Introduction to the Timeline
This timeline presents a detailed listing of intelligence reports and other warnings that were available prior to the attack on the Capitol of January 6, 2021. Because this timeline is based solely on public, open-source information, it cannot be considered complete, but I believe it is the most comprehensive such list publicly available.
Some of these reports seem today as prescient, warning of violence on January 6, while other reports were more sanguine. A few, such as a warning that individuals were planning to fly an airplane into the Capitol on January 6, appear to have been false alarms—although without the benefit of an official inquiry that has access to the full classified record, we cannot know for sure.
We tend to learn the most about the inner workings of intelligence agencies after a major failure, and that truism certainly applies here. Students of intelligence, and hopefully intelligence agencies themselves, will be studying January 6 for years. The warnings and reports described here represent different aspects of the intelligence system, and for a former intelligence professional like myself who now teaches intelligence, they represent a remarkable example of what we call the “intelligence cycle”—how it works, or in this case, how it doesn’t work as well as the textbooks tells us it should.
That cycle begins with the requirements phase, with policymakers or other customers of intelligence asking questions of intelligence agencies, such as when Virginia Senator Mark Warner, chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, contacted the FBI Deputy Director on January 4 to ask about the threat of violence on January 6. The next phase—which may occur simultaneously with the other phases—involves the collection of raw information, which in the case of January 6 came from sources as disparate as social media companies like Parler, and from private citizens who had (as the saying goes) seen something and wanted to say something.
This raw information is then processed and analyzed, and the January 6 timeline shows that intelligence analysis is far from a science. Warnings that one organization or analyst might see as threatening might be considered much less worrisome by another agency. Intelligence analysis is a subjective business, and as we see here warnings that one analyst might assess as indicating “nothing significant to report” can be seen by another as indicating that violence is possible or even likely.
Next, that information is turned into finished intelligence of many different kinds, ranging from daily intelligence reports (which may not get much attention) to special assessments. And finally, these intelligence products are shared with other intelligence agencies as well as with customers. It is an axiom in the intelligence business that intelligence is of no use if it doesn’t get to someone who needs it—and the timeline shows that the system of intelligence sharing within the American homeland security enterprise is very complex, involving familiar agencies such as the FBI, Secret Service, and DHS, but also organizations that you might not expect would have a role in assessing information about threats to the Capitol, such as a network of Transit and Rail Intelligence agencies, or the Postal Inspection Service.
This timeline is not itself an assessment or an analytical product, and its primary goal is to serve as a resource for others interested in understanding better what has been called a “massive intelligence failure.” But the timeline does tend to support the analysis of experts such as Mitchell D. Silber, who has argued that “[c]ollectively, the FBI, DHS I&A, and the Capitol Police has collected sufficient information to have imagined, warned about, and acted on the threat.”
Often the warnings before a disaster tend to be broad, general, and strategic in nature, such as the warnings before the 9/11 attacks that al Qaeda posed a threat to aviation (but which failed to point to the specific plot), or before the COVID-19 pandemic that the world was at risk from a global pandemic (without identifying the specific disease that would ultimately kill millions). Only rarely are the warnings before a catastrophe specific enough to provide what is known as “actionable intelligence.” But this timeline shows that in the days and weeks prior to January 6, there was a considerable amount of actionable intelligence available.
One lesson from this timeline may be that often the most perceptive analysts are not those closest to the situation. In the case of January 6, organizations and individuals who might be assumed to have the most at stake, such as the Capitol Police, often appeared to be less concerned with the possible threat than analysts in other parts of the country.
Perhaps the most important lesson may be that as comprehensive as this timeline is, we cannot know what other warnings and assessments remain hidden from view. Only an official January 6 commission, modeled on the 9/11 Commission and with ready access to the full classified record, can provide a complete answer to the question of why, in the face of the many warnings we see here, the U.S. government was not prepared on January 6 to address the threat that led to the deadly assault on the Capitol.
In today’s highly charged political atmosphere, it may not be possible to establish a bipartisan January 6 commission specific to the intelligence failures, but the next best option would be for the intelligence community, or individual elements such as the FBI and DHS, to conduct inquiries into what went wrong. Such intelligence postmortems have a mixed record of success, but they can prove useful. After the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, for example, then-FBI Director Robert Mueller ordered two separate investigations: an internal FBI inquiry, and an independent review conducted by former FBI and CIA director William Webster. Such inquiries are needed now to resolve questions raised by this timeline and to help us avoid similar failures in the future.
