A new Gang Suppression Force (GSF), approved by the United Nations Security Council on Oct. 1 to address the escalating violence in Haiti, is in the process of taking over from the smaller Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. The new force faces a daunting challenge that the MSS mission clearly was ill-equipped to address: gangs control 90 percent of the capital and are expanding to other regions, using mass killings, extortion, kidnapping, and sexual violence to destabilize communities and disrupt trade and economic activity. More than 5,600 people were killed in Haiti last year, and this year’s toll had already climbed past 3,000 as of June 30. Children make up 30 percent to 50 percent of gang members. Haiti’s transitional political arrangement, established in July 2024 with the aim of organizing credible elections for a new government, is weak, plagued by corruption allegations, and set to expire in February 2026, without the structures needed to end the country’s five-year governance crisis. The dire economic and humanitarian situation compounds these challenges, with rampant double-digit inflation, more than 1.3 million people displaced, 5.7 million facing acute hunger, and an estimated 1 in 7 children out of school.
Haiti’s deep insecurity, fragile governance, and extreme humanitarian desperation amount to a human rights crisis that is profound, longstanding, and multidimensional. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other international organizations had urged the Security Council to act decisively and approve the GSF, emphasizing that a robust security intervention is necessary to break the cycle of insecurity, violence, distrust, and political fragility. During its 18 months of existence, the MSS mission deployed only 1,000 of the planned 2,500 personnel, struggled with insufficient equipment and funding, and failed to secure key territory or strengthen the Haitian National Police. The new force is intended to have as many as 5,500 police and soldiers and 50 civilians.
Yet, one important contribution made during the MSS mission deployment is the human rights compliance mechanisms that were established as an integral part of the operation. As the lead on accountability, compliance, and oversight for a U.S. government interagency working group on Haiti between February 2024 and 2025, I saw how it was possible to begin rebuilding the trust of Haitian civil society and local populations, which will be essential for the GSF to operate effectively in Haiti’s complex environment. The processes put in place also demonstrated that it is feasible to prevent harms, such as sexual exploitation and abuse, that may not be related to kinetic operations but still can undermine the credibility and effectiveness of an international mission.
Certainly, the Trump administration, which commendably pressed for the larger force with enhanced authorities, has taken a number of steps in other contexts that signal a disregard for international law, relevant national laws, and human rights issues. Indeed, concerns in security circles that human rights standards constrain operational agility and effectiveness are not new. But this view is misguided. It ignores that transparency, discipline, professionalism, and authentic community relations drive legitimacy and credibility and sustain operational achievements in complex, low-trust, high-risk environments. For the GSF to successfully counter gangs in Haiti’s challenging context, it will need to rapidly build and expand on the rights-respecting foundation established under the MSS mission. Failure to do so will only jeopardize the success of the new mission.
Basis for Human Rights Compliance, Oversight and Accountability
The GSF, like the MSS mission, is authorized to use force in Haiti under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and remains, like the MSS mission, not formally a U.N. peacekeeping operation. The GSF’s tasking introduces new dimensions designed to make it more kinetically robust, more independent of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and better structured than the MSS mission. Most notably, the authorization to take bolder action against gangs, described as “intelligence-led targeted, counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs,” either independently or in coordination with the HNP represents a significant shift from the limited operational support role of the MSS mission. In addition, the mandate for the GSF to cooperate with the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH) signals an official recognition of the historically problematic FADH by the international community, as well as the need for military-type capabilities to combat gangs effectively.
The GSF also has more explicit security tasks and conditions to support than the MSS mission. These include providing security for critical infrastructure and transit sites, and contributing to measures “to combat illicit trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel,” “security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections,” a secure environment for unhindered, timely and safe access to humanitarian aid, and efforts “to facilitate the safe exit of those willing to voluntarily leave gangs,” with a particular emphasis on children.
Like the MSS mission’s mandate, the GSF mandate is grounded “in strict compliance with international law, including international human rights law, as applicable, and the U.N.’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (UNHRDDP).” This policy is a risk management tool that applies when the U.N. provides support to non-U.N. security operations and institutions. It involves identifying the human rights risks associated with a security operation; taking steps in the planning and conduct of operations to mitigate those risks; comprehensively monitoring and reporting on both positive and negative outcomes of mission activity; and applying lessons learned to update policies and operational practices. It also involves accountability: where grave human rights violations are reported and not adequately addressed by a U.N.-supported security operation, the secretary-general can halt or withdraw U.N. support, either temporarily or permanently.
