The Trump administration’s initial preparations for the Aug. 15 Alaska meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared shaky. But the meeting could advance a lasting settlement of the war if President Donald Trump avoids Putin’s predictable traps, decides to ramp up the pressure on Russia, and makes clear that the United States will back Ukraine’s security.
First, the bad news: when U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff met with Putin in the Kremlin Aug. 6, he apparently mistook Putin’s remarks for a significant Russian concession when none existed. The United States may have arranged the Trump-Putin meeting on the basis of a false impression of Russian willingness to end the conflict on terms other than Ukraine’s effective surrender. Trump had been warning Russia to settle the conflict or face punishing economic pressure. But Trump dropped his latest deadline and turned to musing publicly about unspecified territorial “swaps,” and then criticized Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for not accepting them in advance. Trump’s decision to impose additional tariffs on India for its purchase of Russian oil might have been a sign of pending pressure on the Kremlin to end the war, but the United States vitiated the potential impact of this move through inconsistent messaging.
A worst-case debacle in Alaska could look like this: Putin convinces Trump to officially recognize Moscow’s annexation of Ukrainian territory and to agree to limits on Ukraine’s future security, e.g., no NATO membership ever, no outside forces in Ukraine, and limits on outside arms and munitions to Ukraine. Such a deal would give Russia some of Ukraine now and signal that Putin could go after the rest when he chooses. It would open the way for Putin to make claims against more countries that he considers part of Russia’s natural empire, like Moldova and the Baltic States, and it could encourage China to accelerate its efforts to seize Taiwan.
The Trump administration, though, may not be careening unilaterally toward the worst case. The NATO Summit in June, which included pledges by key European members to significantly increase defense spending, generated new political capital for transatlantic ties that may be paying dividends. While visiting London, Vice President JD Vance discussed Ukraine issues with senior officials from key European governments whose support for Ukraine remains solid.
Neither Zelenskyy nor any European leaders will be present in Alaska, and excluding Zelenskyy from a meeting about his country makes for questionable optics and perhaps bad substance. But Trump reportedly plans to speak with key Europeans and with Zelenskyy ahead of the Alaska meeting and immediately after. In the meantime, the Trump team, perhaps realizing that its initial expectations were the result of a mistaken assessment of Russian flexibility, is now lowering expectations for the Alaska meeting.
A Workable, If Ugly, Peace?
Tactics and short-term expectations aside, there remains space for a lasting settlement of the Russia-Ukraine War. A just settlement is not possible while Russia occupies Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian children remain kidnapped by Russia, among other things. But a workable, if ugly, peace may yet be possible. Its two key elements have been clear for some time.
One is an armistice line – preferably neither a final border nor formal recognition of Russian annexation of any part of Ukraine, but something along the lines of the provisional line between East Germany and West Germany during the Cold War or the armistice line on the Korean Peninsula that has lasted from 1953 to the present. That line could be established along the current front line or adjusted by mutual (and probably mediated) agreement. Territorial swaps such as Trump has suggested, including giving Ukraine back more of its own territory on its Black Sea coast, could be included.
But the United States and Europe should not formally recognize any Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory without Ukraine’s agreement, which is unlikely. The United States should stick with longstanding responsible, respectable diplomatic practice as illustrated by the Stimson Doctrine, the Welles Declaration, and the Pompeo Declaration that stated, respectively, that the United States would not recognize the forceable seizure of Manchuria (by Japan), the Baltic States (by the Soviet Union) or Crimea (by Russia). In each case, such a stance seemed Quixotic at the time, but each time, the position was vindicated over time and benefited U.S. strategic interests.
The second element of a sustainable peace is security for Ukraine to accompany any settlement of the armed conflict. NATO membership is the gold standard. Ukraine’s successful defense of itself — largely by itself — demonstrates that a collective NATO defense of Ukraine is practical. But if the Trump administration blocks Ukraine’s NATO membership, a second-best option would be lasting arrangements to provide Ukraine with weapons systems, ammunition, training, and, hopefully, European forces inside Ukraine. This latter option has been explicitly (if only generally) raised by the U.K./French-led “Coalition of the Willing.” A European force in Ukraine could take many forms; the most practical might be a training and air-defense operation. Any European force in Ukraine would require U.S. support: intelligence and possibly backup, e.g., air cover, in case of Russian attacks, but not U.S. combat troops on the ground.
Demands – and Response
Ukraine would probably accept a settlement along these lines. Most of Ukraine would remain free and its security would be far better than before 2022 or even 2014. Putin would be able to claim a victory by virtue of Russia’s occupation of Crimea and parts or most of four additional oblasts (provinces) in southeastern Ukraine. This would not be a just peace but it could prove stable enough for a long time. Trump could claim vindication for having pushed Putin to back off its initial demands, saving Ukraine, and bringing peace on decent terms.
Putin, of course, will resist anything like these arrangements. He will start by insisting that Ukraine formally recognize new international borders and accept Russian occupation of part of Ukraine as permanent. Putin also will try to insist on limitations on Ukraine’s security. Trump should not haggle with Putin over Ukraine’s security or bargain about new, permanent international borders for Ukraine; doing so would legitimize Putin’s basic contention that Russia gets a say over Ukraine. Pushing Putin off these likely demands will require U.S. and European strength and determination. To use Trump’s phrase, the United States has cards to play: it can squeeze Russia’s economy, starting with its oil revenue; it can make sure that the flow of arms to Ukraine is steady; it can support Ukraine’s defense industry, taking advantage of Ukraine’s cutting-edge defense technology, e.g., in drones.
The United States can use the Alaska meeting to make clear to Putin that the time for his games and dodging is over. He needs to take a deal for a lasting peace or suffer the consequences. And he may well. As George Kennan observed in his famous “Long Telegram” in 1946, the Kremlin is “[i]mpervious to the logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw – and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point.”
Trump and his team should stare down America’s cunning, conniving, but in fact weaker adversary.
