The United Nations Security Council’s unanimous decision to renew the mandate of the European Union’s peace enforcement mission (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina for another year was a relief. Despite reports that Russia, an ally of Bosnian Serb separatist leader Milorad Dodik would go along with the extension, some — myself included — were not reassured. Indeed, the remarks by Council members during the Oct. 31 debate reflected fissures over the future of international oversight in the country, which still struggles to overcome the divisions cemented by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war. With the one-year cushion that the EUFOR mandate extension provides and today’s decision by Bosnia’s Constitutional Court rejecting an appeal by Dodik, Europe’s leading democracies must urgently prepare themselves for the disruption posed by the changed posture of the United States on Bosnia, exemplified just last week by the dramatic lifting of sanctions against Dodik.
At one end of the spectrum in the range of remarks in the U.N. debate was the United Kingdom, a permanent member of the Security Council as well as a member of the steering board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the ad hoc international consortium established to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (which marks its 30th anniversary on Nov. 21). The U.K. set a welcome hardline: that Bosnia’s constitutional order as outlined in the Dayton Agreement must be upheld and that Dodik initiated what had become the most significant crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the past 30 years. Earlier this year, Dodik was convicted by the country’s highest criminal court for defying orders of the High Representative, the PIC’s executive in Sarajevo, to withdraw laws that he, as president of the majority-Serb entity of Bosnia, Republika Srpska, and its parliament had adopted in violation of the country’s constitution. Initially rejecting the court’s order that he step down from the RS presidency, he finally relented last month and was replaced by an interim president; special elections will be held on Nov. 23 to fill his seat.
The U.K., in Minister Counselor Jennifer MacNaughtan’s Security Council remarks, also supported the use of executive powers as needed by the high representative, an office currently held by German politician Christian Schmidt. Alluding to Russia’s contention that Schmidt is illegitimate because he hadn’t been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council (in other words, Russia didn’t have a chance to veto him), MacNaughtan emphasized that the person who fills that position is selected by the PIC, not the Security Council.
The Permanent Representative of another NATO ally, Denmark, Christina Markus Lassen, aligned her country similarly in remarks preceding those of the U.K. Denmark’s representative underscored that, while the RS authorities have de-escalated a constitutional crisis they initiated by withdrawing some violative laws, they still need to nullify other unconstitutional acts. Denmark also encouragingly expressed hope that the Nov. 23 special elections to replace Dodik for the RS Presidency would be held in a fair and peaceful manner, and called on all of Bosnia’s leaders to truly commit to the path to European Union membership. Denmark also underscored that, to ensure stability, international institutions such as EUFOR and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) remain essential. Additionally, Ambassador Carolyn Rodriques-Birkett, representing Guyana, a rotating member of the U.N. Security Council, presented an impressively thorough congruent position, underscoring that OHR’s authorities were reiterated by the PIC in 2008 and have been far from met.
Russia, China Align
At the other end of the range of remarks, unsurprisingly, was the chair of the U.N. Security Council for the month’s rotation, Russia. Its representative, Vassily Nebenzia, reiterated the Kremlin’s position that Schmidt was illegitimate in his role due to his not being voted on in the Council. He also repeated Moscow’s line that the OHR should close for several reasons: not only allegedly impeding BiH sovereignty, but for serving a Western parochial agenda that ostensibly threatens peace, is biased against Serbs, and opposes “legitimate” Croat representation (Bosnian Croat hardliners and their allies in neighboring Croatia have been agitating for creating a third, Croat-majority entity, a position that Dodik has endorsed in order to reinforce his own campaign for secession).
The tone of China in the Security Council debate was less vociferous, but its policies were largely aligned with Russia’s. For example, Ambassador Geng Shuang expressed deep concern over Dodik having been prosecuted, which China alleged had heightened tensions. China’s representative also lamented the U.N.’s adoption in 2024 of an annual commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, and argued that the authority of the PIC and the OHR cannot be permanent if Bosnia is to be sovereign. China at least did not endorse the Croat concept of a third entity, calling for “harmonious coexistence” among the country’s peoples.
