“As a soldier, he owes obedience; as a man, he owes disobedience. For the officer, this comes down to a choice between his own conscience on the one hand, and the good of the state, plus the professional virtue of obedience, upon the other.”
-Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State
“Given the state of national politics, we are concerned about being identified in a study on military officer dissent and disobedience due to fears of politically motivated reprisals against our institution.”
-A U.S. War College Dean (October 2020)
Before interviewing retired Army Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, I anticipated he might respond to some reports that stated he was insubordinate by disobeying an order from the commander-in-chief. Would he claim such a response could have been justified given the circumstances?
Instead, Vindman refuted this narrative and said that after receiving a subpoena to appear before Congress, he never received a direct order from the president forbidding him to testify. (To date, no evidence has been made public that buttresses the claim that President Donald Trump issued a direct order to Vindman not to testify, albeit, some civilian members of the Trump administration did interpret a White House letter to the House Speaker as strong guidance not to participate, even if compelled through a subpoena. Although, like Vindman, several civilian members of the National Security Council staff and other departments still complied with the subpoena and testified.)
When I probed Vindman on the hypothetical: “If President Trump had ordered you to ignore the subpoena, what would you have done?” Vindman responded that, since both Congress and the commander-in-chief represent co-equal branches of government that exercise dual oversight of the military, he would have allowed the courts to adjudicate the decision.
When Vindman decided to testify, he was not acting as a self-empowered military officer, as some critics have asserted. Rather, he dissented in accordance with traditional military protocols and through proper channels. Initially, he raised the issue internally through his chain-of-command at the National Security Council, where he was working at the time, and then he complied with a congressional subpoena, in deference to its constitutional oversight responsibilities (see Figure 1 – lower-left). Vindman could have taken a stronger response through volunteering information regarding the Ukraine funding hold to Congress, releasing information to the press, or resigning in protest, either publicly or initially quietly. However, doing so would have likely caused significant damage to civil-military norms. Vindman still paid the personal price of a shortened military career, but his actions didn’t undermine civilian-control or increase the trust deficit with the military, even though figures on the right tried to villainize him.
However, my research suggests that Vindman’s displayed respect for civilian-control appears to be the exception, not the norm, among a significant portion of the senior officers I surveyed. As illustrated on numerous occasions, there is ongoing disagreement in the overlapping academic and military communities on the propriety of dissent, disobedience, and resignation when military officers are confronted with lawful but immoral civilian-directed orders.
How senior military officers discern and respond (see Figure 1) to legally ambiguous, ethical dilemmas principally depends on their views of civil-military relations. In one camp are the “military supremacists,” who believe a space for moral discretion is created when a civilian superior disregards military advice and the potential consequences of a looming decision appear extreme. In these situations, strategic-level military officers (three and four-star generals and admirals) are afforded agency to respond along the entire continuum in Figure 1 in the decision-making process, including through publicized resignation and acts of disobedience. Military supremacists argue these generals can do so without being disloyal to the country and the oath they took when joining the service.
This perspective is challenged by the view of “civilian supremacists,” a term coined by Professor Peter Feaver. Civilian supremacists assert that—even if civilian orders are imprudent, unwise, or even immoral—democratic principles give civilian leaders the authority to be wrong or right as well as the choice to disregard military advice. Civilian supremacists assert that only limited types of dissent are permissible that include internal and discreet advice to a civilian leader or to respond to congressional oversight (lower-left in Figure 1). Civilian supremacists generally believe that any military officer response beyond these limited measures of dissent are non-permissible acts of interference in the decision-making process. According to civil-military expert Richard Kohn, “A [general] officer ‘resigning’ [in protest] would be crossing the line from advising to making (or attempting to make) policy or a decision properly belonging to their civilian superiors.”
