An international armed conflict in the Asia-Pacific region is not inevitable. Ongoing bilateral military dialogue and efforts to de-escalate U.S.-China trade disputes may lay a foundation to avoid escalation on other fronts. However, assertive People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military activity around Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s “grey zone” tactics confronting Philippines vessels in the Spratly Islands, and an expanding U.S. and allied regional military posture may create trigger points which tilt towards conflict.
It is widely projected that such a conflict would be characterized by unprecedented scale and intensity, engulfing broad and diverse populations and terrain, with general assessments forecasting widespread civilian harm. There has been little critical examination, however, of the specific risks that a large-scale conflict would pose to civilians in Asia-Pacific and how the prospective conflict parties must prepare now to mitigate civilian harm. In a high-stakes confrontation of peer adversaries where the outcome is seen as existential, the parties will pursue quick and decisive victory. If the parties believe that human suffering is tragic but unavoidable and fail to invest in good options to mitigate civilian harm, the outcome will be one of unprecedented destruction and loss of life.
Asia has more megacities than any other region and, in the face of a large-scale external threat, roads, ports, communications networks, and other infrastructure will simultaneously serve both civilian and military functions. With operations under the scenario above likely conducted across air, land, maritime, cyber, and space domains in and near densely populated and metropolitan areas, the risk of civilian harm would be extensive and varied. Urban systems in likely areas of operations are sophisticated but vulnerable whereby millions are dependent on densely networked infrastructure for daily goods and services. Destruction of high-rise residences would result in mass casualties. Damage to power, water and sewage, roads, and transportation systems, resulting from an intense barrage of missile attacks, cyberattacks, and force-on-force land battles would cause displacement at an enormous scale and create life-threatening public health consequences for millions.
Beyond the vast network of undersea communications cables, civilian presence in the maritime domain also warrants attention, including energy, communications, and transportation infrastructure; large and small-scale fishing and trade enterprises; and the millions seeking livelihoods as seafarers in the South China Sea. An estimated one-third of world’s shipping passes through the South China Sea and small island nations and archipelagos across the Pacific depend on commercial shipment of goods for food security and basic provisions. Civilian vessels will require safe passage through contested maritime battlespaces. During hostilities, civilians that cannot find safety on land may flee on fishing vessels, ferries, or commercial ships, thereby finding themselves in militarily strategic ports and littoral areas. Guiding civilians away from sea mines, avoiding strikes on potentially thousands of fleeing civilians, and undertaking rescue at sea while military operations are ongoing will be a complicated endeavor.
Reiterating commitments to fulfill international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations is welcome but will not suffice. Ensuring the protection of civilians is also a practical matter of the capabilities and tools commanders have at their disposal throughout planning and operations.
The duration of a potential future large-scale armed conflict in Asia-Pacific is impossible to predict. Whether it proves to be short and sharp or drags out for many months, the safety and survival of the civilian population depends on steps taken now by the prospective parties to conflict. As military preparations gain momentum, it is essential that these involve a commensurate effort to limit the likelihood and severity of civilian harm. Reiterating commitments to fulfill international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations is welcome but will not suffice. Ensuring the protection of civilians is also a practical matter of the capabilities and tools commanders have at their disposal throughout planning and operations.
Addressing Critical Blind Spots to Manage Risk
Military commanders pursue mission objectives while managing risk – risks to the fulfillment of mission objectives, to the forces under their command, and to civilians. This risk management is inherent to the continuous process of balancing military necessity and humanity. IHL does not prescribe how, exactly, parties to conflict should strike this balance and does not provide specific tools to exercise distinction, proportionality, and precaution to limit civilian harm in carrying out attacks. Rather, it is left to military forces to develop the necessary means of meeting these obligations, for example, through doctrine, procedure, planning, and decision-making processes.
In the United States, the process of Positive Identification (PID), collateral damage estimation (CDE), and no-strike lists, among other methods, evolved out of past operational lessons, have been adopted as good practice by other militaries, and are indispensable for this purpose. They are, however, insufficient to effectively anticipate and mitigate direct and indirect civilian harm. Documented lessons and known good practice emerging from the past two decades of U.S. and coalition warfare led to the formulation of the U.S. policy and action plan for civilian harm mitigation and response. Commonly referred to simply as “CHMR,” the action plan and policy incorporate a series of measures to systematize these lessons and good practice across the Department of Defense, the joint forces, and with allies and partners.
