When Syrian President Bashir al-Assad’s government fell in early December 2024, it ended over a decade of war between the regime and insurgent groups. The United Nations reported that more than 6.2 million people fled Syria during this time, with the majority staying in neighboring countries and others making the perilous journey to far away nations around the globe.
The Syrian regime brutally and systematically carried out attacks on civilians. It perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity – including by repeatedly using chemical weapons on civilian populations. Fifteen years of bloodshed claimed the lives of over 600,000 people.
Today, many Syrians who sought refuge wish to return. Some want to search for the disappeared. Some desire to see what remains of their homes and property. And still others hope to rebuild a country they once knew. As many as 400,000 Syrians have returned since December. Whether or not the interim government is ready to receive them, the process is expensive and complex.
History shows that the cost of return is too often borne by those who suffered, not those who caused the suffering. As Syria begins a fragile recovery, the lessons of Bosnia, Liberia, and Mozambique make clear a central lesson: Without legal accountability and bold international support—including the use of frozen Syrian assets—sustainable repatriation will remain out of reach.
Historical Examples of Repatriation
The experiences of Bosnia, Liberia, and Mozambique highlight critical lessons for policymakers navigating refugee repatriation in Syria. Each country’s post-conflict return process reflects unique challenges and successes, offering insights into the complexities of voluntary return and reintegration. While separated by time and context, these cases underscore the importance of comprehensive peace agreements, sustained international support, and addressing the socioeconomic realities of returnees.
The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement ended the Bosnian War and included Annex 7, which sought to “facilitate the provision of adequately monitored, short-term repatriation assistance on a nondiscriminatory basis to all returning refugees and displaced persons who are in need.” Despite these commitments, ethnic divisions hampered reintegration efforts. Many Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs opted to remain in host countries rather than return to communities fractured by conflict. The failure to fully address ethnic tensions and the absence of a cohesive reintegration strategy limited the success of Bosnia’s repatriation efforts. Bosnia’s struggle with ethnic divisions underscores the risks of premature returns without addressing deep societal fractures, a concern in Syria given its sectarian landscape and documented cases of summary executions, including women and children.
Liberia’s path to repatriation following two devastating civil wars (1989-1997 and 1999-2003) was marked by prolonged insecurity and economic hardship. At the height of the conflict, 700,000 Liberians sought refuge in neighboring Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire. Although there was some semblance of peace, ongoing violence and weak infrastructure delayed the voluntary return of refugees. Over the next decade, only 155,000 Liberian refugees returned, many facing harsh economic conditions and limited international funding. Donor fatigue after years of protracted conflict further constrained support for repatriation efforts. Liberia’s prolonged repatriation process highlights how insecurity and economic hardship can deter voluntary return, echoing the challenges Syrians face as the country remains economically devastated.
In contrast, Mozambique’s repatriation following the 1992 Rome Peace Agreement is widely regarded as a success. The agreement not only secured peace but also guaranteed the restitution of property and provided practical support for returnees. Refugees were offered farming tools, seeds, and technical training, facilitating their reintegration. Strong international assistance and clear security guarantees enabled the return of 1.7 million Mozambican refugees between 1992 and 1995. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees spokesperson at the time, Yusuf Hassan, the operation was “the largest and most complex” ever undertaken, with costs reaching $152 million—equivalent to approximately $314 million today when adjusted for inflation. This sum was a fraction of the cost of war and the costs associated with hosting refugees in other countries. Mozambique’s success, although not without shortfalls, demonstrates how clear security guarantees, property restitution, and practical assistance can facilitate large-scale returns.
Collectively, these cases show that without robust financial mechanisms and a well-supported peace process, the prospect of sustainable Syrian repatriation remains uncertain.
However, what happens to the refugees who do not wish to return? UN General Assembly Resolution 36/148, on “International cooperation to avert new flows of refugees,” stipulates that those people who do not wish to return must receive “adequate compensation.” The perennial question remains: Who will pay this compensation?
Assad’s Wealth Could Greatly Aid Syrian Refugees
According to some estimates, Assad’s net worth is approximately $2 billion, but it could be worth much more. This staggering sum could ease the burden on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which suffers from a perpetual funding shortfall, as well as a depleted Syrian treasury department and central bank that look to rebuild an economically fractured country in which 90 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. These latter two entities are currently under U.S. sanction. So far, UNHCR estimates $575 million is needed for projects in 2025. With a projected 1.5 million Syrians returning home this year, the influx will come during the summer school holidays — in just two months.
There is precedence for the UN Security Council to support the redistribution of state assets to wronged civilians. UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) established the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC). Its purpose was to process claims and award compensation for the damages caused by Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC, a subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council, was tasked with receiving and evaluating claims from individuals and businesses for damages resulting from Iraq’s actions during the war. About $52 billion dollars was distributed from Iraqi oil revenues towards victims.
Legal Mechanisms
Over the years, the international community has assessed culpability for war crimes and established legal mechanisms to facilitate victim repatriation in various contexts. The framework outlined in Principles for Responsibility Sharing: Proximity, Culpability, Moral Accountability, and Capability – a symposium I participated in – underscores the moral and legal imperative to hold perpetrators accountable for crimes that have led to forced displacement, as in the case of Syria. One such mechanism includes National Asset Recovery Laws, through which individual countries enact legislation to repurpose the wealth of former leaders guilty of atrocities in order to compensate victims.
The European Union and the Swiss Government have passed laws and asset recovery programs, which provided the legal framework to freeze and repurpose illicit assets. One example is EU Directive 2014/42/EU on the Freezing and Confiscation of Instrumentalities and Proceeds of Crime. In a landmark case involving former Nigerian President Sani Abacha, Switzerland recovered and returned approximately $700 million to Nigeria. This case, which involved funds illicitly acquired by the former president, provides a model for how a tripartite agreement between Switzerland, The World Bank and Nigeria, successfully returned embezzled funds.
A similar commission to the UNCC should be set up to assist Syrian refugees, using the seized Assad family assets to compensate those who were forced to flee. The three country examples highlighted above demonstrate the need to have economic resources for reintegration and repatriation. This can also fill the funding gaps that both the UNHCR and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are facing. Such a commission, in addition to humanitarian carve-outs in the sanctions currently being imposed, is necessary as the country looks to rebuild.
Financial sanctions on Syria and its interim government complicate efforts to get aid and funding to those in dire need. Even if frozen assets are returned to Syria to help returnees and the humanitarian plight, the long shadow of U.S. sanctions continues to deter aid agencies from working in Syria due to the legal complexities and the persistent risk of violating them.
The new Syrian government faces a dual challenge of managing a broken state, while simultaneously convincing the international community, particularly the U.S. and EU, of its willingness to legitimately govern all Syrians. As governments adopt a wait-and-see approach before fully lifting sanctions, the reality is clear: Assad’s frozen and sanctioned assets can and should be structured into international reparation programs to help Syrian families afford the process of returning and rebuilding their lives.
