The Nord Stream Prosecution: Immunity, Military Objectives, and Superior Orders

Abstract

The prosecution of a Ukrainian officer for the 2022 Nord Stream sabotage raises difficult questions of international law. This article examines whether the law of functional immunity shields officials conducting covert operations abroad and whether soldiers operating without uniforms retain combatant immunity. The article considers whether pipelines that could generate revenue for an adversary qualify as military objectives under the disputed “war-sustaining” theory. Finally, discussion explores whether superior orders may excuse an attack that violates the law of armed conflict. The case illustrates the complex interplay between State immunity, combatant status, the protection of civilian infrastructure, and individual criminal responsibility.

Introduction

Arrest Order Challenge

Indictment

Functional Immunity

Combatant Immunity

Pipelines as Military Objectives

Superior Orders

Conclusion

Introduction

The operation to sabotage the Nord Stream (NS) 1 and 2 pipelines on the Baltic Sea seabed was – if current reporting is correct – audacious, carried out on a shoestring budget, and highly successful.^[1] Reportedly, a small team of Ukrainian military personnel (there is some question as to whether the civilian team members had enlisted in the armed forces for the operation) used a yacht chartered in Germany to lay explosive charges on the NS1 and NS2 pipelines in the Swedish and Danish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).^[2] The devices exploded on Sept. 26, 2022, blowing open three of four pipelines and releasing a substantial quantity of natural gas into the Baltic Sea.^[3] Serhii Kuznetsov (frequently designated as Serhii K. under German and European privacy reporting standards) – at the time a Ukrainian military officer – is alleged to have been among those who carried out the operation. He has been charged with various offenses under German criminal law.

NS1 (two pipelines) and NS2 (also two) run from Russia to Germany. Both are owned by companies in which the Russian firm Gazprom is at least the majority (in the case of NS2, the sole) shareholder; Gazprom itself is majority State-owned.^[4] Their construction was contentious, not least because of strategic fear of growing European, and especially German, reliance on Russian gas supplies. At the time of the attacks, NS2 had not begun delivering gas as it was placed on hold on the eve of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in Feb. 2022. And Russia had halted deliveries through NS1 in late Aug. 2022, ostensibly for maintenance. So neither NS1 nor NS 2 was delivering gas when attacked.^[5]

The apprehension and extradition of Kuznetsov involved European arrest warrants and delays as the Italian courts worked through extradition processes. ^[6] Ultimately, Kuznetsov was extradited to Germany in November 2025 and indicted in June 2026. His trial began on Oct. 14 in Hamburg.^[7] On Oct. 27, the court reportedly rejected a defense application to terminate the proceedings based on claimed national security restrictions affecting Kuznetsov’s ability to testify.^[8]

A second suspect, Volodymyr Zhuravlov, was arrested in Poland, but the Warsaw Regional Court refused surrender on the ground that the alleged conduct did not constitute a prosecutable offense under Polish law, reasoning, among other things, that an operation undertaken for Ukraine in a just defensive war was lawful, that functional immunity applied, and that Germany lacked jurisdiction. Zhuravlov subsequently traveled to Croatia, where authorities arrested him in August 2026; extradition to Germany has been approved, but he remains in Croatia while appealing the decision and seeking political asylum.^[9]

In this Just Security Studies contribution, we focus on key issues raised by the trial and the war crime charge laid.^[10] After describing the indictment and the Federal Court of Justice’s decision upholding Kuznetsov’s detention, including its treatment of functional immunity, we examine whether Kuznetsov can claim immunity under international law, whether the pipelines were military objectives under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and the significance of a superior orders defense in international criminal law. We do not address issues of German domestic law.

Arrest Order Challenge

Kuznetsov was arrested and extradited from Italy to Germany in August 2025. Before indictment, he appealed the arrest warrant. On Dec. 10, 2025, the Federal Court of Justice dismissed that appeal, applying the German standard of “strong suspicion” required for pretrial detention.^[11] In its decision, the court addressed two distinct bases for immunity under international law that we examine below: functional immunity and combatant immunity. The court rejected functional immunity on the basis that it does not apply to the violent acts of an intelligence service.^[12] And with respect to combatant immunity, the court concluded, as noted in an accompanying press release, that it is “highly unlikely that the accused can rely on the right to damage under the law of armed conflict (‘combatant privilege’) as justification. Firstly, this does not cover covert activities by military personnel; secondly, the pipelines were civilian assets.”^[13]

Indictment

On June 30, 2026, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office indicted Kuznetsov, asserting:

There are sufficient grounds to suspect the accused of co-perpetrating an attack on civilian objects, a war crime (section 11 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 2 of the German Code of Crimes against International Law [VStGB]), causing explosions (section 308 para. 1 of the German Criminal Code [StGB]), destruction of buildings (section 305 para. 1 StGB), and disruption of public services (section 316b para. 1 no. 2, para. 3 StGB).^[14]

Thus, based on the same course of conduct, the indictment charges both a war crime and violations of the German Criminal Code.

