Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 13 are not a solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Prior to Israel’s strike, Iran was on the threshold of nuclear weapons, but the U.S. Intelligence Community consistently assessed that Tehran was not engaged in weaponization. Israel’s strike may have pulled Iran off that technical threshold, but only slightly and likely temporarily. In the long term, Israel’s attack increases the proliferation risk and makes a nuclear armed Iran more likely for several reasons.
First, Israeli strikes cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear program. Militarily, Israel cannot target deeply buried and hardened facilities, including the Fordow uranium enrichment facility, without U.S. assistance. Iran reportedly told the IAEA that at least three significant nuclear sites — at Fordow, Isfahan, and Bushehr — were not impacted by Friday’s strikes. Moreover, the Trump administration has made clear it did not support Israel’s military strikes, making it unlikely that the United States will provide the munitions necessary for penetrating deeply buried facilities. Israel also cannot destroy the knowledge Iran has gained from its pre-2003 nuclear weapons activities and about uranium enrichment. Iran will retain a nuclear weapons capability and can rebuild its ability to produce fissile materials more quickly by focusing on more efficient centrifuges.
Second, Israel’s attacks will drive further debate in Iran about the security value of nuclear weapons. Factions in Iran already supported developing nuclear weapons to deter attacks—those voices will be strengthened by Israel’s strike. There is a greater risk now that those voices drive Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and/or to finally make the decision to cross the nuclear threshold and weaponize.
Third, strikes on Iran’s nuclear program and the prospect for further attacks on nuclear sites makes it unlikely that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have access to key Iranian nuclear facilities in the coming weeks. If or when the agency can access the facilities, it could be challenging to determine if all of Iran’s enriched uranium—particularly its 60 percent enriched stockpile which is near weapons grade—remains accounted for. There is a real risk that Tehran follows through on its threat to move enriched uranium to a covert site, either for weaponization purposes or to maintain leverage in ongoing U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations. But even if Iran does not take this step, any challenges the IAEA faces in accounting for Iran’s nuclear material will drive speculation that Tehran is engaged in illicit activities.
Fourth, military strikes will have a disruptive effect on diplomacy, particularly if Iran views the United States as complicit in Israel’s attack, notwithstanding U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement that the United States was “not involved in strikes against Iran.” Iran has already cancelled the next round of U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, which were supposed to resume in Oman on Sunday.
An effective, verifiable nonproliferation agreement focused on limiting Iran’s program and enhancing monitoring remains the best chance of sustainably blocking Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons and disincentivizing future weapons efforts. In the best-case scenario, Israel’s strikes set back diplomatic efforts. In the worst-case scenario, Israel’s strike ends nuclear negotiations and ignites an escalatory spiral that could push Iran to reject diplomacy, withdraw from the NPT, and broaden the regional conflict.
A nuclear agreement is still possible and all the more necessary now, but the United States, Iran, and other regional players need to act with restraint and remain focused on the negotiations.
