People sit, their backs to the camera, in a large hall, watching a large TV screen on a platform that shows Ongwen's face. Two illegible banners hang on stands to the right of the screen. Two windows behind the platform are covered to shade the brightness and ease viewing of the television.

How to Acknowledge Forced Marriage as a Standalone Crime in the Draft Crimes Against Humanity Treaty

In their recent Just Security article, Elise Keppler and Maryanne Koussa describe the growing support among U.N. member states to include forced marriage as a delineated crime in the draft Crimes Against Humanity Convention. In our view, this increase in support is a natural outgrowth of simultaneous developments in international criminal law, international human rights law, and domestic practice. It is also logical: codifying forced marriage in this way helps to satisfy the principles of legality and fair labelling and helps to reduce repetitive debates over its status in international criminal law.

Interested states recently submitted proposals for amendments they wish to see in the draft text, and a compilation of those proposals is expected to be released in approximately two months. This will give states time to consider the compiled proposals in advance of the April 2027 Preparatory Committee meeting, including the idea of explicitly recognizing forced marriage. International case law over the decades can be instructive for states considering their support for this proposal.

From Sierra Leone to Cambodia to the ICC

Forced marriage has been recognized as a crime against humanity under the category of “other inhumane acts” by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in cases from four different contexts spanning four decades. In these decisions, the conduct was classified under that residual category because it was not explicitly listed in the statutes of the respective courts.

The SCSL’s Appeals Chamber in 2008, in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council case, defined forced marriage as “a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury to the victim” (para. 196). In 2018, The ECCC built on this reasoning by recognizing forced marriage and rape in the context of mass coerced marriages during the Khmer Rouge regime, emphasizing the coercive and institutionalized imposition of marital unions (para. 744).

This approach was further developed by the ICC’s Trial and Appeals Chambers, and amici curiae, in the Ongwen case, with the Appeals Chamber in 2022 describing forced marriage as “a situation in which a person is compelled to enter into a conjugal union with another person by the use of physical or psychological force, or threat of force, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment” (para. 1024). The ICC’s Trial Chamber also clarified in 2021 that the central element of the crime lies in the imposition of ‘marital’ status against the will of the victim, including the enforcement of duties and expectations associated with marriage and the resulting social stigma (para. 2748).

Crucially, this jurisprudence demonstrates that forced marriage is not reducible to isolated underlying acts, but instead constitutes a distinct violation characterized by the infringement of relational autonomy — the right to enter into a marriage (however defined) with free and full consent — and by the coercive imposition of social roles based on gender. Victims are thereby subjected to a continuum of harms that vary depending on the context, including sexual and physical violence, forced pregnancy and other forms of reproductive violence, as well as deprivations of liberty, dignity, health, or education.

These harms, together with enduring social stigma and psychological trauma — often intergenerational in nature — illustrate why existing legal categories in the crimes against humanity definition, such as sexual slavery and rape, fail to fully capture the gravity and specificity of the conduct.

Defining the Crime Against Humanity of Forced Marriage

As this jurisprudence shows, the definition of forced marriage has evolved over time. For example, the SCSL focused on male perpetrators, while the ICC took a gender-neutral approach. The SCSL and ICC focused on female victims, while the ECCC recognized as victims both the men and women who were paired in the mass coerced marriages under the Khmer Rouge (para 1185). As well, the term “forced marriage” has been clarified to be understood broadly, with the ICC’s Appeals Chamber indicating that “a formal or official marriage in a particular society is not required;” rather, whether or not the relationship was a forced marriage must be “established on the facts of the case including the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim” and “the subjective view of the victim, third parties and the perpetrator committing the act” on the status of that relationship (para. 1025). It also classified forced marriage as a harm related to gender in which the perpetrator imposes on the victim “socially constructed gendered expectations and roles attached to [the label of] ‘wife’ or ‘husband’” (para. 1024).

The jurisprudence has also clarified that, at the heart of the act of forced marriage is the denial of the victim’s ability to choose a conjugal relationship. As the ICC’s Appeals Chamber stated in 2022, “Crucially, the imposition of such a union violates a person’s right to marry, i.e. to freely choose one’s spouse and consensually establish a family, which is recognised as a fundamental right under international human rights law” (para. 1024). This illustrates the connection between the understanding of nonconsensual marriage under international human rights law and international criminal law.

The term “forced marriage” is used regularly in international human rights law, such as in resolutions of the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. General Assembly (e.g., see here and here). Various international human rights treaties also prohibit non-consensual marriage (e.g. see here (art. 23(3), here (art. 18(1)(b), and here (art. 1)). International human rights law focuses on marriage in “the absence of full and free consent” (para. 3), while also acknowledging that the term “marriage” can encompass “informal unions, cohabitation or other arrangements that are not formalized, registered or recognized by a religious, customary or State authority” (preambular para. 9). While both international human rights law and international criminal law focus on lack of consent, international criminal law goes a step further by including the accompanying constellation of crimes and human rights violations in the understanding of the term “forced marriage.”