Importantly, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office accepts that “[i]n 2022, Serhii K. served as an officer in the Ukrainian army” and was a member of the Ukrainian armed forces at the time of the Nord Stream operation. It also alleges that Kuznetsov and other military personnel conceived the plan, “acting by order of Ukrainian state agencies,” to prevent “Russia from using the revenue from natural gas trade to finance its war effort.”^[15]

The alleged war crime resides in the German Code of Crimes Against International Law,^[16] of which three sections are directly relevant. First, Section 1 (“Scope of application”) provides for universal jurisdiction in orthodox terms:

This Act applies to all criminal offences against international law designated herein; for offences under sections 6 to 12, it applies even when the offence was committed abroad and bears no relation to Germany. For offences under section 13 that were committed abroad, this Act applies independently of the law of the place of commission if the perpetrator is German or if the offence is directed against the Federal Republic of Germany.

Second, Section 3 (“Acting on orders”) recognizes an excuse where the accused executed a qualifying order, did not realize that it was unlawful, and the unlawfulness was not manifest.

Whoever commits an offence under sections 8 to 15 in execution of a military order or an order comparable in its actual binding effect is deemed to have acted without guilt insofar as the perpetrator did not realise that the order was unlawful and the order was also not manifestly unlawful.

Third, Section 11 (“War crimes consisting in the use of prohibited methods of warfare”) sets forth the international law offense charged.

(1) Whoever, in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict,

…

2. directs an attack by military means against civilian objects, so long as these objects are protected as such by international humanitarian law, namely buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, or against undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings, or against demilitarised zones, or against works and installations containing dangerous forces,

…

incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of at least three years. In less serious cases under no. 2, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year.

Accordingly, the prosecution must establish that the pipelines fell within the objects protected by this provision, the requisite conflict nexus and mental elements were satisfied, and conviction is not barred by immunity or excused by a claim of superior orders.

A significant international law facet of the case is that Section 1 authorizes prosecution of the alleged war crime even without a territorial or nationality nexus to Germany. In this case, however, the German authorities also identify a territorial connection. Under international law, universal jurisdiction permits a State to prosecute certain international crimes regardless of where they were committed or the nationality of the perpetrator or victims. For grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I (AP I), States must search for alleged offenders and either prosecute or extradite them.^[17] Beyond grave breaches, customary international law permits, but does not require, States to grant jurisdiction over war crimes to their courts.^[18] The distinction matters here because attacking civilian objects, without more, the war crime charged, is not a grave breach.^[19] Thus, Germany’s jurisdiction over that charge rests on this permissive customary rule, which Germany has implemented in Section 1.

Note that universal jurisdiction under Section 1 does not apply to “regular” crimes. There, the claim is that Germany has territorial jurisdiction because the pipelines come ashore on German territory. During the arrest warrant proceedings, the Federal Court of Justice accepted that argument, reasoning that the result of the offenses (the pipelines’ inoperability) occurred in Germany, as they run through the territorial sea and internal waters to their landfall in Germany.^[20] For the explosives offense, the court relied on the Criminal Code’s universality principle.^[21]

Functional immunity

Functional immunity (immunity ratione materiae), a product of sovereignty under international law, must be distinguished from combatant immunity under LOAC. By the former, State officials are immune from foreign criminal jurisdiction for acts performed in an official capacity. In the arrest warrant case, the Federal Court of Justice correctly treated functional immunity as customary law, found that it extends to persons acting on a State’s behalf even without a permanent service relationship, and concluded that there were strong grounds to believe a foreign State initiated the Nord Stream operation.^[22] According to the court, “he is in principle highly likely to enjoy general immunity ratione materiae for his conduct.”^[23]

Nevertheless, the court pointed to an exception to functional immunity in cases of what it labeled “intelligence-service acts of violence,” that is, “covert State sabotage operations abroad.” The exception finds State practice support in domestic prosecutions for the 1985 bombing of Greenpeace’s Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand by French agents and the 1988 downing of Pan Am 103 over Scotland by Libyan agents.^[24]

But whether that exception applies beyond the target State’s territory is unsettled. In this regard, the Federal Court of Justice reasoned that the exception turns not on location but instead on a violation of sovereignty. And it found such a violation on two grounds: Germany’s rights as a pipeline-laying State under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the fact that the effects of the offense, the pipelines’ inoperability, materialized on German territory.^[25]

Both grounds are questionable. To begin with, UNCLOS protects the freedom to lay submarine pipelines in the exclusive economic zone (or more accurately, on the continental shelf), but those rights are sovereign rights in relation to, not sovereignty over, the seabed. The extent to which interference with them, coupled with harmful effects within Germany, establishes the sovereignty infringement necessary for the court’s asserted immunity exception is highly debatable.

