The United Nations Security Council voted on Nov. 18 to pass Resolution 2803 based on the United States’ revised draft resolution, endorsing the U.S. Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict (“U.S. Plan”) for Palestine. The resolution maintains much of what Professor Eliav Lieblich had noted was wrong with the original draft. We also explained earlier that the plan underlying this resolution has all the appearances of neo-imperialism, and is potentially unlawful under international law. The resolution, however, also carries another more potent challenge, and one that risks repeating the failures of the past: the International Stabilization Force (ISF).
The Security Council’s authorization of the ISF creates what seems to be a militarized force with an aggressive counterterrorism role that will involve close cooperation with Israel. The mandate of the ISF not only raises some doubt as to the resolution’s legal basis, but also poses a serious risk to the prospects of the peaceful transition to Palestinian self-governance and Statehood that is envisaged by the resolution. It also risks backfiring in unintended ways, potentially inadvertently increasing violent extremism rather than defusing it. In this way, it seems to effectively advance neither Palestinian self-determination nor Israeli security concerns.
The ISF as a Militarized Counterterrorism Force in the Form of a Support Mission
Resolution 2803 authorizes the creation of the ISF “in close consultation and cooperation with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel.” It is empowered to use “all necessary measures to carry out its mandate,” which includes such tasks as to “secure border areas, stabilize the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups.”
This mandate raises several questions. Most fundamentally, it raises the question of what kind of force the ISF is meant to be: a peacekeeping operation, or something else? When questioned on this, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio responded that the ISF “shouldn’t be a fighting force.” His comments seem to indicate that, politically, the ISF is being framed as a peacekeeping force to support an eventual transition of governing authority over Gaza to the Palestinian Authority.
If the mandate is to be taken seriously and considered realistically, however, the ISF seems to lack the hallmarks of a traditional peacekeeping force. Broadly, peacekeeping forces must be based on three principles: consent, impartiality, and limited defensive use of force. It is important to note that these principles apply to peacekeeping generally and are not limited only to U.N. peacekeeping forces. The Leuven Manual states that these three principles are part of the framework applicable to peacekeeping universally. Although it is still early in the process, the basic building blocks of the ISF set forth in resolution 2803 do not seem likely to meet all three principles, particularly those of impartiality and limited, defensive use of force.
The Consent Prong May Have Been Met
Although not wholly clear-cut, there is at least an argument that the consent prong has been met. Though, Israel has indicated its consent (not without domestic controversy), Palestine’s case is more complicated. Although the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement welcoming the adoption of the resolution likely constitutes Palestinian consent to the ISF, there isn’t clear consensus both as to whether the PA has the authority to consent, nor whether the PA’s statement was in fact intended to communicate formal consent. In situations of consent-based interventions, effective control, accepting sovereign responsibility, and multilateral recognition are generally key elements in determining who has the authority to grant consent (see Hathaway et. al., p. 542). Palestinian consent is not clear-cut for a variety of reasons, including because effective control and recognition might be divided in relation to Gaza; although the PA enjoys far greater recognition, it may be argued that Hamas has a greater degree of effective control in Gaza compared to the PA (here a consideration of effective control would need to assume such control after Israeli forces have relinquished theirs).
Nonetheless, since the capacity to consent stems from State sovereignty, in situations “where there are competing claims of governance and where effective control is disputed, consideration should be given to whether those claiming to represent the state accept the international law responsibilities that such recognition carries.” (Hathaway et. al., p. 542). On this principle, it is likely that the PA – and not Hamas – would be sufficiently authorised to consent on behalf of Palestine.
