The U.S.-brokered peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan officially ended 37 years of conflict rooted in the legacy of the Soviet Union. Beyond normalizing relations after two devastating wars, the deal reached in August set the stage for a new strategic transit corridor, what the Trump administration has dubbed “the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” or TRIPP. Its goal is to link the Caspian Sea region to Europe through the Black Sea or Mediterranean along the shortest possible route. With this move, Washington has formally entered the South Caucasus as a significant trade and transit actor, challenging Russia in its historic sphere of influence. The United States is also positioning itself closer to Iran’s border and complicating the regional calculus for China, whose Belt and Road Initiative traverses the region.
Notably, another key regional player, Georgia, appeared sidelined by Washington, even though just a year ago, it was the United States’ closest strategic partner in the region. Since then, Georgia’s severe democratic backsliding and the re-emergence of Russian influence in the country has left it on the outside looking in at these new trade deals.
Meanwhile, TRIPP has not been the only U.S. effort to strengthen its position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. On Nov. 6, President Donald Trump hosted the C5+1 summit with Central Asian states in Washington, expanding American economic, trade, and transit cooperation and advancing the Abraham Accords, the pact intended to normalize relations between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries. In doing so, the United States deepened the Middle East’s ties with Central Asia. Washington is clearly outlining the initial contours of a cross-regional approach that links the South Caucasus with Central Asia and the Middle East and thereby counters its rivals in the neighborhood: China, Iran, and Russia.
Yet, as the United States moves deeper into this complex geopolitical environment, it must prepare for pushback not only from competitors but also from its partners, as South Caucasus countries continue to hedge their bets and pursue foreign policies that further their interests.
Understanding TRIPP
In 1923, the Soviet Union drew the borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, placing it within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, even though 94 percent of its population was ethnically Armenian. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh declared full independence, sparking a decades-long conflict that included two full-scale wars resulting in thousands of casualties. In 2023, Azerbaijani forces rapidly seized Nagorno-Karabakh after 24 hours of fighting and regained the territory. As a result, the majority of ethnic Armenians fled.
Against this tragic background, on Aug. 8, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed the Washington Declaration, facilitated by the United States. The agreement aimed to establish diplomatic relations and advance regional connectivity and cooperation. The core initiative of the deal is a new transit corridor, known as TRIPP, agreed to by both parties, that will connect Azerbaijan’s mainland with its exclave, Nakhchivan, through Armenian territory, which Azerbaijan continues to call the “Zangezur Corridor.”
This breakthrough became possible chiefly because the United States committed itself to the process. Armenia agreed to grant the U.S. exclusive special development rights over TRIPP for 99 years. The United States will, in turn, sublease the land to a consortium responsible for developing rail, oil, gas, and fiber-optic infrastructure, and potentially electricity transmission, along the 27-mile corridor. The idea of a link through Armenia’s southern Syunik province is not new: for years, leaders in Baku, Azerbaijan’s capital, have sought to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan, and further eastward to Turkey. With TRIPP, Turkey emerges as one of the principal beneficiaries, gaining a second land link westward to the Caspian region and Central Asia while bypassing Iran. Turkey is also the most likely partner for the United States to rely on for the management and security of the route.
TRIPP positions the United States as an indirect, soft guarantor of the peace process and economic cooperation. Even though the Washington Declaration is not legally binding and only confirmed terms agreed earlier in the year that still have not been entirely fulfilled, it carries significant political weight as long as Washington remains engaged in the process.
Countering Strategic Rivals
The new South Caucasus “Pax Americana” introduces geopolitical complexity to the region, possibly pushing China, Iran, and Russia closer together and provoking pushback from all three.
The TRIPP agreement has already weakened Moscow’s regional standing and reputation. As the historic successor of the Soviet Union, Russia views the South Caucasus as its backyard. It has maintained influence through military bases in its occupied territories in Georgia and with troops stationed near Gyumri in Armenia. Secondly, for years, Russia led mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by France and the United States, but without success. Following the Washington Declaration, Azerbaijan and Armenia jointly requested the OSCE dissolve the Minsk Group, ending Russia’s role mediating their dispute.
Moscow views these developments as linked to its broader standoff with the West. It is equally concerned by the creation of extra transit routes that bypass Russia. It is therefore no coincidence that on Oct. 16, during a telephone conversation about a potential ceasefire in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed Armenia and Azerbaijan with Trump. Moscow has minimized its initial public reaction to TRIPP, however, choosing to observe the situation before taking any concrete steps. The Russian Foreign Ministry publicly expressed support for “a zone of stability and prosperity” in the South Caucasus, but sent specific signals to the United States, emphasizing that regional disputes should be resolved by the regional powers — specifically Turkey, Iran, and Russia — rather than by external players.
