Nuclear proliferation

New START’s expiration highlights the limits of arms control designed for an earlier era of bilateral rivalry, without accounting for factors such as China's buildup.

Experts examine the international law issued raised by the U.S. threats and potential strikes against Iran.

The human rights crisis in Iran reveals the limits of a legal system designed to restrain force even when restraint carries profound human costs.

In reviewing a U.S.-Saudi Section 123 nuclear agreement, Congress must weigh nonproliferation safeguards, enrichment and reprocessing limits, and its national security impact.

In 2026, it is highly likely that countries such as South Korea and Saudi Arabia will move closer to developing the technical means—and political motivation—to build a bomb.

In 2026, the nuclear order will become more fragmented, less predictable, and increasingly difficult to govern through existing institutions.

Trump’s announcement 'approving' a nuclear-powered submarine plan with South Korea contradicts U.S. law requiring specific terms, agreements, and congressional review.

There’s no shortage of opportunities to reduce the chances that a war game – or the plot of “Dynamite” – is never played out in real-time.

The science is sound, the stockpile is strong, and the call to test a nuclear bomb has no technical foundation. Resuming testing would not make America safer.

Acknowledgement and respect for human rights can encourage States, like the Marshall Islands, to join and actively participate in nuclear regimes.

Just Security’s Tess Bridgeman is joined by Richard Nephew to discuss where things stand and what a path forward for Iran's nuclear program might look like.

The White House's future BDA briefings on the Iran strikes will likely project certainty where analysis still urges caution.