The fourth round of talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is about to kick off, with previous meetings injecting much-needed momentum into President Donald Trump’s push for a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Still, with only a short window for diplomacy and factions in the United States, Iran, and Israel opposing diplomacy, there is no guarantee that the current momentum will lead to a sustained negotiating process, much less an effective agreement that verifiably reduces Iran’s proliferation risk.
If the Trump administration is serious about reaching an agreement, it needs to maximize this opportunity created by these early talks. That includes creating an environment conducive to the intensive diplomacy that will be necessary to reach an effective agreement. To achieve that, the administration should focus on consistently messaging pragmatic objectives for a deal and de-emphasizing U.S. efforts to exert so-called “maximum pressure” on Iran while talks are ongoing.
Consistent Messaging on Realistic Nuclear Objectives
Trump consistently has expressed support for reaching a nuclear deal with Iran, but officials around him are sending mixed messages about U.S. objectives. With Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei still skeptical of U.S. intentions and credibility following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during the first Trump administration, sustained pragmatic messaging will be needed to reassure Tehran that the United States is not seeking the complete dismantlement of Iran’s civil nuclear program.
Trump’s choice of Witkoff to lead talks suggests that Witkoff’s focus on limiting, rather than dismantling, Iran’s nuclear program is closely aligned with Trump’s own vision for an acceptable deal. Witkoff has consistently said the U.S. focus is on verification and preventing the weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program, objectives Iran has said it is willing to discuss.
Witkoff has, however, back-pedaled on a critical issue—whether the United States will negotiate a deal that allows Iran to retain any amount of uranium enrichment. In an April 14 interview with Fox News, Witkoff suggested Iran will need to dial back its uranium enrichment from near weapons-grade levels to 3.67 percent, a level suitable for reactor fuel (and the limit in the JCPOA, which Iran abided by for years as verified by the UN’s nuclear watchdog, including for a year following U.S. withdrawal). He also said a deal must include intrusive monitoring and prohibitions on certain weaponization-related activities.
The following day, however, Witkoff said on X that Iran will need to completely dismantle its enrichment program—a demand that has been a non-starter for Iran since the Bush administration. The breakthrough in the talks that led to the JCPOA of 2015 came after the Obama administration acknowledged Iran could retain a limited, tightly monitored, civil enrichment program under a deal. Even more than then, Iran will put a premium on retaining uranium enrichment to provide a guarantee that it can rebuild its leverage should the United States fail (yet again) to uphold its commitments under a future nuclear deal.
If the Trump administration continues to waffle on the question of uranium enrichment, it will strengthen arguments from factions in Tehran arguing against a deal and could create the impression that Trump will be pressured into more maximalist demands. Key Trump administration officials, such as National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, said repeatedly in the lead up to the recent Oman talks that complete dismantlement of the nuclear program is the U.S. goal for talks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed a similar goal, saying the United States should pursue a deal based on the model of Libya’s decision to abandon its nuclear program.
This opening gambit is a non-started for Tehran. For Iranian leaders, the lesson of the “Libya Model” is that Ghaddafi gave up the country’s nuclear weapons program in 2003, only to be overthrown and later killed in 2011 by NATO-backed forces during the civil war. Iran will resist making concessions on its nuclear program that follow the Ghaddafi model, even if they are willing to make substantial concessions that eliminate the prospect of working towards nuclear weapons so long as any new agreement remains in effect. President Trump needs to distance himself from these maximalist objectives that will kill the negotiating process before the United States can test Iran’s intentions to reach an agreement.
Not only will adopting a hardline “no enrichment” position push Iran from the negotiating table entirely, it is not necessary for an effective agreement and would not fully address Iran’s proliferation risk. . A complete ban on enrichment might initially appear to be an ideal starting point from a nonproliferation standpoint, but dismantling the infrastructure does not erase the knowledge Iran has gained about uranium enrichment. Iran’s experience enriching uranium to near-weapons grade levels and its development of centrifuges that enrich uranium more efficiently would allow Tehran to quickly reconstitute its program. The irreversibility of this knowledge underscores that monitoring should be the key focus of an effective agreement going forward. With the right monitoring in place, the United States can negotiate an effective nonproliferation accord that allows Iran to retain a tightly circumscribed nuclear program that includes limited enrichment.
