On June 12, President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) had killed “Niño Guerrero” (Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores), the leader of the transnational criminal gang Tren de Aragua (TdA). Trump stated that the operation was “coordinated closely with our friends in Venezuela, with whom we are working very well.” The CIA reportedly provided intelligence for the operation.
The following day, in an X post, the USSOUTHCOM Commander, General Frank Donovan, expressed “gratitude to the Venezuelan security forces for their support in the successful joint operation against a Tren de Aragua compound that resulted in the death of the narco-terrorist organization’s leader,” who was “a wanted fugitive charged by the U.S. Department of Justice with ordering, directing, and facilitating acts of terrorism and violence in the United States.” According to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth,
The operation underscores the shared U.S. and Venezuelan commitment to take the fight to narco-terrorists and deny them any safe haven in our hemisphere. We will continue to work closely with security partners, like Venezuela — and countries in the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C) partners — to take the fight to our enemies.
The administration has not yet stated the purported legal basis under domestic or international law for the operations, nor explained why, in its view, the killing does not constitute murder or extrajudicial killing. The following annotated list addresses those and related questions about the June 12th operation in Venezuela (and is relevant to any future such operations).
Administration View on Legal Authority
1. On what domestic and international law authority does the Trump administration believe it was acting in carrying out this killing?
Note:The Trump administration has not yet stated the purported legal basis for what appears to be a pre-planned targeted killing operation under domestic or international law.
Law Enforcement Operations and Limitations
2. Does the administration believe that the operation in which the U.S. military conducted a lethal strike against Guerrero can be legally justified on the basis of conducting a law enforcement operation against an individual who has been indicted in the United States, and did Venezuela consent to the operation as an exercise of U.S. law enforcement authority?
Note: The Justice Department has noted it has indicted scores of so-called “leaders and members of designated foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (TdA), linked to various violent crimes inside and outside the United States, including murder, robbery, extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, and controlled substance trafficking.” As of today, the United States has conducted 63 strikes against alleged drug runners, many reportedly affiliated with Tren de Aragua, killing 207. The United States also participated in a March 6th military operation in Ecuador that involved an airstrike, though the circumstances remain murky.
Designation of an individual or group as a “terrorist organization” does not provide authority to take lethal action against any individual or group member subject to that designation (see, for example, this explainer on wartime authorities and what these designations do and do not authorize). Moreover, the United States is not in an armed conflict with Tren de Aragua (see no. 10 in this Q&A), which means status-based killings of its members or leaders are not permissible under the law of armed conflict, given that body of law does not apply in peacetime.
Moreover, the existence of a law enforcement investigation (including a warrant for arrest) does not make lethal targeting permissible. During law enforcement operations, lethal force may be used only in certain limited circumstances (see #3 below). While the United States may criminalize conduct abroad that has effects in the United States or harms U.S. citizens (“prescriptive jurisdiction”), the exercise of “enforcement jurisdiction,” such as investigation, arrest, and law-enforcement-based uses of force, requires the consent of the territorial State, Venezuela (Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Fourth), §§ 407, 409, 411). On the nature of the requisite consent, see Question 8. And on the manner in which a consensual operation may be conducted, see Question 9.
3. Law enforcement operations are subject to international human rights law. What human rights obligations of the United States, if any, were implicated by the killing of Guerrero?
Note: The use of deadly force outside an armed conflict (see Question 9) is governed by international human rights law (IHRL), which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life. To comply with this rule under customary and treaty IHRL, lethal force:
(1) may be used only as a last resort;
(2) must be strictly unavoidable to protect life against an imminent threat of death or grievous injury; and
(3) is available only when no less extreme alternatives exist.
(See, e.g., UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials ¶ 9; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, ¶ 12; McCann v. United Kingdom, ¶¶ 148–49). Under this standard, the lethal strike on Guerrero, even though surgical in character, would have been permissible only if the threat to life he posed was imminent and capture or other less lethal alternatives were unavailable. These are questions of fact that the United States would have to establish to justify the strike as a law enforcement operation. The president’s description of the harm posed by Guerrero does not come close to meeting the imminence standard.