Reviews of anti-ISIS operations in Mosul (2016) and Raqqa (2017) were particularly instructive. These were counter-insurgency operations, however; the coalition operations seeking to dislodge and ultimately “annihilate” ISIS were force-on-force battles in densely populated urban centers where ISIS demonstrated sophisticated intelligence-gathering, combined arms, battle formation and maneuvers, psychological warfare, and propaganda tactics. Both operations resulted in extensive civilian loss of life and both Raqqa and East Mosul were reduced to rubble. While ISIS booby-traps and other tactics are at least partly responsible, a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense and conducted by Rand to examine “how the U.S. military — which is the best-trained and most technologically advanced military in the world… could cause significant civilian harm despite a deeply ingrained commitment to the law of war” illuminated numerous intelligence and operational gaps. Asia-Pacific military forces should take heed or risk replicating systemic gaps at an even larger scale.
These blind spots create unknown risk for operational commanders and can lead to unintended but recurring patterns of civilian harm.
Chief among these lessons is the persistence of information blind spots regarding the civilian environment – namely, civilians and the things upon which civilian life depends. These blind spots create unknown risk for operational commanders and can lead to unintended but recurring patterns of civilian harm. Although often described in their aftermath as a “tragic mistake,” repeated patterns of civilian harm can be analyzed, foreseen and, to at least some extent, mitigated. Preparation for a potential future conflict must include addressing these information blind spots in military planning and operations. The range of capabilities under the broad CHMR umbrella equip commanders with an expanded information aperture on the civilian environment. This enables planners and operators to understand civilian harm risk based on planned and ongoing operations and to create options to reduce risk in support of command decision-making.
Throughout U.S. implementation of CHMR policy, I repeatedly observed commanders, planners, and operators recognize the sheer common sense and potential for enhanced effectiveness inherent in overcoming these common blind spots and achieving enhanced battlespace awareness. While dedicated U.S. DoD resources to implement CHMR good practice are now constrained, the CHMR policy framework remains intact and CHMR capabilities and tools can be adapted by any military force or operational command to meet the unique demands of their operations.
In addition, the U.S. and its allies remain bound by IHL to take all feasible measures to limit civilian harm. CHMR does not address the totality of IHL obligations in a large-scale international armed conflict. However, by expanding reasonably available information, CHMR helps commanders fulfill their IHL obligations to exercise precautions in attack, constant care to limit the impact of operations on civilians, and good-faith judgements in the conduct of hostilities. In some respects, the CHMR policy framework goes beyond what IHL requires. For example, IHL does not require anticipating and mitigating cascading effects arising from damage to structures and infrastructure but doing so ensures better outcomes for conflict-affected societies. Political leaders and military commanders may recognize the strategic value of civilian protection beyond the bare minimum of IHL requirements and find CHMR tools useful to achieve best possible outcomes.
Tailoring CHMR Capabilities to Command Requirements
CHMR capabilities can and should be tailored and scaled to different kinds of military operations. Regional militaries should take deliberate steps to assess their civilian environment blind spots and ensure that their operational ecosystem supports command decision-making to anticipate and mitigate civilian harm. Failure to do so will leave military commanders with enormous unknown risk, result in costly distractions and disruptions once hostilities commence, and produce immense and widespread civilian harm.
Establish Explicit Intent
Large-scale international armed conflicts, including any that may take place in Asia-Pacific, are generally expected to be characterized inter alia by a sustained high tempo of operations conducted by highly capable conventional and non-conventional forces across all domains. Forces may be decentralized and widely dispersed, operating with degraded communications and intelligence capabilities, with some command authorities decentralized to lower-level commands. A protracted conflict, for example over the status of Taiwan or control of the South China Sea, could lead to expanded participation by other State parties, broadening its geographic scope across the Pacific Rim. Mis- and disinformation will be prolific and significantly shape the operating environment.
Establishing expectations from the outset to minimize civilian harm drives the command climate and military readiness for this purpose.