And basing the exception on effects manifested in Germany is broader than the territorial exception as generally understood, which typically turns on the official’s presence in, and commission of the act on, the State’s territory.^[26] In fact, the International Law Commission’s commentary on the Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction cites “sabotage … committed in the territory of a State” as confirmed by State practice.^[27]

Thus, a more compelling, albeit not definitive, position would have been to base the exception on the fact that Kuznetsov entered Germany on a forged passport, staged the operation from there, and returned to Germany after the attack.^[28] Covert State-directed preparation and staging on German soil of the violent act would have been a firmer ground for application of the exception than the effects-based approach.

Finally, we note that under the prevailing view, functional immunity does not apply in cases of war crimes. Therefore, even if that type of immunity shielded Kuznetsov from prosecution for the other offenses, it would not shield him from the war crime of attacking civilian objects in violation of international criminal law.^[29]

Combatant immunity

Members of the armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict “are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”^[30] The corollary is so-called “combatant immunity” – a privileged combatant may not be prosecuted for lawful acts of war that would otherwise be crimes under domestic law.^[31] The immunity requires both that the individual be a privileged combatant and that the act be lawful under the LOAC. It is distinct from the superior orders defense, which concerns the culpability of a person who acted unlawfully. This section addresses status; whether the act was lawful is addressed in the next section.

The indictment acknowledges that Kuznetsov was a serving Ukrainian military officer. Yet the Federal Court of Justice held that he was “highly unlikely” to enjoy the immunity, as it “does not cover covert activities by military personnel.”^[32] Note that the court treated the combatant privilege as a substantive justification excluding criminal liability, rather than a procedural impediment to prosecution.

According to the court, combatants must carry “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,” typically a uniform, and carry arms openly. Thus, the team members lacked combatant status on that basis “even if they were members of the Ukrainian armed forces.”^[33] The court cited the 1907 Hague Regulations and Article 4A of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention (GC III), but not Articles 43 and 44 of AP I, the provisions most directly on point.^[34] This is particularly interesting as Germany, Russia, and Ukraine are Party to that instrument.

The court was right not to treat the case as one of espionage. The rules on spies, including their limitation to spies “taken in the act” and their protection of a spy who has rejoined his forces, apply only to information gathering.^[35] Although State practice has treated saboteurs who operate out of uniform like spies for prisoner-of-war status,^[36] that practice focuses on the failure to wear a uniform, not sabotage as such. Sabotage (of military objects) by uniformed combatants is clearly a lawful military operation.^[37]

The question, therefore, is whether a member of the regular armed forces who engages in sabotage without distinguishing themself from the civilian population loses combatant status. As Article 43(2) of AP I explains, combatant status is “the right to participate directly in hostilities.” Immunity follows from exercising that right lawfully. A combatant who retains their status therefore enjoys immunity for lawful acts of war. But what are the requirements for combatant status, and how is it lost? There are two competing views.

According to one view, combatant status derives solely from membership in the armed forces. Article 4A(1) of Geneva Convention (GC) III covers “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict” without conditions. The four conditions of Article 4A(2), including a fixed distinctive sign and carrying arms openly, apply by their express terms only to “other militias” and “other volunteer corps.”^[38]

The membership approach finds support in the underlying purpose of the obligation to distinguish, that is, “to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities.”^[39] In the Nord Stream operation, no Russian forces were present, and the team’s appearance endangered no civilians. The lowering of divers and explosives and the emplacement of the charges all occurred far from view. Thus, it is a paradigmatic example of a case where there was no need to wear a uniform, as there were neither enemy forces nor civilians present.