The Security Council resolution on the GSF reiterates and strengthens the human rights requirements and mechanisms previously applied to the MSS mission. This includes aligning the rules of engagement and any directives on the use of force with international law and the authority to undertake arrests and detentions in exceptional circumstances under what the Council calls “urgent temporary measures.” In this regard, it provides more explicit, rights-respecting guidance on protections for specific groups in the use of these measures, particularly for children and survivors of sexual violence.
The resolution reaffirms two key mechanisms: a “robust compliance mechanism to prevent, investigate, address, and publicly report violations or abuses of human rights, including sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment,” building on the mechanism created under the MSS mission; and an “oversight mechanism to prevent human rights violations or abuses, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse.” It also highlights the need for a “safe survivor- and victim-centered response,” including safe and accessible complaint and referral mechanisms, timely investigations of all allegations, accountability for perpetrators, and repatriation of units when credible evidence of misconduct exists. Child protection and women’s protection capacities are integrated throughout other aspects of the mandate.
Finally, a “Standing Group of Partners” made up of countries most invested financially or through personnel in the MSS mission will select a new special representative for the GSF to provide strategic direction alongside a force commander. Additionally, a U.N. Support Office in Haiti must be established to provide logistical and operational support to the GSF as well as to the U.N. political mission BINUH, the HNP, FADH, and the OAS.
The MSS Mission’s Compliance Approach
The MSS mission was mandated in 2023 and deployed in 2024 amid deep distrust of international intervention and the U.N. within Haitian society. This mistrust was driven in part by the troubling legacy of the U.N.’s previous peacekeeping operation, MINUSTAH, which caused widespread harm, including hundreds of cases of sexual abuse and exploitation and thousands of deaths from cholera. While complaints regarding the U.N.’s use of force were fewer, there were notable instances, and the operation was widely perceived as unaccountable, aggressive, and disconnected from local communities and leaders.
Thus, the MSS mission emerged against a backdrop of deep divisions within both the international and local communities over continued intervention in Haiti. Many civil society organizations were cautious in their support and insisted on transparency and specific safeguards to prevent a repetition of past abuses. In agreeing to lead the mission, Kenya faced significant pressure, including open letters from Haitian groups alleging neo-imperialism, concerns about the human rights record of the Kenyan police, and legal challenges that delayed mission planning and deployment. Global human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and HRW, also advocated with the United States, the primary financial and logistical supporter of the MSS mission, for strong oversight and accountability measures.
As the MSS mission was not a U.N. deployed peace operation, it needed to establish a legal framework for its operations in Haiti in the absence of the U.N. Convention on Privileges and Immunities. This raised key questions related to accountability for any misconduct by MSS mission personnel. The Status Protections Agreement, signed by Haiti, Kenya, and other personnel-contributing countries to the MSS mission, emphasized accountability measures and the role of the force commander in enforcing them. That stopped short of providing jurisdiction to Haiti for accountability, as Haitian civil society and some international organizations had advocated. The mission put in place regulations signed by the force commander to govern use of force, arrest, and detention, as well as for the standards for conduct and discipline, the complaints-reporting mechanism, and the establishment of boards of inquiry to investigate allegations of violations and misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse.
To operationalize its human rights responsibilities, the participating countries, under Kenya’s leadership, collaborated with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the U.N. agency responsible for implementing the HRDDP. While not strictly required by the Security Council resolution, the OHCHR drew on lessons from supporting other non-U.N. missions, particularly the G5 in the Sahel, to inform the MSS mission context.
This collaboration, developed through a series of planning conferences and meetings, produced a Compliance, Oversight, and Accountability Policy, providing a concrete framework for the MSS mission’s approach to human rights compliance. The policy outlined five pillars of action, the corresponding processes and tools to support them, and the roles and responsibilities of both internal capacities and external actors, including the OHCHR compliance team embedded within the UN mission BINUH.
The five pillars detail how human rights are integrated into core planning and operational aspects of the mission, including personnel selection and screening, training and briefings, rules and regulations governing conduct and authority, operational planning and actions, and accountability measures such as investigations of alleged breaches. Supporting processes and tools include after action reviews, monitoring, situational and mandated reporting, strategic communications, and community engagement. In this latter area, the policy established a liaison mechanism to coordinate with the humanitarian community through the U.N. Office for Humanitarian Affairs, and created a Civilian Oversight Advisory Committee to engage Haitian civil society directly in oversight.