Structural and Operational Partiality to Israel
However, the text of the resolution indicates that the structure of the ISF likely does not sufficiently safeguard the principle of impartiality. This principle requires operational impartiality, impartiality in the mode of decision-making (i.e. procedural impartiality in the manner in which decisions are made), and impartiality in the basis for decision-making (i.e. substantive impartiality in which interests and facts guide decision-making) (see here and here). The ISF’s operational mandate and decision-making practices likely fall short. For instance, the resolution provides that the ISF is to operate in “close consultation and cooperation with” Israel and Egypt and that it “shall work with Israel and Egypt” in carrying out its mandate (para. 7). Although the oversight body established by the resolution called the “Board of Peace” (“BoP”) is mandated to create an apolitical, technocratic Palestinian committee (see paragraph 4(B)(1)), the resolution does not establish any direct relationship between the ISF and that committee that would, at least on its face, facilitate direct cooperation with the ISF; rather, the ISF and the committee both, separately, fall under the supervision of the BoP. Additionally, paragraph 7 of the resolution indicates that the ISF will “work with” not only Israel and Egypt but also a new Palestinian police force of some kind to implement the ISF mandate – but this police force is not included in the higher-level and likely more comprehensive “consultation and cooperation” role that is given to Egypt and Israel. Egypt’s ostensible role, then, is to be a counterbalance to Israeli involvement, perhaps with the intent of protecting against partiality to Israel. It does not, however, eliminate this risk entirely.
While Egypt may be able to take a leading role to represent and protect Palestinian interests in the ISF, and its involvement may limit wholly unbridled Israeli influence over the ISF’s activities by imposing a political checks-and-balances system, this is unlikely to fully balance out Israeli influence. This is not only because, as a matter of political reality, Israel’s interests are highly likely to come with the powerful backing of the U.S. (and thus the BoP that will be chaired by the United States). It is also because the resolution seems, at least facially, to grant a more expansive set of authorities to Israel than it does to Egypt. It stipulates, for example, that the “standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization” will be agreed between the “IDF [Israel Defence Forces], ISF, the guarantors, and the United States.” Egypt is not clearly accounted for in any of those categories. The implication of this is that the IDF will be empowered to (potentially significantly) influence not only the process for its own withdrawal but also the standards for the ISF’s “control and stability” in Gaza that the resolution sets as a prerequisite to IDF withdrawal, without a clear structural guarantee of Egyptian (or Palestinian) involvement. This seems to open the door to an unbalanced level of Israeli influence on the ISF’s implementation of its mandate.
This, of course, is not to suggest that the ISF ought not to cooperate with Israel at all. Indeed, such an approach would be unrealistic. To guard against impartiality, however, Israeli involvement should be limited to only a logistical support role such that it enables the ISF to effectively carry out its mandate, without allowing it to substantively influence the ISF’s actual operational decision-making or other activities.
A (Non)Limited Use of Force Mandate
It is not unprecedented for peacekeeping forces to be issued robust mandates with an authorization to use armed force. For instance, the Security Council authorized peacekeeping operations to undertake targeted offensive operations in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (although these missions have had mixed levels of success).
However, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations has indicated that there is a difference between “robust peacekeeping,” which involves the use of force specifically for the purpose of preventing specific threats to civilians or the peacekeeping mission itself, and “peace enforcement,” which involves the use of force against specific groups regardless of any particular threat to civilians or the mission. But even peace enforcement can differ from an enforcement operation under the Security Council’s Chapter VII authorities, which may more clearly involve a military effort to defeat an adversary (although the lines are somewhat blurred between these various distinctions). Furthermore, the Leuven Manual suggests that peacekeeping forces deployed to provide security support “differ from enforcement operations in which armed force is applied” and from forces tasked with “the imposition of a political solution upon warring parties by force of arms in situations where governmental authority has broken down” (Leuven Manual, p. 4).
The ISF’s mandate seems to indicate that it will serve exactly the twin purposes identified by the Leuven Manual: use of armed force, and the imposition of a political solution. Its primary responsibility is, in fact, imposing a political solution for Gaza where governmental authority has broken down on both sides. Years-long contestation for both military control and political legitimacy amongst the warring parties has also left the area of concern with heavily fragmented and ineffective governmental authority, deeply affected by Israeli occupation and with split claims to legitimate governance between the PA and Hamas.