Key sources of data in the timeline below include news media; organizations including the Anti-Defamation League, CREW, and Property of the People; and official reports from the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office, and a staff report from the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Rules and Administration Committee.
Numerous news organizations, think tanks, and analysts have produced timelines and chronologies highlighting other aspects of January 6, and the January 6 Clearinghouse includes several of the most useful. Others I consulted in developing this timeline include those produced by the National Security Archive, Grid News, and the Washington Post.
|October 1||DHS intelligence product||DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis developed an intelligence product assessing that ideologically motivated lone offenders and small groups, some of whom may target events related to the election results, pose greatest domestic terrorist threat through 2021, with domestic violent extremists presenting most persistent and lethal threat.||GAO Report|
|October 30||DHS intelligence memo||Memo states that open-source intelligence reports about election-related threats must be approved by DHS leadership and legal prior to release.||DHS memo, CNN|
|November 9||FBI analyst email||Analyst in Huntsville, Alabama, sends email to colleagues warning of post-election violence by the far right.||FBI Email|
|December 4||New Jersey State Police Regional Operations & Intelligence Center
|Report indicates increased danger for politicians, citing a rise in rhetorical violence.||New Jersey Regional Operations & Intelligence Center (ROIC) report|
|December 11||House Members announce plans to challenge electoral vote, and Capitol Police requests security assessment for Capitol||After a few Members of Congress announce their intention to challenge the electoral vote, Director of U.S. Capitol Police’s Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) John Donohue requests a preliminary security assessment for the Jan. 6th Joint Session of Congress.||Senate Staff Report|
|December 14||Intelligence agencies sharing of open source data||“Officials from the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department for the District of Columbia (MPD) and the D.C. Fusion Center began sharing open source data on January 6 with other law enforcement partners, including the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Park Police (USPP), and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.”||GAO Report|
|December 14||Capitol Police alerted to potential disruption||Sean Gallagher, Deputy Chief for the Protective Services Bureau of the Capitol Police, alerts then-USCP Chief Steven Sund and then-assistant chief of protective and intelligence operations, Yogananda Pittman, that the Jan. 6 Joint Session “will bring some demonstrations, with the potential for some issues on the House floor.” Mr. Sund responded, “considering a significant deployment.”||Senate Staff Report|
|December 15||SITE intelligence report||This report is not available publicly; title is “Far-Right Forum Urges Proud Boys to ‘Overpower and Rush’ Police During D.C. Protests.”||SITE Intelligence Group|
|December 16||Capitol Police Special Event Assessment (IICD first report)||The Capitol Police intelligence office issues the first iteration of a special assessment concerning anticipated protests on Jan. 6. It reports that “At this time there are no specific known threats” related to the Jan. 6 Joint Session of Congress.||Senate Staff Report|
|December 17||Tip to FBI; FBI memo||An FBI memo shared with Capitol Police and local law enforcement includes online posts and comments. One said, “You might have to kill the palace guards. Are you okay with [that]?” Another said: “Drop a handful, the rest will flee.”||Washington Post|
|December 19||Capitol Police becomes aware of further social media activity||USCP IICD learns about and circulates President Trump’s tweet, “Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!” USCP IICD also receives information about other social media posts promoting Jan. 6 as “the Biggest Protest in American History” with plans to “Occupy DC, Congress, SCOTUS, WH.||Senate Staff Report|
|December 20||Park Police report||U.S. Park Police shares multiple social media posts about protests planned for Jan. 6 with other agencies, including a Facebook post that says, “Fight for your country.”||GAO Interactive Timeline|
|December 20||Tip called into FBI||Tipster warns that Trump supporters are discussing online bringing guns to Washington to “overrun” police. On Dec. 22 an FBI assessment states that no further investigation is needed in response to this tip.||Washington Post|
|December 21||Mary McCord of Georgetown University and a former senior DOJ official warns about extremist chat groups||She shares with DC, DOJ, and FBI officials research, including from Atlantic Council’s DFR Lab, warning about what extremist chat groups are saying about planning for Jan. 6.||Washington Post|
|December 21||Israeli analyst warning||Arieh Kovler writes on Twitter “On January 6, armed Trumpist militias will be rallying in DC, at Trump’s orders. It’s highly likely that they’ll try to storm the Capitol after it certifies Joe Biden’s win.”||Twitter, Washington Post|
|December 21||Metropolitan Police Department||MPD shares a Twitter post about the planned Jan. 6 demonstration with the Senate Sergeant at Arms; the protest is seen as a lawful demonstration.||GAO interactive timeline|
|December 21||Capitol Police Investigative Research and Analysis Report||The seven-page report says DHS notified USCP of a blog (thedonald.win) that discusses US Capitol tunnels, including one saying, “Anyone going armed needs to be mentally prepared to draw down on” law enforcement officers, and comments such as “Bring guns. It’s now or never” and “Exactly, forget the tunnels. Get into Capitol Building, stand outside congress. Be in the room next to them. They won’t have time [to] run if they play dumb.” The report also lists “Patriot Organizations” expected to participate in events on Jan. 6 including the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers. However, the report states, “Review of the comments are negative for specific threats or specific plans of action.”||Washington Post, Senate Staff Report|
|December 21||DHS I&A online threat information||A DHS Field Operations Division member posts threat information related to Jan. 6 on an online forum for state and local partners.||DHS Inspector General report|
|December 21||DC Fusion Center||The Fusion Center shares open source data about threats concerning Jan. 6 with DHS and the Metropolitan Police Department.||GAO report|
|December 22||Postal Inspection Service report||Reports high potential for individuals to incite violence on Jan 6.||GAO report|
|December 22||Parler alert to FBI||Parler sends FBI three screenshots from user who threatens to kill politicians.||Washington Post|
|December 22-23||Capitol Police intelligence unit||The unit (IICD) receives several reports about the possibility of violence on Jan 6, including an email from an analyst at the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency about threats toward counter-protestors and toward members of Congress.||Senate Staff Report|
|December 23||Capitol Police intelligence Special Assessment (IICD second report)||This intelligence assessment reports that some participants on January 6 planned to be armed, but also reports that there is “no information regarding specific disruptions or acts of civil disobedience targeting this function.” Despite there being additional available evidence of an increased threat and possibility of violence during the Jan. 6 certification, IICD’s overall analysis reads identical to the first report from Dec. 16.||GAO interactive timeline Senate Staff Report|
|Late December||NYPD intelligence packet||The NYPD sends the Capitol Police and other agencies “an intelligence packet describing threats and violent rhetoric on social media.”||NBC, NPR|
|December 24||SITE Intelligence Group bulletin||Warns of a “supposedly violent insurrection” being planned for Jan. 6; includes a user writing that if members of Congress voted to certify Biden as the winner, the protesters should “start marching into the chambers.”||Politico|
|December||Private intelligence report (date unknown)||According to NBC News, a private intelligence report issued in December warns that January 6 “is likely to spart street violence, some of which may be lethal, between Antifa and Trump supporters or far-right groups.”||NBC|
|December 24||Parler alerts FBI||Social media company Parler forwards to the FBI posts that threaten violence at the Capitol on January 6.||Parler letter to Congress, GAO report|
|December 28||U.S. Capitol Police assessment||Capitol Police special event assessment says confrontations between opposing groups on Jan 6 could lead to violence.||GAO interactive timeline|
|December 28||U.S. Park Police report||Park Police develops an executive brief about potentially aggressive behavior by people planning to attend Jan. 6.||GAO interactive timeline|
|December 29||DC fusion center||The fusion center shares a post with the Senate Sergeant at Arms, the FBI, and the Capitol Police from the Telegram channel that encourages supporters on Jan. 6 to use intimidation tactics against members of Congress.||GAO interactive timeline|
|December 29||FBI Minneapolis Field Office report||The report warns of possible violence by right-wing extremists in protests planned for January 17 at state capitols in Michigan and Minnesota.||FBI Minneapolis Field Office Situational Information Report, Yahoo News|
|December 29||Capitol Police||A Capitol Police information paper says domestic extremists could attach themselves to Jan. 6 demonstrations.||GAO interactive timeline|
|December 29||SITE Intelligence Group bulletin||Report includes Telegram user writing in a neo-Nazi chat group that Trump supporters on Jan. 6 should “march into the capital[sic] building and make them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.”||Politico|
|December 30||Postal Inspection Service report||Reports that a new social media platform, Wimkin, is being used by militia groups preparing for Jan 6; a user said “We have to mobilize into action on the 6th. … Unfortunately all peaceful options have been exhausted. This is war …. there will be blood.”||US Postal Service Threat Assessment, GAO interactive timeline|
|December 30||Postal Inspection Service||The Postal Inspection Service receives a report from a Joint Terrorism Task Forceabout a neo-Nazi affiliated Telegram channel encouraging supporters to march on the Capitol on Jan 6. The title of the post includes “Occupy Federal Building,” referring to the Capitol.||GAO Report, GAO interactive timeline|
|December 30||DHS I&A assessment||Warns of potential for white supremacists to carry out “mass casualty” attacks. (But according to I&A spokesperson later, the report was about the “heightened threat environment related to the election,” and did not mention Jan. 6.)||New York Times , WSJ This is likely the same DHS threat analysis reported in the GAO interactive timeline.|
|December 30||Capitol Police information paper||The paper states that members of the Proud Boys might attend the Jan 6 events “incognito,” and includes examples of violence from past MAGA demonstrations. [Senate Staff Report appears to date this as Jan. 3; they may be two separate papers]||GAO interactive timeline; Senate Staff Report|
|December 30||Capitol Police Special Assessment (IICD third report)||Repeats the same overall assessment as in the past two reports; states that “no group is expected to march and all are planning to stay in their designated areas.”||Senate Staff Report|
|December 31||DC fusion center warning||The DC fusion center shares with the FBI, DHS, and other agencies Parler posts that protesters planned to be armed on Jan 6.||GAO interactive timeline|
|December 31||Capitol Police threat product||Reports members of the Proud Boys may attend Jan 6 incognito.||GAO interactive timeline|
|December 31||Park Police bulletin||This bulletin, called an operational snapshot, says that if opposed groups come into contact on Jan. 6, “violence would be almost certain.”||GAO interactive timeline|
|December 31||Secret Service Protective Intelligence Brief||Secret Service is monitoring a “possible ellipse event” with approximately 59 groups that could be involved. The report states, “There is no indication of civil disobedience” associated with these groups.||Secret Service documents, CREW, GAO interactive timeline|
|January 1||Warning about Washington tunnels||Elliot Carter, who runs a website about tunnels underneath Washington, DC, sends email to the FBI’s Washington Field Office about a worrisome increase in traffic to his site.||NBC News|
|January 2||Parler alert to FBI; Facebook alerts to FBI||Parler sends additional threatening posts to FBI, including one that says “don’t be surprised if we take the #capital building.” The company sends more than 50 tips to the FBI before January 6. GAO report says that both Parler and Facebook shared information with the FBI regarding potential violence at the Capitol on January 6.||Parler letter to Congress, Washington Post, House hearing,GAO report, Just Security|
|January 2||Head of intelligence for D.C.’s homeland security office warns of attack||Donell Harvin, head of intelligence for D.C.’s homeland security office, makes an urgent phone call to Mike Sena, head of the Northern California intelligence office and President of the National Fusion Center Association. Sena’s office had also been inundated with threats including plans to disrupt the joint session or hurt lawmakers on Jan. 6. Based on these threats, Sena plans a call for all of the nation’s fusion centers.||Washington Post|
|January 2||DHS intelligence online chat discussion||A DHS open source intelligence collector learns that maps of the Capitol building are circulating on line; says in an online chat “Jan 6th is gonna be crazy.”||DHS Inspector General report|
|January 2||FBI and DHS communications to DoD||“Mr. Miller’s staff coordinates with the FBI, DHS, and USMS [US Marshals Service] on whether these agencies had any concerns regarding the January 5-6, 2021 election protest events; the FBI had no specific concerns; DHS was not increasing its posture and was not tracking any threats to Federal facilities; and USMS was not responding to protests on January 5-6, 2021.”||DOD Inspector General report|
|January 3||Park Police threat product||The briefing notes that First Amendment demonstrations on Jan 6 will be similar to previous MAGA demonstrations; in both past instances, widespread violence occurred.||GAO interactive timeline|
|January 3||Capitol Police Special Event Assessment (IICD fourth report)||Warns of a “significantly dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public alike;” “some protestors have indicated they plan to be armed;” “white supremacist groups may be attending;” and “supporters of the current president see January 6, 2021, as the last opportunity to overturn the results of the presidential election.” The end of the 15-page document warns that “Congress itself is the target on the 6th,” but the Bottom Line Up Front is more sanguine. USCP leadership fails to act in response to this analysis. IICD also fails to share its internal report with other law enforcement agencies like the FBI.||AP, New York Times, Washington Post, Senate Staff Report|
|January 3||Administration officials convene to discuss security threats relating to Jan. 6||Representatives from the Department of Justice, DHS, FEMA, as well as Robert C. O’Brian, President Trump’s national security advisor, join in a series of conference calls to review security concerns surrounding Jan. 6. The group reportedly discussed the possibility of protesters targeting federal buildings, but believed the biggest risk would be fighting between pro-Trump protestors and liberal demonstrators.||Washington Post|