Distinguishing Forced Marriage from Other Conjugal Relationships

Some countries are worried that the term “forced marriage” might be legally overinclusive, capturing other forms of conjugal association not intended to be captured in the Crimes Against Humanity Convention, including, for example, certain arranged marriages. There are two responses to this concern. First, the contextual element of crimes against humanity naturally limits the types of acts that can be considered: only those committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with perpetrator knowledge of the attack. Second, grounding the crime in the absence of consent helps to distinguish forced marriage as a crime against humanity from other forms of conjugal union recognized in different legal and social systems. In many countries, for example, there is a distinction between civil marriages and customary or traditional marriages, which may involve the participation of families or the community in the selection of a partner or other aspects of the marriage. The fact that a marriage takes place within a customary or traditional framework does not, in itself, make it coercive. While such marriages may entail family or community participation, they do not necessarily exclude the free and full consent of the parties. The key question is therefore not the cultural or institutional form of the conjugal relationship, but whether the individual had a real and meaningful opportunity to agree or refuse.

This distinction has also been recognized in international criminal jurisprudence. For example, in the Al-Hassan case, the ICC’s Trial Chamber indicated in 2024 that the decisive factor is not the cultural form of the marriage, but whether individuals were able to give genuine consent in the coercive environment in which those practices took place (para. 1417 and following).

State Practice

Beyond its recognition as an inhumane act and therefore a crime against humanity under international criminal law, and as a violation of international human rights law, there is a growing trend at regional and domestic levels toward the criminalization of forced marriage as a domestic offense, reflecting a broader consensus that such conduct warrants individual criminal responsibility.

For example, at a regional level, within the framework of the Council of Europe and the European Union, forced marriage is considered a criminal offense under Article 37 of the Istanbul Convention and the Article 4 of the EU Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence (VAW Directive). Accordingly, states bound by these regional instruments are required to criminalize such conduct, in particular: (i) forcing an adult or a child to enter into a marriage; and (ii) luring an adult or a child to the territory of a country other than the one in which he or she resides for the purpose of forcing that person to enter into a marriage.

At the domestic level, a growing number of States have enacted specific legislation addressing forced marriage. The United Kingdom (section 121.1 and 122.1), for instance, criminalizes forced marriage as a distinct offense, prohibiting the use of violence, threats, or other forms of coercion to cause a person to enter into a marriage without their free and full consent. Similar legal frameworks have been adopted in jurisdictions such as Canada (section 293.1), Australia (section 270.7 and 270.7B), China (article 257), New Zealand (section 207A) reflecting a shared understanding of forced marriage as conduct that violates the human right to enter into a marriage with a full and free consent.

Tweaks to the Jurisprudential Approach?

As mentioned, international criminal law seems to have been converging on this definition of forced marriage: compelling a person to enter into a conjugal union with another person by the use of physical or psychological force, or threat of force, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment. This is the definition advocates put forward in 2023 — and which some states appear to be considering — for the Crimes Against Humanity Convention. They argue that clear and explicit recognition of forced marriage as a type of crime against humanity helps to satisfy the principle of legality, as it makes the crimes against humanity definition more precise and accessible. It also helps to satisfy the principle of fair labelling, under which criminal labels are to be a fair and representative indication of the perpetrator’s blameworthiness (Dias, chapter 3).

However, a tweak might be considered: adding “or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or an inability to give genuine consent, including because of age.” In some situations, genuine consent is not possible, such as when children are involved. This recognition of circumstances could help to avoid restrictive interpretations that fail to adequately consider the vulnerability of victims. This is illustrated by Judge Tomoko Akane´s approach in the ICC’s Al Hassan case, where the age of the victims — and, consequently, their extreme vulnerability — was not taken into consideration (para. 37 and following). As documented in the trial judgment, some of the victims of forced marriage were minors, including girls as young as 12 and 13 years old (para. 1419).

Such a recognition would align with recent developments. In November 2025, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber, in the confirmation of charges decision in the case against Joseph Kony, head of the Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), recognized that some sexual and gender-based crimes committed by the LRA — including forced marriage — were directed against girls specifically on account of their age and gender (para. 256).

Conclusion: Why It Matters

Adding forced marriage to the Crimes Against Humanity Convention is important for several reasons: (1) it would formally recognize a violation that has been progressively defined by the courts; (2) it would highlight the multiple and severe harms stemming from the act; (3) it would uphold the principles of legality and fair labelling by ensuring that criminal charges accurately reflect the alleged conduct, thereby avoiding its mischaracterization; and, (4) it would prevent defendants from challenging its recognition as a distinct international crime, reducing repetitive debates over its status in international criminal law. In the ICC’s Ongwen case, for example, defense counsel raised questions about the legal status of forced marriage at every stage of the proceedings (for example, para. 35 and following).

Ultimately, codification would help close the gap between judicial recognition and treaty law.

Filed Under

, , , , , , , , , ,
Send A Letter To The Editor

DON'T MISS A THING. Stay up to date with Just Security curated newsletters: