As the civil war in Sudan rages on, civilians sheltering in the city of El Obeid are facing the threat of an imminent ground offensive by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group that has been fighting the Sudanese military since 2023. Fighting in the North Kordofan region has escalated in recent months, leading the United Nations and some states to warn of impending atrocities. These warnings are particularly stark given the RSF’s conduct during its siege and seizure of El Fasher, where reports emerged of systematic mass killings of civilians, targeted killings of non-Arab communities, and widespread rape and other forms of sexual violence. Following a detailed investigation, Amnesty International found that the RSF committed crimes against humanity including murder, torture, sexual slavery, and persecution. The U.N. fact-finding mission concluded that the group’s actions in and around El Fasher bear the “hallmarks of genocide.”
Like many conflicts, the civil war in Sudan has been fueled by support from external countries. Backers of the Sudanese military include Iran, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the RSF receives its most significant military aid from the United Arab Emirates. The UAE has supplied weapons to the RSF for use in the group’s operations in El Fasher and elsewhere, including powerful Chinese-made drones and Serbian-made thermobaric munitions. Reports also point to the central involvement of the UAE in a network of private military contractors from Colombia who provided critical military support to the RSF and participated in the capture of El Fasher. Reports indicate that the Colombian contractors may themselves have acted in violation of international law, for example by training child soldiers forced to fight in the conflict.
The RSF’s actions and those of the Colombian contractors may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide, possibly aided and abetted by officials from the UAE. Their conduct also violates international norms that are binding on states. The law of armed conflict prohibits much of the behavior seen in El Fasher, including the targeting of civilians and the recruitment of child soldiers. This prompts the question: does the UAE bear state responsibility for the atrocities committed by the RSF and associated forces in Sudan? To answer this question, it is necessary to assess whether the RSF’s conduct is attributable to the UAE. Although the evidence available today does not support attributing the RSF’s actions to the UAE, it does suggest that if the Colombian contractors breached international law when operating in Sudan, the UAE potentially bears international responsibility for their violations.
When is a Private Entity’s Conduct Attributable to a State?
This question is governed by the law of state responsibility, codified in the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility (ASR). Although not a binding treaty, most states consider the ASR to largely reflect customary international law. The articles begin with the basic principle that states bear international responsibility for their internationally wrongful acts (art. 1 ASR). International responsibility refers to the legal consequences that follow when a state violates international law, including an obligation on the state to cease its wrongful conduct and to provide full reparation for the injury caused (arts. 28-39 ASR).
There are two elements to an internationally wrongful act (art. 2 ASR). The first is that the conduct in question is attributable to the state. The second is that the relevant act or omission breaches an international legal obligation that is binding on the state. Attribution is therefore key to a finding of state responsibility. If an international law violation is not attributable to a state it remains private in character and cannot lead to state responsibility. If, however, an act or omission that breaches international law is attributable to a state, it amounts to an internationally wrongful act engaging the state’s responsibility.
As states are abstract entities, they can only act via human beings. Attribution thus represents the human link between conduct in violation of international law and the state. Normally, states act via their organs, that is, persons or entities designated under the state’s domestic law as organs or representatives of the state. The acts and omissions of a state’s organs are always attributable to it, except for any conduct performed in a private capacity (arts. 4, 7 ASR).
In contrast, the conduct of private entities such as armed groups or private military contractors is not normally attributable to a state. There are, however, limited exceptions to this general principle, as expressed in several rules of attribution reflected in the ASR (arts. 4, 5, 8, 9-11 ASR). I examine all six rules in detail in my recently published monograph.
When considering the conduct of the RSF and associated forces, the most relevant rules are those set out in Articles 4, 5 and 8. Article 4 relates to state organs and can apply not only to entities designated as such in the state’s domestic law but also to entities that, in fact, act in that capacity (de facto state organs). Article 5 applies when a state empowers a private entity to perform governmental functions on its behalf, while Article 8 relates to conduct performed on the state’s instructions or under its direction or control.
Is the RSF a de Facto State Organ of the UAE?
On March 5, 2025, Sudan instituted proceedings against the UAE before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging that the UAE violated the Genocide Convention through its support to the RSF and allied militia groups. In its application, Sudan referred not only to the UAE’s significant financial and military support to the RSF but also asserted that,
The relationship of the rebel RSF militia to the United Arab Emirates Government is so much one of dependence and control that it would be right, for legal purposes, to equate the rebel RSF militia with an organ of the United Arab Emirates Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government. The rebel RSF militia is, for the purposes of international responsibility, to be equated with State organs of the Government of the United Arab Emirates (para. 10).
The ICJ has determined that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Sudan’s case against the UAE, so the Court will not have the opportunity to consider the merits of Sudan’s assertion. Nonetheless, Sudan’s argument regarding the relationship between the RSF and the UAE is highly relevant to the issue of attribution. The language Sudan uses is very similar to that employed by the ICJ in its Nicaragua (paras. 109-10) and Bosnian Genocide (paras. 391-94) judgments when discussing attribution based on de facto state organ status. If an armed group or other entity qualifies as a de facto state organ, all of its conduct is attributable to the state (other than acts performed in a private capacity), just as it would be if the entity had been designated as a state organ under the state’s domestic law (art. 4 ASR).
