights. But it has no authority to waive the customary law entitlements of other States. As noted in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, generally accepted as reflective of customary law, a “treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.” That principle precludes agreement between the United States and Iran. Just as the former cannot waive the rights of other flag-States, the latter cannot impose a new restrictive regime on them through agreement with Oman or the United States.
The existence of an ongoing international armed conflict complicates the analysis but does not salvage Iran’s position. The law of naval warfare qualifies the peacetime regime in some respects. For instance, belligerents may employ mines to channel neutral shipping and may visit and search neutral vessels for contraband. Yet that body of law still does not authorize closing an international strait that includes belligerent waters to neutral commerce when, as with the Strait of Hormuz, no alternative route of comparable convenience exists (Mark Nevitt’s piece; on mining, see Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare, § 7.2.3.2). More fundamentally, Iran has framed its condition not as an active belligerent measure but as a post-conflict term. Once hostilities cease, nothing in the law of naval warfare remains to qualify the peacetime rule, and the right of transit passage governs without exception.
Note that the law of State responsibility allows States to take “countermeasures” when they are the victims of an internationally wrongful act, such as the wrongful use of force (ARSIWA, art. 22). Countermeasures are actions that would otherwise violate international law but for the fact that they are taken by an injured State against a responsible State to compel the latter to desist or to pay reparations (arts. 49–52); they “preclude wrongfulness.” Iran could accordingly have sought to justify closing the Strait to U.S.-flagged vessels on the theory that doing so could reasonably be expected to pressure the United States into terminating its unlawful military operations and providing reparations.
But countermeasures only preclude the wrongfulness of conduct directed against the responsible State – here, the United States (art. 49(2)). Since the right of transit passage is a customary right independently enjoyed by all States, closure remains a violation of international law with respect to other States using the Strait. Iran, moreover, has not characterized its action as a countermeasure, as the rule on countermeasures notification requires (art. 52(1)(b)). It has also used force against neutral shipping, whereas countermeasures are limited to non-forcible conduct (art. 50(1)(a)).
Conclusion
The legal bottom line is straightforward. Iran is entitled to insist that the United States comply with international law, as other States are entitled to demand that Iran do likewise; neither party has clean hands in this conflict. The United States must stop using force except in collective self-defense of States under Iranian attack, cease threatening force that lacks a lawful basis, end the blockade, and provide reparations for harm caused by internationally wrongful conduct. Iran must stop using force against other States, quit attacking vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and open it. It too is subject to demands for reparations. Of course, this must all be done in a manner that enhances international peace and security, not one that exacerbates them. With one exception, everything else is on the table.
What Iran cannot do is hold the Strait of Hormuz hostage to its demands. The rights of third States are not bargaining chips in a bilateral dispute. Whatever the legality of U.S. conduct toward Iran, and whatever concessions the United States may choose or be required to make, Iran may not condition other States’ passage through an international strait on satisfaction of its demands against the United States.
To say the situation is a cascade of strategic and diplomatic blunders on both sides would be an understatement, to say the least. But as the two sides try to dig themselves out of the hole they have dug together, it would behoove them to start paying attention to international law.
