U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will lead a delegation of executives from more than 200 American businesses to Samarkand, Uzbekistan, for a meeting with Central Asia’s five foreign ministers on October 17. This C5+1 visit gives Washington a rare opportunity to press the region, and more specifically Uzbekistan, for long-awaited institutional reforms and the release of political prisoners in exchange for American investment––an opportunity that may only come once. And if Rubio believes, as he often states about Cuba, that individuals should not be imprisoned for the “simple sin of asking for basic rights, opportunity, and dignity” and the United States should not seriously engage with regimes that hold political prisoners, then he cannot abandon those principles here. The White House must seize its chance to secure the release of political prisoners in Uzbekistan while it has leverage. Otherwise, giving away for free what someone would pay for is just a bad deal.
This trip is Rubio’s first visit to the region as secretary, and it’s a business trip as much as a diplomatic one. It builds on the earlier C5+1 Washington summit in 2025, when Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick announced $25 billion in commercial deals with countries in the region, with hundreds of billions more in potential future agreements. The United States seeks access to Uzbekistan’s vast supply of minerals and rare earths, along with other possible deals around aviation and agriculture. Uzbekistan, for its part, is clearly interested in expanding trade and commercial ties with the United States. Today, its foreign trade is mostly concentrated in China and Russia, giving Moscow and Beijing clear leverage over Tashkent.
By forming closer ties with Washington, Uzbekistan seeks to diversify its trading partners. And there is one thing Uzbekistan wants specifically: the repeal of Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions, which suspend most-favored nation status for certain trade partners based on human rights concerns. They have applied to Uzbekistan since 1991, but only recently, as Uzbekistan has opened its economy and pursued trade diversification, has their repeal become a priority. Only the U.S. Congress can remove these restrictions, giving the United States leverage it has rarely had in Tashkent and that it cannot afford to waste.
The Trump administration already demonstrated in Belarus how effective the White House can be in securing the release of political prisoners when it chooses to use its leverage. Over the course of a year, President Donald Trump’s special envoy for Belarus, John Coale, has helped secure the release of hundreds of political prisoners in exchange for targeted sanctions relief. In Uzbekistan, it would cost even less. Tashkent is actively seeking partnership with Washington rather than extracting concessions, giving the United States the chance to decide whether to grant the repeal outright or tie it to something of greater value. And the release of prisoners is not unprecedented in Uzbekistan: early in his presidency, Shavkat Mirziyoyev freed more than 35 unjustly imprisoned people, so he may be willing to negotiate this time.
An Easy Ask Before Doing Business
Today, dozens of prisoners of conscience from Karakalpakstan––a sovereign republic within Uzbekistan––are languishing in Uzbek prisons with no hope for justice. Four years ago, in July 2022, many of them took to the streets to peacefully oppose amendments to Uzbekistan’s constitution that would have removed Karakalpakstan’s sovereign status. Uzbekistan responded with deadly violence as security forces used lethal force against the demonstrators. Dozens of people were killed and nearly 300 were injured. Now, more than four years later, there has been no meaningful investigation into the actions of the Uzbek security forces and therefore no justice for the victims. Instead, Uzbekistan went after the protesters, imprisoning more than 60 individuals for their participation in the protests, many of whom are still behind bars today.
None have been punished more severely than Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, a Karakalpak lawyer and journalist who gave a public speech condemning the amendments and calling for peaceful protests against them. For his role in the protests, Tazhimuratov received a 16-year sentence, the longest of any of the defendants, which has since been extended, bringing his total sentence to nearly 18 years. (Through our work at the Human Rights Foundation, we represented Tazhimuratov in his case before the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and actively advocated for his release.)
While imprisoned, Tazhimuratov is suffering constant violence and abuse at the hands of prison officials. He is held in an overcrowded 4×5 meter cell and is only able to access bathing facilities about once every six weeks, so he is forced to bathe in the toilet area. Officials often deny him access to pen and paper, and they have limited visits from his family in an apparent attempt to cut off his contact with the outside world. Perhaps worst of all, high-ranking officials at the prison regularly beat and taunt him, trying to force him to disclaim his Karakalpak identity. One beating was so severe that he had blood in his urine for more than a week, but he was denied medical treatment.
The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found that Tazhimuratov’s detention violates international law, and multiple U.N. Special Rapporteurs have written to the government about his case. Recently, U.S. Representative James McGovern wrote to Uzbekistan’s foreign minister about Tazhimuratov’s case, calling for transparency and compliance with international human rights obligations. Despite all this, Uzbekistan has thus far ignored calls for his release and demands for better treatment in prison. But now is the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the power of direct U.S. leverage to deliver what years of international pressure have not.
Uzbekistan wants to diversify trade, expand its U.S. investments, and end its Jackson-Vanik designation. Washington has also signaled interest in deepening trade and investment ties with Uzbekistan, and talks are already underway to repeal Jackson-Vanik, with Rubio himself supporting legislative action to remove the designation. But the United States should not forfeit its leverage too cheaply. The United States presents itself as a bastion of freedom and this administration, despite other valid criticisms, has established a reputation for freeing not only Americans held abroad, but also non-citizens, such as Pastor Ezra Jin or the prisoners in Belarus. Washington should continue this pattern in Uzbekistan and not agree to repeal the trade restrictions without demanding freedom in return. This is the art of the deal.
Timing is everything. Before any agreements are signed or restrictions are lifted, Rubio and the business executives traveling with him must exercise their leverage and make it clear that commercial diplomacy with the United States comes with conditions. Uzbekistan cannot be allowed to continue arbitrarily detaining Karakalpaks for exercising their basic human rights, and the United States cannot passively accept that many of those arbitrarily detained are subjected to torment at the hands of government officials.
If the United States is committed to closer cooperation with Uzbekistan, it cannot turn a blind eye to Uzbekistan’s forgotten. If the United States takes its commitment to freedom seriously, then Rubio must insist on justice for Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, justice for Karakalpaks, and justice for all of Uzbekistan’s prisoners of conscience.