|January 4||Senate Sergeant at Arms threat review||The open source review discusses violence that had occurred at past MAGA demonstrations, and that Proud Boys members plan to attend Jan. 6.||GAO interactive timeline|
|January 4||Park Police intelligence report||Says there would be “the probability of sporadic violent actions” but “no indication of any acts of violence being pre-planned by any specific individual(s) or groups.”||Newsweek. This is probably the same product described in the GAO interactive timeline.|
|January 4||Capitol Police daily intelligence report||Assesses the chance as low that the groups planning to demonstrate on January 6 would break laws or incite violence.||New York Times|
|January 4||Secret Service Protective Intelligence Brief on planned protests||The report states “There is no indication of civil disobedience.”||Secret Service documents, Newsweek, GAO interactive timeline|
|January 4||Fusion centers convene “rare national call” to discuss January 6||Call is coordinated by Mike Sena, the president of the National Fusion Center Association. In an internal email from Sena later summarizing the call, a top question and answer relates to the suspected risk of “violent counter-protestors.” The email directs participants “to track, organize and coordinate incoming threats related to the upcoming January 6th, 2021 meeting by Congress” with the hashtag #CERTUNREST2021 on the FBI eGuardian platform. The email also disseminates generic information about how fusion centers should respond to a “mass casualty” event.||Mike Sena, Threat Coordination Call Notes, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Politico|
|January 4||Senator Mark Warner contacts FBI||Warner talks to FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich about online chatter concerning violence on January 6. Bowdich assures him the FBI is on top of it.||Washington Post|
|January 4||ADL publishes report about Jan 6||The report notes, “At this time, ADL is not aware of any credible threats of acts of violence that are slated to occur at the January 6 protests. However, if the past is any indication, the combination of an extremist presence at the rallies and the heated nature of the rhetoric suggests that violence is a possibility.”||ADL|
|January 4||Acting Sec. of Defense and Joint Chiefs Chairman call Cabinet meeting||Acting SecDef Miller and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley convene a call with Cabinet members. “According to Mr. Miller, he and General Milley voiced concern about the permits that had been issued, questioning whether there was a mechanism to revoke permits for the 1,000 to 2,000 people who had been granted permission to gather on Capitol grounds.” Miller told Senate investigators the consensus from law enforcement was that, given the current threat picture, they believed they had all the “resources and capability they needed to control the demonstration.”||Senate Staff Report, Washington Post|
|January 5||Press report of planned violence (including research report by Advance Democracy)||“More than half of the top 50 posts on thedonald.win’s homepage Monday related to Wednesday’s certification featured calls of violence within the top five comments, according to research by Advance Democracy, a group headed by former FBI analyst and Senate investigator Daniel J. Jones … The group said thedonald.win had more than 18 million visits in November, and the recent posts with calls for violence had more than 40,000 engagements.”||Washington Post|
|January 5||Press report of online threats of violence (including research report by Advance Democracy)||“Online forums popular with conservatives and far-right activists have been filled in recent days with threats and expectations of violence ahead of a planned protest in Washington on Wednesday” (referencing Parler, thedonald.win, Twitter, TikTok).||NBC News|
|January 5||FBI Seattle, 5 January Evening Update||Reports that “some Washington State residents planning to travel armed to Washington D.C. for tomorrow’s protests there.” But also said, “At this time we have no reporting of planned violence or credible threats to Federal facilities.”||FBI Seattle Field Office internal emails|
|January 5||Transit and Rail Intelligence Report||A Transit and Rail Intelligence Awareness Daily Report states, “Law enforcement and security professionals warn that violence is possible at the demonstrations” on January 6.||Transit and Rail Intelligence Awareness Daily Report|
|January 5||Secret Service emails to Capitol Police||Warns that police officers could face violence||Secret Service Warnings of Violence to Capitol Police, Politico|
|January 5||Federal Protective Service bulletin about planned march||Warns domestic extremists will likely participate and motivate followers to violence||Washington Post and National Security Archive|
|January 5||DHS intelligence assessment||DHS I&A reports, “Nothing significant to report” in assessment sent to law enforcement. Note: This claim is disputed: In a March 3, 2021 Senate hearing, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for Homeland Security Melissa Smislova denied the existence of the report: “We have heard of that report that we supposedly sent out that said ‘nothing significant to report’ and we can’t locate that so I have no idea where that notion came from. … We don’t have a copy of that report.”||Wall Street Journal|