In addition, civilian supremacists assert that a quiet resignation is also not permissible due to the strong likelihood that such a senior resignation would likely become public and adversely impact civil-military relations. This was the case in 1997, when Air Force Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman asked to “retire” a year short of his 4-year tenure due to disagreements with Defense Secretary William Cohen. And just in the last two years, we heard rumblings of at least two high-ranking officers, General Mark Milley and Rear Admiral Collin Green, who purportedly considered resigning due to Trump’s actions surrounding the Lafayette Square incident and the handling of the accused war criminal and Navy SEAL, Eddie Gallagher. It’s unlikely that if either of these officers either retired early or quietly resigned that their underlying reasons wouldn’t be revealed in short order to the press. And the subsequent fallout would degrade the trust and candidness required, between senior generals and civilian leaders, for effective civil-military dialogue and decision-making.
In this Huntingtonian vs Clausewitzian rift, my research suggests that preferences of current senior officers are clear: the preponderance hew to the views that military officers should exercise moral discretion when needed.
For my research, I conducted an anonymous survey of 221 senior officers (18.4 percent of students) from three of the five U.S. war colleges to determine their likely responses to morally objectionable orders. The surveyed officers were all of the rank of lieutenant colonel / colonel (and equivalent Navy ranks) with approximately 20 years of service. Roughly 74 percent of the survey respondents were Army officers; therefore, the results are more applicable to future Army generals. However, I found no appreciable difference in responses between the Army and other military services, active-duty vs Reserves/National Guard, or occupational specialty. In short, a large majority of these senior officers do not believe civilians have an authoritative “right to be wrong,” in decisions on war and peace. Just over 87 percent of the respondents believe that under certain circumstances, and using their best professional judgment, strategic military officers can disobey a lawful but immoral or unwise civilian-directed order yet still be loyal to a higher, societal good. And just over one-third of the officers believe they have a compelling moral obligation to disobey and publicly resign in these situations. These officers also generally judge their impact on civil-military relations as a secondary concern to the efficacy of their act of dissent or disobedience. Roughly 60 percent of officers agreed that changing the policy-maker’s decision is of primary importance to the potential negative effects to civil-military relations.
I also surveyed these officers on hypothetical scenarios that were presented as nominally lawful yet also strained the military professional ethic. The scenarios also demonstrate a civilian decision-maker that is unreceptive to the officer’s contravening, best military advice. Many of these examples were drawn from contemporary or historic examples of morally questionable or objectionable orders, such as the detention of Japanese-Americans during WWII, targeting terrorists’ immediate family members, employing techniques that resemble torture on detainees, attempting to use the military to suppress a peaceful domestic protest, and initiating a war without a just cause.
Across the go-to-war (jus ad bellum), war-fighting (jus in bello), war-ending (jus post bellum) and peacetime scenarios (see Figure 2), the latter prompted the most visceral reaction and, thus, greatest potential for senior officer interference. Officers were asked how they would react to a scenario in which they were issued orders to politicize the military—positioning it to support one faction of the U.S. population—during a period of civil unrest. Officers showed steadfast opposition to such a norm-violating directive, even if determined lawful. Roughly 55 percent of officers said they were likely or very likely to resign in protest if a civilian superior attempted to use the military in a highly partisan and dangerous manner.
Lethal targeting of suspected terrorists’ families also engendered a strong response. Approximately, 52 percent of officers surveyed said they were likely or very likely to resign if civilian leadership, against military advice, adopted an expansive interpretation of combatant status allowing for the targeting of suspected terrorists’ families in warzones.
Officers were asked their likelihood to resign if
contrary to [their] best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has adopted lawful interrogation techniques that resemble torture and are ordering members of the military to work with host-nation forces to use these inhumane techniques on suspected terrorists in war-zones. You assess that thousands of innocent people will be detained and tortured as a consequence of this order, with minimal information of value gleaned.
The survey prompt attempted to present a situation of “lawful but awful” orders in the interrogation space, similar to the CIA’s authorized use of waterboarding before it was banned by Congress. Roughly 39 percent of officers surveyed said they were likely or very likely to resign and 30 percent of officers said there was an even chance of resigning in protest.
My survey posed a present-day, scenario in which national leadership decides that the military will detain and intern all American citizens originally from “high-threat countries” for the sake of national security. In addition, in the survey, the Supreme Court has ruled such action is lawful; however, the order is ineffective at mitigating the national security threat and will create a dangerous civil-military rift in society. Roughly 43 percent of officers said they were likely or very likely to resign in protest and 19 percent said there was an even chance they would resign.