On the second view, the Article 4A(2) conditions are implicit in the concept of regular armed forces. After all, as the original 1960 ICRC Commentary to GC III, Article 4, points out, regular forces “wear uniform, they have an organized hierarchy, and they know and respect the laws and customs of war.”^[40] It would be inconsistent, proponents assert, to deny combatant status to a militia member who fails to wear a distinctive sign while extending it to a regular soldier who fails to do the same. The Privy Council so held in Mohamed Ali, which involved Indonesian soldiers in civilian clothes who bombed a Singapore office building.^[41] And the U.S. Supreme Court in Quirin treated “an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property” as a “familiar example” of an unlawful combatant.^[42] The German Manual likewise provides that combatants “must always be distinguishable from the civilian population by their uniform or another permanent distinctive emblem,” and that those who commit sabotage “wearing plain clothes . . . may face punishment.”^[43] The question before the court here is whether the attack was a lawful exercise of the right to participate in hostilities; on this second view, an attack carried out in breach of the obligation to distinguish is not.

Additional Protocol I can be interpreted to support both views, and has been in this long-standing debate; there is something in it to support and refute both positions. In support of the view that there is no absolute obligation to wear a uniform, Article 44(2) provides that LOAC violations “shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant,” except as provided in Article 44(3) and (4).^[44] Article 44(3), requires combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population (typically by wearing a uniform) “while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.” Where the nature of the hostilities prevents them from doing so, they retain combatant status provided they carry their arms openly “during each military engagement” and while “visible to the adversary during the military deployment preceding an attack” in which they are to participate.

Article 44(4) provides that combatants who fail to comply with these requirements forfeit prisoner of war (a captured combatant) status if they “fall[] into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet” them. But a combatant captured “while not engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities.”^[45] Similarly, the ICRC 2020 Commentary to Article 4 of GC III notes, “Members of armed forces who are not in uniform while engaged in sabotage are unlikely to be given prisoner-of-war status if captured.”^[46] Kuznetsov was arrested nearly three years after the operation. On this first view, he retains both his combatant status and, if the act was lawful under LOAC, his immunity.

But AP I can also be read as imposing a uniform requirement, looking to the same provisions. Article 44(3) obliges combatants to distinguish themselves “while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.” It allows a combatant who cannot do so to “retain his status” only if he carries his arms openly in specified circumstances.^[47] Under this view, a combatant who meets neither standard loses status. Notably, Article 44(7) expressly preserves the practice of uniform wear for regular forces.^[48]

Nothing about the operation prevented the team from distinguishing themselves. They posed as holidaymakers and traveled on forged papers as they chose to operate covertly.^[49] As for Article 44(4) and (5), those provisions govern prisoner of war status upon capture by an adverse party. Germany is not an adverse party; it is a neutral.

Either way, status is decisive only if the pipelines were lawful targets under LOAC because combatant immunity attaches solely to lawful acts of war. In particular, the section is relevant to whether Germany can bring changes for conduct in violation of German law that is not unlawful under LOAC. We therefore turn to whether the pipelines were military objectives.

Pipelines as Military Objectives

That intentionally targeting civilian objects is a war crime is not contested. Thus, the question is whether the pipelines were, at the time of the attack, either civilian objects or military objectives.

AP I, Article 52(2)’s definition of military objectives does not apply as treaty law to purely maritime engagements.^[50] Still, most States and experts, correctly in our view, treat it as reflecting the customary law of naval warfare.^[51] The Article 52(2) definition provides:

In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.^[52]

The U.S. formulation differs in a respect that matters here, referring to objects that “effectively contribute to the enemy’s warfighting, war-supporting, or war-sustaining capability,”^[53] a point to which we return below.

The criteria of nature, location, and use in the first prong of the definition need not detain us. A commercial gas pipeline is not military in nature, its location bore no relation to military operations in Ukraine, and pipelines were not transporting gas when attacked, nor had they ever supplied Russian forces.

That leaves “purpose.” As the ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols explains, “[t]he criterion of ‘purpose’ is concerned with the intended future use of an object,”^[54] a militarily sensible one, for an attacker should not have to wait until an object is actually used for military ends before striking it. But because the future is a matter of inference rather than observation, the criterion is easy to abuse. Thus, as the late Yoram Dinstein regularly emphasized, qualification based on purpose cannot rest on speculation, worst-case assumptions, or an object’s capacity for military use.^[55] The evidence of intended military use must be reliable enough that a reasonable commander, based on the information reasonably available at the time, would conclude that the object will in fact be so used.^[56] Ukrainian planners might reasonably have believed that NS1 could be restarted quickly. But nothing in open-source material of which we are aware suggests that Russia intended to use the pipelines for any military purpose.

