Beginning today, diplomats, lawyers, and military experts from approximately 100 governments will convene at the United Nations in Geneva for a meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (“LAWS GGE” or the “Group”). The LAWS GGE is the primary intergovernmental forum dedicated to discussions on international law and autonomous weapons systems (“AWS”). Autonomous and AI-enabled systems have rapidly transformed from abstract ideas to commonly used technologies in armed conflict, but many believe that the international legal framework has not sufficiently adapted to keep pace with technological developments. This week’s meeting represents an inflection point for the Group. The majority of states participating in the Group—but not all—want to negotiate new rules applicable to the use of AWS. Absent progress in that direction, states in favor of a treaty will likely find a different avenue to reach that goal, and the GGE will either come to an end or lose many of its participants to an alternate process.
To contextualize this essential moment in the multilateral efforts to address the use of AI in the military domain, it is important to explain what the Group is, how it operates, the key issues it has been grappling with under its current three-year mandate, and why this week’s meeting is so important. I share these thoughts based on my personal experiences and perspective, having been a member of the U.S. delegation to the LAWS GGE from 2022 to 2025.
1. What is the LAWS GGE and how does it operate?
In 2016, states parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (“CCW”), a 1980 treaty that restricts certain excessively injurious or indiscriminate weapons, agreed to establish the LAWS GGE as an expert working group under U.N. auspices to examine the emerging technology of AWS. LAWS GGE meetings are open to all 128 CCW parties. Non-parties may attend as observers. Typically, representatives from 80-100 governments participate in GGE meetings, including all the major military powers (the United States, Russia, China, India, Israel, and all NATO members). Civil society, academia, and the ICRC also attend and play an active role in the discussions.
Over the past decade, the Group has developed 11 Guiding Principles and six annual reports containing agreed (though non-legally binding) conclusions on issues such as human-machine interaction and accountability. The annual reports reflect consensus understandings that could, in the future, form the basis of a new treaty or crystalize into customary international law with the requisite state practice and opinio juris. States have also submitted dozens of working papers, proposed protocols, and draft articles for the GGE’s consideration.
The central principle underlying the Group’s work is that existing International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) applies fully to the use of AWS, as it does to all weapons in armed conflict. The Group has focused much of its attention on how states can ensure compliance with the IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack throughout all stages of the AWS lifecycle, from initial development all the way to use and post-use assessments.
The GGE operates by consensus, meaning that all states must agree to any language that is adopted in the final report that it produces at the end of each year. With such a large and diverse group of participating states, ranging from major military powers in active armed conflicts to states without a standing military, consensus does not come easily. The negotiations are technical, detailed, and painstaking. Often, it is not until very late into the night on the final meeting day that the Group reaches consensus on certain language, while other much-discussed provisions fall out of the outcome document due to a lack of consensus.
2. Why is this week’s meeting such a pivotal moment?
The LAWS GGE operates under mandates determined by the CCW parties. Its current mandate, which runs from 2024 to 2026, is to “further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature” (see more on what this language means below).
Prior to this multi-year mandate, the GGE operated under annual mandates that CCW parties renegotiated each year. In practice, this meant the Group had only two one-week sessions each year to negotiate and reach consensus on an outcome document. By the end of the second week, the Group would identify the language that could be adopted by consensus, and everything else was left on the cutting room floor. The next year, the process would re-start, losing much of the progress from the prior year. To end this inefficient pattern, in late 2023, CCW parties agreed to the current three-year mandate to give the Group more time to negotiate a single rolling text.
Today begins the sixth and final session of the current three-year mandate. While the last three years of negotiations have generally been viewed as productive, nothing is yet set in stone. If history is any indication, the Group will work late into Friday night to seek consensus on as many elements as possible. It will be up to the Chair’s judgment as to which elements to prioritize and which to give up on as the clock winds down. If the Group does not agree to significant substantive elements this year, the chorus of states and non-governmental organizations calling for a new forum for international negotiations on AWS will only get louder, and it is likely that at least some GGE participants will seek to stand up a new multilateral process on AWS (I lay out some potential options for that below). It’s possible that the GGE could continue in parallel with a renewed mandate, but it would almost certainly lose its status as the primary international forum for discussions on AWS.
3. Is the Group negotiating a treaty?
No. At least not yet. The GGE’s mandate is to negotiate elements of an instrument without prejudging the legal nature of that instrument. This means that the elements under negotiation could eventually be part of a legally binding treaty, or part of a non-binding instrument such as a declaration or code of conduct.
Many states have called for beginning negotiations on a legally binding instrument. In their view, existing IHL is not sufficient to address the legal and humanitarian challenges posed by AWS. They are also concerned that the development and use of AWS is lowering the threshold for engaging in armed conflict. The UN Secretary General, the ICRC, the Pope, and civil society groups have echoed that call. Other states, including several major military powers, are not yet convinced that there is a need for new legal rules beyond what existing IHL requires, and are hesitant to limit the development of new technologies that could provide a military advantage and even reduce civilian harm through more discriminate uses of force.