The test for determining de facto state organ status is very stringent. In those previous cases, the ICJ concluded that the group concerned must act under the “strict control” of the state and in “complete dependence” on it. If the group exhibits “some qualified, but real, margin of independence” in its actions, the test is not satisfied (Bosnian Genocide, paras. 391-92).
The ICJ has yet to hear a case in which it concludes that an entity qualifies as a de facto state organ. The only international court that has done so to date is the European Court of Human Rights, when examining the relationship between Russia and the rebels operating in eastern Ukraine. Here, the court concluded that,
all the armed hostilities undertaken by the separatists reflected an overall strategy and tactics wholly devised by the Russian Federation. … [W]hatever their legal status, the separatists were completely dependent on military, political and economic support from the respondent State to carry out their activities and were, ultimately, a mere instrument of that State. It is for these reasons that the Court was persuaded that, from 11 May 2014, the relationship of the separatists to the Russian Federation was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the separatists … with de facto organs of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of Article 4 [ASR] (para. 363).
It seems doubtful that a similar conclusion can be reached regarding the UAE’s relationship with the RSF. The information available in the public domain relates principally to the military support the UAE has provided to the group. Although this may give rise to some degree of dependence by the RSF on the UAE and allow the UAE to exert some degree of control over the RSF’s behavior, the reporting includes little to indicate that the UAE devised the RSF’s strategy and tactics or that the RSF is a “mere instrument” of the UAE. To the contrary, reports suggest that the RSF has independent sources of income, such as from fees it charges for safe passage through areas under its control, and that it receives some support from other states including Libya, Ethiopia, and Kenya. It is likely, therefore, that the group’s level of independence precludes the attribution of its conduct to the UAE on this basis.
Does the RSF Act under the UAE’s Instructions, Direction, or Control?
If the RSF is not a de facto state organ of the UAE, another rule of attribution could nevertheless apply. The most likely candidate is the rule reflected in ASR’s Article 8. This provides for the attribution to a state of conduct performed on its instructions, or under its direction or control. Unlike the rule relating to state organs expressed in Article 4, Article 8 focuses narrowly on the state’s influence over the particular acts that violate international law rather than the group’s operations more generally. Applied to the RSF, the rule looks to the factual relationship between the entity and the state to determine whether UAE officials instructed RSF fighters to act in way that violated international law, or if the fighters performed those acts under the UAE’s direction or control.
In its application before the ICJ, Sudan seemed to suggest that attribution is appropriate on this basis. Sudan claimed that the UAE “sent its own agents to the Republic of Sudan in order to lead the rebel RSF militia forces in carrying out the genocide” (para. 9). This assertion, if correct, could indicate that officials from the UAE exercised “effective control” over the RSF’s actions in violation of international law.
The ICJ formulated the effective control test in its Nicaragua judgment (para. 115) and elaborated upon it in the Bosnian Genocide case (paras. 396-406). It requires evidence of state control over the specific acts on the part of the group that violate international law. The degree of control must therefore be assessed on a case-by-case basis in relation to each violation, or regarding each group of violations arising from the same operation. To illustrate, the test could be satisfied if the UAE sent its organs (for example, its own military officers) to Sudan to exercise command and control over the RSF’s operations, and those state organs exerted tactical control over the RSF’s conduct when the group perpetrated mass killings or other acts of violence against civilians. In other words, there must be evidence to demonstrate that the UAE “directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by [Sudan]” (Nicaragua, para. 115).
There is minimal reporting in the public domain to support attribution on this basis. While there are some indications that Emirati nationals were present in locations held by the RSF, which could suggest that state officials acted in a command role, the stronger evidence relates to the UAE’s indirect assistance to the RSF by providing the weapons, money, and other military support that enabled its operations. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case made clear that such indirect forms of assistance are insufficient to satisfy the strict effective control threshold (para. 115). Of course, it is possible that Sudan has access to evidence that demonstrates the UAE’s direct control over the RSF’s conduct in violation of international law. Without such evidence, however, it seems that the UAE facilitated the RSF’s atrocities but did not instruct or compel the RSF to act in this way. As such, the available evidence does not support the attribution of the RSF’s conduct to the UAE.
Is the Conduct of the Columbian Contractors Attributable to the UAE?
Organizations including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Conflict Insights Group (CIG) report that hundreds of former Colombian soldiers took part in the RSF’s military operations. According to CIG, the contractors served as drone pilots, artillerymen, and instructors. One contractor informed HRW that they conducted “joint operations” with the RSF. Witness accounts corroborate this, noting the presence of foreign fighters when members of the RSF committed abuses such as mass killings and rape. The contractors may also have directly violated the law of armed conflict, for example, by operating weaponized drones that targeted civilians during the RSF’s siege and eventual takeover of El Fasher (CIG, p. 21), or by training child soldiers.