The fact that the ISF’s mandate involves the “destruction” and “prevention of rebuilding” of “military, terror and offensive infrastructure” also indicates that its duties may include using armed force proactively to carry out enforcement operations. Executing a proactive mandate to “destroy” military, terror, and offensive infrastructure would necessarily require military operations well beyond the limited use of defensive force contemplated by traditional peacekeeping operations.
With all of the above taken together, the ISF thus appears to constitute something more akin to an ad hoc counterterrorism operation exercising military force, rather than a peacekeeping operation. This is particularly noteworthy given that the U.N. High-Level Panel on Peace Operations concluded in 2015 that U.N. peacekeeping missions “are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations,” but rather that such activity ought to be undertaken by other entities such as “an ad hoc coalition authorized by the Security Council” (see para. 119). It appears that Gaza will have the latter, rather than the former.
A Precarious Legal Basis for the Authorization of a Militarized Force
If the ISF is indeed a militarized counterterrorism operation rather than a true peacekeeping operation, this raises an important question: what is the legal basis for authorizing a mandate involving the use of force, for a purpose other than self-defence?
Though the Security Council is empowered to authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the resolution conspicuously omits reference to Chapter VII as per usual practice (although an explicit reference is not required). In any case, the Security Council’s power to authorize force under Chapter VII is not unlimited, as confirmed in Tadic where it was held that the Security Council cannot go beyond its jurisdiction and that the Charter did not conceive of it as being unbound by law (para. 28).
At the very least, the procedural conditions within Chapter VII must be met. For instance, under Article 39, the Security Council must first determine that there exists a threat to international peace and security before it is able to authorize the use of force under Article 42 of the Charter. Notably, resolution 2803 does not explicitly make such a determination, nor does it reference any prior such determination by the Council. Instead, it determines that the situation in Gaza constitutes a threat to “the regional peace and security of neighboring states.” This may not satisfactorily constitute the requisite determination under Article 39, which uses the specific language of “international” peace and security. As Lieblich notes, however, the combination of the word “regional” with reference to “neighboring states” could also be taken to mean “international.” Accordingly, there is some legal ambiguity; it is possible that the ISF’s authorization is based on an implicit invocation of Chapter VII authorities after having made the requisite finding under Article 39, but it is not entirely clear.
Even if so, however, the Security Council’s power to authorise force under Chapter VII is limited by Article 24(2), which provides that the Security Council shall act in accordance with the “Purposes and Principles” of the U.N. in discharging its duties under Chapter VII. An authorization to use force cannot be contrary to the principles enshrined under Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. These include, inter alia, the right to self-determination, political independence of States, and the peaceful settlement of disputes by member States. The ISF’s partiality and expansive use of force mandate would appear to risk undermining some among these principles.
In particular, the ISF’s mandate to militarily impose, under what may end up being a certain level of Israeli direction, a political solution where the priorities and legitimate political actors are determined by foreign entities potentially runs the Security Council into the risky territory of authorizing force to stifle Palestinian’s rights to self-determination. For instance, paragraph 9 of the U.S. Plan establishes that Gaza will be governed by a temporary Palestinian committee made up of “qualified” Palestinians and international experts, under the “oversight and supervision” of the Board of Peace. Paragraph 4 of the resolution references participation by “competent” Palestinians that are “championed” by the Arab League; it does not reference international experts at all, leaving ambiguity as to whether the committee will be wholly Palestinian, or not. Neither text indicates the mechanism or metrics or by which Palestinians will be determined to be sufficiently “competent” or “qualified,” nor how international experts will be chosen (if they are to be included). The resolution also leaves the time horizon for the committee’s governance under the Board of Peace open-ended, indicating that once the Palestinian Authority reform program has been “faithfully” completed and Gaza redevelopment has moved forward, a pathway “may” be in place for Palestinian self-determination – without indicating how such progress will be determined, nor by whom. Paragraph 8 authorizes the BoP through December 2027, allowing for additional reauthorization without any clear time limit. No consultation with Palestinian authorities for such reauthorization is indicated in the text. This open-ended framework could theoretically leave the Board of Peace – and the ISF – in place for the interminable future, with limited and unclear Palestinian decision-making. At the least, these arrangements leave open the question of how well the resolution comports with the Charter’s principle of self-determination.