A large minority of respondents also signaled strong belief that the determination to go to war—which is ultimately a civilian-made decision—falls within the senior officer’s purview to interfere. Given a hypothetical with the 2003 Iraq War characteristics, 36 percent of officers said they were likely or very likely to resign and 24 percent indicated an even chance of resigning if—contrary to their best military advice—national leadership decided to wage an unnecessary and elective war with unachievable aims.
While many of the officers were willing to exercise their conscience, most preferred to do so discreetly if afforded the outlet. When officers were asked how they would resign given the aforementioned scenarios, approximately 53 percent preferred a quiet resignation. However, roughly 18 percent respondents still supported writing a public letter to the senior civilian decision-maker detailing their reasons before resigning.
Next, I asked the entire sample of officers, given the previous scenarios, specifically, how they would respond to the civilian decision-maker before choosing to resign or get fired. Roughly 66 percent said they would support circumventing the chain-of-command to influence the situation and outcome. On the higher-end of the interference spectrum, approximately 35 percent of officers supported “slow-rolling” an immoral order (grinding its implementation to a glacial pace) from within their organization. Purported acts of general officer “slow-rolling” was a common theme during the Trump presidency. According to a recent Axios report, one U.S. intercept indicated that senior generals were going to defy Trump’s desire for a speedy draw-down in Afghanistan and would slow-roll his orders. And another report stated that Defense Secretary James Mattis and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Joe Dunford were slow-rolling Trump on his pursuit of military options against Iran and the regime of the Bashar al-Assad in Syria. These cumulative military acts of intransigence have come with the cost of degrading civil-military trust. The civil-military relationship was so tainted during the Trump years that Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller exclaimed “it was rotten.” Miller’s expressed concern that the core principle of American democracy—civilian control of the military—was in peril.
Acts of bureaucratic slow-rolling also occurred outside the military during the Trump years. Civilian examples include a U.S ambassador falsely reporting to State Department leadership that the number of American troops on the ground in Syria was under a White House directed troop cap. In another instance, John Kelly, serving as Trump’s chief of staff, took measures to delay the administration’s plan to ban transgender troops from serving in the military.
Roughly one in five of the surveyed officers supported directly challenging civilian control by taking steps to undermine the perceived immoral order. And a smaller percentage, roughly 15 percent of officers, were inclined to disobey the immoral order, then either publicly resign in protest or wait to be fired.
It is evident that a large share of senior officers believes that strategic decisions, such as when to go to war, how to fight wars, how to end them, as well as how to use the military in a domestic context, can challenge the professional military ethic. In these instances, the surveyed officers displayed a sense of moral courage to adhere to the just war principles even when given a nominally, lawful order to do otherwise. This activist norm present among senior military officers might not prove surprising to civilian supremacists. These officers understand that their decisions often involve balancing bedrock principles tied to higher societal interests against the democratic principle of civilian over military control. If civilian supremacists are concerned by these rooted Huntingtonian beliefs, then additional investment should be made in professional military education to include more robust and effective leadership ethics.
These surveyed officers also believe more needs to be done through military professional education to inculcate a strong foundation in ethics. Nearly one-third of the officers surveyed said they had not received professional military education on the ethical frameworks required to navigate the morally vexing space of “lawful but awful” orders. And 90 percent of respondents agreed that the military should focus teaching senior officers about differing views of civil-military relations and ethical reasoning.
Specifically, senior military officer education should introduce future generals to morally and legally ambiguous scenarios as well as a more comprehensive survey of civil-military relations frameworks. Senior officers require a more fulsome ethical toolkit to conduct rigorous analysis of ethical dilemmas and to avoid a simple resort to default responses like “I will not follow an illegal order” and “I will support and defend the Constitution.” It became abundantly clear after the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol that even senior officers have wildly varied views (see retired Lieutenant General Michael Gould comments regarding “not picking sides” at 41:50) on the meaning and normative bounds of defending the Constitution.