It is unlikely that these potential violations of international law by the Colombian contractors are attributable to the UAE based on the rule reflected in Article 8 ASR. As with the RSF’s conduct, the reporting does not indicate that the relevant acts were performed under the UAE’s instructions, direction, or control. In the case of the contractors, however, the rule reflected in Article 5 ASR could apply. Unlike Article 8, the rule expressed in Article 5 does not require proof of state control over the relevant acts. Instead, three conditions must be satisfied: the person or entity performs governmental functions on the state’s behalf; it is authorized to perform those functions under the state’s domestic law; and the person or entity violates international law while performing the delegated public tasks.
The information in the HRW and CIG reports indicates that these conditions for attribution could potentially be satisfied. The company that hired and paid the Colombian contractors, Global Security Services Group (GSSG), is based in the UAE and reportedly has strong links to senior Emirati government officials. According to HRW, the UAE facilitated the Colombians’ travel to Sudan, and the contractors may have received training from Emirati nationals at a military base in Abu Dhabi. As the UAE is a highly centralized authoritarian state, HRW notes the likelihood that Emirati officials were fully aware of GSSG’s activities on their territory, particularly on government property and military bases.
To determine whether the rule expressed in Article 5 ASR could attribute the Colombian contractors’ conduct to the UAE, one critical question is whether the UAE authorized the contractors to operate in Sudan in a manner that accords with its domestic laws. The UAE law that governs the activities of private security companies, Federal Law No. (37) of 2006, requires security companies to obtain approval from the competent authority and limits their services to those set out in the license (art. 10). Furthermore, companies must “coordinate with the Competent Authority to ensure that its activities are not in conflict with any established security measures” (art. 13).
HRW obtained copies of five licensing documents for GSSG issued by UAE government agencies. These licensed the company to undertake activities such as “general security” or to act as “armed security guards.” There are also indications that the UAE government authorized GSSG to perform other activities on its behalf. For example, a Wall Street Journal article quotes a Ugandan army spokesman who said that GSSG “presented itself as acting on behalf of the Emirati government” when providing training to the Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces.
These examples suggest that the UAE may have authorized the Colombian contractors to act in support of the RSF’s military operations in Sudan via a license issued to GSSG under Federal Law No. (37). If that is correct, it means that the contractors were “empowered by law” to operate in Sudan for the purposes of Article 5 ASR. For the rule of attribution to apply, it is also necessary that the functions the UAE authorized the contractors to perform are governmental in character.
An authorization issued by a government to a private contractor to perform military functions in another state clearly involves an exercise of public, rather than private, functions. States have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and private actors that engage in conflict typically do so either on a state’s behalf or in violation of a state’s laws. If the UAE empowered the Colombian contractors to fight alongside the RSF in Sudan, the contractors’ conduct when acting under that authorization would amount to an exercise of the UAE’s governmental authority.
The third condition relevant to Article 5’s application is that the person or entity violates international law while performing the delegated public functions. In the case of the Colombian contractors, it appears that this criterion can also be satisfied. If the contractors violated international law while operating in Sudan by training child soldiers, for example, it seems evident that this conduct formed part of the governmental tasks they were performing for the UAE.
In summary, if the UAE empowered the contractors to act in support of the RSF’s military operations in Sudan, via a license issued to GSSG or by any other lawful means, the contractors’ conduct when performing the delegated public functions is attributable to the UAE. This means that if the contractors violated international law, such as by operating drones in support of RSF attacks targeting civilians or by training child soldiers, such conduct amounts to an internationally wrongful act engaging the UAE’s international responsibility (art. 2 ASR). Legal consequences would then follow, including an obligation on the UAE to cease the harmful conduct and to pay full reparation for the injury caused (arts. 28-39 ASR).
Speak Up
As events continue to unfold in and around El Obeid, it is not only the acts of the RSF and allied militias that should focus the world’s attention but also the conduct of the group’s principal backer, the UAE. Through its support to the group, the UAE not only enables the RSF’s military operations but also facilitates its egregious conduct in violation of international law.
Invoking the UAE’s international responsibility is one way that Sudan and other states can draw attention to the UAE’s key role in the conflict and pressure it to cease its harmful conduct. Although the available evidence does not currently support attribution of the RSF’s atrocities to the UAE, the acts of the Colombian contractors may constitute internationally wrongful acts engaging the UAE’s state responsibility.
It is also important to recall that by supporting the RSF and allied groups, the UAE may have directly violated other international norms that are binding upon it. For example, the UAE may have violated its duty to prevent genocide under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention (see Bosnian Genocide, paras. 428-38). It may also have breached the prohibition on the use of force by supplying the RSF with weapons and other military support that the group used to commit acts of violence against Sudan (Nicaragua, paras. 205, 228).
To date, external states have been reluctant to call out the UAE for its role in the conflict and its facilitation of the RSF’s atrocities. However, as reports continue to emerge regarding the RSF and its allies’ savage conduct, states need to speak up and take action to avert a repeat of the horrific events in El Fasher from occurring in and around El Obeid.