This leaves the resolution on ambiguous legal ground: although one might fairly point to the PA’s expression of support (even if after the passing of the resolution), the lack of a clear triggering of Chapter VII authority leaves some room for doubt, and there is at least an argument to be made that the transitional frameworks imposed by the resolution do not entirely comport with Article 24(2)’s constraints on the use of Chapter VII authority.
The Strategic Failures of the ISF and of Militarizing Transitions
Beyond the legal murkiness of the ISF’s mandate, it sets itself up for potential strategic failure. Militarized transitions frequently collapse the distinction between supporting self-determined political processes and imposed political outcomes. An emphasis on disarmament through force and stabilization through enforcement risks reproducing or exacerbating the underlying root causes of the conflict itself, including any applicable cycles of power or inequality. This could cost the mission crucial public support on the ground and potentially backfire including by inciting further extremism that undermines Israeli security.
The ISF in essence continues Israel’s attempts of eradicating Hamas, not through political negotiation or processes with meaningful Palestinian participation, but through what are essentially foreign-led counterterrorism operations. In so doing, it continues similar conditions to the active armed conflict that the resolution purports to put an end to – simply now, instead of the IDF fighting Hamas, it will be the ISF. Following the passage of the resolution, Hamas has indicated that it will not voluntarily disarm, increasing the likelihood that to carry out this aspect of its mandate the ISF may indeed resort to use of force. In the end, Palestinian civilians will be left to continue to suffer the perils of what may amount to the same violent war, but with the ISF as another belligerent.
To this point, a stabilization force that is in effect undertaking counterterror operations with the use of armed force in dense urban settings will inevitably cause collateral civilian casualties. This has the strong likelihood of creating enmity and animosity amongst civilians towards a force that they already do not identify with, potentially radicalizing them against that force. As a consequence of both these factors, there is a serious risk that the ISF may push civilians closer to Hamas and extremist violence against an international force they perceive to be the enemy.
Additionally, it is a complicated reality that Hamas – not the PA – has governed Gaza since 2007. Paragraphs 2 and 9 of the resolution, in combination with the broader mandate of the ISF, enshrine what is in essence a change in governing authority in Gaza to the PA. Externally, and potentially forcefully, changing the seat of political power via a process that largely excludes meaningful domestic political participation or consultation may push some civilians to the fringes of the political arena where extremism thrives.
Although rife with its own challenges, one approach that might be preferrable would be the establishment of free and fair domestic political processes. Limiting Hamas’ involvement in governance this way would reflect and empower Palestinian self-determination and may mitigate some of the risks identified above. Of course, there are no guarantees that this would be successful (Hamas has won elections before, for instance), and such a process comes with its own obvious risks and problems. But it is not entirely implausible; polling shows that support for Hamas amongst Palestinians has sharply declined.
These issues expose a larger strategic fallacy inherent in militarized transitional frameworks: the assumption that political and public legitimacy can be engineered through armed enforcement. On the contrary, such an approach risks not only widespread public opposition and disapproval, but also can actively cause increased radicalization and extremism.
These risks are compounded especially when the force is perceived as being partial to and serving the interests of an occupying power. Because of the ISF’s intended close cooperation with Israel, it inherits the psychological baggage of occupation. For many Palestinians, an ISF whose mandate is effectively co-produced with the occupying power will be viewed not as a transitional support mechanism but as an extension of Israeli coercive capacity under international cover. Such perceptions are not merely symbolic; they decisively determine the force’s ability to operate, secure cooperation, and create conditions conducive to peaceful and stable political processes.
Ultimately, a militarized transition structured this way and predicated on shaky legal grounds can take on the appearance of merely rebranding externally imposed control as transitional governance. In doing so, it risks perpetuating insecurity, undermining trust, and creating new hostile non-State actors in the process.