The MSS Mission’s Human Rights Legacy
The MSS mission made notable progress in implementing the agreed compliance framework, in significant part due to the leadership of the Kenyan force commander, who publicly committed to the human rights compliance approach. He demonstrated, both personally and through his senior leadership team, a commitment to building the trust necessary to advance work across multiple pillars in collaboration with OHCHR representatives.
This had several marked benefits. First, to date, there are no substantiated human rights violations involving the MSS mission, including any cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. A few allegations, such as excessive use of force, were investigated according to established procedures, with conclusions either finding the actions were not attributable to MSS personnel or were unsupported by the evidence. There has also been a notable lack of reporting by civil society organizations about MSS personnel involvement in human rights abuses, though future cases could emerge. While the lack of cases could be seen as evidence that the MSS mission was operationally limited against the gangs, abuses such as sexual abuse and exploitation typically occur outside the context of security operations.
Second, Haitian civil society was actively engaged in the complaints reporting process, beginning with the opportunity to provide feedback on the complaints and reporting procedures. Recognizing the challenges of credible and accessible reporting in Haiti, the MSS mission and OHCHR prioritized civil society as a partner and conduit for reporting. Civil society organizations were able to volunteer to be trained as focal points for the mechanism and to participate in the Steering Committee, where allegations were jointly reviewed by the MSS mission leadership, the HNP, and civil society representatives to determine the credibility of allegations and next steps. Initially, 28 civil society representatives, including 11 women, received training as focal points. They were also involved in developing a protection guide for safe engagement between community members and MSS personnel. These efforts represent the first notable direct engagement between a uniformed international operation and Haitian civil society in developing and implementing human rights compliance mechanisms.
Third, the MSS mission conducted rigorous reviews of its operational conduct and its impact on the population, working closely with OHCHR human rights experts. BINUH’s human rights unit monitors gang activity and security operations, sharing information to prevent violations and help improve the MSS mission’s understanding of the operating environment. The mission carried out a number of after-action reviews, including one at the strategic level, exchanging critical information with OHCHR to develop recommendations for risk mitigation and improved operational effectiveness.
Additional steps were also taken. While consistent pre-deployment and in-mission training remains a goal, personnel from different contributing countries received varied pre-deployment training. The U.N. provided a range of briefings and in-mission training to raise awareness about the mission’s human rights obligations and code of conduct, addressing gaps and promoting coherence. The deployment of a gender advisor was another important advance, focusing on the situation of women personnel and broader women’s protection issues in Haiti, particularly prevention of sexual abuse and exploitation. The mission also used strategic communications platforms to publicly highlight its human rights compliance approach, although the impact on public perception is difficult to assess, in part because gangs in Haiti are highly effective in controlling social media and public messaging.
Building and Expanding on the Legacy
For the GSF to successfully fulfill its mandate will likely require an accelerated effort to proactively address the deficits the MSS mission faced in financial, logistical, and personnel capacity. It will also mean grappling with the lack of a shared security strategy for Haiti and the myriad problems in executing effective intelligence-led and strategic operations with the HNP and FADH. The force’s effectiveness will also depend on actions beyond the GSF’s purview, such as increased pressure on those who finance, lead, and enable the gangs, and on members of the political elite who profit from the status quo. Such pressure could be exerted via sanctions, prosecutions, arms trafficking controls, and other political measures.
In addition, the cycles of mistrust and disempowerment that sustain gangs and inhibit effective engagement with communities in Haiti pose serious challenges for the GSF. Demonstrating that robust law enforcement action can be taken in compliance with human rights is crucial to help break those cycles. In enhancing discipline, professionalism, transparency, and cooperation with local communities, the human rights compliance approach can help the GSF be operationally effective in its environment.
The approach is not limited to law enforcement contexts. While Haiti is not currently considered to be in a state of armed conflict, that could change. Although the application of international humanitarian law would modify certain parameters regarding kinetic actions and targeting, the same compliance architecture is adaptable to the operational environment, from leadership to the tactical level.
