The severe humanitarian crisis in Cuba caused by the United States’ oil blockade has compounded the devastating humanitarian consequences of six decades of unilateral coercive measures by the United States on the Cuban people. Beginning with the Eisenhower administration’s partial embargo in 1960 and the Kennedy administration’s comprehensive trade embargo in 1962, Cuba has been subjected to an ever-tightening and comprehensive system of sanctions.
During that period, Cuba and Cubans have been shut out from the international banking system. They lack the ability to process payments, not just with U.S. nationals, but also with third-party firms that are afraid of violating the U.S. sanctions regime. Cuba’s financial exclusion and isolation have therefore made it insuperably difficult to obtain medicines, equipment, and humanitarian goods. Even companies from around the world that are not legally prohibited from transacting with Cuba refrain from doing so because of the perceived regulatory and sanctions risk. For example, European, Canadian, and Asian banks fear the powerful U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control’s investigations, and its civil and criminal penalties. They also dread the loss of access to U.S. financial markets and the high cost of compliance with U.S. sanctions. For example, BNP Paribas agreed in 2014 to pay approximately $8.9 billion for processing transactions involving, inter alia, Cuban entities, while Société Générale and UniCredit each later paid penalties exceeding $1 billion in sanctions-related enforcement actions.
There was a brief thawing of bilateral relations and partial reprieve from coercive economic measures towards the end of the Obama administration. But Cubans were placed under even tighter restrictions when the first Trump administration inaugurated a new swath of sanctions under its maximum-pressure campaign in 2019. That campaign of fuel-shipping sanctions, tanker designations, and remittance restrictions has worsened Cuba’s humanitarian crisis. These recent measures have placed even more barriers to trade, as well as access to essential goods and services to Cuba and Cubans. In particular, the fuel blockade, put in place by the United States in January 2026 stopping or deterring third countries from supplying oil and fuel to Cuba, exacerbated social and economic hardships for ordinary Cubans. The blockade has effectively cut off essential goods and put enormous constraints on the provision of public services. Power blackouts have been prolonged because electricity generation has been disrupted. Similarly, diesel shortages have made it impossible for farmers to operate tractors and other agricultural machinery. Fuel scarcity has also disrupted cold-storage facilities, food processing and refrigeration, resulting in food spoilage and shortages. Transportation disruptions have impaired access to water and food supplies from rural to urban areas, leaving many communities with diminished access to basic necessities. In addition, interruptions in electricity have interfered with hospital operations, including the treatment of patients under general anesthesia, those on ventilators, and others requiring life-sustaining care.
The United States has defended these extreme measures as instruments of regime change designed to force Cuba onto a path toward democratic transition. The fuel blockade therefore raises a fundamental question: whether economic coercion has become the preferred mechanism through which powerful states seek to accomplish indirectly what international law prohibits them from pursuing through more direct forms of intervention. The evidence shows that the fuel restrictions against the government of Cuba have effectively functioned as collective punishment if the United States and Cuba were in a state of armed conflict, because their burdens disproportionately fall on the civilian population.[1] There is no doubt, however, that the shortages affecting hospitals, transportation, food distribution, water, education, and electricity, rather than targeting only government officials, undermine the human rights of millions of ordinary Cubans. U.N. special rapporteurs have observed that the measures are inconsistent with international human rights norms, including those that protect rights to food, health, water, and education for ordinary Cubans.
Decades of Condemnation
Almost every year since 1992, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a Resolution on the necessity of terminating the U.S. embargo against Cuba, a position it reaffirmed again in 2026. This persistent opposition to the embargo mirrors a longstanding, broader critique within the United Nations concerning unilateral coercive measures. Through repeatedly renewed annual resolutions, such as the one approved by the Third Committee in November 2026, the U.N. has continuously highlighted the severe detriment these unilateral actions inflict on basic human rights, while urging member states to cease enforcing measures that violate international legal norms. The current fuel blockade therefore sits very uncomfortably alongside an unusually persistent and widespread international consensus against the broader U.S. Cuban blockade. Indeed, the criticism of the embargo measures by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive Measures is especially pertinent here.
The Special Rapporteur has criticized the fuel measures because they have discouraged third-party suppliers, insurers, and financial institutions from facilitating oil deliveries to Cuba. In this sense, the effectiveness of the fuel blockade depends on the forms of extraterritorial economic pressure that have long attracted international criticism because of their inhumane consequences as well as their illegality. Through this fuel blockade the United States has effectively ensured that foreign banks, shipping companies, insurers, and suppliers conform their conduct to U.S. policy toward Cuba. These sorts of secondary boycotts that seek to alter the behavior of third-country actors and that extend beyond the territory of the United States are of dubious legality.[2] The January oil blockade targets energy supplies on which a civilian population depends. It also entrenches a sanctions regime that the U.N. General Assembly has condemned for more than 30 years. Even more, the U.S. sanctions regime and the oil blockade are inconsistent with sovereign equality, non-intervention, and freedom of trade.