In short, the United States (and any future negotiating partners) can find the right combination of limits and monitoring to block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons while allowing Iran to retain a less risky level of uranium enrichment. . The administration should remain focused on the goals articulated by Witkoff in his April 14 interview—prohibiting weaponization activities, limiting uranium enrichment, and expanding monitoring. There is a chance at achieving a historical foreign policy success if it does so, but virtually no chance if it does not.
In addition to articulating realistic nuclear objectives for a deal, the United States should make incentives to Iran clear. Iran has good reason to doubt U.S. credibility after the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA, despite Iran’s verified compliance up to that point, and reimposed and strengthened sanctions in May 2018. Even before that, uncertainty about the sustainability of a deal and sanctions targeting Iran for other activities stifled economic relief envisioned under the JCPOA. If the Trump administration can articulate meaningful inducements that go beyond what was offered in the JCPOA, such as lifting primary sanctions and encouraging U.S. companies to invest directly in Iran, it will help demonstrate that the United States is seeking a mutually beneficial deal.
Deemphasize Maximum Pressure
To maximize the current diplomatic opening, the Trump administration should focus on creating an environment conducive to direct, intensive negotiations. De-emphasizing coercive tactics while negotiations are ongoing would help signal U.S. intent and demonstrate the political will to reduce pressure. It would be premature to lift sanctions this early in the negotiating process, but refraining from pressure-based rhetoric and holding off on additional sanctions while talks are ongoing would help signal to Iran that the United States is serious about a deal.
Trump’s early emphasis on coercion has already damaged the prospects for a negotiated agreement. Just weeks into his term, Trump announced a return to maximum pressure on Iran. His Feb. 4 national security memorandum, which outlined objectives for the United States to ratchet up sanctions pressure, prompted Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to take a harder line against negotiations with the United States, saying it is “not intelligent, wise or honorable” to negotiate with Washington. Following those remarks, the Pezeshkian administration doubled down on its refusal to directly negotiate with the Trump administration.
Temporarily easing up on U.S. pressure to test the waters for a deal does not diminish Washington’s leverage. Iran is well aware of how quickly the Trump administration can ratchet up sanctions. But, it is unconvinced that Trump has the political will nor the credibility to lift them. Pausing pressure tactics now would build confidence in U.S. intentions. In contrast, increasing pressure now strengthens the hand of factions in Tehran arguing that the United States cannot be trusted to negotiate in good faith.
Additionally, Trump should refrain from unnecessarily antagonistic military threats. It is not surprising that Trump, like his predecessors, has reiterated that the United States will use military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Now, however, is not the time to be publicly emphasizing U.S. military options.
Military threats to its nuclear program are nothing new to Tehran. Iran is clear-eyed about the consequences of a move toward nuclear weaponization. It is aware of U.S. military capabilities in the region and its vulnerabilities to airstrikes, particularly after Israel’s October attack damaged key air defense systems. Publicly reiterating military threats when Iran is already at the negotiating table risks undermining Pezeshkian domestically and driving a narrative that Iran is negotiating under threat. It poses an unnecessary risk to the negotiating process.
Sustaining a Process
The United States and Iran have a narrow window for negotiating a nuclear deal. If Washington and Tehran fail to make progress toward an effective, verifiable accord in the next few months, it is increasingly likely that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom will restore UN Security Council sanctions on Iran using a veto proof-mechanism, prompting Tehran to retaliate by withdrawing from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This scenario does not necessarily close the door on diplomacy, but it does shift the focus of talks to keeping Iran in the NPT and significantly increases the risk of military confrontation with Iran.
If Trump wants to stay out of new conflicts in the Middle East and negotiate a deal that pulls Iran back from the threshold of nuclear weapons, the United States should prioritize negotiations now. To create the conditions conducive for this process the United States should focus on articulating clear, pragmatic objectives for a deal and moving away from pressure-based tactics in the coming weeks. Serious, quiet diplomacy stands the best chance of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, but only if both sides stay focused and invest in the process.