Russia retains the ability to destabilize the region, exploiting unresolved local grievances—such as issues related to refugees, property, and cultural heritage—which could undermine the implementation of agreements. Russia could also use its military presence in Armenia to its advantage.
For Washington, TRIPP also enhances its leverage over China, as the new route can be seamlessly integrated into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor—known as the Middle Corridor—which originates in Southeast Asia and China and extends eastward across Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and continues into Europe. Launched in 2014, this route involves maritime and rail transport. Since Russia’s unjustified attack on Ukraine, the Middle Corridor has emerged as a safer alternative for transit than moving goods through Russia. The Middle Corridor is advancing day by day, responding to the major bottlenecks in the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus by improving infrastructure. Between January and June, a total of 9,849 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units) of containers were shipped from China and back through Georgia along the Middle Corridor — a remarkable 173 percent increase compared to the same period in 2024, when only 3,608 TEU were transported. As the fastest-growing overland alternative to longer maritime passages and Russia’s northern route (from China through Russia to Europe), the Middle Corridor is a key element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, meaning U.S. influence over it runs counter to Beijing’s strategic interests.
From Beijing’s perspective, TRIPP agreement is double-edged. China’s logistics and industrial firms could benefit from this new transit route, as it would reduce reliance on traditional maritime chokepoints, and would lower transportation costs. However, given its rivalry with the United States—especially in areas of logistics and technology—China may find itself vulnerable to having to accept higher operational costs under U.S. conditions. Avoiding this outcome could push China to deepen engagement with alternative regional actors such as Georgia, where it previously outmaneuvered the United States by gaining influence over the strategically important deep-sea port of Anaklia.
Meanwhile, Beijing continues fostering cooperation with South Caucasus countries. Oddly, Armenia and Azerbaijan respond to China’s overtures positively, noting China’s important role in Eurasian connectivity and Beijing’s market access and investment. Both countries want to place themselves on the Middle Corridor and other China–Europe trade flows. Unlike energy-rich Azerbaijan, which is able to pursue independent policies with eclectic geopolitical actors, Armenia’s accelerated partnership with China is a bit risky in this transitional moment, as it aspires to leave the Russian orbit, while awaiting TRIPP guarantees from Washington and closer ties with the EU. Consequently, only a month after shaking hands at the White House, leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, led by Xi Jinping. This event was not the first time leaders from Armenia and Azerbaijan sat together in a room while Chinese or Russian leaders endorsed alternative regional and global alignments of the liberal world order — previously they have been spotted at the BRICS summit in Russia. Moreover, Armenia has recently signed a strategic partnership agreement with China; likewise, the other South Caucasus countries.
As for China-Georgia relations, Georgia’s abrupt reorientation toward Russia and authoritarianism, combined with the imposition of Western sanctions, created a strategic vacuum that also affected Tbilisi’s cooperation with Beijing. The strategically important Anaklia Deep Sea Port project, is still unsigned with the Chinese consortium. The uncertainty surrounding the project raises questions about whether Georgia and China may be struggling to finalize the agreement. Once a point of contention between the United States and China, Anaklia now seems to reflect Tbilisi’s hesitation amid ongoing political crises in the wider U.S.-China rivalry. At the same time, as the Georgian government seeks renewed legitimacy from the United States, it might use the Anaklia project as a card to recalibrate its stance toward Washington to restart diplomatic relations. Georgia’s absence from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in August also highlights this possibility and the strain in its relations with Beijing.
Georgia still holds significant potential for the United States thanks to its geostrategic location and connectivity with Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. With access to the Black Sea, it also presents Beijing a possible gateway to the EU through the Middle Corridor. Because of its location, Georgia has been one of the leading recipients of U.S. financial support in Europe and Eurasia, generating value for the country’s economy through enforcing its role in the Middle Corridor. For now, the partnership between Georgia and the United States is suspended as a result of the Georgian government’s anti-U.S. and European rhetoric and actions. There is no U.S. ambassador appointed, and there is little diplomatic pressure coming from Washington. Although the United States could still recruit Tbilisi for its grand plan using sticks and carrots, the current isolation and sanctions are not painful enough for Tbilisi to pressure them to conduct free and transparent elections, free political prisoners, or abolish Russian-style oppressive laws. If it did take these steps, Georgia could perhaps return to the democratic, Euro-Atlantic track.
