While the flames of Burma’s brutal civil war continue to burn, even after the tragic March 28 earthquake that killed more than 3,700 people, the so-called State Administration Council born of the 2021 military coup continues to lose ground to the ethnic armed organizations and People’s Defense Forces that now control substantial swaths of the country’s territory. While the junta has the stated intention of holding national elections in December 2025 and January 2026, its position remains precarious, propped up by support from Russia and China. And yet, as Burma inches toward a post-junta reality, Washington’s strategic myopia is striking. Beijing, on the other hand, is not making that mistake.
Chinese leaders are intensifying their efforts to shape Burma’s post-conflict landscape. Their approach is classic: arms and intelligence for the military (known as the Tatmadaw), quiet relationships with insurgent groups, investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, and diplomatic maneuvering designed to ensure that, no matter who comes out on top within Burma (also known as Myanmar), China will come out on top in its geopolitical battle, too.
By contrast, the United States, which just a decade ago was leading international efforts to forge a new future for Burma, is now felt most by its absence and risks losing any potential role in helping shape or support Burma’s future. With that, the United States will be further marginalized in its role as the “partner of choice” in Southeast Asia.
Critical for U.S. Security
That would be a generational mistake. Burma may seem far away to the average American, but it’s crucial for U.S. national security in the Indo-Pacific.
First, there is the imperative of access to Burma’s mineral riches, which in turn is intertwined with geopolitical influence, as the United States seeks to loosen China’s tightening grip on the region – and beyond. Northern Burma, especially Kachin and Shan States, are rich in rare earths and critical minerals vital to the future of the global economy. Control over these resources has already made parts of the country a playground for Chinese shadow companies and illicit mining cartels, with devastating ecological and human costs. A federal, democratic, fully functioning Burma/Myanmar could align with Western supply chain standards and offer an alternative to China’s monopoly in critical minerals. But that window is narrow and closing fast.
The second way Burma is pivotal for the United States is infrastructure, trade, and economic connectivity. Burma is a keystone in mainland Southeast Asia. It borders India, China, Bangladesh, Laos, and Thailand. A more stable, pro-democratic Myanmar could become a connective hub between South and Southeast Asia, offering counterbalance to Beijing’s corridors of influence. China understands this, given memories of the strategic role played by the battle over Burma in World War II and the critical supply lines kept open for allied U.S. and Chinese forces against the Japanese by pilots flying “The Hump” (the Himalayas); it’s one of the reasons Chinese pipelines today cut through Burmese territory to the Bay of Bengal. If the United States wants to sustain influence with ASEAN and in the Indo-Pacific, Myanmar must be part of the equation.
Third, the significance of Burma/Myanmar is about the architecture of norms and values. This is where some of the 21st century’s core ideological contests are playing out: between democratic aspiration and authoritarian repression, between ethnonationalist fragmentation and civic inclusion, between genocide and accountability. Today’s battle for Burma is not only territorial. It is moral. And it matters what the United States does — or does not do — when those who have resisted tyranny emerge – undoubtedly with their hands still tied by the difficulties of reconstruction, but raised in hope for a full recovery for their country.
Policy Options
Washington has policy options — if it’s willing to engage.
First, with success on the battlefield, the Trump administration has a significant opportunity to upgrade the political recognition of ethnic armed organizations and the National Unity Government (NUG), the exiled and representative government formed after the coup. This does not necessarily mean formal diplomatic recognition today, but simply enhanced engagement: intelligence sharing, technical support, participation in regional dialogues, and material aid and governance support to areas the resistance governs, including helping the ethnic armed groups build an inclusive federal future for Burma from the ground up.
Second, Washington can take a lead in building a regional coalition to monitor and support post-conflict stabilization in liberated zones. This should be done through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or an ad hoc regional mechanism if needed, along with Japan, the Quad (an informal security and economic alliance between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), and the European Union. Such a platform could help coordinate humanitarian aid, mediate ethnic political transitions, and offer developmental incentives.
And while Washington has a critical catalytic role to play, the burden of such an effort, in keeping with the Trump administration’s broader approach to foreign policy, can be carried by those closest to the conflict and with the most at stake in regional stability. ASEAN has sought to mediate the conflict in the past, with limited success given ASEAN’s sometimes paralyzing approach to consensus and non-interference. But the stakes at play in Burma – for ASEAN and for the wider region – bring into sharp relief ASEAN’s need to consider how it will remain “central” if it is unable to forge coherence on such a critical issue.
Third, it’s time for Washington to get serious about economic leverage. Target Chinese-linked illicit mining and timber networks with secondary sanctions, particularly those that finance malign militia groups. Additional economic pressure is likewise crucial to rein in cyberscam centers and the associated human trafficking for labor to work in them – even China is interested in fighting that scourge.Meanwhile, the United States, along with ASEAN and other regional partners, can prepare a roadmap of development assistance and investment for a future democratic Burma/Myanmar that can deliver the good governance and environmental accountability that its people want and that will strengthen its potential as a pivotal partner for the United States in the region.
Bipartisan Letter
Congressional interest in Burma remains high, with Representatives Gregory Meeks (D-NY) and Bill Huizenga (R-MI) recently leading a bipartisan letter urging an additional appropriation of $121 million to support Burma and the goals of the BURMA Act, which was passed by Congress in 2022 with the aim of isolating the junta, bolstering pro-democracy stakeholders, expanding U.S. humanitarian assistance and supporting Burmese refugees.
Of course, there is no guarantee of success. The previous opening in Burma that the international community tried to nurture a decade ago for the fledgling democratically oriented government of Aung San Suu Kyi fell short, resulting in genocide against the Rohingya people and ending with a coup. Myanmar’s political history is littered with false dawns. The ethnic armed organizations are not a monolith. The Tatmadaw may yet retrench.
But the strategic terrain is shifting, and China knows it and is prepared to take advantage of the swing. Chinese envoys are busy from Lashio, the site of a major rebel victory last year, to the second-largest city of Mandalay, engaging with all comers, from ethnic opposition groups to the military, and brokering ceasefires and buying loyalty. Meanwhile, Washington is perceived as indifferent and abandoning its partners. The Trump administration, for example, went so far as to fire staff of the DOGE-targeted U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as they were on the ground responding to the devastating earthquake that struck in April.
Moments of possibility in geopolitics are fleeting. Burma’s civil war is entering a new phase. Whether its next chapter is shaped by repression, chaos, or pluralistic stability depends not only on the Burmese people, but on the choices great powers make in the coming months. And that means the choices the United States makes are crucial on whether – and how — to support the people of Burma to build a better future for themselves and their nation. Any support will be doubly difficult with the demise of USAID, but it’s crucial for U.S. national security interests, if nothing else, to find a way.
Washington must decide: will it watch history unfold to its detriment, or help write history in its favor and to the benefit of both Burma and the United States?