Some readers of my research might interpret the results as heartening that the surveyed officers would dissent (including resign in protest) and in some cases disobey before carrying out nominally lawful, civilian-directed orders that violate the just war principles and military professional ethics. However, such a permissive Huntingtonian norm could also create space for generals to respond to a host of other perceived constitutional concerns, such as the legitimacy of elections and the presidency, the transfer of presidential power after an election, or even the Department of Defense’s initiative to counter domestic extremism in the ranks due to the perception that it unfairly targets a certain political class and infringes upon civil liberties.
In conclusion, my research demonstrates that there are numerous ways—below the threshold of disobedience—through which officers consider that they would oppose lawful but immoral civilian decisions. Critics of my research might retort that, despite Trump pushing against moral boundaries, there were no high-profile military resignations in protest during his administration. (Although, both former Defense Secretary James Mattis and Navy Secretary Richard Spencer, both serving in civilian roles, did resign in protest to Trump policies.) We don’t necessarily know of other general officers, aside from reportedly Milley and Green, who might have also considered resigning to stop some of the more consequential Trump actions or proposals. But past is not necessarily prologue. We should anticipate that many of these future generals, who are Xennials (straddling Generation X and Millennials) and comfortable questioning authority, will more assertively respond to morally objectionable civilian orders, particularly those perceived to violate professional military standards and propriety.
Given the potential for future military interference, the question we should ask ourselves, is this Huntingtonian norm, on balance, a net-positive for the common defense and society?
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
***
Research Methodology
From August 2020 to May 2021, I conducted an anonymous online survey of 221 U.S. military officers from three of the five war college programs (Army War College, Naval War College, Air War College, Marine Corps War College, and the National War College. Due to the sensitive nature of this research topic, one of the war college deans requested that the author not mention the school’s name as a participant in the report; therefore, the specific war colleges that participated remain anonymous.). The 221 survey responses represent 18.4 percent of war college students from three participating institutions, which together total approximately 1,200 U.S. officers enrolled. All of these students were sent electronic copies of the anonymous survey. The results are representative of three of the five war colleges (the data might not necessarily be representative of the remaining two war colleges, roughly 350 additional officers, which did not allow for officer participation in the survey.)
However, the author did compare surveys results between services, components and military specialties and response differences were compared to a randomized baseline. The average differences were marginal and indicate that service membership, component affiliation and job specialty are not indicative of variables that significantly influence officers’ views on dissent, disobedience and resignation.
The author did not examine differences in responses associated with underlying demographics such as race, sex, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomics, or political party affiliation, due to war colleges’ concerns over protecting the privacy of respondents.(The participating war colleges stipulated that they would only participate in the survey if the research did not include an analysis of underlying demographics associated with specific views on dissent, disobedience, and resignation.) However, all of these factors and others could influence the respondents’ views, to varying degrees.
Most senior generals and admirals are graduates of the U.S. war colleges. Therefore, the sample is intended to represent a significant portion of future strategic officers and their views on dissent, disobedience and resignation. The survey sample demographics can be found in Appendix A and the survey questionnaire in Appendix B.
The first section of the questionnaire probes the officers’ broad views on dissent, disobedience, and resignation to determine whether they exhibit a military or civilian supremacism tilt. The second section of the survey tests notional scenarios that are nominally lawful, many based on historic events, to determine circumstances that might lead to strategic officer interference in the decision-making process. To reduce response bias, the specifics of the historic events, such as country names and classes of people are omitted from the survey questions. The final section of the survey builds on the notional scenarios to determine how officers might respond to civilian-directed immoral orders.
Appendix A: Survey Sample Demographics
War Colleges students were surveyed between August 2020 and May 2021. Totals slightly vary due to non-responses to certain questions.
*The question on race was omitted for one of the three war colleges.
Appendix B: Dissent, Disobedience and Principled Resignation Questionnaire
Q1. Are you currently enrolled in one of the War College (Army, Navy, Air-Force, Marine Corps, NDU) programs?
Yes
No
Q2. Which option best describes your professional affiliation?
U.S. Army Officer
U.S. Marine Corps Officer
U.S. Navy Officer
U.S. Air Force Officer
U.S. Coast Guard Officer
Q3. What is your military duty status?
Active Duty
Reserve
National Guard
Q4. What is your gender?