TRIPP, envisioned as a comprehensive infrastructure initiative encompassing railways, energy pipelines, fiber-optic networks, and the flow of goods, will bypass traditional transit routes not only through Russia but Iran. Iran also sees danger in the U.S. presence, even though American troops will not be deployed along the route. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs talked about “the negative consequences of any form of foreign intervention, especially near shared borders.” In an August phone call, Armenian leaders sought to reassure Iran, their longtime ally, emphasizing that the agreement benefits the region, preserves Iran’s access to Armenia, maintains Yerevan’s administrative control over its sovereign territory, and includes a pledge not to involve U.S. forces.
TRIPP faces significant hurdles and internal challenges before it delivers lasting peace, but early investments are already being made. Washington intends to grant Armenia $145 million for TRIPP, while Armenia received $500 million in investment from U.S. chip maker NVIDIA to build the region’s most powerful supercomputing hub and data processing center, offsetting Chinese influence through investments in artificial intelligence. The United States also signed a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan in August, lifting its arms embargo and elevating Baku’s status as a regional powerhouse on the Caspian Sea.
Early indicators suggest some progress toward Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization. Baku lifted the transit ban to Yerevan, and the first transit shipment of Kazakh grain is expected to reach Armenia using the Georgian railway. At the same time, Armenia opened its border, allowing Azerbaijani trucks to transit through its territory to Turkey, and each country launched flights through each other’s airspace. So far, the U.S.-facilitated TRIPP agreement is pushing the peace and development process forward.
TRIPP and the Abraham Accords
As mentioned, brokering the TRIPP agreement was not a single, targeted initiative devised by Trump; rather, the South Caucasus has been considered as a strategic bridge connecting the Middle East and Central Asia as part of broader U.S. interests.
On Nov. 6, the United States hosted the C5+1 Summit in Washington, D.C., convening the leaders of the Central Asian States to deepen engagement and expand Washington’s footprint in the region. According to the joint statement, the parties committed to enhancing supply chain connectivity and resilience by fully developing the Trans-Caspian Trade Route (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) and integrating it with TRIPP in the South Caucasus. These moves aim to secure the movement of cargo, information, and energy, benefiting both the C5+1 countries and the broader international community. The summit further emphasized the pursuit of secure, reliable, and diversified energy supplies, while encouraging expanded investment and trade in energy and critical minerals. Notably, Kazakhstan, the world’s leading uranium producer with an estimated 2.6 million tons of rare earth elements, joined the Abraham Accords, reflecting the Trump administration’s belief that economic cooperation and trade can overpower geopolitical tensions between Israel and the Muslim world.
In the U.S. view, Azerbaijan plays an increasingly important role as a crucial node in energy and transit logistics, both for the Central Asian countries and the Middle East. At a Nov. 16 summit in Tashkent, Central Asian leaders and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan had been invited to join the regional C5 consultative format, effectively turning it into a C6.
In parallel to this, Washington is pressing Azerbaijan to join the Abraham Accords. Even before TRIPP, Baku was already benefiting from the potential advantages of the Abraham Accords within bilateral cooperation with Israel, including access to advanced military technologies and energy trade with Israel. However, linking Azerbaijani and Israeli ports could connect the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor to the Trans-Caspian International Transit route, creating a commercial crescent that could counter China’s influence in Central Asia and mitigate the power wielded by Iran and Russia. Whether Azerbaijan will sign on to the Abraham Accords is unclear for now. The country typically tries to maintain an independent foreign policy that keeps its options open.
It is worth noting that the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia were present at the Gaza ceasefire deal in Egypt. Their attendance primarily underscored that the Trump administration may be able to address two long-standing regional conflicts in the Middle East and the South Caucasus within a single cross-regional framework. Aware of the changes coming to the region, Putin recently apologized to Azerbaijani leader Aliyev for a Russian air defense system shooting down an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft in December 2024, killing 38 people. Putin knows he needs to reset Russia-Azerbaijani relations to push back against the increasing regional influence of the United States.
Ultimately, Washington’s ability to sustain progress will depend on consistent diplomacy and investment, restoration of its credibility among regional partners, and the creation of tangible economic incentives that demonstrate long-term U.S. commitment. The TRIPP deal may indeed accelerate peace and connectivity, but without a coherent and durable U.S. presence, the geopolitical space it opens could just as easily be reclaimed by Washington’s rivals, especially when the South Caucasus countries are still vulnerable to influence. The coming years will determine whether this cross-regional vision becomes a lasting pillar of U.S. strategy or a missed opportunity in a rapidly changing Eurasian landscape.