Had flows resumed, the pipelines would have done what they were meant to do – deliver gas to European buyers. Any contribution to Russia’s war would have come only through revenue, which is precisely the rationale the indictment attributes to the planners.^[57]

But whether revenue alone would qualify the pipelines as a military objective would depend on the so-called “war-sustaining” debate. The United States treats as military objectives objects that make an effective contribution to the enemy’s “war-sustaining capability,” which encompasses economic activity that “indirectly, but effectively supports and sustains the belligerents’ warfighting capability,” including “exports of products the proceeds of which are used by the belligerent to purchase arms and armaments.”^[58] Kuznetsov’s defense relied on precisely this theory before the Federal Court of Justice. But the court rejected it thusly:

Russia obtained a benefit from the pipelines that was ultimately relevant to the armed conflict only indirectly, insofar as the sale of the natural gas carried through them generated revenue that could be used to finance military activities. Contrary to the appellant’s legal position, such a merely indirect benefit derived from the economic use of civilian installations (“war-sustaining effort”) does not suffice to turn the object concerned into a lawful military target. The right of parties to an international armed conflict to inflict damage does not extend to objects serving directly civilian purposes, even if the adversary generates funds from their use that it employs for military activities. That position also accords with the prevailing academic view.^[59]

We agree. The “war-sustaining” military objective approach is a controversial minority view.^[60] In our estimation, every object must be assessed against the definition, which requires an effective contribution to military action. Oil and gas are not special cases.^[61] Fuel destined for enemy forces, and any infrastructure delivering it, clearly qualifies. But revenue that may ultimately be spent on the military does not. That does not provide a “definite military advantage.” Accepting the war-sustaining standard would render most of a modern economy targetable, a result that cannot be reconciled with the principle of distinction.

And in our view, the operation fails even by the U.S. standard, which still requires an effective contribution. In September 2022, neither pipeline was earning anything. Russia itself had shut off NS1, and NS2 had never operated. Any future revenue depended on political decisions in Moscow, Berlin, and Brussels. That contribution was speculative at best, not effective (or definite).

The defense claim that the pipelines “were a weapon in the hand of the Russians” is likewise flawed as a matter of law.^[62] Coercing European governments through energy supply is political pressure on neutrals, not “military action.” The argument also fails on the second prong of the military objective definition. Blocking European dependence on Russian gas is a political or economic objective, rather than a military one.

The law of naval warfare specific to submarine pipelines leads to the same result. The Newport Manual, which addresses Nord Stream directly, provides that pipelines “will be lawful targets and may be made the object of attack, if they, by use, make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action,” as when “the oil or gas is destined for the enemy’s armed forces.” Export pipelines may be targeted only by “States accepting a contribution to the enemy’s war-sustaining effort as sufficient for rendering an object a military objective.” Applying that standard, the Manual concludes that Nord Stream “w[as] not making an effective contribution to the Russian military operations in and against Ukraine” and “would have qualified as [a] lawful target[] … only because of [its] contribution to the war-sustaining effort of the Russian Federation.”^[63]

For those that, like the Federal Court of Justice and the majority of States, reject the war-sustaining approach, the pipelines were therefore clearly civilian objects. The San Remo Manual adds a further layer of protection. It requires belligerents to “take care to avoid damage to cables and pipelines laid on the sea-bed which do not exclusively serve the belligerents,”^[64] a rule the court treated as customary and applied on the basis that Nord Stream also served German and other Western European purchasers.^[65] The Newport Manual rejects that rule,^[66] but the disagreement does not matter here. Under either approach, a pipeline may be attacked only if it is a military objective, and Nord Stream was not.

Superior Orders

If the pipelines are civilian objects and combatant immunity is unavailable, the final question is whether Kuznetsov can be convicted if he was merely following orders. Section 3 of the German Code of Crimes Against International Law largely tracks Article 33 of the Rome Statute. A subordinate who commits a war crime when complying with a military order “is deemed to have acted without guilt” if he did not realize that the order was unlawful and it was not manifestly unlawful.^[67] The prosecution’s own case supplies the predicate, for it alleges that Kuznetsov acted “by order of Ukrainian state agencies.” Reporting attributes the decision to proceed to the then Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian armed forces.^[68]

Was such an order manifestly unlawful? There is a strong argument that it was not. The war-sustaining theory is the official position of the United States, set out in its principal law of war manuals.^[69] William Boothby, who rejects the approach as we do, suggests that the controversy may bear on whether any violation was manifest.^[70] And a Polish court has characterized the operation as lawful.^[71] An order to attack infrastructure that one of the world’s leading military powers would regard as targetable (had the purpose criterion been satisfied) is difficult to characterize as manifestly unlawful to a subordinate, whatever its actual legality. Ordinary offenses are a different matter, subject to German law, which we leave to our German colleagues.

Conclusion

The Nord Stream prosecution is not a judgment on Ukraine’s crystal-clear right to defend itself against unambiguously unlawful Russian aggression. It is an application of LOAC as it applies through international criminal law, which binds all belligerents equally, whatever the justice of their cause.

On the assumed facts, that law points in one direction. The pipelines were civilian objects. They made no effective contribution to Russian military action, and even the war-sustaining approach, which the Federal Court of Justice rightly rejected, struggles to accommodate pipelines that were earning nothing when attacked. This conclusion not only supplies the objective element of the war crime charged, but also renders combatant immunity unavailable, whichever view one takes on whether a soldier operating out of uniform retains combatant status.

Two features of the case nonetheless warrant caution. First, the court’s effects-based exception to international law’s functional immunity, which applies to ordinary crimes, goes beyond established practice. If adopted, it would expose State officials to foreign prosecution for official acts abroad wherever those acts have effects. That is far broader than what States have previously accepted. Second, the superior orders defense may be available with respect to the war crime. Therefore, in theory, prosecution of the ordinary offenses could be barred by functional immunity, while Kuznetsov could be acquitted of the war crime charge if the conditions of the superior orders excuse were satisfied. Whether these or other pathways to dismissal or acquittal are available depends on the facts established at trial and on the German court’s resolution of the relevant international and domestic law. How the court resolves them will resonate well beyond this case.

