I. Design of the ISIL-Specific AUMF

  1. Avoiding Unnecessary Wars and Preserving Accountability: Principles for an ISIL-Specific AUMF (Ryan Goodman & Steve Vladeck: Nov. 10, 2014)
  2. Seeking Consensus on AUMFs (Jack Goldsmith, Ryan Goodman, & Steve Vladeck: Nov. 15, 2014)
  3. Principles to Guide Congressional Authorization of the Continued Use of Force Against ISIL — Clarification on Sunset Provision (Ryan Goodman & Steve Vladeck: Nov. 12, 2014)
  4. Debunking the “Vichy France” Argument on Authorization to Use Force against Co-Belligerents (Ryan Goodman: Nov. 17, 2014)
  5. An AUMF for ISIL: A Survey of Different Drafts & Proposals [Updated] (Ryan Goodman: Dec. 9, 2014)
  6. The Unintended Consequences of the 2001 AUMF Sunset (Ken Gude: Dec. 15, 2014)
  7. AUMF Proposals and Congressionally Mandated Reporting Requirements: Some Guideposts (Andy Wright: Jan. 23, 2015)
  8. Don’t Overvalue a Sunset in the AUMF: Start talking about the Conditions When Wars Could End (Ken Gude: Feb. 11, 2015)
  9. Suggestions for Clarifying/Amending the President’s Draft ISIL AUMF (Marty Lederman, Feb. 12, 2015)

II. Relationships Between an ISIL AUMF and the 2001 & 2002 AUMFs 

III. Theory of Applying the 2001 & 2002 AUMFs to ISIL

  1. Assessing the Claim that ISIL is a Successor to Al Qaeda—Part 1 (Organizational Structure) (Ryan Goodman & Shalev Roisman: Oct. 1, 2014)
  2. Assessing the Claim that ISIL is a Successor to Al Qaeda—Part 2 (Organizational Goals) (Ryan Goodman & Shalev Roisman: Oct. 6, 2014)
  3. Obama’s ISIL Legal Rollout: Bungled, Clearly. But Illegal? Really? (Harold Hongju Koh, Sept. 29, 2014)
  4. Tentative First Reactions to the 2001 AUMF Theory [Updated] (Marty Lederman: Sept. 11, 2014)
  5. The Premature Discussion of ISIS and the 2001/2002 AUMFs (Jennifer Daskal, Ryan Goodman, & Steve Vladeck: June 17, 2014)

IV. Definition of Associated Forces

  1. You Can’t Have an “Associated Force” with No Core (Daphne Eviatar: June 24, 2014)
  2. “Associated Forces” Has a Legal Meaning … but It’s Not “Every Group that Calls Itself al Qaeda” (Marty Lederman: Feb. 4, 2014)
  3. POTUS’ View on Who Counts as al Qaeda (Harold Koh: Jan. 20, 2014)
  4. Al-Qaeda, the Law on Associated Forces and “Belonging to” a Party (Did the New UN Drones Reports Get It Right?) (Ryan Goodman: Oct. 18, 2013)
  5. The Problematic “Belonging To” Analogy: A Response to Goodman (Kevin Jon Heller: Oct. 23, 2013)
  6. Belonging to a Party to a Non-International Armed Conflict: A Reply to Kevin Jon Heller [Updated] (Ryan Goodman: Oct. 30, 2013)

V. Negotiating History

  1. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Approves ISIL AUMF and Sunset of 2001 AUMF (Ryan Goodman: Dec. 11, 2014)
  2. Kerry Outlines 5 Key Positions: What the Administration Wants in an ISIL AUMF [Updated] (Ryan Goodman: Dec. 9, 2014)
  3. Sec. Kerry’s Difficult Defense of 2001 AUMF Application to ISIL–and Senators’ Disbelief (Ryan Goodman: Sept. 17, 2014)
  4. SFRC Access to Intelligence Information During Force Authorization Debate (Andy Wright
    Sept. 18, 2014)

VI. Ending the Forever War

  1. “Ending the Forever War”: A Progress Report (Harold Koh: Oct. 28, 2013)
  2. Ending the Forever War: One Year After President Obama’s NDU Speech (Harold Koh: May 23, 2014)
  3. Ending the Forever War is (Still) in Reach–a.k.a. How I Read the Goldsmith-Koh Exchange (Ryan Goodman: Oct. 9, 2014)

VII. Use of Force in Syria

  1. International Law on Airstrikes against ISIS in Syria (Ryan Goodman: Aug. 28, 2014)
  2. Strikes in Syria: The International Law Framework (Jennifer DaskalAshley Deeks and Ryan Goodman: Sept. 24, 2014)
  3. Having Crossed the Rubicon: Arming and Training Syrian Rebels (Ryan Goodman and Michael Schmitt: Sept. 26, 2014)
  4. Taking the Weight off of International Law: Has Syria Consented to US Airstrikes? (Ryan Goodman: Dec. 23, 2014)
  5. Assad: Willing to risk direct confrontation with U.S. over moderate rebels—and stronger opposition to US airstrikes (Ryan Goodman: Jan. 27, 2015)