4. What weapons are within the Group’s mandate?
Typically, weapons treaties clearly define the weapons they regulate at the outset. This is much harder in the AWS context. After ten years, the GGE has yet to reach consensus on a definition of an AWS, although it has reached consensus on common characteristics of AWS—including the autonomous identification, selection, and engagement of targets. Now that the Group is negotiating elements of an instrument, however, it has focused on developing a definition to delineate the scope and application of the other elements of the instrument.
Agreeing on a definition of AWS has proven challenging for several reasons, including that an AWS is not a specific weapon like a landmine or cluster munition, but rather a weapon system defined by a particular set of capabilities and characteristics. In addition, the definition must cover all components of the system that enable its autonomous functions—such as sensors, computers, software, and communications links—whether physically integrated with the weapon or not. GGE members also continue to disagree on whether to limit the definition to lethal AWS, in line with the mandate and name of the Group, or to include non-lethal AWS.
The current rolling text contains the following: “[A] lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as a combination of one or more weapons and functionally integrated technological components that can identify, select, and engage a target, without intervention by a human operating the system.” Several caveats and clarifying statements follow. Expect this language to be a major focus for the Group this week.
5. What is “meaningful human control” and why has it become the Group’s most challenging issue?
The other critical issue facing the Group this week is the role of the human in the use of AWS. The human element has featured heavily in GGE discussions since 2017. However, agreement on the core questions—do humans need to maintain control over AWS, and if so, what nature and degree of human control is required—remains elusive. A majority of states seek a requirement that AWS remain under “meaningful human control” at all times. The current rolling text does not contain such a requirement, as it would not gain consensus. States that oppose it (including the United States) argue that it means different things to different states and in different contexts, and is therefore not appropriate as a binding international law requirement.
For now, the rolling text includes a requirement for “human judgment and control with regard to LAWS.” The text makes explicit that this “does not imply constant direct human control” and that, in determining the appropriate level of human judgment and control needed, a range of factors, from the operational context to the capabilities of the weapon system, should be considered. Another possible option, from DoD’s AWS policy, is “appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force,” although this is also unlikely to gain consensus, as it does not go far enough in the views of many states in requiring human involvement with respect to the weapon system itself.
The GGE has already reached consensus on non-binding measures states can implement in using AWS to ensure compliance with IHL, including building in self-destruct or self-deactivation mechanisms and setting limits on the number of engagements and types of targets an AWS can engage without human involvement. Reaching consensus this week on the issue of human control or judgment would be a significant achievement for the Group.
6. What parallel domestic efforts should U.S. stakeholders be tracking?
Separate from international law frameworks, individual States can and have adopted their own domestic laws, regulations, and policies on AWS and military use of AI. There is a dizzying volume of legal and policy work on issues related to military AI and autonomy in the United States alone. For example, in NSPM-11, issued June 5, the President gave the Pentagon just 90 days to update DoD Directive 3000.09, its long-standing policy on Autonomy in Weapons Systems, to “ensure the deliberate adoption of AI systems that respect the chain of command and operational authorities.”
Members of Congress are also getting involved, proposing a variety of laws to regulate the U.S. military’s use of AI-enabled and autonomous weapons, ranging from requirements for ensuring appropriate levels of human judgment based on the expected risk to human life, to design requirements and testing standards, and prohibiting certain uses of military AI. The current Senate and House texts of the FY 2027 NDAA also contain several AWS-related provisions, including the establishment of a Robotic and Autonomous Systems Combatant Command and a requirement that AWS designed and employed by DoD be done in a manner that enables commanders and operators to exercise “ultimate human responsibility” over the use of force.
7. What can we expect going forward?
Other more informal initiatives have been launched in recent years to address broader military uses of AI and autonomy, such as for target generation and decision support. One such effort is the Netherlands and South Korea-led REAIM (Responsible AI in the Military Domain). REAIM has held three international summits since 2023 to promote awareness and international engagement, each generating important outcome documents. The U.N. General Assembly has also entered this space, adopting annual resolutions on AWS since 2023, which thus far have encouraged and not sought to supplant the LAWS GGE.
If a critical mass of states is dissatisfied with the outcome of this week’s GGE meeting, after three years of negotiations, we can expect to see efforts to move international discussions on AWS out of the GGE. One option would be to stand up a new forum—potentially in the U.N. General Assembly or a standalone state-led process—that does not operate by consensus and has a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument. States could also call for negotiations within the CCW to negotiate a sixth protocol that is focused on AWS. (The CCW currently has five protocols that contain restrictions and prohibitions on specific types of weapons). Under Article 8(2) of the CCW framework agreement, a conference of all CCW parties must be convened to negotiate a new protocol if a majority of parties (and not less than 18) agree, which likely is already the case.
What is certain is that militaries will continue to use AWS on the battlefield, and industry will continue to develop new autonomous capabilities at a rapid pace. Even states that are among the most hesitant to adopt new legally binding rules on AWS have expressed strong support for the importance of continuing international dialogue on this critical issue at the GGE. A move by some states to a new forum could result in a fracturing of IHL and interoperability challenges within NATO and other military alliances, as it is unlikely that all states would participate in the new process. Therefore, all eyes should remain on the GGE this week, as its outcomes (or lack thereof) will have far-reaching implications.