|January 5||Draft DHS open-source intelligence report||DHS open source intelligence collector drafts report about threats related to January 6; the report was not released until January 8. [This may be the Jan 5 DHS threat product described in the GAO interactive timeline.]||DHS OIG report|
|January 5||DHS threat product||The product reports on an individual who was potentially a member of the Proud Boys, who had staked out federal buildings to determine how to bring firearms to Jan 6; the individual claimed to be driving through North Dakota with enough ammo to “win a small war.”||GAO interactive timeline.|
|January 5||House Intelligence Committee staff member||Staff member emails FBI to ask for assessment of threats to January 6, stating that “This matter is of high interest to the Committee, especially in light of recent press reporting suggesting that individuals, possibly with links to violent extremist groups, may be involved with violence or criminal activity in the vicinity of the U.S. Capitol.”||BuzzFeed|
|January 5||Capitol Police planning memo||The memo states that “there are no specific known threats” to the Electoral College vote certification.||POLITICO|
|January 5||DC Police host virtual planning meeting for January 6 and Inauguration||Sund said later that no entities at the meeting provided intelligence indicating “a coordinated violent attack on the United States Capitol.”||ABC (reporting statement by Sund)|
|January 5||Capitol Police daily intelligence report||Rates chance of major disruption as “highly improbable”||Senate Staff Report|
|January 5||Architect of Capitol – Warning of aviation threat||The Architect of the Capitol’s office and the Capitol Police receive warning of individuals planning to fly a plane into the Capitol on Jan 6.||GAO interactive timeline|
|January 5||Architect of the Capitol warning of threat to “storm” the Capitol||An official with the Architect of the Capitol receives information from an entity providing third-party open source analysis service about online posts, including one indicating plans to kill federal law enforcement employees and “storm the Capital.” Architect of the Capitol’s Chief Security Officer forwards the information via email to U.S. Capitol Police Command Center Watch Commander.||GAO Report|
|January 5||Pence’s chief of staff warning||Marc Short, chief of staff for Vice President Mike Pence, warns Pence’s lead Secret Service agent that Pence would face a security threat because he would not intervene in the Electoral College count the next day.||NYT|
|FBI Norfolk office Situational Information Report (SIR)||Warns of calls for violence and of individuals traveling to Washington for “war” on January 6. One of the online threads highlighted in the Norfolk SIR stated: “Be Ready to Fight. Congress needs to hear glass breaking, doors being kicked in, and blood from their BLM and Pantifa slave soldiers being spilled. Get violent … stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest. Go there ready for war.” The Norfolk SIR also warns of online message board traffic sharing maps of the Capitol complex. According to their congressional testimony, neither FBI Director Christopher Wray nor counterterrorism chief Jill Sanborn were briefed on the report until days after Jan. 6.||FBI Norfolk Division, Situational Information Report, Washington Post, October 31, 2021, Senate Staff Report|
|Capitol Police Deputy Chief email||Email sent to recipients including an official with the Senate Sergeant at Arms about increased attention online on the Capitol’s tunnel system; references an online tip received by the National Threat Operations Center about “significant uptick” in new visitors to WashingtonTunnels.com.||Senate Staff Report.|
|Internal briefing for DHS I&A leadership and Deputy Secretary||Analysis of indicators of possible protest-related violence briefed to DHS leadership, but not otherwise disseminated.||DHS OIG report|
|January 6||Architect of Capitol – warning of Proud Boys planning against fire system at Capitol||Architect of the Capitol identified a Twitter post that indicated the Proud Boys planned to disable fire suppression systems in government buildings, including the U.S. Capitol.||GAO Report
|DOJ counterterrorism update||National Security Division update email reported “There are no credible threats as of the 10:00 brief.”||DOJ and FBI internal email correspondence planning and response to January 6th events, BuzzFeed|
|January 6||Capitol Police daily intelligence report||Stated major disruption as “highly improbable,” and “No further information has been found to the exact actions planned” by the Stop the Steal rally. The Capitol Police Daily Intelligence Reports on Jan 4, 5, and 6 assess the probability of acts of civil disobedience as “remote” to “improbable.”||AP, Senate Staff Report.|
|DHS National Operation Center update||DHS National Operation Center update sent to DoD: “In the last 2 hrs – There are no major incidents of illegal activity at this time.”||DHS National Operations Center to Department of Defense on Jan. 6, Politico