Further, the fuel blockade shows how the United States uses its dominant position in the global financial system to isolate a much smaller state and compel third-country actors to participate in that isolation. The humanitarian burdens of that strategy fall overwhelmingly on ordinary Cubans, who bear the costs of fuel shortages, food insecurity, prolonged blackouts, and disruptions to medical care, delayed access to critical treatment, and reduced access to food and other basic necessities. The sanctions and fuel blockade also revive a concern advanced repeatedly by newly independent states during the decolonization era and reflected in the 1970 U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: While the postwar legal order came to prohibit military coercion through Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, it largely declined to impose comparable constraints on economic coercion. Yet many postcolonial states argued that economic coercion could be as destructive of sovereign equality and self-determination as military intervention.[3] The Friendly Relations Declaration accordingly condemned the use of economic measures to secure “the subordination of the exercise” of another state’s sovereign rights. That Declaration affirms that “[n]o State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.” Article 32 of the U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, (CERDS) likewise provides that “[n]o State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.”[4] While several Western industrialized states either opposed or abstained from the resolution, CERDS was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, with 120 votes in favor and only six against. Indeed, in the 1986 Merits Judgment in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) the ICJ relied on analogous General Assembly formulations of the principle of non-intervention as evidence of customary international law.
As such, under international law, States are free to determine their own political, economic, social, and cultural system free from external coercion. The Court further held that foreign intervention becomes wrongful when that intervention employs, “methods of coercion” with respect to choices that sovereign states are entitled to make freely, including the choice of their political and economic systems. While the Court did not find, on the facts before it, that the embargo at issue in Nicaragua violated the principle of non-intervention, the January fuel blockade raises the question of whether contemporary forms of economic coercion designed to induce political change are increasingly performing the very functions that the non-intervention norm was intended to prevent. Even more, the fuel blockade reveals an additional tool in the arsenal of powerful states to impose their will on the choice of political and economic systems that the people of less militarily powerful states do not approve. It bears a striking resemblance to what Kwame Nkrumah, then-president of Ghana, described as neo-colonialism: the use of economic power to direct the political choices of formally independent states from the outside. In this respect, the fuel blockade revives the unfinished debate embedded within the Friendly Relations Declaration itself: whether powerful states may use economic coercion to achieve indirectly what international law prohibits them from pursuing through more direct forms of intervention.
If the twentieth century delegitimized military conquest, the Cuba fuel blockade pointedly raises another question: has contemporary international law paid insufficient attention to economic domination? The Friendly Relations Declaration condemned the use of economic measures to secure the “subordination of the exercise” of another state’s sovereign rights, yet the postwar legal order ultimately drew its brightest line around the use of force. The result is a system that treats military coercion as exceptional while often normalizing forms of economic pressure designed to influence the political and economic choices of weaker states. In such a system, it is unfortunately ordinary people such as those in Cuba who suffer the worst excesses of economic coercion.[5] A system that subordinates the lives and livelihoods of poorer populations in the Global South to projects of political conquest is illegitimate and unacceptable.
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- In the context of Iraq, see Richard Falk, Iraq, The United States, and International Law: Beyond the Sanctions (2002), arguing that post-1991 sanctions against Iraq violated “the fundamental economic and social rights of the Iraqi people” and constituted “a deliberate and indiscriminate policy designed to inflict harm on the civilian population of Iraq.” ↑
- G.A. Res. 36/103, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 182, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981) and in particular ¶2(I), which states: “The duty of a State … to refrain from measures which would constitute interference or intervention in the internal or external affairs of another State … including … not to use its external economic assistance programmes or adopt any multilateral or unilateral economic reprisals or blockade … as instruments of political pressure or coercion against another State.” ↑
- See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004) (examining how postcolonial states confronted international legal structures that perpetuated hierarchy after formal decolonization); Siba N. Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law (1996) (showing how Third World conceptions of sovereignty linked formal independence to meaningful political and economic self-determination); Adom Getachew, Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (2019) (arguing that anti-colonial leaders viewed political independence as incomplete without transforming international economic structures that reproduced dependency and inequality). ↑
- Article 32 of CERDS reflected the conviction of many postcolonial states that sovereignty could be undermined through economic as well as military means. As Chimni notes, the New International Economic Order, (NIEO), project sought to transform international law to address enduring structures of economic dependency and subordination that survived formal decolonization. See B. S. Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches (2d ed. 2017) (explaining the Charter as part of the NIEO project through which Third World states sought to secure meaningful economic self-determination and resist structures of economic domination and dependency). ↑
- See also Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions (2010). Gordon demonstrates how comprehensive sanctions can impose devastating and foreseeable harms on civilian populations while leaving governing elites relatively insulated from their effects. Her analysis suggests that such measures risk treating the welfare of ordinary people as an acceptable cost of pursuing broader geopolitical objectives. ↑