The United States has long debated whether IHRL, as a matter of treaty law, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), applies to military operations outside the United States (see, e.g., Army Operational Law Handbook). But, putting that debate aside, a State operating on another State’s territory with that State’s consent is bound by the IHRL obligations of the territorial State (see, e.g., Milanovic). As explained in Question 9, Venezuela shoulders the aforementioned obligation and, as a result, so does the United States when operating in that country; this is the case irrespective of whether any IHRL obligation to respect life applies directly to the United States.
During an armed conflict, the killing of enemy forces, so long as done in a manner consistent with the law of armed conflict, is not “arbitrary.” But there was no armed conflict. See Questions 4 and 6.
Claimed Armed Conflict with TdA
4. Does the administration believe there is an active armed conflict between the United States and Tren de Aragua, such that targeting its leader would not have been prohibited under the law of armed conflict? If so, on what legal and factual basis did the administration conclude that an armed conflict exists?
Note: The United States has claimed that it is involved in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) with Tren de Aragua. NIACs are armed conflicts between a State and an organized armed group. During such conflicts, it is permissible to target members of the group who are taking part in the hostilities, including those commanding them, based on that status (“status-based targeting”).
There are two requirements for the existence of a NIAC. First, the non-state group must be both armed and organized. Cartels and criminal gangs are sometimes well-organized, but they are not per se “armed” in the sense of the law of armed conflict. “Armed” denotes engaging in military violence against the State in an organized fashion; that the group may possess weapons used for other criminal activity does not suffice. The second requirement is that the armed violence between the State and the group must be protracted and intense; sporadic violence is not intense enough.
Despite the Trump administration’s reported claims that it is in NIACs with approximately 24 criminal gangs, cartels, or other non-state groups in Latin America, the administration has provided no information suggesting that TdA satisfies the “intensity” of hostilities or “organization” thresholds for an armed conflict to exist. In contrast with White House statements, Venezuela’s statement on the killing notably describes Guerrero as the head of “una organizacion criminal [a criminal organization].” The U.S. Intelligence Community’s April 2025 consensus “sense of the community” assessment is consistent with this characterization. As a few of us previously explained, if a non-state group (like TdA) is not organized in a manner that is roughly comparable to that of a State’s armed forces in order to conduct military-like operations against the State concerned at the requisite level of intensity, it cannot be a party to an “armed conflict” under international law, and status-based targeting of the group’s members or leaders is flatly prohibited.
On whether there is a NIAC between Venezuela and TdA, and if so, its implications for U.S. operations in Venezuela, see Question 9.
5. Does the United States believe the strike on Guerrero was taken in self-defense, as codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter? If so, what is the factual basis for concluding that TdA was engaged in an imminent or ongoing “armed attack” against the United States justifying the use of force in self-defense? Or, does the United States believe that there is an ongoing NIAC with Tren de Aragua (see Question 4), and that it does not need to justify its operations as taken in self-defense?
Note: Article 51 allows for the use of necessary and proportionate force to prevent an imminent “armed attack” or defeat an ongoing one. Drug trafficking as such does not constitute an “armed attack” triggering the right of self-defense. Although this claim has recently been made by the United States when it launched Operation Southern Spear in November 2025, the assertion that drug trafficking as such can amount to an armed attack is almost universally rejected by international law experts.
Moreover, the prevailing view is that the right of self-defense exists only until the armed attack is over, and no further attacks are imminent. The use of force is never lawful for punishment, general deterrence, or other purposes unrelated to the defense of the State concerned. This raises the question of whether the United States is of the view that there is an ongoing armed attack by TdA.
Finally, whether a NIAC is underway (see Question 4) has no bearing on the underlying right to use force in the first place.