– – – – – – – –

1. See Bojan Pancevski, The Nord Stream Conspiracy (2026); Bojan Pancevski, A Drunken Evening, a Rented Yacht: The Real Story of the Nord Stream Pipeline Sabotage, Wall St. J. (Aug. 14, 2024). ↑
2. Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Public Prosecutor General], Press Release, Indictment Filed Regarding the Nord Stream Gas Pipelines Explosions (July 2, 2026) [hereinafter GBA Press Release]; Katya Adler, A Journey to the Site of the Nord Stream Explosions, BBC News (Nov. 18, 2022). ↑
3. What Is Known About Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Explosions, Reuters (Aug. 21, 2025); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 10, 2025, StB 60/25, HRRS 2026 Nr. 119, paras. 3, 37 (Ger.) (authors’ translation) [hereinafter BGH, StB 60/25]; GBA Press Release, supra note 2. ↑
4. Billy Stockwell, A Trial Over One of the Biggest Acts of Sabotage in Decades Is Getting Underway. Here’s a Refresher, CNN (Oct. 14, 2026); William H. Boothby, Attacking a Pipeline: Legal Issues for Consideration, Articles of War (Oct. 25, 2024). ↑
5. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, para. 37; Stockwell, supra note 4; What Is Known About Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Explosions, supra note 3. ↑
6. Nord Stream Sabotage Case Back in Court Amid Legal Setbacks, Political Blowback, Radio Free Eur./Radio Liberty (Oct. 21, 2025); Nord Stream Extradition Case: Legal Analysis, Schlun & Elseven Rechtsanwälte (last visited Nov. 1, 2026). ↑
7. GBA Press Release, supra note 2; Jessica Parker & Paul Kirby, Germany Puts Ukrainian on Trial Accused of Blowing Up Nord Stream Pipelines, BBC News (Oct. 14, 2026). ↑
8. German Court Rejects Bid to End Ukrainian Ex-Officer’s Trial over Nord Stream Pipeline Blasts, CP24 (Oct. 27, 2026) (Associated Press). ↑
9. Sarah Rainsford, Polish Judge Refuses to Extradite Nord Stream Blasts Suspect over “Just Act”, BBC News (Oct. 17, 2025); Alex Stezhensky, Nord Stream Suspect Zhuravlyov Seeks Asylum in Croatia after Extradition Approval, New Voice of Ukraine (Sep. 29, 2026). ↑
10. For prior analyses relevant to the Nord Stream operation, see Danae Azaria & Geir Ulfstein, Are Sabotage of Submarine Pipelines an “Armed Attack” Triggering a Right to Self-Defence?, EJIL: Talk! (Oct. 18, 2022); Agata Kleczkowska, Nord Stream Explosions as a Breach of the Peace, Opinio Juris (Oct. 31, 2022); John C. Tramazzo, Sabotage in Law: Meaning and Misunderstandings, Articles of War (June 23, 2023); Alexander Lott, Attacks Against Europe’s Offshore Infrastructure Within and Beyond the Territorial Sea Under Jus ad Bellum, EJIL: Talk! (Oct. 17, 2023); Alexander Lott, Did an Alleged Ukrainian Attack Against the Nord Stream Pipelines Violate the Law of Armed Conflict?, NCLOS Blog (Nov. 21, 2023); Boothby, supra note 4; Petra Bárd, When Just War Meets the European Arrest Warrant: Warsaw Court Refuses Germany’s EAW in the Nord Stream Case, I·CONnect (Nov. 14, 2025); Przemysław Roguski, Functional Immunity and “Covert Violent Acts”: The BGH’s Progressive Development of CIL in the Nord Stream Case, EJIL: Talk! (May 12, 2026). ↑
11. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, paras. 1, 4-5, 10; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Press Release, Federal Court of Justice Dismisses Complaint Against Order for Arrest Filed by Accused in Remand Detention for Alleged Participation in Nord Stream Pipelines Bomb Attacks (Jan. 15, 2026) [hereinafter BGH Press Release]. ↑
12. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, para. 26; BGH Press Release, supra note 11. ↑
13. BGH Press Release, supra note 11; see BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, paras. 49–51. ↑
14. GBA Press Release, supra note 2. ↑
15. Id. ↑
16. Völkerstrafgesetzbuch [VStGB] [Code of Crimes Against International Law], June 26, 2002, BGBl. I at 2254, §§ 1, 3, 11 (Ger.), translated in Gesetze im Internet. ↑
17. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 85(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; see U.S. Dep’t of Def., Law of War Manual § 18.9.3 (June 2015, updated July 2023) [hereinafter DoD Manual]. ↑
18. 1 Customary International Humanitarian Law r. 157 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds. 2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study]; DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 18.21.1. ↑
19. See AP I, supra note 17, art. 85(3)–(4); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. ↑
20. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, para. 53; BGH Press Release, supra note 11. ↑
21. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], §§ 3, 6 no. 2, 9(1) (Ger.), translated in Gesetze im Internet; BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, para. 53. ↑
22. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, paras. 24–25. ↑
23. Id. para. 25. ↑
24. Id. para. 26. ↑
25. Id. paras. 27–30 (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 2(1), 55, 58(1), 79(1), 86, 87(1)(c), 112(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397). ↑
26. See Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge of the German Fed. Ct. [2011] EWHC 2029 (Admin) (Eng.); Roguski, supra note 10. ↑
27. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, with Commentaries, art. 6 cmt. ¶ 19 & n. 146 (2026), in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Seventy-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/81/10 (2026) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles]. ↑
28. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, paras. 6, 8, 19; GBA Press Release, supra note 2. ↑
29. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 27, art. 6(c); BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, para. 26. ↑
30. AP I, supra note 17, art. 43(2). ↑
31. See e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 87, 99, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 4.4.3. ↑
32. BGH Press Release, supra note 11; see BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, paras. 48-49. ↑
33. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, para. 49. ↑
34. Id. (citing Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations], and GC III, supra note 31, art. 4A(1)–(2)). ↑
35. Hague Regulations, supra note 34, arts. 29–31; AP I, supra note 17, art. 46; CIHL Study, supra note 18, r. 107; DoD Manual, supra note 17, §§ 4.17.2, 4.17.5.1. ↑
36. DoD Manual, supra note 17, §§ 4.17.3, 4.17.5; Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention ¶ 990 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 GC III Commentary]. ↑
37. Fed. Ministry of Def. (Ger.), Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/2: Law of Armed Conflict Manual ¶ 328 (2013) [hereinafter German Manual]; see also DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 4.5.2.1 (special operations forces “have the same rights, duties, and liabilities as other members of the armed forces”). ↑
38. GC III, supra note 31, art. 4A(1)–(2); see DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 4.6.1.3 (“[U]nder the GPW, members of the armed forces of a State receive combatant status . . . by virtue of their membership in the armed forces of a State.”). ↑
39. AP I, supra note 17, art. 44(3); see also DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 5.14.5. ↑
40. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 63 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (discussing Article 4A(3)); see also DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 4.6.1 (the Article 4A(2) conditions “reflect the attributes common to regular armed forces of a State”). ↑
41. Mohamed Ali v. Pub. Prosecutor [1969] 1 A.C. 430 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Malay.). ↑
42. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942); see also DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 4.17.5. ↑
43. German Manual, supra note 37, ¶¶ 304, 328; see generally Michael N. Schmitt & Christopher J. Koschnitzky, The Regular Armed Forces, Uniforms, and Prisoner of War Status, in Prisoners of War in Contemporary Conflict 51 (Michael N. Schmitt & Christopher J. Koschnitzky eds., 2023); Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict 65-66 (4^th ed. 2022). ↑
44. AP I, supra note 17, art. 44(2). ↑
45. Id. art. 44(5); see also DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 4.6.1.3 (members of the armed forces engaged in spying or sabotage “forfeit their entitlement to the privileges of combatant status if captured while engaged in those activities”). ↑
46. 2020 GC III Commentary, supra note 36, ¶ 990 (emphasis added). ↑
47. AP I, supra note 17, art. 44(3); see Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ¶ 1703 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter AP Commentary] (possibility of distinguishing oneself solely by carrying arms openly “also exists for members of the regular armed forces, though only under the same exceptional circumstances as for members of so-called guerrilla forces”). ↑
48. AP I, supra note 17, art. 44(7); AP Commentary, supra note 47, ¶ 1723; see CIHL Study, supra note 18, r. 106. ↑
49. GBA Press Release, supra note 2; BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, paras. 6, 14; Pancevski, A Drunken Evening, supra note 1. ↑
50. AP I, supra note 17, art. 49(3). Note that the fact the operation arguably had effects on land might make Article 52’s definition directly applicable to the operation. ↑
51. E.g., German Manual, supra note 37, ¶ 407; San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea ¶ 40 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SRM]; DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 5.6.3; see also Newport Manual Expert Group, Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare § 8.5 (2d ed. 2025) [hereinafter Newport Manual]. ↑
52. AP I, supra note 17, art. 52(2). ↑
53. U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. Coast Guard, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations § 8.2 (2022) (emphasis added) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M]; see also id. § 8.2.5, (“[T]he United States has interpreted the military objective definition to include these concepts.”). ↑
54. AP Commentary, supra note 47, ¶ 2022; see also DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 5.6.6.1. ↑
55. Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives Under the Current Jus in Bello, 78 Int’l L. Stud. 139, 148 (2002); Dinstein, supra note 43, at 132-33. ↑
56. Michael N. Schmitt, When Civilian Infrastructure Becomes a Lawful Target, Just Security (July 23, 2026); see also Int’l Law Ass’n Study Grp. on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st Century, The Conduct of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare, 93 Int’l L. Stud. 322, 332–33 (2017); DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 5.3.2. ↑
57. GBA Press Release, supra note 2. ↑
58. NWP 1-14M, supra note 53, §§ 7.4, 8.2.5; see also DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 5.6.6.2. ↑
59. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, para. 51. ↑
60. Charlie Trumbull & Michael Schmitt, The OLC Maduro Memorandum: Assisting in War Sustaining Activities Is Not Direct Participation in Hostilities, Just Security (Feb. 6, 2026); see also Marko Milanovic & Michael N. Schmitt, Data Centers as Military Objectives: The Russian and Ukrainian Justifications, Just Security (Oct. 29, 2026); W. Casey Biggerstaff, What’s in a Name? Much Ado About “War-Sustaining” Objects, 108 Int’l L. Stud. 195 (2026); Ryan Goodman, The Obama Administration and Targeting “War-Sustaining Objects in Noninternational Amed Conflict, 110 Am. J. Int’l L. 663 (2016); NWP 1-14M, supra note 53, § 8.2.5 (acknowledging that “some allies and partners” do not accept the approach); Newport Manual, supra note 51, § 8.5.1.1. ↑
61. See Newport Manual, supra note 51, § 8.5.1.1, n.575. ↑
62. Ukrainian Ex-Army Officer’s Lawyers Seek Dismissal as Nord Stream Pipeline Blast Trial Opens, CP24 (Oct. 14, 2026) (Associated Press). ↑
63. Newport Manual, supra note 51, § 8.6.8.2. ↑
64. SRM, supra note 51, ¶ 37. ↑
65. BGH, StB 60/25, supra note 3, para. 52. ↑
66. Newport Manual, supra note 51, § 8.6.8.1, n. 607. ↑
67. VStGB, supra note 16, § 3; Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 33(1); see also DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 18.22.4; Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities, supra note 43, at 382-383 (arguing, “The fact that an accused acted in obedience to superior orders cannot constitute a defense I, but is in fact but is a factual element which may be taken into account – in conjunction with other circumstances – within the compass of an admissible defense based on lack of mens rea (specifically, duress or mistake)). ↑
68. GBA Press Release, supra note 2; Pancevski, A Drunken Evening, supra note 1. ↑
69. NWP 1-14M, supra note 53, § 8.2.5; DoD Manual, supra note 17, § 5.6.6.2. ↑
70. Boothby, supra note 4. ↑
71. Rainsford, supra note 9. ↑