Most of the other 15 members of the Security Council fell between these poles. For the first time, this included the United States, a permanent member of the Security Council and principal broker of the peace agreement negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, which has until last week’s lifting of sanctions on Dodik firmly opposed destabilizing hardline elements in Bosnia. Ambassador Dorothy Shea, the deputy U.S. representative to the U.N., stated that the United States is committed to stability and security in Bosnia and that EUFOR and OHR are essential. The United States called on all parties to refrain from threats and to continue de-escalating, explaining that the lifting of sanctions was intended to support de-escalation and prompted by Dodik’s stepping down and the RS Parliament’s withdrawal of some violative laws). The reality of the evident shift of the U.S. position came in the closing: that “the United States is no longer pursuing nation-building or heavy-handed international intervention. Now is the time for local solutions, led by local actors representing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s three constituent peoples. These actions reflect a step in that direction and the spirit of U.S. policy.”
The official position of Bosnia and Herzegovina was presented in the Security Council debate by the chair of the three-member presidency of Bosnia, moderate Bosnian Croat Željko Komšić. He asserted that attacks on High Representative Schmidt were aimed primarily at eliminating his office and role. Komšić noted that he had been critical of Schmidt’s actions in the past (alluding to, inter alia, imposed amendments to the Bosnian election law and to the Federation of BiH Constitution in 2022 and 2023), but he said several of Schmidt’s acts were not primarily of his own design (a reference to the previous U.S. role). Alluding to Russia’s calls to shut down OHR, he reiterated a point first made by Guyana’s ambassador — that the conditions for OHR closure articulated in 2008 (the “Agenda 5+2”) remained unmet.
Neighboring countries Serbia and Croatia, though not current members of the Security Council, were invited by Russia to make statements, presumably as signatories of the Dayton Peace Accords. Their positions reflected their established state policy orientations. Serbia’s Chargé d’ Affaires Dragomir Ilic stated that High Representative impositions primarily served the majority (Bosniak) community, and that only dialogue and consensus among the two entities and three constituent peoples could achieve progress. (“Constituent peoples” refers only to Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, excluding citizens who don’t identify exclusively with any of those ethnic groups.) Croatia’s Chargé d’Affaires Hrvoje Curic Hrvatinic pressed his country’s position that only a changed electoral system could ensure that Croats could reliably elect “their legitimate representative” to the three-person BiH Presidency, a position that generally implies hardline Croats rather than moderates and thereby casts doubt on Komšić’s own legitimacy.
Evolving U.S. Posture – and the Response
While the potential for a Russian veto of EUFOR’s extension was averted, the main takeaway was the depth of the change in the American position. It could be interpreted as mere support for stability and de-escalation with a jettisoning of ambitions for deeper progress or as a signal of a far more fundamental reorientation of the U.S. posture.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas’ visit to Camp Butmir outside Sarajevo on Nov. 3 to review EUFOR may indicate an appreciation of this dynamic. She contextualized the EU’s efforts in BiH in the wider European context, where she noted that sovereignty and territorial integrity are under threat, adding that the Union “will not stand by in the face of destabilization efforts” and that EUFOR is “here to stay.” But the force’s troop strength has long been incommensurate with a credible and fully capable operational deterrent force. More worryingly, Kallas framed the end of international engagement via the PIC, OHR, and EUFOR as dependent on BiH politicians showing “their ability to make decisions,” including advancement on the path to EU membership. However, to achieve that end, the country requires a post-Dayton constitutional order to replace the current one – to which EUFOR’s deterrent and the High Representative’s enforcement roles are integral. Lack of clarity on this point has characterized the EU’s policy toward Bosnia consistently.
Unsurprisingly, Dodik, commenting on the Security Council debate, embraced the U.S. shift, citing what he characterized as the Trump administration’s desire to avoid interference in countries’ internal affairs and in “building other states and nations.” He also thanked Russia and China for their “integrity and constructive behavior,” as well as thanking (self-) interested neighbors “Serbia, as well as Croatia, which has expressed the position that there must be an equal dialogue in BiH.”
But Dodik is not yet seeing complete victory. On the one hand, the Bosnian State prosecutor’s office on Nov. 4 suspended its investigation into Dodik and two close allies for violating the constitutional order with their executive and legislative actions, generating speculation that the end of the probe was part of the arrangement with the United States for lifting sanctions. But on the same day, the country’s Constitutional Court rejected his appeal in a separate but related case, in which he had argued that the change Schmidt imposed to Bosnia’s criminal code that got him convicted was illegal. Dodik will now take the case to the European Court of Human Rights.
So as Dodik remains at least partly sidelined and the political jury is still out on what the changed U.S. position on Bosnia portends, the EU should take it as a cue to put its own policy toward Bosnia and the Western Balkans on a more firm footing and to create conditions for Bosnia to advance toward EU membership with popularly accountable and stable, democratic governance. Only in this way can long-term stability be assured.
