Ukraine’s Zelenskyy Has Options in Response to Latest U.S.-Russian ‘Peace Plan’

The draft “peace plan” for Ukraine, apparently put together by U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff and his Russian counterpart Kiril Dmitriev, is a hot mess of ambiguity, Russian-favored positions, inconsistencies, and some workable notions. It’s not ready for prime time, yet the Trump administration — or parts of it — appears to be pressuring the Ukrainians to agree to it by Nov. 27. The sudden push for this peace plan is the latest twist in the erratic policy of the Trump administration toward Ukraine that has careened from pressuring Ukraine to accept maximalist demands from Russia, to pressuring Russia to accept a ceasefire in place (a reasonable starting point for a settlement), and now pushing for a fast, bad, deal. The gambit reflects shoddy coordination within the administration; bad judgement in some parts of the administration about Russian demands; and general inattention to details that are critical to the success or failure of a settlement in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainians are right to try to work with the draft peace plan rather than reject it out of hand. In an address to his fellow Ukrainians today, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the government would work on the plan rather than risk a break with the United States, which he described as Ukraine’s most important partner. This was the right call. And there is a way to do so for Ukraine and for those in the U.S. administration who understand the U.S. interest in Ukraine’s survival as an independent nation aligned with the United States and Europe.

To be lasting, a settlement of the war that Russia unleashed against Ukraine must include a ceasefire along agreed-upon territorial lines; security for Ukraine; and continued Ukrainian sovereignty, even if Russia continues to occupy Ukrainian territory for the indefinite future. Those elements are present in the U.S. draft, albeit in distorted and unworkable forms and sometimes contradicted by other provisions in the same document. But they are there and, as diplomats say, the language can be worked.

Ukraine’s best play moving forward is to do what Ukraine successfully did with the “minerals deal” that started as apparent U.S. exploitation of Ukrainian resources and ended up as a reasonable proposal for joint U.S.-Ukrainian economic development. This peace proposal is more complicated. Nevertheless, Ukraine should embrace the U.S. initiative in principle and agree to work on the text with the United States on a fast track. Some of the clauses could be accepted in close to their current form. Others could be accepted “in principle” with language fixes that would make them acceptable for Ukraine and less vulnerable to Russian exploitation. Still others would be impossible for Ukraine to accept in their current form but, in some cases, language fixes could mitigate the damage. Ukraine’s tactical purpose in engaging to develop the would-be plan is wise, to avoid a blow up with U.S. President Donald Trump, a la the Feb. 28, 2025 Trump-Zelenskyy meeting in the Oval Office. It also could convince Trump again that Ukraine is not an obstacle to a negotiated settlement, and they might manage to either emerge with a workable plan around which a ceasefire could be arranged or put the Kremlin in the position of spoiler.

Options for the Counteroffer

This is what a Ukrainian counteroffer to the United States might look like, point by point from the draft as reported by the Associated Press:

1. “Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.” This could be accepted but fixed to have Russia affirmatively accept Ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent state.
2. “A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.” Ukraine can accept this as a post-settlement project. There are reasons to question any such undertaking with President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, but Ukraine can suggest language that any such talks would follow a lasting ceasefire in the war and Russian implementation of its terms.
3. “It is expected that Russia will not invade neighboring countries and NATO will not expand further.” The language of the first clause needs to include a Russian commitment not to engage in any form of aggression against its neighbors. The language of the second clause needs to change as NATO is not a party to the agreement. As an alternative, the United States and Ukraine could agree that decisions about NATO’s potential future enlargement and Ukraine’s policy of seeking NATO membership will be made in light of the security situation in Europe generally, including implementation of this agreement and Russia’s respect for its commitments under it.
4. “A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.” It makes no sense for the U.S. to “mediate” a NATO-Russia dialogue – the United States is a member of NATO and indeed the traditional leader of NATO. But NATO-Russia dialogue could resume after the war if Russia adheres to the terms of the agreement.
5. “Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.” Ukraine can accept this provision if coupled with agreement that such guarantees will be developed and agreed between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine before signing of the peace plan.
6. “The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.” The proposed 600,000 limitation of Ukrainian armed forces is much higher than earlier Russian demands. But Ukraine currently has about 800,000-850,000 forces and had 250,000 before the war, according to Axios, and in any case, this unilateral limitation violates Ukraine’s sovereignty and does nothing to limit Russian forces. There is ample precedent, however, for agreements limiting conventional forces of European countries and Russia. An alternative clause could include a commitment to conventional arms control involving either Russia and Ukraine or even Europe as a whole after the end of the war if the terms of the agreement are met.
7. “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.” This makes little sense as NATO is neither a party to this agreement nor is likely to approve a change to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (the apparent reference to the “constitution”). Ukraine might consider a counter-formulation like the one suggested for clause 3 above: that its NATO aspirations will depend on the security situation, including implementation of the terms of this agreement.
8. “NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.” Ukraine could agree to this language, which as written does not rule out European troops in Ukraine that wouldn’t be under a NATO umbrella, e.g., to provide air defense or training. The language could add “…in Ukraine, a non-NATO member. That suggests that should Ukraine someday join NATO, the restriction would be off.
9. “European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.” This odd formulation – to which the Poles rightly objected on the grounds that they should be consulted, does helpfully suggests that European contingency backup for Ukraine’s security is part of the agreement. Happily, the language does not prohibit U.S. planes stationed in Poland or European or U.S. planes stationed anywhere else. Ukraine can accept it.
10. “The U.S. guarantee:”
    1. “The United States will receive compensation for the guarantee.” This is a jarring bit of transactionalism but as written is sufficiently vague for Ukraine to accept.
    2. “If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee.” This opens to door for future false Russian claims of Ukrainian aggression. The language should be changed to include, for example, a U.S.-Ukrainian consultation process before any such decision to avoid a situation in which the United States unilaterally withdraws its support for Ukraine. It is unlikely that Ukraine would “invade” Russia anyway.
    3. “If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked.” The language is clumsy and “recognition of the new territory” is something to which the United States should not agree in any case. But the idea that yet another Russian attack on Ukraine should be met with severe penalties is a solid one, and Ukraine should find a way to accept a version of it.
    4. “If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be deemed invalid.” This is weird (would Ukrainian missile attacks on Nizhni Novgorod be alright?) and duplicates an earlier point. It can go.
11. “Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.” European Union membership is for the EU to decide, but the language could be altered to affirm Ukraine’s EU aspirations and Russia’s acceptance of them.
12. “A powerful global package of measures to rebuild Ukraine, including but not limited to… [the draft includes various economic initiatives including some with the U.S. and World Bank involvement]. The language is positive, if general; Ukraine can accept it.
13. “Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:”
    1. The lifting of sanctions will be discussed and agreed upon in stages and on a case-by-case basis.” This is sufficiently caveated. Ukraine can accept it.
    2. “The United States will enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement…” This is general but positive. Ukraine can accept it.
    3. “Russia will be invited to rejoin the G8.” This is for the G8 to decide but Ukraine can accept it if Russia’s adherence to the terms of a peace settlement is added as a condition.
14. “Frozen assets will be used as follows…[details follow for the United States and Europe to respectively use $100 billion in frozen assets for Ukrainian reconstruction and a residual amount for a separate U.S.-Russia investment fund.] This is an improbable proposal likely to fall apart, not least because most of Russia’s frozen assets are in European hands and because it is unlikely that Russia will agree in the end to losing control over its immobilized assets. But Ukraine can agree to this language.