6. Does the legal justification for this operation rest on President Trump’s mere assertion that an armed conflict exists? If so, do the Department of Justice, DoD/OGC, and State/L concur that the President may determine an armed conflict exists irrespective of the facts? Is there a record of any facts that were relied on by the president in reaching legal conclusions about TdA, Guerrero, or other potential targets for lethal strikes?
Note: International law experts almost universally agree that the existence of a NIAC is a purely factual question that turns on satisfaction of the organization and intensity criteria cited in Question 4. States may not unilaterally declare that a NIAC exists contrary to the facts and then engage in operations permitted only during an armed conflict, like status-based targeting.
7. In the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) cases, the administration has told federal courts that TdA is acting at the direction of the Venezuelan government (it makes this claim because the AEA applies only to incursions and invasions by foreign governments). Those representations to courts are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the statements by Trump and Hegseth in the wake of the Guerrero killing, making clear that Venezuela was aiding the United States in targeting TdA’s leader.
Is this further evidence that the administration’s statements to the courts in the AEA cases are either not true or at least no longer true? How can the administration claim to continue to rely on the AEA based on its description of this operation and stated cooperation with the Venezuelan government?
Note: Trump stated, “This action was coordinated closely with our friends in Venezuela, with whom we are working very well” and “The operation underscores the shared U.S. and Venezuelan commitment to take the fight to narco-terrorists and deny them any safe haven in our hemisphere.” Venezuela called the strike “a combined operation between security organs of Venezuela and the United States” (“una operación combinada entre organismos de seguridad de Venezuela y de los Estados Unidos”) and praised the “cooperation and exchange of intelligence information among the authorities of both countries” (“cooperación e intercambio de información de inteligencia entre las autoridades de ambos países”).
Venezuelan Consent and Underlying Authority
8. The government of Venezuela appears to have agreed to the U.S. lethal operation within its territory. Given the United States’ use of force against Venezuela, removing its head of State by force, and prior and subsequent coercive measures, on what basis does the Trump administration believe that the Venezuelan government’s agreement was free from coercion?
Note: The use of force by one State on the territory of another State can violate a number of prohibitions under international law. Such actions can violate the State’s sovereignty because the use of force occurred within its territory. Moreover, an exercise of law enforcement authority on another State’s territory also violates its sovereignty on the basis that under international law only the territorial State may exercise such “enforcement jurisdiction” on its territory (see Question 2). And, under some circumstances, such operations might amount to a use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter against the territorial State, even when targeting non-State actors, such as a terrorist group.
However, international law recognizes “valid consent” freely given as a “circumstance precluding the wrongfulness” of an otherwise unlawful action (Articles on State Responsibility, art. 20). General Donovan’s statement issued by SOUTHCOM acknowledges support from Venezuelan security forces and characterizes the operation as “joint.” This statement and the one released by the government of Venezuela suggest not merely acquiescence but active collaboration by Venezuela, which would satisfy the requirement that any consent be valid. Nevertheless, given the power relationship between the two countries, the previous U.S. attack on Venezuela, the military removal of its head of state, President Trump’s repeated statements such as “we’re in charge,” and the fact that the Venezuelan regime remained largely intact after that attack, the issue of whether the consent was freely given looms large.
9. What was the Venezuelan government’s stated legal basis for the action? Its public statements do not indicate that it believes TdA to be in an armed conflict with Venezuela. And if it did not believe an armed conflict exists, on what basis did the operation comport with Venezuela’s international human rights law obligations?
Note: It is essential to understand that States may consent only to actions they themselves may undertake under international law. Thus, the legality of the U.S. (or joint U.S.-Venezuela) operation turns on whether there was any basis for Venezuela to use lethal force against Guerrero in the first instance.
If Venezuela were involved in a NIAC with TdA, the United States could lawfully engage in status-based targeting at the request of Venezuela. To qualify as a NIAC, the same organization and intensity conditions would have to be satisfied as discussed in Question 4. These are questions of fact. Importantly, even if the situation in Venezuela qualified as a NIAC, Venezuela would be entitled to impose constraints on the U.S. operations, for the U.S. authority to use force would be purely derivative of Venezuela’s.
If the situation is not a NIAC, Venezuela’s authority to use force against members of TdA, including Guerrero, would be governed by Venezuelan domestic law and IHRL. In addition to customary IHRL, Venezuela is a party to the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Articles 4 and 6 of those instruments, respectively, like customary IHRL, prohibit the arbitrary deprivation of life. Deprivation is not arbitrary when limited to situations where deadly force is the last resort, there is an imminent threat to life or of grievous injury, and there are no alternatives to its use. Thus, if the United States was engaging in forcible law enforcement at the request of Venezuela based on that country’s right to maintain law and order, it would derivatively be bound by the same prohibition.
Murder and Extrajudicial Killing
10. On what basis, if any, would the Trump administration distinguish this action from an extrajudicial killing?
11. Does the killing of Guerrero by U.S. active duty personnel constitute the offense of murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)? If not, why not?
Note: Article 118 of the UCMJ defines murder for which U.S. servicemembers may be prosecuted, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when such person— (1) has a premeditated design to kill; [or] (2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
See also the Manual for Courts-Martial (p. IV-79) as described here.
12. Does the killing of Guerrero implicate conspiracy to commit murder under 18 U.S. Code § 956 or Article 81 of the UCMJ? If not, why not?
Assassination Ban
13. Does the killing of Guerrero constitute assassination under the assassination ban in Executive Order (E.O.) 12333? If not, why not? Did CIA lawyers assess whether their agency’s involvement violated E.O. 12333?
Note: Section 2.11 of E.O. 12333 provides: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”
Scope of the President’s Claimed Art. II Authority
14. As one of us (Tess) and Mary McCord have written, the administration has claimed the president is relying on authority under Article II of the Constitution for killings of individuals alleged to be associated with gangs and cartels abroad, raising a host of serious questions about the purported scope of that authority:
In its report to Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution [on the vessel strikes that began on Sept. 2, 2025], President Trump claimed that his “constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations” provided authority to kill suspected drug traffickers.
Is it [the administration’s] view that Art. II of the Constitution allows the President to use lethal force against anyone he deems a “terrorist”? If so, what criteria would need to be met for an individual or organization to be deemed “terrorists”?
Is it [the administration’s] view that Art. II “affords the President the power to order the military to kill any and all persons around the world who might (in the President’s view) be planning to commit crimes in the United States”?
Could the President order the military to kill a “terrorist” in the middle of a city? Bogota? Paris? Chicago? If not, why would he have the authority to order the strikes that have been taken but not those strikes?
Operational Roles
15. What were the respective roles of the United States and Venezuela in the action that Venezuela describes as “una operación combinada [a combined operation]?”
16. What Rules of Engagement (ROE) governed the attack? Has Tren de Aragua been “declared hostile”?
17. What alternative operations, such as capture, were considered in lieu of a lethal strike? What was the basis for rejecting them?
18. What was the approval level for authorizing the strike? SOUTHCOM or higher? What was the involvement of judge advocates or other legal advisers?
Transparency and Notification
19. Did President Trump report the killing to Congress within 48 hours as required under the War Powers Resolution? If so, will it make that notification public?
20. When did the United States and Venezuela agree this action would be taken? Were members of Congress briefed on the operation prior to its execution? When did President Trump authorize it? When were administration lawyers (in the White House, at DoD, at State), and uniformed lawyers advising SOUTHCOM, informed of plans to undertake the operation?
21. Will the Trump administration publicly release the written legal justification for this lethal operation, including any memorandum by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (with any redactions for classification that might be needed)? Will the administration share with Congress in full any legal memorandum related to the operation?
22. Did U.S. officials consider any legal risks to U.S. personnel due to the International Criminal Court’s having jurisdiction in the territory of Venezuela?