Establishing expectations from the outset to minimize civilian harm in this operational setting drives the command climate and military readiness for this purpose. Commanders should establish desired civilian environment end states as part of their overall mission objectives. These should be reflected in commander’s intent, cascade into subsequent planning and execution orders and, as with other objectives, be rigorously tracked. An emphasis on continual awareness of the civilian environment, including the effect of operations on civilians, shapes the information underpinning command decision-making and drives operational preparedness. Commanders will naturally prioritize the speed of decision-making and may resist measures which interrupt the desired operational tempo to achieve mission objectives. The range of procedures to anticipate and mitigate civilian harm put in place now should be designed to keep pace with these command decision-making processes.
Anticipate Direct and Indirect Harm
With operations likely conducted across air, land, maritime, cyber, and space domains, the risk to civilians will be extensive and varied. Intelligence preparation of the operating environment must include sufficient information on the elements of the civilian environment – including civilian presence and the resources, services, structures, infrastructure, and systems which sustain life — to estimate civilian harm risk, including by modeling indirect and cascading effects as well as potential civilian reactions to hostilities. External information sources will be indispensable and should be integrated into operational planning alongside traditional intelligence and civil affairs analysis. Once hostilities commence, maintaining real time civilian environment information will be challenging particularly if there is loss of command communications networks and surveillance capacities. Civilian environment information and analysis should be frontloaded into the common operating picture as much as possible prior to hostilities and augmented with real-time information gathering by decentralized forces to detect and incorporate changes throughout operations.
Mitigate Direct and Indirect Harm
Civilian environment risk estimates enable military planners to identify and interrogate bias and embed a range of risk mitigation measures throughout planning, targeting, and operational decision-making. This enables, for example, greater granularity in the process of no-strike listing based on the criticality of structures and infrastructure to civilian survival. This should include critical nodes in cyber and physical infrastructure on which a wide range of services depend.
In particular, national and local civil defense functions in countries defending themselves against external threats will be critical to civilian survival. “Civil defense” entails national efforts to sustain essential functions, maintain public order, and ensure the safety of civilian populations in times of crisis, such warnings, evacuations, search and rescue, and emergency medical services among many other life-saving functions. Emerging as organized practices in World Wars I and II, civil defense has gained renewed attention among States preparing for potential external threats to national security. Taiwan, for example, has adopted a whole-of-society resilience concept, which draws on the Swedish example among other models. While civil defense personnel and functions are protected under IHL, there is a risk that civilians may lose their protection from attack if the notion of “civil defense” encompasses civilian contributions to military defense, as Taiwan’s concept does. It will be essential for all parties to understand the risks of misidentification in targeting that may arise from “whole of society” defense concepts. Adopting systematic use of the civilian defense emblem may helpfully distinguish personnel, services, and structures performing civilian functions from military personnel and operations.
To reduce unknown risk in command decision-making, command staff must estimate risk associated with courses of action, identify the mitigation measures applied, and the residual risk remaining. Commanders must have a range of options at their disposal to limit civilian casualties, limit destruction of civilian structures and infrastructure, avoid harm or disruption to civil defense functions, avoid impeding independent and impartial humanitarian operations, and preserve effective communications by, to, and among civilian authorities and populations. For example, these could include battlefield-shaping measures; alternative angle, direction, and timing of attacks; alternatives to the use of explosive weapons in populated areas; and non-lethal or less lethal means of achieving the desired results. Cyberattacks can mitigate harm by incorporating compartmentalized and reversible effects to avoid compromising civilian functions. In anticipation of disrupted command communications, the delegation of authorities to conduct strikes should incorporate these lower-risk options and reinforce mission objectives and commander’s intent to, to the extent feasible, preserve the civilian environment.
Assess Civilian Harm Throughout Operations
Post-strike civilian harm assessments should be considered an indispensable capability by all armed forces.
Operational commands cannot mitigate risk if they do not know what harm is resulting from their operations. Post-strike civilian harm assessments, as outlined in Section 4 of the CHMR DoD-Instruction, should be considered an indispensable capability by all armed forces. Civilian harm assessment data and trend analysis informs ongoing risk estimates and continuous refinement of precautionary measures when selecting courses of action and approving targets. During application of CHMR capabilities in exercises and planning discussions, military intelligence, planning, and targeting personnel repeatedly highlighted how information on the civilian environment prior to and during operations should form a coherent and continuous information loop in support of the command decision-making process.