15. “A joint American-Russian working group on security issues will be established to facilitate to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.” Ukraine must be part of this process, as should either the EU or key European nations, e.g., U.K., France, Germany, and Poland.
16. “Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.” This is void of real content, given Russia’s track record of ignoring such commitments, e.g. the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that it violated with its 2014 original invasion of Ukraine, not to mention its February 2022 full-scale assault. Still, Ukraine could accept this, even knowing it lacks meaning.
17. “The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.” This is strange language. START I is gone. New START, the most recent follow-on agreement, which has been extended to February 2026, could be extended further. Ukraine need not expend capital objecting to this clumsy clause.
18. “Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” This refers, of course, to nuclear weapons, not nuclear energy, and Ukraine could agree to this, especially given that its obligations under this peace plan would be void should Russia again attack it. (Ukraine gave up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons after the breakup of the USSR in exchange for security assurances in the Budapest Memorandum – the same ones that Russia violated with its 2014 invasion and 2022 full-scale assault.)
19. “The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the IAEA, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine — 50:50.” Should Russia remain in occupation of Zaporizhzhia Province, this clause could benefit Ukraine.
20. “Both countries undertake to implement educational programs in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:”
    1. “Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and protection of linguistic minorities.” Ukraine could agree to this, perhaps adding that this would be part of – and according to the terms of — its EU accession process.
    2. “Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.” This is one of the few examples of reciprocal oblations under the peace plan. While Russia is almost certain not to agree to it as it has adopted a policy of hostility toward Ukrainian culture, Ukraine may well do so.
    3. “All Nazi ideology and activity must be rejected and prohibited.” This is a longstanding and cynical Russian ploy based on a false accusation that Ukraine is a hotbed of Nazism. The Ukrainian counter could be to insist on reciprocal Ukrainian and Russian measure against nationalist extremism.
21. “Territories:”
    1. “Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto
       Russian, including by the United States.” This makes no sense, as “de facto” is not recognition. Ukraine should push for no U.S. recognition of territorial changes.
    2. “Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de facto recognition along the line of contact.” Freezing the current line may be acceptable to Ukraine but “de facto recognition” is contradictory. Again, Ukraine should push for no U.S. recognition of territorial changes.
    3. “Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.” Ukraine could agree to this.
    4. “Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.” Even with the language on demilitarization, this gives Russia control over critical territory it has been unable to conquer in nearly four years of full-scale war. Ukraine should ask the United States to adhere to President Trump’s formula for a freeze of the lines in place.
22. “After agreeing on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.” The Russians are unlikely to respect this provision any more than they respected previous commitments to respect the Russian-Ukrainian border. Ukraine may nevertheless feel it has to agree to this provision.
23. “Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.” Russia’s track record leaves it untrustworthy with respect to any such provision. However, Ukraine may believe that it can accept this provision.
24. “A humanitarian committee will established created to resolve outstanding issues…” This provision is vague and Ukraine should seek to strengthen it, especially with respect to Ukrainian children who have been abducted by Russia.
25. “Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.” This is a Russian demand that violates Ukraine’s sovereignty. Ukraine could counter with an offer to hold national elections when the agreement is concluded and in force.
26. “All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.” Ukraine understandably may object to this provision, considering the energy and resources it has put into documenting and pursuing justice for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Russia during the course of the war, not to mention the original crime of aggression in the original invasion.
27. “This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by the Peace Council, headed by President Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.” This provision seems inconsistent with section 15 above (a monitoring group headed by the United States and Russia). This is probably the result of sloppy drafting and the Ukrainians should ask for clarification, including whether a ceasefire is contingent on such steps. If Russian legal processes are required before a ceasefire goes into effect, Russia could stall and demand changes based on alleged demands from its parliament while continuing to attack Ukraine.
28. “Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.” The Ukrainians may want to propose an immediate ceasefire without preconditions.

The analysis and suggestions above are illustrative only. The point is that the text, however badly prepared and distorted, can be improved, and that the Ukrainians have an option other than surrender or defiance, neither of which would seem to be in their interest. It may be in Ukraine’s interest to make the effort to work on the text with the U.S. administration. If it does, it may find that its U.S. counterparts in such an exercise are reasonable and knowledgeable.

The Trump administration’s inconsistent approach to Ukraine often complicates its own stated objectives. It is the task of diplomats, my former profession, to try to provide options even in the most difficult of circumstances. And these do exist.