Male
Female
Prefer not to answer
Q5. Are you Hispanic or Latino?
Yes
No
Prefer not to answer
Q6. What is your race? (mark one or more)
White
Not White
Prefer not to answer
Q7. What is your rank?
Military – 04
Military – 05
Military – 06
Other (please specify)
Q8. How would you best describe your military background and specialty?
Combat Arms (Infantry, Armor, Pilot, Special Forces, Surface Warfare, Submariner, Air Defense, etc.)
Combat Support (Intelligence, Communications, Cyber, Military Police, Foreign Area Officer, Civil Affairs, etc.)
Combat Service Support (Transportation, Logistics, Acquisition, Quartermaster, Medical, JAG, etc.)
Q9. Please rank order your level of agreement with the following frameworks on “Dissent,” “Disobedience,” and “Principled Resignation.” (1 Most Agree – 3 Least Agree)
(If you totally disagree with any one of the frameworks, please select the box, “I don’t agree with this framework” next to that framework).
For more information on these ethics frameworks, please review this primer: Frameworks for Dissent and Principled Resignation in the US Military: A Primer
a. There are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order. If an officer decides that an order is rendered unconscionable by its probable consequences, it follows that he has a moral obligation to dispute the order and, if unsuccessful, to dissent or disobey in a manner that has the best chance of averting those consequences, or his actions are rendered meaningless. There is a narrow moral space wherein the exercise of discretionary professional judgment can lead to a public principled resignation and even disobedience. Our democratic institutions are strong and can withstand a public resignation by a senior military officer in protest to an immoral order.
́b. If we hold that soldiers and leaders remain moral agents on the battlefield, we must also hold their seniors equally responsible for decisions and actions taken in higher headquarters or in the capital. However, “Principled resignation” cannot threaten civil control of the military and must always be a “quiet one” (without the reasons being disclosed to the public) and only as a last resort after discreet persuasion and dissent through the chain-of-command fails. Going public is an act of coercion and changes the nature of the resignation. Resigning in response to immoral, but legal civilian orders must be reserved for narrow circumstances during times of war or national emergency where lives are needlessly threatened and cannot be merely over policy disagreements.
́c. Resignation in protest in defiance of a legal order or legal policy is a political act of insubordination–that is, in democratic theory terms, an evil because it has as its explicit purpose the undermining of the democratic order. Encouraging military leaders to substitute their own judgments for those of civilian leaders and then to resign in protest when their judgment is violated creates a new norm that undermines civilian-military relations. This new norm will also incentivize civilians to evaluate and select senior military advisors for upfront policy agreement, malleability, and total loyalty leading to less objective military advice.
Q10. During the course of your career have you learned any of these ethical frameworks (from previous question) to respond to immoral (but legal) civilian directed orders? If so, where were these frameworks taught? (mark one or more or N/A if unfamiliar)
Military Training / JPME I / JPME II
Civilian Education
Self-taught
N/A – I am unfamiliar with these frameworks Other (please specify)
Q11. Select your level of agreement with the following statement: “Senior military advisors (General officers advising senior civilian officials) have a professional responsibility to use their position to privately persuade civilian decision-makers against choosing perceived immoral and potentially disastrous policies.”
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Any additional comments to your response:
Q12. Select your level of agreement with the following statement: “In certain rare cases, senior military officials can be justified in “resigning quietly” (without the reasons being disclosed to the public) in response to civilian- directed, immoral and disastrous orders (although still deemed legal).”
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Please provide an explanation to your answer:
Q13. Select your likelihood to resign (either publicly or quietly) if you were the senior military official responsible for advising top civilian decision-makers on the decision to go to war (Jus ad Bellum) and were in the following hypothetical scenarios. (Assume you have high confidence that your assessment is correct and that all scenarios are lawful.)
Very likely to resign
Likely to resign
Even chance to resign
Unlikely to resign
Very unlikely to resign
I wouldn’t consider resigning.