Civilian harm assessment data is also essential to manage mis- and disinformation. When militaries believe they are already doing everything they can to limit civilian harm, it is easy and common to dismiss civilian harm reports as malicious disinformation. However, without post-strike assessment data, commanders have no basis to acknowledge or refute reports of civilian harm. Assessment data also informs contextually appropriate responses to civilian harm, including timely acknowledgement of harm and concrete measures to stem harmful cascading effects in ongoing operations. Commanders often view their strategic narrative as essential to sustaining public confidence in their mission and central to their theory of victory, but this can easily slip from their grasp without an understanding of how their operations are affecting civilians and a readiness to transparently address civilian harm.
A non-permissive operating environment, a high tempo and volume of fires, and degraded surveillance and communications means that it will not be possible to assess the impact of every strike. Civilian harm assessments must necessarily focus when, where, and how meaningful information can be gathered. Procedures could encompass a combination of pro-active detection efforts through continuous collection and tracking of all internal and external reports of civilian harm; periodic macro-level assessments to examine civilian harm resulting from a series of connected operations within a given time frame; and thorough assessments of individual strikes where significant operational data or institutional learning can be gained.
The importance of civilian harm reports from external sources should not be underestimated including, for example, traditional and social media reports; local government authorities and services, such as first responders and hospitals; local and national civil society; and international humanitarian organizations. Failure to utilize external sources can reinforce blind spots and cognitive biases. Some non-governmental organizations, such as Airwars, have developed rigorous methods to remotely assess the impacts of armed conflict on civilians. Operational commands should adopt a posture of pro-actively seeking information regarding the impact of operations on civilians. Using the operational planning process to develop the necessary relationships and information channels will help avoid disruptions once hostilities commence.
Invest in Shared Practice and Capabilities
Finally, it is essential to consider the unique risks and opportunities associated with operating as a multinational coalition in Asia-Pacific. Coalition members may lack the extent of integrated concepts, doctrine, and operational procedure which characterize a standing alliance such as NATO. In addition, coalition members may be simultaneously defending their own borders, airspace, maritime space, and population against an external threat. This creates a risk of inadvertent harm to their own population, particularly if defending forces lack combat experience and corresponding operational lessons about civilian harm mitigation. Past coalition operations demonstrate that even highly capable forces with a history of combined operations may lack shared approaches to the protection of civilians, thereby leaving civilians falling through critical gaps.
Numerous legal considerations will have implications for civilian harm, including how coalition members interpret the application of IHL rules across various domains of military operations, the use of new weapons systems and tactics, and the role of artificial intelligence in operational decision-making. Differences in interpretation of international law and obligations arising from status of forces agreements (SOFAs) may exacerbate challenges and give rise to coalition friction. It will be essential to understand and address these considerations, to the extent possible, prior to the onset of hostilities to ensure that shared practices to anticipate, mitigate, assess, and respond to civilian harm are implemented as fluently as possible.
Commanders may find that explicit and concerted effort to ensure the protection of civilians in combined operations proves to be indispensable glue that allows a coalition to preserve its coherence and the perceived integrity of its mission. True interoperability is a high bar but coalition planning, training and exercises, and command relationships offer plentiful opportunities to spell out a shared intent to preserve the civilian environment, to identify critical information blind spots, and to establish shared practice across all war-fighting domains. Clarifying the contributions of coalition members to achieve combined capacity for effective civilian harm mitigation and response may help to distribute and sustain critical functions when communications and other capabilities become degraded.
Conclusion
Civilian harm is not entirely avoidable during armed conflict, but it can be anticipated and its likelihood and severity limited. In Asia-Pacific, this depends entirely on steps taken now. With the pressure of rising tensions in the region, there is no time to waste and much work to do. Regional militaries should view their capabilities to mitigate and respond to civilian harm as integral to their military readiness. Anticipating and preparing to mitigate civilian harm helps to avoid costly distractions and disruptions once hostilities commence. Demonstrable effort to treat civilians with dignity and respect inspires confidence and fosters public trust. Avoiding widespread and massive destruction of a civilian resources, structures, and infrastructure supports societal resilience and creates better conditions for sustainable peace.
