The Israeli government and Hamas ceasefire and hostage-release deal is underway, based on the 20-point Gaza peace plan announced by President Trump. Hopes are high that we will finally see an end to hostilities and immense destruction and suffering. Yet the ceasefire faces many challenges and is currently threatened by serious violations. What can we learn from the experience of ceasefires elsewhere?
Ceasefires are politically and technically complicated peace agreements. They have their own logic and dynamics, which are different from long-term settlements intended to resolve a conflict. Their details naturally differ from case to case but there are several fundamental requirements for a strong ceasefire, regardless of the context.
The point of departure is that ceasefires are extremely risky. The risks include that a conflict party takes advantage of the ceasefire to rearm or to attack an adversary that has disarmed or dropped its guard. In addition, ceasefires are always subject to at least some violations, whether deliberate or unintentional. Even minor violations can give rise to retaliation, escalation, and the collapse of the ceasefire.
These risks cannot be managed simply on the basis of verbal assurances from the parties and their allies. In the cauldron of intense enmity, hatred and mistrust, such assurances are just hot air. Instead, the risks have to be managed by robust ceasefire mechanisms.
Ceasefire Mechanisms
Joint Forum for Monitoring and Verification: One essential mechanism is a joint forum to monitor the ceasefire, verify compliance, and address disputes that arise. This forum should comprise senior security officials from both sides, international peacekeepers that are trusted by the belligerents, and impartial mediators who can help resolve disagreements.
As with joint ceasefire forums elsewhere, the security officials should be appointed by the belligerent parties. In the absence of a single mediator trusted by all the parties, it would be a workable arrangement to use the triumvirate of mediators – Egypt, Qatar, and the United States – that brokered the Gaza plan.
The joint forum should be established immediately and should operate on a 24-hour basis. It is evident from past ceasefire experiences in Sudan, South Sudan, and other countries that the forum’s most critical functions are to investigate and verify alleged ceasefire violations, take steps to prevent recurrence, and resolve disputes between the parties. This is the only way to avoid unilateral military reprisals against actual or alleged violations.
In the case of Gaza, the joint forum would also ensure safe passage within the territory for United Nations (U.N.) and other humanitarian agencies.
International peacekeeping: Another essential ceasefire mechanism is an international peacekeeping force. The U.N. has often played this role. The Gaza plan envisages the establishment of a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) “to immediately deploy in Gaza.” In reality, though, it could take several weeks, if not months, to set up the ISF.
Prior to the deployment of the ISF, what are the deterrents against ceasefire violations and who are the guarantors? The Gaza peace plan states that “regional partners” will provide a guarantee to ensure that Hamas complies with its obligations. Who will provide a similar guarantee that the Israeli government honors its undertakings? The United States has the necessary leverage but there is no certainty it will exercise its influence over Israel.
At the very least, the U.N. Security Council should issue a resolution that requires the belligerents to honor their commitments in good faith and to comply with international humanitarian law and all other relevant international laws. The Security Council resolution should also provide a mandate for the ISF.
Clear rules: Risk can also be managed by ensuring that the ceasefire rules are clear, precise and realistic. The rules should cover prohibited activities, lines of control, disengagement of forces, the use and control of weapons, the movement of fighters and the schedule for planned activities. Vague rules on any of these matters – as is currently the case in the Gaza ceasefire plan – are a recipe for disaster.
It is essential that the rules – and indeed every aspect of the ceasefire arrangements – are subject to negotiation between the Israeli government and Hamas. The history of imposed ceasefires is littered with corpses. A ceasefire is only sustainable if it is negotiated by the belligerents to their collective satisfaction.
In the case of Gaza, negotiations are also required to address the unresolved and incomplete details of the peace plan. For example, the plan anticipates, but provides little detail on, the demilitarization of Gaza. This will be extremely challenging, not least because Hamas has declared that it will not disarm. And of course, negotiations will need to tackle the controversial proposals for governing the territory. These negotiations should draw in the Palestinian Authority, whose marginalization is not conducive to enduring peace and stability.
The Political Horizon and the Path Ahead
Israel and Hamas can overcome the technical difficulties of a Gaza ceasefire if they have the political will to do so. It is relevant that the two sides have previously negotiated a number of ceasefires in Gaza.
None of these ceasefires lasted, however. And none of them was likely to last, because they were not conceived as building blocks towards a political resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict. A ceasefire with no political horizon is inherently unstable and fragile.
The Gaza peace plan addresses this issue in the following way:
While Gaza re-development advances and when the Palestinian Authority reform programme is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.
This approach runs counter to international law. The Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, which includes the right to an independent State of Palestine, has been endorsed repeatedly by the UN General Assembly. In 2024 it was affirmed categorically by the International Court of Justice. The Court emphatically rejected Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory, finding that Israel’s policies and practices constituted a breach of the right to self-determination. The exercise of this right of self-determination is not legally or legitimately subject to any conditions.
The immediate imperatives are the stabilization of Gaza and the provision of humanitarian support to its residents, who have experienced scarcely believable physical and psychological trauma. While the realization of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination may be a more distant goal, a basic commitment to that right is urgently required from Israel and the United States.
The sustainability of the Gaza ceasefire ultimately depends on the robustness of its mechanisms, the political will of the parties, and the domestic, regional and international legitimacy of the peace plan. Strict adherence to all aspects of international law is a non-negotiable requirement for legitimacy.