Scenarios:
a. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has decided to wage a war, protecting a vital national interest, against an aggressor; however, the aims of the war are likely unachievable. You assess the war will be extremely costly and hundreds of thousands of service-members and civilians will die with little to be gained.
b. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has decided to wage an unnecessary and elective war with unachievable aims. You assess the cost at roughly 4,000 U.S. military lives, $1 trillion, and hundreds of thousands of civilians killed and displaced.
c. Contrary to your best military advice, civilian leadership has ordered a “massive military retaliation” against a nation state for perpetrating a cyber-attack on U.S soil that resulted in physical damage but no deaths. You assess that the planned military response is disproportionate to the cyber-attack and that the retaliation will lead to a conventional war with hundreds of thousands of unnecessary civilian deaths.
d. You are in the senior position to advise civilian decision-makers and they have decided to not include your “best military advice” or any military voice in the decision-making process to use significant military force or initiate a conflict with another country.
Describe any other Jus ad Bellum scenario you would resign over? Include an estimative probability in resigning.
Q14. Select your likelihood to resign (either publicly or quietly) if you were the senior military official responsible for advising top civilian decision-makers on war-fighting decisions (Jus in Bello) and were in the following hypothetical scenarios? (Assume you have high confidence that your assessment is correct and that all scenarios are lawful.)
Very likely to resign
Likely to resign
Even chance to resign
Unlikely to resign
Very unlikely to resign
I wouldn’t consider resigning
a. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has decided to employ disproportionate military means that will likely lead to victory sooner with less U.S. military casualties; however, you assess that hundreds of thousands more civilians will die as a result of these disproportionate military means.
b. Contrary to your best military advice, civilian leadership has taken an expansive interpretation of the definition of a combatant and is ordering the lethal targeting of the families of suspected terrorists and insurgents in theaters of armed conflict. You assess such a policy will erode the long-standing international norm of civilian immunity.
c. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has adopted lawful interrogation techniques that resemble torture and are ordering members of the military to work with host-nation forces to use these inhumane techniques on suspected terrorists in war-zones. You assess that thousands of innocent people will be detained and tortured as a consequence of this policy, with minimal information of value gleaned.
d. You are in the senior position to advise senior civilian decision-makers and they have decided to not include your “best military advice” or any military voice in the decision-making process to develop the war- fighting strategy, methods, and rules of engagement
Describe any other Jus in Bello scenario you would resign over? Include an estimative probability in resigning.
Q15. Select your likelihood to resign (either publicly or quietly) if you were the senior military official responsible for advising top civilian decision-makers on options on how to end a war the U.S. is engaged in (Jus post Bellum), and were in the following hypothetical scenarios? (Assume you have high confidence that your assessment is correct and that all scenarios are lawful.)
Very likely to resign
Likely to resign
Even chance to resign
Unlikely to resign
Very unlikely to resign
I wouldn’t consider resigning
a. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has decided to abruptly and haphazardly end a U.S. military engagement in a decades long stalemate. You assess the subsequent disengagement will likely lead to ethnic cleansing and the resurgence of terrorism and political and economic instability in this strategically important region of the world.
b. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has decided to not commit the resources required to fully stabilize a country the U.S. military is currently occupying after the initial fighting has ended. You assess that without these additional resources, the U.S. will be unable to achieve its war aims. The U.S. occupation will become significantly prolonged with a high cost to civilian lives and both economies.
c. You are in the senior position to advise senior civilian decision-makers and they have decided to not include your “best military advice” or any military voice in the decision-making process on how to end a conflict the U.S. is currently engaged in.
Describe any other Jus post Bellum scenario you would resign over? Include an estimative probability in resigning.
Q16. Select your likelihood to resign (either publicly or quietly) if you were the senior military official responsible for advising top civilian decision-makers during peacetime and were in the following hypothetical scenarios? (Assume you have a high confidence that your assessment is correct and that all scenarios are lawful.)