As the GSF builds its force strength, capitalizing on the strong partnership with the OHCHR to double down on human rights compliance should be a top priority. This could include:
- Retain the focus on a preventive and learning approach.
Emphasizing the prevention of violations, thereby mitigating reputational and other risks, remains the core strength of human rights compliance. The commitment of the new GSF leadership, both the special representative and especially the force commander, to continue to prioritize human rights compliance and deepen the established mechanisms will be essential. That would help tailor GSF planning and deployment to maximize speed and efficiency during the transition, particularly in the areas of personnel selection, pre-deployment training and preparedness, and equipping the new force.
A key component of prevention is ensuring high-quality and systematic internal monitoring and reporting. This will strengthen the mission’s intelligence-led approach and its ability to identify and address its operational challenges. It should include rigorous, comprehensive documentation of deaths, injuries, and other harms, and their circumstances to establish patterns and causes of harm linked to GSF operations. Maintaining robust reporting and continuing the exchange of impact data and gang activity information and the conduct of after-action reviews with the OHCHR, as well as HNP and FADH, at both strategic and operational levels, will enhance the mission’s ability to mitigate harm and improve its effectiveness.
- Nurture and grow civil society and community-based mechanisms and strategic communications.
Given the GSF’s emphasis on intelligence-led operations to disrupt gangs embedded in Haitian communities, its success will depend on the trust and cooperation of civil society, local resistance groups, and the general population. The emerging relationships established by the MSS mission with civil society in Haiti must be deepened and sustained, as most civil society actors and communities want the GSF to succeed in restoring security. This includes strengthening existing compliance and reporting mechanisms, including the steering committee process for alleged incidents. It also means maintaining regular and transparent engagement with civil society representatives through meetings and briefings, deepening channels of support for survivors (particularly survivors of sexual violence), and tapping into local capacities. Community consultations on the GSF’s impact and activities, through local town halls, regular data-based impact assessments, and other activities, are vital, alongside disciplined investigation and accountability measures when warranted.
As trust develops and matures, the GSF should establish a dedicated oversight mechanism, as envisioned for the MSS mission and by the Security Council, composed of civil society and community representatives from the most-affected areas, with particular attention to involving young people and women. Such a mechanism could help manage expectations, provide context-sensitive insights and recommendations, and improve two-way communication between the GSF and Haitian communities. This should include increased commitment to transparency on the challenging issue of accountability and remedies in relation to foreseeable allegations of violations.
With the gangs having broad reach across social media, culture, music, and Haitian communities, the GSF and other international actors face significant challenges in strategically communicating and building an authentic voice that resonates with the Haitian population. Nonetheless, strategic communication is a critical tool for building the trust and accessibility at the core of human rights compliance, one that requires an innovative, youth-oriented strategy driven largely by Haitians working in collaboration with the GSF.
- Model demonstrable compliance and create enablers for national capacities.
Even with a mandate to act independently, the GSF’s effectiveness remains linked to the capacity of the HNP and FADH to combat gangs, and to the ability of the justice system to detain and hold perpetrators to account. The HNP faces systemic challenges, including workforce attrition, underfunding, low morale, corruption, and gang infiltration. It therefore struggles with reputational and operational risks and currently lacks effective compliance, oversight, and accountability mechanisms.
Several MSS compliance measures engaged the HNP, such as complaints reporting and coordination mechanisms, demonstrating that international security forces can work collaboratively and transparently with human rights experts and national civil society actors. This approach should be reinforced by the GSF, with the dual objective of modeling compliance and strengthening institutional relationships on human rights compliance within both the HNP and FADH. The leadership of these Haitian institutions needs to be open to this approach and willing to engage in trust-building and cooperation through practical action, developing mechanisms, protocols, and measures on human rights. Moreover, as specific capacities within the justice system are strengthened to work on complex criminal and financial gang-related cases, these authorities need to be increasingly engaged in the formulation of these mechanisms.
The success of the MSS mission in human rights compliance, though it was nascent, provides an opening for both international and Haitian actors to rebuild some trust and meaningful cooperation to address insecurity. To be operationally effective, the GSF will need to demonstrate leadership and commitment to integrating human rights in its planning and operations. It will require, however, authentic, committed, and engaged partners in Haitian civil society, local communities, and the security and justice authorities. With this approach, the GSF can contribute to changing the pattern of impunity and the lack of human rights protections in Haiti.
