The massive Ukrainian drone attack on Russian military bases on June 1, followed by the blast on Russia’s Kerch Strait Bridge to occupied Crimea two days later, filled Ukrainians with pride. The audacious assaults demonstrated the country’s willingness to fight on in what Ukrainians know is an existential battle. At the same time, they are realistic, prepared to negotiate, if the Russians are serious about reaching a reasonable agreement. In nearly a week of meetings in Ukraine — Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv — my Atlantic Council colleagues and I heard differing assessments of Ukraine’s prospects in the fighting from government, opposition, military, and civil society leaders — some were guardedly optimistic and others worried about Ukraine being ground down. But all agreed that Ukraine must fight on until either the Russians are exhausted by losses and lack of success or Ukraine achieves, with U.S. and European backing, a sustainable settlement, de facto or formal, with the Kremlin. The Ukrainians mood seemed one of tough determination while thinking through the options in a disciplined way.
My colleagues and I were driving to Kyiv from Mykolaiv, a city that barely escaped Russian occupation in the early days after the February 2022 full-scale invasion and which still lacks drinking water due to Russian bombardment (the residents must carry water to their homes daily from newly-dug wells), when word came of the June 1 Ukrainian drone attack, dubbed Operation Spider’s Web by Ukraine and apparently referred to by some Russian military bloggers as their country’s Pearl Harbor. It particularly targeted Russia’s strategic bombers. The attack on the base of the Kerch bridge on June 3 had its own significance, striking at one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s projects to “own” Crimea by linking it to his own shore.
Ukrainians we spoke with noted that the successful military strikes demonstrated Russia’s continued vulnerability and assessed that Russia’s ongoing losses meant that an end of the war that would leave Ukraine free — albeit with part of its territory temporarily occupied — was achievable if Europe and especially the United States kept up their military support and intensified economic pressure on Russia. Ukrainians universally expected that Putin would strike back hard, but they were not dismayed: years of living under constant bombardment has toughened Ukrainians to the point where daily trips to bomb shelters are merely part of life’s routine, an outlook that even we began to share after some days in the country.
Ukrainians’ assessments of the likelihood of a negotiated end to the war varied, but they were grounded in realism, not hopes for a miracle. They generally credited President Donald Trump with putting negotiations in the spotlight. They seemed ready to accept the outlines of the Trump plan: a ceasefire roughly along the current front line and provisions for Ukraine’s security moving forward.
Short of NATO Membership, Continued Military Support
To achieve a reasonable measure of such security, they hoped for NATO membership at some point, but again with realism, they insisted, reasonably enough, on at least continued military supplies from Europe and the United States. They generally welcomed the British-French offer to put together a deterrence force stationed in Ukraine. But some Ukrainians with strong security credentials wondered whether putting a brigade or two in central Ukraine with an unclear mission was the best approach; European assets to bolster Ukrainian air defense in the Central, Western, and Southern Ukraine might be both more practical and more effective assistance.
The outline of a practical deal seemed to be taking shape in Ukrainians’ thinking. But, as Ukrainians wryly noted, their reasonable position doesn’t count for much as long as Putin’s position remains maximalist. Given that reality, the Ukrainian “asks” of the United States — reasonable ones — included moves to change Putin’s calculation so that he either starts negotiating in earnest or simply winds down the war to a de facto near-ceasefire that would allow Ukraine to start rebuilding. Their specific asks include intensified U.S. sanctions in parallel with European and U.K. sanctions, especially those intended to curtail Russian income from oil sales. They were enthusiastic about the bill introduced by U.S. Senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT ) that has attracted 81 co-sponsors in the Senate. They also urged that the United States make some arrangement for a flow of arms, perhaps via a lend-lease arrangement, given the Trump administration’s aversion to continued aid to Ukraine.
The Ukrainian assessment appears sound. If the U.S. leadership can find it beneficial to put more economic pressure on Russia and to craft a formula for sustained arms flows to Ukraine, an end to the war seems plausible, whether formal or de facto and at least leaving most of Ukraine free, though with some 20 percent under temporary occupation. As several Ukrainians put it, Putin may think that time is on his side, but he may be mistaken, and with enough Western assistance to Ukraine and pressure on Russia, even Putin may come to realize that.
Trump’s Position
Therein, however, also lies the problem. Trump, as one Ukrainian put it, has set the stage for a good enough outcome, one that would count as a bitter but clear success for Ukraine and would deliver a sovereign, free, even if partially-occupied Ukraine, with Western security backing, which the U.S. president could count as a success, too. But will Trump seize the opportunity for the (qualified) win? Will he turn up the pressure on Russia, turn on the spigot for arms for Ukraine, and back the Europeans in their offer to do some heavy lifting for Ukraine’s security?
Putin still seems to be counting on Trump to abandon Ukraine. Ukrainians we spoke with worried about that as well. They have good reason for concern: Trump seems to waiver, never quite ready to take decisive steps to back his own declared policy of demanding fast-track negotiations to stop the war. Trump seemed to accept, without pushing back, Putin’s warning in their June 4 phone call that Russia would retaliate for Ukraine’s strike against their strategic bombers. Such apparent silence could well be taken by the Kremlin as consent to massive Russian strikes against civilian targets — and thus weakness on the part of the U.S. president. If Putin assesses that Trump will abandon Ukraine, he has no reason to cut any deal.
In sum, the Ukrainians are in a good place of determination and realistic appreciation of the need to cut a deal. They have shown their military skill and operational effectiveness through Operation Spider’s Web. They are doing what Trump has insisted upon: getting ready to negotiate. Meanwhile, the Russians are digging in, defying Trump’s mixture of verbal warning and pleas, holding to their maximalist positions in true Soviet style. If the pattern of many decades holds true, the Kremlin will stick to its positions, “impervious to [the] logic of reason” as the first American Sovietologist George Kennan wrote in his 1946 “Long Telegram,” but “highly sensitive to [the] logic of force.” It’s in Trump’s hands to deliver the logic of force — to rally the West, to back Ukraine, squeeze Russia, and set the stage for the qualified win for Ukraine, for the Free World, and for the United States.