Very likely to resign
Likely to resign
Even chance to resign
Unlikely to resign
Very unlikely to resign
I wouldn’t consider resigning
a. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has decided to begin pardoning convicted war criminals. You assess these actions will likely lead to the erosion of “good order and discipline” in parts of the military and an uptick in Law of War violations.
b. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, national leadership has decided that the military will detain and intern all American citizens originally from high-threat countries for the sake of national security. The Supreme Court has ruled that such action is lawful. You assess that such an order is both ineffective at mitigating this national security threat and will create a dangerous civil-military rift in society.
c. Contrary to your best military advice to senior civilians, DoD leadership has ignored your advice to dock and evacuate a large majority of sailors on a deployed naval vessel due to a serious public health concern that will likely jeopardize the lives of several thousand service- members. You assess that the evacuation of the ship’s sailors will have a minimal impact on the U.S.’s deterrence capability to halt any type of aggression.
d. You are in the senior position to advise senior civilian decision-makers and they have decided to not include your “best military advice” or any military voice in the decision-making process on a vitally important and risky national security decision during a domestic emergency that will require military assistance (hurricane, pandemic, civil unrest/riots, earthquake, etc.)
e. You are in the senior position to advise senior civilian decision-makers and you assess they are issuing you orders to politicize the military, positioning it to support one faction of the U.S. population, during a period of divisive civil unrest in the country.
Describe any other peacetime scenario you would resign over? Include an estimative probability in resigning.
Q17. How often do you believe senior military leaders have the requisite level of certainty in their assessments of the situation to make an informed decision to resign in protest to a perceived civilian-directed immoral order or decision-making process?
Always
Usually
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
N/A – I don’t believe in senior officer resignations in response to lawful but immoral civilian-directed orders.
Q18. In general, how often should resigning in protest to a perceived immoral civilian-directed order or decision-making process be used as a last resort–done only after other attempts are made by the senior officer to persuade the civilian decision-maker to change his immoral order or policy?
Always
Usually
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
N/A – I don’t believe in senior officer resignations in response to lawful but immoral civilian-directed orders. Any additional comments on your response
Q19. Given your responses to only Question 13: national decisions on going to war (Jus ad Bellum).
If you were serving as a senior military advisor and decided to resign in protest to a perceived immoral civilian- directed order or decision-making process, would you consider the following options? (Please select the likelihood you would consider these options.)
Very Likely
Likely
Even Chance
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
N/A – I don’t believe in resigning in protest to immoral but lawful orders
a. Without providing any explanation to the senior civilian decision-maker, you offer your resignation and then resign. You make no public protests to the immoral policy after your resignation.
b. While still in government, you write a private letter to the senior civilian decision- maker detailing your reasons for resigning and then resign, keeping your actions private even after leaving the military.
c. While still in government, you write a public letter to the senior civilian decision-maker detailing your reasons for resigning and then resign.
d. As a last resort, you disobey the immoral order or decision-making process, then either publicly resign in protest or wait to be fired.
Would you consider other options not listed? Please include “Likelihood.”
Q20. Given your responses to only Question 14: national decisions on the means, methods, and tactics of warfighting (Jus in Bello).
If you were serving as a senior military advisor and decided to resign in protest to a perceived immoral civilian- directed order or decision-making process, would you consider the following options? (Please select the likelihood you would consider these options.)
Very Likely
Likely
Even Chance
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
N/A – I don’t believe in resigning in protest to immoral but lawful orders
a. Without providing any explanation to the senior civilian decision-maker, you offer your resignation and then resign. You make no public protests to the immoral policy after your resignation.
b. While still in government, you write a private letter to the senior civilian decision- maker detailing your reasons for resigning and then resign, keeping your actions private even after leaving the military.
c. While still in government, you write a public letter to the senior civilian decision-maker detailing your reasons for resigning and then resign.
d. As a last resort, you disobey the immoral order or decision-making process, then either publicly resign in protest or wait to be fired.
Would you consider other options not listed? Please include “Likelihood.”
Q21. Given your responses to only Question 15: national decisions on the military strategy to end the conflict (Jus post Bellum). If you were serving as a senior military advisor and decided to resign in protest to a perceived immoral civilian-directed order or decision-making process, would you consider the following options? (Please select the likelihood you would consider these options.)
Very Likely
Likely
Even Chance
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
N/A – I don’t believe in resigning in protest to immoral but lawful orders
a. Without providing any explanation to the senior civilian decision-maker, you offer your resignation and then resign. You make no public protests to the immoral policy after your resignation.
b. While still in government, you write a private letter to the senior civilian decision- maker detailing your reasons for resigning and then resign, keeping your actions private even after leaving the military.
c. While still in government, you write a public letter to the senior civilian decision-maker detailing your reasons for resigning and then resign.
d. As a last resort, you disobey the immoral order or decision-making process, then either publicly resign in protest or wait to be fired.
Would you consider other options not listed? Please include “Likelihood.”
Q22. Given your responses to only Question 16: national decisions on the use of the military during peacetime domestic emergencies and concerns over military discipline.
If you were serving as a senior military advisor and decided to resign in protest to a perceived immoral civilian- directed order or decision-making process, would you consider the following options? (Please select the likelihood you would consider these options.)
Very Likely
Likely
Even Chance
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
N/A – I don’t believe in resigning in protest to immoral but lawful orders
a. Without providing any explanation to the senior civilian decision-maker, you offer your resignation and then resign. You make no public protests to the immoral policy after your resignation.
b. While still in government, you write a private letter to the senior civilian decision – maker detailing your reasons for resigning and then resign, keeping your actions private even after leaving the military.
c. While still in government, you write a public letter to the senior civilian decision-maker detailing your reasons for resigning and then resign.
d. As a last resort, you disobey the immoral order or decision-making process, then either publicly resign in protest or wait to be fired.
Describe other options not listed you would consider? Please include “Likelihood.”
Q23. Given your responses in Questions 19-22, If the civilian decision-maker is not responsive to your best military advice, after multiple attempts are made to persuade him to avoid an immoral and potentially catastrophic decision, would you consider pursuing any of the following specific options before resigning or being fired? (mark one or more)
a. Circumvent the chain-of-command and go above him/her to a superior official
b. Report the concern to an Inspector General or Congress
c. Release unclassified but sensitive information on the issue to the press
d. “Slow roll” the implementation of the decision within your organization
e. Take active countermeasures against the immoral decision from within your organization
f. Make a public pronouncement that you will not carry out the immoral order or policy
g. N/A – I don’t believe in senior officer resignations or acts of disobedience in response to lawful but immoral civilian orders
h. Other options you would consider
Q24. Please select your level of agreement with the following statement, “The military should do more to teach senior officers differing viewpoints on civil-military relations and ethical reasoning.”
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Additional comments to your response:
Q25. Please select your level of agreement with the following statement: “If I am willing to take the extreme step to disobey or resign in response to an immoral and disastrous civilian decision, then changing the decision is of primary importance and the potential negative effects to civil-military relations are a secondary concern.”
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
N/A – I don’t believe in senior officer resignations or any acts of disobedience in response to lawful but immoral civilian orders
Q26. Please rank order these concerns when considering “how to resign,” “disobey” or “dissent” to a civilian- directed, immoral decision. (Select “N/A” if don’t believe senior officers should dissent, resign, or disobey when faced with civilian-directed immoral orders or policies.)
a. My decision’s effectiveness at changing the senior decision-maker’s mind on executing the immoral policy
b. How my decision might affect civil-military relations and civilian control over the military
c. Concerns to personal reputation and employment after resignation
Q27. Does the political/ideological affiliation of a President have an impact or change your views of senior military officer dissent, disobedience and resignation in the face of immoral and potentially disastrous civilian-directed orders or policies?
Yes
No
If you answered, “Yes,” generally which factors impacted your views?
Q28. Please select your level of agreement with the following statement: “During the selection process of future senior military advisors, these officers should also be evaluated for their ability and role acceptance to provide objective and candid dissenting views to civilian leaders, in response to immoral but not unlawful orders or policies.”
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Additional comments to your response:
Q29. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, said in 2017 that, “a subordinate needs to understand that they have the freedom and they are empowered to disobey a specific order, a specified task, in order to accomplish a higher purpose.” “Disciplined disobedience” is to be loyal to a higher purpose.
Select your level of agreement with the premise that a similar argument can be applied at the strategic level for senior military officers confronted with perceived immoral (but lawful) civilian-directed orders. Senior military advisors can disobey a civilian order or policy yet still be loyal to a higher, common good.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Additional comments to your response: